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Protectionism down- US actions key
Associated Press 11/7 [“APEC ministers to agree on anti-protectionism: report”, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gEXVMA3T09cyt7VDLvhRin-YKw-Q?docId=CNG.74bac5b4cc9462fd7346e1c94b90120a.31]
TOKYO — Ministers
of the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum this week are likely to agree on banning fresh
protectionist measures to safeguard the world economy, a report said Monday. In a two-day ministerial meeting ahead of the APEC summit
this weekend, they are expected to agree on not taking fresh anti-protectionist measures in the coming three years to
2013, Japanese public broadcaster NHK reported, without citing its sources. The ban on protectionist measures, which APEC member China will also
agree to, will include a ban on blocking exports after Beijing recently blocked Japan-bound exports of rare earth
minerals amid Sino-Japanese territorial disputes, it said. APEC ministers are also likely to agree on simplifying cross-border trade
procedures by introducing integrated circuit tags for freight, NHK reported. The ministers' joint statement, to be announced by Japanese foreign and trade ministers on
Thursday, will include these agreements, it said. In the talks starting Wednesday in Yokohama, ministers are due to discuss growth strategy and a
path towards regional economic integration, including the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade talks that are
backed by the United States. APEC finance ministers on Saturday pledged to work towards safeguarding growth and to
avoid weakening each other's currencies, as the US sought to ease tensions over recent economic proposals. China rejected a US
proposal that countries assign a quantifiable limit for their current account surpluses or deficits to help rebalance the global economy and ease trade tensions. While the
finance chiefs agreed to curtail "excessive" trade imbalances, many Asian governments are anxious about being
squeezed if the United States turns inward and China grows even more assertive.
Plan causes massive labor union backlash- provides foundation for protectionism
Bhagwati and Johnson 09 Interviewee: Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Senior Fellow for International Economics and Interviewer: Toni Johnson
09, Staff Writer, CFR.org, Stricter Rules for Skilled-Worker Visas Are a Mistake,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20732/stricter_rules_for_skilledworker_visas_are_a_mistake.html
Much of the debate over U.S. immigration policy has focused on illegal immigration, but visas
for skilled workers also are under attack, from Congress
nativist and union lobbies. Recent congressional efforts to create stricter rules for skilled-worker visas
are "particularly inappropriate," says Jagdish N. Bhagwati, CFR's senior fellow for International Economics and a professor at Columbia University,
who also recently coedited the book Skilled Immigration Today: Prospects, Problems and Policies. The current attitude, fueled in part by the recession,
is based on a fallacy, says Bhagwati, because it fails to account for the quality of skilled-worker visa holders. He points out
and from
that many of these hires are from world-class technological and management institutions in India, Seoul, and China, which the United States has often helped to set up. "Intel,
Microsoft--they are looking for the best people they can get," Bhagwati says, and " the
Americans who do not get the jobs in competition with
the foreign hires tend to be graduates who are at the bottom of the class." Any openness policy is going to be a
tough sell for lawmakers right now, but he argues that openness benefits the country economically. Much of the debate at the end of the Bush administration was
focused on illegal immigration from Mexico, though it also included the issue of expanding visas for skilled workers, such as the H1B Visa. With a new Congress and a financial crisis, however, the politics has shifted to restricting these quotas, not
increasing them. Why do you feel the United States needs to hire skilled foreign workers and why aren't there enough workers in the United States to do these jobs?
The recent immigration [bill], which failed, focused for the most part on illegal immigration. U.S. legislation typically addresses refugees, legal immigrants, and illegal
immigrants separately, so the issue of hiring skilled foreign workers belongs to legislation addressed to legal immigration. But it got included in the current reform legislation
addressing illegal immigration, to increase lobbying support for a failing bill. The calculation was that, by adding this issue, the proponents of the bill would galvanize the
support of influential firms such as Intel and Microsoft, which use a lot of the foreign skilled workers. But this strategy didn't work. In some areas
of negotiations like
trade, the more issues you open up, the more tradeoffs are possible and you can make progress by making
concessions in one area and "collecting" in another. This does not work with immigration, however. Within each area of immigration, there are lobbies on both sides.
Thus, adding skilled immigration to the illegal immigration bill drew in the support of Intel, Microsoft etc.; but it also drew in opposition from
the lobbies representing the native engineers who opposed the use of skilled foreigners who would "take jobs
away from them." They said: We're not getting employed, why should we have more [visas]? So, in fact, instead of winning
the war for the bill, you simply added another battle ground! I firmly believe that the native opposition to skilled foreigners coming into the United States is harmful to us.
That causes a slew of protectionist measures
McGinnis & Movesian 2k John O. McGinnis is a professor of law at Northwestern University, Mark L. Movsesian is Professor of Law,
Hofstra University School of Law, “The World Trade Constitution.” Harvard Law Review. l/n.
As a result of real monetary losses and the patterns of human psychology, then, workers and owners in industries
adversely affected by free trade will
try to persuade the government to erect protectionist barriers. The realities of interest group politics suggest
that they will enjoy significant success. As concentrated groups, workers and owners can obtain substantial
benefits from government action. Consequently, these groups have strong incentives to provide campaign contributions and electoral support in return for
protectionist policies. In contrast, groups that benefit from free trade, such as consumers, are diffuse, and their gains, though large in the
aggregate, tend to be small on an individual basis. These groups have comparatively few incentives to contribute
time and money to lobby for free trade policies. Moreover, they face high agency costs in monitoring legislators to determine whether their
representatives are yielding to interest groups at the expense of society as a whole. For these reasons, citizens may choose to remain “rationally
ignorant” of almost all trade policy issues. So far, this account is the relatively familiar story of interest group politics. But protectionist
groups enjoy an additional advantage: they can exploit nationalist sentiments. These sentiments, which are
often deeply rooted in a country’s tradition and culture, can
have a positive impact on politics by encouraging the production of
public goods. For example, they facilitate the common defense and aid in rallying opposition to totalitarian oppression, as in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War.
Unfortunately, these sentiments can also provide cover for a variety of protectionist measures, like “Buy American”
and domestic-content laws, that are designed to benefit interest groups at the expense of the public. The trade
restrictions secured by protectionist interest groups are particularly deleterious to social welfare. It is well established in economic theory that the most effective way to
increase the income of disadvantaged groups is through direct transfer payments. For instance, direct transfer payments are preferable to rent control as a method of
improving housing for the poor because direct transfers lack the substantial deadweight loss that accompanies rent control. Instead, it is better to provide the poor with
housing vouchers. Similarly, with
the wealth generated by free trade, society can provide transfers to people with less
income, including those for whom trade provides no advantage or even a net disadvantage. For example, instead of pressuring the Japanese automobile industry to adopt
voluntary export restraints in the 1980s, the United States could have paid cash compensation to American autoworkers. This strategy would have cost far less than the $3
billion that American consumers ultimately spent in higher car prices.
Protectionism causes nuclear war and turns case
Panzner 8, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New
York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from
Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138, googlebooks)
Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious
Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which
many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster,
But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of
desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely
scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many
nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and
reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to
buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to
ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence
and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk
management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind
will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The
rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more
heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as
well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic
necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with
supply. Disputes
over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become
more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with
minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem
from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic
problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap
technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and
scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage
aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China
will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt
colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of
conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United
States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be
transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering
resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the
basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons
will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread
destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings
of a new world war.
1NC
The President of the United States of America should issue an executive order that expands
beneficiary eligibility for employment-based Facilitated Transit Documents to include F-1
Facilitated Transit Documents holders who graduate from a regionally accredited U.S.
university who are offered jobs in the United States aerospace industry and pass appropriate
security screening measures
The word “visa” creates a system of visual objectification that produces Orientalist US/Them
dichotomies
Szorenyi ‘4 (STHE FACE OF SUFFERING IN AFGHANISTAN: IDENTITY, AUTHENTICITY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE SEARCH FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE REFUGEE Anna Szorenyi* Anna Szorenyi
recently completed her PhD with the Centre for Women's Studies and Gender Research at Monash University,
and is a graduate of the 2001 School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University. Her doctoral thesis, tided
'Collected Suffering: Refugees on display in contemporary media', considers representations of refugees in
photography, documentary film and testimony. She can be contacted at annasz@mira.net. The writing of this
article was supported by a Monash University Postgraduate Publications Award. Thanks are due to Ashley
Woodward and Denise Cuthbert for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of the text.
Australia's recent Migration Legislaion Amendment (Idenlifcation and Authentication) Act, 2004 allows the collection of
personal identifiers, including fingerprints and handprints, photographs, audio and video recordings, signatures, iris
scans, and passports or other travel documents, from applicants for protection visas. Similar data, other than audio and
video recordings, may be collected from applicants for temporary safe haven visas.3 Division 13AA of the amended Act
allows the use of force in collecting such personal identifiers from those in immigration detention. As the tide of the act
suggests, authenticating the identity of asylum seekers has been given crucial importance in the project of protecting the
nation's borders. Within this process of identification, objective bodily facts are seen to carry more
evidentiary weight than the content of the asylum seekers' words. 4 The result is intrinsically objectifying.
National Geographic's 2002 film, Search for the Afghan Girl,seems at first to be a far more benevolent project than the
legislation, devoted to presenting its title character as a person in her own right. In the film, photographer Steve McCurry
goes in search of the subject of a photograph he took in 1984, a photograph which has become one of National
Geographic's most widely recognised images. The image is celebrated for its ability to 'reflect the anguish of refugees
worldwide' and has, we are told, inspired people to take up aid work in Afghanistan.6 The film is devoted to the process of
discovering this 'girl's' name and her current whereabouts. Unlike the legislation, the purpose of this project of
identification is not to render the woman's words irrelevant, but to authenticate them: towards the end of Search for the
Afghan Girl, the narrator triumphantly informs us that thanks to their efforts in discovering Sharbat Gula, 'the face that
inspired so many to give now has a voice.' 7 The process of discovering and validating the identity of this celebrated
figure, however, is familiar: after examination by an optometrist her photographs are subjected to FBI facial recognition
techniques and her eyes to iris scans. Precisely the techniques used by the legislation to exclude 'bogus' asylum
seekers in Australia are here used to identify an ideal representative of the deserving refugee. In this case, the
project is ostensibly not one of control, but of celebration. This essay addresses the cultural assumptions about
refugees which can produce such an uncanny convergence between the invasive apparatuses of border control and an
apparently benevolent exercise in humanitarian concern. What is it that produces this affinity between the
humanising gaze of the sympathetic refugee observer and the intrusive and objectifying gaze of border
policing? The answer, I will suggest, has to do with colonialist habits of representation which continue to
structure the relationship between the European technological gaze and the mysterious collectivised other who
is imagined as the natural object of this gaze. The scene produced by these assumptions is one in which the
aspiring national subject must be extracted from an anonymous and opaque mass of otherness and 'given' an
individual identity, before he or she can be recognised as a valid trigger for humanitarian concern. The result
of such an obsession with the authentication of identity is not so much to produce sympathy for refugees in
general, as to implicitly authorise the division of asylum seekers into 'authentic' and 'inauthentic'. This
narrative structure thus works as a kind of alibi, in which the increasing use of technologies of surveillance
against refugees can be recast as a benign effort to identify those refugees 'deserving' of sympathy . The
celebration of those who pass the tests obscures and implicitly justifies the relegation of the rest to cultural
insignificance and physical deprivation. In short, we shall see that for the outsider to the Western nation, there
is no voice without 'visa': the authorised status of having a technologically verified 'name' and 'face'. It is worth
noting that the concept of the visa is based around a particular regime of visuality. Etymologically, 'visa'
is the past participle of the French 'viser- to examine, view' and is defined as '[a]n entry or note on a passport,
certificate, or other official document signifying that it has been examined and found correct .'8 To receive a
visa, then, is to receive certification that one's passport - a combination of photograph and identifying name,
has been viewed and judged true. The essential requirement for entry to the nation is that one has a name and
a properly photographed face. The insight presented in this paper is that the structure of the visa is not limited
to the legislative realm. It is also mirrored in recurring cultural narratives. To track the cultural assumptions at
work in this relationship between refugees, authenticity and visual regimes of identification, I examine in detail two
cultural texts, both of which are narratives of Westerners searching for truth in Afghanistan. The first is the above
mentioned film Search for the Afghan Girl, which was broadcast on Australian national television in September 2002. The
second is the story of All Bakhtiyari, who has been called 'perhaps Australia's best known refugee',9 and whose identity
and country of origin were the subject of two 'fact-finding' missions to Afghanistan by investigative reporters from
separate Australian newspapers. Both these projects are constructed as processes of uncovering° and extracting an
authentic individual from an amorphous crowd of anonymous refugees. These elusive figures' access to the position of
recognisable subject worthy of compassion can apparently only be achieved through an intrusive and
objectifying process of verification and authentication. The prominence of Orientalist imagery within
these texts betrays their colonialist structure, a structure in which the mysterious 'other's' trajectory into
subjecthood becomes figurable only through a violent initiation into the superiority of Western technological
efficacy. Like the legislation, these texts fixate on concepts of 'identity' and 'authenticity' The process of validating the
authenticity of claimed identities is shown to be crucial not only to the legal process of determining which
asylum seekers should be offered a visa, but also to the cultural processes by which 'refugees' are rendered into
recognisable subjects worthy of engaging Western compassion. According to National Geographic's website 'How They Found National Geographic's
Afghan Girl', Steve McCurry's 1985 photograph, known as 'the Afghan girl' depicts 'one of the world's most famous faces ... Her image appeared on the front of magazines and books, posters, lapel pins,
and even rugs ... , 1 The portrait, showing a young woman with luminous green eyes, was chosen for the cover of National Geographic's 100 best pictures.12 It has become iconic to the extent that at the
time of writing my local independent bookshop carries a display from which boxes of postcards bearing the image can be purchased. These boxes do not carry any contextualising details, other than
McCurry's name. In the film, we discover that at the time the photograph was taken, McCurry did not record any details of the girl's identity. According to National Geographic's original article, to ask her
name would have been culturally insensitive.13 It is also usual for the 'Third-World' photography industry to publish photographs without giving the names of the subjects. Catherine Lutz and Jane
