Chris Copolillo
December 1, 2008
Conflict Transformation in the United Nations Definition of Genocide
Abstract
In December 1948, the United Nations created a word for one of the world’s most strange
and disturbing phenomenon, genocide. The definition created at the UN Convention on
Genocide and presented in Resolution 260 (III) A completely transformed the way the
world would view and act upon crimes against humanity. As time has passed, it appears
that the definition has influenced the international community in both a positive and
negative manner. This definition shows how the creation of a frame has impacted and
transformed an important subject in the modern world.
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Not far outside of Munich, Germany, there sits a long field of gravel and halfdead grass in front of a large, ivory-colored building, where a row of trees stand like
soldiers guarding the fragile peace. The place is today dominated by the tragedy that
unfolded here, and thus unmistakable feelings of guilt and humility fill the air. But here at
Dachau, the first camp created to remove from society those deemed unfit to live by the
Nazi party, there is also hope. Outside the great building a sign reads, “May the example
of those who were exterminated here between 1933 and 1945 because they resisted
Nazism help to unite the living for the defense of peace and freedom and in respect for
their fellow men.” The example of the prisoners and victims of the crimes against
humanity during this period did indeed inspire men. When the last person was murdered
in the European Holocaust, there still existed no word to describe the complex atrocities
that were done. Just three years later, the newly formed United Nations (UN), with the
guidance of a Polish Jew who lost his own family and friends in the Holocaust, created a
definition for this unique type of conflict that would transform the world view on crimes
against humanity. In defining the conflict, they provided a frame for the recognition and
action upon the baffling issue. To this day, the United Nations definition of genocide
continues to shape world action and belief about how to deal with one of the most
pervasive and disturbing problems in the modern world.
Genocide as Defined by the United Nations and Positives
To understand how the UN has fundamentally changed the nature of crimes
against humanity through the creation of the definition, one must discuss the frame of
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these issues in general. Frames are defined as, “the cognitive patterns that interpret,
select, emphasize, exclude, and organize data (Musa p. 83),” and therefore determine our
thought processes about a given situation. In the case of the UN definition on genocide,
represented in Resolution 260 (III) A of the UN Convention on Genocide, the frame and
the conflict transformation that followed was based extraordinarily on the language used
in the definition.
The quintessential first three articles read as follows:
Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake
to prevent and to punish.
Article 2
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 3
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
When Raphael Lemkin, the previously mentioned Polish Jew, went about trying to define
genocide, he fought for a term, “intended to signify a coordinated plan of different
actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national
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groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” He sought a definition broad
enough to encompass these ideas, and yet specific enough so that genocide could be
practically recognized as a crime. In the settled-upon definition of genocide, the UN
managed to narrow down a variety of what might be perceived as crimes against
humanity into a categorical set of actions that are based on other preconditions. This
allowed the UN to frame the word how they wanted to: into a working, functional
definition that, when recognized, must be acted upon. Therefore, the definition exists
direct for the purpose and desire for conflict transformation. In developing a frame for
certain types of conflict, the UN created a situation where in the event of certain
preconditions, a conflict is inherently transformed into a unique crime. In turn, the
framing of genocide as a crime has both positively and negatively impacted the practical
implications of the definition.
In the development of the term by UN member-states, the international
community settled upon a definition together, making the definition much more binding.
The definition implies a moral obligation of the international community to recognize
genocide and then act upon it. In addition, besides a moral obligation, the definition
places legal obligation upon the member states (though the legality is based upon the
moral obligation). Even the sense of responsibility towards a place in need, in this case a
place experiencing genocide, further propagates action on the part of those with power.
The aforementioned preconditions for the occurrence of genocide and the broad
standards required in making the conflict a genocide help to expose the true nature of the
conflict and those involved. More generally in conflict today, peace comes as a society
finds the ability to balance its many opposing perspectives. In the diverse modern
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climate, “with pluralism and multiculturalism come natural discontent borne out of
competition and differences in world view (Musa, p. 87-88).” In essence, the many types
of dividing lines among diverse populations all over the world create different kinds of
conflict. John Paul Lederach writes, “In situations of armed conflict, people seek security
by identifying with something close to their experience and over which they have some
control (p.13).” In genocide, this means the alignment to a group and extreme alienation
of another group deemed to be different for a reason that deserves punishment. The UN
definition helps make sense of these complexities in the practical setting of dealing with
genocide. Acts to commit genocide occur within, “national, ethical, racial, or religious
groups.” The inclusion of these broad terms helps identify the root of the problem in
genocide and the groups involved in the conflict. This recognition leads to exposure of
the underlying details of the conflict. The definition helps in bringing about questions
like these:

Is the problem more based in differences on national identity, ethnic identity, or a
combination of both?

How does a peacekeeping mission approach the situation differently in these
instances?

How might the international community substantially impact the conflict in the
short term?
