Unconventional weapons in the Middle East – Israel and Iran.
Abstract
The Middle-East is unstable and continuously on the verge of eruption of violent
conflicts. The states, in order to maintain their fortitude are involved in an
unconventional weapon race. The sources of these weapons are legal and illegal ones
and self-developed. International treaties have failed to decrease the arm-race.
Therefore in the near future every diplomatic move will be affected by the existence
of non-conventional weapons in each state. Two states – Iran and Israel are involved
in an unconventional weapon race that fuels the endless international involvement in
the area. This paper compares the unconventional weapons of both side and its
conclusion is that both sides are more interested in deterrence than in unconventional
war. But if diplomacy fails, Israel and Iran are prepared for doomsday war.
Keywords:
Unconventional weapon
Contamination of environment
Missiles and missile development
Chemical warfare
Nuclear arms
Biological arms
The unique problems of the unconventional weapons.
As the international arena is deeply concerned with the Iranian nuclear program, the
non-nuclear unconventional weapons pose nonetheless great dangers to the safety of
the Middle-East. Almost each state in the Middle-East owns various types of
unconventional non-nuclear weapons, and few develop nuclear programs.
1
Seth Carus observes that approximately 25 distinct sub-national actors (individuals
and groups) have shown concerted interest in biological agents. Eight of these 25 are
known to have acquired or developed biological weapons.1 Only five of the eight are
commonly believed to have employed them, and only two have caused significant
harm. The fall 2001 anthrax-by-mail attacks should, of course, be added to this list.
Yet the biological challenge is far greater than mere sub-national actors armed with
biological weapons. Terrorism is arguably the lesser-included case. While Milton
Leitenberg’s assessment that “terrorist use of a BW (Biological Warfare) agent is best
characterized as an event of extremely low probability which might . . . produce high
mortality” is arguable, his observation that the national debate on the biological threat
“is characterized by gross exaggeration, hype, and abstract vulnerability assessments
instead of valid threat analysis” is a valid criticism.2
Although the international forum has created a kind of defense shield against
unconventional weapons and its use, in other words - the international treaties like the
NPT (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty), the CTBT (The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty),
which opened for signature in 1996, is intended to prohibit all nuclear weapon test
explosions. The CTBT has achieved near universal adherence, however, Article XIV
of the Treaty requires ratification by 44 named states, before the Treaty can enter into
force. The CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), etc., are not enough to ban the
danger of thee. As the ratification of these treaties is not complete, and even though
some states have signed it, the success of the process depends on the states’ goodwill
to realize the treaties.
Furthermore, these treaties relate to states only and not to guerrilla or terrorists
groups. Guerilla groups and freedom fighters that are not recognized by the
international community as legal bodies, have not even signed those treaties.
2
Nevertheless, they rarely use unconventional weapons as they are aware to of the
negative public opinion this action will cause. There is a possibility that states that
possess non-conventional weapons will turn it over to terrorists groups in order to
enhance the strength of them and of the state. But this is merely a speculation as no
evidence exists.
The unique problems that unconventional weapon causes are:
a/ Contamination of the environment – Avner Cohen, a nuclear specialist and a
participant in the comprehensive nuclear test ban committee held in 1998, said that
there is a need for inspection in the Middle-East as a nuclear clash between Iraq and
Israel will create a regional catastrophe, as it will destroy the fauna and flora and
contaminate the scarce water reservoirs.
b/ The knowledge misused – Richard Gotrey, a genetic scientist claimed that
mapping the human genomes will lead to a double track route – the positive one will
open new horizons for efficient medicine and drugs but the negative one can be used
by terrorists by exploiting ethnic uniqueness thus achieving ethnic cleansing. His
comments were delivered after the El-Kaida attempt to obtain and buy biological
weapons.
Advances in biotechnology thus create the potential for the misuse of peptide
[chemicals made up of short strings of amino-acids] bioregulators in offensive BW
programs. Advances in the use of viral and bacterial vectors enhance the possibility
for direct delivery of a toxin or bioregulator to the human target or they could be used
to transfer the toxin or bioregulator genes to the target.3
Kagan discussed the potential advantages to terrorists of use of such substances-for
example, that they are not usually on anyone's threat list, are difficult to diagnose,
cannot be vaccinated against, and can cause massive effects over large areas via
3
unusual routes of dispersion.4
Zilinkas hypothesized that the work of Soviet and Aum-Shirinkyo would be likely to
serve as precedents for other nations or groups that would attempt to apply advanced
biotechnology in research to perfect agents for use in biological weapons but would
depend on classical technologies.5 Nevertheless, Zilinkas is aware that mapping the
human genome is maybe the first step in developing ethnic BW.
c/ The legal liability of use and distribution of unconventional means to terror
and guerilla groups – The international community avoided a serious discussion and
decisions how to stop the spreading of non-conventional weapons as it ignored the
possibilities to stop the funding, assistance and responsibility for unconventional
terrorism (Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. December 26, 2002).
In his book, Bush at War, (2002), Woodward cited Tennet, the head of the CIA (who
resigned during 2006 due to the Iraq war) who admitted that in his opinion, a special
state is responsible for distributing unconventional terror, but he is not sure whether
its Russia or Iraq. Scooter Libby, Cheneys' top aide, was skeptic in the wisdom of
connecting terror groups to states, as long as the U.S cannot interfere. Furthermore, he
commented that various states use unconventional means in order to achieve political
aims. The list is long and includes states like Cuba, PRC (People’s Republic of
China), Russia and even Israel.
d/ Lack of appropriate answer to unconventional weapon - chemical and
biological weapons are very effective and countermeasures are very secretive and not
really tested for their efficiency. The American alleged practice and conclusions in
Iraq during the first and second Gulf War is not public knowledge, so nobody can tell
for sure whether there are effective means to combat unconventional terror.
e/ The storage and development – due to heavy storage expenses and heavy costs of
4
the research ands development, mainly states possess unconventional means. Selling
these weapons is problematic, as no state is willing to expose its unconventional
abilities.
f/ Arms race – third world states are developing or buying unconventional weapons
in order to stand up against the nuclear ability of the great states. The biological and
chemical weapons are some kind of response, designed to retaliate and deter stronger
states.
Even though those states that have signed the treaty banning unconventional weapons
till 2012, I am doubtful, they will fulfill their commitment as no better and cheaper
deterrence exists.
