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LEARNING THROUGH DISCUSSION:

ETHNICITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE

ABSTRACT

The present research contains representative materials related to themes of wide and often shared concern and commitment in our culture and society, especially among university young people.

Ethnicity and human rights in Europe is the focus around which the materials are assembled in order to encourage critical discussion about the rise of multiculturalism in

Europe, the right to diversity, the difficult issues of integration of race, class and gender.

The research has been carried out having in mind the didactic purpose of offering our students a valid integration to the current university courses in English which, as a result of the recent reforms, tend to narrow the field of learning to the specific language skills in the area of study chosen.

Unfortunately, the process of language learning is not an easy one and we often realise that an overtly utilitarian approach is neither sufficient nor effective.

On the other side, the learner’s act of “recognizing” his own concerns and commitments, together with his desire of “taking sides” and discussing, may often be a powerful drive to push his own capacity of learning and improving.

In this sense, the materials here provided are meant to be a valid encouragement, a solidary and supportive affect

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SECTION ONE:

RIGHTS TO CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

1. The Right to Cultural Identity

If culture is essential to human existence, then individuals have a right to culture. The right to culture is aimed at preventing people from being treated unequally on account of their culture. Culture is, however, not static but variable. It changes as a result of a number of factors. Cultures also influence each other, especially if they coexist in one geographical unit. Some cultural practices may be objectionable to outsiders for a variety of reasons.

They may be harmful or discriminatory. Whether or not a cultural practice is objectionable on the ground that it is injurious should not be determined subjectively but in accordance with human rights norms in order to avoid unfairness in judging it.

In the past there was a belief that there was one predetermined direction for cultural development. This facilitated cultural assimilation or integration. Today, however, this is considered to be cultural imperialism.

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Cultural diversity requires cultural tolerance if there is to be mutual and peaceful coexistence. Conflict often emanates from cultural intolerance, which often stems from lack of understanding of the cultures of others. In order to circumvent this cultural intolerance, international and regional instruments have provided for the right to culture.

One of the earliest instruments for regulating the interaction between cultures is art. 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This article stipulates that everyone has the right to participate freely in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to share in scientific advancements and its benefits. The purpose of this provision is to protect cultural diversity while at the same time supporting the evolution of a common culture.

In the past, people from Western countries tended to look down upon and consequently to treat shabbily the cultural practices of non-Westerners. This was part of the philosophy of imperialism which gave rise to feelings of cultural superiority on the part of

European people. Obviously, this paternalistic view is no longer acceptable.

The right to culture is often connected to education because education is the means through which culture is transmitted from one generation to another.

(Adapted from: Cross Cultural Perspectives, edited by A.Sportelli & C.Williams, Ed.

B.A. Graphis, October 2003)

1. Discussion

What does the right to culture aim at?

Are cultural practices always viewed positively? How is injustice avoided?

How does cultural conflict arise?

What does art. 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulate?

What cultural philosophy existed in the past? Discuss.

2. “European Identity”: An Emerging Concept

Europe has always been more of a mental construct than a geographical or social entity. This continent has not always been as confined as Homer made it though it has never been larger than a mere peninsula of Asia. Yet, from remote times Europe was always more important than size alone warranted. From early in the Christian era, Europe’s inhabitants were said to share a common history and to be conscious of being unlike peoples beyond its eastern and southern margins. Yet, what was felt to be distinctive about Europe – militant

Christianity, aggressive mercantile expansion, exploration and imperial conquest spurred by urban growth, technology and nascent capitalism – soon transcended the frontiers of any localised geography. Trade, migration, the spread of languages, and the extension of empires involved Europeans with the outside world. European culture and institutions, economy and architecture, are now almost wholly global.

Acceptance of Europe as a realm sharing a common history and destiny has been largely aborted by ingrained prejudices. These biases, local, national and global, have prevented most Europeans from viewing themselves collectively.

Over the past two thousand years, and especially since the Renaissance, three features of European life became particularly distinctive: the pervasive pressure of Christianity, the rise of a dynamic mercantile economy that promoted trade and urbanism and the growth of pan-European artistic expression in architecture, sculpture, painting, literature and music.

Only in the late eighteenth century, however, did consciousness of being European begin to extend beyond these realms of life and towards a wider community of participants. By the mid-nineteenth century, folk-conscious heritage encouraged democratisation throughout the

Continent. As the century wore on, European political cohesion became a mystic hope

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among the Continent’s statesmen: “We are part of the community of Europe”, Britain’s

Prime Minister Gladstone affirmed in the 1880s, “and we must do our duty as such”. Such sentiment peaked with the onset of the First World War (note that “World” equated with

Europe); “the lamps are going out all over Europe” Lord Grey of Falloden intoned in 1914.

Out of this tragic war emerged the League of Nations but subsequently, the interwar decades merely intensified European rivalries. Only in the wake of the Second World War, have there been serious efforts to replace suicidal national rivalries with a European entity, and only since the end of the Cold War has a European-wide structure seemed plausibly achievable.

Today, elected leaders of Europe’s major states have become active European advocates and economic integration is so far advanced as to transform national into

European Community politics. Tax harmonisation and pan-European economic measures have made enormous strides. The media diffusion of everyday popular culture now promotes the sense of being European among ever-larger segments of society. Although a truly pan-European society is still in its infancy, many of its essential elements are already in place. Most European states are democratic in form and increasingly democratic in reality; their economies are for the most part market driven; their popular culture grows more homogeneous as communications among them expand.*1 Yet, in many respects

Europeanization remains superficial – “Despite all the talk of an integrating Europe driven to get together by its single currency”, writes a financial analyst, “very few deals so far involve cross-border transactions. Instead, many seem intended to keep foreigners – especially other

Europeans – at bay. Indeed, many are explicitly promoted on nationalistic grounds, viewing banks or industrial corporations as national treasures”.*2

Why is it that European identity remains so embryonic? It is easy to identify at least half a dozen circumstances that impede integration: a. Linguistic diversity : Europeans speak scores of different languages and this gives rise to vexing and expensive problems of communication because Europeans cling with jealous intensity to the prerogatives of national tongues. b. Disparities of size and resources : The larger states – notably Germany and France – are so much more populous and economically dynamic than many of the smaller entities as to create a threatening imbalance, not only of resources but of power. To achieve a Europe in which the prospects and perspectives of Portuguese and Irish, Greeks and Poles, are not dissimilar from those of French and Germans is a daunting task. However, to sustain equity becomes more costly, especially as more impoverished Eastern Europeans join the amalgam. c. Enduring cultural discords: There are differences of policy and philosophy that make each European people cherish traditional uniqueness. Besides language differences, ancient conflicts and grievances and idiosyncrasies of thought and behaviour remain sources of deep discord. d. Europeanness suspected as being negative: Europeans like to conjure up a shared heritage of democratic progress, mercantile entrepreneurship, Christian and humanist traditions, devotion to art and learning. But the authentic European spirit equally involves a shared complicity of fascism, racism, colonialism and genocide, not to mention the unsavoury aspects of industrial proletarianization and other modern ills.*3 As a result, the strongest sentiment shared by many Europeans is fear of some threat. Surveys just after the

Treaty of Maastricht showed pro-European feeling most eloquently expressed in opposition to American influence, exemplified now in McDonald’s, now in Disney, now in the State

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Department.*4 More ominous is the rising sentiment that sets newly united Europe against

Asians and Africans seeking a better life. The disappearance of barriers within the European

Union erects them more implacably against immigrants, legal or clandestine, from beyond. e. Top-down traditional approaches: Administrative integration within Europe has outpaced day-to-day interconnections. The only populist links are in such realms as sports and the popular media. Public resentment against top-heavy bureaucracies further impedes efforts to build a truly popular Europe. Even Chirac and Kohl complained, in June 1998 to the

European Co mmission, of an “excess of centralisation” and of “remoteness from citizens and their everyday concerns”.*5

Despite the impediments discussed above, European heritage is a web of human memory embracing everything from oral tradition and written records to folkways, art, architecture and archaeology. Such ways of valuing heritage have in recent decades become global. However cynical national rhetoric continues to be, it is the strongest and largest states – France and Germany – that most confidently evoke the name European. The Euro may at times be weak, but the status of Europe is now so enviable that its aspirants embody a greater range of land and cultures than ever before.

(Adapted from: “European Identity”: An Emerging Concept” by David Lowenthal,

Australian Journal of Politics and History: Vol. 46 N° 3, 2000, pp.314 -32

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Notes:

1. Stanley Waterman, “Cultural Politics and European Jewry”,

International Jewish Policy Research 1 ( February 1999), p.23

2. Edmund L.Andrews, “European merger mania stays at home”, International Herald Tribune, 26 March 1999

3. Mark Pluciennik, “Archaeology, archaeologists, and ‘Europe’”, Antiquity, 72 (1998), p. 817; Ashworth, “Heritage, identity and interpreting a European sense of place”, p. 119

4. Mark Pluciennik, “Archaeology, archaeologists and Europe”, p.819

5. Barry James, “What superstate? EU officials ask”, International Herald Tribune, 17 June 1998.

2. Discussion

In what way are Europeans different from the peoples of the eastern and southern frontiers of the continent?

What three features became distinctive about European life since the Renaissance?

When was the European identity seriously taken into consideration?

How is European integration expanding today?

Explain briefly what prevents integration and total European identity from taking place.

 What is meant by “European heritage” being a “web of human memory”?

3. A Model of European Citizenship: Market Citizenship

Drawing on the individualistic variant of liberalism, this mode depicts European citizenship as comprising a core of entitlements designed to facilitate market integration.*1

This owes much to the belief that “the Union is still predominantly a market and most of its freedom to move is of interest only to property and commodity owners.”*2

This conception, however, overlooks that economic transactions do not take place in a vacuum. Instead they are embedded within a social and political context. The latter does not regulate them but shapes the frames through which economic transactions are understood.

This has been made clear by the European Court of Justice, which has pronounced the right to free movement as an intrinsic part of affirming workers’ human dignity and a means for the improvement of their living and working conditions and promoting their social

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advancement. A quick glance at the ECJ’s jurisprudence suggests that free movement rights have turned ‘aliens’ into associates, opened up possibilities for the Community nationals’ active involvement and participation in the socio-political life in the Member State of

Residence.*3

The market citizenship template has been superseded by an understanding of Union citizenship which develops the status of European citizenship; therefore, not only is economic activity the core of the new European citizenship policy framework. This finding is at variance with the institutional literature which privileges stability and continuity over change, innovation and risk.

