This research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear
Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but reflects the views of the author and should not be
construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Commission.
The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program: Domestic
Perspectives and International Implications
Fiona Simpson1
May 2009
Executive Summary
This paper seeks to outline and assess the political debate surrounding stockpile
stewardship in the US. It begins by providing a brief history of the stockpile
stewardship program (SSP), before turning to the debate surrounding the program
itself. Specifically, it maintains that the “dual commitment” of the SSP – to maintain
the safety and reliability of the deterrent without nuclear testing – contains some
inherent tensions, which have resulted in very different assessments of the program
and its contribution to both national security and the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime.
The paper argues that the perspectives tend to fall along a continuum in which the
program is, at one end, considered too constraining on unilateral decision-making
regarding the ability to maintain and modernize the existing nuclear arsenal and, at the
other, is considered to be not constraining enough. In between, there are those who
consider the program to be essentially sound, but in need of redirection. The paper
places these views under one of four general categories:
The Skeptic’s View (1): Stockpile stewardship is fundamentally problematic;
undermines the national interest.
The Qualified Supporter’s View (1): Stockpile stewardship is essentially sound;
requires redirection towards new (re)designs, modernization.
The Qualified Supporter’s View (2): Stockpile stewardship is essentially sound,
requires redirection away from new designs, modernization.
The Skeptic’s View (2): Stockpile stewardship is fundamentally problematic;
undermines international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
The paper then touches briefly on the question of the benefits of cooperative
stewardship, (cooperation with other nuclear-weapons states), noting that such
cooperation has been a given in some cases (the U.K.) and has proved more
1
Center on International Cooperation, New York University
2
controversial in others (the Russian Federation). The paper notes that suggestions
have been made for greater cooperation. in this area, with the Russian Federation, as
well as the possibility of integrating the existing cooperation stewardship with Russia
– such as it is – with other areas of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on
securing nuclear materials.
Finally, the paper focuses on the relationship between the work of the SSP and the
future of the CTBT, with particular reference to the developments over the last ten
years, since the US Senate’s rejection of the Treaty. The results of the SSP’s work
over the past decade indicate that many of the technical concerns regarding warhead
reliability, which were cited by some as the basis for rejecting the Treaty in 1999,
have been assuaged. However, it is argued that technical concerns regarding the
CTBT have always been irrevocably entwined with political and national security
concerns, and these concerns remain and are likely to reappear. It is noted that even if
all technical arguments in favor of ratification are convincing, there is no reason to
assume that this will translate into political support for the Treaty.
Obtaining this support will require an active role by the U.S. President, but will also
require that increased attention be paid to putting forward convincing arguments in
favor of the non-proliferation and disarmament advantages created by the CTBT, both
for the international regime and for the United States. The nuclear programs of Iran
and Syria, and the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK – all of which have taken
place despite the U.S. testing moratorium may make finding convincing political
arguments in favor of the Treaty at least as challenging as in 1999, if not more so. The
paper also notes that some of those who opposed the CTBT in 1999 have since come
out in support of its ratification and may serve as credible sources of persuasion for
those who remain reticent.
The paper concludes by observing certain common themes have emerged with regard
to stockpile stewardship, regardless of which perspective on the program is favored.
The first is that the ultimate objective of the Stockpile Stewardship Program has
tended to be ill-defined. One of the more tangible concerns arising from this question
– and, inevitably, a source of future deliberations – will be the financial cost of the
program. If the future course of the SSP is unclear, as it seems to be now that the
RRW program is off the table, finding political (and therefore budgetary) support for
the program may prove difficult.
In addition, stockpile stewardship, in its present form, has self-evidently postponed
any decision about modernization and new nuclear weapons. While the RRW
program has been sidelined, there is no reason to assume it will not be revisited,
although its eventual success is by no means assured, particularly if there continues to
be a lack of precision regarding what the RRW concept entails.
The debate over stockpile stewardship is, in essence, a debate over the future of the
US deterrent. In turn, a debate about the future of the US deterrent (and whether or
not it has one) may also be credibly understood as a window into the US intentions
regarding nuclear disarmament. The results of these discussions will inevitably be
held up by other actors for comparison against US rhetoric on this issue.
3
Introduction
The end of the Cold War, in 1991, resulted in perhaps a greater degree of political
optimism than at any time in the twentieth century, certainly since the end of the
Second World War and particularly in the context of nuclear non-proliferation. To be
sure, revelations regarding Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program had increased
concerns regarding the spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of states,
regardless of whether or not those states were parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). However, the demise of the previous nuclear paradigm – that of the
two Cold War adversaries on either side of a world divided by an iron curtain and
each deterring the other with the prospect of mutually assured destruction – seemed to
have given way to sustained and significant reductions in the numbers of nuclear
weapons, to realistic prospects for the conclusion and entry into for of a
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to a unified and effective
United Nations Security Council.
Over the ensuing two decades, such optimism has often appeared increasingly quaint.
Although significant cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian
Federation have taken place, both states, along with the three other NPT nuclearweapon-States – have been subject to accusations that they have failed to take their
disarmament obligations seriously. The US, in particular, has been the target of such
criticism. Moreover, the CTBT – the ratification of which was rejected by the US
Senate in 1999 – has not yet entered into force, while the words “unified” and
“effective” are rarely used in the context of the Security Council.
Against the backdrop of the post-Cold War evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime is the U.S. stockpile stewardship program (SSP). The antecedents of this
program may be found with the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons tests
that was announced by then-President George H.W. Bush in 1992. The program is
closely linked not only to cuts in the nuclear arsenal (while retaining personnel and
expertise), but also to the prospects for CTBT ratification, seeking – as it does – to
ensure the reliability and safety of the nuclear arsenal without the need for testing.