The future poses new dangers:
Technical problems a/ The development of biotechnology and genetics can produce a new kinds of toxins,
hard to detect therefore hard to take countermeasures..
b/ Combination of biological and chemical compounds will make it difficult to
develop anti-dot and antibody.
c/ The progress in technologies and the powers to launch strategic cruise missiles with
unconventional war-heads is great.
Political and international problems a/ States under embargo and sanctions, like Iran will try to be in possession of
knowledge and depend less on import.
b/ States will pledge to international treaties meanwhile convert the chemical and
biological industry into military needs.
c/ The brain leak from the former Soviet Union, North Korea and Pakistan will
continue.
5
d/ States will realize the undeveloped potential in granting unconventional weapons to
terrorists groups.
The international trend in missiles development
The efficiency on the unconventional weapons depends more on the method of
dispersing and launching than on the weapon itself. States concluded that in order to
increase the capacity, the chemical or biological substance ought to be launched by a
missile. Missile range categories are short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM)—less than
1,000km; medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)—1,000-3,000km; intermediaterange ballistic missile (IRBM)—3,000-5,500km; and intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) — greater than 5,500km.
The international community is trying to curb the missile development and to
supervise missiles productive states. But till 2002 only 22 states signed and ratified
the MTCR treaty (Missile Technology Control Regime). Since then, 90 more states
joined the pact, including Israel and PRC.
The situation in the international arena is a mixed one:
By 1984, North Korea was building its own Scud-Bs and developed two new
versions, the Scud-C and Scud-D. It has since developed a medium-range missile, the
Nodong, and a long-range missile based on Scud technology, the Taepodong. The
Nodong could deliver conventional and WMD warheads throughout most of Japan
(including several U.S. military bases). However, given the missile’s relative
inaccuracy, the Nodong is more useful as a “terror weapon” against population centers
than as a significant military system—unless it is armed with a nuclear warhead. The
Nodong is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 2-4 kilometers (km),
which means half of the Nodongs fired would fall outside a circle of that radius.6 In
July 2006 it test-fired a modification to the Taepodong, called the Taepodong-2,
6
which experts say could have a range of up to 6,000km (3,500 miles). The missile
failed shortly after launch.7
Since 1999 North Korea halted the long range missile tests, after achieving 5000 km
range. It even agreed to stop the missile plans in return for western aid for its satellite
plans.
After long negotiations with the U.S, in 2007 North Korea abandoned its nuclear
program in exchange for western and American aid.
Middle East and South Asian thinking about BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) also is
preliminary because for all intents and purposes, ballistic missiles today remain
invulnerable to local defenses. The defensive systems that do exist—such as the
American Patriot and the Russian SA-300 air defense system touted by Moscow to
have anti-ballistic missile capabilities—are not readily available and their
effectiveness is debatable. The Patriot missile system was hailed for its effectiveness
in countering Iraqi ballistic missiles in the midst of the Gulf War, but post-war
analysis has called into question the Patriot’s battlefield performance; assessments of
the Patriot’s success rate range from 40 to 80 percent.8
The intended point of interception is another way of distinguishing BMD. There are
generally three intercept points; in initial boost-phase, in midcourse, and the terminal
or end of the missile’s trajectory. The Bush administration is leaning toward on the
deployment of an NMD system to destroy enemy warheads in the midcourse phase,
the point after an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) has burned its fuel and
released the warheads but before the warhead reenters the atmosphere. Intercepting
ballistic missiles in the earlier and powered phase of trajectory has several advantages
over the midcourse intercept, however. Interception in the boost-phase would destroy
the entire missile payload including submunitions, decoys, and warheads and be easier
7
to detect because the burning missile is brighter, larger, slower-moving, and more
fragile than the warhead. A boost-phase defense, furthermore, could cover a much
larger area than a midcourse defense.9
Cruise missiles pose a significant security threat, both alone and in conjunction with
ballistic missiles. Gormley attributed the recent proliferation of cruise missile
programs to three factors:
Access to specialized knowledge. Most of the emerging programs are being carried
out with the help of outsiders, such as technicians from Russia with knowledge of
systems engineering and systems integration. Iran's cruise missile programs depend
on foreign-trained engineers who developed their skills in France, Germany, Russia,
China, and North Korea.
A shift in the narrative on the reasons for acquiring the missiles. States have come
to the conclusion that cruise missiles can penetrate an enemy's defenses more easily
than ballistic missiles (which have more predictable trajectories and, in theory, are
more vulnerable to interception). During the Iraq war in 2003, five crude Iraqi cruise
missiles managed to evade U.S. Patriot missile defenses. Former Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf touted his country's new cruise missiles as incapable of being
intercepted.
A change in the norms of state behavior regarding missile proliferation. Despite
some recent attempts to strengthen legal conventions regarding cruise missile
proliferation, many nations do not regard the issue with the same sense of urgency as
ballistic missile proliferation, Gormley said. States such as India, South Korea, and
Japan have expressed a right to use cruise missiles in preemptive "first strike" attacks
against foes. The United States has allowed allies such as South Korea and Taiwan to
develop cruise missile programs, and Taiwanese military analysts, too, have been
8
talking about the right to "preventive self-defense" using cruise missiles.
Gormley said the increasing tendency to link land-attack cruise missiles to preemptive
strike doctrines has been fueling regional arms races and promoting instability in
areas such as South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have been developing cruise
missiles that could be used in a war over the disputed Kashmir region.
Looking to the future, Gormley argues that it is time to end the second-class treatment
of cruise missiles in nonproliferation policies. He cites the Hague Code of Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, adopted in 2002 and subscribed to by 128
nations so far. The Code does not discuss cruise missiles. Gormley also calls for more
emphasis under the Missile Technology Control Regime on monitoring illicit
activities by skilled engineers who can transfer invaluable knowledge to those seeking
to acquire cruise missiles. Taking a more evenhanded approach to spending on
ballistic and cruise missile defense programs also would help alleviate the secondclass treatment of the cruise missile threat.10
The U.S and Israel reached a mutual understanding that the U.S will assist Israel in a
case of long range missile attack. The two states agreed upon technological
cooperation in missiles research and development. Even though, during 2007-8 Israel
has developed the Jericho3 missile, about the range of 4000 km, in order to retaliate
against Iran. The U.S, Israel and Taiwan cooperated in defense missiles testing.
North Korea keeps selling missile technology and Scuds to Iran, Pakistan Egypt,
Syria, Vietnam and Libya. Iran and Pakistan further developed the Korean weapons
and prolonged its range.
South Korea with American help built in 1999 a 300 km range missile and continues
to develop launching abilities.
India declared its intention to develop missile ranging 2000-3000 km.
