THE BUREAUCRATIC CREATION OF ENTREPRENEURS: A CASE OF THE UNIVERSITY RELATED INCUBATOR Branko BUČAR, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics Address all correspondence to: Branko Bučar University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics Kardeljeva ploščad 17, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia Email: branko.bucar@uni-lj.si Abstract: This paper provides an ethnographic account of the conflict of taking credit between groups of Venture Growth1, Inc. (VGI - incubator) staff and entrepreneurs, where VGI seeks to increase its power through community recognition and control of resources and entrepreneurs try to run their companies independently but rely on VGI for space, counseling, contacts and services. Charles Perrow’s (1986) concept of goal displacement and Alvin W. Gouldner’s (1960) concept of reciprocity are combined to understand the conflicting, yet symbiotic relationship between the two groups. Exchanges between VGI staff and entrepreneurs are governed by the norm of reciprocity. These exchanges promote a number of subgoals that are different from the official goals of the VGI incubator. BIROKRATSKO USTVARJANJE PODJETNIKOV: PRIMER UNIVERZITETNEGA INKUBATORJA Povzetek: Pričujoči članek predstavlja etnografsko študijo konflikta jemanja zaslug med skupino zaposlenih v inkubatorju Venture Growth, Inc. (VGI) in skupino podjetnikov, ki ustanavlja podjetja v inkubatorju. VGI povečuje svojo moč in vpliv z graditvijo svojega imena znotraj skupnosti in nadzorom nad sredstvi, medtem ko podjetniki poizkušajo samostojno graditi svoja podjetja, pri čemer uporabljajo prostor, stike ter svetovalne in druge storitve inkubatorja. Koncept recipročnosti (Gouldner, 1960) in koncept nadomeščanja ciljev (Perrow, 1986) sta združena za razumevanje kofliktnega, vendar simbiotskega odnosa med obema skupinama. Izmenjave med zaposlenimi v inkubatorju in podjetniki potekajo pod normo recipročnosti. Te izmenjave spodbujajo številne sekundarne cilje, ki so drugačni od uradnih ciljev inkubatorja. INTRODUCTION The nurturing of entrepreneurs by an incubator is a complex process that involves a conflicting interaction of individuals with different motivations. This paper explores a specific case of one incubator’s relationship with its entrepreneurs. VGI was established 1 Names of individuals and organizations have been modified to preserve the anonymity of participants in the study. 2 as a facility that offers a broad range of services to emerging companies and has a clearly identifiable organizational structure enhanced by the office arrangement (offices for top officials vs. cubicles for other employees). VGI mainly relies on governmental grants and private donations for its existence and therefore must write frequent and extensive reports to maintain its financing. For this reason VGI needs to collect extensive data from incubator companies. In opposition to this objective, entrepreneurs try to maintain their independence and hide the details about their operations. Entrepreneurs fear the disclosure of sensitive data because of their vulnerability to competitor's attacks. These opposing objectives are one source of the conflict. Another source of the conflict is that the incubator companies do not get as much from VGI as they expect. They perceive a lack of quality advice, a lack of networking, and a lack of financial sources from VGI. This situation is driven by the 'on-the-edge' activities of incubator companies that require very specialized knowledge and represent high risk investments for external partners. The incubator companies are reluctant to participate in the schemes and rituals that represent VGI’s official goals. As a result unofficial goals become more important for VGI, such as community recognition (e.g., events/awards), extracurricular activities (e.g., golfing), and benefits (e.g., free education at a university). Official rules (e.g., regular reporting, length of stay limits in the incubator) are also used to promote the unofficial goals - goal displacement. Over time this goal displacement fosters more bureaucratic rules to maintain the normal functioning of the organization. 3 This organization is an established structure with roles, habits and routines, whereas entrepreneurs embody the destruction of previously existing structures. The conflict that arises from these disparate structures is maintained at a sustainable level by a form of integration called reciprocity. The relationship between the incubator and its entrepreneurs is maintained since each receives something in exchange for their participation in the arrangement. The entrepreneur companies receive low cost space and services, while VGI receives increased visibility (e.g., the best incubator award), increased access to resources and consequently increased power. Based on these exchanged benefits, reciprocity replaces authority as a governing mechanism in the organization. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Weber viewed the rational-legal authority system with its bureaucratic organizational form as technically the most efficient system possible. “Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, unity, subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs-these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration…” (Weber, 1958, p.214). Bureaucracies represent the final stage in depersonalization and a clear separation is made between personal and business affairs. Selznick (1948), however, pointed out that “individuals have a propensity to resist depersonalization, to spill over the boundaries of their segmentary roles, to participate as wholes” (Selznick, 1948, p. 26). The needs of individuals do not permit a single-minded 4 attention to the stated goals of an organization. Selznick recognized informal structures and conflicting interests of subgroups within bureaucracies with continuing modification of formal goals of organization. “Ties of sentiment and self-interest are evolved as unacknowledged but effective mechanisms of adjustment of individuals and sub-groups to the conditions of life within the organization. These ties represent a cementing of relationships which sustains the formal authority in day-to-day operations and widens opportunities for effective communication” (Selznick, 1948). Organizational behavior develops from the interaction between the individual and formal organization (Argyris, 1957, p. 175). Argyris’ (1957) analysis of the basic properties of human beings and formal organization led him to the conclusion that “there is an inherent incongruency between the self-actualization of the two” (p. 175). Bureaucratic impersonality can be undermined, however, if relations in the organization are based on reciprocity. RECIPROCITY The first author that discovered the connection between reciprocative behavior on the interpersonal level, on the one hand, and given