Amitabha Buddhist Centre
Lama Tsongkhapa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom
Transcript of the teachings by Geshe Chonyi
Root text from The Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path
of Enlightenment Practised by Persons of Three Capacities by Lama
Tsongkhapa, translation Jeffrey Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition
of Wisdom © 2008 Jeffrey Hopkins, Snow Lion Publications.
All outline references refer to the outline by Trijang Rinpoche unless
otherwise stated. Outlines are in bold.
Lesson No: 26
Date:10th August 2010
2. Actual generation of the two views in stages
A. Delineating the selflessness of persons
a. Identifying persons
b. Delineating persons as not inherently existent
1) Delineating “I” as not inherently existent
a) How the view realizing selflessness is born from the four essential points
b) Extensive explanation of the third and fourth points in particular
i) [Third essential point:] Refuting that the self and the aggregates are
inherently one
ii) [Fourth essential point]: Refuting that the self and the aggregates are
inherently different
1' Indication of a source
2' The consequence that if the two were different by way of their
entity, the self would not have the characteristics of the aggregates
3' The other approved syllogism establishing that by the sign of
being unaccompanied it is unsuitable to be apprehended as the
basis of designation and as the self
4' Explaining that it is not apprehended in that manner with the
consequence that something other than the characteristics of the
aggregates would be apprehended as self
5' The importance if gaining certainty concerning such reasoning
2) Delineating “mine” as not inherently existent
3) Showing how, in dependence on this, persons appear as like illusions.
5' The importance if gaining certainty concerning such reasoning
You should train until gaining firm ascertainment, seeing by way of such reasonings the
damage to [the position that] the self exists as a different entity from the aggregates. For if
you do not induce pure ascertainment regarding the damage to these two positions of
sameness and difference, although you might decide that persons do not inher ently exist, it
would be just a thesis, and hence the pure view would not be found (Page 72 of the root text).
On the basis of correctly identifying the object of negation, we then
analyse to see if the self is inherently one with or inherently different from
the aggregates. Through this analysis, we have to see for ourselves the
damage to these two positions, after which we will then be able to
generate the pure view of selflessness.
In order to realise emptiness, we have to first delineate in our own minds
the view of selflessness. On the basis of that, we then set off to actualise
calm-abiding focussing on emptiness and on that basis, we develop
special insight focussing on emptiness. Through that, we exhaust the
apprehensions of the self of persons and phenomena.
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Before we can develop the calm-abiding focussing on emptiness, we first
have to realise what emptiness is. So much can be said about settling the
view of emptiness in our minds but the main focus is to delineate the view
of the selflessness of persons.
2. Actual generation of the two views in stages
A. Delineating the selflessness of persons
a. Identifying persons
b. Delineating persons as not inherently existent
1) Delineating “I” as not inherently existent
2) Delineating “mine” as not inherently existent
a) That reasoning refuting the inherent establishment of the self also refutes an
inherently established mine; sources for this
b) The need to know how, through those reasonings, all other persons and their
mine are also established as without inherent existence
3) Showing how, independence on this, persons appear as like illusions.
a) That reasoning refuting the inherent establishment of the self also refutes an inherently
established mine; sources for this
When whether the self has or does not have inherent establishment is sought in this way
through reasoning, inherent existence is negated with respect to the self because the self is
not found to be either one or many. At that time inherently established "mine" will not be found
by the reasoning analyzing suchness, just as, for example, when the chi ld of a barren woman
is not observed, the "mine" of the child of a barren woman - eyes and so forth - are not observed.
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle says:
If the self does not [inherently] exist,
How could the "mine" [inherently] exist?
and Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) "Treatise on the Middle" also says:
Because [of being like the fact that, for example] an object [such as a pot] of a nonexistent agent [such as a potter] does not exist,
Without [an inherently established] self [inherently established] "mine" does not exist.
Therefore through the view of "I" and "mine" as empty [of inherent existence]
A yogi [viewing such] will be released [from cyclic existence upon having abandoned all
afflictive emotions conceptualizing inherent establishment] (Pages 72 – 73 of the
root text).
b) The need to know how, through those reasonings, all other persons and their mine
are also established as without inherent existence
Through those reasonings settling that the "I" of an apprehending consciousness thinking
"I," or self or person, in your own continuum is not established by way of its own nature, you
should also realize the entire meaning of the suchness of the selflessness of persons, in which
all persons ranging from hell-beings through Buddhas are not inherently established as the
same entity with or different entities from the contaminated and uncontaminated aggregates
that are [their] bases of imputation. And through this you should understand the fact that all
their "mine" is also established as without inherent existence (Page 73 of the root text).