9
Russia and China continuously sell missiles to Iran, Syria, Pakistan and Libya.
Bahrain is purchasing missiles from European companies.
The Middle-East region and the unconventional weapon
Four states that are subject to unconventional wars are examined in this paper – Israel,
Iran, Syria and Egypt.11 Each of these states was involved or threatened by
unconventional warfare.
Unconventional weapons exist in this area since WWII, rarely used but handy. The
following examples prove the swiftness of using unconventional weapons:
During the civil war in Yemen, 1963-1967, Egypt used chemical weapons against the
royalists. The Egyptian used mustard gas, phosgene, and tear gas. Egypt used Russian
made bombs KHAB200, AOKh-25, R5 and abandoned British weapons that were left
on Egyptian territory during WWII.
After the “6 Day War” in 1967, reports claimed that Israel captured in the Sinai
arsenals of mustard gas, phosgene, and tear gas. Official denial was issued by Egypt. 12
Post the “Yom Kippur” war in 1973, Egypt transferred a small amount of chemical
weapons to Syria, but no official evidence was shown, even though in an article that
was published in the Lebanese journal “Strategy” in 1993, the author claimed that in
1972, Egypt sold to Syria mustard gas and sarin bombs worth 6 million dollars.13
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), in September 1980, an Iranian plane tried to
damage the Iraqi nuclear reactor without any success. In June 1981 Israel bombed the
same reactor and destroyed it using conventional bombs.
The Iraqis tried to bomb the Iranian reactor in Bushar in 1984, and again a year later.
Both attempts failed.
In the same war, Iraq used chemical weapons against the Iran soldiers. In 1983 Iran
filed a complaint against Iraq to the Security Council. As no actions were taken
10
against Iraq, Iran used chemical weapons against Iraq during 1984-1985.14
Later on, after the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, Iraq bombed the Kurdish minority
in Halabche using nerve gas and mustard gas, in order to prevent Kurdish upheaval.
About 5000 Kurds were killed. By December 1998, UNSCOM (United Nations
Special Commission), inspectors had destroyed 38,537 filled and unfilled chemical
munitions, 690 metric tons of CW agents, more than 3,275 metric tons of precursor
chemicals, over 425 pieces of key production equipment and 125 pieces of analytical
instruments.15
In November 2002, following a period of escalating pressure on Iraq, UNMOVIC
(United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), inspection
teams were finally allowed access to Iraq. Between 27 November 2002 and 18 March
2003, UNMOVIC conducted 731 inspections covering 411 sites, 88 of which had not
been inspected previously. The UNMOVIC inspections were able to verify the
destruction of between 30 and 39 per cent of Iraq's declared stockpile of 1.5 metric
tons of VX (a neurotoxic chemical warfare agent). They also identified a small
number of CW munitions that appeared to have been produced prior to 1990.
UNMOVIC concluded that it had not found evidence of the continuation or
resumption of WMD programs.16
In 1987, the Libyans used chemical bombs made in Iran against the Chad
revolutionaries.
Allegedly, Israel’s air attack on Syria in September 2007 was directed against a site
that Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear
reactor, apparently modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of
nuclear weapons fuel, according to American and foreign officials with access to the
intelligence reports.17
11
Israel – Unconventional weapons and policy
There are a few reasons why Israel has allegedly armed itself with unconventional
weapons:
a/ The memory of the holocaust secured the policy of “never again” and Ben-Gurion's
policy of an isolated state between hostile neighbors.
b/ The hostile neighborhood that declined for years to negotiate with Israel and
initiated wars, conflicts and hostility.
c/ The continuously changing rules of the game in an overwhelmingly Arab coalition
required a doomsday weapon.
Allegedly, to Russian reports, Israel has nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
Nuclear
Israel has the most advanced nuclear weapons program in the Middle East. David Ben
Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, clandestinely established the agenda in the late
1950s to meet the perceived existential threat to the nascent state. 18 The program
allegedly is centered at the Negev Nuclear Research Center, outside of Dimona.
Based on estimates of the plutonium production capacity of the Dimona reactor, Israel
has approximately 100-200 nuclear explosive devices.19 Officially, Israel has declared
that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East; however,
it has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and its policy of declaratory ambiguity have
led to increase tensions in current Middle East peace discussions and arms control
negotiations.
The Israeli policy has not changed ever - during the first Gulf War, Iraq used
conventional warheads assembled on its Scuds against Israel, after a cost-effective
series of battles against Iran. Israel did not react, in order not to disassemble the
12
American led coalition against Iraq. As Thomas McNaugher pointed out, the missile
strikes had great impact on the Iranian moral, and the use of these missiles led to the
conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, as Iran agreed to sign the UN Cease-Fire Resolution
No. 598.20
In July 2004, however, Israel accepted a visit from International Atomic Energy
Agency director Mohamed El-Baradei. Israeli officials continue to assert that they
will address disarmament only after a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace is
obtained, and to deny international inspection of the Dimona nuclear complex.
Mordechai Vanunu,21 the nuclear bomb spy, refuted the Israeli ambiguousness
regarding the official policy. Still, Israel remained decisive in its declarations that it
will not be the first state in the Middle East to nuclear the region. Meanwhile, it
refuses to commit to the TPN- Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Even though El-Baradei visited Israel in 2006, Israel did not open up the nuclear
reactor before him.
In February 2007, Olmert, the Israeli prime-minister, declared that Israel has an
answer in case of unconventional attacks against it.
The estimation is that Israel has 100-200 executive nuclear bombs.
Biological
Israel's neighboring states allege that Israel has an offensive biological weapon (BW)
program, but there are no reliable sources on specific biological agents the Israelis
may possess.22 Reportedly, Israeli specialized military-units sabotaged water wells
with typhoid and dysentery bacteria in Acre (near Haifa), Palestine during the 1948
war, but evidence of such events is fragmentary. Speculation that the production is
located at the Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) in Ness Ziona has raised
both international and domestic concerns.23 Activists within the Israeli community
13
have recently protested the expansion of the Institute due to reports, denied by Israeli
officials, of multiple injuries and deaths within the facility and one near-evacuation of
the surrounding area. Israel is not a signatory to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC). In 2001, Israel's foreign and defense ministries reassessed policy
with regard to the BWC, but no change in approach has yet been made public.