(Adapted from: “Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship” by Dora Kostakopoulou, professor at the Law Dept., Manchester University; The Modern Law Review Limited,

2005)

NOTES:

1.

M.Everson, “The Legacy of the Market Citizen » in J.Shaw and G.More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Integration

(Oxford: Clarendon, 1995)

2.

See K.Von Beume, “citizenship and the European Union” in K.Eder and B.Giesen (eds),

European Citizenship, National

Legacies and Transnational Projects (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 61, 80.

3.

This coheres with the sociological paradigm of citizenship which views citizenship as an institution that contains capitalist inequalities and social rights as a precondition for full membership in a community; Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class.

3. Discussion

How are economic transactions absorbed within a social and political context in Europe?

What positive framework does Union citizenship encourage and what privileges result from this?

4. The Convention on the Future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty

Despite the institutional reforms that transformed Union citizenship, it is unfortunate that a much less innovative template found its way in the Constitutional Treaty that was drawn up by the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe and agreed at the EU summit on 18 June 2004. The final draft which was discussed by the Brussels European

Council on 12 December 2003 reflected existing provisions.*1 The first draft text issued on

28 October 2002 had introduced the idea of a dual (European and national) citizenship, in recognition of the multiple allegiances that European citizens have.*2 Although such a provision would not bring about substantial change, it would, nevertheless, enhance the status of European citizenship in a symbolic way. Unlike Article 8 on Citizenship of the

Union, Article 7 of the Constitutional Treaty is significant, since it provides for a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights by means of its incorporation in Part Two. It also enables the EU to accede to the ECHR by stating that accession to the EU will not affect the

Union’s competences as defined in the Constitution.

Believing that “Union citizenship is destined to be a fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States”, and in keeping with the norms of European integration, *3

European judges have made principled decisions in dialogue with the Commission by taking into account the wider organisational climate. The discussion has highlighted the effects of institutional interaction, dialogue, competition and the impact of the general organisational climate and critical events such as the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on judicial decision-making. This shows that the ECJ is not a unit surrounded by a faceless environment, but it operates within a cluster of relations. Through exchanges and interactions with the broader socio-political structures and other institutions, the ECJ takes part in what may be termed ‘a reflexive European Circuit’.

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Without a doubt, European citizenship has come of age.

(Adapted from: “Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship” by Dora Kostakopoulou , professor at the Law Dept., Manchester University; The Modern Law Review Limited

2005)

NOTES.

1.

European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 12 December 2003; DN:DOC/03/O5,12/12/2003

2.

CONV 369/02; See also the speech by the Chairman of the European Convention, Valery Giscard d’Estaing at the College of

Europe on 2 October 2002; hhtp//European-convention.eu.int/docs./speeches/3314.pdf, last visited 11 January 2005.

3.

Concerning the ECJ’s pro-integrationist interest, see Stone Sweet and Brunell, n 89 above.

4. Discussion

Discuss the various steps taken to draw up the Constitutional Treaty of Europe.

What does Art. 7 of the Constitutional Treaty state?

What effects did the European judges highlight in the Constitutional Treaty?

 Why has the European Court of Justice been placed in a “reflexive European circuit”?

SECTION TWO

BRITISH EUROSCEPTICISM AND THE GLOBAL MARKETS

1. British Conservatives and Globalisation

During the long ‘Thatcher decade’, British Conservatives played a key role in articulating the neo-liberal doctrines of openness, flexibility and competition, which were to become the dominant discourse of globalisation (King and Wood 1999; Scholte 2000). At the same time the party under Margaret Thatcher began to distance itself from its earlier strong commitment to the European Union and began to re-emphasise the importance of national sovereignty and the sanctity of the nation state.

With the need to defend Europe, much reduced in the post-Soviet era, many British

Conservatives have felt free to display their atlanticist bias emphasising Britain’s economic, political and cultural ties to the USA, rather than its ties to Europe.

Other developments have further weakened attachments to Europe. First, for many

British people Europeanisation is the unacceptable face of globalisation. Many of the economic, cultural and social trends associated with ‘globalisation’ appear to threaten the nation state and national identity (Giddens, 1994). Secondly, the implementation of the

Single European Act (SEA) after 1992 has made these threats that much more real by accelerating the pace of European economic and political integration.

Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black have continued to hound the Blair government over the issue of keeping the pound and have attacked Europe as being bureaucratic, high tax orientated, undemocratic and centralising, with an anti-German subtext in some cases.*

However, other opposing positions against Europeanisation in Britain have also emerged recently. Others are anti-euro and against any further loss of sovereignty to the EU.

With a predominantly anti-euro press and opinion polls which showed two thirds of those polled against the euro, and around a third favouring withdrawal, there appears to be a considerable potential available for the Conservatives to tap into and exploit anti-

Europeanism.

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NOTES:

* For an example of this tendency see The Tainted Source, by John Laughland, sometime director of the Bill Cash’s European Foundation and contributor to the right-wing weekly The Spectator.

A main theme of this work is that supporters of the EU are the ideological offspring of Adolf Hitler: ‘Like modern pro-Europeans, the Nazis believed that the nation-state system encouraged division. Goebels was also persuaded that technology brought peoples together and made borders anachronistic – a thought common among modern pro-

Europeans …’ (Francis Wheen,

The Guardian, 9 February 2000.)

1. Discussion

Was the Thatcher government, at its origin, anti-European? Explain.

In their need to defend Europe as a result of the post-Soviet era, what principles did the British Conservatives express?

Discuss the developments that further distances Britain from Europe.

What criticisms have been expressed by Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black?

2. Hyperglobalism, Intergovernmentalism and Open Regionalism

The divisive issue of Britain in Europe and Europe in Britain has a long and complex history and the debate over this issue has been shaped by particular global contexts. The most important long-term change in attitudes was brought about by the collapse of the

Bretton Woods international financial regime in the early 1970s. Since then the context in which national economic policy-making and European integration has been discussed has been dominated by the growing issues of globalisation and regionalisation.

In relation to the domestic debate in the United Kingdom, three strategic perspectives are of particular importance, both in understanding the divisions and Britain’s future role in

Europe.

The three positions are: hyperglobalism, intergovernmentalism and open regionalism. The first two positions allocate priority to national sovereignty and the importance of the nation state; the third emphasises instead Britain’s growing interdependence in the world.*

Hyperglobalisation

The first perspective in the globalisation debate is hyperglobalism (Perraton et al.

1997; Held et al. 1999). The proponents of hyperglobalism argue that the changes introduced by globalisation are so profound that they have altered irrevocably the political economy context of policy-making. The power of the nation state is depicted as being

‘hollowed out’ by a huge increase in capital mobility due to the computerised financial and commercial flows which have created for the first time a global (as distinct from international) economy whose major flows national governments cannot manage to control.

The programmes and policies of national governments in the preceding era of social democracy, including Keynesian economic management aimed at giving priority to growth and employment, simply no longer work.

Intergovernmentalism

A second position in the globalisation debate argues strongly against the globalisation thesis as a model of the real world and defends the continuing viability of social democracy and other competing nationally based economic policy regimes. This view recognises that there have been significant changes in the way the international economy has been organised in the last thirty years, but it insists that it has not been transformed into a global economy, and that nation states, on the whole, have not declined in power. The key assumption of intergovernmentalism is that the world economy remains an international economy rather than a global economy and therefore what happens in it still depends on ‘real politics’ – that is, on the political will, democratic choice and the political programmes of its constituent states.

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Its position was well expressed in the already mentioned cross-party group New

Europe, formed in March 1999 to oppose Britain’s participation in the euro and headed by

David Owen, former Labour Foreign Secretary and Leader of the SDP, James Prior, the former senior Conservative cabinet minister under Margaret Thatcher and leading internal critic of Thatcherite economic policies, and Dennis Healey, the former Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer and Deputy Party Leader.

Open Regionalism

The third broad position that has structured the British debate on globalisation is ‘open regionalism’. Open regionalists accept the globalisation thesis but not the more extreme formulations of the hyperglobalisation thesis (Perraton et al. 1997).

The very term open regionalism signals that these regional blocs such as the EU are not mere protectionist fortresses. They remain open to world trade and subject to its rules.

Open regionalists stress that globalisation should be thought of as a historical process rather that an outcome. Globalisation does not necessarily imply the erosion of institutional diversity in the global economy, nor does it reflect a linear progression towards a world economy dominated by frictionless markets. Increased regionalisation of economic activity is understood as an integral part of the move towards the greater intensification of interconnected world economic activity.

NOTES:

The argument of this article builds on our earlier research findings which suggested that the split between interdependence and sovereignty is a crucial ideological dimension in accounting for the attitudes of national political elites (Baker et al. 1993a,

1993b, 1994,1996 and 2000)

2. Discussion

 What three strategic positions define Britain’s relationship with Europe?

What is the primary preoccupation of the hyperglobalists?

 What has happened to the “power of the nation state” according to the hyperglobalists?

What point of view have the intergovernmentalists adopted?

Who are the intergovernmentalists that have adopted this position?

How do the open regionalists see globalisation?

3. Euroscepticism in other Nations

The appeal of hyperglobalism in the United Kingdom reflects in part the legacies of

Britain’s past history as is so often the case in euroscepticism elsewhere e.g. landownership in Hungary.

Significantly, the only other major liberal democracy where conservative hyperglobalists are a major, some would say dominant, element in the national debate is the

United States. In fact, so strong is this economic atlanticist ideology that all the major

British parties have this attachment to some degree.

Modern euroscepticism is not a uniform phenomenon and in each country of the

European Union where it is strong, it is associated with specific national features and traditions. In France, for example, where euroscepticism has at times been strong, European integration, the Maastricht Treaty and EMU are all seen by eurosceptics as manifestations of a dangerous process of globalisation, rather than the benign effects of it (Benoit 1997).

Italy, after the election of Berlusconi in 2001 provides an interesting case. Although the elements of this coalition, particularly the Lombard League, fit into the pattern of other eurosceptic European parties, Berlusconi himself is much closer to Thatcherite positions on

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the EU and the global economy. His emphasis on tax cuts and other neo-liberal policies as well as the need for Italy to build stronger links with the United States suggest that there may be conflict between Italy and the rest of its partners in the Eurozone. However, Berlusconi has also affirmed his support for the EU and for the stability pact, so it is not yet clear how far he will be prepared to go.