Collins, in their extensive research on National Geographic Magazine point out that the magazine generally follows this tradition, and that the absence of names is one of the main methods by which
portraits of single individuals can be made to stand not as individuals but as examples of a 'type'.14 As can be read from its title ('The Afghan Girl') this photograph was expected to portray a nationality as
well as an individual girl. Indeed, National Geographic see it as standing for refugees as a generalised category. They celebrate the fact that '... she has become a symbol that National Geographic has used
to illustrate the circumstances of refugees like her,' and that '[s]he stood for an entire group of refugees, not just Afghan refugees'.15 That the representative of this taxonomic category is a female child
only reinforces the common equation between the 'third world' and the passive, vulnerable and feminine. Nonetheless, this photograph seems to have crossed genres and been read as a portrait
photograph, showing not merely a representative type but a particular individual.16 The film states that McCurry began to get daily emails, letters and phonecalls asking about the girl's identity and
history. Such questions apparently inspired the 2002 return to the refugee camp in Pakistan where McCurry took the original photograph. From its opening statements, Search for the Afghan Girlis
presented as a detective story - a search for the truth. 'The mystery began...' is the narrator's first line, but it soon becomes clear that the mystery is not the sudden importance of this girl's identity. Rather
Afghanistan itself constitutes the mystery. The task is not only to find out what happened to this girl whose face has become so iconic, but to find the 'true' story of suffering in Afghanistan, as represented
by the picture. At the beginning of the film, we are provided with signifiers of 'Steve's' worthiness as a guide to this 'authentic' suffering Afghanistan. We are told of his long association and 'intimate
knowledge' of the region. References to reality, to presence and to truth abound: 'Steve is standing face to face with the teacher who allowed him in the tent school that day'; 'Together, they return to the
very spot where they both met the Afghan girl'. This 'very spot' is not Afghanistan but the Nasir Bagh refugee camp in Pakistan, near Peshawar. Peshawar is cast as the exotic location of the mystery in
textbook Orientalist fashion. As well as such hyperbole as 'Steve braces for a trip that will take him to the other side of the globe', we are treated to shots of 'Persian' carpets and bazaars. With a backdrop
of atmospheric music, we are told that Peshawar is 'A mix of the old and the new - it is a carpet that spans from the second century to the twenty- first century
.'17 As Said points out,
such imagery, repeated ad nauseum, constructs an 'East' that is unchanging and eternally mysterious, the
essential 'other' of the West.18 Rather than challenging such dehistoricised essentialism, the specific modern
history which produced the refugee camp where McCurry originally took the photograph only adds to the sense of
mystery in the form of confusion and impenetrability. 'There are few phones or addresses at Nasir Bagh camp. It's
such a maze that only the people who live here know their way around.' The task of finding one woman in such a maze is,
we are told, almost impossible. 'One woman, today possibly covered by a burqa, lost among millions'.19 The narrative
structure of Search for the Afghan Girl is thus one in which McCurry as authoritative white male acts as our guide to a
vast, mysterious and intrinsically confused region of exotic otherness. 20 The Orientalist statements by which these
images are accompanied remind us that such contrasts between the Western individual and the colonised
collectivity, whose members are seen not as individuals but as representatives of a category, have a history. As
Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, writing about the individualised subject of Western autobiographical practice, put it:
Since Western autobiography rests upon the shared belief in a commonsense identification of one individual with
another, all 'I's are potentially interesting autobiographers. And yet, not all are 'I's. Where Western eyes see man as a
unique individual rather than a member of a collectivity, of race or nation, of sex or sexual preference, Western eyes see
the colonized as an amorphous, generalized collectivity. The colonized 'other' disappears into an amorphous,
opaque collectivity of undifferentiated bodies. 21 Such representational habits have not disappeared in the
'postcolonlial' era. Refugees, it seems, are the contemporary recipients. The tendency to represent refugees in quantiy,
as vast masses of generic human need, recurs across the Western media. Perhaps the most familiar image of refugees is
the photograph of the mass refugee exodus: crowds of people on the move, crowded at borders or in refugee camps. The
textual equivalent of this mass homogenization is the simple reportage of numbers. The 'one' thing refugees rarely are in
these reports is one. The effect is to homogenise the refugees, the movement appearing not as a collection of specific and
different personal histories but as simply a vast amorphous mass which takes on the scale of a force of nature, as the
recurrent use of metaphors of 'floods', 'tides', and 'pipelines' demonstrates.22 As Liisa Malkki and Catherine Dauvergne
point out, such tropes are usually accompanied by corresponding associations of refugees with disorder.23 In
emphasising the uncharted status of Nasir Bagh camp, Search for the Afghan Girl contributes to this tradition. In
focussing on the story of a single refugee, however, Search for the Afghan Girl can also be located in relation to the rapidly
growing genre of efforts to 'humanise' refugees through the retelling of their personal histories.24 Such projects seem to
offer a self-evident antidote to the dehumanising effects of the representations of refugees as amorphous, threatening
hordes, and they have been undeniably effective in producing support for refugees in Australia and counteracting the
invisibility and silence imposed by the mandatory detention regime. However a consideration of Search for the Afghan
Girl shows that when combined with an uncritical reliance on orientalist imagery and an obsession with authenticity,
such attempts at individualisation can paradoxically reinforce a division of the world into 'we' individualised
humans and 'they', the homogenised masses of the 'third world'. They are also, as we will see, not incompatible
with the tradition of consumption of images of the other that began with the World Exhibition of 1851 and
continues today in the mass market for displays of 'third-world' trauma. 25
Orientalist US/Them dichotomies result in extinction
Batur ‘7 (Pinar Batur, PhD at UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology at Vassar, 2007, “The Heart of Violence: Global
Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations)
There needs to be a growing consensus on the part of human beings and organized society that penetrates the
very basis of human culture that mass killing is unacceptable to civilized peoples, otherwise the prevailing
momentum of historical experience will continue for generation after generation that genocide is a
phenomenon of nature, like other disasters, and this view of the inevitability of genocide as an almost natural
event will continue to justify in the sense of convincing people that nothing can be done. (Totten et al. 1977:
xxxix) War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem
is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them.
Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the
establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and
elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide.
But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the
path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the framework of global antiracist
confrontation. Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of
impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997)
with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the
workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between
African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior
value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize
this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic
racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,”
defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the
routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic reproduction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and
economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial
oppression to forge systemic coherency .
It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now
frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion,
war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding
privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over
immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial
space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racialized hierarchy of power. The expansion of
capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as
they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of
racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this
expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems
would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself
imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday
life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points
out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling
connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of
thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this
perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its
legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial
ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of
the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts
and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing
and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only
identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained
segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The
exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide.
Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by
the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led
to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide. Violence glued them together into seamless continuity.
Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses
how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for
both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are
integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe
into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this
dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and
imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent
destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the
context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now
demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit
the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity
of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of
newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and
exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.
The term Facilitated Transit Document solves Orientalism- EU-Russia border proves
Joenniemi ‘4 (2004-03-17 "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The EU's and Russia's North" Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada Pertti Joenniemi, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), pjo@diis.dk
As to Kaliningrad, the Russian discourses have evolved back and forth between very modernist, security-oriented
departures and clearly postmodern ideas that aim for Kaliningrad-specific solutions in a regionalised context. The fear for
being rolled over by the EU was, for example put aside in the autumn 1999 by outlining a medium-term strategy for the
development of Russia’s relations with the EU. The document prepared envisaged, among other things, a special
arrangement for Kaliningrad by suggesting that that the region should be seen as a ‘pilot region’ in the development of
EU-Russian relations, particularly with regard to other regions of north-western Russia.1 As observed by Christopher
Browning (2002:36), the proposal has been paralleled by moves from within Kaliningrad that call for the
internationalisation of the region and development of the Oblast into a linking space between the EU and Russia. The
current governor, Vladimir Jegorov, has been particularly active in this regard. Yet, the contest has basically been between
Russia and the EU at large. The Russian leadership addressed - at least at times - the issue as one of a test pertaining to
Russia's cooperation with the EU more generally. What was to prevail: the constitutional right of Russian citizens to travel
freely from one part of their country to another or Lithiania's right - as a future EU member country - to control the
movement of people across its territory (Poland was less of an issue due to a modest need of using Polish territory for
transit in the context of Kaliningrad)? As to Kaliningrad being in the sphere of the Schengen rules, Russia has
proposed visa-free arrangements and the establishment of a fast train connection between Kaliningrad and mainland
Russia. The line was to be operated without visas. Russia also aired the idea of skipping visas in general in the relations
between the EU and Russia. These proposals has, however, had modest impact. In the end, after heated debates, an
agreement was reached between the EU and Russia which implied that as of July 2003 Russians wishing to
travel between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia (by land or rail) have to acquire what is being termed as a
Facilitated Transit Document (FTD). One aspect of the dispute was solved by Lithuania and Russia signing an
intergovernmental readmission agreement in May 2003. In essence the FTD is a visa by another name, although not
a Schengen visa as it will apply only to transit through Lithuania. Kaliningrad’s borders are being treated as foreign and
EU-related borders, thereby compelling Russians travelling from one part of their own country to another one to comply
with procedures agreed with the EU. The EU showed flexibility in the sense that a specific (and in this sense
regionalised) visa was devised for the needs of Kaliningrad, albeit the solution can also be seen to be in harmony
with the EU’s more universalising aspirations (cf. Potemkina, 2003). It could be argued, against the background of
Russia’s rather heavy modernist legacy and self-understanding, that there has been quite many efforts of
exploring new ground. The ideas and initiatives that point in a different direction have all been coined in relation to the
challenges posed by the EU. Moreover, they have usually been Northern-Europe specific in character (the proposal to skip
visas in general stands as an exception here). The initiatives launched have not always been very well thought out, it
seems, or pursued systematically and consequently. Still, they have been there, and the EU has, for its part, put forward a
regionalist framework in the form of accepting the placement of the Northern Dimension on its agenda, through
participation in the Barents as well as Barents co-operation and more recently by approving the jointly agreed technical
frame for handling transit between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia. The at least in some cases assertive policies pursued
by Russia have occasionally paid off. 5. By Way of Conclusion In all, the various issues pertaining to the borders located
in the northern part of Europe have drawn the EU and Russia into a set of negotiations. Russia has recognised that
Union's expanding subjectivity in northern Europe and has in this sense gained an accepted voice in the process of
constructing political space and drawing borders. Instead of just being allotted with the position of a permanent
outsider, Russia has been able to aspire – largely by the usage of Kalinigrad’s position increasingly inside the
Union - for a position of a semi-insider rather than just being pushed into the post of a (close) outsider. It could
be argued that there has been a game of recognition (cf. Ringmar, 2002), in which the Union has achieved a more
established position if seen from the perspective of Russia but also the Union has granted Russia and the various Russian
proposals pertaining to organising political space and border-drawing in northern Europe at least some legitimacy.
However, the exchange of views that has emerged does not stand out as one between equal partners who basically share a
joint framework of thinking. Thus, a clash might still develop on other issues that Kaliningrad once the EU penetrates
further and enhances its subjectivity in the outer circles for example through the new neighbourhood policy (ENP). This
process seems to aspire at the establishment of "a ring of friends" treated on the basis of a coherent and uniform set of
principles, and this instead of respecting and making use of the specific conditions that largely constitute the motivational
ground for example in the case of the Northern Dimension. The reasons for potential tensions are many-fold. Arguably,
the Union’s Russia-policies are not very developed, and the EU has only recently been compelled to encounter more
concretely the various needs of Russia. As to the Union’s border-policies, the universalising tendencies tend to have an
upper hand, and region-specific measures are usually seen as breaking with such policies, thereby endangering the EU’s
credibility and ability to design and implement more general, all-encompassive policies. Deviations from general
norms and an approval of fuzziness at the outer edges would also challenge the Union’s rather stiff structure of
pillars and the pursuance of quite vertical policies, that is policies primarily on a clear-cut division between
those who are ‘in’ the Union and those who remain ‘out’. Hence, also the policies pursued in Northern Europe tend
to boil down to a redrawing of dividing lines, and this despite often preaching the opposite. An open Union is not taken to
be equal to a secure one. The integration project has thus gained considerable aspects – if seen from a Russian perspective
– of exclusion. It provides features of a self-other hierarchy. Being pressed, the Union is prepared to negotiate to correct
such impressions and accept compromises, albeit within relatively strict limits. The rules of the game are, in fact, not open
for discussion with the Union aspiring for the position of a unified and coherent actor. Once different logics and
conceptualisations collide, the EU does not opt for discussion between equal partners but basically insists on the
application of its own existing departures – understood as the only conceivable basis for commonly agreed norms. There is
almost no seeking (except in the context of the Northern Dimension and euroregions such as the Karelian one) for the
views of outsiders, nor is there any forwarding from the EU’s core of proposals and ideas designed to meet the needs of the
specific issues or regional concerns at hand. Russia is, for its part, not that well equipped to comprehend the EU’s logic in
the first place and hence misinterpretations may occur even in the future. Deviations from the modern, realist and
geopolitical logic calling for rather strict, statist borders has often been viewed with suspicion. Deviations are
interpreted as bringing about fragmentation, this spelling danger. Yet it appears that it has, for the most part,
been Russia that has occasionally experimented with some specific postmodern, regionalised ideas, being thus
able to appeal to the Union’s own rhetorics about openness, freedoms, de-bordering as well as region-building.