Chemical
While there are allegations that Israel has an advanced chemical weapons (CW)
program, no confirmed evidence of production or stockpiling exists. Some reports
have suggested an offensive CW program is located at the Israel Institute for
Biological Research in Nes Ziona.24 In October 1992, an El Al airliner carrying a
cargo of approximately 50 gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate (a widely used
stimulant for defensive research but also a possible precursor of sarin nerve agent)
destined for the Institute crashed in Amsterdam.25 Israel stated that this material was
being imported to test gas masks. Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC).26
Missile
Israel's missile program began in the 1960s. Israel has a varied missile industry,
having developed ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as missile defense systems and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).27 The Jericho ballistic missiles series was initiated
in the 1960s with French assistance, beginning with the short-range ballistic missile
(SRBM) Jericho-1 with a 500 km range. In the 1970s, Israel developed the
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) Jericho-2, a two-stage, solid-fueled
missile with a range of 1,500 to 3,500 km.28 There are some unconfirmed reports that
suggest the existence of a 4,800 km-range Jericho-3 missile that may stem from
Israel's space launch vehicle, the Shavit. Israel has also developed, with U.S. financial
14
assistance, the Arrow defense missile, which has become one of the only functioning
missile defense systems in the earth. In addition to these systems, Israel has become a
leading exporter of UAVs. Israel is not a member of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), though it has pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines. Israel has
recently reported to have successfully tested the Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile system,
as well as new long-range guided missiles.
Iran – Unconventional weapons and policy
Iran's chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, and possibly its nuclear weapon
program and biological warfare capabilities, are meant to deter opponents and to
increase influence in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions. Iran under the
Ayatollah regime aims to achieve regional supremacy and the leadership of the
Muslim World. On the other hand, the acquisition and creation of these various
weapon systems can also be seen as a response to Iran's own experience as a victim of
chemical and missile attacks during the Iran-Iraq War.
Nuclear
By early June 2005, the EU-3 (France, Great Britain, and Germany) had not yet
submitted their plan to Iran outlining future nuclear negotiations. The EU-3 requested
a postponement in dialogues, but Tehran rejected the delay and publicly announced it
would resume peaceful nuclear research activities.29 At issue was Iran's insistence that
right to peaceful nuclear research be included in any proposal, a position the US
adamantly opposed. Attempts were made to persuade Iran to give up its fuel cycle
ambitions and accept nuclear fuel from abroad, but Tehran made it clear that any
proposal that did not guarantee Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology would
lead to the break of all nuclear related negotiations with the EU-3. In addition,
members of the Iranian Majlis, scientists, scholars, and students were protesting and
15
holding rallies to support the administration to lift the moratorium on uranium
enrichment and to not succumb to foreign (U.S.) pressure. One week later, Iran once
again agreed to temporarily freeze its nuclear program until the end of July when the
EU agreed it would put forward an offer for the next round of discussions.
In June, IAEA Deputy Director, Pierre Goldschmidt, stated that Iran admitted to
providing incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran
claimed all such researches ceased in 1993, but results from recent tests showed that
experiments took a place as late as 1995 and 1998.30 In early July, Iran asked the
IAEA if it could break UN seals and test nuclear-related equipment, stating the testing
would not violate Tehran's voluntary suspension of nuclear activities. At the end of
July, an official letter was submitted to the IAEA stating that the seals at the Isfahan
Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) would be removed. The IAEA requested that it
be yielded 10 days to install the necessary surveillance equipment. On 1 August, Iran
reminded the EU-3 that 3 August would be the last opportunity for a recommendation
to be presented to continue discussions. A few days later, the European Union
submitted the Framework for a Long-term Agreement proposal to Iran.31 The proposal
specifically called on Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity. Tehran immediately
rejected the suggestion as a negation of its inalienable rights. On 8 August, nuclear
activities resumed at the Isfahan UCF and two days later, IAEA seals were removed
from the remaining parts of the system lines with IAEA inspectors present.
In the days leading up to Iran's resumption of nuclear activities, several countries
called on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to re-establish full suspension of all
enrichments’ related activities. Additionally, some European countries and the United
States threatened to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. Once again, Iran rejected
any proposal related to the suspension of conversion activities, but stated they were
16
ready to continue negotiations. Tehran did not believe there was any legal basis for
referral to the UN Security council and believed it was only a political move. Iran also
threatened to stop all negotiations, prevent any further inspections at all its nuclear
facilities, suspend the application of the Additional Protocol, and withdraw from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), if it was referred to the UN Security
Council.32
In August 2005, the IAEA announced that most of the highly enriched uranium
(HEU) particle contamination traced at various locations in Iran was found to be of
foreign origin. The IAEA concluded much of the HEU found on centrifuge parts were
from imported Pakistani equipment, rather than from any enrichment activities
conducted by Iran.
In late August, Iran began announcing it would be resuming nuclear activities in
Natanz and that Tehran would be willing to negotiate as long as there were no
conditions. In August, Iran refused to comply with a resolution from the IAEA to halt
its nuclear program, stating that making nuclear fuel was its right as a member of the
NPT. The European Union believed that although Iran did have a right to nuclear
energy under Article 4 of the NPT, it had lost that right because it violated Article 2 of
the NPT - "not to seek or receive any help in the manufacture of nuclear related
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." On 24 September 2005, the IAEA found
Iran in non-compliance of the NPT. The ruling passed with 21 votes of agreement, 12
abstentions, and one opposing vote. Russia and China were among those that
abstained from voting and Venezuela was the only country to vote against the
decision. The resolution stated Iran's non-compliance due to "many failures and
breaches" over nuclear safeguards of the NPT were grounds for referral to the UN
Security Council.
17
The resolution passed on 24 September 2005, leaving the door open for future referral
of Iran to the Security Council was finally adopted in February, 2006. On 4 February,
the 35-nation board of the IAEA voted to “report” Iran to the Security Council over its
finding published in January, to restart nuclear research. Iran has rejected the above
resolution calling it, “illegal, illogical and politically motivated” and has decided to
scrap the “containment and surveillance measures” as defined under the 1997
Additional Protocol. Iran has also resumed small scale enrichment activities at its
Natanz facility as of 16 February. In a parallel diplomatic process Russia continues to
pursue negotiations with Iran that would allow Russia to host Iran's uranium
enrichment program leaving only the uranium conversion to be carried out on Iranian
soil. The international community is still trying to avoid the end of the Iranian nuclear
enrichment program.
As of 17th November 2008, 9956 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades since February
2007, and a total of 839 kg of low enriched UF6 had been produced. The results also showed
that the enrichment level of this low enriched UF6 product verified by the Agency was 3.49%
U-235. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 January 2009, it produced
an additional 171 kg of low enriched UF6. The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed,
product and tails), as well as all installed cascades, remain under Agency containment and
surveillance.