symmetrical groupings, on the other, was the anthropologist Richard Thurnwald, in 1915, in an empirical study of the marriage system of the Bánaro of New Guinea. Until Gouldner (1960) however, the concept of 5 reciprocity was tacitly involved but neglected by any formal theory2. Gouldner developed his conceptualization of reciprocity on Malinowski’s earlier seminal contribution3. For Malinowski, reciprocity is a mutually gratifying pattern of exchanging goods and services, where equivalency of exchanges is very important. According to Gouldner (1960), Malinowski implied that “people believe that (a) in the long run the mutual exchange of goods and services will balance out; (b) if people do not aid those who helped them certain penalties will be imposed upon them; or (c) those whom they have helped can be expected to help them; or (d) some or all of these”. Gouldner criticized Malinowski for the lack of explication of the value element in his writings about the principle of reciprocity. He maintained that there is another element, beyond reciprocity as a pattern of exchange and beyond folk beliefs about reciprocity as a fact of life, reciprocity as “a generalized moral norm, which defines certain actions and obligations as repayments for benefits received”. Gouldner claimed that “there are certain duties that people owe one another, not as human beings, or as fellow members of a group, or even as occupants of social statuses within the group but, rather, because of their prior actions” (Gouldner, 1960, p. 171). We owe other people because of what they have previously done for us. 2 Gouldner developed the construct of reciprocity on the fundaments of the functional theory. Functional theory focuses on already established, on-going systems, and on the mechanisms by which an established social system is enabled to maintain itself. 3 Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, London: Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932; in Gouldner (1960). 6 A norm of reciprocity makes three demands: (1) people should help those who have helped them, (2) people should not injure those who have helped them, and (3) if people want to be helped by others they must help them. Gouldner pointed out that reciprocity processes “mobilize egoistic motivations and channel them into the maintenance of the social system” (Gouldner, 1960, p. 173). Gouldner also indicated the disruptive potentialities of power differences. Given significant power differences, egoistic motivations may seek to get benefits without returning them. The norm of reciprocity, however, generates motives for returning benefits even when power differences might invite exploitation, because “emergence of exploitative relations would undermine the social system and the very power arrangements which had made exploitation possible” (Gouldner, 1960, p. 174). Two other attributes of reciprocity have to be examined: time period and comparative indeterminacy. There is a certain amount of ambiguity as regard to the time period when there is an obligation still to be performed and, over time, “generates uncertainty about who is in whose debt” (Gouldner, 1960, p. 175). Additionally, reciprocity does not require highly specific and uniform performances from people whose behavior it regulates. This indeterminacy enables the norm of reciprocity to perform some of its most important system-stabilizing functions: it can be applied to countless transactions that otherwise might not be regulated by specific status obligations. Polanyi (1957), in his paper The Economy as Instituted Process, developed a similar notion of reciprocity following the tradition of Malinowski. Malinowski predicted that socially relevant reciprocation would regularly be found to rest on symmetrical forms 7 of basic social organization. Polanyi suggested that the economy acquires unity and stability through a combination of a very few patterns which he called forms of integration. Empirically, he was able to distinguish three main forms: reciprocity, redistribution and exchange. Polanyi defined “reciprocity as movements between correlative points of symmetrical groupings; redistribution as appropriational movements toward a center and out of it again; exchange as here to vice-versa movements taking place as between ‘hands’ under a market system” (Polanyi, 1957, p. 35). There are two attributions of reciprocity that are unique to Polanyi: symmetrical groupings and complementariness of reciprocity with other integration forms. To Polanyi, a group which deliberately undertook to organize its relationship on a reciprocative foundation has to split up into sub-groups where the corresponding members of each group can identify one another as such. The power of reciprocity as a form of integration gains greatly through its capacity of employing both redistribution and exchange as subordinate methods. The problem with these conceptualizations of reciprocity is that they assume cooperative behavior and solidarity among actors. I argue that these reciprocal relationships are rather characterized by the conflict and instability. Obligations for repayment of benefits received mobilize egoistic motivations, which are not the basis of social system maintenance as Gouldner argued, but rather the core of its instability. The partners in the reciprocal relationship focus on the fairness of the exchange and they put a lot of effort to settle any inequalities in a short period of time. Egoistic motivations generate low levels of trust, which tends to suggest rapid turnover in exchange partners. 8 The key to understanding the relationship between reciprocity and goal displacement is in the notion that “reciprocities processes mobilize egoistic motivations” (Gouldner, 1960, p. 173). Egoistic motivations operate on the individual level, whereas official goals are set on the organizational level. The conflict between the individual and system was explored by Argyris (1957). To the extent that the requirements of the individual and of the formal organization are not congruent, the individual will tend to feel frustration, conflict and feelings of failure. “The individuals may adapt by leaving, working their way up the ladder, distorting their world through defense mechanisms, becoming apathetic and uninterested, reducing production, gold-bricking, creating informal groups to counteract the cause of the conflict” (Argyris, 1957, p. 119). There are instances in the organizational life, however, where individuals are able to further their personal interest using formal organization. Charles Perrow (1986) conceptualized this phenomenon as a goal displacement. GOAL DISPLACEMENT Selznick pointed out the prevalence and positive and negative effects of group conflict within organizations4. Perrow (1986) speculated that internal conflict in organizations evolved around the question of conflict over goals. “Since organizations are established to do something, to perform work directed to some end, all organizations have goals – some implied, some explicit” (Perrow, 1970, p. 133). 