Although it is a technical program, the political ramifications of stockpile stewardship
have, from the outset, given rise to a range of disagreements within the US. It has
been charged that the SSP is, variously, too restrictive of the United States’ ability to
be flexible with regard to its response to changing threats or is not restrictive enough
– is antithetical, in fact, to non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
Given its origins as a Clinton administration initiative and its related connections to
the domestic debate over ratification of the CTBT and the Treaty’s eventual entry into
force, such domestic politicization is hardly surprising. In addition, the ratification of
the Treaty by the U.S. has become highly symbolic in the international sphere, often
being viewed – fairly or unfairly – as a litmus test of the sincerity of nuclear-weapons
states regarding their obligations under Article VI of the NPT (i.e. to negotiate in
good faith towards nuclear disarmament). The CTBT was the first of the thirteen
practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference, and the U.S. failure to ratify the Treaty is frequently cited by other states
4
parties to the NPT as part of the reason for the deadlock in the regime.2 Ratification of
the CTBT may, in turn, shed light on whether and when the US non-ratification of the
Treaty has been a reason or an excuse for a lack of movement on that issue by other
states.
Moreover, the history and future of the SSP, as well as the results of its work, are an
integral part of decision-making on the direction of the US nuclear deterrent. The
direction of the deterrent – the extent to which it is maintained and modernized, as
well as the perpetuation of the testing moratorium – has, in turn, a sizable effect on
the viability of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts writ large.
This paper will therefore seek to outline and assess the political debate surrounding
stockpile stewardship in the US. A 2007 report by the American Academy for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS) has suggested that “stockpile stewardship has
succeeded politically because of the dual commitment to a sound nuclear weapons
program and to one that proceeds without nuclear testing.”3 This dual commitment,
however, contains some inherent tensions, which have given rise to differing opinions
regarding the efficacy and direction of such efforts. In addition, there is the question
of the benefits of cooperative stewardship, i.e., cooperation with other nuclearweapons states, which has been a given in some cases (the U.K.) and has proved more
controversial in others (the Russian Federation).
Finally, the paper will turn to the relationship between the work of the SSP and the
future of the CTBT, with particular reference to the developments over the last ten
years, since the US Senate’s rejection of the Treaty. Specifically, results of the SSP’s
work over the past decade indicate that many of the technical concerns regarding
warhead reliability, which were cited by some as the basis for rejecting the Treaty in
1999, have been assuaged. The paper will also assess whether or not these advances in
technical knowledge are likely to overcome both the political and other technical
concerns (i.e. regarding verification) raised by the CTBT.
Four perspectives on stockpile stewardship
The political debates regarding the SSP, as noted previously, tend to fall along a
continuum in which the program is, at one end, considered too restrictive upon
unilateral decision-making and, at the other, considered to be not restrictive enough.
In between, there are those who consider the program to be essentially sound, but in
need of certain modifications (see Annex 1). These views appear to fall more or less
under four categories.
The Skeptic’s View (1): Stockpile stewardship is fundamentally problematic;
undermines the national interest. According to this view, stockpile stewardship
2
The complete list of the thirteen practical steps towards nuclear disarmament are contained in the
Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Volume I, Part I (Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the
decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, p. 14. Accessed
at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement.
3
“The United States Nuclear Weapons Program: The Role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead,”
Nuclear Weapons Complex Assessment Committee of the American Academy for the Advancement of
Science, April 2007, p.4.
5
efforts are considered to be unacceptably restrictive. Instead, it is argued, new
warhead designs should be introduced and it should be made possible for testing to
resume either immediately or, more commonly, within a relatively short time-frame.
The Qualified Supporter’s View (1): Stockpile stewardship is essentially sound;
requires redirection towards new (re)designs, modernization: More recently, it
has been argued that the goals of the SSP (specifically, ensuring confidence in the
reliability and safety of the nuclear deterrent without the need for testing), while
preferable insofar as the international climate permits, should be approached in a
more flexible manner and the existing deterrent transformed from its Cold War
framework to a modern arsenal (i.e. low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons and,
later, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Initiative), which could allow for the
preservation of the program’s goals via-à-vis nuclear testing while ushering in a
further reduction of the stockpile and serving a means to address the post-Cold War
challenges (including the potential for attacks by non-state actors using nuclear,
biological, chemical, or radiological weapons).
The Qualified Supporter’s View (2): Stockpile stewardship is essentially sound,
requires redirection away from new designs, modernization: Alternatively, it has
been suggested that, again, while the Stockpile Stewardship Program is essentially
sound – an interim, if unfortunate, necessity given the reality of nuclear weapons – it
should focus the bulk of its efforts on the obtaining support (both financial and
political) for the existing life extension programs, stockpile surveillance, and other
activities dedicated to supporting the testing moratorium, and with the ultimate goal
of eventual disarmament. This approach tends to be skeptical of initiatives such as the
Reliable Replacement Warhead, not least because of its potential to lead to resumed
testing and to undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Other experimental
work carried out under the auspices of the program has also, in some cases, been
subject to criticism.
The Skeptic’s View (2): Stockpile stewardship is fundamentally problematic;
undermines international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Finally, the
SSP has been labeled – both in and of itself and as a consequence of the suggested
realignment characterized by the nuclear earth-penetrator work and the RRW Program
– as, once again, intrinsically problematic. This is the “flip-side” of the more national
security-oriented approach outlined above, in that it considers the SSP flawed, this
time, by virtue of its lack of restrictions. According this assessment, the SSP, by its
very nature, is hostile to the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
epitomizes a lack of commitment to Article VI obligations under the NPT, and thus
contributes to the stalemate that has characterized the nuclear non-proliferation
regime for the better part of a decade.
History of the US-based Stockpile Stewardship Program
In the US, the science-based stockpile stewardship and management program grew
out of the 1992 moratorium on nuclear testing, which was extended in 1993, under
President Clinton. This moratorium was part of a broader trend, with the then-USSR
making a similar pledge in 1990 and the United Kingdom doing the same in 1991.