On 29 September 2008, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
(PFEP), the results of which confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran, within the
measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. Between 29 October 2008
and 15 January 2009, Iran fed a total of approximately 50 kg of UF6 into the 20-machine IR-1
cascade, the 10-machine IR-2 cascade and the single IR-1, IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges. The
nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area, remains under Agency containment and
surveillance. Iran has transferred a few kilograms of low enriched UF6 produced at PFEP to
18
the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre for
research and development purposes.33
According to IAEA report dated 4th March 2009, that contrary to the decisions of the Security
Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy waterrelated projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, IR40, and the production of fuel for that reactor.34
On 1st February 2009, 3936 centrifuges were being fed with UF6; 1476 centrifuges
were installed and under vacuum, and an additional 125 centrifuges were installed but
not under vacuum.35
In the beginning of the Obama Presidency, in 2009, the U.S adopted the two edged
diplomacy - to start negotiating with Iran in order to halt the nuclear program or
otherwise U.S will impose sanctions on her.
Iranian intentions to achieve nuclear ability are not contained to Iran only, as Iran is
more than willing to assist each state that would alter the fragile nuclear balance. Its
assistance to Alger can be viewed as a strategy to threat the EU but also as a resort to
continue its nuclear plant outside Iran, in a case that Israel or the US will attack its
nuclear plants.
On November 25, 2006, Algerian Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Shakib
Khalil announced that Algeria would launch a nuclear energy program in order to
exploit the country’s substantial uranium deposits.36 Three days later on November
28, Khalil visited Tehran, where Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offered to
provide assistance to Algeria’s new nuclear undertaking, stating that Iran was willing
“to share its expertise in different fields with Algeria, including peaceful nuclear
technology.”37 Khalil was quoted as replying that Algeria “is very interested in Iranian
expertise in various fields, especially in oil, gas, and nuclear energy” and that it “is
19
prepared to establish relations with Iran based on common interests.”38
Concerns about Algerian intentions could be heightened by the suspicions Algeria
raised in the early 1990s, before it joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
that it was seeking the capability to produce nuclear arms.
In discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) several weeks
prior to the November 25 announcement of Algeria’s new nuclear plans, Khalil stated
that Algeria’s goal was the “integrated development of the entire nuclear sector and its
applications: seawater desalinization, industry, agriculture, medicine, the environment
and, in particular, electricity.”39 In the late 1990s, Algeria’s exploitable deposits of
uranium were thought to be limited and to pose an obstacle to the country’s
development of a self-sufficient nuclear energy program.
Algeria abstained in two key votes at the IAEA, which, respectively, found Tehran to
be in noncompliance with its IAEA inspection agreement and referred the Iran case to
the UN for further action.40
Close nuclear ties between Algeria and Iran could complicate international
nonproliferation efforts in a number of ways. Of particular concern is that Iran might
clandestinely assist Algeria in developing a uranium enrichment capability.41 Even if
Algeria were to claim it had developed this capability indigenously and placed it
under IAEA safeguards, however, the result would still be the emergence of an
additional state possessing at least the latent capability to manufacture nuclear
weapons and known to have regional leadership ambitions. At a time when the United
States and many other nations are seeking to slow the further spread of this sensitive
technology, such a development would be a setback to international nonproliferation
efforts, even if Algeria never misused this capability.42 Concerns about the potential
for misuse, however, could arise given Algeria’s nuclear history. In 1991, prior to
20
joining the NPT, Algeria secretly acquired a 15-megawatt research reactor from
China, raising suspicions about the possible development of nuclear weapons.43 These
suspicions were significantly eased when Algeria agreed to place the reactor under
IAEA inspections and, in 1995, joined the NPT. Nonetheless, as recently as 2004,
rumors circulated that Algeria was engaged in nuclear activities with military
overtones.44
In the meantime, some analysts have suggested that Ahmadinejad is seeking Algeria’s
aid in serving as a mediator with the West on the Iranian nuclear controversy. They
speculate that Ahmadinejad sees Algiers, having recently built closer ties with
Washington, as an intermediary that both sides trust.45 With the UN Security Council
having imposed sanctions on Iran and Ahmadinejad refusing to slow Iran’s uranium
enrichment and plutonium production activities, it remains to be seen whether Algeria
will step into this role and what it might accomplish, if it does so.
Biological
There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is
pursuing a biological weapon program. Although Iran acceded to the Geneva Protocol
in 1929 and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1973,
the U.S. government believes Iran began biological weapon efforts in the early to
mid-1980s, and that it continues to pursue an offensive biological weapon program
linked to its civilian biotechnology activities.46 The United States alleges that Iran
may have started to develop small quantities of agent, possibly including mycotoxins,
ricin, and the smallpox virus.47 Iran strongly denies acquiring or producing biological
weapons.48
Chemical Iran suffered severe losses from the use of Iraqi chemical weapons over the
period 1982 to 1988. As a consequence Iran has a great deal of experiences of the
21
effects of chemical warfare (CW). Iran has continued to maintain a significant
defensive CW capability since the end of the Gulf War in 1988. The most important
incentive for this effort was probably a concern that Iraq continued to possess
chemical weapons. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in
November 1997 and has been an active participant in the work of the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the
existence of a chemical weapons program enhanced during the latter stages of the
1980-1988 war with Iraq.49 On ratifying the CWC Iran opened its facilities to
international inspection and claimed that all offensive CW activities had been
terminated and the facilities destroyed. Nevertheless, the United States has continued
to claim that Iran continues an active program of promotion and production of
chemical weapons. This production reportedly includes the production of sarin,
mustard, phosgene, and hydrocyanic acid. The U.S. government estimates that Iran
can manufacture 1,000 metric tons of agents per year and may have a stockpile of at
least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent. Open-sources do not
provide unambiguous support to these accusations. Iran strongly denies producing or
possessing chemical weapons. To date the United States has not pursued possibilities
available to it under international law to convincingly demonstrate Iranian
noncompliance with the CWC.50
Iran is committed to the development of its civilian and military industries and this
has involved an ongoing process of modernization and expansion in the chemical
industry aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers of materials and
technology. Due to U.S. claims of ongoing chemical weapons production Iran
encounters regular difficulties with chemical industry related imports that are
22
restricted by members of the Australia Group.
