Democracy and Distribution:
Subnational Regime Dynamics in Mexico
Mauricio Benítez
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
210 Barrows Hall #1950
Berkeley, CA 94720
Prepared for delivery at the Conference on Democracy and Its Development
Center for the Study of Democracy
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA
March 1, 2008
[Please do not cite or quote without permission.]
Two distinct views regarding the politics of distributive policy—involving the allocation of
discrete, divisible, and targetable goods among constituents—have emerged among scholars. A
“legislative discretion” view, developed mainly in the American politics literature, sees
distribution as a predominantly legislative concern, due to the marked interest on the part of
legislators in benefiting their particular constituencies on a differentiated, discretionary basis. In
this context, for many scholars the president, who represents a wider constituency, is expected to
advocate more programmatic policy making. An “executive-discretion” view, in contrast, is
derived from the comparative analysis of presidents in the developing world. This view
highlights the leeway of the executive branch in policy implementation, and a parallel interest on
the part of executives to exercise discretion in policy making as a way to secure the electoral
support of particular constituencies. These contrasting views raise two important questions:
Which actors—whether executives or legislators—are most important in shaping distributive
policies? More crucially, what conditions are most conducive to programmatic distribution?
This study addresses these questions by turning attention to subnational “distributive
regimes” governing their allocational practices with respect to distributive goods. Distributive
regimes are constituted by two main variables. The first is the particular type of goods that tend
to be prioritized, whether public or particularistic. While this distinction is useful in creating a
typological space, it mainly refers to gradations of the targetability of different distributive
goods, which is in turn closely associated to the notion of “non-excludability” employed by
economists.1 The second variable defining distributive regimes is the prevailing type of policy
making: whether allocation decisions for policies are made on the basis of programmatic or
discretionary criteria.
1
Hardin (1982: 17-20).
2
Distinct distributive regimes arise from the political incentives created among
governments and oppositions in the context of democratic contestation to take advantage of
distribution for the advancement of their electoral careers through “credit-claiming”.2 I thus
argue that distributive politics ultimately results from the interaction between the executive and
the legislature: distributive policies are attractive to all types of elected authorities. However,
both executives and legislators, left free to control the policy-making process, prefers discretion
to rules. In the end, the perpetuation of discretion or the establishment of rules depends on the
interaction between incumbents and oppositions over the electoral advantages associated with
distribution.
To assess the plausibility of this hypothesis, this study focuses on state-level distributive
regimes in Mexico. In recent years Mexican states have become central loci of distributive policy
since substantial decentralization of federal expenditure began in the late 1990s. For most of the
20th century, state governments lacked resources to provide most public goods and services to
their constituents. The federal government became the main service supplier of the country, up to
a point, in the 1980s, in which it was in charge of basically all social and infrastructural policies.3
This state of affairs was dramatically altered in recent years, through processes of fundamental
economic and political change.
Financially, states have seen a marked increase in their financial resources for
investment, due to a process of administrative decentralization and increasing revenue-sharing
funds.4 Politically, democratization has had two major impacts on distributive dynamics. First,
The concept of “credit-claiming” is in Mayhew (1974). On the electoral drive toward distributive policy making,
see Ferejohn (1974); Shepsle and Weingast (1981).
3
A sophisticated assessment of the balance of power between the national and state governments during the second
half of the 20th century is Rubin (1996). See also Hernandez Rodriguez (2004).
4
See Courchene and Diaz-Cayeros (2000) and Amieva Huerta (2004) for the public finance aspects of the process.
Rodriguez (1997) provides an overview of the administrative decentralization process. Federal authorities seem
2
3
since the late 1990s, by a punctuated process of PRI power erosion, the president lost much of
his political influence over governors, which was mostly based on his control of PRI candidacies
and his informal power to oust governors.5 Governors are now independent to launch their own
policy projects. Second, since all states now feature significant levels of political competition,
state-level politicians now face a variety of demands from constituents, and in order to garner
electoral support they must address them strategically.6 Despite a close federal oversight, state
governments are now pursuing markedly different distributive policies, under diverging
allocational practices.
This study attempts to explain such variation. It analyzes in detail and attempts to explain
the distributive regimes that have emerged in three Mexican states: Jalisco, Michoacan, and
Veracruz. These states were chosen to maximize variation in patterns of electoral support and
political competition while “controlling” for institutional variables that have been hypothesized
to affect distributive dynamics, such as electoral rules.7 However, due to their political,
economic, and demographic weight, these cases are by themselves central in studying
subnational politics in Mexico.
In the next section I explain how existing views on distributive policy making have led to
divergent expectations regarding the role of executives and legislators in shaping distribution,
and on the conditions for programmatic distribution. I then develop a typology of distributive
regimes, and characterize the three state cases based on that typology. Next, I present the
theoretical background of the study, and provide evidence from three Mexican states supporting
suspicious that state governments may use federal funds for overtly political purposes, or for objectives that do not
correspond to their own federal designs.