Three years after President Clinton’s moratorium extension, China and France
followed suit, after completing their own “farewell tests.” Pakistan and India, who
6
conducted nuclear weapons test in 1998, also subsequently announced unilateral
moratoria on further testing. The DPRK, which conducted a nuclear test in October
2006 (generally considered to have been something of a “fizzle”), has made no such
pledge.
In 1995, the announcement was made that the US would sign (and move to ratify) the
CTBT. 4 The Stockpile Stewardship Program, which had been in development for the
past two years, was put forward as part of a quid pro quo to help allay concerns about
the national security implications of ending nuclear tests and, by doing so, to garner
the support needed in the Senate for CTBT ratification. The SSP allowed for the
preservation of the nuclear deterrent (and, equally as important, the retention of the
related technical expertise by the three national laboratories), thereby shifting away
from the development of new weapons designs that had occurred during the Cold
War. This stated position explicitly did not rule out a return to testing and, in fact,
noted that this did not indicate any intention on the part of the Clinton Administration
to move towards nuclear disarmament.5 Instead, the program – established in response
to the (FY) 1994 Defense Authorization Act – was officially created in order to:
1) Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the
enduring stockpile;
2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging stockpile;
3) Refurbish and re-manufacture nuclear weapons and components, as required;
and
4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the
nation’s nuclear deterrent, now and in the future.6
The SSP, as conceptualized, would allow the national weapons laboratories
(Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia) to carry out the kind of work described above.
The continuation of such work, it was hoped, would allow the labs to attract and
retain the personnel, and thus the intellectual and technical expertise, that existed
around the nuclear deterrent by ensuring that they had something against which to
apply and refine that expertise in spite of the fact that no yield-producing tests would
be carried out.
During the time between its formal inception, in 1995, and the unveiling of the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program in 2004, the implementation of
stockpile surveillance, and the life extension program (LEP) of the SSP, maintained
the warheads’ reliability by replacing components as they aged as part of an annual
certification process. This is done through routine surveillance of a selection of
warheads to search for evidence of deterioration, primarily through non-destructive
assay, but also through destructive evaluation.7 In cases where problems are detected
that are located outside the nuclear explosives package, corrections and replacements
may be made with testable or upgraded components. However, problems that have
4
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Statement by President Bill Clinton (Transcript), released by the
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, August 11, 1995.
5
Ibid.
6
Stockpile Stewardship Program, Department of Energy Factsheet, Accessed at:
http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/FactSheets/DOENV_1017.pdf.
7
Jonathan Medalia, CRS Report for Congress, “The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program:
Background and Current Developments,” September 12, 1998, p.8.
7
occurred in the nuclear explosive package component of a warhead may be only
corrected or replaced “using original designs and, insofar as possible, original
materials,” but, in keeping with the moratorium, cannot be tested.8
Against the backdrop of the life extension programs, and in order to further
understand and explore how failures and aging occurred, as well as other aspects of
the weapons, the SSP supported three new experimental developments: a National
Ignition Facility (NIF); a Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DAHRT)
Facility; the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (later Advanced Simulation
and Computing), and later the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research
(JASPER) facility, and the Z-Machine.9
By 1998, the SSP was well underway. Through its surveillance program it had
identified an aging mechanism high explosives, worked to further understand the
effects of corrosion, and developed new diagnostic tools, all designed to confirm that
“the weapons [were] aging gracefully.”10 The second annual certification of the
existing stockpile had been completed and “over nine thousand” nuclear weapons had
been dismantled since the end of the Cold War.11
A year, later, in 1999, the stockpile stewardship program was placed under a brighter
spotlight when the CTBT was put forward to the US Senate for ratification. The
success of the SSP was again touted although, in testimony to the Senate’s Armed
Services Committee, the Director of Sandia (C. Paul Robinson) noted that
“confidence in the reliability and safety” of the nuclear deterrent would “eventually
decline without nuclear testing…[and that] much of the erosion will be in the form of
a shrinking base of experienced personnel who know how to perform the arcane
responsibilities of stockpile stewardship.”12 Other testimony was more optimistic,
with increased confidence being expressed in the “long-term credibility” of the
stockpile and the ability of the SSP to provide that credibility.13 Ultimately, however,
the CTBT failed to find support in the Senate, and the tradeoff – stockpile stewardship
for CTBT support – remained unrealized.
Growing concerns and skepticism regarding the benefits of the SSP found increasing
support in the U.S. Congress by 2000 – particularly with regard to the ability of the
program to hit its milestones, stay on budget, and achieve its overall mandate. Such
skepticism was predominant among those who advocated a return to testing and new
weapons production. A Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the
United States Nuclear Stockpile had therefore been established in 1999, pursuant to
8
Ibid., p.9.
For a comprehensive (and comprehensible) overview of these various aspects of the SSP, please see:
A.Fitzpatrick and I.Oelich, “The Stockpile Stewardship Program: Fifteen Years On,” The Federation of
American Scientists, April 2007.
10
Statement of Dr. Victor H. Reis, Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Department of Energy,
before the Subcommittee on National Security, U.S. House of Representatives, March 19, 1998.
11
Ibid.
12
Statement of C. Paul Robinson, Director, Sandia National Laboratories, United States Senate
Committee on Armed Services, October 7, 1999.
13
Sidney D. Drell, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Stockpile Stewardship
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, October 7, 1999.
9
8
that year’s Defense Authorization Act.14 The panel reported for fiscal years 1999,
2000, and 2001.