The various proposals pertaining to the Kaliningrad puzzle demonstrate this quite clearly as does the idea of
skipping visas in the EU-Russia relationship, although it also becomes obvious that the strategy has so far been met
with relatively little success. The reaching out and appealing to the EU’s rhetorics on inclusiveness, openness and
horizontal approaches has not helped either. The construction of fuzzy borderlands in view of Russia has not appealed to
the EU and the offensive play by utilizing the margins in an innovative and spontaneous rather than strictly rule-bound
and administrative manner has not – at least not yet – paid off in any decisive manner. The lack of success could reside in
Russia’s own uncertainty about whether the postmodern approaches are really what are called for. Russia has by and large
been able to launch proposals without fearing that the seriousness of the suggested ideas will eventually be put to a test as
the EU has quite rarely been willing to capitalize on these proposals. This inability pertains, in one of its aspects, to what
Browning labels the EU’s ‘internal/external security paradox, i.e. a constellation that calls for the reproduction of
modernist understandings of subjectivity, central to which is the notion that subjects require clearly demarcated territorial
spaces and borders over which they exercise sovereign control. The conflation of identity, territory and sovereignty
embedded in the paradox also tends to lead to the reification of selfhood to the negative characterisation of those outside
the borders of the EU as potential threats to the Union’s security. The subjectivity and recognition of actors such as Russia
as legitimate partners – in the form of semi-insiders - is thus undermined. Borders are, in this context, comprehended as
lines of differentiation and exclusion. Such an approach turns problematic if applied in rather regionalised context
furnished with networking and a variety of overlapping spaces, and that is what the essence of Northern Europe is
increasingly about. Russia is by no means a champion of such a trend but has at least occasionally been able to tune in to
such development as indicated by the negotiations that emerged in the context of Kaliningrad. The postmodern views
pertaining to debordering and region-specific solutions offered a bridge to talks with the Union, thereby also
bolstering the subjectivity of Russia, as the proposals have qualities that resonate with the Union's own
rhetorics.
1NC
VIEWING THE WORLD AS SOMETHING TO BE ESCAPED REDUCES IT TO MERE
“PLANETARY MATTER”, TURNING LIFE INTO AN ABYSS AND DESTROYING ONTOLOGICAL
SECURITY
Turnbull, 2006- Nottingham Trent University (Neil, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary
World”, SAGEJournals Online, REQ) JRC—no change
In the ‘parable of the madman’, Nietzsche addressed what he believed to be the consequences of Copernican
astronomy and Darwinian evolutionary theory for Western culture’s most cherished and deeply held moral and
metaphysical convictions (Nietzsche, 1977: 202–3). In his view, rather than producing ‘Enlightenment’ and liberating
humanity from the dead hand of religious dogma and superstition, these theories threatened to undermine the moral
and intellectual foundations of life in the West. According to Nietzsche, Copernicanism and Darwinism endangered
the ancient, residual, yet still ubiquitous, metaphysical idea that there is an ultimate foundation or ‘ground’ to the
universe, capable of cognizance, and of ‘rationally supporting’ judgement in all its forms. Nietzsche encapsulated the
theological dimensions of these anxieties in his claim that ‘God is Dead’. However, as many have pointed out, this was no simple countertheological statement, bu t a warning about the bottomless void – what might be termed the ‘spatial nihilism’ – implicit within the
‘new cosmology’. For in Nietzsche’s view, with the quest for greater epistemological self-assuredness, modern
humanity is in danger of not only sacrificing its traditional bases of meaning, but of losing the very idea that the world
exists as something fixed, stable and significant. Thus the madman asks the crowd: ‘[w]hither are we moving now?
Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward forward, sideward in all directions? Is there any up or
down left? Are we not straying as if through an infinite nothing?’ (Nietzsche, 1977: 203). Essentially, Nietzsche’s claim is that Copernicanism
and Darwinism force us to question the significance of both the Greek Humanist and theJudeo–Christian conceptions of humanity and its world (that is, to think beyond the territorialization of
Western philosophy as somewhere between ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’). In Nietzsche’s view, modern metaphysics is both ‘groundless’ and ‘simian’ because, after Copernicus and Darwin, ‘the
earth does not stand fast’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 2) and ‘man is more of an ape than any ape’ (Nietzsche, 1969: 42). In such a context Nietzsche’s madman is not a prophet of lost archaic theological
certainties, but a new voice of sanity, castigating, warning and exhorting his ‘metaphysically somnambulant’ audience to wake up to the truly frightening placelessness of modernity’s Copernican
and Darwinian forms of life. And many who have followed Nietzsche in this regard have noted that the key to understanding the significance of modernity’s unheimlich ontology resides within a
. As Nietzsche’s heir Martin Heidegger famously
claimed, when seen in Copernican planetary-cosmological terms, the earth is no longer the earth in any vital or lived
sense but simply an object comprised of ‘purely technological relationships’ and an object, moreover, that is
subjectivized into a representation, a vorstellung, that ‘stands before us’ rather than as something in ‘our midst’
(Heidegger, 1993: 105–6). For Heidegger, once perceived and conceived as a visual representation of a planetary
bounded whole, the earth becomes ‘deworlded’: appearing as just one more casual system within a much wider
cosmological causal order. And this is why for Heidegger – in his much-cited reflections on this matter – the interplanetary images of the earth from
space are not simply the end product of a rather complex and powerful set of technological process that enframe the
earth as a mass industrialized object, but are images that radically diminish the meaning of the earth, rendering
humanity without a world within which to dwell (a theme that I return to later). When seen in Heideggerian terms,
Copernicanism reduces the earth to mere ‘planetary matter’; an absurd and inhuman cosmic accident devoid of any
ultimate sense or significance. In such a context we can no longer speak of a meaningful world at all, because when the
earth is ‘reduced’ to a visual representation, it ceases to be a context of significance but stands as something that
‘transcends all tacitly shared assumptions’. As such, it is ‘beyond all frameworks – an abyss’ (Wood, 2002: 15). It
becomes a ‘spectral earth’ – a mere flicker of light in the cosmological void. As Lyotard claimed, as a Copernican technologized object the earth
‘isn’t at all originary’ but merely a ‘spasmodic state of energy, an instant of established order, a smile on the surface of matter in a remote corner of the
cosmos’ (Lyotard, 1991: 10). Thus the modern astronaut is seen as one of the primary agents of modern worldlessness
broader appreciation of the way in which the new cosmology has undermined traditional conceptions of earth
in Heideggerian philosophy (and one is immediately struck by the phenomenological similarities between the spatial nihilism of Nietzsche’s madman and the free-floating placeless experience
). For when the earth is seen from an astronautic point of view, all traditional human concerns are
deterritorialized and strangely diminished to the extent that interplanetary representations of the earth threaten to
sever the connection between humanity and its traditional ontological supports. Heideggerian scholars such as Robert
Romanyshyn have developed this idea and used it as the basis for an existential critique of ‘the mad astronaut’: the
quintessentially modern avatar that stands as the highest expression of modernity’s unheimlich rootlessness. Romanyshyn’s is
a critique of what might be termed ‘the astronautic condition of modernity’ (1989; 200), as, in Romanyshyn’s view, the modern astronaut – what so many modern
Western children want to ‘grow up to be’ – is a metaphor for a hypermodern cultural-psychological dream of distance,
departure and escape from matter that reveals a world of pure ‘spectacular wonder’, and that disguises and perhaps
even obliterates those deep and emotional connections to the earth that maintain a sense of ontological security and lived
of the modern astronaut
reality.
INSECURITY IS AN INEVITABLE CONDITION OF EXISTENCE—THE DRIVE FOR PERFECT
SECURITY TURNS LIFE INTO A STANDING RESERVE THAT NECESSITATES ENDLESS
WARFARE.
Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research
in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]
There can be no security. If being is what threatens then security as the absence of terror would be the absence of
being. But the absence of being is precisely the threat. Obviously, security is just as little to be found in the absence
of danger as it is in the consummation of the danger, total annihilation. Instead, security is to be found within the
danger and threat of being. But how? Heideggerlikewise provides us endangered ones with a way of thinking
security and preservation. This is his fourth contribution to a thinking of terrorism. Security and assurance, both equally
apt translations of the German Sicherung, are indissociable from certainty (Gew it) for IHeidegger. In the course of the 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger provides a brief history of this
relation between security and certainty: "the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the
(Sicherung), "In the
quest for mathematical certainty, what is sought is the assurance of man in nature, in thesensible, in the quest for
the certainty of salvation, what is sought is the assurance of man in the suprasensible world" (VS, 30/14).22 Certainty is in the service of assurance or security and is only the epistemological
aspect of a greater ontological condition of security. Security is freedom from uncertainty in all of its forms,
sensible, super-sensible, and ontological. Salvation and the mathematical certainty of nature are themselves to be
understood as instances of an ontological assurance against uncertainty. Ontological uncertainty would be found in
conceptions of singularity, where the uniqueness of a thing renders it irreplaceable and thus opens us to the
possibility of loss, or in conceptions of alterity, where the other is not anticipated and confined in advance to the
strictures of categorical thought. Uncertainty in this broader sense is eliminated in security. One is securely insulated against these differences of the world. For modern
thought, the securing of representations for representational thinking provided the backdrop for the arrival of certainty (see GA 7: 82; EP, 98). Modern metaphysics itself,
according to Heidegger, "means the securing of the human being by itself and for itself" (GA 67: 167). Such a policy
must be abandoned as the human becomes more and more a piece of the standing-reserve like everything else . This
postmodern security is accomplished through bestowal and appraisal of value, "Securement, as the obtaining of
security, is grounding in valuation" (GA 5: 262/195; tin). What is valued can be replaced by something of equal
value, and this fact lies at the center of our conception of security today. Securement, as a giving of value, assures us
against loss by making the world replaceable. In this respect, security is nothing other than total
availability, imagined as a world of utter transparency where all resources, human and otherwise,
are constantly surveilled and traced through their paths of circulation. The transformation in being
coincident with the end of modern warfare likewise puts an end to modern politics and establishes in its place an
impersonal commitment to the furthering of planned replacement. Security is only possible when everything works
according to these plans, and this requires "leaders," whose true function now becomes evident. For the plan, "the
necessity of 'leadership', that is, the planned calculation of the securing of the whole of beings, is required" (GA 7:
89-90/EP, 105; tm). The demand for security is always a call for such Fiihrers. Planning is a matter of ensuring the
smooth and "frictionless" circulation of resources along channels and pipelines of order and delivery. The plan's
success is assured from the outset, because beings are now in essence planable. The mathematical tracking of stock and supplies becomes a
search for the mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo)" (VS, 30/13). Heidegger unites these two concerns for certainty within a single concept: assurance
total tracking when things have become completely available. Nothing is concealed from this taking of inventory, with the effect that the mathematical model of the thing is no different from the
thing itself. The mathematical modeling of things, an operation that Heidegger traces back to Ockham and the nominalist split between word and thing (see VS, 30-31/13-14), is paradigmatic
for the disappearance of identifiably discrete beings under the rule of technology. The model is no longer a representation of what is modeled but, in a paradoxical manner, the thing itself.
Everything essential to the thing is contained in the model, without
remainder. Such is the truth of the standing-reserve; it is a collapse of the distances that made possible
representation. Without that spacing, there is only the suffocating rush of the standing-reserve along the circuitry of
the plan.The plan makes manifest the self-willing nature of technology, in that the plan has no purpose other than to assure its own expansion
and increase. For the plan to function, it is therefore necessary that beings be consumed and their replacements follow right upon
them. The plan plans for consumption, outlining the paths and channels that the standing-reserve will occupy in its
compelled obedience to order. The world wars have pointed towards this end, according to Heidegger, for "They
press toward a securing of resources [Bestandsicherung] for a constant form of consumption" (GA 7: 88; EP, 103-4;
tm). This consumption is synonymous with replacement, since there is nothing lost in consumption that is not
immediately replaced. The plan is to protect itself from loss by completely insulating itself from uncertainty. The
plan seeks "the 'all-inclusive' [restlose] securing of the ordering of order" (GA 7: 92; EP, 107; tm). Order is only
secured when there is nothing that resists it, nothing that remains in "disorder." Any remainder would stand
outside of the prevailing order, as would any difference , in complete disorder. There is another Nietzschean intimation in this, as Heidegger reads the will
Nothing beyond the thing's mathematical model is recognized.
to power as a drive to secure and order all chaos. Without remainder (restlose), without rest, the standing-reserve threatens to encompass everything in a monotonous,
The more secure the world becomes, the greater is the abandonment of being as it is further enframed
within the plan. Homeland security is thus an oxymoron, since one of the most prominent effects of planning is the
elimination of national differences and "homelands." Security itself is precisely the planned elimination of
differences, and as for "homeland," it is ever more difficult to conceive of a homeland that would be nationally
distinct from another.
swirling sameness.
THE AFFS TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARISTIC SOLUTIONS INEVITABLY REPRODUCE
THE SAME ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHES THAT KILL BILLIONS. THIS DISCOURSE OF
MANAGEMENT CREATES AN ECLIPSE OF BEING AND THE VIEW OF EARTH AS STANDING
RESERVE TO BE DISPOSED OF. VOTE NEGATIVE TO BREAK THE CONFINES OF
TECHNOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN AN ACT OF DOING NOTHING.
Ladelle McWhorter. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University. “Guilt as Management Technology:
A Call to Heideggerian Reflection.” Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. 1992. pp. 1-3
Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn — on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even
the most casual of conversations everywhere — we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and
omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of
technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked
consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying
of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that
industrial pollution —
thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered,
probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within
humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or,
when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some
technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies
disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological
balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity
followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it
would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the
problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do? Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to
think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically . Once we begin to move with and into
Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still
believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist
within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but
paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution
(hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes
. At a time when the stakes are so very
high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do — nothing. If we get
possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger frustrates us
beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon
paradox; how
is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic
of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining
control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought
through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that
must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very
structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call
is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of
our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."' Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think
through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also
ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human . What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today,
on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural
resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational
facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient
and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But
wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates
from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we
approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to
break down. We have become a society of managers — of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies — so is it surprising that we set ourselves up
as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays — in particular the beautiful
1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" — Heidegger
speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age.
This danger is a kind of forgetfulness — a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster
or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and
who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their
relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it
forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some
thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery' is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the
occurring together of revealing and concealing.
1NC
Text: The United States should offer to negotiate a Code of Conduct for acceptable space
practices with any other interested space faring nation. This should include the extension of a
conditional offer to China that it will negotiate rules of the road for the use of space as long
both China and the United States refuse to engage in practices that contribute to the
militarization of space, including the launch of solar power satellites, and offer reciprocal
verification. The president should authorize transparency measures to allow international
monitors from any country that agrees to a Code of Conduct to allow verification of United
States adherence to the Code of Conduct. The United States federal government should mine
the moon for Helium 3.