(The whole of unit two was adapted from: “Sovereign nations and global markets:

modern British Conservatism and hyperglobalism” by David Baker, Andrew Gamble and David Seawright; Political Studies Association 2002)

3. Discussion

What does British hyperglobalism reflect?

Who are the major hyperglobalists?

What is euroscepticism linked to? How do euroscepticists see the Maastricht Treaty and the European Monetary Union?

Discuss the exceptional Berlusconi case in Italy.

SECTION THREE

EUROPEAN LEGISLATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1.

A Theory of Human Rights

Few concepts are frequently evoked in contemporary political discussions as human rights. The moral appeal of human rights has been used for a variety of purposes, from resisting torture and arbitrary incarceration to demanding the end of hunger and of medical neglect.*1

At the same time, the central idea of human rights, even without any specific legislation, is seen by many as foundationally dubious and lacking in cogency. But where do these rights come from?

Many philosophers and legal theorists see the rhetoric of human rights as just loose talk. The contrast between the widespread use of the idea of human rights and the intellectual scepticism is not new. The U.S. Declaration of Independence, in 1776, took it to be “self evident”, and thirteen years later, the French declaration of “the rights of man” asserted that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights.”

Some critics, however, propose a discriminating rejection: they accept the general idea of human rights but exclude specific classes of proposed rights, in particular the so-called economic and social rights, or welfare rights.

Human rights activists are often quite impatient with such critiques. The invoking of human rights tends to come mostly from those who are concerned with the changing world rather than interpreting it (to use a classic distinction made famous by the theorist, Karl

Marx.)

There is, thus, need for some theory and also for some defence of any proposed theory.

The object of this reading is to consider the justification of the general idea of human rights, including economic and social rights within the broad class of human rights.

Indeed, a great many acts of legislation and legal conventions (such as the “European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”) have been

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clearly inspired by a belief in some pre-existing rights of all human beings. This applies even to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, linked to the normative vision of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. The difficult questions regarding the status and standing of human rights arise in the domain or ideas, before such legislation occurs. We also have to examine whether legislation is the pre-eminent, or even necessary, route through which human rights can be pursued.

A theory of human rights must address the following questions in particular:

1.

What kind of a statement does a declaration of human rights make?

2.

What makes human rights important?

3.

What duties and obligations do human rights generate?

4.

Through what forms of actions can human rights be promoted and, is legislation a means of implementation of human rights?

5.

Can economic and social rights be included among human rights?

6.

How can proposals of human rights be defended or challenged, and how should their claim to a universal status be assessed, especially in a world with much cultural variation?

Possible Answers:

1.

Human rights can be seen as primarily ethical demands. Even though human rights can, and often do, inspire legislation, this is a further fact, rather than a constitutive characteristic of human rights.

2.

The importance of human rights relates to the significance of the freedoms that form the subject matter of these rights. To qualify as the basis of human rights, the freedom to be defended or advanced must satisfy some “threshold conditions” of (i) special importance and (ii) social influenceability.

3.

Human rights generate reasons for action for agents who are in a position to help in the promoting or safeguarding of freedoms. The induced obligations primarily involve the duty to give reasonable consideration to the reasons for action and their implications.

4.

The implementation of human rights can go well beyond legislation, and a theory of human rights cannot be sensibly confined within the juridical model in which it is frequently imprisoned. For example, public recognition and agitation can be part of the obligations generated by the acknowledgement of human rights. Also, some recognized human rights are not ideally legislated, but are better promoted through other means, including public discussion.

5.

Human rights can include significant and influenceable economic and social freedoms. If they cannot be realized because of inadequate institutionalisation, then, to work for institutional expansion or reform can be a part of the obligations generated by the recognition of these rights.

6.

The universality of human rights relates to the idea of survivability in discussion – open to participation by people across national boundaries. Adam Smith’s insistence that ethical scrutiny requires examining moral beliefs from “a certain distance” has a direct bearing on the connection of human rights to global public reasoning.

The fact that many of the deprivations in the world seem to arise from lack of freedom, is an important reason to emphasise the role of freedom. This led Marx to argue passionately for the need to replace “the domination of circumstances and chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances”*2 The general idea of freedom seems particularly relevant to normative social choice theory and to the theory of justice, in particular.

To take a different type of example, consider the freedom of new immigrants to West

Europe or North America to conserve the ancestral cultural customs and life-style from their

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countries of origin. A strong argument can be constructed in favour of an immigrant’s having the freedom to retain at least parts of an ancestral life-style, but this must not be seen as an argument in favour of pursuit of ancestral life-style whether chosen or not. The central argument is the freedom to choose how to live, including the opportunity to pursue ancestral customs, and it cannot be turned into an argument for the pursuit of customs irrespective of alternatives and choices: Though this is not the occasion to provide a critical assessment of

“multiculturalism” as a social policy, it is perhaps worth noting here that there is a big difference between (i) valuing multiculturalism because of the way it enhances the freedom of people involved to choose to live as they would like and (ii) valuing cultural diversity per se, which focuses on the descriptive characteristics of a societal pattern, rather than on the freedom of the people involved. The importance of capability, reflecting opportunities, is central to this distinction.

Another approach is of course that of “legislation”. Even though the ethics of human rights must not be seen merely as “parents” of “human rights laws”, it is certainly the case that many legislations have been encouraged or inspired by considerations of human rights.

Many modern laws have been enacted by individual states, which gave legal force to certain rights seen as basic human rights. For example, the European Court of Human Rights, established in 1950 following the European Convention, can consider cases brought by individuals from the signatory states against violations of human rights. This has been supplemented by the Human Rights Act of 1998, aimed at incorporating the main provisions of the European Convention into domestic law, with an overseeing role of the European

Court to see “just satisfaction” of these provisions in domestic judgements.

The universalist nature of Adam Smith’s approach raises the question whether distant people can provide useful scrutiny of local issues, given what are taken to be “uncrossable” barriers of culture.

One of Edmund Burke’s criticisms of the French declaration of the “rights of man” and its universalist spirit was concerned with disputing the acceptability of that notion in other cultures. Burke argued that “the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, that cannot be settled upon any abstract rule.”*3

Rosa Luxemburg, a leading Marxist thinker and political leader in the early twentieth century, invoked a similar line of criticism of what she called the “metaphysical cliché of the type of ‘rights of man’ and ‘rights of the citizen’.”*4 Luxemburg intended to draw out the relevance of local circumstances and regional conditions in specification of the exact demands of human rights.

To consider another historical example, in early seventh-century Japan, the Buddhist

Prince Shotoku, who was regent to his mother, Empress Suiko, produced the so-called constitution of seven articles, in 604 AD. The constitution insisted, much in the spirit of the

Magna Carta to be signed six centuries later in 1215: “Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They should be discussed with many.”

When, in the twelfth century, the Jewish philosopher Maimonedes had to flee an intolerant

Europe to try to safeguard his human right to stick to his own religious beliefs, he sought shelter in Emperor Saladin’s Egypt, and found an honoured position in the court of this

Muslim emperor while the European Inquisitions were still going on, and Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, in 1600.

In his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela describes how he learned about democracy and individual rights, as a young boy, by seeking the proceedings of the local meetings held in the regent’s house in Mqhekezweni:

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“Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and labourer.”*5

Despite their practical preoccupations, human rights activists have reason enough to pay attention to the scepticism that the idea of human rights generates among many legal and political theorists. But it is also important to note that the understanding of human rights can benefit substantially from considering the reasoning that moves the activists and the range and effectiveness of practical actions they undertake, including recognition, monitoring and agitation, in addition to legislation. Not only is conceptual clarity important for practice of human rights. There is also no great deficit in the balance of trade between theory and practice.

(Adapted from: “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights” by Amartya Sen; Philosophy

& Public Affairs 32, n° 4, 2004)

NOTES:

1.

See International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals, ed. Henry J. Steiner and Philip Aston (New York:

Oxford University Press, 2000)

2.

Karl Marx, The German Ideology, with Friedrich Engels, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellen (Oxford

University Press, 1977), p.190.

3.

Quoted in Steven Lukes, “Five Fables about Human Rights,” in The Human Rights Reader, ed. Micheline R.Ishay (London:

Routledge,1997), p.238.

4.

Rosa Luxemburg, “The National Question and Autonomy,”

The Human Rights Reader, p.291.

5.

Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1994), p.21.

1. Discussion

What are the different points of view of philosophers, activists and general critics regarding the definition of human rights?

What difficulties exist regarding the status of human rights?

Discuss briefly the questions and possible answers that are necessary in providing a theory and legislation for human rights.

 What does the “role of freedom” consist in? Consider Marx’s theory in your analysis.

Where are the limits in the conservation of ancestral cultural customs from immigrants from West Europe and North America?

In what way has legislation been encouraged to come into being? Give examples.

Discuss briefly the philosophers’ positions in their approach towards human rights and the legislation in this regard.

2. Open Markets versus Welfare Citizenship

EU engagement in social policy is wide-ranging. This reading shows that it is in those areas where there is a clear relationship to employment (for example, enabling young or disabled people to participate in the labour market) or to the establishment of a competitive open labour market on equal terms (for example free movement and associated social security rights, common measures for health and safety) that most policy development has taken place. Public health, the needs of the elderly or the poor and racial discrimination receive much less attention. Other areas directly related to the workplace (employment rights, working conditions, workers’ participation and social dialogue) occupy an intermediate position. There has been substantial legislative activity, but progress is hampered by the differences between the industrial relations issues (for example, the right to strike or to form a union). Equal treatment is an interesting case and here the EU has been active in developing policies to bring women into the labour market. Across other areas national provision remains dominant, and it is uncertain how far the “open methods of

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coordination” will produce convergence of outcomes where it is pursued. Issues such as tax harmonization (provoking intense debate as a proposal in the draft EU Constitution) seem unlikely to achieve consensus in the near future.

Social policy issues are addressed almost entirely through measures that do not conflict with policies designed to advance the market agenda. EU policy-making departs from its commitment to the development of human capital in relation to young and disabled people and the opportunities available to women, and, to a lesser extent, in its poverty policy.

