‫פרשת יתרו‬
The contribution of Yisro to our system of justice is remarkable. According to Rashi
(Perek 18/Posuk 13), Yisro was an active observer when Moshe Rabbenu introduced
Torah adjudication on the first day possible, the morrow of Yom HaKippurim. On
Yom Kippur, Moshe descended from Har Sinai with the second 'Aseres HaDibros
and the Torah became operational.
Upon seeing the desire of Bnei Yisroel "li'drosh E…lokim" (Posuk 15), seeking the
word of G-d, and the overwhelming and mutual burden that it placed on the lone
judge, Moshe Rabbenu, and the people, Yisro made a monumental suggestion. As
we know, his suggestion was the appointment of judges to deal with all the monetary
issues that would arise. [The appointment of Dayanim to deal with capital punishment
is discussed in Parshas Bha'aloscho (B'midbar, Perek 11/Posuk 16.]
We will focus on one aspect of this section. At the beginning of his words, Yisro
introduces his ideas by saying, "…i'o'tz'cho vi'hi E…lokim 'i'moch" (Shmos Perek
18/Posuk 19). I will offer you my counsel and G-d should be with you. Rashi
explains that Yisro's suggestions included the caveat that Hashem should approve of
the counsel. "Hi'mo'lech BiG'vurah". Consult with the Al-mighty.
We are in admiration of Yisro when we hear these words. We see that his choice to
join B'nei Yisroel was sincere and though he was among the most powerful men of
his time he chose to subjugate his will and his judgment to that of HaKodosh Boruch
Hu.
However, seemingly Yisro repeats the same thing in his closing remarks to Moshe
Rabbenu. We must remember that even though this is a dialogue among people,
and it is not surprising that people would repeat themselves, the fact that the Torah
chose excerpts from the dialogue and made it part of Torah requires that we examine
repetitions just like we do anywhere else in the Torah that there appears to be
repetition.
"…v'tzi'cho E…lokim v'yo'chol'to a'mod" (Posuk 23). And G-d will command you [to
do so] and you will be able to stand (succeed). Rashi here comments, "Hi'mo'lech
biG'vurah im m'tz'v'cho …v'im y'a'keiv". Consult with the Al-mighty if He commands
you, you will be successful and if He halts you, you will not succeed.
What is the reason for the Torah to write the same idea two times?
Or HaChaim HaKodosh addresses this question and explains that the meaning of
these similar words is quite different according to the context in which they were said.
The first phrase does mean what we wrote. Yisro gave advice and he conditioned the
validity of his advice upon the agreement of Hashem.
The second phrase (Posuk 23) is not counsel whatsoever. It has a completely
different meaning. Yisro had said to Moshe Rabbenu, "no'vol ti'bol" (Posuk 18).
You will become weary and wither away. You, Moshe and B'nei Yisroel, will not be
able to continue in this fashion. Now, the question begs to be asked. B'nei Yisroel
may become tired and discouraged, but how can we say that about Moshe
Rabbenu? The Torah testifies as to the strength of Moshe Rabbenu on the last day
of his life. "…lo nos lei'cho" (D'vorim Perek 34/Posuk 7). He was not weakened
physically on his 120th birthday, after 40 years of often anguished leadership of B'nei
Yisroel. If Yisro's advice was premised upon a false evaluation, then all he had to
say was false. It would not have been adopted as Torah!
The answer is that the "novol tibol" of Moshe Rabbenu was different than that of the
people. The people could become discouraged and develop antipathy. That had to
be avoided.
The "novol tibol" of Moshe Rabbenu was of a different quality completely. He
wouldn't tire. He would continue with vigor. However, his vigor would be totally
directed towards judging the people and he would not have the koach to continue to
reach the same heights of prophecy as he did on Mt. Sinai. That is, his position as
Moshe Rabbenu would be threatened. To be a novi, the requirements are legion.
To be Moshe Rabbenu, with his unparalled status among all other prophets (see
Mishnah Torah Hilchos Y'sodei HaTorah Perek 8), the requirements are
extraordinary and unique. It was humanly impossible to be so absorbed in the
people's needs and to be Moshe Rabbenu at the same time.
This, then, is the meaning of the second of the phrases spoken by Yisro to Moshe. If
you do what I say and remove some of the burden from yourself and allow yourself
the freedom to reach that highest level of communication with Hashem, then
"v'tzi'vcho E…lokim". Hashem will continue you to command you as He has done
these last months since Mattan Torah. If you continue to be fit as a prophet, then
"v'yo'chol'to a'mod". You will be able to continue in your standing ("a'mod") as
Moshe Rabbenu. Rather than being instructional, as it was the first time it was said,
this time the phrase is predictive about what could be.