Additionally, the terms national, ethical, racial and religious groups beg questions as to
what may be problems or inconsistencies in the definition of the groups themselves. For
example, in the Rwandan genocide, the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups bickered and killed
one another (primarily Hutus killing Tutsis) based on their ethnic identities. However, to
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outsiders, and indeed to many Rwandans, the physical differences between the two
groups are impossible to tell. A conflict which originally could have been said to be
based purely on ethnic differences was actually based much more on the hatred that built
up and the political subjugation that occurred when imperialists and outsiders pitted one
group against the other, giving the Tutsis power on completely illogical, racist ideologies.
The focus on the conflict in the international arena as an ethnic-based struggle allowed
peacekeepers and diplomats to understand the people involved in Rwanda. In the
recovery process, it has allowed them to try more community-oriented approaches toward
justice and attempt to bridge the gap between the two opposing groups.
Perhaps the most transcendent piece of the definition made at the UN Convention
on Genocide occurs in Articles 4-9, which expand on the notion that genocide is a
punishable crime and outline how the international community will actually carry out
justice in a manner that should legitimately trump sovereign states. By establishing an
international system of justice and courts that have authority over UN member nations in
the case of the crimes against humanity that constitute genocide, the UN managed to give
real power to the international system. The nations that formed the definition actually
agreed that just solutions to genocide override state sovereignty. The states willfully
gave up individual power to move forward in the world setting. The commitment to
prevent genocide at such a time, right as the UN was gaining power, gave the
international community a real position, even if it remained more symbolic, in world
relations in 1948.
Negative Consequences of the UN Convention Definition of Genocide
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Despite all the positive influences the definition of genocide created, the definition has
negatively transformed the ways that the international community deals with crimes
against humanity as well. As is sometimes the case, in reaching higher in the struggle
against genocide, some immediate concerns were left behind. The United Nations
definition of genocide is by nature an open and broad definition designed to propagate
action from countries, but in its broadness it created several problems that continue to
plague the system and actually cause inaction. To understand why this is, one must
explore the historical setting surrounding the UN Convention on Genocide.
In 1948 when the Resolution was agreed upon, and for around 40 years
afterwards, the world was dominated by the Cold War powers. During this time, “super
powers effectively policed the entire hemisphere[s] by partitioning them into zones of
influence (Musa, p. 77).” In the Cold War era, the UN generally found itself not in the
position to take direct responsibility for the halt of crimes against humanity. In the
majority of the time, the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact not only took tacit
responsibility for conflict management, they often created and dealt with the conflicts
themselves. All this changed with the collapse of the Soviet Block and the end of the
Cold War. Although it was already recognized formally as such, the UN became
overnight the most relevant institution for international conflict management. The
demand on the international community was so great that, “Between 1991 and 1995, the
UN authorized more peacekeeping missions than in its first 40 years of its existence
(Musa, p. 79).” In this moment, the international community was placed in the position
of power without real knowledge as of how to control many of the dire situations from a
peacekeeping perspective. Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which
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had previously dealt in conflict, could not effectively keep the peace in areas where it still
exerted control. In Bosnia, the international community showed its incompetence,
implementing the controversial “Safe Haven” policy, where peacekeeping troops could
not take any action against perpetrators, leading to the Srebrenica massacre. The
combined failures of the European Union, UN, and NATO in the open recognition and
action against the Bosnian conflict would prompt the justified observation that, “For the
previous three years, the world's response to the Bosnian war had been an elaborate effort
to dampen the fighting and mitigate its effects without actually intervening ("A chronicle
of deaths foretold - The Srebrenica massacre." The Economist).” A short time later
during the conflict in Rwanda, the international community appeared unprepared and
confused again. The UN moved slowly in authorizing troops for the conflict in Rwanda,
which was not immediately identified as genocide. Then, shortly after international
troops were authorized and flown in, the UN pulled out about 2250 troops, leaving only
250 to protect an entire country - without the authorization to use force. Whether the
future effects were impossible to tell or not, the definition failed in its exclusion of
specific practices towards the implementation of peacekeeping forces. It created a
situation where genocide could be a recognized crime, but it touched very little upon how
the international community would actually take action. Which international
organizations would take responsibility in which cases? How would peacekeeping forces
act to prevent genocidal acts in the middle of a conflict? These are both huge omissions
in the international definition that allow the natural propensities for self-interest among
nations in the international community to dominate. After all, even though Resolution
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260 (III) A created a meaningful connection among international players, nations will
always show a reluctance to influence a conflict not in their immediate interest.