The dilemmas that arise when policy debates impinge on issues of the balance between work and family responsibilities (as in equal treatment or poverty policy) or national social security frameworks (as in the free movement of workers and their families) may offer opportunities for the future development of policy. Thus EU policy-making accepts the

Schumpterian argument that market freedom is essential to economic success, but does allow a social agenda to enter, so long as welfare ends do not conflict with the market, and encourages social intervention when they can be made to support movement towards the goal. Pressures for both liberalism and for a stronger interventionist role exist, and whether the balance between the two will shift in the future is at present unclear.

(Adapted by: Introduction: Open Markets versus Welfare Citizenship: Conflicting

Approaches to Policy Convergence in Europe” by Peter Taylor-Gooby; Social Policy &

Administration ISSN 0144-5596 Vol. 37, n° 6, December 2003, pp.539 –554)

2. Discussion

In what areas of social policy is EU involvement most prominent?

Where is there less attention?

What is the position of the EU regarding tax harmonization?

What queries may offer better opportunities for future development of policy?

How does the EU Constitution attempt to create a balance with the Schumpterian argument?

3. Human Rights and Citizenship

Human rights discourses are increasingly being coupled to citizenship and citizenship education. On examining the relationship between human rights and citizenship in the current English policy, it is argued that human rights are conceptually distinct from citizenship. Whilst human rights have a place as a component of citizenship, attempts to present human rights as a theoretical basis for citizenship - as exemplified in the French case

(Starskey, 2000), and as in the case of the United Kingdom - are not coherent means but, rather, obstruct the empowerment and participation of individual citizens in a political community.

Contemporary conceptions of human rights have their philosophical roots in eighteenth-century Western European philosophical theory framed in terms of the rights of the individual against the state (Leary, 1990). Whilst international human rights’ instruments clearly have been developed in response to, and indeed reflect particular contemporary socio-political concerns and events, they nevertheless reflect a particular philosophical understanding of what it means to be a human being. For example, the 1948

Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to the human rights of all human beings, linking it to the idea of the dignity of the human person. Article 1 states that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. In addition, Article 2 states that everyone is accorded such rights, regardless of nationality (United Nations, 1948). Hence, human rights are conceptualised in terms of a particular understanding of what it means to be a human being: that is, to be a human being is essentially a moral experience.

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It is logically coherent to propose that human rights should be a theoretical underpinning for citizenship. This is because citizenship is always defined in terms of membership within a political community, in contrast to human rights, which are based on membership of a common humanity, or an ethical community.

Furthermore, where citizenship is constructed as active and participatory, as in the

English case, the conflation of human rights and citizenship may actually obstruct the empowerment and active participation of individual citizens. This is because human rights stress legal definitions of the individual in universal terms.

However, it must be remembered that a values approach to citizenship deals nevertheless with ‘shared values’ within a political rather than an ethical community.

Moreover, reaching shared values requires the notion of identification with the community, whereas human rights are based on universal membership of common humanity.

France’s formulation of citizenship would suggest that human rights derive from the state, or that having human rights are a characteristic of belonging to a certain political community. This notion of human rights deriving from possessing nationality, is contradictory to the idea that human rights are accorded to all human beings based on their universal membership of common humanity. As such, the idea of universal human rights as a theoretical underpinning of citizenship is incoherent.

Citizenship conceptualised as active and participative requires an identification of individual citizens with their community. This focus on identity and culture is necessarily particularist as opposed to universalist, as in theories of liberalism and legal conceptions of citizenship. Conceptions of citizenship that focus on participation and active involvement cannot be underpinned by human rights, which are universalist, based on the notion of all human beings belonging to an ethical rather than a political community.

Lastly, there is nevertheless identification with a political community – as opposed to a universal community of all humanity – although this political community may not be at the national level. As such, it is argued that even in the case of more universally constructed conceptions of citizenship, such as global citizenship, discourses on human rights and discourses on citizenship should not be treated as synonymous.

(Adapted from: “Human Rights and Citizenship: an Unjustifiable Conflation?” by Dina

Kiwan; Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 39, N° 1, 2005)

3. Discussion

What relationship exists between human rights and citizenship? Consider the French and British case.

What does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state in articles 1 and 2? As a result, how are human rights conceptualised?

What is the basic difference between citizenship and human rights?

Why is the conflation of human rights and citizenship a handicap towards active participation of individuals in a political community?

 How are “shared values” included in the definition of human rights and citizenship?

In conclusion, why can there not be an underpinning between citizenship and human rights?

How can we identify human rights within a political community?

4. Review by Emek M.Uçarer of Lydia Morris’ Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants’ Rights

Students of international migration have long been interested in the formal and informal processes of inclusion and exclusion created by Westphalian notions that states

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have the right to control access to a given territory. Yet, the issues have come into sharper focus in recent years as the migrant-receiving liberal democracies of the North have sought to balance their economic rights and protections. In the book, Managing Migration: Citizen

Stratification and Migrants’ Rights

, sociologist Lydia Morris explores the levels of differentiation among aliens in terms of their rights and their access to social services. She focuses her attention on three countries that have had somewhat different experiences with

Migration during the last few decades: Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

T.H.Marshall characterizes membership and inclusion as a sequential process, and it hails citizenship as the ultimate key to a level of membership that opens doors to the labour market, available social services and full political participation. Nonetheless, a review of the rights accorded to migrants in the EU suggests that aliens can successfully lay claim to certain provisions by the welfare state even without citizenship.

In her book, Morris makes a very persuasive case for the need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the migrant. She argues that being an alien is both a status and a process that encompasses prospects for both inclusion and exclusion. She alerts us to the tensions inherent in the efforts to manage and control migration and implies that different states have had different experiences in shaping access to labour markets and social services.

The three countries provide interesting counterpoints: Germany is an immigration country and until the next enlargement of the EU, Germany will also remain on the easternmost border of the EU’s collective territory, providing the first point of entry from the east. Italy, by contrast, is historically a country of emigration and has only recently been confronted with the challenges of immigration as a destination country. Located on the southern border of the EU, Italy’s expansive coastal border has become a magnet for attempted illegal entry. Finally, the UK represents a country whose immigration experiences result from its imperial past. Thus, these three countries have had substantially different experiences with immigration. They also have different provisions for regulating their labour markets, other different welfare systems, and have developed different formal and informal strategies for managing migration. Taken together, these countries provide a comprehensive picture of the challenges of managing migration in the European context.

Morris draws out the inherent tensions between the logic of a common market, in which labour moves freely, and the bounded welfare state, in which access to services is limited to those deemed to be legitimate members of the national community. She highlights the divergent interests pursued by employers seeking suitable workers and states seeking to regulate their borders. Lastly, she recognizes the inconsistencies between maintaining control and observing human rights, paying particular attention to asylum seekers, who hold a special protected status in international migration as potential political refugees.

In the German case, Morris finds an effort to carefully regulate the labour market through highly formal and stratified differentiations between skilled and unskilled workers, as well as between EU member nationals and the nationals of other countries. Each group draws formal rights from their status, resulting in a hierarchy of gradually expansive rights as one’s residence status improves. The United Kingdom, by contrast, embodies efforts to manage migration through the progressive removal of rights previously extended to British subjects.

Finally, Italy represents a case in which formal rules are relatively underdeveloped and often circumvented because the domestic labour market still depends on unskilled labour.

Apart from issues related to the labour market, Morris compares these three countries in terms of their policies regarding family reunification for third country nationals, asylum and unlawful presence. Her analysis is relevant beyond these three cases. At a time when the European Union is developing a collective immigration and asylum regime, Morris suggests the need to search for similar mechanisms at the EU level. In the cases she reviews, she highlights the divergences in policy content and implementation that have driven EU harmonization efforts, which continue to be daunting, arduous, and contested tasks.

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Therefore, the draft migration policies reflect the stratified statuses and rights that sustain the distinctions analysed by Morris: Between EU citizens, long-term EU residents, asylum seekers, third country nationals and the family members of these categories. Thus, an echo of the national status differentiations is emerging at the regional level.

(Adapted from: “Layers of Rights, Channels of Access” review by Emek M.Uçarer;

International Studies Review (2003) 5, 261 - 263 )

4. Discussion

What do the Westphalian notions regarding migration consist of and what has been happening in recent years?

How does T.H.Marshall define membership and inclusion of migrants?

What arguments does Lydia Morris bring forth regarding the area of migration and migrants?

Discuss how, according to Lydia Morris, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom experience migration.

What important aspects does Morris draw out between the labour market and the welfare state?

How do Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom regulate the labour market without contrasting social welfare?

What does the draft migration policy reflect?

5. The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: South East Asia and the Universalist Theory

The early 1990s was an interesting period for the development of international human rights law and for international human rights as a movement. With the end of the Cold War, civil and political rights ‘took off’ both in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe where rights had previously been rejected as antiethical to communism and in those of the

Americas where rights had often been suspended in the name of fighting communism. The growing number of accessions to the European Conventions on Human Rights and the growing authority of the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights both testified to this development. However, at this time, a new line of resistance to the expansion of human rights norms and institutions arose. This went under the banner of

‘cultural relativism’ and suggested that human rights essentially represented values of the west. Broadly speaking, this cultural relativist charge had two main variants:

One, primarily found in Africa and the Middle East, challenged by the universalist claims of the civil aspects of human rights, notably regarding equality, privacy and definitions of torture, arguing that these simply reflected Christian and European culture.

The other, primarily found in South East Asia, rejected the universality of the political aspects, such as free expression and association, arguing that these again only reflected western ways of doing politics. The rapid economic growth of the ‘Asian Tigers’ in the

1980s and early1990s bolstered the arguments of those advancing the latter view, apparently endorsing their claim that a distinctively Asian style of politics was more likely to bring prosperity to the region.

However, confidence in such views was punctured by the Asian financial collapses of the mid 1990s, especially as a lack of political and economic transparency. International human rights discourse continued its advance, perhaps reaching its peak with the

International Criminal Court statute of 1998. After September 11 2001, however, this onward advance seems in jeopardy. As the USA strains to break free of the internationalism that began to characterise its foreign policy in the 1990s, it and some other nations have put

16

in question some of what appeared to be the most securely established human rights norms, notably the protection against torture when it comes to suspected al-Qaeda members. At the same time, in so far as the ‘war on terrorism’ is claimed to have a normative basis this is more likely to be expressed in terms of defending western civilization than of advancing universal human rights. This in turn is only likely to provoke a backlash in those countries whose civilisation is other than western, in turn reinforcing cultural relativist arguments against human rights claims, especially those focusing on ‘civil’ rather than political human rights standards.