4 Selznick, Philip. 1949. TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkley and Los Angeles: Uni. of California Press. 9 Perrow (1986) challenged a number of assumptions about goals in organizations in previous theoretical approaches. One assumption was that organizations are oriented toward a specific goal. He observed that the goals pursued by organizations are multiple, and that they are generally in conflict. The pursuit of multiple goals forces firms to develop organizational mechanisms to deal with conflict. Perrow also disagreed with the assumption that managers can fully establish the preference ordering of goals. Instead, he maintained that “goals should be viewed as emerging from a bargaining process among groups” and that even “some conflicting goals can be met” (Perrow, 1986, p. 134). Perrow (1961) discussed two major categories of goals, official and operative. “Official goals are the general purposes of the organization as put forth in the charter, annual reports, public statements… Operative goals designate the ends sought through the actual operating policies of the organization; they tell us what the organization actually is trying to do, regardless of what the official goals say are the aims” (Perrow, 1961, p. 855). Operative goals may be justified on the basis of an official goal, or they may be irrelevant to, or subvert official goals. When operative goals are means to an official goal, Perrow talks about the official operative goals. Unofficial operative goals, on the other hand, are tied more directly to group interests and they may not necessarily be connected to official goals. Various unofficial goals may be achieved at the expense of official ones, or, in some cases, in conjunction with them. The goals most relevant to understanding organizational behavior are not the official goals, but those that are embedded in major operating policies. “The operative goals will be shaped by the dominant group, reflecting the imperatives of the particular task area that is most critical, their own background characteristics (distinctive 10 perspectives based upon their training, career lines, and areas of competence) and the unofficial uses to which they put the organization for their own needs” (Perrow, 1961, p. 857). Perrow identifies four tasks that every organization must accomplish: (1) secure the inputs; (2) secure acceptance (legitimacy); (3) marshal the necessary skills; (4) coordinate internal and external relations. The group that is best equipped to accomplish the critical task will dominate in the organization and the dominant group will be able to manipulate the organization to further their own interests. Perrow defines goal displacement as a situation in which formal rules are used by organizational members to further their own interests in opposition to official goals. Identifying a company’s goals is important to understanding bureaucratization because goals affect organizational structure. Managers can adopt various mechanisms for resolution of conflict (resulting from the plurality of goals) such as standard procedures and operational rules. The qualitative nature of the goals also affects organizational structure: having basic research as an output goal suggests establishing less formal structures, while a product goal such as ease of replication facilitates the establishment of bureaucratic structures in an organization (Perrow, 1986). LITERATURE REVIEW Attewell & Gerstein In their study “Government Policy and Local Practice”, Attewell and Gerstein (1979) explained the failures of government policy on methadone treatment for heroin 11 addiction. They used a concept of goal displacement to understand the practices of local agencies, which were administering the directives of federal agencies. The cases of several methadone clinics showed why governmental agencies’ policies often acquired considerable power even though they were not backed by law. The FDA had no legal power to control the practice of methadone, but has asserted its jurisdiction by categorizing methadone as an “Investigational New Drug”, despite the fact that in 1970s methadone was used in U.S. and abroad for more than two decades. The FDA defined the protocol for methadone programs, which also “provided criteria for evaluating a program: numbers of drug-free graduates, changes in arrest record etc. State and local agencies took these as standards by which to assess a program’s requests for licensing and refunding” (Attewell & Gerstein, 1979, p. 315). This dependence on the external financing shifted the foci of methadone clinics from therapeutic aims per se and toward an increasing concern with the self-presentation in order to look good to funding and regulatory agencies. Waiting lists were adopted as one indicator of the need for a program and the need for more money. Characteristics of addicts in treatment were widely publicized and a program’s statistics were compared with others in order to show its efficiency. A reality construction or presentation of self (Goffman, 1959) became the primary goal and the means to preservation of the organization. Additionally, methadone programs had to manipulate their public image in order to hold off external criticism. For example, a California Board of Pharmacy inspector complained in the local press of one program: “It is a failure to the agencies monitoring it, to the agencies administering it, to the patients using it, and to the tax-payers” 12 (Attewell & Gerstein, 1979, p. 316). The main complaints were that measures of success of the program were not defined. A technique that was developed by Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander in 1964 called for indefinite daily dose of methadone defining the addiction as a chronic disease. This notion was progressively modified by the FDA, which invoked the ideal of a drug-free addict as measure of success. The experience of main actors, clients and staff in methadone programs, is described as one of grown adults in a high school setting. “Everyone knows the rules, virtually everyone present dislikes the rules, but everyone’s behavior is rule-governed, even if only in grudging ritualistic compliance” (Attewell & Gerstein, 1979, p. 318). The staff members’ normal situation was one of profound role conflict. Most of the counselors were ex-addicts because peer counseling provided role models for clients, job prospects for ex-addicts, and inexpensive labor for programs. This was in a direct conflict with demands for counselors to enforce punitive sanctions. The conflict was organizational since counselors as therapists were expected to establish supportive relationships with clients but due to the increasing concern with the external environment were increasingly required