There is a narrow window of opportunity for the counterplan—other countries have doubts
about whether the U.S. is actually going to militarize space and the counterplan provides
crucial reassurance that will dampen pressure to militarize internationally
Hitchens. 2007. (Theresa, Director for Center for Defense Information “The Perfect Storm: International
Reaction to the Bush National Space Policy” Space Policy
http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070322-103.pdf)
Obviously, the Chinese ASAT test raises the specter of a negative action-reaction cycle between Washington
and Beijing—and on the face of it represents the worst-case scenario stemming from the misunderstandings
and misperceptions fostered by the NSP and US declaratory policy on space. Dramatic near-term responses to
the new US space policy by other space-faring nations seem unlikely, as other nations are instead more liable
to wait to see how Washington moves to implement the policy. Given growing fiscal constraints on
US spending and the change of Congressional leadership to the Democrats—both factors that could impact
how much leeway the Bush administration has to invest in any new space programs or efforts—a ‘watch and
wait’ policy would seem to make sense. That said, there remains potential for subtle reactions by others,
including allies, in the short and medium term that could have negative repercussions for the US. In Europe,
several questions arise regarding future transatlantic relations in space. A fundamental issue, according to
diplomats, is in regards to balancing cooperation with Russia and the US on future exploration missions.
Moscow has been actively lobbying for higher levels of space cooperation with Europe, an initiative that has the direct backing of
President Putin, according to European officials. Indeed, the European Space Agency and the Roskosmos on 10 March 2006 signed a pact designed to boost cooperation in a wide range of space activities
uropean officials perceive less of a commitment to civil space cooperation by the US, so they
have been slow to consider US plans. Meanwhile, Europe is attempting to agree on its own European Space Policy, an effort that is expected to come to fruition in 2008. One
of the questions underlying that effort is the extent to which Europe needs to establish strategic autonomy in space, including in the military arena. To the extent that the new
NSP furthers the long-standing perception in Europe that the US is an unstable and even unwilling partner in
space—on the civil and commercial side, as well as, the military side—European thinking may be nudged
further in the direction of autonomy and overtures by Russia for cooperation may look more attractive.
from exploration to launch vehicles.34 E
Limitations on research and development of space weapons are good—most countries can’t
weaponize now, but a US move to develop new technology will cause our enemies to copy our
technology—thus ensuing space arms race would tank hegemony. The counterplan’s
conditional offer provides an adequate hedging capability
Karl Mueller, Analyst @ RAND, March 27, 2002 (Is Weaponization of Space Inevitable?
http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/mueller.html)
2. Enlightened Self-Interest. The second scenario assumes that space weapons do in fact prove to be fairly
useful and cost-effective. In this case, there is a good chance that U.S. security in particular would be best
served by perpetuation of the space sanctuary for purely nationalist reasons: as the leading spacefaring state
and the country most dependent upon satellites for its military power and economic wealth, the United States
has the most to lose if those satellites become more vulnerable to attack. In addition, having invested vast
resources in developing a preponderance of land, sea, air and unweaponized space power, a true space weapon
revolution that wiped the clean the slate of military competition might well represent a net power loss for the
United States relative to its rivals (as the steam, ironclad, and Dreadnought revolutions each did in turn for the
Royal Navy).[40] One approach to dealing with this problem would be for the United States to announce a
policy of conditional unilateral restraint in space weaponization: that it will not be the first nation to weaponize
space, although it will continue to develop the relevant technologies in order to be prepared to respond in kind
should other states violate the sanctuary. In this scenario, such an approach would not be motivated by an
idealistic belief that eschewing space weapons would inspire or shame other states to do the same. Instead, it
would be based on a hard-nosed, realist calculation: U.S. space weaponization would not only encourage other
states to follow suit, but would greatly assist them in doing so, since they would be able to exploit the
advantages of backwardness after the United States had paid the costs of trailblazing the new
technologies. With the United States not leading the way, yet threatening to lift its self-restraint in the
absence of reciprocity from its rivals (thus denying them the hope of establishing hegemony in space), other
states might well find insufficient value in initiating space weaponization to justify its costs.
Only a space code of conduct solves the risks of weaponization and de-escalates the drive
towards a space arms race
Wright, 7 - co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (David, Boston
Globe, “Protecting our future in space”, 10/3,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/10/03/protecting_our_future_in
_space/)
So, in looking forward, we need to figure out how to protect these space assets. And to do that, we must recognize
that the space environment has changed dramatically since the Soviets launched a 2-foot-wide metal ball back in October
1957. First, space is now multinational. For decades, the United States and Soviet Union dominated space, but today more
than 50 countries own satellites or a share in one, and nine countries have successfully launched satellites. People in
nearly every corner of the globe now depend on the services satellites provide. As a result, space is getting crowded. Over
the last five decades, the number of objects in space has increased dramatically. Today, more than 850 operating satellites
and nearly 700,000 pieces of debris larger than a marble orbit the Earth. A collision with such a piece of debris could
damage or destroy a satellite. Laws and "rules of the road" to guide operations in space, and controls on the production of
space debris are increasingly necessary. Meanwhile, some resources are at a premium: Slots in the highly sought-after
"geostationary band," the part of space where satellites can remain over a given point on Earth, are assigned by the
International Telecommunications Union on a first-come, first-served basis. Many developing countries are concerned
that slots won't be available when they are ready to use one. Second, space is in danger of becoming weaponized.
While space has long supported military forces through reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellites, there
currently are no weapons based in space. The Bush administration, however, has been pushing to develop weapons to
deny other countries the use of space; these include space-based interceptors, which could be used to attack satellites.
Meanwhile, China's successful test of an antisatellite weapon last January dramatically demonstrated that satellites are
already at risk. Left unchecked, the fear that controlling space may afford a decisive military advantage threatens
to trigger a space arms race. That would divert economic and political resources from other pressing issues, and hinder
international cooperation necessary to make progress on such problems as nuclear nonproliferation and terrorism. In
addition, increasing reliance on satellites for crucial military functions could cause instability in a crisis. Military
war games suggest that the loss of important satellites, such as reconnaissance satellites, could spark a quick escalation in
a conflict. Increased congestion and the threat of weaponization pose an important challenge: How do we
continue to reap the benefits of space and avoid conflict? That requires a new model for space. Long over are the
"Wild West" days when most viewed space as sparsely populated with little need for laws and rules, and so vast that no
one was worried about degrading the environment. This new model must reflect our modern, interconnected world. It
requires a legal framework to regulate space traffic, allocate limited resources equitably, and provide ways to
resolve disputes. Particularly important are limits on potentially harmful or destabilizing technologies, such as
a ban on testing and use of weapons that destroy satellites, and verification measures to instill confidence in
and strengthen adherence to the regime. Forty years ago this month, the Outer Space Treaty entered into force. The
treaty bans stationing weapons of mass destruction in space and extends the UN Charter to cover space operations. It lays
out the fundamental principles for governing space, which should be used to create a legal framework that addresses
today's issues and technologies. To do this, international negotiations are urgently needed. Some steps have been taken,
but much more work is needed, especially on military issues. Since 1994, a handful of countries, including the United
States, has blocked efforts to begin international negotiations on space arms control. Given its long history in
space, the United States, which owns more than half of the active satellites orbiting today, instead should be
promoting negotiations to protect our future in space as well as security on Earth.
Here’s our solvency advocate for moon mining
Lasker 06—Writer in the Christian Science Monitor
[John, 12/15, Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel, http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2006/12/72276?currentPage=2]
NASA's planned moon base announced last week could pave the way for deeper space exploration to Mars, but one of the biggest beneficiaries may be the
terrestrial energy industry. Nestled among the agency's 200-point mission goals is a proposal to mine the moon for fuel used in fusion reactors -- futuristic power
plants that have been demonstrated in proof-of-concept but are likely decades away from commercial deployment. Helium-3 is considered a safe,
environmentally friendly fuel candidate for these generators, and while it is scarce on Earth it is plentiful on the moon. As a result, scientists have
begun to consider the practicality of mining lunar Helium-3 as a replacement for fossil fuels.
Mining would revolutionize the world and spur space explaration
Bright 07—editor of eastfeild
[James, 9/26, Helium 3 could revolutionalize the world,
http://media.www.eastfieldnews.com/media/storage/paper1070/news/2007/09/26/OnCampus/Mining.The.Moon-2994100.shtml]
Imagine a world that is not dependent on petroleum and fossil fuels, a world which has taken a giant leap forward towards space colonization.
Although this may seem like an impossibility, this utopia is getting closer to becoming a reality and I welcome it with open arms. Currently The
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space Colonization Technical Committee is developing plans to have a moon base established as early as 2015
according to a position statement on www.aiaa.org. Aside from the obvious interest of lunar colonization, a rare type of Helium called Helium 3 could be
mined from the surface of the moon and then transferred by shuttlecraft to Earth. H3 is what powers our Sun . Particles of the element are pushed off from
the sun and then bombarded by cosmic rays which knock neutrons out of the Helium particles. The particles then combine, forming H3. The benefits of H3 are
unquestionable. The compound can be used a safer fuel for nuclear reactors. Just the concept of safer nuclear power plants excites me. But
unfortunately there are only small amounts of H3 on Earth. There is enough to be studied but not be utilized.The Earth-bound H3 burns up in the
atmosphere, where as the moon has no atmosphere and is therefore literally coated with the compound. The reason we would want to harness the
power of H3 is due to its incredibly low rate of radioactivity. The dangers of a nuclear fusion reactor would be reduced to only minor threats
according to popularmechanics.com. H3 will not wear down nuclear reactors as fast as Uranium, therefore reducing the cost needed to replace the
reactors. My question is, why are we not publicizing this? It's a great idea. The ability to colonize the moon and reduce the use of our depleting fossil fuels is
an invaluable resource. As long as our Sun exists we would never run out of H3. For the first time the world would be looking at an infinite supply of
energy. Aside from the elimination of highly-radioactive reactors and reduction of the use of fossil fuels the moon mining would create a whole new
section for the global economy. The AIAASCTC's document asks for the United States to set up the lunar colony with the help of other international space agencies,
so a free-market economy would be created for the area of mining and scientific research. This process would narrow the dividing lines between our country and other
countries with space-exploration programs. I just hope we as a people are able to put our greed aside. This new development would be a major step
forward towards global peace and understanding because of the need for several countries to work as one. Lastly, this would take us closer to the
possibility of deep space exploration. It would be the first steps towards colonizing Mars. Telescopes could be set up on the surface of the Moon to
view deeper parts of space with out any interference from an atmosphere. For these reasons, lunar colonization would launch us into a new area of
progress for our economy and civilization.
Space Weap
TURN – A BUILDUP OF SPACE WEAPONS WOULD CAUSE COUNTRIES TO ATTACK OUR
SATELLITES AND CAUSE A GLOBAL WAR AND EXTINCTION
Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte and Helwich, Teaching
Fellows in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 20N (Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, lSlS
Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads", No. 6 July,
http:llwww.isisuk.demon.co.uklO811lisis/uk/bmd/no6.htmI)
A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of ‘peace through strength' deterrence, but this
rationale glosses over the tendency that I.. . the presence of space weapons ... will result in the increased likelihood
of their use.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnabv: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite
warfare technologies go hand-in- hand1.34
The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of space borne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of
Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that
ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling
through the Earth's atmosphere.
The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose’ pressure into strategic calculations, with the
specter of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger devices. In theory, automation would enhance
survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of
human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of
accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated
components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all
the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[the odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system
characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable.36 Deployment of space weapons
with we-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable,
given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. according to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman , 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space
strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage - even more than would be done by a
nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defense analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people1.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is
not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force,
including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in
space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.
3. TURN – ECONOMY
A. US PUSH FOR SPACE WEAPONIZATION SHIFTS R&D AWAY FROM THE COMMERCIAL
SECTOR KILLING THE ECONOMY
Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President April 18, 2002, <“Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy
Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons” http://cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm>
Kubaski and other U.S. industry leaders are predicting little growth in the commercial sector in the near term.
Corporate chieftains at major defense and space firms already are citing missile defense as a much more lucrative
future market than commercial/civil space operations. Such a market assessment by U.S. industry is not without
consequences. As one corporate strategist at a major U.S. defense/space firm explained, market assessments drive
where corporate research and development dollars go.
40 Considering that it is industry, rather than DoD and NASA, that carries the bulk of R&D spending in the defense
and civil space arena, there is some possibility that an emphasis on space weaponization could shift technology
investment from the commercial to the defense world.
Granted, this would hold only for those firms — such as Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Co., Raytheon Co., and
TRW — that do large percentages of government businesses, rather than for those companies more vested in the
commercial end of space operations (providing telecommunications and Internet services for example.)
Nonetheless, the ramifications of shifting R&D on market edge in the commercial arena deserve some
consideration.
Interestingly, the U.S. industry has not done as well over the past two years as the overall marketplace. Overall, the
worldwide market rebounded in 2000 with a 23 percent growth in revenue, according to the Satellite Industry
Association. The association data show that while the global market for satellite manufacturing grew by 9 percent in
2000, U.S. revenue declined by 11 percent. Similarly, worldwide revenue in the satellite launch segment grew by 29
percent in 2000, whereas U.S. revenue grew only by 17 percent.
39
NUCLEAR WAR
The Baltimore Examiner 9 [“Will this recession lead to World War II,” 2/26, http://www.examiner.com/x-3108Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this-recession-lead-to-World-War-III]
Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by
looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of
Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign
resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to
rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements
arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and
led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession,
will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war?
Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it
gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself.
TURN – MENTALITY SHIFT
SPACE WEAPONS CREATE A USE THEM OR LOSE THEM MENTALITY—PROVES RISK OF
ACCIDENT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE
Rosenberg, journalist, 2004 Barry, 2004 Carnegie Challenge, “The Weaponization of Space: Divided Viewpoints, Uncertain
Directions http://www.carnegie.org/pdf/weap_space_chal_paper.pdf
Like ground-based nuclear weapons, space-based weapons are first-strike “use-them-or-lose-them” assets. The
inclination would be to use such weapons if they were threatened, which could escalate small conflicts into larger,
more serious ones possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons.