5
Snyder (2001a); Eisenstadt (1999).
6
Lujambio (2000); Klesner (2005). A quantitative cross-state analysis of distinctive policy-making patters across
Mexican states is in Gutierrez (2003). See also Beer (2003).
7
Carey and Shugart (1995); Myerson (1993).
4
the competitive theory of distributive regimes. Finally, I provide a recapitulation of the
argument, and discuss potential contributions of this framework.
The Comparative Analysis of Distributive Politics
Distributive policy making has been often described as a quintessential legislative
concern, particularly in contexts where legislators have a clear “electoral connection” to
constituents in their districts. Legislative interest in the allocation of distributive benefits lies in
the possibility of providing specific, differentiated benefits to their constituents, and to “claim
credit” for those benefits in order to maintain electoral support. In order to do so, legislators must
be able to exercise discretion when selecting specific projects and benefits. The narrow territorial
constituencies of legislators make them, then, an unlikely influence in favor of programmatic
policy making.8 While this view of legislative interest in discretionary distribution has been
mainly developed in the American context, it has been influential for the analysis of other, quite
dissimilar countries, such as Brazil, Italy, and Japan.9
In light of this narrow interest of legislators in discretionary distribution, executives, on
the other hand, are often considered to focus on more collective concerns, because executives
represent a wider constituency. A corollary of this notion is that executives are more likely to be
in favor of converting discrete distributive allocations into programs intended to pursue more
general interests.10
8
E.g., Ferejohn (1974); Shepsle and Weingast (1981); Mayhew (1974); Lowi (1964); Stein and Bickers (1995);
Davis (2004).
9
On Brazil, see Ames (2001); on Italy, see Golden (2003); on Japan, see Woodall (1993).
10
See McConnell (1966); Spitzer (1994); Davis (2004: ch. 5).
5
An executive-discretion view of distribution has emphasized, by contrast, the prominent
interest among presidents in benefiting from discretionary allocation of distributive goods, and
their ability to do so particularly in the context of weak legislative opposition. Analyzing the
logic of the famous National Solidarity Program implemented in Mexico in the early 1990s,
Dresser (1994: 146) exemplifies this view when she writes: “The fundamental tactic in this
coalition building [through the Solidarity Program] has been to concentrate as much power as
possible in the hands of the executive, in order to channel resources to politically turbulent zones
or disaffected groups”. This phenomenon is not exclusive to Mexico: executives in Brazil, Peru,
and Russia have been said to exert discretionary control over distributive policies in order to
create and sustain political and electoral coalitions.11 The position of the legislature with regard
to distributive policy making, on the other hand, is indeterminate in these studies, given its
subordinate or weak role vis-à-vis the executive. What is, then, the role of executives and
legislators in shaping distributive policy? In addressing this question, it is useful to distinguish
different distributive regimes.
A Typology of Distributive Regimes
Distributive regimes are constituted by the type of goods that tend to be prioritized by
policymakers, and the prevailing mode in allocating such goods among constituents. Types of
goods range from public to particularistic. Public distributive goods are relatively nonexcludable, that is, their benefits are widespread among a relatively large population; in other
words, their “targetability” is relatively low. Public distributive goods include large-scale public
works, such as water provision, highways, ports, airports, and urban transportation projects.
11
On Brazil see Ames (2001, ch. 6); on Peru, Schady (2000); on Russia, Treisman (1999, ch. 3).
6
Benefits from those projects tend to be based more on membership to a social group that
employs or depends on them heavily, than on geographical location.
Particularistic goods are more easily divided and targeted than public distributive goods,
and thus their benefits are relatively more circumscribed. In other words, their benefits are more
targeted. These goods include, for example, the subsidies and transfers delivered through poverty
alleviation programs. While antipoverty programs obviously have a redistributive aspect in the
aggregate, they also have a distributive dimension, in that they provide pure private goods to
program beneficiaries. Another type of particularistic benefit consists of basic infrastructure.
This category includes most public works that are residentially-oriented in nature, and that
satisfy basic social needs. Compared to large-scale infrastructure the scope of their benefits is of
a much more localized scale. Thus they could alternatively be labeled as “local public goods”. 12
A second defining dimension of distributive regimes is the mode of policy making that is
most prevalent in allocating goods. Policymaking can be discretionary, by assigning goods to
constituents on a case-by-case basis, depending on any consideration that decision-makers deem
applicable to a specific case. Alternatively, distributive policymaking can be programmatic, that
is, based on codified, open and public principles for the allocation of benefits. Programmatic
policymaking is mainly characterized by the existence of rules, which, however, may vary in
terms of their specific goals, such as equity and efficiency.13
A typology of distributive regimes emerges by combining the types of goods and the
types of policy making through which they are distributed. When public goods are delivered in
programmatic terms, the ensuing regime is a form of developmentalism; when they are allocated
12
Desposato (2003: 28-29). In Mexico, as elsewhere, many small-scale public works, including street paving and
water sewage, are usually in the hands of local or municipal authorities. But many others, including local schools,
clinics, and rural roads, are most usually provided by state-level authorities.