This reading reflects much of what actually goes on in international human rights practice, especially international human rights law-making, where efforts are often made to identify the pluralist foundations of human rights norms and effects compromises between the conceptions of these norms advanced in different societies. This is an especially pertinent issue in the contemporary world where the fall-out of international politics frequently poses dilemmas for human rights advocates, such as whether to endorse economic sanctions of military action against a country with a poor human rights record when the states proposing such action advocate only a very limited vision of human rights.

(Adapted from: The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: South East Asia and

Universalist Theory by Anthony J.Langlois; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2001, ix + 214 pp and The Modern Law Review Limited 2003)

5. Discussion

What happened at the end of the Cold War with respect to international human rights legislation?

 What is “cultural relativism”? Discuss its two variants.

When did the international human rights discourse reach its peak?

Give reasons why the human rights advance has been in jeopardy since September

11, 2001.

As a consequence, what dilemmas do human rights advocates face today?

SECTION FOUR

WOMEN’S WORKING RIGHTS IN EUROPE

1. Socio-historical Paths of the Male Breadwinner Model

In sociological thinking, the supposition has tended to prevail that in the household, wives were charged, in society, with family care and housework, husbands with participation in labour force as the family providers. However, recent changes have occurred in family structures. In this light, the housewife model of the family was the point of departure for the family development in the second half of the twentieth century. In recent times, in view of increasing women’s employment and one-parent families, this model seems to be disintegrating, and there is international feminist discussion about egalitarian forms of the family increasingly replacing the male breadwinner model. It is often assumed that the integration of women into the economy has occurred everywhere as a three-phase process: from the extensive integration of women into societal production in pre-modern societies, to their wide exclusion with the shift to industrial society, and finally to their re-integration into paid work during the further course of modernization.

Hence the question: why is there such historical variation in the development and importance of the housewife model of the male breadwinner family? The social and political

17

strength of the urban bourgeoisie had central societal importance in the imposition of the housewife model of the male breadwinner family. In this, it is necessary to distinguish between the imposition of the breadwinner marriage at the cultural level on the one hand, and at the level of social practice in the family on the other.

The establishment of the breadwinner marriage as the dominant family model was an inevitable result of the evolution of modern western capitalist society.

Role acquisition takes place by the internalization of the family role-structure during the process of socialization. In Parsons and Bates (1955) the role differentiation is unavoidable because different behavioural components and functions cannot be optimized in one person; for them, gender role differentiation implies a normative function, necessary to the stability of modern societies.

The argumentation in feminist-orientated theories, based on the patriarchy approach of the male breadwinner marriage, is criticized as the basis of discrimination against women in modern capitalistic societies. According to Walby, who led the development of this type of socialist-feminist approach in Britain, every society has a comprehensive ‘patriarchal system’, defined as a ‘system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women’ (Walby, 1990: 20).

The feminist historian Karin Hausen argues:

Indeed, industrial societies in the course of the 19 th century became increasingly structured so that men in all groups of the population were to be in paid employment outside of their families but at the same time recognized within their families as head of the house, breadwinner and protector of wife and children . In contrast to men, women – without regard to the time and energy they invested to their own work, or whether they in fact lived within marriage or not – were increasingly obligated to be the caring housewife, marriage partner and mother. (Hausen 2000: 349)

Accordingly it is usually assumed that everywhere in the western world, or in modern society in general, the housewife model formed the starting point for the more recent development of the labour-force integration of women. The book Careers of Couples in

Contemporary Society. From Male Breadwinner to Dual Earner Families, edited by Hans-

Peter Blossfeld and Sonja Drobnic, is an example. They argue that the male breadwinner family form in all countries was the beginning, in the 1960s, of the change towards a dualearner model:

In all countries, there has been a shift from a male-breadwinner to a dual-earner model

(Blossfeld and Drobnic 2002: 379)

(Adapted from: “Socio-historical paths of the male breadwinner model – an explanation of cross-national differences”; The British Journal of Sociology 2004 Vol. 55 Issue 3 )

1. Discussion

What is happening to the traditional male breadwinner model and the position of women in society?

Discuss the three-fold economic and social evolution of women in modern society.

 What does “role differentiation”, as seen by Parsons and Bates, consist in?

How do the socialist-feminist approaches analysed by Walby and Hausen contrast the theory of “role differentiation”?

What do Blossfeld and Drobnic affirm regarding the modification of roles in the past century?

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2. Managing the Family and the “Male Veto”

An analysis of family management in Europe took place with the help of 246

SOCCARE interviews across five European countries (Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK) to try to establish the variables that are conventionally accepted as having fundamental significance (family-friend policies and general care services, flexible working hours, women’s work-life preferences and cultural differences).

Debates about the work-life balance have been structured by two distinct paradigms of ‘ the problem’. The first paradigm emerges from the literature that debates the future of the largely European welfare state. This is a literature that is concerned with the sustainability of welfare capitalism and with the future of the welfare state in the context of global competition. The second paradigm is rooted in citizenship rights and obligations and particularly in the roles of women in the household and the economy. The contribution of the family to work and to care is a key boundary on which these two paradigms meet.

From the point of view of the welfare state theorists, the work-care balance has critical impacts on productivity, social costs and social reproduction. The revolution in women’s labour market participation across Western Europe since the 1960s has raised the economic output of families faster than their total wages. At the same time the family has continued to sustain its contribution to the production of social care and to maintaining social capital.

Some room remains where women’s labour market participation is relatively low, such as in Italy where women’s part-time work is relatively high. Britain has the second highest proportion of part-time employment among working women, 44 percent in 2002, in Europe.

This is much higher than in the other countries in the sample: France 30 percent; Italy 18 percent; Finland 17 percent; Portugal 16 percent (Eurostat 2000).

What the macro data suggest are complex interactions between social and economic forces. For example, among couples with children in the UK, two out of three women in paid work are employed part-time while the situation in France is that three out of four will be working full-time. While there is some evidence that in France childcare options and full-time working hours are more frequently compatible with parenthood, it is also true that part-time work is less available in France and that more of the French women are choosing not to enter employment at all for some parts of the childrearing period. Only in Britain do fewer than half the families with children under six express a preference that both parents should work full-time. In Finland, Portugal, Italy and France the number of women with young children who wish to work full-time, and to a lesser extent part-time, is much greater than those who are currently able to do so.

Fathers, while in principle committed to reaching a better work-life balance, have a different order of priorities. A review of both quantitative and qualitative studies reported by the British Opportunities Commission summarizes fathers’ roles in this way:

Fathers are not a homogeneous group and there is wide variety in the roles they adopt. A number of studies emphasise the importance of the breadwinner role as a powerful source of identity for fathers and many cite this role as their main family commitment . At the same time, younger men in particular have expressed a wish to participate more fully in family life, and there are some fathers for whom the breadwinning role has less relevance, especially those whose partner is working full-time.

(EOC 2003: 2)

Fathers’ conceptions of fathering and of their contributions to housework are variable but relatively inflexible. The Equal Opportunities Commission review argues that qualitative studies portray four main types of involvement:

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Enforcer Dad: is not involved in the day-to-day care of children and sees the most important aspects of being a father as providing a role model and clear rules for children.

Entertainer Dad: often entertains the children while mother does the household work.

Useful Dad: helps out with day-to-day childcare and some household tasks. He still takes the lead from the mother about what needs doing and when .

Fully Involved Dad: is as equally involved with running the home and family as his partner, at least some of the time, and parental roles are virtually interchangeable.

Most fathers are in the two middle groups, which implies a support role in the home rather than the sharing of responsibility. (EOC 2003: 3)

Irrespective of their levels of commitment, the literature shows that fathers are often willing to enter into explicit negotiations about their roles. Bond and Sales (2001: 243-4) conclude their review of variables associated with contributions to household work among parents in

British Household Panel Study by arguing that:

The relatively low level of variation explained for levels of sharing in the household suggests that couples are not necessarily adopting a rational “strategy” towards household work.

Brannen and Moss (1991), in their studies of dual earner families after maternity leave, found that 40 percent of the couples reported that there had been no discussion of household strategy or tactics ...(In addition) the results of this research suggest that if any household work organisation has actually been discussed and agreed between couples, its application is vague and imperfect or maybe is subject to many extraneous variables.

The SOCCARE study included countries in which “family-friendly” policies and services are relatively well developed and established (Finland and France), those in which they are expanding (UK) and those where they remain significantly underdeveloped (Italy and Portugal). Except in the case of Italy, there appears to be little correlation between the policy and service context and the patterns of employment among women with children. A similar lack of relationship was found in an OECD study of the links between an index of

“work-family reconciliation policies” and the employment of women (OECD 2001). Greater public recognition and support for families’ care responsibilities (including child-care coverage for under threes, maternity pay entitlement, leave provisions by employers, entitlement to part-time working) were not associated with higher employment among women, except in those OECD countries with very little public support (Italy and Spain) and those with a good deal (Denmark and Sweden). The trend away from single-earner to dualearner families, which brings with it significant increases in the proportions of employed workers with caring responsibilities, appears to be one that is relatively independent of the pattern of supports for such families provided by public policy.

Throughout Europe governments are seeking ways to assist families with their growing obligations in the labour market and at home. A common reform agenda is to be found across Western Europe: assisting the incomes of working families with caring responsibilities, improving the volume of and access to care services, encouraging and requiring from employers flexible work regimes that recognize families’ caring functions, and providing incentives for men to play a greater role in the household and caring work done by families.

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While the trends intensifying the work-care pressures on families are likely to continue, driven by international competition and its effects upon labour markets, it is assumed that the current policy reform agenda will ease the pressure on families.

(Adapted from: “Managing the Family: Productivity Scheduling and the Male Veto” by

John Baldock and Jan Hadlow; Social Policy and Administration ISSN 0144-5596 Vol.

38, N° 6, December 2004, pp. 706-720)

2. Discussion

What were the objectives of the SOCCARE interviews which took place in Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK?

Which two features have been considered in the analysis of the work-life balance? How do these two paradigms meet?

Give examples that imply interactions between social and economic forces.

Discuss briefly the four types of male involvement in the family as established by the Equal Opportunities Commission. In which categories are most fathers collocated?

How do Bond and Sales define the variables discussed above among parents in British households?