Missile
Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East and has
acquired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles
indigenously. It has purchased North Korean Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs, and Nodong ballistic
missiles. Meanwhile, Iran has also developed short-range artillery rockets and is
producing the Scud-B and the Scud-C—called the Shehab-151 and Shehab-2,
respectively. Iran recently flight-tested the 1,300 km-range Shehab-3, which is based
on the North Korean Nodong. The Shehab-3 is capable of reaching Israel. Following
this most recent flight-test, the Shehab-3 was placed in service and revolutionary
guard units were officially armed with the missiles.52 There are conflicting reports
about the development of even longer-ranged missiles, such as the Shehab-4 and the
Kosar intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). US intelligence agencies assess that
barring acquisition of a complete system or major subsystem from North Korea, Iran
is unlikely to launch an ICBM or satellite launch vehicle (SLV) before mid-decade.
At present, Iran's capabilities in missile production have kept in line with its doctrine
of protection from regional threats. Iran has developed new missiles including the
Ra'ad and Kosar and continues to test its Nodong based, Shehab-3 missile.
On October 20, 2004, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani confirmed the latest
successful test of Iran's Shehab-3 with a 2,000-kilometer range in front of observers.
Iran has openly declared its capacity to mass produce the Shehab-3 medium-range missile. Intelligence reports
regarding Iran's expansion of capabilities and persistent interest in acquiring new technologies have led the US to
seek other options in dealing with Iran as a regional threat.
23
Summary
The arms race in the Middle-East includes all types and methods of warfare. The states are not interested in
changing the international order, but to maintain a sustainable level of deterring.
The unconventional weapons and knowledge, even if hard to obtain legally, is sold by states like Pakistan, North
Korea and PRC, in order to increase their powerful influence and prestige in the international arena. The EU,
Russia and the U.S also provide chemical ingredients used for element weapons to various states that can transfer
it to third party which can be a terror group. This is not yet the case-as, we've observed – terror groups rarely use
unconventional weapons. This privilege is the states'.
The effort to control unconventional weapons by a string of international treaties has failed – even if a state
pledges itself to the pact, the treaties lack punishing abilities therefore their capacity is very limited.
The states in the Middle-East invest huge amounts of resources in order to develop, produce and maintain the
unconventional deterrence, as the area is in an arm race. The contradicting religions, ideologies and heterogeneity
of the states, together with inferiority feelings make peace process almost impossible.
The international treaties lack ability to prevent unconventional weaponization either by states or guerilla groups.
The lack of international definition of “Terror State” prevents any possibility of international resistance and action.
Therefore, the only remaining solution is local activity against states armed with unconventional weapons.
24
Appendix
Nuclear
Biologic
Chemical
Algiers
research
research
development?
Egypt
research
development?
Feasible
(1963,
1967)
Iran
development
development
feasible
(1984-
1989)
Iraq
feasible?
feasible?
feasible
1987-1988)
Israel
feasible
production
production
Libya
research
development?
feasible
Saudi Arabia
-?
-
-?
Syria
research
development?
production
Turkey
research
-
-
Yemen
-
-
-?
25
(1983,
1
Toward a National Biodefense Strategy Challenges and Opportunities April 2003, Center for
Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC.
W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, working
paper (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University,
February 2001). See also Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical
and Biological Weapons. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological
Weapons: Limiting the Threat (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
2
Milton Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United States,” The
Journal of Homeland Security, January 2001.
3
Malcolm Dando, "Scientific and technological change and the future of the CWC: the problem of
non-lethal weapons,", Disarmament Forum, Volume 4, p.33-43, 2002.
4
Elliott Kagan,. "Bioregulators as Prototypic Nontraditional Threat Agents." Clin Lab Med 2006,
26:421-43.
5
Raymond A. Zilinskas (1999). Biological Warfare. Lynne Rienner Pub. pp. 247-250.
6
David C. Wright, “An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program,” Roundtable Paper, Appendix
III, Commission toAssess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Rumsfeld Commission
Report), July 15, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_wright.htm; David C.
Wright and Timur Kadyshev, “An Analysis of the North Korean Nodong Missile,” Science and Global
Security, Volume 4, 1994, http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/4_2wright.pdf.
7
North Korea has a variety of short-range missiles. The KN-02 is thought to be the most accurate, but
its range - around 100 km - is the shortest.
The Scud-B and C have ranges of 300 and 500 km respectively, while the Scud-D is believed to have a
range of 700 km. It is thought that these missiles could deliver conventional warheads.
The Scud-B, C and D have all been tested and deployed. These missiles would enable North Korea to
strike any area in South Korea.
The KN-02 missile, currently in the testing stage, could be aimed at key targets in South Korea such as
military installations south of the border.
The Taepodong-1 is a two-stage missile comprising Nodong and Scud parts and can reach a distance of
2,200km, but it is said to be even less accurate than the Nodong.
26
North Korea tested a Taepodong-1 in August 1998, firing a missile over northern Japan.
It brings US bases on Okinawa within North Korea's reach.
But the missile must be fired from a fixed location and has a long preparation time, meaning that
potential launches could be detected.
A land-based missile, the Taepodong-X, is also said to be under development but has not yet been
tested.
Based on a Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, it is thought to have a range of up to 4,000 km,
reaching US bases on Guam. Unlike the Taepodong-1, it could be fired from mobile launch systems
hidden from view.
The Taepodong-2 long-range missile is estimated to have a range of between 5,000 and 6,000 km,
putting Alaska, Hawaii and parts of the west coast of the US within range.
But the first launch of the missile, in July 2006, appeared to be a failure after it crashed within seconds
of launch - according to US sources.
If the missile was successfully launched, it is not thought to be particularly accurate or to be able to
carry a large warhead.
Like the Taepodong-1, it requires a fixed launch site.
The Taepodong-2 test took place from the Musudan-ri complex on the East coast of the Korean
peninsula. Analysis of satellite images of the area appears to show a range of missile fabrication,
fuelling, testing and control facilities.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2564241.stm
8
Alaa Issa, “The Drivers Behind Missile Proliferation,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies and Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of
Southampton, Occasional Paper No. 7, Missile Proliferation and Defenses: Problems and Prospects,
May 2001, p. 4. The controversial article at the vanguard of studies calling into question the Patriot’s
performance during the Gulf War is Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with
Patriot,” International Security, Winter 1991–92, pp. 119–171.
9
Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy,” International Security, Summer 2001, pp. 49, 52–53.
10
Dennis M. Gormley (2008). Missile contagion: Cruise missile proliferation and the threat to
international security. N.Y: Praeger.
27
11
NTI.org (Nuclear Threat Initiative) founded in the USA by Turner and Senator Nunn in 2001.