13
Kitschelt (2000).
7
discretionally, the result is a pork-barrel regime. Similarly, a social welfare regime features
particularistic goods that are distributed programmatically, while clientelism also emphasizes
particularistic benefits, but relies on discretion to distribute them. These distinct regimes are
schematized in Figure 1.1. I now turn to three Mexican states in order to show these distributive
regimes at work.
------------------Figure 1.1 here
-------------------
Distributive Regimes in Mexican States
Jalisco, Michoacan, and Veracruz feature distinctive patterns of political competition. In Jalisco
the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), a rightist party, has controlled the governorship since 1995,
and it competes closely with the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) a centrist party. In
Michoacan the leftist Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) ousted the PRI in 1995, but
competition between the two parties remains close. Finally, in Veracruz the PRI has retained
power, even though the PAN and the PRD have made electoral inroads recently. Differences
among these three states are also marked in terms of their distributive regimes, whose
characterization follows.
Developmentalism in Jalisco. As explained in the typology of distributive regimes,
developmentalism is characterized by the programmatic allocation of public distributive goods.
Jalisco is an instance of this regime. In terms of distributive policies, PAN governors have
prioritized investment in large-scale infrastructure. During the 2001-2006 period, an average
8
46.2% of all state investment went to that type of infrastructure. This proportion is almost
doubled when excluding investment in education, which goes for the most part to personnel.14
The programmatic stance of infrastructural policymaking in Jalisco has a first expression
in the bureaucracy in charge of it. By law, the Urban Development Ministry is restricted to
providing infrastructure of inter-municipal scope, on the assumption that almost all infrastructure
strictly within municipal limits is in the realm of municipal governments. This restriction is
precisely intended to avoid engagement in particularistic infrastructure provision, of the type that
prevails in Veracruz.15 Moreover, unlike Veracruz too, Jalisco’s infrastructure bureaucracy is
highly professionalized and technical.16
Further evidence of programmatic delivery of public goods in Jalisco is based on the
characteristics of infrastructural funds in the state. Most of Jalisco’s public investment in
infrastructure is channeled through three main funds, two of which have strict operating rules,
while the third is invested in the consecution of widely publicized technical programs.
The first major fund is the Metropolitan Fund. The Fund’s sizable resources are allocated
to projects in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara (MAG), the state capital, which are selected
by the mayors on the basis of well-established voting rules.17 A second major infrastructural fund
in Jalisco is the Regionalization Fund. It was created in 1996 to address regional inequalities in
the state, which are acute due to economic and demographic concentration in the MAG.18 The
Regionalization Fund is intended to finance infrastructural and productive projects in each of the
state’s regions, based on their particular needs. Monies are equally divided among the regions of
the state, even though they vary widely in terms of population, economic activity, poverty levels
Author’s calculations, based on Sexto Informe de Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco (2006).
Ley Organica del Poder Ejecutivo del Estado de Michoacan, art. 32.
16
Interviews, SEDEUR officials.
17
Interview, director of Planning, SEDEUR.
18
Woo (1999).
14
15
9
and other considerations that could possibly justify differentiated assignment of funds. The
Regional Fund has specific operating rules to govern project selection, based on consensus
among the mayors of the region.19
Besides the Metropolitan and Regionalization funds, most of Jalisco’s resources devoted
to infrastructure are funded by what is called among officials as “free assignment funds”, that is,
monies without legal restrictions in procedural aspects besides those stipulated by procurement
laws. Still, it is a sign of programmatic policy making in Jalisco that most of those resources are
channeled to well-known infrastructural programs, which are based on technical considerations,
such as the Jalisco Communications Program, whose main objective is identifying the steps
needed to link different regions of the state to outside markets. For the most part, investment in
roads in Jalisco follows the guidelines set up by the State Communications Program and the
Urban Transportation Program for Guadalajara.20
Welfare in Michoacan. Unlike Jalisco, which prioritizes developmental infrastructure, the PRD
government in Michoacan invests heavily in social programs consisting of the delivery of
particularistic goods and transfers to the poor. During the 2001-2006, the Michoacan government
spent an average 60.8% of its investment funds in “social development”.21 Social programs in the
state are particularly intended to benefit rural communities, where the PRD draws most of its
electoral support. But instead of relying on discretionary policy making, all social initiatives in
Michoacan are subject to operating rules characterized by a sense of securing universal access to
their benefits among targeted groups.22
19
Osorio and Cuevas (1998: 39-51).
Interview, director of Planning, SEDEUR.
21
Author’s calculations, based on the Cuentas de la Hacienda Publica Estatal de Michoacan (various years).
22
Interview, deputy secretary of the Comptroller.