What does the West European reform agenda foresee in order to assist families in the labour markets?

3. Parity, Power and Representative Politics: Gender Equality in Europe

In recent years, the concept of parity democracy has rapidly risen up the European political agenda. Using the typology of sex-quotas, this reading undertakes a classification of the measures taken by the 15 old EU member states to improve the gender balance in representative assemblies.

Following the embarrassingly low numbers of female representatives in elected public office, a number of European countries have recently introduced measures designed to promote the candidacy and participation of women ranging from unenforceable (party political) action programmes to legislative quotas in electoral laws and in some cases constitutionalisation of the parity principle.

Undoubtedly over the past 30 years women’s rights have become a central matter of concern to the international community. However, despite the general commitment to formal equal rights for women, there has as yet not been a substantial corrective to the gender imbalance evident in the national assemblies of western Europe. In this respect, formal legal equality, the right to vote and to stand in elections, has proved incapable of radically altering women’s position and representation in the public sphere. The mere granting of equal rights is an insufficient way of making up for the historic prejudice facing women in public life, and, in particular the institutional nature of sexism. As a result, legal controversy continues over the best way to correct materially existing inequalities and to prevent others from developing.

In this regard, even policies aimed at giving ‘equal opportunities’ to citizens may simply not be enough. Equal opportunities, like equal rights, can result in very unequal outputs, considering that the starting point does not necessarily have to be uniform: that is, in terms of capabilities, training, information and other random factors. One corrective in this case has been to insist not only on input in the assessment of equal capacities but also on output. For example, within its Title III on equality, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights

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provides a full menu of equality provisions couched in terms of basic rights which include the non-discrimination principle (Art. 21), and the principle of equality between men and women (Art. 23). The latter also envisages the possibility of positive action in order to redress gender inequality, stating that :

Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.

In other words, not only is everyone to be equal, but positive discrimination measures are countenanced at the EU level when a lack of representation of one of the two groups is observed, that is, when the material output does not concur with equality objectives intended by legislation.

This, translated to the level of national assemblies, would suggest that firm steps need to be taken to address the gendered democratic deficit which continues to haunt national political regimes and their decision-making bodies. Respect for diversity and difference in terms of promoting active and balanced participation in public life goes to the heart of what is meant by democratic decision-making processes. Notably, such arguments are based upon the factor associated with women’s engagement in the legislative assemblies, that is the view that women’s engagement in political processes will confer positive benefits in terms of a diversification of political culture and change in substantive legislative output. These two approaches – based on rights and utility – are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Instead they are frequently combined, with arguments based on rights being assumed whenever utility arguments are advanced.

Affirmative action programmes “aim to encourage applicants by providing training sessions, advisory group targets, financial assistance” (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; citations from Norris 1997). Gender quotas fall into this category if they are advisory rather than binding. More specifically, sex quotas and parity measures can either take the form of affirmative action programmes, which are not binding recommendations, or positive discrimination strategies, which are binding. The use of quotas is based on the belief that a balance of the sexes cannot be reached naturally, that is, by simply letting the evolution of society change patterns of behaviour. Iris Marion Young, for example, claims that the universalism which is behind liberal democracy is false and ignores factual discrimination

(1997, 1998): Therefore, she stresses the need for artificial mechanisms such as quotas that merely establish a compositional threshold that can be defined either positively or negatively. Conceptually, quotas are based on the idea that representation is about standing for group interests. It assumes that the representative shares social characteristics (for example, gender, race, locality, class) with those represented and that this commonality will result in similar policy preferences.

Despite their temporary appeal, the philosophy underlying quotas means that they may conflict with the essence of some political regimes. This problem motivated the development of the parity concept. From a distance, the two notions seem somewhat similar, that is, they denote measures of correction in order to reach a political balance between men and women. But they are not synonymous. According to the parity philosophy, it is the very duality of humankind that justifies a sharing of power between men and women. This is why it is necessary to break away from the logic of assimilation, and replace it with the construction of autonomous individuals, each with the capacity of self-determination.

Yet, even if the defenders of parity stress the differences between quotas and parity, there has proved to be little difference when it comes to implementation. In countries where parliament has tried to enact legislation providing for positive action to promote parity democracy, these attempts have been rejected as unlawful since their underlying ethos runs

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contrary to the Constitution. As the French and Italian examples illustrate, legislators have then changed strategy and decided to modify first the Constitution ensuring that positive actions can be drawn from a constitutional principle. Thus, following the French example, the principle of parity has now entered the Constitution of Belgium (2002) and Italy (2003).

In Spain, the introduction of sex-based quota in the electoral system has been discussed, but has failed to yield positive results in terms of legislation at the national level.

The United Kingdom, despite a lack of written Constitution, hasn’t seen successful attempts to introduce mechanisms to promote a better sex balance in the House of Commons.

Interesting from the comparative constitutional perspective is the fact that in the UK legal regime the issue lost its very constitutional significance becoming a routine matter of employment law or political context. Fortunately, in trying to side-step the Sex

Discrimination Act, the Labour government has pursued its policy to increase the number of women in parliament by other means. This has resulted in the adoption of the Sex

Discrimination Act 2002.

This ‘soft’ approach to quotas operates within an unaltered electoral system that has been demonstrated to be resistant to realising higher levels of female representation.

In Portugal, the principle of parity was incorporated into the Constitution in 1997.

However, the legislative proposals that have been made have never gained a parliamentary majority, not even among the female members of parliament.

Italy is a country with an absolutely dire level of female participation in its lower assembly, the Camera dei Deputati which comprises 11.5% of women. Again the issue had a long history of constitutional objection. Two different reforms were adopted in Italy during 1993 for the elections to the lower house. In March a first reform established that in the lists of candidates the number of candidate from one sex could not be above two thirds.

The second reform adopted in August, modified the election rule and converted it into a mixed system in which 75% of the seats were assigned by simple majority vote, and the remaining 25% were assigned through proportional representation and party-list system. For the latter 25%, Article 4-2 provided for the alternation of male and female candidates in the lists presented by the parties, which also implied a strict parity (50-50) in the numerical composition of the lists. Subsequently, the idea of quotas was referred to the corte costituzionale which held the matters to be unconstitutional. The law establishing a 50-50 quota for the elections, together with the zipper system of male and female candidates, was applied only in the 1994 elections. Efforts to promote parity in the elections to the European

Parliament in June 2004 did not look very promising either. It was feared that the larger parties would take a strategic decision not to respect the law. On top of that, the quota of a maximum limit per sex of two thirds only regulated the quantity and not the positions of the candidates within the party lists. Nevertheless, further action was undertaken for the Italian elections to the European Parliament designed to change public attitudes towards the election of female candidates. A campaign called “Vote for Women” (Io Voto Donna) was initiated by the Ministry for Equal Opportunities and publicised on national T.V. during the election campaign. All in all, and despite the above-mentioned deficiencies, the number of women has significantly increased between the two legislative terms: from 11.5% for the 1999-2004 period (10 women out of 87 members), to 19.2% after the 2004 elections (15 women out of

78 members).

In France, the idea of parity democracy was innovatively introduced as a constitutional principle following a long battle with the Conseil Constitutionnel as to the constitutionality of sex quotas for electoral office. The Council delivered in May 2000 and finally declared the principle of quotas to be constitutional. This view has been more recently endorsed by the regional elections comprising alternate male and female candidates as being compatible with the parity principle.

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Finally, it is the Belgian example that provides the best model so far for legislative change. Adopting a positive discrimination strategy in the form of legally binding measures requiring a sex quota in the electoral law, the Belgian story of parity begins with the Smet-

Tobback law on quotas which was approved in 1994, and applied for the first time in the elections to the Federal Parliament in 1999. New legislation intended to favour equal representation of men and women, enacted in 2002 and applied in the elections of 18 May

2003. The first results after application of the new reforms produced the following results: the number of women in the federal Chamber rose to 35% and in the Senate to 37.5%.

The comparative study demonstrates that legal and constitutional reforms envisaging political equality are complex mechanisms requiring consideration of their primary and side effects. However, such measures are needed in order to increase women’s political participation. The evident disparity in the composition of the parliaments of the EU member states shows that gender equality cannot be taken for granted.

In some cases, the poor presence of women in some national assemblies reveals a clear disparity between principle and practice. In this regard a simple constitutionalisation of quotas or the parity principle is insufficient. The statement of principle requires some regulatory, or legally binding measures to put words into action. In this respect the Belgian model offers the clearest example of best practice so far. It is hoped that other legislatures will watch and learn from this example.

(Adapted from: “Parity, Power and Representative Politics: the Elusive Pursuit of

Gender Equality in Europe” by Mercedes Mateo Diaz and Susan Millins; Feminist Legal

Studies 12: 279 – 302, 2004)

3. Discussion

Why were sex-quotas introduced?

 How has women’s position remained unaltered in the public spheres?

Where have there been failures?

 Why do equal opportunities run the risk of becoming “unequal” mechanisms?

How do gender quotas and parity measures fit in with affirmative action programmes or, on the contrary, with discrimination strategies?

How does Iris Marion Young define the universalism of liberal democracy and what is her opinion on quotas?

Define the parity philosophy.

What has happened to parity legislation in the different countries analysed in this text?

Explain how the ministry of Equal Opportunities in Italy managed to increase the number of women in the European Parliament. What were the results?

Which country proves to be the best model for legislative change? How did this country reach this success?

What implementation is important to overcome disparity?

4. The Headscarf Debate: French Law n° 2004-228 of 15 March 2004

On 17 March 2004, Law 2004-228 was published in the Official Journal of France to regulate, in educational establishments, the wearing of symbols that express religious adherence. The law prohibits symbols that “ostensibly” manifest a particular religious belief.* This was one recommendation of the report of the Stasi Commission (published in

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December 2003) after the question of wearing headscarves in French public schools became a site of controversy for the third time in fifteen years.

In present day Europe, where we note an apparently increasing xenophobia towards

Muslims, the headscarf has a stronger symbolic load than a kippah or a Sikh turban for instance, and it is the result of this symbolic overload that the debate has touched questions of identity, community, cultural diversity, religious freedom and tolerance, Islam in Europe and gender relations.

Case Law in France (beginning in 1989) has brought into focus a latent conflict between the individual expression of religious belief and the collective value placed on the principle of laìcitè, that is, the separation of religion and the state (Dubourg-Lavroff 1999).