A second major problem with the definition lies in the lack of detailed definitions
for the national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. In addition, the sizable exclusion of
political groups has caused concern from observers. In the Convention, political groups
were left out to differentiate genocidal conflict from what might be a separate civil
conflict, the idea being that these are independent events which may occur at the same
time. However, the exclusion of political groups coupled with the absence of definitions
for the included groups has caused problems in the implementation of genocide policy,
creating situations of uncertainty and inaction. In fact, due to the wording of Article 2,
there was never a fully explained concept of any victim group until the Rwandan
genocide. When the ethnic conflict in Rwanda broke, it was presented as tribalism,
barbarianism, and typical “endemic violence” in central Africa (Musa, p.52). Without a
definition for the victim groups, no one could legitimately argue that the conflict
surpassed these labels, and stereotypical frames as defined by the Western media took
over the frame of the conflict. Later, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
would define ethnic groups as, “A group identified by others, including perpetrators of
the crime.” The missing definitions have caused problems in other cases. Take, for
example, the Gukurahundi conflict in Zimbabwe, a country operating under a repressive
ruler who has shown no qualms to take violent action against his own people. The
conflict occurred on the surface to be a case of quarreling political parties. However, it
played out in a specific region and the victims were often civilians assaulted on the basis
of where they lived. The situation prompted the following observation, “The genocide
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convention evidently does not cover political groupings, at least not directly... But what is
a national grouping, which this convention provides for? It is clear that Zimbabwe is a
nation just as it is clear that any political grouping is part of a nation. Could it therefore
be that, any persistent attacks on members of a political party constitutes an attack on a
national grouping or at least part of it? Is killing or causing serious bodily and mental
harm to such a group therefore, an act of genocide. If the soul of any political grouping is
its activists, is killing those people not consistent with an intention to cause the
destruction of that grouping (Mpoku, www.africanews.com)?” In the case of Zimbabwe,
a failure to see possibly genocidal motives could cost the people of the country a great
deal. The real question being asked here is do the broad, unspecific terms really help to
identify and act upon genocide, or do we allow them to blanket our eyes from the truth:
that perhaps genocide occurs far more often than we may be willing to admit and ready to
combat.
As noted above, the UN Convention has reached far to transform the issue of
genocide, but it has left many significant gaps. It has indeed failed to completely cover
genocide from its origin to its resolution. The aftermath of genocide often poses the most
difficult set of problems, for how does one begin to piece together a broken society? The
definition and the UN Convention did not go nearly far enough here to restore adequate
justice and safety in post-genocide zones. To deal with major genocide crimes, the UN
developed very formal methods of justice, like the International Criminal Tribunals in
Rwanda and Yugoslavia. These courts have allowed for the prosecution of major
criminals and have therefore set the tone for a system of justice in areas of extreme
conflict. Meanwhile, grassroots-level justice and conflict management has been
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astonishingly ineffective and, in some cases, nonexistent. It is not the responsibility of
those who make and commit to such a definition to fix every problem in a society in
which genocide has occurred. However, the definition itself exists as recognition that the
nations and groups of people mired in genocidal conflict can no longer deal with the
conflict on their own. These societies plainly need the assistance of the international
community. Therefore, the institution of courts to deal with higher-up members of the
conflict while giving inadequate attention to the communities and more insignificant
groups that were involved in genocide is short-minded and irresponsible. A study of the
previously-mentioned community-based courts in Rwanda, called Gacaca courts,
exposes the problems inherent in a lack of attention to post-genocidal justice systems.
The reliability of the courts hinges often on an arbitrary mediator, usually of the same
ethnicity as the victim. In some cases there may even be a feeling that justice has been
done, but the study found that, “Since the Gacaca process began its pilot phase in 2001,
community-based organizations that had reestablished or built new cross ethnic
relationships have faced extreme difficulties as other people (both Tutsi and Hutu) within
the community have tried to destroy solidarity across ethnic lines (Burnett, p. 173).”
Meanwhile, the international community has not been directly involved, limiting itself to
the Tribunals while the divisions that created the conflict remain unsolved.
As one views the issue of genocide and this definition which changed
international relations, a few general things about conflict transformation are important to
state. In transforming a conflict, actors must remain mindful of every angle they change.
In the UN Convention, a definition was created, and that meant that the transformation of
the conflict occurred in both the elements of the issue that were and were not defined.
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The crux of both the successes and failures of the UN Convention were the abilities of
mere language to reach the root of the problem – the divisions that define, control, and
sometimes break our societies today. In the failures of the definition, the language, or
lack thereof, has not inspired or transcended the obscure concerns and roadblocks to
preventing and adequately dealing with genocide. The lesson it teaches is this: Not only
must we reach higher in striving for conflict transformation, but we must remember what
it is we are reaching for. We must remain mindful in our efforts that reaching higher
means little should we forget what surrounds our struggle and where the foundations of
the conflict lie. Only when we see through our ambitions and concerns to observe the
raw truth can we hope to create a lasting, binding, transforming change.
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Works Cited
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Burnet, Jennie E. "The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and Revenge in
Rwanda." Genocide Studies and Prevention 3 (2008): 173-93.
"Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide." 27 Jan. 1997. United
Nations. 2 Nov. 2008 <www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html>.
Lederach, John P. Building Peace : Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. New
York: United States Institute of Peace P (USIP P), 1997.
Mpoku, Thabani. "Zimbabwe; Judiciary Selectively Applying Genocide Law?" Africa
News. 8 May 2008.17 Nov. 2008 <http://www.africanews.com>.
Musa, Bala. Framing Genocide : Media, Diplomacy and Conflict Transformation. New
York: Academica P, LLC, 2007.
"Rwanda: A Historical Chronology." Frontline: Rwanda Chronology. Public
Broadcasting Company. 15 Nov. 2008
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html>.
Spivey, Sue. "Origins of Genocide." Introduction to Justice: Classroom Lecture. Oct.
2007.
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