20
10
The bureaucracy in charge of social policy making in Michoacan is professional and
technical, as was the case with the Urban Development bureaucracy in Jalisco. In fact, the PRD
administration created two new ministries to oversee the creation of social programs. The first
was a Ministry of Planning for Development, which centralized budgeting, planning, and
programming activities for all agencies in the state. The second agency was the Ministry of
Social Development, one of the first such state-level agencies in Mexico, which concentrates the
state government’s efforts at poverty alleviation and participatory policy making.23
In terms of specific social policies, one the most important launched by the PRD
administration is the Community Development Program, by which the state government assigns
funds for public works that are selected by rural community members through participatory
methodologies. Another program distributes school supplies among children in public schools.
Another major initiative is CRECER, a program intended to provide nutritional supplements to
children less than three years.
The intention of all these programs is obviously to benefit the poorest families, but they
are nonetheless open to all who request their benefits and satisfy certain obvious requirements,
such as being part of the target population.24 In other words, these programs resemble the
“targeting within universalism” that has been advocated as a modern, politically viable option for
welfare regimes.25
Clientelism Veracruz-Style. Unlike the governments of Jalisco and Michoacan, the government
of Veracruz employs most of its resources for distributive investment in basic, small-scale
infrastructure, which it can target to particular communities. Veracruz spends around 50% on
23
See Ley Organica del Poder Ejecutivo... (2002).
Interview, deputy secretary of Planning for Development.
25
Skocpol (1996).
24
11
average of its investment resources in infrastructure, mostly of the basic, small-scale type.26 This
infrastructure is distributed among the rural poor that form the governor’s party, the PRI, main
base of electoral support. Unlike Michoacan, then, whose government also seeks to court the
rural poor, and unlike Jalisco, which also invests heavily in infrastructure, the government of
Veracruz privileges low-cost infrastructure delivery, which is easy to deliver in discretionary
terms among poorer constituents.
As expected of a clientelist regime, discretionary and politicized decision-making
characterizes distributive policy-making in Veracruz. First, investment is purposively
“atomized”, that is, disaggregated into small projects in order to reach more communities in the
state with public works, even if these are of such a small scale as to make little difference for the
isolation and backwardness of the targeted communities. In fact, he set up a maximum limit for
the amount of money to be spent on any particular project. 27 Moreover, decision-making for
investment in particular projects is often based on political considerations. State officials acceded
more easily to constituent demands when constituents (1) threaten to mobilize in a public or
violent fashion to make their demands be heard, or (2) are identified with the PRI. 28 Finally, the
publicity around distributive policymaking is extremely personalistic. The governor runs
widespread publicity campaigns to highlight the idea that distributive benefits come directly
from his person.29
The bureaucracy in this clientelist regime stands in sharp contrast to those in charge of
the main distributive policies of the welfare and developmentalist regimes. In Veracruz, instead
26
Tercer Informe de Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz (2007).
Interview, director of Research, Office of the Government Program; interview, director of Planning, Ministry of
Communications.
28
Interview, director of Programming, Committee for School Construction.
29
Some public works even carry his name or that of his governmental personalistic project, such as the bridge
“Fidelidad”.
27
12
of delegating infrastructure policy to a technical bureaucracy, governors use state agencies as
springboars for politicians to gain public exposure, or to have a safe employment after finished
tenures as legislators or mayors—obviously, when they belong to the PRI.30
A Competitive Theory of Distributive Regimes
What explains the emergence of those distinct distributive regimes? I propose a theory based on
two factors associated with democratic contestation: the electoral constituency that the governor
seeks to court, and the strength of his legislative opposition to contain discretion.
Governing Party Constituency. In order to create lasting electoral coalitions in their states,
governors must invest in the constituencies whose support will help their parties remain in
power. Governors obviously address the demands of other constituencies besides those that
support them, but the continuation of their winning coalitions depends on whether they are able
to deliver the goods that their core supporters value.31
Mexican political parties differ markedly regarding the constituencies from which they
tend to draw their electoral support.32 The PAN depends heavily on the support of urban middle
classes and entrepreneurial sectors. Having generally higher incomes, most of the basic needs of
those constituencies have been met, and their support cannot easily be “bought” by incumbents
through the distribution of relatively inexpensive particularistic goods. Moreover, being
relatively more educated, these constituencies may develop a more sophisticated understanding
30
See Diario de Xalapa (2007).
On electoral and expenditure strategies of incumbents, see Ames (1987). On the importance of party
constituencies for distinctive policymaking, see Boix (1997; 1998), and Calvo and Murillo (2004).
32
For the social basis of party voting in Mexico, see Moreno (2003) and Klesner (2004; 2005).
31
13
of the long-term costs associated with expansionary distribution, especially of the discretionary
type.33 As a result, the PAN in government can be hypothesized to prioritize the distribution of
public goods that are arguably more effective in generating the support of these constituencies.