to be disciplinarians. Clients, on the other hand, experienced a high degree of arbitrariness in terms of urinalysis requirements and punitive detoxification. Addicts did not know what day they would be called for a urine analysis. For some heroin could be detected even two days after the use and for others not even if they shot heroin hours before testing. Additionally, there were problems with the technique of urinalysis: even when urines were split into two portions for separate urinalysis, the results rarely agreed. Therefore, addicts did not regard urinalysis as an objective system of surveillance, but rather as “a form of 13 unpredictable Russian Roulette” (Attewell & Gerstein, 1979, p. 321). Similar were addicts’ views of punitive detoxification. The clients were first verbally warned and after that were obliged to sign the contract that more positive tests would result in detoxification. The discretionary power of staff to put someone on detoxification led to a widespread belief by clients that staff member manipulated the urine samples to protect friends, earn bribes, or hurt enemies. Authors offer only limited explanation on why a goal displacement is a central concept for explaining the failure of federal policy in methadone programs. They argue that none of the typical organizational compliance mechanisms (coercive, remunerative, and normative compliance) could be used in the staff-addicts relationship. Instead, Attenberg & Gerstein maintain that loss of face to some addicts was the only remaining lever for obtaining compliance. The friendships between staff and addicts produced respect and feelings of personal obligation. This type of commitment was only possible through particularistic behavior such as special treatment, making exceptions to rules, doing more than the standard minimum. However, the insistence on increasing formal rationality to look good for funding agencies undermined the discretionary powers of counselors and particularistic basis of clinical compliance. “As programs attempted to respond to outside agencies by strictly enforcing federal and state regulations they simultaneously became the agents of their own therapeutic demise” (Attewell & Gerstein, 1979, p. 324). 14 Demerath & Thiessen In “On Spitting against the Wind: Organizational Precariousness and American Irreligion” (1966) Demerath and Thiessen analyzed small-town Wisconsin free-thought movement and dilemmas that arose out of its irreligion. They explored organizational goals alongside with social status, leadership, commitment, and recruitment to inform adaptation to dissidence and precariousness of the Sauk City Freie Gemeinde movement. They viewed the free-thought movement as a deviant organization, which lacks any crystallized doctrine, has no sharply defined organizational goals, no natural population from which to recruit, and no values which would be consistent with the normative mainstream. Unattainable or unrealistic goals are associated with the precarious nature of the freethinker’s movement. Values tend to be relativistic and goals are rarely specified, because of their high regard for individual autonomy. Some quotations from the interviews with the movement members are illustrative of the amorphous conception of the Freie Gemeinde’s purpose: “Well, I think we are looking for something we can believe in. We are a group of seekers rather than a body of believers. We think that through advancement of science the truth will change. We are prepared to accept this, and we can change our beliefs very easily, because if it follows the truth, then we believe we are right in changing it in contrast to other religions.” 15 Authors juxtaposed conventional religious groups and freethinker’s movement in terms of characteristics of their goals. Churches have long suffered from goal displacement since salvation is not a clear-cut or easily achieved goal. Means such as recruitment often replaced goals such as salvation. Similarly, the Freie Gemeinde has witnessed the “means-ends inversion”. Many interviewed freethinkers admitted that their participation was motivated more by social reasons than anything else. “The combination of ‘mighty fine food’ and German ‘egg coffee’ has supplanted the reformist zeal of overturning the churches and emancipating their parishioners” (Demerath and Thiessen, 1966, p. 685). Yan In his book “The Flow of Gifts”, Yan offered an ethnographic account of the system of gift exchange and the patterns of interpersonal relations in a north China village. Inspired by the Gouldner’s essay on the norm of reciprocity, Yan discovered four operating rules of gift exchange among village residents. These rules provided means of understanding the complexity, flexibility, and contextuality of interpersonal relations. The first rule is that “a good person always interacts with others in a reciprocal way”. Yan quotes a passage from the Confucian classic Book of Rites that describes the obligation of giving, receiving, and returning gifts in the long run: “In the highest antiquity they prized good; in the time next to this, giving and repaying was the thing attended to. And what the rules of propriety value is reciprocity. If 16 I give a gift and nothing comes in return, that is contrary to propriety; if the thing come to me, and I give nothing in return, that is also contrary to propriety” (p. 124). The second rule of gift exchange is that “the offer of a gift should not break the existing hierarchical system of social status in either kinship or social terms”. This rule goes even so far that an unsuitable gift may be offensive to the recipient and other donors. The third rule is one of “making gifts in accordance with previous interactions”. Based on close daily interactions, or some help offered in the past, villagers may chose to create a new gift-giving relationship by increasing the value of the gift of one villager or by presenting the gift for a situation in which they were not necessarily required to do so. The fourth rule concerns “the proper manner of returning the gifts”, where villagers agree that a respectable man should avoid the appearance of gift exchanges as payoffs. The most common way to do this is to increase somewhat the value of the returned gift. These rules are similar to Gouldner’s notion of reciprocity where self-interested individuals engage in dyadic, transaction type relationships. The principle of reciprocity plays an important role in the Chinese system of gift exchange. The reciprocal relationships are instrumental in the maintenance of the social system. Yan observed several incidents of conflict in gift exchange behavior, but he explained them as cases of ‘breaking the rules’. Such is the case of the conflict between cook Zhao and Lin, the deputy party secretary in the town government. Lin failed to attend wedding of Zhao’s son or to make a return gift, even though Zhao cooked twice for Lin