One strand of the discussions of the Stasi Commission was the potential conflict between the legislation on religious symbols and the European Convention on Human

Rights. The Court of Human Rights, governs the freedom of religion and the right to religious manifestation. These are not absolute rights and they can be restricted to protect public order, health or the rights and freedoms of others, elements which have been evoked in the French proposals.

Understanding why women wear headscarves is not taken into consideration in

Western culture. Some legal pronouncements, for example, berate Muslim women for failing to conform to a Western image of how women should behave. Furthermore, women’s bodies remain central in the construction of the discourse on the radical difference of the Arab or the Muslim considered as the Other. At a time where Victorian morals predominated, Arab women were the objects of male erotic fantasies associated with the idea of harem and the figure of the odalisque; now they are dominated, unequal, inferior and covered.

While globalisation produces standardisation and universalism on the one hand, at the same time it sees the rebirth of difference and localisms on the other, often expressed through claims to religious, ethnic and cultural belonging. This might be understood as a

“resistance identity” (Castells 1996).

The affaire du foulard teaches us a bitter lesson about the fragility of our democracies.

Many interpreters such as Giacomo Marramao in Italy – have launched the idea of a

‘narrative’ rather than an argumentative public sphere (Marramao 2003). Our democracies need public spheres where different groups and individuals may come into contact and

‘narrate’ themselves to each other, thus ‘making themselves accountable’ for their values and traditions, and engaging a kind of public dialogue that is not afraid to touch on values. This could be a strategy to avoid entrenchment of communities in self-centred models of identity.

Many interpret the wearing of the foulard as the symbol of the humiliation and oppression of women by a patriarchal and integralist world; Hence, banning it can only

“free” Islamic women from unjust and intolerable violence. However, the answer to one constraint (the religious obligation to wear the foulard) cannot be another constraint (the obligation not to wear it): an effective process of liberation cannot be based on a prohibition.

On the contrary, we must communicate and create an understanding with positions that we do not immediately come to terms with. In the end, this is the profound meaning of tolerance as the capacity not only to accept difference, but also to recognise the dignity in difference.

So, the problem is not the foulard in itself, but the foulard as an object of free choice.

It becomes an object of free choice starting from conditions of equality. Banning the foulard means denying Muslim women this chance to tie elements of modernity and tradition in new ways which sees them as autonomous subjects in their lives while conserving those differences that they perhaps wish to retain. The ban on the headscarf is supposed to

‘defend’ young women from an oppressive and family-enforced tradition, and yet at the same time it submits these same women to another form of tutelage. If the life choices of

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Muslim women are a concern of the French state, it is the social background, economic, legal and political conditions in which they live, including the everyday reality of racism, that need to be the focus of attention, to create conditions in which choice can be real.

In Islamic countries, a ban on headscarves, is closely associated with the authoritarian regimes, which sought, through symbolic and physical violence, to modernise their societies and ‘clear out backwardness’. Thus in these contexts, the veil has become a symbol of dissent and opposition to authoritarian regimes. What has happened in France is perceived, first and foremost, as authoritarianism. Furthermore, the claim of French secularism to offer the best safeguard for the emancipation of women is equally rejected as Arab women have gained significant autonomy and have found ways to express their claims for greater democracy (fro example, in Saudi Arabia, 40 percent of private property is owned by women and over 55 percent of university graduates are women ).

Islamic feminism places emphasis on communal solidarity rather than individualism: in relation to the freedom of the individual woman, Islamic feminists point to the security the

Islamic family and community grant women. Instead of equality, they insist on complimentarity between men and women based on biological differences, and whilst they accept the principle of segregation between the sexes, they want to be able to exert the same social, professional, leisure, religious and political activities as men. They accept that gendered differences should not be blurred, that they should be inscribed in the public space through women wearing the veil. In this thinking, the chador or the hijab are thus the tangible and visual markers of female identity, not of submission to male domination.

Therefore, the veil is the conspicuous sign of Islamic feminism. Women choose to wear it, and will not remove it in any circumstance. This is a way of freeing themselves from a male-imposed feminine model and, by retaining the veil, they show that it is not imposed by men but chosen by them.

The veil is not a thing but a sign. Asking school girls in France to remove their veil inside the classroom or the school is forcing them into categories that deny their autonomy.

(Adapted from: “Unveiling the Headscarf Debate” by Dawn Lyon and Debora Spini;

Feminist Legal Studies 12: 333-345, 2004)

NOTES:

Article 1 of Law 2004 – 228 inserts a new Article L. 141-5-1 into the Code on Education to this effect, Article 1: Il est inséré, dans le code de l’éducation, après l’article L. 141-5, un article L. 141-5-1 ainsi rédigé : Article L. 141-5-1 :- Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestant ostensiblement un apparetenance religieuse est interdit... Further to the legislation, a circular was adopted on 18 May 2004 by the Ministry of Education regarding the more detailed terms of application of the Act : Journal Officiel n° 118, 22 May 2004, p.

118 .

4.

Discussion

What does the French Law 2004-228 establish?

What does the European Convention on Human Rights establish?

 What is the “resistance identity”?

 Discuss Giacomo Marramao’s idea of a “narrative”.

Discuss briefly what Lyon & Spini want to express when they mention

“the profound meaning of tolerance”.

What does the ban on headscarves represent in Islamic countries?

What is Islamic feminism?

Discuss the importance of the veil as a symbol of Islamic feminism .

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SECTION FIVE

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:

CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE, MORAL IMAGINATION

AND SWEATSHOPS

1. Children’s Rights in South East Europe

The beginning of the transition in South East Europe coincided with the adoption of the Convention of the Rights of the Child by the United Nations General Assembly. The political, social and economic conditions in the countries of SEE throughout the past 15 to 16 years have had a huge impact on the enjoyment of children’s rights. The entire region went through a period of crisis and only Slovenia and Hungary are now out of it and on their way to economic prosperity, political stability and social recovery. The rest, meaning the former

Yugoslavia, plus Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are still experiencing serious problems.

The combination of economic and political crisis, and massive instability and insecurity, has severely hampered the effective implementation of the Convention on the

Rights of the Child. This crisis has , in fact, made the situation of children worse than it was before the transition began.

The transition, in combination with the armed conflicts have brought on numerous problems. On the one hand, the area was faced with structural inequalities, changes in family forms and the failure of the entire social welfare system to meet the existing and emerging needs. Family structures – so crucial for a child’s healthy development – have changed drastically. Most of the families in the region were suddenly faced with growing poverty and inability to maintain their households. At the same time the state could not

“walk in” and assist families in need as it used to do before in the communist period. Not only because too many, too suddenly, were in great need, but also because the state was impoverished itself, using its ever smaller budget either to pay debts and fund defence needs or to enlarge the police forces.

The health situation of children has worsened in most of the countries of SEE. Whilst access to basic education has tended to remain high, the last decade has seen no tangible improvement in access to quality education. Juvenile delinquency has increased, and the offences committed by minors have become more serious in nature. Drug abuse and sexual exploitation of children are widespread. Child labour, practically unknown during the communist period, has become a reality in SEE. The situation of children belonging to minority groups has worsened, particularly for Roma children. On top of all this, hundreds of thousands of children in the region have witnessed the war, with all its devastating consequences, and about the same number have been forced to leave their homes.

The consequences are notable in terms of growing nationalism and intolerance, and a general breakdown of the shared values system. The overall crisis has isolated SEE, and particularly its children from the rest of Europe and the world in a very distinct way.

The great majority of children has never travelled abroad and has never met a peer from another country. It is only through the movie industry and thanks to limited access to

Internet that some children are aware of the way of life and events in other countries.

However, this is for the most part confined to “Western” sources and unfortunately does not include information about their peers in other countries of SEE.

(Adapted from: “A New Phase for Children’s Rights” by Nevena Vuckovic Sahovic;

Political Studies Review Vol. 14, n° 2 )

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1. Discussion

What are the social and economic conditions in the countries of South East

Europe? Give examples.

How are the family structures organized in this part of the world? What problems are the families facing?

What are the pessimistic consequences of this transition?

2. What is intended by Child Labour?

“Child labour” refers to paid workers who are under sixteen years of age. “Juvenile” labour refers to paid workers between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. “Youth workers” refers to any worker under eighteen, grouping together the other subgroups. In particular, the Global Reporting Initiative uses the term “young workers” and defines it as “a person who is above the applicable minimum working age and younger than eighteen years of age.”*1

The ILO Convention N° 182, against the Worst Forms of Child Labour, came into force on November 19, 2000. The convention defines the “child” to be anyone younger than eighteen years of age. According to the new ILO estimates, there are some 250 million children 5-14 years old who are toiling in economic activity in developing countries, with almost half working full-time.*2

In the United States, the common response is to heavily regulate all forms of child labour, and to impose severe restrictions on the number of hours children may work during a school day. In developing countries, that is generally not the best answer for the children or the families involved. This is because full-time education programmes are not universally available. Youths who are banned from working in the formal sector may end up working in less desirable, though profitable, activities such as prostitution or drug dealing. Moreover, notwithstanding the possible educational alternatives in some environments, this proposed solution completely ignores the financial impacts of terminating the employment of a youth worker. The income generated by the youth worker may assist in supporting the youth’s basic needs (food, clothing, shelter) or it may be critical in supporting the entire family.

NOTES:

*1 Global Reporting Initiative, Child Labor Protocol, Draft for Public Comment, May 17, 2002

*2 Kebebew Ashagrie, “Statistics on Working Children and Hazardous Child Labor in Brief” (Geneva: ILO, 1998), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/stats/child/stats.htm

2. Discussion

 Give the definitions of the three terms: “child labour”, “juvenile labour” and

 “youth workers”

 How does the ILO Convention n° 182 define the “child” and what are the

 convention’s estimates?

What is the difference between legislation in the U.S. and the inapplicability of these laws in developing countries?

 What is the “benefit” of a youth worker’s income?

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3. Moral Imagination

Disputes concerning global labour practices are the core of contemporary debates regarding globalisation. In this unit, two multinational corporations are analysed and their global labour programmes in an effort to illustrate the positive impact of moral imagination at the individual, organizational, and systems levels on the “sweatshop” problem. The term,

“sweatshop” is defined as any workplace in which workers are typically subject to two or more of the following conditions: systematic forced overtime; systematic health and safety risks that stem from negligence or the disregard of employee welfare; coercion; systematic deception that places workers at risk; underpayment of earnings; and income for a 48-hour work week less than the overall poverty rate for that country (one who suffers from overall poverty lacks the income necessary to satisfy one’s basic non-food needs such as shelter and basic health care).*1 The intent is to identify the factors that have allowed particular multinational corporations (MNCs) to respect at least some of the basic rights of workers.