The PRI and the PRD have developed stronger constituencies among the rural and urban
poor. Those constituencies tend to receive different distributive policies by governing authorities
than do middle and upper classes. Their levels of deprivation and lack of education make it
relatively more efficient for incumbents to attempt “buying” their electoral support by
distributing relatively cheap particularistic goods. When in government, the PRI and the PRD
can thus be hypothesized to privilege the distribution of particularistic goods.
Regardless of their party, governors try to protect their discretion over allocation
decisions in order to maximize their electoral prospects by addressing demands of, and “buying”
support from, specific constituencies. In the case of Mexico, governors’ demand for
discretionary authority may result from a tradition forged during the period of PRI hegemony,
during which the independence of legislatures at all levels of government was limited.
Legislative Opposition. In this model, governors’ ability to exert discretionary power ultimately
depends on the capacity of the legislature to influence distributive policy making, particularly by
moving it toward the establishment of programmatic decision-making. In a competitive context,
other things equal, in light of discretionary policy making by the governor, legislative
oppositions will seek to constrain the governor’s leeway and thus his ability to sustain electoral
support for his party.
Legislative opposition works through two mechanisms in leading to programmatic policy
making. First, the legislative opposition will directly seek to limit the governor’s discretion, since
33
This section draws heavily from Kitschelt (2000).
14
doing so makes distributive benefits part of general programs, rather than benefits restricted to
the governor’s supporters. Moreover, if constituents perceive that distributive goods come from
codified programs, independent on the permanence in power of the incumbent party, electoral
benefits from distributive policies will be more evenly spread among the main competing parties.
Also, imposing operating rules on programs creates “focal points” for opposition forces to
monitor any deviation in practice by the executive branch.34 Second, the opposition may affect
the governor’s future calculations: if the opposition can credibly aim to gain power in the future,
it is safer for the governor to codify programs that will benefit his party, thus increasing the costs
of their cancellation after a power turnover.35
However, the strength of the legislative opposition is not simply a headcount of
opposition legislators. In fact, numerical control of the legislature by the opposition does not
even guarantee that the opposition will actively try to impose controls on executive discretion. In
protracted transitions to democracy, as in Mexico, it is not always the case that the legal
framework for decision-making gives a privileged role to the legislature. In such contexts,
legislatures often develop their powers on a piecemeal basis, by acquiring new roles during the
process of reform of extant laws and the writing of new ones. But even after the legislature as a
branch of power has acquired extensive authority, it may be the case that the governor’s party
holds a majority, thus allowing him to remain in control of distributive policy making.36 It could
also be the case that the legislative opposition, though theoretically strong legally and
On the notion of “focal point” see Ferejohn (1993).
A similar notion of the role of legislative opposition is in Geddes (1994) in the context of civil service reform. A
similar notion of forward-thinking dependent on electoral concerns among policymakers is in O’Neill (2003). For
legislative opposition strategies more generally, see Dahl (1966).
36
For a characterization of proactive and reactive powers, see Cox and Morgenstern (2001).
34
35
15
numerically, is internally divided, which would as well go in detriment of its strength vis-à-vis
the executive. One expression of internal division is, for example, party-switching.37
For a legislative opposition to influence distributive policy making, then, two conditions
must be met. First, the legislature as a whole must have extensive influence in the policy process.
Second, the opposition in the legislature must be both numerically and cohesively strong.
To sum up, according to this model of distributive regimes the governor’s ability to
impose his policy priorities on a discretionary basis depends on the strength of the legislative
opposition. The model is schematized in Figure 1.2.
------------------Figure 1.2 here
-------------------
According to this model, a first potential outcome is developmentalism. It emerges when
the governor leads a party whose constituencies are primarily the middle and business sectors,
and he confronts a strong legislative opposition. The governor must use programmatic criteria
when assigning infrastructure projects, in order to gain legislative opposition for his policies.38 A
second distributive regime, welfare, occurs when the governor’s party constituency consists of
the rural and/or urban poor, and he also faces strong legislative opposition. The regime is
characterized by a rules-based approach to distributive policy making. The governor is forced to
maximize his electoral appeal by investing in regulated, universal social programs.39
37
On party-switching at the state-level in Mexico, see Barrow (2007).
The classic formulation of the “developmental state” is Chalmers (1982). A recent reformulation is in Evans
(1995); see also Woo-Cummings (1999).
39
The classic reference to the welfare state as a programmatic system of universal social benefits is Marshall (1963).
Obviously, such a poor state as Michoacan is far from delivering the substantive benefits of a full-blown welfare
state. What I highlight here is the universalistic stance of benefits to targeted populations in Michoacan.