The “Foster Panel,” as it was colloquially known, issued its first report in November
1999 and was broadly, if modestly, supportive of the goals of science-based stockpile
stewardship and the program’s ability “to provide a degree confidence in a credible
nuclear deterrent.”15 It added, however, that “it will not be known for at least a decade
and probably longer just how effective the Stockpile Stewardship Program will be.”16
A year later, and shortly after the new Bush administration had taken office, the panel
reported again on its previous year’s work. This time, the tone and approach to the
program had become more concerned. The report declared bluntly that it had found “a
disturbing gap between the nation’s declaratory policy that maintenance of a safe and
reliable nuclear stockpile is a supreme national interest and the actions taken to
support this policy.”17 The panel in that year made a series of nine recommendations,
including the reduction of test-readiness “to well below the Congressionally mandated
one year.”18 This followed on from a more modest recommendation, the previous
year, which had called for accelerated efforts “to understand and preserve test,
development, and production data and insights.”19
The final report of the panel’s three-year tenure struck a tone somewhere between the
first two, noting both progress made and lingering concerns. The Panel again called
for enhanced test-readiness, this time of “no more than three months to a year.”20
(Notably, this reduced testing time had recently been called for in the Nuclear Posture
Review, completed in late 2001. The Review had also, inter alia, rejected the CTBT.)
Over the following few years, increasing attention was directed at the SSP and, in
particular, the life-extension program. Criticism came primarily on two fronts:
budgetary and political. On the budgetary side, a GAO report called for improved
budgeting and management process,21 while on the political side – as will be
discussed shortly – the role of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons (Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrators, RNEP) was being reconsidered. Later, the development of the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) was pursued, which sought to address the
perceived shortcomings of the life-extension program and its ability to provide longterm confidence in the existing nuclear stockpile.
14
This Act was formally known as the Strom Thurmond Defense Authorization Act of 1999. The full
text may be accessed at: http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/laws/105/publ261.105.pdf. See especially,
Sec.3158 and Sec.3159.
15
FY 1999 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United
States Nuclear Stockpile, February 1, 2001, ES-1.
16
Ibid., p. 4.
17
FY 2000 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United
States Nuclear Stockpile, February 1, 2001, ES-1.
18
Ibid. pp.28-29.
19
FY 1999 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United
States Nuclear Stockpile, February 1, 2001, p.9.
20
FY 2000 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United
States Nuclear Stockpile, February 1, 2001, p.ES-3.
21
“Opportunities Exist to Improve the Budgeting, Cost Accounting, and Management Associated with
the Stockpile Life Extension Program,” GAO Report (GAO-03-583), July 2003.
9
Nonetheless, the SSP – including the life extension program – proceeded with its
work. The manufacturing of replacement plutonium “pits” (which, together with high
explosives, constitute the primary stage of the nuclear explosive package) started
again in 2007, for the W88 warhead. This represented the first time in nearly two
decades that the pits had been manufactured, following the shutdown of the plutonium
pit facility in Rocky Flats, Colorado. During this time, and following the 2006
congressional elections, support within the US Congress shifted away from RRW.
The continuing intention to avoid nuclear testing meant that, even if only by default,
support for the life extension and stockpile surveillance programs continued. Now,
with the prospect of U.S. ratification of the CTBT once again on the horizon, the last
ten years of work and findings by the SSP are again due to come under increased
political and public scrutiny.
Cooperation with other nuclear-weapon States
Before turning to the political context and debates surrounding stockpile management,
it is important to note that some level of cooperative stewardship has taken place as
part of the US stockpile management. In particular, this cooperation has been with the
United Kingdom and France.22 The UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) has
its own stockpile stewardship program, but cooperates closely with the US pursuant to
the 1958 UK/US Mutual Defense Agreement. France also participates in the US SSP,
and its own form of the stockpile stewardship program is the Programme de
Simulation des Essais Nucléaires (PaSEN), or the “Simulation Program.”
Cooperation with the Russian Federation, on the other hand, has traditionally taken
place in “a more limited way.”23 More extensive cooperation on stockpile stewardship
appears to have been constrained by concerns that assistance and information
exchanges might benefit Russia militarily.24 The most obvious example of this
concern came in the form of the rejection of Russia’s request for US computers for its
own stockpile maintenance in 1996, when it was determined that the export of these
computers would contravene the pre-existing boundaries on cooperation, set by the
US: that cooperation in this sphere must be both unclassified and, of particular
relevance to this request, must “not enhance the performance of Russian nuclear
weapons or contribute to Russian nuclear weapons design.”25
The existing levels US-Russian cooperation on stockpile stewardship does not appear
to have changed substantially since. Nonetheless, it was suggested – including by one
former Director at Los Alamos – that this limited cooperation should be expanded.
Specifically, it was proposed that such (unclassified) technical cooperation could
Victor H. Reis, “Stockpile Stewardship and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Post-Cold War U.S.
Nuclear Strategy: A Search for Technical and Policy Common Ground, National Academies
Committee on International Security and Arms Control Public Symposium, August 11, 2004.
Accessible through: http://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/cisac/PGA_049763. (N.B. Cooperation on
stockpile stewardship with Israel is often assumed, but cannot – for obvious reasons – be confirmed.)
23
Ibid.
24
Siegfried H. Hecker, “Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia,”
in The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001, p.7.
25
GAO, “Russia’s Request for the Export of US Computers for Stockpile Maintenance,” Statement for
the Record by Mr. Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division, September 30, 1996 (GAO/T-NSAID-96-245),
p.1.