in ritual situations 17 hosted by political cadre. The occasion led to deterioration of their relations and finally to the open confrontation between Zhao and Lin after which Zhao received a return gift from Lin via a middleman. Yan then continued to show that in hierarchical contexts gifts are given unilaterally and that “recipients remain socially superior even though they fail to return the gifts” (p. 214). Von Reden In her work “The Commodification of Symbols: Reciprocity and its Perversions in Menander” (1998), Von Reden defined reciprocity as “a local concept of order, peace, and social cohesion”. She argued that the confrontation of reciprocity and commodity exchange in Menander’s plays was “a metaphorical confrontation of order and disorder, civic community and its corrosion” (p. 255). Menander represents civic symbols like marriage, friendship, and sacrifice as objects, which have a price and are transacted arbitrarily. Menander’s commodification of symbols suggests that “commodity exchange was regarded as the moral opposite of civic exchange”. Author utilizes Gouldner’s principle of reciprocity to explain the differences between relationship of reciprocity to social cohesion and of commodity exchange to social cohesion. While reciprocity is characterized by the indeterminacy of both timing and value of the return, making it an element of social cohesion, the commodity exchange sets an end to this indeterminacy. The most important feature in commodity exchange is the exchangeability of objects. However, not every object can turn into a commodity, especially some exchanges that “symbolize a society’s most important relationships” (p. 18 259). Menander insisted that everything in his society is purchasable and von Reden provided several examples from his plays: the costs of prostitutes are compared to the value of marriage, and the costs of a cook to the value of sacrifice. SITE DESCRIPTION Venture Growth Inc. (VGI) was established in 1983 as one of the state sponsored programs for turnaround of the economically troubled mid-western City. VGI performs several activities, which can be grouped into four categories: technology transfer, building public awareness, entrepreneurial education and client assistance. Technology transfer is facilitated through three incubators for high-tech and biotech companies: High Technology Incubator (HTI), Biotechnology Incubator (BI) and Growth Incubator for Technology (GIT). A number of events, like investor conference, the business school award for excellence in management, the business school Hall of Fame, and a magazine were initiated to increase awareness of small businesses in the community as well as VGI’s efforts in this area. Entrepreneurial education is an always-changing activity, but obviously doesn’t meet the needs of early-stage entrepreneurs. They rarely participate in courses or seminars and are quite critical about their content. Similarly, the client assistance does not meet expectations of ‘incubator entrepreneurs’. VGI provides help in development of business plans, offers solutions to business problems, refers to sources of capital, provides opportunities for networking, and arranges for technical assistance. Main critiques by tenant companies are that VGI staff lacks technical knowledge needed 19 to assist high-tech companies and that they do not give enough time to accommodate needs of early-stage companies. There are two distinctive groups of actors in the field site: VGI staff and entrepreneurs of tenant companies. VGI staff forms clearly determinable organizational structure, even though some people refuse to talk about hierarchy and talk about flat organization where “everybody does everything”. The hierarchical organizational structure is easily observable through office arrangement: offices for top officials vs. cubicles for other employees. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, expressed many times (verbally and through their actions) that independence, flexibility and openness are important to them. Their dissatisfaction with VGI was mainly focused on the lack of communication, competence and ‘real’ networking. Additionally, there is a board of directors representing the funding sources and community. The primary function of the board is to define goals that should be achieved through the organization. The main funding sources reflect the non-profit nature of VGI. Federal and state grants represent the largest single sources of financing and account for one quarter of total revenues. Additionally, money from governmental institutions is an important source for large remodeling investments into VGI building5, and a cheap lending source 5 Creation of space for Biotechnology Incubator was a big renovation project, which was financed by many institutions and carried out by the University. Federal grant of $2 million came from Economic Development Administration and these funds were matched by $1.5 million from University (which later on increased to $1.8 million); $300,000 was a contribution from the City and $200,000 was a favorable loan from a local development initiative. University received a federal grant in August 1995; construction started a year later and was finished in April 1997. 20 for tenant companies6. VGI also receives grants from several foundations and donations from the well-known business school and others. VGI revenues mainly consist of fees for courses, events, advertisers, and account for forty percent of total support and revenues. The largest expense category is salaries and related costs, followed by the expenses for facility. The University is owner and landlord of the facility. The space for incubator comes from the University’s commitment to the State, where the Universtity promised that it would make available 40,000 square feet of space for VGI’s incubator activities. INTERPRETATION Control of resources and information In the previous section I have given a short description of VGI, whereas in this and the following sections I will try to explain the nature of the relationship between VGI and entrepreneurs of tenant companies. An incubator is an organization, where traditional governance mechanisms may apply only to a limited extent. Even though VGI assumes the controlling position in the incubator, it has to deal with a number of organizations, whose primary motivation is independence. VGI is able to maintain a managing role in the incubator primarily through control of financial resources. It has access to those who make donations and has a control over the systems for fund raising. Through financial control, they are able to impose the rules on the entrepreneurs; rules like entrance criteria, rules of conduct, the tenancy, and graduation terms. 