38
16
A third possibility is the emergence of a clientelist regime. This regime results in contexts
where the governor faces weak opposition and the constituency of the governor’s party consists
mainly of the rural and/or urban poor. In such a context the governor will be able to engage in
the discretionary distribution of particularistic goods, in the form of unregulated subsidies
dependent on the governor’s will.40 Finally, pork-barrel ensues when the governor’s party
constituency consists of the urban middle and entrepreneurial classes, and the legislative
opposition is weak. The governor invests mainly in public goods, which he allocates to areas
where his party’s constituents are concentrated.41
Explaining Distributive Regimes in Mexico
Based on the previous model of distributive regimes, I explain the emergence of
developmentalism in Jalisco, welfare in Michoacan, and clientelism in Veracruz.
Electoral Constituencies of Governing Parties
The PAN in Jalisco. The PAN in Jalisco draws decisive electoral support from middle and
entrepreneurial classes in the state, principally in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, which
concentrates more than 60% of the state’s total population, and most of its industrial and general
40
This usage of clientelism is certainly much broader than many definitions found in the literature. The choice is
based on the fact that clientelism as a form of distributive policymaking is ultimately a “reciprocal exchange
between actors of unequal power” (Fox 1994: 153), which is the broadest understanding of clientelism. On
clientelistic policymaking see also Scott (1972) and Kitschelt (2000). Medina and Stokes (2007) focus on the
electoral-manipulation side of the concept of clientelism, which, although closely related to the concept of clientelist
policymaking, I do not directly address here.
41
The most developed literature on the pork-barrel is in the context of American politics. For recent overviews of
pork-barreling, see Stein and Bickers (1995) and Evans (2004).
17
economic activity.42 While maintaining the support of the middle and entrepreneurial classes, the
PAN has been unable to attract enduring support among other social groups.43
Another major constituency of the PAN in Jalisco is organized business. While in the
past organized business in the state was tightly linked to the PRI, they became estranged in the
1980s, when neoliberal reform hit business in the region in a particularly hard fashion. 44 PAN
governments have been relatively successful in attracting foreign and national investment to the
state, which has consolidated its image as a party close to business interests.45
The PRD in Michoacan. Historically, the PRD in Michoacan has drawn most of its electoral and
mobilizational support from the state’s rural communities. In those areas, the PRD faces strong
opposition by the PRI. The party has not been able to consolidate support among the state’s
middle classes, which are concentrated in the main urban areas.
Being a predominantly rural and poor state, organized business in Michoacan is very
weak. A few prominent families monopolize ownership of large firms in the state, and they have
direct access to political authorities regardless of their party. Strong organized business interests
are more common in the vibrant agro-industrial sector. However, agro-business leaders are more
closely linked to the PAN.46
The PRI in Veracruz. Electorally, the PRI in Veracruz draws support from the rural and urban
poor in the state. The state has almost 20,000 communities of less than 1,000 inhabitants.
Veracruz has long been characterized by caciquismo, given the extreme poverty and isolation of
different regions in the state, and the presence of certain almost autonomous groups, such as the
oil workers union in the oil-rich regions of the state. The state’s caciques have been important
42
ITESO (2000, 15-17). On PAN support in the MAG, see Lomeli (2001: 94-97).
Lomeli (2001: chapter 4).
44
Alba Vega (1989).
45
Valencia Lomeli et al. (1998: 24-28).
46
Interview with PAN diputado, former president of the Avocado Producers Organization.
43
18
sources of electoral mobilization for the PRI. The party also draws support from local
bureaucrats, who are concentrated in the state capital, Xalapa, and from the oil workers union,
which has a strong grip over politics in the urban centers of the oil-rich areas of the state.
Legislative Opposition Strength
Jalisco. Jalisco’s legislature is arguably one of the most powerful in Mexico, and it is heavily
involved in the policy-making process. Within the legislature, the PRI is a very strong and active
opposition. Indeed, since the PAN has failed to command strong majorities in the legislature, and
it frequently has to “co-govern” with the PRI.
The opposition actively uses its powers to circumscribe the capacity of the governor to
distort the partisan balance of power in the state through distributive policy making. Particularly
important in that regard is the budget approval process, which is a real struggle between the
executive and legislators. Jalisco’s legislators routinely employ their budgetary authority to
demand amendments to the governor’s proposed budget.47
The strength of the legislative opposition in Jalisco depends heavily on its legal powers.
First, Jalisco’s legislature is the only in Mexico that meets all year round, instead of having
ordinary legislative periods followed by recess periods, which allows legislators to respond
quickly to any issue that needs their attention, and to be in constant oversight of executive
activity.48 Second, Jalisco’s legislature can change its governing law based solely on agreement
among diputados, since the governor cannot veto such changes, and it actively uses this
47
Interview, technical secretary of the Finance Committee; interview, technical secretary of the Planning
Committee.
48
Interview, PAN legislative coordinator. Ley Organica del Poder Legislativo del Estado de Jalisco, article 125.
Jalisco’s legislative law mandates minimum numbers of meetings to be observed at different times of the year, and
legislators are free to decide whether they want to meet more frequently.