22
10
include “the aging of plutonium, computational materials modeling, response of
materials to dynamic and shock loading conditions, and a variety of experimental
techniques using lasers, pulsed power, or accelerators.”26
In addition, it has been proposed that stockpile stewardship efforts could be integrated
with other areas of US-Russian cooperation on securing nuclear materials – an area of
collaboration and assistance that has, even against the backdrop of changing political
circumstances, managed to remain comparatively stable. In particular, integration
with Cooperative Threat Reduction, Materials Protection Control and Accounting,
and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative have been identified as potentially fruitful
areas of integration.27
The question of whether or how this might best be done, if at all, does not appear to
have been revisited in years since this suggestion was made in 2004. Possible political
benefits have been identified as the reduction of “the potential for any sort of Russian
return to adversary status, and to help encourage [Russian] participation in
international security policies and operations.”28 It is, however, unclear whether the
risks of a Russian return to adversary status are sufficiently high that still greater
cooperation on stockpile stewardship is warranted. Nonetheless, past cooperation on
securing former weapons material, such as the HEU Purchase Agreement and, in
particular, the verification of excess nuclear material from weapons programs
developed during the 1996-2003 Trilateral Initiative (with the IAEA) opens the door
to such integration, as has – more recently – the joint statement by Russian President
Dmitriy A. Medvedev and US President Barack Obama on April 1, 2009. Still, preexisting political, technical and military sensitivities remain regarding assistance in
stockpile stewardship.
Political debate surrounding the SSP:
The Skeptic’s View (1): Stockpile stewardship as fundamentally problematic;
undermines the national interest.
As noted in the introduction, the debate surrounding the stockpile stewardship
program, within the US, has evolved since its inception. More specifically, the view
that the goals of the SSP are inherently flawed – i.e. that both testing and
modernization of the deterrent should instead be resumed (or that the right to do so
should be reserved) for the sake of the national interest – has become more nuanced
over the years, although this is not to argue that opposition to the program, in
principle, no longer exists. This development has tended to accompany the
development of the initiative on RRW, which would see modernization of the
deterrent ostensibly without testing, and which will be discussed shortly.
The belief that the goals of stockpile stewardship are simply antithetical to US
national security interests is one that was perhaps most publicly expressed during the
Senate debate over CTBT ratification, in 1999. The division between those who
Siegfried H. Hecker, “Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia,”
p.6.
27
Victor H. Reis, “Stockpile Stewardship and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Accessible through:
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/cisac/PGA_049763.
28
Ibid.
26
11
questioned the goals of the SSP (and, for that matter, the value of the CTBT) and
those who supported them tended to be along party lines: unsurprising, since the
stockpile stewardship program itself was, as noted earlier, developed under the
Clinton administration and was associated with that administration’s broader nuclear
weapons policies, and particularly its support for the CTBT.29
According to this viewpoint, the stockpile stewardship approach was unable to singlehandedly ensure the reliability of the nuclear explosives package and thus the weapon
itself. Or, as the FY2000 Foster Panel report put it:
existing assessment tools and the current level of scientific
understanding are inadequate to provide sufficient confidence in
either a future aged stockpile or a newly manufactured
replacement, without nuclear testing.30
During the hearings on the CTBT before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
several witness provided testimony regarding what they viewed as one of the intrinsic
problems of the SSP: a stockpile stewardship program, however useful it might be for
increasing the knowledge base of the labs, could not provide dependable results. One
letter to the Committee (a letter signed by, among others, future Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and future Vice President Dick Cheney) stated: “we will never
know if we can trust stockpile stewardship if we cannot conduct nuclear tests to
calibrate the unproven new techniques.”31
According to this view, the SSP contains an internal contradiction: its goal is to use a
variety of tools and techniques to increase the reliability – and confidence in the
reliability – of the nuclear stockpile without testing, yet without nuclear testing it is
unclear how one can say with any certainty that stockpile surveillance and life
extension efforts have worked. Such concerns have been raised32 in spite of the fact
that confidence in nuclear tests had, even in the pre-moratorium days, only ever made
up a small part of the American testing program and were not, in any case, frequent
enough to be statistically significant as regarded reliability of the stockpile as a
whole.33 The underlying concern, however, is that in foregoing nuclear testing, the
SSP thereby foregoes the most visible demonstration of the reliability of the nuclear
stockpile, thus eroding confidence in it (particularly, it may be assumed, outside the
scientific community).
See, for instance, Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, House National Security Committee, “The Clinton
Administration and Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship: Erosion by Design,” October 30, 1996.
30
FY 2000 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United
States Nuclear Stockpile, February 1, 2001, p.16.
31
Letter to Senators Trent Lott and Tom Daschle from James R. Schlesinger, Frank C. Carlucci,
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Richard, B. Cheney, Caspar W. Weinberger, and Melvin R. Laird, Final Review
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105-28), Hearing Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, October
7, 1999, p.64.
32
See also, Kathleen C. Bailey and Robert B. Barker, “Why the United States Should Unsign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Resume Nuclear Testing,” in Comparative Strategy, vol.22, no.2,
p.134.
33
Hannah Levine, “Stockpile Stewardship in the United States: A Primer,” World Security Institute’s
Center for Defense Information, June 6, 2006. Accessed at:
http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/Haninah%20Levine%20Stockpile%20Stewardship%20Primer.pdf, p.4.
29
12
Further, skeptics argue that a cessation of testing would thwart the development of
new U.S. nuclear weapons – a situation that is undesirable to those who tend to be
more hawkish on military and foreign policy matters. This, in turn, constrains
behavior and, potentially, the ability to act in the national interest. Maintaining the
military effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent requires, as one commentator put it, “an
unfettered modernization program.”34 An unfettered modernization program – one
that involves the design and development of completely new types of nuclear
weapons – necessarily requires testing. The stockpile stewardship program thus
impedes the ability of the state to maintain a modern (and therefore credible and
effective) deterrent.
The Qualified Supporter’s View (1): Stockpile stewardship as essentially sound,
requires redirection towards new designs, modernization.
Following the rejection of the CTBT, the election of a new US administration in 2000,
and – just as importantly – the events of 9/11, the political approach to stockpile
stewardship evolved. There remains some measure of opposition in principle towards
the program on the basis outlined above. However, the emphasis since the Nuclear
Posture Review of 2001, certainly within the then-presiding administration, has
focused on the need to redirect the SSP in a way that would involve the modification
and modernization of the existing deterrent. While ostensibly rejecting neither the
stockpile stewardship program, nor its goal of maintaining a deterrent without
resorting to testing, such a policy incorporated a more utilitarian approach to the
question of nuclear tests, seeking to “upgrade” the deterrent without testing, but
against the backdrop of reduced test-readiness should circumstances be deemed to
require it.