If you don’t need a commentary (for this section), then here is a question
for you. The last paragraph is saying that by depending on the same
reasonings that establish the lack of an inherently existent person, one
will come to realise that there is no inherently existent “mine.”
We are supposed to use the same reasonings that is used to establish
how the “I” is not inherently existent to establish how there is no
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inherently existent “mine.” With regards to “mine,” that can refer to many
things possessed by the “I.” Let’s take the object to be the aggregates.
How do we use those reasonings that were stated earlier to establish that
the aggregates are not inherently existent?
For example, we can say that the aggregates are not truly existent
because they are not truly established as one nor are they truly
established as different. Earlier, the object in question was the person
who is not inherently existent because it is not inherently one with or
inherently different from the aggregates. Now we switch the object to the
aggregates.
See if you can figure out how you can use the same reasoning with
respect to the aggregates to establish in your own mind that the
aggregates are also not inherently existent. Please think about this and
see whether you can come up with an answer the next time.
3) Showing how, in dependence on this, persons appear as like illusions
a) Indicating the meaning of setting forth illusory-like appearance
i) The unerring mode of illusory-like appearance
1' How all phenomena are ultimately illusory-like without signs
2' From among the two that are like an illusion, here it is the appearance that is
illusory-like
3' The need for the collection of two, the conventional mind to which appearances
appear rather than being utterly non-existent and the reasoning consciousness
to which [the object] occurs as empty of true existence in accordance with
appearance
4' [The way in which phenomena resemble illusions]
5' Such an emptiness is nothing like a nihilistic emptiness or a mentally fabricated a
emptiness or a limited emptiness
6' Setting out the doubt that the ascertainment of reflections as empty of what they
appear to be is an ascertainment of their being empty of inherent existence
7' Even if you realize that a reflection is empty of a face, this is not a realization of
its suchness since you have an apprehension of the true existence of the
reflection
8' The reason why the analogies of reflections and illusory horses, elephants, and
so forth have nevertheless been set out
9' The need to differentiate between the two realizations, that appearances such as
reflections are empty of what they appear to be and that reflections are empty of
being inherently established
ii) The fallacious mode of illusory-like appearance
b) The method in dependence on which illusory like appearance occurs
1' How all phenomena are ultimately illusory-like without signs
The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra says:
Like a mirage, a city of Scent-Eaters,
A magician's illusions, and dreams,
Meditation on signs is empty of inherent existence.
Know all phenomena to be like that.
and the Mother of the Conquerors [that is, Perfection of Wisdom Sutra] says that all phenomena
from forms through exalted-knowledge-of-all aspects are like a magician's illusions and dreams
(Pages 75-76 of the root text).
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2' From among the two that are like an illusion, here it is the appearance that is illusory-like
There are two meanings of such teachings of being like an illusion. In the description of, for
instance, an ultimate truth as being like an illusion, it is taken [as meaning] that although [an
ultimate truth, that is, an emptiness,] is established as merely existent, truth [that is, its true
existence] is negated. [The second] is an illusory-like appearance in which [an object] appears
while being empty [of inherent existence]. Between these two, here [being like an illusion refers to]
the latter (Page 76 of the root text).
This paragraph is explaining the meaning of illusory-like in relation to the
two truths, the ultimate truth and the conventional truth:
o The ultimate truth is said to be illusory-like from the perspective of the
fact that the ultimate truth is a mere negation of true existence.
o In relation to the conventional truth, illusory-like means that, for
example form, while empty of true existence, appears as form.
Illusory-like appearance is taken to be the latter.
3’ The need for the collection of two, the conventional mind to which appearances appear
rather than being utterly non-existent and the reasoning consciousness to which [the
object] occurs as empty of true existence in accordance with appearance
Concerning this, two [factors]—appearance of something and emptiness of existing the way
it appears—are needed. Moreover, if [objects seem] to be utterly non-existent even as mere
appearances, like the horn of a rabbit or the child of a barren woman, and do not dawn as
appearing yet empty of existing the way they appear, the meaning of illusory-like appearance
has not dawned to the mind (Page 76 of the root text).
This paragraph explains how two factors must come together before we
can establish in our own minds that, for example, form is illusory-like:
 First, there must be the factor of the appearance of form to the
conventional mind.