6 For example, Biotechnology Incubator received a large loan under favorable conditions from State 21 VGI itself, on the other hand, is quite independent and without constraints from inside or outside of the organization. The president of VGI reports to the board of trustees, which is active primarily through its Incubator Committee. This committee meets on a quarterly basis to discuss strategic questions of incubator’s operations. VGI makes an effort to diminish the role of the board of trustees. Caricatures of board members on the way to VGI offices are grotesque representations of individual’s distinctive features with intent to ridicule the authority that they symbolize. Increasingly, VGI has been able to find alternative funding sources beyond the range of the current board thus reducing board’s power. Additionally, VGI seems to be efficient in controlling the information flows among the actors in the organization7. Due to their limited role in the incubator, members of the board rely on VGI’s quarterly reports for the information about tenant companies. Under such conditions “trustees are likely to find that their legal power becomes nominal” (Perrow, 1961, p. 858). External control from state or federal departments is at best unthorough. VGI reports about its incubator activities to State Department of Development (SDOD) through quarterly status reports. Copies of the report summary are also sent to the State Committee, which supervises operations of similar incubators statewide, and to governor’s advisor for technology. These institutions do not have standards by which Department of Development, which was used for cheap ‘construction’ loans for tenant companies. 7 I observed an occasion where one of the VGI directors misled the Incubator Committee. The debate was about a tenant that was in the incubator for over 6 years, even though VGI has an explicit rule that the maximum tenancy is 4 years. Incubator’s director explained that the company was graduating in few months, but consequent interview with the entrepreneur revealed that the company was only moving from High Technology Incubator to Biotechnology Incubator. There are no representatives of the tenant companies attending the committee meetings. 22 they could evaluate work of different incubators. As the HTI director described: “SDOD does not differentiate among incubators and it doesn’t matter if incubator xyz did much better than incubator abc, funding would still be the same”. Thus there is sufficient means for power by VGI and sufficient interest in power. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, can undermine this power by simply choosing not to enter or remain in the incubator. One of the entrepreneurs in Biotechnology Incubator claimed that “the only thing that VGI is helpful for them is space, which is somewhat oriented to more technical companies”, however “it is not hard to find space somewhere else”. Making favors The precariousness of the relationship between VGI and entrepreneurs raises the question about the forces, which ensure minimum of consensus among these two groups. As discussed earlier, the three forms of integration are reciprocity, exchange and redistribution. To a certain extent the relationship between VGI and tenant companies can be seen as exchange relationship, since VGI sells some of the services and rents the space to entrepreneurs. However, most of the services for incubator companies are free or subsidized. For example, business consulting services and the majority of office services are free of charge. Rent is 25 percent below the comparable market prices for the same area. These privileges are attractive enough for entrepreneurs to seek admission to the incubator. 23 The process of initiation of entrepreneurs into the organization sets the basis for reciprocal relationship between VGI staff and entrepreneurs. Although entrance criteria, like high-technology/biotechnology orientation, high growth potential, and incorporation in State, are predetermined, there is still a great deal of arbitrariness in this process. It is at VGI’s discretion, which companies will it allow to enter the incubator (usually one out of ten companies that apply). Sometimes these companies are admitted even if they do not match the entrance criteria. Melanie, a corporate history writer, admits that “her connections with the University helped her to get into the VGI even though her business is not high-tech or biotech”. Additionally, VGI allows some companies to make modifications to facility. For example, Stanheath was able to break the wall to get a connection between their offices. Special cases aside, cheap rental space and free services are benefits for which many companies are grateful and feel that they are “very lucky to be in”. The norm of reciprocity generates motives for returning benefits over time and, according to Gouldner, maintains the social system through egoistic motivations. Entrepreneurs return favors in various ways. They frequently act as guest speakers at VGI’s seminars and courses. More importantly, entrepreneurs willingly (and sometimes unwillingly) participate in promotional activities organized by VGI, which are intended to advertise young companies, but also to justify and recognize VGI’s role in the ‘incubation’ process. There are several ways in which VGI promotes itself and tenant companies. The quarterly Magazine features incubator success stories with a broad reach among local business community. VGI organizes and places its name on the awards endorsing regional fastest growing firms. In its quarterly report to SDOD and State’s 24 governor, VGI provides significant tenant news (mostly success stories). It also includes news about the companies that have graduated from incubator years ago8. Through these and other activities VGI builds its own reputation on the achievements of other companies regardless of its contribution to the success of these companies. Entrepreneurs receive low cost space and services, while VGI receives increased visibility, increased access to resources and consequently increased power. A characteristic not previously observed or discussed by the theorists of reciprocity in multi-group arrangements is that each group will observe and evaluate relationships among all other groups in the social system. This is even truer when these entities are supposed to have qualitatively similar reciprocal relationship with another entity. VGI claims that it will provide support to all tenant companies, but several entrepreneurs complained that they didn’t receive the assistance that other companies did because “there is nothing to brag about” their companies or because their “business is not exactly in line with VGI’s preferences”. Although this observation does not oppose the quid pro quo nature of the relations in the incubator, it counters Gouldner’s assumption of system stabilizing function of time period and comparative indeterminacy under the norm of reciprocity. Instead, as I will discuss in the following section, reciprocal relationships are characterized by the conflict and instability. 