In practice, then, the mandate and much of the work of stockpile stewardship would
be preserved, but certain aspects of it altered, particularly the life extension program
(LEP). Instead of the LEP in its current form, the Advanced Concepts Initiative
(endorsed by the Nuclear Posture Review) determined that the existing deterrent
needed a clear set of objectives. It should move from the large-yield Cold War
stockpile to a smaller, modern arsenal more appropriate to 21st century threats,
including those from non-state actors.
The first step in this direction, away from “simple” stewardship of the existing
arsenal, came in the form of renewed attention to the development of an earth
penetrating nuclear weapon – the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).35 The
RNEP sought to provide an answer to deeply buried targets – for instance in tunnel
facilities – such as chemical, biological, or nuclear capabilities. In the past, such
efforts had raised concerns that any work towards a low-yield weapon blurred the
distinction between nuclear and conventional war. This concern had, in fact, been the
raison d’être behind a 1994 law prohibiting research and development to this end. The
Baker Spring, “Why the Administration’s Stockpile Stewardship Will Harm the U.S. Nuclear
Deterrent,” Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #1334, October 7, 1999.
35
An earth penetrating weapon had, in fact, been introduced already, in 1997 under the Clinton
administration. Although this version was not low-yield, the B61-11 nuclear weapon was nonetheless a
source of controversy, with some debate as to whether it did indeed constitute a new nuclear weapon or
– as the administration maintained – was merely a modification of an older delivery system.
34
13
RNEP, as envisioned in this latest iteration, would have a higher yield than five
kilotons and therefore would not violate the 1994 law. In the context of the SSP, this
also meant that research on the RNEP would focus on modifications to existing
weapons, thereby permitting their eventual deployment without testing.
While funding for the RNEP was zeroed out by the US Congress for FY 2006,
another more substantial reorientation of the SSP had already arrived in the form of
the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which was part of the SSP’s directed stockpile
work.36 The RRW was devised as a direct answer to concerns within the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and from within the labs regarding the
reliability and long-term effectiveness of the life extension program and, in essence,
the next iteration thereof.37 As described in one report, the RRW was “a different
approach to stockpile maintenance that makes use of the experimental apparatus of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program.”38 This involved the redesign of an existing,
tested warhead design, with the aim of increasing the predictability and reliability of
the weapon itself. It was also argued that new features could be incorporated into the
design that would increase safety and security, particularly those that would prevent
its detonation by, for instance, anyone who had somehow obtained unauthorized
access to it.
As with the RNEP, limitations on the design of the RRW were put in place, as a
House Appropriations Committee determined that its qualified endorsement of the
initiative was
based on the assumption that a replacement weapon will be designed
only as a re-engineered and remanufactured warhead for an existing
weapon system in the stockpile…[and not] as the beginning of a new
production program intended to produce new warhead designs or
produce new weapons for any military mission beyond the current
deterrent requirements.39
In spite of this, there were disputes and confusion regarding whether the RRW
program involved “new weapons” in the sense of a brand new warhead design or in
the sense of being only physically new – modernized weapons based on a redesign
(i.e. within existing design parameters). An RRW design was nonetheless produced,
within the parameters set by the House Appropriations Committee, in 2007. A year
later, funds for proceeding further were denied and the 2009 Department of Energy
budget ended funding for the initiative.
This new approach to stockpile stewardship differed from the more skeptical
approach to the SSP in its willingness to acknowledge the benefits of and seek to
continue the work of the SSP in increasing the understanding of nuclear weapons,
their aging process, and other associated aspects. In spite of the limitations placed on
“Directed Stockpile Work” refers to those activities within the SSP that are directly associated with
maintaining the current weapons in the stockpile.
37
“The United States Nuclear Weapons Program: The Role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead,”
p.1.
38
A.Fitzpatrick and I.Oelich, “The Stockpile Stewardship Program: Fifteen Years On,” The Federation
of American Scientists, April 2007, p.58.
39
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 109 th Congress, 1st Session, House of
Representatives, Report 109-86, May 18, 2005, p.130.
36
14
the initiative in 2005, there were concerns that the RRW work might be moving in the
direction of new warhead designs, thus setting the stage for the eventual abandonment
of the original rationale for the Stockpile Stewardship Program – permitting a
moratorium on nuclear testing while maintaining a safe and reliable deterrent. To this
end, it was argued that “it takes an extraordinary flight of imagination to postulate a
modern new arsenal composed of such untested designs that would be more reliable,
safe, and effective than the current U.S. arsenal based on more than 1,000 tests since
1945.”40
The Qualified Supporter’s View (2): Stockpile stewardship as essentially sound;
requires redirection away from new designs, modernization.
Also contained within the spectrum of opinion on the SSP is another version of
qualified support for the program, one which is also frequently given public voice by
think-tanks, academia, and other non-governmental organizations who work on
questions of nuclear non-proliferation. While favoring nuclear disarmament, this
viewpoint sees the Stockpile Stewardship Program as necessary in the interim, as was
the political bargain that created it. The program itself is considered to have had
significant benefits. The most crucial of these, under this assessment, is simply the
success in certifying the reliability and safety of the stockpile such that the testing
moratorium could be undertaken and can continue. The importance placed on the vital
role of the SSP in maintaining the moratorium contrasts sharply with the previous two
assessments of the program, the first of which openly desires a return to testing (or
test-readiness), the second of which is, at best, agnostic on the issue.