12
Dany Shoham,"The Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," ACPR Policy Paper
No. 46, http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp046-xs.html, 1998; Volume 1: The Rise of
CB Weapons: The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiskell, 1971), p. 160.
13
Ibid, p.49.
14
Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 5; Anthony
Cordesman, "Creating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Armed Forces Journal International 126
(February 1989), p. 54. According to the Mostazafan and Janbazan (Veterans) Foundation of Iran, over
100,000 were exposed to chemical agents. See also Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 July 2000.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.html.
15
Thirteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284,
S/2003/580, 30 May 2003, United Nations Security Council, p. 40.
16
Thirteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284,
S/2003/580, 30 May 2003, United Nations Security Council, p. 5.
17
New York Times, 14th September 2007, p. 1.
18
Shimon Peres, (1995) Battling for Peace: A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 132.
19
Based on Avner Cohen (1998). Israel and the Bomb. N.Y: Columbia Univ. Press.
Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or its Parts," New York Times, 18 July
1970.
20
Thomas McNaugher "Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War",
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 5-34.
21
This was the first, and only, time in which an insider from the Israeli nuclear program divulged
information on the program. Those revelations implied that Israel's nuclear program is more
sophisticated and advanced than it had been commonly estimated until then. Some analysts interpreted
the information Vanunu provided and concluded that Israel's nuclear arsenal may be at the level of 100
to 200 weapons, possibly even some thermonuclear weapons.
28
22
Ben-Gurion's letter to Avriel, dated March 4, 1948, is cited in Michael Keren, Ben-Gurion and the
Intellectuals (Sdeh Boker: The Ben-Gurion Research Center Press, 1988 [in Hebrew]), p. 32.
Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The
Nonproliferation Review 8 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 29-30.
23
Sara Leibovitz-Dar, "Haydakim Besherut Hamedinah" [Microbes in State Service], Hadashot,
August 13, 1993, pp. 6-10.
24
Ephraim Katzir, "The Beginning of Defense Research: Ben Gurion and the HEMED" (in Hebrew), in
David Ben-Gurion and the Development of Science in Israel (Jerusalem: Israel National Academy of
Science, 1989), p. 37. Munya Mardor, RAFAEL (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publication, 1981), pp.
53-66, 78-79, 104-06.
25
At that time, it was not illegal for states to develop such capabilities; establishing national CBW
programs was not at odds with international norms. All three major Western (and NATO) powers—the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France—had significant CBW programs. Bergmann was well
aware of the activities of those programs. While the Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibited first use of
CBW, it said nothing about developing, producing, or even using of those weapons in strict retaliatory
fashion.
26
"Israeli See Chemical Option Against Iraq," New York Times, 28 July 1990.
Further readings: Gerald Steinberg, "Israeli Policy on the CWC," OPCW Synthesis, November 2000,
pp. 9-13.
Steve Rodan, "Bitter Choices: Israel's Chemical Dilemma," Jerusalem Post, 15 August 1997, p. 10;
David Makovsky, "Israel Must Ratify Chemical Treaty," Ha'aretz, January 8, 1998; Aluf Benn,
"Chemical Weapons Convention: Israel's Decision Time," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57 (MarchApril 2001), pp. 22-24.
Ze'ev Schiff, "An interview with Yitzhak Mordechai," Ha'aretz, 16 April 1998, p. 10.
27
"Dassault Lifts the Lid On The Jericho Missile Story (Dassault Lève Le Voile Sur Le Missile
Jericho)," Air & Cosmos/Aviation International, 6 December 1996, p. 36.
28
"U.S. Miffed at Jericho Missile Test," Jerusalem Post, 3 May 2000. This article reports the test-flight
of a Jericho-I missile.
A knowledgeable source interviewed by CNS reports that the Jericho I was not operational at the time
of the 1973 war.
29
Douglas Frantz, "Israel Adds Fuel to Nuclear Fire," Los Angeles Times, 12 October 2003,
http://www.iai.co.il/site/en/iai.asp?pi=23048&doc_id=26778.
On the Jericho III/Jericho-3, see "A must read about Israel's military machine," Jerusalem Post, 9
August 1996 and Encyclopedia Astronautica, "Jericho 2,"
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/jericho2.htm.
29
As of October 2003, according to Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy officials, the Bushehr reactor
is set to go online in 2005, postponed a year from 2004 because of the need to replace certain
equipment.
30
Akbar Etemad, "Iran," in A European Non-Proliferation Policy, edited by Harald Muller, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 212.
31
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the
Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2003/40, 19 June 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.
Additional Protocol is a voluntary agreement signed by each country with the IAEA, which allows for
more intrusive inspections to be conducted by the IAEA inspectors. The inspectors may request and the
state must grant access to any place on a nuclear site or to any other facility, declared or not, where the
IAEA suspects a nuclear activity.
Global Security Newswire, "Iran Signs Additional Protocol," 18 December 2003,
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003_12_18.html#C836A786.
"Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards," IAEA, 18 December 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/.
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution
adopted by the Board on 18 June 2004," IAEA, 18 June 2004,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf/.
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the
Director General," IAEA, 1 June 2004,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-34.pdf/.
32
Louis Charbonneau, "El Baradei wary of taking Iran to Security Council," Reuters, 8 July 2004,
http://www.iranexpert.com/.
"Sanctions
30
against
Iran
'unacceptable',
Russian
minister,"
AFP,
17
November
2003,
http://www.iranexpert.com/; Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Iran in bombsights?" Washington Times, 5 July
2004.
33
IAEA report, GOV/2003/40, paras 7 and 18; GOV/2004/83, paras 14 and 73–74.
34
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Report by the Director General.
35
For more detail on the configuration of FEP, see GOV/2008/38, para. 2.
36
H. Soulayman, “Iran ta3ridu khibrataha limousa3adat Al jazaaer,” [Iran Offers Its Expertise to Help
Algeria], el-khabar, November 29, 2006.
37
“Iran ta3ridu 3la alzajaa’r taqasum khebratiha fi al majal annawawi,” [Iran Offers to Share Its
Nuclear Expertise with Algeria], al-sharq, November 29, 2006.
38
BBC Monitoring in First Global Select, December 26, 2006, “Iran Offers Algeria Its Nuclear
Expertise: Gratitude or Ploy?,”
http://www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/news_article.r?vcnews-id=437972.