8 For example, company Chartech, Inc. was featured in the quarterly report for the period October 1, through December 31, 1997, even though it graduated from incubator in 1990. There are several other examples of graduates from 1995, 1996 and 1997 in the same report. 25 Conflict Gouldner argued that the norm of reciprocity mobilizes egoistic motivations, and channels them into the maintenance of the social system. However, I believe that these egoistic motivations focus on the fairness of the reciprocal exchange and whenever there are perceived inequalities, there is a potential for tension and conflict. The conflict between VGI and entrepreneurs is latent, but still quite easily observable. There were only few open confrontations that subjects in my study referenced to or I was able to observe, but especially entrepreneurs were very eager to point out the deficiencies in the incubator. One source of conflict is that incubator companies do not get as much from VGI as they expect or as much as they are led to believe when they enter the incubator. Specifically, entrepreneurs complained about a lack of quality advice, a lack of networking, and a lack of financial sources from VGI. Several accounts from entrepreneurs make the point: “People (VGI) are nice but they do not take time to breathe with the new entrepreneur, to really know our problems and help us with them. Lack of business advice can be explained by the lack of hands-on experience. There are some people in VGI that were closely involved with small businesses but majority has worked for non-profits.” (Ruben, a GIT entrepreneur) “Eight months ago I could have applied for an SBA loan, but I didn’t know about it. So I was late. I lack the time to search for such information but the problem is that I can not get such information from VGI.” (Joe, tenant) 26 “VGI organized this short seminar on financing. On that seminar they told me that it is very hard to get money from banks or angels, so my first source of financing should be my rich relatives. I drove downtown to listen to somebody telling me that I should borrow money from my aunt or grandpa.” (Harry, former tenant) Another, more profound, conflict is the one of taking credit for the success of young companies. Entrepreneurs believe that they are solely responsible for the progress of their companies. They try to maintain their independence and hide details about their operations. Entrepreneurs fear the disclosure of sensitive data because of their vulnerability to competitor’s attacks. VGI, on the other hand, relies on governmental grants and private donations for its existence and therefore must write frequent and extensive reports to maintain this financing. For this reason VGI collects detailed data about the development and growth of incubator companies. The mandatory reporting of information by tenant companies is included as a stipulation in the Memo of Understanding. The information is then used for various promotional activities and publications in which VGI praises its own role in the incubation process. Comments from entrepreneurs are a good indication of this situation: “VGI likes to collect information for their newsletter and different reports. We provide them as little as possible. They want to know a little too much, so that they can claim credit for what our company does. I don’t really like this because it seems that VGI wants to feel that they have in a significant way contributed to the success of our company. They think of us, the companies, as being their children.” (Dave, an entrepreneur) 27 “If you succeed it is OK, if you fail so be it. They (VGI) should be more active: if you fail, we fail also.” (Mukul, a tenant) Another controversial issue in the incubator is the long-term success fee. It is designed to bring additional revenues to the incubator, but its introduction and implementation are frequently being disputed. The fee is initially mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding, which is to be signed by an entrepreneur upon moving in the incubator. Memo only specifies a time period in which a long-term success fee agreement should be negotiated. A closer look at the fee formula shows that a company leaving the incubator would have to pay for the most, if not all, of the difference between the market and incubator rent, and for supposedly free services of consulting, conference rooms, and furniture for the whole ‘incubation’ period. VGI effectively changes ex post the nature of its relationship with entrepreneurs from reciprocal to exchange. The fact that companies have to negotiate to which extent the services and rent will be free of charge increases the visibility of VGI’s ‘favor’. Entrepreneurs view that these benefits are comparatively much smaller than what they give to VGI and therefore are very eager to voice their dissatisfaction with the incubator personnel and services. VGI downplays the conflict. By the words of Linda, director of High Technology Incubator, VGI is a “benevolent landlord” and that “tenants also have to show some effort”. Clark, a project manager in VGI, described the relationship: “The prevailing philosophy in VGI is that companies (tenants) should come and ask VGI personnel for help. This is supposed to help them become independent. Some companies come and ask for help and others don’t. I don’t 28 know if this approach is good. I am not sure if tenants know what are all the services that VGI offers.” This stands in a stark contrast to claims in the Annual Report and other publications where VGI is presented as a major contributor to the success of incubator companies. Conflict is maintained at the sustainable level, because of the stipulation that companies have to leave the incubator in 24-48 months. Even though this may be an appropriate ‘incubation’ period, it also has a rather subtle function: it gives VGI the power to dismiss any of the companies that would complain too much and on the other hand, to regard any extension of tenancy as a reward to the companies that comply. The built-in high turnover of tenant companies prevents the conflict from growing out of proportion and helps VGI to maintain its role in the incubator. The situation in the incubator is quite different from Gouldner’s theoretical expectations about the norm of reciprocity and the disruptive potentialities of power differences. Gouldner claimed that the norm of reciprocity would keep off exploitative relations, because they would undermine the very social system that enabled them. VGI, however, uses its power not only to get benefits without returning them, but also to take back some of the favors it has supposedly given in the first place. By the institution of the limited tenancy, VGI is able to keep the conflict at the sustainable level. Entrepreneurs react either by actively seeking benefits from VGI or by avoiding any contacts