 Then, there must be a factor of the ascertainment of (that) form as not
being inherently existent.
In dependence on the coming together of these two factors, we will be able
to understand how, for example, form is illusory-like.
It may be easier for us to understand what this means on the basis of
analogy or example. This is what the next paragraph (in the text) tries to
do: A magician produces an illusion of an elephant and horse. The
magician’s eye consciousness apprehends the elephant and the horse but,
at the same time, part of his mind realises that there is no real elephant
and horse existing in the way they appear although there is an
appearance of the elephant and horse. Based on these two factors, the
magician understands that the elephant and the horse are illusory-like.
When you understand this analogy, you can substitute the object here
with a phenomenon, such as form or even the “I” or person.
There is an “I” who appears to the conventional valid cogniser. If that
person’s mind also has the realisation that the “I” is not inherently
existent, then in dependence on these two factors, this person will
understand that the “I” is illusory-like.
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In order to realise that the self or person is illusory-like, two minds must
be present:
1.
A conventional valid cogniser to which the “I” appears and
2.
A valid cogniser which realises that the “I” is not inherently existent.
The person is able to see that the “I” is illusory-like only with these two
minds.
Realising the “I” is illusory-like is a realisation of subtle conventionality
which only occurs after one has realised emptiness. After one has
realised emptiness, one is then able to realise how things are empty of
true existence yet they also appear as illusory-like.
The process of refuting the object of negation i.e., inherent existence, is
done in relation to a particular basis. If this process of eliminating the
object of negation is done incorrectly, whereby even the basis itself is
eliminated, that becomes a hindrance to our realising emptiness. Without
realising emptiness, there is no way one can have the illusory-like
appearance, i.e., things, while they are empty, yet they appear.
4' [The way in which phenomena resemble illusions]
Therefore, the way to know other phenomena as like the example of an illusion is as follows.
For example, the illusions emanated [or conjured] by a magician are from the start empty of being
horses and elephants, but appearances as horses and elephants undeniably dawn; and likewise
you should know that phenomena, persons and so forth, also are from the start empty of inherent
existence—that is, of being established by way of their own nature right with the object—but it is
undeniable that they appear as if established that way (Page 76 of the root text).
Because it is said that all phenomena are illusory-like, we have to know
how this is so. Two factors must come together:
1.
There must be a valid cogniser to which that phenomenon appears
2.
There is also a mind that realises that the object in question is
empty of inherent existence.
In dependence on these two factors, one comes to understand that that
particular phenomenon while it is empty, it appears as illusory-like.
Question:
Since one only realises the meaning of the illusory-like
appearance after emptiness is realised, then at the point of realising
emptiness, what does one realise?
Answer: In the beginning when one realises emptiness, the object that
one is realising has to be emptiness (itself). At that time, one is realising
the emptiness which is the refutation of the object of negation, i.e.,
inherent existence. When the mind has as its object, emptiness, what one
realises is emptiness. That is likened to space. That is why we talk about
the space-like meditative equipoise. So there is the space-like emptiness
We also talk about the illusory-like emptiness as well.
Question: So the illusory-like emptiness is in the post-meditative
equipoise?
Answer: Yes.
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Keep this in mind and use it as a basis for further reading and analysis.
The point is that it is only after one has realised emptiness that one can
realise things are illusory-like. Realising things are illusory-like is
realising subtle conventionality. Without realising emptiness first, there is
no way to realise the meaning of subtle conventionality.
If the appearance of dependent relation,
Which is unbetraying, is accepted separately from emptiness,
And as long as they are seen as separate,
Then one has still not realised the Buddha’s intent.
If [these two realisations] are happening simultaneously without alternation,
And from merely seeing dependent relation as completely unbetraying
The definite ascertainment comes that completely destroys
The way all objects are apprehended (as truly existent),
At that time the analysis of the ultimate view is complete.
(The Three Principles of the Path by Lama Tsong Khapa)
According to some scholars, the first verse refers to the fact that although
one has realised emptiness, one’s analysis of emptiness is incomplete. The
second verse then refers to how one realises the meaning of illusory-like
appearance. This is one way of explaining these two verses. It is not
definitive.
Translated by Ven. Tenzin Gyurme
Transcribed by Phuah Soon Ek and Vivien Ng
Edited by Cecilia Tsong
Checked by Yap Siew Kee
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