19
prerogative.49 Third, the budget of the legislature is autonomous of the governor: the legislature
draws its own budget, and the governor must accommodate it in order for the overall state budget
to be approved. As a result, Jalisco’s legislature enjoys significant financial, personnel, and
logistic resources.50
The governance of Jalisco’s legislature follows a power-sharing logic among the largest
parties. As a result, the PRI has been able to command an important power position. During the
2004-2007 legislature, for example, the PRI won control of the Finance Committee, one of the
most important power positions in the legislature, since it controls approval of all budget, debt,
and taxation matters.
The oversight role of the legislative opposition has shaped the programmatic stance of
infrastructural policy in Jalisco. First, the PRI opposition in the legislature is extremely vigilant
of expenditure, particularly of whether it is assigned with a bias toward regions in the state where
the PAN is stronger. The Finance Committee routinely reviews the semester and yearly reports
submitted by law by the executive.51 Second, the legislative opposition strives to limit any
discretion on the part of the governor, by pressing him to inform the legislature when specific
objectives have not been met, or why investment priorities have changed.52
Michoacan. Michoacan’s legislative opposition to the PRD administration is also strong, even
thought the legislature has less formal and logistic resources than in Jalisco. The PRI-led
opposition is both cohesive and numerically strong, and, as a result, it wields significant
influence in the policy making process.
49
Ley Organica del Poder Legislativo, art. 1.
Interview, director, Technical Organ for the Public Treasury.
51
Interview, technical secretary of the Finance Committee.
52
See changes to the Ley de Presupuesto, Contabilidad y Gasto Publico del Estado de Jalisco, article 39.
Interviews, chairwoman of the Committee on Planning; interview, technical secretary of the Committee on Planning
50
20
As the PAN in Jalisco, the PRD in Michoacan has not been able to consolidate strong,
enduring legislative majorities, and rather shares power with the PRI, and, to a lesser extent, with
the PAN. As in Jalisco, legislative governance in Michoacan tends toward power-sharing, given
that the PRD and the PRI are almost tied in their number of legislators, with the PAN working as
an important pivot. During the 2005-2008 legislature, the PRI had the chairmanship of the
Constitutional Issues and Finance committees, which, as in Jalisco, are key positions of power
within the legislature and in terms of executive-legislative relations.
A cohesive PRI keeps a watchful eye on the PRD executive. The party is united in
making demands on the executive and other legislative parties, even though it might be internally
divided on other aspects. And while lacking in legal sophistication and technical knowledge,
opposition legislators closely observe, at the grassroots level, how the executive delivers
distributive policies. Based on that information, they actively demand from the government the
unpoliticized delivery of social programs.53 With regard to the Community Development
Program, the PRI sought to include municipal authorities as intermediaries between state-level
social policy authorities and the targeted rural communities. This demand was based on the
PRI’s strength at the municipal level, so that it could prevent a partisan bias in the allocation of
funds across communities and the turn of organizing activities toward electoral gains for the
PRD.
Michoacan’s legislative opposition routinely uses its most fundamental power to impose
demands on the governor: the capacity to stall the budget approval process. 54 Consequently,
53
54
Interview, diputados Duarte and Montoya.
Interview, diputados Marin and Quezada.
21
specific provisions have been drafted to prevent the political use of social policies, and the
governor has agreed to legislative pressure.55
The presence of a numerically and cohesively strong legislative opposition has worked in
another way to produce programmatic policymaking in Michoacan besides direct power
showdowns between the governor and the legislature. Together with major problems in areas
such as public safety, it has signaled to PRD policymakers that their party’s continued rule in the
state is not by any means secure, and that it thus needs to work toward securing the permanence
of its programs.56 For social policymakers in the executive branch, the elaboration of open and
public operating rules for governmental programs serves to attract as many potential recipients as
possible, and to make them “appropriate” the programs, so that they could demand their
continuation and programmatic stance in the future in case of any attempt to cancel or politicize
them.57
Veracruz. Relative to Jalisco’s and Michoacan’s, the legislature of Veracruz is relatively strong
in formal terms, but the opposition within it is not cohesive. Indeed, Veracruz’s legislature shows
how the sheer number of seats is not a reliable measure of legislative opposition strength.
Until 2003, the Veracruz legislature had been comfortably under the control of the PRI.
But in the 2004 election the legislature became for the first time evenly divided between the PRI
and the PAN. The two parties set out to “co-govern” in the legislature. For the first time ever, the
PAN had to be taken into account for all decisions to be taken in the legislature, including
committee assignments and all legislative reforms.
55
See Presupuesto de Egresos para el Estado de Michoacan 2006.
Beginning in 2002, drug trafficking in Michoacan, and the violence associated with it, increased in the state, to
levels not seen before. Given its limited institutional and financial capacity, the state government was not able to
contain the violence, but many people blamed it for it.
57
Interview, deputy secretary for Social Development; deputy secretary of the Comptroller; director of Social
Development.