In the meantime, however, the support for the SSP is tested by the sums of money put
into the large-scale experimental work. A fifteen-year review of the program by the
Federation of American Scientists, for instance, stated that “the current approach to
stockpile stewardship, careful surveillance and monitoring along with judicious
replacement of parts, has maintained a nuclear stockpile that is safe and reliable.”41
The report expressed criticism of the costs of the program, and in particular the large
experimental projects under the SSP’s umbrella, noting (in 2007) that the “the three
major components of SSP [the NIF, DAHRT, and ASCI] are over budget and
seriously behind schedule.”42 There have
This approach reserves still greater skepticism – financially and philosophically – for
the proposed redirection of the program in favor of, as was undertaken recently, a
Reliable Replacement Warhead. The SSP, it was observed, has been able to certify the
stockpile year after year and, as such, its budget “should not be savaged in order to go
pushing ahead” with the RRW program.43 As long as the SSP is achieving its goals of
maintaining the safety of the existing arsenal, the RRW initiative is unnecessary. In
fact, it was argued, “if new RRW designs introduce new, untested concepts, it could
increase doubts about the reliability, not decrease doubts about the reliability, of the
40
Sidney Drell and James Goodby, What Are Nuclear Weapons For?, Washington, Arms Control
Today, April 2005, p. 20.
41
A.Fitzpatrick and I.Oelich, “The Stockpile Stewardship Program: Fifteen Years On,”, p.4.
42
Ibid., p.1.
43
Speaker: Sidney Drell, Arms Control Association press briefing on “The Future of US Nuclear
Weapons: The Weapons Complex and the Reliable Replacement Warhead,” April 19, 2007.
15
enduring nuclear stockpile.”44 More symbolically, such a program will tend to have a
negative effect in the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole, and will undermine
efforts to strengthen it, as a result of the perceived loss of US credibility and good
faith.
The Skeptic’s View (2): Stockpile stewardship as fundamentally problematic;
undermines international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
The fact that a stockpile stewardship program, by its very nature, perpetuates the
existence of a nuclear stockpile has also given rise to another perspective that rejects
the program outright. This viewpoint has been expressed particularly (although by no
means exclusively) by those involved in activist and advocacy work related to nuclear
disarmament. While the SSP promised and has permitted an end to testing, the
continuation of the program may confirm suspicions among many that the SSP has
always been a fig leaf behind which the indefinite and expensive preservation – and
even improvement – of the nuclear deterrent proceeds. This perspective considers that
stockpile stewardship is simply a means by which the nuclear weapons architecture
within the U.S. is propped up, and through which the U.S. intends “to maintain
nuclear superiority indefinitely, with or without underground testing.”45
Moreover, while SSP might have nominal goal of stewardship of the deterrent without
testing, skeptics of the program have not forgotten that its introduction in 1995 came
with the codicil (politically expedient though it might have been) that testing would
and could resume if circumstances or new information required it. As such, the SSP
itself represents the continuing institutionalization and modernization of the nuclear
arsenal or, as it has also been described, is simply “nuclear weapons research and
production for the 21st century.”46
Stockpile stewardship and current prospects for CTBT ratification
The new US administration is apparently ready to take up the question of the CTBT
once again and to “immediately and aggressively” pursue ratification of the Treaty.47
As a consequence, and as in 1999, the SSP is likely to come to come under close
scrutiny during the political debate that ensues. This is not least because some of the
results of the past ten years worth of work have direct implications for the likelihood
of CTBT ratification.
Daryl Kimball, speaking at “Reliable Replacement Warhead: Does the United States Need a New
Breed of Nuclear Weapons?” an Arms Control Association panel, April 25, 2006. Accessed at:
http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20060425_RRW_Transcript.
45
See, for instance, John Burroughs (Hague Appeal for Peace, International Association of Lawyers
Against Nuclear Arms, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy), speaking at The South Asia and
Southeast Asia Peace Activists Conference, “Peace Builds, Bombs Destroy: Let’s Make Asia Nuclear
Free,” Dhaka, Bangladesh, February 18-20, 2000 (Plenary I, February 18, 2000), accessed at:
http://lcnp.org/disarmament/nwfz/dhakatalk.htm.
46
Andrew Lichterman and Jacqueline Cabasso (Western States Legal Foundation) “Stockpile
Stewardship: Nuclear Weapons Research and Production for the 21 st Century,” in News in Review:
Civil society perspectives on the Seventh Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
May 9, 2005, no.6, accessed at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NIR2005/day6.pdf.
47
US President Barack Obama, speaking in Prague, April 5, 2009.
44
16
In 2003, as already noted, the ability to produce plutonium pits was reestablished,
allowing for the remanufacturing of the plutonium core of the existing stockpile. This
option had not been available since 1989, when the pit facility in Colorado was shut
down. The remanufacturing ability supports the argument that the stockpile
surveillance and life extension programs will, as maintained by its supporters, be able
to ensure the continued reliability and safety of the deterrent.
More importantly, the understanding of the way that plutonium decays has recently
changed. During the Senate hearings in 1999, it was noted that “we lack experience
predicting the effects of such aging on the safety and reliability of the weapons.”48 In
2006, however, studies by the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories
(and supported by an independent assessment from the JASON group) indicated that
the plutonium core did not decay in the manner that was once thought, but that the
damaged crystal structure reasserted itself.49 As a result, it has now been stated that
“most primary types have credible minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 years as
regards aging of plutonium.”50
However, technical concerns regarding the CTBT (which, in the past, also included
concerns as to its verifiability) have always been irrevocably entwined with political
and national security concerns. These are most often focused the Treaty’s scope (i.e.
the fact that it does not prohibit research on nuclear weapons), as well as its ability to
meaningfully augment the nuclear non-proliferation regime or whether, instead, the
U.S. would “risk strategic surprise from a sophisticated violator conducting smallscale weapons tests in ways designed to evade detection.”51 Other longstanding
concerns are raised by the inevitable loss of expertise on weapons design and testing
that will occur as time passes. Regardless of the technical reassurance that the SSP’s
work should provide, these and other objections to the CTBT that existed in 1999 are
likely to be argued again. Therefore, (and leaving aside concomitant progress that has
also been on the Treaty’s verifiability) the fact that many of the technical objections to
the ratification of the CTBT have been assuaged by the work of the program is
necessary, but not sufficient.