PRE-EMPTIVE WAR MEANS WE ACCESS NUCLEAR WAR BEFORE YOU GET THE BENEFITS
Lewis, 04 - Post doctorate Fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, (Jeffery, July “What if Space Were
Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Conflict Scenarios” Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf
The Pentagon’s assessments of Chinese ASATs are based largely on circumstantial evidence — a Hong Kong
newspaper report here; a commercial purchase by a Chinese company there. In fact, the Pentagon admits that
“specific Chinese programs for a laser ASAT system have not been identified” and that press reports of a so-called
“parasitic” microsatellite “cannot be confirmed.” 28 Such gaps in U.S. knowledge are dangerous, given the natural
tendency of defense planners to assume the worst. Although Blue claimed that it had acted on
“unambiguous warning” of a threat to space assets, the mere fact that the Chinese might already have such system
— or could improvise a crude ASAT in a pinch — would create a strong incentive to use U.S. space systems before
they were lost. It is not too far fetched to imagine the president, faced with a crisis over Taiwan, deciding — as he
did with Iraq — that “we cannot wait for the final proof — the smoking gun —that could come in the form of a
mushroom cloud.”29
TURN – PLAN KILLS HEGEMONY
A. PREVENTING MILITARIZATION IS VITAL TO MILITARY SUPERIORITY
Hartung, 05 (William, senior research fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School, “Weapons in
space put the world at risk”, 7/13, Seattle Post Intelligencer,
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/232239_spaceweapons13.html)
Satellites save lives and support our economy by predicting the weather, helping first responders provide
emergency assistance, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid in cases of natural disaster and by making cell
phones, pagers and modern financial transactions possible. A weapons-free space environment also allows the
United States to maintain its military superiority by supporting state-of-the-art reconnaissance, communications
and targeting capabilities. Placing weapons in space that can shoot down another nation's satellites will encourage
them to respond in kind, putting U.S. satellites at risk.
B. SPACE WEAPONIZATION CRUSHES U.S. HEGEMONY IN THE LONG-TERM
Center for Defense Information, 4-18-02, Theresa Hitches- CDI Vice President, “Weapons in Space: Silver
Bullet or Russian Roulette?,” http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
It is quite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing as the atomic
weapons race proved to be. Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in
the long run that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with spacebased weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of
opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities — raising the proverbial question of whether we
would be starting a game we might not be able to win.
RUSSIA AND CHINA PUSHING FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF SPACE NOW
Interfax News, 8 (“Russia, China call for international ban on space arms race,” 5-23-08, Lexis)
Beijing, 23 May: Russia and China a calling for peaceful use of space, oppose placing their weapons and a space
arms race and suggest this be regulated with a separate legal act. "The sides are calling for peaceful use of
space, against stationing weapons in space and space arms race, stress the importance of the preparation of a
relevant international legal act within the disarmament conference in Geneva," says the joint declaration on
international issues, signed in Beijing on Friday [23 May] by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev and Chinese
President Hu Jintao. At the beginning of this year Russia and China put forward an initiative to ban
militarization of space. "The Chinese side thinks that an agreement of this kind has big significance for peace
and stability in the world and hopes for a positive reaction from all countries to the project that was put
forward, an official representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Liu Jianchao, said.
EVEN IF OTHER COUNTRIES DEVELOP SPACE WEAPONS, THEY WON’T ATTACK THE U.S.,
AND IT WOULD BE EASIER TO USE CONVENTIONAL MEANS—THIS EVIDENCE ALSO
PROVES THAT TERRESTRIAL COUNTERMEASURES NULLIFY THE BENEFITS OF
MILITARIZATION
Mueller, 02 (Karl, analyst at the Rand Corporation, “Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?”, Prepared
for presentation at the International Studies Association Annual Convention,
http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/mueller.html)
The third inevitability argument holds that rapidly growing American commercial investment in and economic dependence on space technology will make attacking U.S. satellites very attractive to enemy
states, and that the United States will need to build space weapons in order to defend them.[22] American industry, commerce, and civil society more generally do indeed depend heavily and increasingly
on space systems for communications, navigation, weather prediction, and many other functions.[23] From this reality it seems just a short leap to the conclusion that what is important to us must be an
it is not clear that
attacking U.S. space assets would actually appear to be worthwhile for an enemy seeking ways to hurt the
United States, or that protecting them would require weapons in space. It is important to consider why an enemy might want to attack U.S.
attractive target for our enemies, and another easy step to the implication that averting this danger will require the active defense of satellites in orbit. However,
commercial satellites. The most obvious reason would be simply to hurt the United States or, more likely, to coerce it to change its behavior in order to avoid further punishment—in other words, for
terrorist purposes, broadly defined. The second would be to damage or disrupt the U.S. economy in order to gain a power advantage over it, most likely during a war or other protracted conflict, although
at the operational level such economic warfare would look very similar to terrorist or coercive attacks against economically valuable targets.[24]
In the abstract, it is clear why an enemy seeking to harm or to intimidate the United Sates might want to attack
important satellites, potentially causing considerable disruption of the services it provides, destroying
expensive pieces of American infrastructure, and possibly even causing significant damage to the U.S.
economy.[25] Although major acts of state-sponsored terrorism directed against the United States have been
relatively infrequent, such a coercive strategy is certainly possible.[26] However, an enemy that wanted to
achieve such a result against the United States could do so far more easily by attacking something other than
satellites in orbit, and unlike satellites, most of these targets can be attacked without first developing or acquiring specialized weapons for one particular target set.[27] This is even more
true when considering non-state terrorist organizations, which are unlikely to be even remotely as capable of attacking satellites as they are of striking a wide range of terrestrial economic targets.
crippling or destroying a small object
several hundred miles overhead moving at 17,000 miles per hour (to say nothing of satellites at higher
altitudes) is vastly more challenging than doing comparable damage to targets such as ships, airliners, bridges, dams, pipelines, computer networks, office buildings—the list
Attacking satellites is difficult, at least compared to attacking most sorts of terrestrial civilian targets.[28] It certainly can be done, but
could go on almost indefinitely. That such targets are not attacked on a regular basis is due mainly (at least until recently) to the very small numbers and limited capabilities of serious terrorists, not to any
Even if an
enemy did want to disrupt the use of American satellites, attacking their ground communications stations and
launch facilities might be far more effective than striking satellites in orbit, as well as much easier.
great degree of protection for these assets. Increased defensive measure since 11 September 2001 have done little to alter the relative difficulty of attacking space and terrestrial targets.
Space Tourism
1. Budget cuts and lack of focus mean no space exploration.
David Rivkin and Diana McCaffrey, The Hill, “U.S. no longer a space-faring nation,” 2/22/2010, http://thehill.com/opinion/oped/82727-us-no-longer-a-space-faring-nation
America is no longer a space-faring nation. The Obama Administration's recent budget kills the successfullytested Ares rocket, meant to replace the Space Shuttle as a workhorse for future manned missions. Billions of
dollars will be spent to pay off private companies, whose contracts must be broken as a result of this decision .
Starting in 2011, when the last Space Shuttle is retired, NASA, which over 40 years ago sent men to the Moon, will be unable to launch
any astronauts into space. Overall, the Administration redirects NASA from goal-oriented human spaceflight
and exploration to scientific experiments and equipment-testing, relegating our astronauts to commercial
space flights – without explaining why, how, or when Americans will be back in space. Goal? Unknown. Damage to American
leadership, both in space and on earth? Profound.
To paraphrase a line from the movie, “The Right Stuff,” about the Mercury astronauts, "No Buck Rogers - No Bucks." People don't get excited about a
program that sends robots and petrie dishes, rather than John Glenn and Neil Armstrong, into space. The conspicuous absence of a target
for manned U.S. space missions raises a serious question whether the we will ever again send Americans to the
moon and beyond. President Obama’s insistence that any future manned deep space missions be international,
rather than American, ventures further imperils the program.
2. Other countries will do the job.
David Rivkin and Diana McCaffrey, The Hill, “U.S. no longer a space-faring nation,” 2/22/2010, http://thehill.com/opinion/oped/82727-us-no-longer-a-space-faring-nation
While the Administration’s approach effectively destroys our space program, problems
have been mounting for a long time. China,
India, and Japan, who 40 years ago could only peer over NASA’s shoulder, now look up with excitement at
their spaceships hurtling away from the Earth. Indians plan to be on the moon by 2016, and China has begun
to plan moon missions. Russia announced it will land on Mars before 2020.
3. Increased space innovation creates a space bubble, turning case.
Tudor Vieru, Softpedia, “Another 'Space Bubble' Not Impossible,” 9/15/2010, http://news.softpedia.com/news/Another-Space-Bubble-NotImpossible-156456.shtml
Space industry analysts believe that we may be heading for another space bubble, as it happened before in the 1990. And
they have the official statistics to prove it.
At this point, private spaceflights are considered to be the future of space travel. Companies that aim to provide affordable seats
on flights taking passengers to the edge of space are springing up all over the place.
All around the United States, private ventures are making deals among
each other, or with local and federal authorities,
for constructing new launch platforms or spaceports.
There are already seven federal and eight non-federal launch sites licensed by the US Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and applications for many more are currently pending.
But experts say that the industry may be over-extending, and also overestimating the interest that
people have in suborbital spaceflights, Technology Review reports.
Back in the 1990s, when satellite cell phones were all the rage, the space industry estimated that about 1,000 communications satellites will be launched
to space over the next decade or so.
Countless start-ups popped up, seeking to meet this demand, which apparently never existed. After about 150 satellites were launched, the industry
collapsed.
This happened because more and more communications companies decided to base their networks on land relays, circumventing the need for expensive
satellites.
At this point in time, the same could happen to companies such as Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital), Space Exploration Technologies
Corporation (SpaceX) and Virgin Galactic, to name but a few.
They are all developing unique spacecrafts, capable of either going to low-Earth orbit (LEO) and meeting up with the
International Space Station (ISS), or take several passengers to the edge of space.
The Sierra Nevada Corporation, the Boeing Company, XCOR, PlanetSoace and Blue Origin are additional names from the industry that are producing
various spacecraft designs.
But their supplies of ships, trained personnel and spaceports may contribute to creating an artificial growth
bubble, that has little to do with the actual demand for such technologies and experts .
Undoubtedly, some private machines are needed, at least in the US, to fill in the void that the retirement of the space shuttles will leave behind. But
this many will most likely do more harm than good.
4. Interstellar travel is impossible – speeds required are lethal to humans.
Katherine Butler, Mother News Network, “Traveling at warp speed is lethal,” 3/29/2010, http://www.mnn.com/earthmatters/space/stories/traveling-at-warp-speed-is-lethal
If you've ever fantasized about hopping from galaxy to galaxy aboard the Starship Enterprise, you may want to also imagine a super-powered radiation
suit. Space.com reports that traveling at warp speed would blast ship and crew with more lethal radiation than man or
instrument could handle. Physicist William Edelstein of Johns Hopkins University told the American Physical Society that stray atoms of
hydrogen gas would actually go right through the ship traveling close to light speed, effectively microwaving its
passengers.
Edelstein came to this conclusion based on Einstein’s special theory of relativity. If a ship is traveling at a low speed, space radiation
would not be a problem. But Einstein proposed that a starship traveling at just 99 percent of the speed of light
would get a radiation dose from hydrogen of 61 sieverts per second. This would present a beyond-lethal dose of
radiation to humans.
Experts liken this blast of radiation to standing in front of the high-energy proton beam from the Large Hadron Collider particle accelerator at CERN in
Geneva, Switzerland. There are two hydrogen atoms per cubic centimeter on average in space. This means that these atoms would transform
into “deadly galactic space mines” for a spaceship traveling through them close to the speed of light. This also
would completely destroy the ship’s instrumentation.
Space.com reports that this revelation did not sit well with the American Physical Society, a group that reacted to Edelstein’s revelations with gasps of
horror. Several protested that Captain Kirk and his crew would still be alive because of radiation-resisting shields. But Edelstein insists that solid
shields would add a mass that would make traveling close to light speed impossible and that electromagnetic shields
would be difficult to create. As Edelstein told Space.com, "Getting between stars is a huge problem unless we think of something really, really different.
I'm not saying that we know everything and that it's impossible. I'm saying it's kind of impossible based on what we know
right now."
Edelstein concludes that the difficulties
presented by space travel may be one of the reasons aliens have yet to land on
our doorstep. Ultimately, he offers a modest take on his Star Trek-buzz killing theory. "I'm not claiming this is a brilliant new discovery or anything.
I'm just saying that it's interesting."
Every satellite launch makes the problem worse creating a cascade effect which results in
destruction of all space objects
Taylor, 7 - Chief of the Space and International Law Division at Headquarters United States Air Force Space
Command; B.A, Berry College; J.D. University of Georgia; LL.M. (Air and Space Law), McGill University
(Michael W. "Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a Time: Earth's Orbital Debris Problem," Georgetown
International Environmental Law Review, Fall, 2007, Gale)
<Estimates of the future levels of risk are even more speculative than estimates of current risk levels, but most
show an alarming trend of increasing debris. A January 2006 NASA study estimates the amount of debris ten
centimeters and larger in LEO will triple within 200 years, increasing the likelihood of debris collisions by a factor of ten.
n126 The greatest concentration of orbital debris will be located in the regions 800-900 kilometers and 1400-1500
kilometers in altitude. n127 The study acknowledges it seriously underestimates the future risk because it assumes no
further launches into space. n128 For each of the past five years, launch providers have sent an average of sixty-one
rockets into orbit each year. n129 Considering that each of these launches produces multiple pieces of debris
in addition to one or more payloads, the future risk in the NASA study is understated. The cascade
effect is the greatest fear of those who study the problem of orbital debris. If the cascade effect begins,
orbital debris would collide with other space objects, which in turn would create new debris that
would cause even more collisions. In this way, orbital debris would become self-generating and could
make certain regions of space completely unusable, even without new satellites [*19] being placed in those
areas. n130 International efforts aimed at mitigating the creation of new debris have helped, n131 but will not alone solve
the problem. That is why many authors are calling for increased research efforts into technologies for remediationremoval of existing debris from space. n132 Unfortunately, remediation measures are currently economically or
technologically unfeasible. n133>
Space debris increases the risk of strikes on Russian early-warning satellites, resulting in an
accidental global nuclear war
Lewis, 4 - postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Metods of Cooperative Study Program; worked in the office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Jeffrey, Center for Defense Information, "What if Space were
Weaponized?" July 2004, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf)
This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America's opponents
to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping
nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single
accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the
catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own
ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabiliz- ing. For all
the talk about a "new relationship" between the United States and Russia both sides retain thousands of nuclear
forces on alert and configured to fight a nuclear War. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W.