Our study of this explanation of Or HaChaim will challenge us since it seems to
suggest that Moshe's total involvement with Bnei Yisroel would weaken him. That is
certainly not a simple idea. Why would Moshe Rabbenu's involvement in Mitzvos, in
bringing to fruition the Mitzvos of the Torah, weaken him? Would we not expect that
precisely from these Mitzvah activities he would receive Divine help and assistance
to maintain his position as Moshe Rabbenu? Thus, we need to delve further to
understand these words.
We can suggest another approach to the apparent repetition in these phrases.
Yisro's words, after receiving clarification and making his assessment of the situation
(P'sukim 13-18), have two phases. The first phase is the theoretical and the second
phase is the application of the theoretical.
In the first phase (P'sukim 19-22), Yisro presents his plan to Moshe Rabbenu for
consideration. He outlines the solution, suggests a standard for judges, a hierarchy
(Posuk 21) and a division of responsibility for the different levels of the hierarchy
(Posuk 22). This is the plan, well-developed and thorough. In relationship to the
plan, Yisro says, "vi'hi E…lokim 'i'moch". Consult with Hashem. Before continuing
with the plan make sure that the plan is appropriate. That initial verification will
prevent you from discussing and developing a subject that is unsuitable. However,
that is only sufficient for the initial stage.
The second phase is the execution of the plan. For the execution of the plan it is not
sufficient to make sure the plan is appropriate. There must be a specific order
allowing it to take place. Thus, "v'tzi'v'cho", Hashem will command you, clearly and
explicitly.
What is the source to make a distinction between the theoretical and the
implementation? We will note two sources here.
In Masseches Bova Basra 130 b we find a discussion about the issuance of a
Halachic decision and the need for that decision to specifically note that it is
"l'ma'a'seh". "L'ma'a'seh" means that the decision can be acted upon and it does
not merely remain in the realm of theory.
Upon initially encountering this idea of requiring a decision to be stated as
"l'ma'a'seh" is puzzling and seems foreign. If Chazal said that something is the
Halacha why must we wait for "green light" of "l'ma'a'seh"?
Rashbam (ibid.) explains. "…d'b'sha'as ma'a'seh o'dom yo'rei li'don u'm'cha'vein li'bo
yo'ser…" When it becomes the time for undertaking the particular activity under
halachic discussion, the individual is afraid to issue a judgment and will focus his
heart (thinking) in particular.
These words of Rashbam require analysis. We are most certainly talking about
Dayanim, individuals whose commitment to the propagation of Torah law is great.
These are individuals about whom the Posuk says, "E…lo'kim ni'tzov ba'a'das E…l"
(T'hillim Perek 82/Posuk 1). Hashem attends the court sessions of his judges to
insure they will judge truthfully (See Rashi). They are dedicated to truth since a
judge who judges truthfully is considered to be a partner with HaKodosh Boruch Hu
in Creation (Masseches Shabbos 10 a). What is this special attention, then, that they
give when things are "l'ma'a'seh"
The answer seems to be with the freedom of thought the Torah encourages for Torah
study.
Unlike the rest of Creation where there is nothing new under the sun
(Koheles Perek 1/Posuk 9), Torah allows for creativity. The rest of the world is finite
and limited and thus wishful thinking remains science fiction. When it comes to
Torah which is infinite, there is, then, room to expand. One can never reach the
infinite.
Thus, when seeking to understand the theories of Torah and the possibilities,
remaining within the framework of Torah sources and authorities of course, unique
possibilities can be considered. Chazal can entertain a "hava a'mi'na", a possibility
that is so remote that it serves only to explore a concept, not a real-life event.
Nonetheless, Torah encourages us to think about Torah.
When it comes to "l'ma'a'seh", however, it is quite different. Then there are clear
rules of how to reach judgment. True, as the Chazon Ish writes, it is "chochmoh",
wisdom and understanding, that is to be the final arbiter of justice. However, since
so many times that chochmoh seems elusive, we rely on the rules Chazal set up for
us. [For an initial sense of the breadth of those rules, see the Encyclopeda
Talmudit's entry on Halacha for a concise listing of the dozens of rules that are
operational when it comes to render Halachic decisions.]
Another example of this idea is found in Masseches Beitza 2 b, among other
locations. There we learn that when Chazal want to show us the extent of a halachic
dispute, they often show the extreme of an argument. Keeping with the style
necessary for Torah She'ba'al Peh, they often show only one of those extremes.