with VGI whatsoever. One example is the idea of an ‘open space’ incubator, where VGI tries to blur the boundaries between VGI office space and offices of tenant companies. Some entrepreneurs play along, while others introduce extreme security 29 procedures. On one occasion when I helped an VGI employee deliver memos about a publicity event to tenant companies, I was able to observe that many of the companies had their doors open and were generally very welcoming. This was not the case with one of the tenant companies. Obeying the specific request of the president of the company, we had to knock on the closed door and wait until we were admitted into their offices. Several other companies were also reluctant to participate in the event that would praise VGI’s role in the economic revival of the City. The widespread reluctance among entrepreneurs to participate in VGI rituals evokes frustration among VGI staff and focuses their attention to various unofficial goals. Self-interest and community recognition All formal organizations are shaped by forces that are tangential to the official goals and procedures of these organizations (Selznick, 1949). Individuals resist to being treated as means to an end, but instead participate as wholes, bringing in their special problems and purposes. As Perrow (1986) pointed out, the group conflict revolves around the question of conflict of goals in organizations. The official goal of VGI is to “stimulate entrepreneurial activity and the creation and growth of early stage businesses”. In the absence of social supervision and constraint, many other unofficial goals are being pursued by VGI, such as community recognition (e.g., events/awards), extracurricular activities (e.g. golfing), and fringe benefits (e.g., free education at the university). I discussed earlier the role of frequent and extensive reports that VGI has to write. The main purpose of these reports and publicity events is to obtain governmental grants 30 and private donations, but also to gain community recognition. As one entrepreneur describes it: “They (VGI staff) many times have to do things to look good for their financial supporters and that are not essential for early stage companies”. A large number of people in VGI are involved in the preparation of reports and organization of publicity events. Community recognition has become one of the unofficial goals of the organization, directly feeding into the ambitions of the senior vice president for operations, technology transfer and client assistance. On several occasions, she talked about the development of a large technology park in the City area, where VGI would have a leading role. The president and both senior vice presidents received the awards for the Entrepreneur of the Year in the past years. Many of the entrepreneurs see this as a “bad joke”, since none of these people “has ever really started a company”. The majority of the VGI staff only worked for non-profits or large organizations. The president had a business career for 27 years with a big steel company, where “money went into drainage”. He is the only one featured in the previously mentioned caricatures, where he wears a golfers outfit and is preparing to strike a ball. There is also a stack of books in the picture with clearly readable titles: The Golfers’ Guide to Business; BMW Reparaturleitung; How to Manage Women in Business Vol. I.; Without Them Trying to Manage You Vol. II. President and senior V. P. for recognition events and educational 31 programs are frequently involved in golf outings, which are officially fund raising events, but unofficially a pleasant extracurricular activity9. Senior V. P. for recognition events is one of the founders of VGI. His attitude towards entrepreneurs can be sensed through jokes and quotes that are pasted on the visitor’s table in his office. The first one is a definition of an entrepreneur from Willey’s Dictionary (a comic strip): “a person who does everything he can think to keep from getting a job”. The second one is a quote from Prof. Abraham Zaleznich (Harvard Business School): “I think if we want to understand the entrepreneur, we should look at the juvenile delinquent”. This attitude does not seem to represent the broader culture in the organization, but rather an attitude of an individual that has become disinterested in the formal activities of the organization. He has no contacts with entrepreneurs and is “just a name” to many of them. One member of the board of trustees maintained that “because salaries paid are usually lower, a president should have the ability to manage people that could make more money in other positions”. Instead, VGI allocated practically all the increase in the funds available in the previous year (15 percent increase) to the increase in salaries and related expenses. Free education at the university is the most important fringe benefit that employees of the incubator receive quite frequently. Motivation of VGI staff centers on their self-interest as manifested in extracurricular activities, community recognition, material gains, and long-term gains in power. 9 I overheard a discussion between senior V. P. and one of his assistants about specific golfing in Florida for which none of the potential financial contributors signed up. Senior V. P. said that he and the president would still go to Florida. 32 CONCLUSION VGI is an organization that was established to nurture and develop small companies, but has instead become a vehicle to pursue personal goals. The displacement of goals takes place because certain activities accrue increasing internal relevance, instead of having a direct relationship with the ultimate goals of the organization. VGI’s top administrators are able to pursue their self-interest, because there is no adequate system of control in existence. The external control is limited to a general type of supervision, which concentrates on the financial constraints. The internal control, exercised through board of trustees, is done routinely and with little interest. The relationship between VGI staff and entrepreneurs is governed by the norm of reciprocity, despite some attempts from VGI to change this relationship retroactively into exchange relationship. Previous researchers conceptualized the norm of reciprocity as “a local concept of order and peace” (Von Reden, 1998) with “system stabilizing function” (Gouldner, 1960), where conflict is only an instance of “breaking the rules” (Yan, 1996). Alternatively, I argued that reciprocal relationships are characterized by the conflict and instability. Obligations for repayment of benefits received mobilize egoistic motivations, which turn focus of exchange partners on the fairness of exchange. Two attributes of reciprocity (Gouldner), time period and comparative indeterminacy, do not perform their system-stabilizing functions. 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