Bush reportedly asked "What do we need all these weapons for?"43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of
possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Rus- sian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear
weapons to compensate for the country's declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the "*rst use" of nuclear weapons and
conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov reiter- ated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons "preemptively" in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack.44 So, it remains business as usual with
U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In
September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile *elds in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to
fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satel- lite might malfunction,
the of*cer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution
In January 1995,
Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident
missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was
apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his
"nuclear football" , - a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review
by saying: "When people start a war, they don't start it with only * ve missiles. You can do little damage with just * ve missiles." 45
his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was
under way and the crisis passed without incident.46 In both cases, Russian observers were con* -dent that what appeared
to be a "small" attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket,
space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under
attack. The Russian command sys-tem, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating "attack corridors" through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines.47 Further, Russia's
constellation of early-warn-ing satellites has been allowed to decline - only one or two of the six satellites
remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to
reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia
will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning
of an American attack.48 As the previous section explained, the Penta- gon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear
forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications
satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited ef- fort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct "early deterrence strikes" to signal U.S. resolve and
control escalation.49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions - to coerce opponents and, if necessary,
support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems - for example, long-range strike systems that could
What would happen if a piece of
space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satel-lite under these conditions? Could the Russian
attack targets in less than 90 minutes - to disable Russia's nuclear deterrent before the Rus- sian leadership understood what was going on.
military distinguish between an accident in space and the *rst phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning
satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus dif*cult to attack from the ground or air. At a
minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warn-ing of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of
Russia's warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent
of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more dif* cult orbital plane and any warning systems
moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the
ability to de* nitively deter-mine the cause of the satellite's failure. Even the United States does not maintain (nor
is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distin-
guish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack - and Russian space
surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for col-lision with debris are
speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that
the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how con* dent could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred
in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike oc-curred shortly after a false alarm showing a mis-sile
launch? False alarms are appallingly common - according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 "moderately seri-ous" false alarms between 1977 and 1983 - an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable
information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable.51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of co- incidences is
dif* cult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously early- warning data is taken by Russian leaders.
More- over, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would
only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites - in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss
of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a pe- riod of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a
threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expan- sion may have on the
Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian govern- ment.53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical
nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a *t of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and
Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be extremely suspi-cious. It is
any military's nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For ex- ample, consider the
Russia.
coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On
one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidenti*ed aircraft penetrat- ing its airspace; 2. one
hundred Soviet MiG-15s were *ying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian *eet was moving
through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the con* uence of events "might trigger off ... the NATO operations plan" that called for a
nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The "jets" over Turkey were a *ock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort
returning the president from a state visit to Mos- cow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical dif*culties; and the Soviet *eet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an
important sense, these were not "coincidences" but rather different manifestations of a common failure - human er- ror resulting from extreme tension of an interna- tional
crisis. As one author noted, "The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the *rst major example of
how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own." Perhaps most worrisome, the United States
might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union
suffered a major "war scare" during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the
Reagan administration, forti*ed by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some
elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American of*cials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American
dence is often the difference between war and
peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in
this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information. When that
information flow is disrupted - whether by a deliberate attack or an accident - confidence collapses
and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because
* rst strike during this period.56 All of these incidents have a common theme - that confi
such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result,
the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the con*dence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.
Space exploration will cause environmental exploitation, nuclear annihilation, arms races, and
epidemics
Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, 1999 (Bruce K.,
“Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)
We are now poised to take the bad seed of greed, environmental exploitation and war into space. Having shown
such enormous disregard for our own planet Earth, the so-called "visionaries" and "explorers" are now ready to
rape and pillage the heavens. Countless launches of nuclear materials, using rockets that regularly blow up on
the launch pad, will seriously jeopardize life on Earth. Returning potentially bacteria-laden space materials
back to Earth, without any real plans for containment and monitoring, could create new epidemics for us. The
possibility of an expanding nuclear-powered arms race in space will certainly have serious ecological and
political ramifications as well. The effort to deny years of consensus around international space law will create
new global conflicts and confrontations.
Humans cannot survive in space due to lack of oxygen
Spencer, space historian, 97 (“How Long Can a Human Live Unprotected”
http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/970603.html, June 3, accessed on July 14, 2008)
How long can a human live unprotected in space? If you don't try to hold your breath, exposure to space for
half a minute of so is unlikely to produce permanent injury. Holding your breath is likely to damage your lungs,
something scuba divers have to watch out for when ascending, and you'll have eardrum trouble if your
Eustachian tubes are badly plugged up, but theory predicts -- and animal experiments confirm -- that
otherwise, exposure to vacuum causes no immediate injury. You do not explode. Your blood does not boil. You
do not freeze. You do not instantly lose consciousness. Various minor problems (sunburn, possibly "the bends",
certainly some [mild, reversible, painless] swelling of skin and underlying tissue) start after 10 seconds or so.
At some point you lose consciousness from lack of oxygen. Injuries accumulate. After perhaps one or two
minutes you're dying. The limits are not really known.
Space exploration will lead to the spread of pathogenic viruses through biohazardous land
samples
Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, 1999 (Bruce K.,
“Space Exploration and Exploitation,” http://www.space4peace.org/articles/scandm.htm)
Potential dangers do exist though. Barry DiGregorio, author and founder of the International Committee
Against Mars Sample Return, has written that "…any Martian samples returned to Earth must be treated as
biohazardous material until proven otherwise." At the present time NASA has taken no action to create a
special facility to handle space sample returns. On March 6, 1997 a report issued by the Space Studies Board of
the National Research Council recommended that such a facility should be operational at least two years prior
to launch of a Mars Sample Return mission. Reminding us of the Spanish exploration of the Americas, and the
smallpox virus they carried that killed thousands of indigenous people, DiGregorio warns that the Mars
samples could "contain pathogenic viruses or bacteria." There are vast deposits of mineral resources like
magnesium and cobalt believed to be on Mars. In June of 1997, NASA announced plans for manned mining
colonies on Mars, expected around 2007-2009. The mining colonies, NASA says, would be powered by nuclear
reactors launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida.
Mutated disease cause extinction
Discover 2000 (“Twenty Ways the World Could End” by Corey Powell in Discover Magazine, October 2000,
http://discovermagazine.com/2000/oct/featworld)
If Earth doesn't do us in, our fellow organisms might be up to the task. Germs and people have always
coexisted, but occasionally the balance gets out of whack. The Black Plague killed one European in four during
the 14th century; influenza took at least 20 million lives between 1918 and 1919; the AIDS epidemic has
produced a similar death toll and is still going strong. From 1980 to 1992, reports the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, mortality from infectious disease in the United States rose 58 percent. Old diseases
such as cholera and measles have developed new resistance to antibiotics. Intensive agriculture and land
development is bringing humans closer to animal pathogens. International travel means diseases can spread
faster than ever. Michael Osterholm, an infectious disease expert who recently left the Minnesota Department
of Health, described the situation as "like trying to swim against the current of a raging river." The grimmest
possibility would be the emergence of a strain that spreads so fast we are caught off guard or that resists all
chemical means of control, perhaps as a result of our stirring of the ecological pot. About 12,000 years ago, a
sudden wave of mammal extinctions swept through the Americas. Ross MacPhee of the American Museum of
Natural History argues the culprit was extremely virulent disease, which humans helped transport as they
migrated into the New World.
Solvency 1NC
1. Turn- The plan causes backlash against F1 visas and labor certification guts solvency
Tiger, 08 (Joseph Tiger, The Author Is A J.D. Candidate At The Georgetown University Law Center. He Graduated From Georgetown University In
2006 With A Degree In Economics. While In High School, He Earned An Associate Degree In Mathematics From The Santa Rosa Junior College,
California, In 2003, Re-Bending The Paperclip: An Examination Of America's Policy Regarding Skilled Workers And Student Visas, Spring 2008, 22
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 507)
Offering all students green cards but not H-1B visas would be even more problematic. If all students were made
automatically eligible for EB status upon graduation, acceptance at an American university would, in essence,
constitute a near guarantee of future citizenship. Thus, to maintain its power to control citizenship, the
government would have to exercise even stricter control over the granting of student visas. These procedural
hurdles could act as a disincentive if not an actual barrier to foreign students interested in studying at
American universities. n197 Additionally, working under a green card has procedural hurdles of its own, not
associated with the H-1B visa program (notably, labor certification). As such, foreign students who do not wish
to stay in the United States beyond a temporary period of work would face the choice of accepting the green
card and becoming a permanent resident, or leaving immediately upon the termination of F-1 status.
2. No IT shortages, there’s an oversupply of talent
Gardner, Staff Writer at the Atlanta Journal Constitution, 09 (Walt, Tech firms invent shortage panic, http://www.ajc.com/opinion/techfirms-invent-shortage-190632.html)
It’s become the mantra of critics that public schools are not turning out enough qualified math and science graduates
to meet the needs of companies in this country. We’ve all read the stories and seen the news reports that China and India are graduating
four times as many engineers as the United States and that shortage is growing dire. But repeating something often enough does not
make it true. This year, nearly six months after the government began accepting applications for what has always been the coveted H-1B visa for
qualified high-tech workers, only 46,700 petitions have been filed. This compares with the 65,000 visas that were snapped up in just one day last year
when the window opened. The H-1B is a visa that enables employers to employ foreign workers for stipulated periods of time in speciality occupations,
such as math and science. The shrinkage is partly the result of the recession, but it’s also due to the stimulus package that requires all
companies receiving bailout funds to show they are not displacing an American worker for a foreigner with an H-1B visa. But what’s
overlooked is
that regardless of economic conditions, companies continue to insist they need to recruit abroad because of the shortage
of science, technology, engineering and math graduates produced by schools here. Their claim doesn’t stand up to
scrutiny. The latest evidence comes from a study released last month titled “Steady as She Goes? Three Generations of Students
Through the Science and Engineering Pipeline.” Investigators B. Lindsay Lowell of Georgetown University and Harold Salzman of Rutgers University
found that the flow of math and science students is strong — except among high achievers, who are defecting to other majors and fields.
In 2007, the
same researchers reported in “Into the Eye of the Storm” that about three STEM graduates exist for every
new STEM position, not counting openings caused by retirements. They also found that two years after graduation, 20 percent of
STEM bachelor degree holders were still in school — but not in STEM fields. Moreover, 45 percent of STEM graduates who were in the workplace were
not in STEM jobs. They concluded that the educational system is producing a supply of qualified STEM graduates far in
excess of demand. Two years ago this month, several experts testified before the House Subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation to support this view. Michael Teitelbaum, vice president of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, which has long
devoted substantial funding to improving science, engineering and economic performance, presented data that refuted the bleak outlook. He
cited several RAND Corp. studies that found an overall surplus — ₪ stopped here at 18:25 ₪ not shortage.
“These findings of no general shortage are entirely consistent with isolated shortages of skilled people in
narrow fields or in specific technologies that are quite new or growing explosively,” he said. In his testimony, Teitelbaum charged
that the conventional portrait of STEM shortages was “simply the expressions of interests by interest groups and
their lobbyists.” If this data were not enough to contradict the assertions made by high tech companies, the Wall Street Journal
published a series of letters last year from experienced STEM professionals in New York, Colorado and Florida who were
unable to find work in their field at wages commensurate with their backgrounds. All called into question the need for H1B visas in light of the reality of the market for their services. Their plight was echoed by their counterparts in Philadelphia, Seattle, Boston and San
Jose’s Silicon Valley. Against this backdrop, it’s hard to believe the alarmist claims made by high-tech companies about
STEM workers. What is more likely is that their complaints reveal their desire to pay H-1B workers below-market wages,
which in turn drags down wages for their American counterparts. That’s why companies clamor for the issuance of more H-1B visas under
the guise of not being able to find sufficient qualified STEM employees. Government data show that Indian outsourcing companies, for example, account
for nearly 80 percent of the visa petitions approved last year for the top 10 participants in the program. These companies allow low-level tech
workers from other countries to train in the United States for salaries far below what Americans with similar
backgrounds can live on, and then return home. It’s time to acknowledge that careers in STEM have acquired a cachet in
the minds of the American public that doesn’t jibe with reality. When compensation in these fields is declining,
along with benefits and security, bright students understandably look elsewhere for their future. Companies
then use the predictable data to create a doomsday scenario to justify expanding the number of H-1B visas. It’s a
vicious circle. Portraying the issue anyway else is a red herring.