Even assuming that the technical arguments that have been made are convincing,
there is no reason to assume that, therefore, they will translate into political support
for the Treaty among those who, in the past, were unconvinced. Obtaining this
support will require not only an active role by the U.S. President, but will necessitate
that increased attention be paid to convincing arguments for the non-proliferation and
disarmament advantages created by the CTBT, both for the regime and for the United
48
Letter to Senators Trent Lott and Tom Daschle from James R. Schlesinger, Frank C. Carlucci,
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Richard, B. Cheney, Caspar W. Weinberger, and Melvin R. Laird, Final Review
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105-28), Hearing Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, October
7, 1999, p.64.
49
For an extremely useful explanation of these new advances in understanding please see the
presentation provided by Dr. Sidney Drell on “The Future of the CTBT” at the 2009 Carnegie
International Non-Proliferation Conference, April 7, 2009. Accessed at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_ctbt1.pdf.
50
“Pit Lifetime,” JASON Defense Panel Advisory Report (JSR-06-335), January 11, 2007, Executive
Summary, page 1. (Accessed at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/pit.pdf).
51
Christopher A. Ford, “Shattering Obsolete Thinking on Arms Control,” in Arms Control Today,
vol.38, no.9.
17
States. This is potentially a more difficult task than in 1999, with such a debate
occurring against the backdrop of concerns regarding the nuclear programs of Iran
and Syria, and the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK – all of which have taken
place despite the U.S. testing moratorium. On the other hand, some of those who
opposed the CTBT in 1999 have since come out in support of its ratification.52 These
voices may serve as credible sources of persuasion, particularly for others such as
Senator John McCain, who opposed the Treaty in 1999 but who has since expressed a
willingness to keep an open mind on the subject.
Final observations
The expression “nuclear taboo” is generally used to refer to the taboo against the
actual use of a nuclear weapon, which has sprung up in the sixty-four years since the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As more time passes since any of the states with
nuclear test moratoria have conducted a test (i.e. all acknowledged nuclear weapons
states except the DPRK), a similar nuclear taboo has been created. Or, perhaps, the
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has begun to extend to the testing of nuclear
weapons, in spite of the fact that the CTBT has yet to enter into force. As the tests by
the DPRK in October 2006 demonstrated, this taboo is fragile. In those states that
have declared a moratorium, however, it has become extremely politically difficult to
identify circumstances that justify a return to nuclear testing particularly if
circumstances have not justified it since the last French and Chinese tests in the mid1990s.
The future of the political debate on the Stockpile Stewardship Program is, of course,
closely tied up in this. All of the various perspectives on the program described earlier
have adherents, and, in spite of their differences, certain common themes have
emerged. The first is the question of the ultimate objective of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, which has tended to be ill-defined. One of the more tangible
concerns arising from this question – and, inevitably, a source of future deliberations
– will be the financial cost of the program. If the future course of the SSP is unclear,
as it seems to be now that the RRW program is off the table, finding political (and
therefore budgetary) support for the program may prove difficult.
This is, in part, because stockpile stewardship, in its present form, has self-evidently
postponed any decision about modernization and new nuclear weapons. The current
arsenal will last longer, perhaps a great deal longer. It will not, of course, last forever,
and at some point a decision on its future will have to be taken. While the RRW
program has been sidelined, there is no reason to assume it will not be revisited,
although its eventual success is by no means assured, particularly if there continues to
be a lack of precision regarding what the RRW concept entails and what is, and is not
“new” about it, in terms of weapons and the warhead designs. Currently, its
resuscitation seems to depend solely on which way the political wind blows. Those in
favor of this work are likely to remain in favor of it, so long as the life extension
programs are viewed as buying time before an “inevitable” need to modernize the
arsenal.
52
Henry Kissinger is perhaps the most well-known name of those who have since expressed support
for the Treaty’s ratification, as he did (along with George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, and Sam Nunn,
in the op-ed entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” which was published in The Wall Street
Journal, January 4, 2007.
18
If, in other words, the possession of a nuclear deterrent is considered and accepted as
being an indefinite requirement, then modernization of the arsenal would need to
occur, at some point. Pressure to undertake such modernization sooner rather than
later, given the perceived need to update the Cold War arsenal, is therefore to be
expected. Conversely, if the life extension and stockpile surveillance programs were
expressly understood as something else – as, for instance, a necessary step on a long
road towards disarmament – then the pressing need to modernize the arsenal eases
(except, of course, among those who do not consider eventual disarmament to be, ipso
facto, possible or preferable).
The debate over the course and shape of stockpile stewardship is, in essence, a debate
over the future of the US deterrent. In turn, a debate about the future of the US
deterrent (and whether or not it has one) may also be credibly understood as a window
into the US intentions regarding nuclear disarmament. The results of these discussions
will inevitably be held up by other actors for comparison against US rhetoric on this
issue.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program, it is worth noting, is not incompatible with the
act of disarming. To the contrary, it has facilitated significant reductions in the
stockpile from Cold War highs (something that is often overlooked in the criticism of
US nuclear policy). Nonetheless, it is self-evidently incompatible with the existential
state of disarmament, given that the “stockpile” in stockpile stewardship refers to a
stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Finally, as the debate over the CTBT has already shown, although the technical
achievements and efforts of the SSP have facilitated the acceptance of a political
decision (the moratorium) can not be relied upon to trump political considerations.
The upcoming debate over the Treaty, ten years later, is likely to demonstrate that this
is still the case. A more careful effort in convincing the undecided may prove the
tipping point in favor of the Treaty’s ratification.
19