How did they decide which side of the argument to emphasize the extent of its
opinion? The answer is "kocho d'he'tei'ro o'dif". The power of a lenient Halachic
decision is stronger. That is the opinion that should be emphasized.
Why was the special emphasis given to the lenient Halachic opinion? Rashi there
explains, "…div'rei ha'ma'tir she'hu so'meich 'al sh'mu'o'so v'ei'no yo'rei l'ha'tir a'vol
ko'ach ho'os'rin ei'noh r'a'yoh she'ha'kol y'cho'lin l'hach'mir va'a'fi'lu b'do'vor mu'tor."
The words of the decisor who is lenient [are emphasized] since he is relying on his
[thorough] halachic discourse and is not frightened to render a permissive opinion.
However, the power of those who forbid is not such a [clear-cut] proof since all can
be strict, even if something is permissible.
That is to say that the decisor who issues a lenient opinion has clearly and
comprehensively checked his opinion because if he is wrong he has misled others
and caused them to commit an act which was forbidden. On the other hand, one
who forbids may do so because that is his strictly and stringently investigated opinion
or perhaps because he is uncertain and thus he is strict, to be safe.
[Noda Bi'Yehuda makes a most significant note in this area. Unfortunately, there are
those who misuse this Rashi and misinterpret him to me that it is better to be lenient
than to be strict. Of course, Rashi did not say that. He was explaining, similarly to
Rashbam above, that the "l'ma'a'seh" aspects of leniency require completely
assuredness, unlike cautionary strictness.
Thus, the words of Noda Bi'Yehuda are most important. He explains that the reason
that the lenient decisor is most careful is that if there would be a margin of error it
would be towards strictness. The reason it would be towards strictness is the wellknown rule that "sofek d'o'rai'so l'chum'rah". When one is in doubt about the
permissibility of a Torah law, take the strict side.
When one extends this reasoning to a doubt about a Rabbinic Law the answer is
quite different. There we say "sofek d'ra'bo'non l'ku'loh". One rules leniently in such
a case. Thus the Noda Bi'Yehuda concludes that if a Rabbinic Law is in question we
would say "kocho d'i'su'ro o'dif". There is more power in an argument that decides
strictly in such a case. The reasoning is simple. The margin of error in this case
leans towards leniency.
The strict decisor in this case would be most careful.
"Playing it safe" in a Rabbinic case would to give an allowance. The prohibitive
stance would be the most "daring" and risky in this venue.]
We now understand the words of Yisro and why they were introduced into the Torah.
Yisro presents Moshe Rabbenu with a theory. That theory requires investigation and
consultation to be pursued. Chas V'Shalom that one should consider ideas,
explanations or solutions which are heretical and could have been known as such.
When it becomes time for implementation, then that consultation is not enough. Full
clarity and knowledge that one is undertaking G-d's Mitzva ("v'tzi'v'cho") is the order
of the day.
Yisro was fully aware of G-d's command and completely subjugated himself. Shem
Mi'Shmuel uses this idea to explain why Yisro merited that those basic ideas of how
to carry out Torah law is attributed to him.
He points out that every act of conversion requires a beis din of three to validate the
geirus. Chazal say that since conversion is considered "mishpot", it requires a bona
fide court to adjudicate it, like any other mishpot.
Why is conversion considered to be mishpot? Shem Mi'Shmuel explains that the
potential convert had to make a personal adjudication. As the Chazal in Masseches
Shavuos 39 a, basing themselves on the Posuk in D'vorim (Perek 29/Posuk 14)
teaches the soul of every Jew, even in the future and even including converts was at
Mt. Sinai. That is the potential convert received a glimpse of the eternity of Torah
and that glimpse is rooted deep down within him.
When this convert comes to make his decision, to stay in his present status or to
become a Jew, he puts himself on trial. He handles the mishpot. If such is true
about every convert, how much more so is it true in regards to Yisro who was
intimately familiar with all the cultures and religions of the world and made his choice.
Could there be a greater mishpot than that?
Thus, Yisro this prime example of Mishpot, was chosen as the rightful individual who
would enable and enhance the primacy of Mishpot among this people whom he
joined with thought, judgment and the highest level of personal commitment.
Yisro, the Parsha and the man, has much to teach us about personal honesty as a
pre-requisite to dedication to G-d and His people.
May we learn a little more this Shabbos and may our personal dedication grow evergreater.
Shabbat shalom
Rabbi Pollock