3. A. No delays- EB1 EB2 don’t reach the cap, wage deflation turns the aff, and immigrants
share tech anyways
Matloff, 08 (Norman, Computer Science Professor at UC Davis, “badly misinformed George Will column”
June 26, 2008, http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/Archive/GeorgeWill.txt)
To be fair, it must be mentioned that spouses and minor children are included in the cap. On the other hand,
Will doesn't explain why we need all these PhDs anyway. His main example, the late American inventor Jack
Kilby, didn't have a doctorate, nor do Bill Gates, Larry Ellison, Steve Jobs or the vast majority of others who've
made big impacts on the tech industry. Andone has to wonder why Will thinks we need to bestow green cards
on, for instance, all those doctorates with dissertations on color change in chamaeleons. It gets worse. Though
Will may be correct in his statement that "1 million educated professionals are waiting [for green cards] -- often
five or more years," had he done his due diligence he would have found that these people don't have PhDs, nor
do they even have Master's degrees. These are Bachelor's-level people, in the EB-3 category, the lowest of the
three employment-based green card categories. Those PhDs Will wants so much are in the EB-1 and EB-2
categories, and the wait in those categories is quite short. Indeed, as of Sept. 2007, the wait was ZERO for EB-1,
and it has been zero or short for a long time. See the details at
http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/Archive/WadhwaIII.txt. Will speaks of these foreign workers in the same
breadth as Jack Kilby, inventor of the computer chip. Yet he offers no evidence for this implicit comparison of
brilliance or creativity. On the contrary, the vast majority of the foreign tech workers being sponsored for green
cards are ordinary people, doing ordinary work, for ordinary wages. (See
http://www.cis.org/articles/2008/back508.html) Will offers the argument that at worst, it doesn't hurt to have
these people around. Well, it DOES hurt. If Kilby were to come of age and enter the field today, he likely would
never get a chance to innovate. Upon graduation, he would probably be shunted into one of the "talking" jobs,
such as customer support or production control, while the foreign workers are hired to do the real engineering
work. If he did manage to get engineering work at first, he would find it more and more difficult to get such
work once he reached age 35 or so, as young foreign workers are paid much less than older Americans. Even
the pro-industry NRC report, commissioned by Congress, documented extensively that engineers have trouble
getting work in the field 10 or 15 years after graduation. All this is even more interesting in light of the fact that
Kilby filed his patent for the computer chip when he was 36. In fact, Will's point that large numbers of the
PhDs that U.S. universities produce are foreign students itself shows why it DOES hurt to have these people
around. Back in 1989, our National Science Foundation called for an increase in the number of foreign students
in order to keep PhD salaries down--yes, this was their explicit rationale--and moreover, the NSF pointed out
that the resulting low salaries would drive domestic students away from pursuing doctorates, which of course is
exactly what happened. (See http://nber.nber.org/~peat/PapersFolder/Papers/SG/NSF.html) The proposals
now in Congress to give automatic green cards to new foreign graduates in science and engineering would
make things even worse than what the NSF wanted. As mentioned above, young workers have lower wages
than older ones, and almost all the new grads are young. So the proposals would swell the labor pool at the
young end, making it even harder for our Jack Kilbys to make a viable career out of engineering. No wonder
our brightest young people with top math talent are finding it far more lucrative to pursue careers in finance
than in engineering. Does that matter? You bet it does. America's only advantage over the rest of the world is
its innovativeness. Most of the foreign workers come from cultures which do not foster innovativeness and in
fact tend to suppress it. In other words, the muddled thinking Will exhibits here is ruining the only good thing
we have going for us. So YES, it matters. Lastly, Will brings up that constant industry lobbyist refrain that
"We'll lose these people to our competitors" if we don't give them green cards. Again, the putative good ones,
the ones in EB-1 (for "foreign nationals of "extraordinary ability" and for "outstanding professors") and EB-2
(for those who are either of "exceptional ability" or possess an "advanced degree"), are getting their green cards
quickly, so we're NOT "losing" them. However: Even with green cards, the fact is that they often don't keep
their technology in the U.S. anyway. The study by UCB Prof. Annalee Saxenian found that many eventually
return to their home countries even after attaining U.S. citizenship, that many who do stay here start
businesses back home, and that more than 80% share technology with people in the home country. This may
not be all bad, but it certainly shows that the shrill "We've got to give them green cards to prevent them from
helping our competitors" argument is nonsense.
B. Country quotas- creates backlogs and kills perception
NFAP, 07 (National Foundation For American Policy, U.S.Green Card Delays Worsen For Employment-Based
Immigrants: Options Available For Congress To Fix The Problem, May 2007)
Today, many of the world’s most talented people come to America and are told to wait five years – or leave the
country. The enormous backlogs and wait times for employment-based green cards sends a signal to many
international students and other outstanding individuals that America may not be the place to build your
career or raise your family. Given the importance of foreign-born scientists and engineers to the U.S. economy,
failure to solve this problem threatens the level of innovation that takes place in America and the
competitiveness of many U.S. companies.
Even if Congress provides increases in employment-based immigration quotas it does not appear the backlogs
for nationals from certain high volume countries will be eliminated in the near term due to the impact of the
per country limits. Without changes in the per country limits it appears that if Congress passes
new increases in employment-based numbers we may have a situation where, for example, a
Moroccan computer professional might receive his green card in one year, while an Indian engineer might wait
four years. In essence the Indian would be penalized for having been born in a country with a large population.
C. Turn- the plan worsens the backlog
Endelman and Mehta, 10
[Gary Endelman obtained a B.A. in History from the University of Virginia, a Ph.D. in United States History from the University of Delaware, and a J.D.
from the University of Houston. From 1985 to 1995, he worked in the private practice of Immigration and Nationality Law. From 1995 to present, he has
worked as the in-house counsel for BP America Inc. and BP handling all U.S. immigration matters. Dr. Endelman is Board Certified in Immigration and
Nationality Law, Cyrus D. Mehta, a graduate of Cambridge University and Columbia Law School, is the Managing Member of Cyrus D. Mehta &
Associates, PLLC in New York City. Mr. Mehta is the Chair of the AILA’s National Pro Bono Committee and is also the Co-Chair of the AILA-NY Chapter
Pro Bono Committee. He is a former Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American Immigration Law Foundation. He was also the Secretary and
member of the Executive Committee and the Chair of the Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the New York City Bar. He is also an
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, 3/25/10, “ THE TYRANNY OF PRIORITY DATES,” www.ilw.com]
The USCIS' website has a chart on national trends for processing of I-485 applications. 162 The numbers have been
declining as the chart shows but they are nowhere near to completing adjudication of all of these cases. Even with this new
pre-adjudication procedure that was implemented, it is less than one-fourth of the cases received since 2008. Even if CIR
passes, this long grey line of cases ripe for decision would not disappear. Congressional action might help alleviate the
quota but not government backlog; if Congress increased the quota, there would probably be even more government
backlog. Increasing the quota is not the silver bullet; as IMMACT 90, which vastly expanded quotas taught us, the “push”
factors in those countries that send the most immigrants will intensify to create the waiting periods similar or greater to
those that now suffocate the system. The day after CIR, the backlog will be with us still. While CIR will provide a more
rational future, only the adoption of our proposals can begin to correct the past. Indeed, the USCIS has already recognized
the value of preadjudication and the number of cases that have been completed in all but name waiting only for that
golden priority date far exceeds the number of completed cases in recent years as the USCIS chart makes abundantly clear.
The USCIS has embraced pre-adjudication for the same reason that they should adopt our proposals: only through the
sustained pursuit of such proactive steps can the backlog be controlled and, hopefully, reduced. There is no law that allows
them to pre-adjudicate I-485 applications but they do it because they have the administrative power to process these cases
in the most effective manner in furtherance of the law.
4. A. The U.S. is the global leader in downstream innovation and tech adoption---it’s more
important than upstream innovation
Kay 8 – John Kay, Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics and Fellow in Economics at St. John’s College,
Oxford University, December 2, 2008, “The east’s innovators are no threat to the west,” Financial Times
Such policies are described as “techno nationalism” in an important recent book called The Venturesome Economy by
Amar Bhidé. Techno nationalism is derived from the belief that economic growth depends on high technology and that we
will benefit fully from it only if it is our own high technology. Techno nationalism is as common in Europe, which believes
it is falling behind, as in America, which fears it may be overtaken. But the fear that western economic prosperity is
endangered by China’s flood of engineering graduates is not only exaggerated: it may be the reverse of the truth.
The central fallacy of the New Economy bubble was that most of the benefits of new technologies would go to pioneering
companies. But the repeated experience of economic history is that competition ensures that the larger part of the benefits
of these technologies accrue to users. In an admittedly speculative calculation, the American economist Bill Nordhaus has
suggested that consumers get more than 97 per cent of the value of innovations.
What is true of companies is also true of states. The US has a world leading position in information technology but the
products of that technology are available everywhere with minimal delay. And cheaply: the profits of Microsoft, though
large in absolute terms, are less than 0.1 per cent of the national income of the US and Europe.
That is why economist Paul Romer can observe that: “In 1985, I paid $1,000 per million transistors for memory in my
computer. In 2005 I paid less than $10 per million and yet I did nothing to deserve or help pay for the windfall.” But Prof
Bhidé is not so sure that Prof Romer did nothing to deserve it and nor am I.
What distinguishes the US is not just its innovative technologists, but its innovative manufacturers, retailers and
consumers. Discoveries are made in an environment that is responsive to ideas, ready to embrace change and always
willing to try out something new. People who are likely to invent things want to be part of a culture that is open to novelty,
and cultures that are open to novelty are those that will reward innovators best. That is why there are so many
entrepreneurs of Chinese and Indian origin in the US – and Britain – even as more and more mundane jobs are
outsourced to China and India.
The pesky American students who are ready to challenge every assertion the instructor makes contrast with students from
other cultures who believe their aim is to transcribe every authoritative statement that is delivered. These voluble business
students are the bane of the MBA teacher’s life. They are also the people who make American business great. Commercial
and economic success, even in technological industries, depends not on the quality of technology, but on the match
between technology and the needs of its customers. That is why the growing technological capabilities of China and India
create more commercial opportunities than threats for American and European businesses.
B. The plan shifts innovation upstream---directly trades off with the workforce necessary for
strong downstream tech adoption
Bhide 6 – Amar Bhidé, Professor of Business at Columbia University, July 22, 2006, “Venturesome Consumption,
Innovation and Globalization,”
online: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.119.5502&rep=rep1&type=pdf
The goals of educational and immigration policies are more attuned to the labor requirements of upstream innovation. For
instance, there is a long-standing claim in the U.S. that it should train more engineers and scientists. If this were done, the
costs or labor supply constraints faced by organizations undertaking R&D would be reduced. But this invites the question:
whose labor supplies would tighten – what have all the people who otherwise might have become scientists and engineers
been doing? And has this been less productive than if they had been working as engineers and scientists?
The data suggests that many individuals who could have been engineers or scientists have been working as managers. The
progressive increase in the proportion of service sector jobs is well known; many have not noticed however, the increasing
share of managerial and professional jobs – in the U.S. from about one in six in 1940 to about one in three today (Bird
2004). Some of the managerial positions may be filled by individuals who have engineering degrees but such training is
probably not a job requirement.
The growth in managerial jobs, which in the last couple of decades has taken place in a climate of cost-cutting,
restructuring and re-engineering, probably does not reflect a spontaneous increase in bureaucratization of U.S.
companies. More likely it follows from the growth of activities, particularly in the expanding service sector, that are
difficult to coordinate and where economies of scale and scope are difficult to come by. Moreover, these managers have
been at the forefront of the challenging effort to improve the productivity of services sector. As we have seen, the use of
technologies such as ERP pose organizational as well as technical challenges; arguably their implementation requires a
much higher ratio of managers to technical personnel than did the productivity increasing technologies in the
manufacturing sector. In other words, the labor market may not have gotten it monumentally wrong and interventions
that increase the supply of trained personnel for upstream innovators may impair productivity growth by reducing the
availability of the personnel in downstream firms.
We find a similar bias in the area of immigration policy which takes the form of preferring highly trained engineers and
scientists (i.e. those with PhDs and Masters degrees) to individuals with just a bachelors’ degree. Supposedly, highly
trained individuals required to undertake to cutting edge R&D are scarce, whereas engineering and scientific jobs that
don’t require advanced degrees can easily be filled in the local labor market. In fact as I have just pointed out, the highest
valued use of talented locally born individuals may not lie in scientific and engineering jobs at all; therefore, immigrants
who don’t have advanced degrees probably make as valuable a contribution as those who have advanced degrees. As
mentioned in my ongoing study of VC-backed businesses for instance we have found that a relatively small proportion of
employees in these ostensibly high-tech firms have masters and PhDs. Correspondingly, the number of immigrants who
have PhDs or Masters degrees is also much smaller than the number of immigrants (who usually work in a technical
function) whose highest degree is a bachelors. I do not have data on the composition of immigrants on the technical staffs
of organizations such as retailers and banks; I would suspect however that they have an even lower proportion of
immigrants with advanced degrees.
5. A. Status quo solves STEM- COMPETE Act
SPIE, 12-21 (SPIE commends U.S. Congress votes to continue America COMPETES Act, http://spie.org/x43902.xml)
SPIE leaders are among researchers, engineers, and others in the science and engineering community celebrating the
passage today of the America COMPETES Act of 2010.
Today's bipartisan approval by the House of Representatives of the act as amended on Friday by the Senate authorizes $46
billion to continue important basic research, technology innovation, and science education programs for an additional
three years.
"We are delighted to see continued strong support for the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology," said SPIE CEO Eugene Arthurs.
"We are also happy to see approval for both continued and new spending for Department of Energy (DOE) research, and
support for ARPA-E (Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy)," Arthurs said. "This is a vital step in building a
vigorous innovation pathway, linking the excellent R&D produced by DOE and other agencies to successful
commercialization and the creation of jobs."
"Strong bonds between industry and research universities are crucial to effectively applying the promise of science to the
implementation of real-world solutions. New support provided by the act for innovation clusters, science parks, workforce
development, and science, technology, engineering, and math education will strengthen those bonds," said M.J.
Soileau, Chair of the SPIE Engineering, Science and Technology Policy Committee, and Univ. of Central Florida Vice
President for Research and Commercialization.
Soileau noted that the act's new green initiatives at NIST and elsewhere in the Department of Commerce for
manufacturing, construction, and jobs will help the nation create solutions with long-term positive impacts on the
economy and the environment.
B. This is offense the plan destroys education
CNET, 07 (Allow more green cards for foreign techies, Congress told,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2sXJol43hxUJ:news.cnet.com/8301-10784_39796498-7.html+green+cards+for+grads&cd=35&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
That view, however, is not universally shared. The Programmers Guild, a group that represents American
computer programmers and has been especially hostile to H-1B increases, argues the changes sought by IEEEUSA, SIA and their ilk would be a green light for firms to hire foreigners instead of qualified Americans.
The proposal to create a new visa category to fast-track students into permanent resident status is also
troublesome, said Kim Berry, the group's president. "These proposals would crowd American students out of
U.S. universities as even getting (a) B.S. degree would be a virtual guaranteed path to U.S. citizenship," he said
in an e-mail interview.