56
22
However, while numerically strong, the PAN did not pose any major challenge to the
governor’s policies. Even though it came to control the powerful Oversight Committee, the party
did not put effective pressure on the governor regarding politicized policy making.58 A crucial
factor helps to explain the failure of the PAN to become a strong opposition in Veracruz. Unlike
the PRI in Michoacan, the PAN as an opposition party was not cohesive. Several of its legislators
had joined the party only as an opportunity to gain electoral positions, and thus, once in office,
were willing to lend their support to other parties that offered them with benefits of different
sorts.59 Moreover, the PRI administration was able to secure the passage of its budgetary and
reform measures with the support from the PAN by providing it with power positions in the
bureaucracy and other appointments to autonomous and independent bodies. While important in
constructing checks on the power of the PRI, those appointments did not consist of permanent
changes in policymaking.60
Conclusion
I have argued that increased financial resources and electoral incentives have led to the creation
of distinct distributive regimes across Mexican states, such as developmentalism in Jalisco,
welfare in Michoacan, and clientelism in Veracruz. Governors strive to exercise discretion in the
allocation of distributive policies, in order to sustain their electoral coalitions by launching
policies that benefit their parties’ main constituencies. Depending on the party that they lead and
the constituencies they court, doing so requires that governors prioritize different types of
58
Interview with the chairman of the Finance Committee; interview with the chairman of the Oversight Committee;
interview with the chairman of the Municipal Finance Committee.
59
Diario AZ (2006; 2007); interviews, legislative advisors Colunga, Vega.
60
Interview with chairman of the Oversight Committee; interview with chairman of the Finance Committee.
23
distributive goods, particularistic or public. It is the strength of the legislative opposition that
determines whether the governor is able to engage in discretionary distribution to his party’s
advantage. Different combinations of party constituency and oppositional strength result in
alternative distributive regimes. Figure 1.3 synthesizes the argument for the development of
distributive regimes in Jalisco, Michoacan and Veracruz.
------------------Figure 1.3 here
------------------Based on the competitive theory of distributive regime formation developed from those
three cases, it is possible to expect a state like Guanajuato to be an instance of pork-barrel
regime. The PAN has been in power since 1991, drawing support from a sizable middle class and
strong entrepreneurial sector, and has evolved into a sort of hegemonic party. Research on the
application of federal earmarked funds by Guanajuato authorities will test this hypothesis.
The transformation of distributive policies in Mexico helps to understand how, when
combined with decentralization, democratization may lead to territorially distinct patterns of
policymaking that significantly affect the overall quality of democracy. Democratization and
decentralization have prompted a radical change in models of distribution of publicly-provided
goods and services in many developing countries. The model based on strong national
governments linked to class-based organizations is now making room for different subnational
arrangements around elected politicians, who often seek to create direct links to their preferred
constituents without organizational intermediaries. A subnational approach thus sheds light on
the development of divergent policymaking outcomes, such as clientelism and social welfare,
which are frequently found side by side within new democracies. Distributive regime dynamics
24
in Mexico shows how those distinct outcomes are a result of, and consistent with, democratic
electoral competition.
Finally, the analysis of distributive regimes sheds light specifically on how governments
and oppositions interact in the context of structurally weak legislative power. Scholars spouse
different views regarding the role of executives and legislatures in distributive policy making.
This tendency may be due to the traditional role of each branch in different contexts. In
particular, the development of distributive regimes in Mexico illuminates the crucial role of the
legislature in bringing about programmatic policy making in the face of historically and
structurally strong executives. Instead of controlling distributive policies, as their counterparts in
more powerful legislatures do, Mexican state legislatures can often only aspire to limit the
particularistic use of distributive policies by the executive branch, which has historically
controlled the policy-making process.
25
Figure 1.1: A Typology of Distributive Regimes
Type
of Programmatic
policymaking
Discretionary
Type of good prioritized
Public
Particularistic
Developmentalism
Welfare
Pork-barrel
Clientelism
26
Figure 1.2: A Model of Distributive Regimes
Strength of legislative opposition
Constituency of
Lower classes
governing party
Middle
classes
and upper
Strong
Weak
Social Welfare
Clientelism
Particularistic goods
Particularistic goods
Programmatic policy making
Discretionary policy making
Developmentalism
Pork-barrel
Public goods
Public goods
Programmatic policy making
Discretionary policy making
27
Figure 1.3: Distributive Regimes in Mexican States
State
Constituency of
governing party
Strength of the
opposition
Type of
distributive good
Type of policymaking
Type of
distributive regime
Jalisco
Michoacán
Veracruz
[Guanajuato?]
Middle and
upper classes
Strong
Rural poor
Strong
Urban and
rural poor
Weak
Middle and
upper classes
Weak
↓
Public
↓
Particularistic
↓
Particularistic
↓
Public
Programmatic
Programmatic
Discretionary
Discretionary
↓
Developmentalism
↓
Social welfare
↓
Clientelism
↓
Pork-barrel
28
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