39
BBC Monitoring in First Global Select, “Algeria Holds Preliminary Discussions with IAEA on
Nuclear Power,” November 26, 2006, original source: Le Jeune Independant website, Algiers, in
French, November 6, 2006,
http://www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/news_article.r?vcnews-id=412919.
40
See “Non-Aligned Realigning to Confront Iran,” WMD Insights, March 2006 issue,
http://www.wmdinsights.com/I3/G2_Global_Iran.htm.
41
Overt Iranian assistance in this area would not be feasible, because, under Security Council
Resolution 1737, all UN member states are currently prohibited from procuring enrichment technology
from Iran. See UN Security Council Resolution 1737,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm.
42
The White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” February
11, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html.
43
Federation of American Scientists, “Algeria Special Weapons Program,” October 25, 2006,
http://www.fas.org/news/algeria; Daniel Pinkston, “Algeria Seeks Nuclear Cooperation with South
Korea as Seoul Prepares New Nuclear Plans,” WMD Insights, June 2006,
http://www.wmdinsights.com/I6/I6_AF2_AlgeriaSeeks.htm.
31
44
BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political March 7, 2004, “Algeria: U.S. Pressure Over Country’s
Nuclear Capabilities,” Liberté website, Algiers, in French March 7, 2004,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040307-algeria-nuclear.htm. For additional background,
see M. Gonzalez and J.M. Larraya, “Spanish Intelligence Warns of Algerian Nuclear Potential,” El
Pais, August 23, 1998, in Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/news/algeria/fbis-tac98-235.htm; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Algeria: Big Deal in the Desert?” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (May/June 2001) [http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=mj01albright].
45
Khalid Hilal, "Algeria announces plans for expanded nuclear energy program; Iran offers to help."
WMD Insights, February, 2007, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
http://www.wmdinsights.com/I12/I12_AF1_IranAlgeriaOffer.htm.
46
"Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad,"
Central Intelligence Agency, written responses to questions before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the United States Senate, Hearing 104-510,
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960222c.htm.
Gregory F. Giles (2000), "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning The Unthinkable:
How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, p. 84.
47
Anthony Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran, CSIS,
http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinIran4-28-98.html. "Biological Warfare: The Poor Man's
Atomic Bomb-Iran," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 March 1999.
Barbara Starr, "Iran Has Vast Stockpiles of CW Agents, Says CIA, " Jane's Defense Weekly, 14 August
1996, p. 3.
48
The Sunday Times citing a CIA report: "Iran Builds Biological Arsenal," The Sunday Times, 11
August 1996; Anthony Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran, CSIS,
http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinIran4-28-98.html.
49
Gregory F. Giles, Iranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, 15 December 1997, p. 5; Anthony
Cordesman, "Creating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Armed Forces Journal International 126
(February 1989), p. 54. According to the Mostazafan and Janbazan (Veterans) Foundation of Iran, over
32
100,000 were exposed to chemical agents. See also Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 July 2000.
"Envoy to UN interviewed on Chemical Weapons Issuese," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 22
April 1987, translated in FBIS-SAS-87-078, 23 April 1987, p. 11.
U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 25 November 1997,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/meafrica.html#middle.
50
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm; Federation of
American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html; Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's
Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6, June 1995, p. 16.
Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, 30 October 1997, p. 1; Eric
Croddy with John Hart and Clarissa Perez-Almendariz, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A
Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen, (New York: Copernicus Books), p. 42; Federation of
American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html.
Barbara Starr, "Iran Has Vast Stockpiles of CW Agents, Says CIA, " Jane's Defense Weekly, 14
August 1996, p. 3.
Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, 30 October 1997, p. 1; Andrew
Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review – Special Report No. 6,
June 1995, p. 17.
51
Shehab – meteor in Iranian.
52
Press reports during the late 1980s suggesting that Iran was manufacturing the PRC versions of the
FROG or Scud-B are incorrect. Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran" Meria Journal, Vol. 2,
Number 2, March 1998; Bill Gertz, "China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-range Missile,"
Washington Times, 17 June 1997, p. A3; "Israeli Report on Nuclear Targeting Priorities," Davar, 13
January 1995, p. 15, as cited in JPRS; Douglas Jehl, "Iran is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York
Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9; Arnold Beichman, "Iran's Ongoing Arms-buying Binge," Washington
Times, 4 June 1992, p. G3; Lally Weymouth, "Iran Resurgent," Washington Post, 10 April 1992; John
W Lewis, Di Hua, and Litai Xue, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export
Enigma," International Security, Spring 1991, pp. 87-109. The DF-15/M-9 was reported to have first
been tested during June 1988, and was expected to begin production the summer of 1990. See David B.
Ottaway, "China Sale Report Concerns U.S.," Washington Post, 23 June 1988, p. A33; and Michael R.
33
Gordon, "Beijing Avoids New Missile Sales Assurances," New York Times, 30 March 1990, p. A7.
The Shahab-4 has variously been reported as being as having a range of 2,000-2,400km with a 1,000kg
warhead and being a derivative of the DPRK's Nodong or Russia's R-12 (SS-4 SANDAL). This later
reference comes from sources that state that the Shahab-4 is powered by the RD-214 engine, which was
originally used in the R-12. These engines were supplied by the Energomash Science and Production
Association in Khimky, Russia. Steve Rodan, "Israel Differs With CIA on Iran Missiles," Middle East
Newsline, 22 December 2000; "CIA Report on Iran Viewed as Confirming Israeli Concern," Yedi'ot
Aharonot, 18 January 2000, p. 9; Bill Gertz, "Iran Sold Scud Missiles to Congolese," Washington
Times, 11 November 1999, p. A1; Arieh O'Sullivan, "Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon - Source,"
Jerusalem Post, 15 September 1999; "Iran 'Armed and Safe' 20 Years After Revolution," Reuters, 7
February 1999; "Iran Delayed Missile Test Due to Problem," Reuters, 20 January 1999; "Part II of
Iran's Missile Program Article," Izvestiya, 22 October 1998, p. 5, as cited in FBIS; Martin Sieff, "Iran's
Long-range Missile Plans Worry Netanyahu," Washington Times, 1 October 1998; Bill Gertz, "Longer
Range on Iranian Missile Shehab-4 Could Hit Central Europe," Washington Times, 29 July 1998, p.
A12; Gideon Alon, "Syria, Iran ‘Stocking Up Arms'," Ha'aretz, 23 June 1998; Bill Gertz, "Russia,
China and Iran's missile program," Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1; and Bill Gertz,
"Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals Contract Contrary to Official Denials," Washington Times, 20
October 1997, p. A1.
9651 Words in the article, including endnotes.
34