6. Post-Docs:
A) Rapid growth of temporary foreign post-docs in the squo – lynchpin of scientific research
Garrison, Stith and Gerbi, 5
(Howard H. Garrison*, Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology, , Andrea L. Stith, Howard Hughes
Medical Institute and Susan A. Gerbi, Division of Biology and Medicine, Brown University “Foreign postdocs: the
changing face of biomedical science in the U.S.,” (The FASEB Journal. 2005;19:1938-1942)
The biomedical science (Note A) workforce has grown substantially over the past three decades (Fig. 1 ). Not surprisingly,
this workforce growth parallels the increase in the NIH budget, as personnel costs are typically the largest budget item of NIH research grants. There has
also been a change in the relative composition of the biomedical research workforce since 1972. In the early 1970s, the number of NIH principal
investigators (PIs) was roughly equal to the number of biomedical postdocs and exceeded the number of biomedical graduate student research assistants
(RAs) by more than 50%. From 1984 through 1994, the number of graduate student RAs and postdocs increased more rapidly than NIH PIs, and by 1994
the number of RAs exceeded the number of PIs by nearly 20%; the number of postdocs exceeded the number of PIs by almost 40% (Note B). In 1972,
there were 9492 NIH PIs holding one or more NIH grants. By 2002, the number of NIH PIs had more than doubled, reaching 21,643.
During most of this period the expansion of the PI population was gradual, and for the past two decades the growth rate averaged 2% per year and
exceeded 4% only twice. Even during the unprecedented "doubling" of the NIH budget (1998–2002), the annual growth rate for NIH PIs has averaged
3.3%. While the number of NIH PIs doubled over the past three decades, the number of biomedical science graduate students paid as research assistants
quadrupled, increasing from 5435 in 1972 to 23,697 in 2002. Unlike the steady growth in the number of NIH PIs, however, the graduate student RA
population has undergone periods of both rapid and slow growth. Growth was greatest in the early 1970s and again in the late 1980s. During the period
from 1984 through 1991, the average annual growth rate for graduate student RAs was 7.4%. In contrast, the population of graduate student RAs
remained stable from 1995 through 2000, despite the increase in the NIH budget. The stabilization of the number of graduate student RAs in recent
years cannot be viewed as the result of an increase in alternative funding sources for graduate students, as the number of predoctoral trainee and
fellowship slots has not increased. The population of biomedical postdocs also quadrupled during the past three decades, rising
from 7097 in 1972 to 30,677 in 2002. For most of this period, the growth rate for biomedical postdocs was parallel to that for biomedical graduate
student RAs. The growth patterns diverged sharply, however, in the late 1990s. While the population of both postdocs and graduate student RAs dropped
in 1995, the postdoc population—unlike the graduate student RA population—continued to grow in each of the subsequent years. The overall growth in
the postdoctoral population is especially notable considering the declining rate at which new U.S. biomedical Ph.D. recipients have been entering
postdoctoral appointments immediately after earning their doctorates. This percentage decreased from 63% in 1995 to 54% in 2001 (1) . Increased
dependence on foreign postdocs Foreign postdocs on temporary visas are the fastest growing segment of the biomedical
postdoc population (Table 1 ). Over a 25 year period, foreign scientists increased from 27% to 55% of the total postdoctoral pool. In 1977, there
were 8967 U.S. postdocs (Note C) and 3372 foreign postdocs in the biomedical sciences at doctorate granting universities in the U.S. By 1992, foreign
postdocs had reached numerical parity with U.S. postdocs. Rates of growth for U.S. and foreign postdocs were similar from 1992 through 1998. After
1998, however, the growth rates diverged again. The number of U.S. postdocs declined in two of the next four years, and by 2002 there were fewer of
them than there were in 1998. In contrast, the number of foreign postdocs continued to increase during this period, and as a result foreign postdocs have
accounted for all of the recent growth in the biomedical science postdoc population. By 2002, foreign postdocs outnumbered U.S. postdocs by 23%
(16,890 to 13,787). It appears that most of the increase in the number of foreign postdocs is comprised of individuals who earned their doctorate degrees
in other countries and came to the U.S. to work. The expansion is not due to an increase in the number of foreign Ph.D. students or their propensity to
stay in the U.S. The number of U.S. biomedical Ph.D.s earned by foreign students is stable (Table 1) and is only one-tenth the size
of the total foreign postdoc population. The fraction of foreign students remaining in the U.S. after earning Ph.D.s in the life sciences from U.S. schools
(the "stay rate") has been relatively constant at ∼75 percent (2) . Thus, it is clear that the growth in the postdoctoral population cannot be attributed to
an increased number of new U.S.-educated Ph.D. recipients and must reflect recruitment of doctorate-level scientists from abroad. The extent of our
dependence on doctorate-level scientists from abroad can be estimated using data from NSF surveys. In recent years, ∼70% of the individuals earning
biological science Ph.D.s from U.S. institutions had definite plans for postdoctoral positions (3) . This percentage was similar for U.S. citizens,
permanent residents, and temporary residents. In the biological sciences, the median time spent in postdoctoral positions is approximately four years
(4) . Assuming that these relationships for the biological sciences hold for the biomedical sciences as well, we can estimate the number of biomedical
science postdocs who earned their doctorates at U.S. institutions from the NSF data on doctorates awarded by U.S. institutions. Comparing the estimated
postdoctoral yield of U.S. institutions with the actual postdoctoral pool (Fig. 2 ), it is apparent that this estimated number currently comprises only
one half of the entire postdoctoral population. The rest, we can safely assume, enter the U.S. postdoctoral marketplace with a doctorate earned outside
the U.S. DISCUSSION Over the past three decades, the biomedical science workforce has grown steadily. There continues to
be a strong demand for biomedical researchers, and the most rapid growth has been in the postdoc population. Since
1998, all of the growth in this group has been due to the increased number of foreign postdocs. While foreign scientists
now comprise the majority of the postdoctoral pool, there is no evidence that they are taking permanent jobs from U.S. citizens. For
example, the percentage of medical school faculty with degrees earned in foreign countries has increased only slightly (5) . From 1980 to 1984, 17.5% of
the newly hired, full-time medical school faculty had one or more doctoral degrees from institutions outside the U.S. (H. Yamagata, personal
communication, February 24, 2004). From 1995 to 1999, the comparable figure was 21.3%. A bigger constraint facing U.S. scientists seeking careers in
academia, however, is the slow growth in number of faculty positions. At U.S. medical schools, which award approximately one-half of the nation’s
biomedical science Ph.D. degrees, the number of full-time basic science faculty with Ph.D. degrees rose by only 2499 in the period from 1980 to 1999
(6) . Full-time Ph.D. faculty in clinical departments grew by 5,656 during the same time period. Moreover, the turnover of existing faculty positions has
also slowed as attrition rates for Ph.D.s in both basic and clinical departments dropped from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. Clearly, our progress
in biomedicine is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign scholars with temporary visas. As a magnet for the best and
brightest researchers from around the world, we have been enriched by their talent and productivity. A recent report of
foreign scholars published by the National Academies concluded that, in order to maintain its dominance in science and
technology, the U.S. must continue to recruit the best and brightest international students while continuing to improve the
training of domestic students (7) .
B) Permanent visas for PhDs kill post-doc participation – they’ll bail to secure higher-paying
private sector jobs
Lan, 9
(Xiaoxuan, Department of Economics, University of Virginia, “ Permanent Visas and Temporary Jobs: Evidence from
Postdoctoral Participation of Foreign PhDs in the U.S.,” November 2009, http://people.virginia.edu/~xl8g/visa.pdf)
Among non-citizen PhDs in S&E, temporary visa holders from developing countries are more likely to take a postdoctoral
position in the U.S. than are permanent visa holders from the same country. This paper explains the difference by
exploring visa restrictions in the U.S.: temporary visa holders have fewer job opportunities in the U.S. and could extend
their stay in the U.S. by taking postdoctoral positions; otherwise they might have to return home and take low-paying jobs.
The significant and exogenous visa status shock generated by the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 provides an
opportunity to estimate the causal effects of visa status on postdoctoral participation. In general, a permanent visa
decreases the probability of postdoctoral participation among temporary visa holders by 24%. In fields in which
postdoctoral training has become a standard, such as biology, visa policies may not change the size of their postdoctoral
population by much. However, in fields in which postdoctoral training is prevalent but elastic to visa status, such as
chemistry and physics, a loosened permanent visa regulation may substantially shrink their postdoctoral population. The
estimates suggest that the U.S. visa policies could explain the prevalence of temporary positions in the labor market of
PhD recipients.
7. Green cards are not key to retention- they’ll return anyways and remittance takes out their
impact
Matloff, 06 (Norm Matloff for The Center For Immigration Studies, Best? Brightest? A Green Card Giveaway For
Foreign Grads Would Be Unwarranted, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,0531-matloff.shtm)
One Argument Involving Entrepreneurship. One common argument made by industry lobbyists is that
unless we have a liberal green card program, the foreign students in U.S. universities will take the training we
give them back home, where they will start businesses to compete with us. This argument has never made
sense, for two reasons. First, if this is a realistic fear, why do those who make this argument advocate bringing
in so many foreign students in the first place? It would seem counter to the national interest to train so many
foreign students. Thus it is clear that the industry’s argument is just a pretext for bringing in cheap labor, which
the NSF advocated explicitly. Second, Professor Annalee Saxenian of UC Berkeley has shown that many foreign
graduates who get green cards eventually go back home and start businesses there to compete with us anyway.
In fact, Saxenian found that even those who do not return home actively help the development of industry in
their native countries.35 After surveying members of Silicon Valley networking groups such as the Asian
American Manufacturers Association and the Indus Entrepreneurs, Saxenian found that half of those who run
startup companies here have set up subsidiaries, joint ventures, or other business operations in their home
countries. Most respondents are from India, China, and Taiwan. Whether they run their own business or not,
half of foreign-born professionals travel to their homelands on business every year, the study found. More than
80 percent said they share information about technology with people back home. "The most interesting
findings are the extent of the ties that these immigrants are building between Silicon Valley and their home
countries, not only transferring information but advising companies, arranging contracts, investing in startups,
working with governments, and even starting companies in their home countries," Saxenian said. So again, if
the lobbyists were truly concerned with foreign business competition in the tech industry, they would be
advocating a large reduction in the number of foreign students, not incentives to increase that number. The
industry lobbyists also are fond of pointing to prominent businesses founded by immigrants, with Intel and
Google being two commonly cited examples. The lobbyists claim that this shows the importance of having so
many foreign students. Let’s look more closely at that claim. First, neither Intel nor Google’s founders came
here as foreign students. Google cofounder Sergey Brin immigrated to the U.S. with his family when he was five
years old. Andy Grove, frequently described as a cofounder of Intel,36also immigrated with his parents, as a
refugee. Much more importantly, no firm in the computer industry has been pivotal to the development of the
field. Intel and Google have certainly not been indispensable. Back in 1981 when IBM needed to select a CPU
chip for its new PCs, IBM had many alternatives to its choice of Intel as a CPU supplier. Actually, the IBM
engineers who designed the original PC favored a competing chip by Motorola.37 And though Google arguably
is more fun to use than other search engines, they are all about equally effective in their search capabilities.38
8. Turn- the plan kills global diplomacy
Miano 09 [John Miano has been with the Center for Immigration Studies since 2008 and his area of expertise is in guest worker programs,
particularly in how they affect the technology work force. Mr. Miano has a BA in Mathematics from The College of Wooster and a JD from Seton Hall
University. Mr. Miano is also the founder of the Programmers’ Guild, an organization committed to advancing the interests of technical and professional
workers; “No Green Cards for Grads”, July 20, http://www.cis.org/miano/grads]
What Mr. Frank advocates is tantamount to granting universities the ability to sell U.S. immigration benefits.
How much is a green card worth on the open market? If Mr. Frank had his way, we would soon find out.
The U.S. would have quickie graduate programs spring up all over. Fourth tier and for-profit universities would
set up programs tailored to foreign students. The ability of universities to sell immigration benefits could
justify high tuition prices for such programs.
Consider the simplest case. U.S. universities could market graduate programs to people who already have a PhD or MS from foreign institutions. Take one or two
courses at the U.S. school and get an MS degree in the exact same field. The university could even include it as
part of the package employment.
What Mr. Frank has completely lost in his call for foreign student to remain in the U.S. is the benefit gained
from such students returning home. Foreign students create a pool of people who have learned about American and
Americans in general. When they return home they serve as American ambassadors to the world.
If foreign students remain in the U.S., our national investment in them (financial investment that
could have been used to fund education for Americans) is squandered.
9. Plans not key to innovation
Matloff, 06 (Norm Matloff for The Center For Immigration Studies, Best? Brightest? A Green Card Giveaway
For Foreign Grads Would Be Unwarranted, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,0531-matloff.shtm)
Most F-4s Would Not Be "the Best and the Brightest." Industry lobbyists have often made the argument that the H-1B
program is working well for those who have graduate degrees, as they are the top talents from around the world. The lobbyists’ claim is that these H1Bs are being hired for their superior abilities, not for cheap labor. We saw above that the H-1B program in fact is used as a
source of cheap labor even at the graduate level, so the lobbyists’ argument already fails. But let’s set that aside for a moment and address the quality
issue itself. Some foreign PhD students are indeed the world’s "best and brightest." I fully support the immigration of such individuals, and have played
an active role in the hiring of outstanding foreign nationals from China, India, and other countries to my department’s faculty at the University of
California, Davis. However, only a small percentage of all foreign PhDs are of this caliber, as will be seen below.
Remarkably, even some analysts who have been critical of industry’s usage of imported engineers for cheap labor are nevertheless susceptible to the
industry lobbyists’ "best and brightest" argument. They extrapolate from a few success stories to a romantic, starry-eyed view that all the foreign students
are Einsteins. Harvard economics professor Richard Freeman is a prime example. [27] On the one hand, he agrees that ...the huge influx of foreign
students and workers keeps wages and employment opportunities below what they would otherwise be. This discourages U.S. citizens from investing
in science and engineering careers... Yet he then says [the U.S.] has attracted large numbers of the best and brightest students, researchers, and
science and engineering workers from foreign countries. According to the 2000 Census of Population, 38 percent of Ph.D.s
working in science and engineering occupations were foreign-born—a massive rise over the 24 percent
foreign-born figure for 1990. Apparently Freeman considers all or most of those 38 percent to be "the best and
the brightest." But the reality is quite the opposite. Posssesion of a graduate degree does not imply that one has
outstanding talent—far from it. The fact is that virtually anyone with a Bachelor’s degree can be accepted into
some graduate program. Thus one should not assume that workers with graduate degrees are "smarter." In
fact, foreign PhD students are disproportionately enrolled in the academically weaker universities:[28]