The following conclusions have been drawn out:

 MNCs are regarded as morally responsible for the labour practices of their

 subcontractors.*2

MNCs have duties in their offshore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labour laws are followed, to meet minimum safety standards and to provide a

 minimum wage for employees.*3

MNCs that provide respectful health and safety conditions and a living wage will not cause greater harm than good to workers.

MNCs that respect the basic human rights of workers can gain certain strategic advantages such as improvements in worker productivity, corporate reputation and employee morale.*4

Many MNC managers in the apparel and footwear industry now accept the soundness of at least some of these conclusions. The case studies that are going to be discussed in readings five and six intend defending the conclusions based on recent field studies of Nike and Adidas-Salomon contract factories in Vietnam.

NOTES

*1 Denis G. Arnold and Norman E.Bowie, “Sweatshops and respect for Persons,”

Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (April 2003): 221-42

*2 Arnold and Bowie, “Sweatshops and Respect for Persons”,; and Denis G.Arnold, “Moral Reasoning, Human Rights, and Global Labour

Practices”, in Hartman et al., Rising Above Sweatshops.

3. Arnold and Bowie, “Sweatshops and Respect for Persons”; Arnold, “Moral Reasoning, Human Rights, and Global Labor Practices”; and

Arnold, “Human Rights and Business: An Ethical Analysis.”

4. Arnold and Hartman, “Beyond Sweatshops: Positive Deviancy and Global Labor Practices”.

3. Discussion

Give two or three definitions of “sweatshop conditions”.

What is lacking for a person who suffers from total poverty?

What results came into being the moment multinational companies started respecting the basic rights of workers?

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4. The Globalisation of the Apparel and Footwear Industry Systems

The global apparel and footwear manufacturing systems that are going to be examined, developed within global economic labour supply structures that have significantly impacted their evolution. One significant feature of globalisation, that is of particular relevance to our analysis, is the increase in outsourcing by multinational corporations (MNCs). Prior to the

1970s, most foreign production by MNCs was intended for host-country markets. In the

1970s, new financial incentives led MNCs to begin outsourcing the production of goods for

North American, European, and Japanese markets to manufacturing facilities in developing countries. Encouraged by international organizations such as the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund, developing nations established “free trade zones” to encourage foreign investment via tax incentives and a minimal regulatory environment.

In the 1980s, the availability of international financing allowed entrepreneurs to set up production facilities in developing economies in order to meet the growing demand by

MNCs for offshore production.

Outsourcing production has many distinct advantages from the perspective of MNCs.

Outsourcing has been especially popular in consumer products industries, and in particular in the apparel industry. The advantages of outsourcing include the following:

 Enhanced production flexibility as a result of the utilization of a large pool of

 contractors. Such flexibility allows companies to vary the level of production to meet market demand.

Enhanced product diversity as a result of utilizing diverse contractors with a wide range of specialized skills and equipment.

Reduced production costs based on lower payroll and reduced expenditure on

 environmental protection.

Enhanced product development as a result of being able to experiment with new product lines at reduced financial risk.

The apparel and footwear brands first recognized the need for oversight of these outsourced and overseas contractor labour operations in the late 1980s when Levi Strauss &

Co. uncovered violations of workers’ human rights in their Chinese contractors.*1 At first most other firms did not consider themselves responsible for the activities of their contractors, but later many followed suit, establishing codes that follow the principles articulated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In his discussion of systems theory, Gerald Weinberg argues that systems that are the product of human ingenuity constitute a point of view or a way of looking at the world.*2

There is no “real” system to be discovered, but rather individual interpretations of a web of relationships. He states that it is foolish to look for a purpose in such systems:

With “man-made” systems, we talk about “purpose” whereas such language is forbidden for

“natural systems. Yet much of the dissatisfaction with our man-made systems stems precisely from disagreement about what the “purpose” of the system is: that is, what the system “really” is. The answer, of course, is that the system has no “purpose”, for purpose is a relation

, not a thing to “have”. To the junk dealers, General Motors does exist to put out scrap metal, yet the stockholders probably couldn’t care less whether General Motors is producing cars or string beans, as long as it is producing profits.

Weinberg’s point is that one’s interpretation of a system will depend on one’s relation to that system. And it is one’s relation to a system that determines one’s interaction within the web of relationships.

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Historically, apparel and footwear corporations accepted responsibility only for that which fell within the boundaries of their own organizations and did not regard themselves as accountable for the labour abuses that occurred within the operations of their contractors.

When these corporations did business domestically, they were bound to the US or European laws. When they began to globalize, they did not at first consider the need to be responsible for the actions of their contractors since that was not the case with their business operations in the US and Europe. In addition, part of the allure of overseas contracts was the lower cost structure, in part the result of fewer legal requirements. This conception changed as awareness grew on the part of MNCs and others regarding working conditions in these factories and the lack of legal protection for workers.

Under the original conception of the apparel and footwear supply chain systems, contracted factory workers were not considered by corporations to be part of their system and therefore were beyond the bounds of their duties. However, today, decisions of government entities create legal obligations for MNCs and for the host-nation environment within which these firms operate. They, in turn, might influence or be influenced by other governments or intergovernmental agencies, such as the International Labour Organization, the United Nations and The World Bank. North American and European consumers have recently become much more interested and informed regarding overseas labour practices in the apparel and footwear industry. They have the ability to act individually, through boycotts, or through participation in advocacy organizations. These actions influence the decisions of MNCs within the system since their very existence depends on consumers and their opinions .

This exercise of moral imagination concerning labour practices and the alteration in the conception of global labour systems, occurred at both Nike and Adidas-Salomon.

Detailed examination of these cases will illustrate the practice of moral imagination at the systems level, as well as the individual and organizational levels.

NOTES:

*1 Karl Schoenberger, Levi’s Children: Coming to Terms with Human Rights in the Global Marketplace (New York: Atlantic Monthly

Press, 2000)

*2 Gerald M.Weinberg, An Introduction to General Systems Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1975)

4. Discussion

Describe a fundamental feature of globalisation.

When and where did outsourcing of goods start to take place?

 What is a “free-trade” zone?

What are the advantages of outsourcing?

On what grounds did the apparel and footwear industry start considering regulations for the protection of human rights?

 What does Gerald Weinberg’s description of a “systems theory” consist in?

What was the original conception of footwear corporations regarding labour

 workers in developing countries?

What is happening today?

 From what you have analysed in this reading, discuss “moral imagination” as you understand it.

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5. Case Study: Nike

Nike has sorted out all its problems regarding global labour practices and has made significant changes as a result of an exercise of moral imagination at the individual, organizational and systems level.

Nike was founded in 1964 by Philip H. Knight. Knight remains Nike’s Chairman and

CEO today. Nike, based in Beaverton, Oregon, has more than 22,000 employees and over

800 contract suppliers in about 52 countries throughout the world. The company employs more than 550,000 workers who manufacture sports and fitness footwear, apparel, equipment and accessories for worldwide distribution. Approximately 175 million pairs of shoes are manufactured each year for Nike, contributing in part to Nike’s annual revenue for 2001, which totalled almost 10 billion dollars. Nike’s Code of Conduct, first sent out to manufacturers in 1992 binds all its contract manufacturers and requires that all

“manufacturing partners must post this Code in all major workspaces, translated into the language of the worker, and must endeavour to train workers on their rights and obligations as defined by the Code and applicable labour laws.*1

In 1998, journalists began to focus their attention on wage law violations in Nike’s

Jakarta, Indonesia suppliers. The United States Agency for International Development funded a large-scale survey to document wage law violations; that survey was subsequently supported by a study of the Indonesian shoe industry. When Nike first entered Vietnam, its critics claimed that Nike was paying its workers wages that left them impoverished, even by

Vietnamese standards. In addition to wage-related concerns, during the first two years after

Nike entered Vietnam, the New York Times reported that a factory official had been convicted of physically abusing workers and another was under indictment for similar behaviour. Countless protests resulted in support of these workers but Nike’s response – despite the existence of their Code of Conduct for contract manufacturers – was that the workers and their working conditions were not their responsibility.

During this time in its history it is difficult to conclude that Nike regarded the actual welfare of its construct workers as a significant priority. It was not until July 1998 that

Knight publicly accepted responsibility on behalf of Nike for many of the issues facing its suppliers.*2 This was the first time that Nike, at the individual or corporate level, accepted this level of responsibility. Nike began to establish for itself goals and purposes, as well as a prioritization of those objectives with regard to traditional concepts of profit maximization.

In a speech delivered at the National Press Club that evidenced Nike’s capacity for productive imagination, Knight accepted responsibility and established six initiatives for the firm:

Increase the minimum age of new footwear factory workers to 18 and the minimum for all other new light-manufacturing workers (apparel, accessories, equipment) to

16.

Adopt the personal exposure limits (PEL) of the US Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) as the standard for indoor air quality for all footwear

 factories.

Fund university research and open forums to explore issues related to global manufacturing and responsible business practices.

Expand worker education programmes, including middle and high school equivalency courses, for workers in all Nike footwear factories.

Increase support of its current micro-enterprise loan programme to 1,000 families each in Vietnam, Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand; expand its current independent monitoring programmes to include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations and educational institutions.

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 Involve NGOs in the process of factory monitoring, with summaries released to the public.*3

A rethinking of its previous attitudes regarding their responsibility to contract workers represented a significant change in policy for Nike and produced a ripple effect through the apparel and footwear industry.

However, some critics accused Knight of not including several other commitments, including the protection against whistle-blowers within the factories; a Nike-directed worker rights education programme; a guarantee of living wages and reasonable working hours; and the protection of workers’ rights to freedom of association.*4

NOTES.

*1 Nike, “Code of Conduct” Available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=compliance&subcat=code

*2 “nike Revies Challenges and Successes of Corporate Responsibility Initiatives” Available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/pressrelease.jhtml?year=2001&month=05&letter=g

; see also Phil Knight, “New Labour Initiatives,

May 12, 1998” Available at http://cbae.nmsu.edu/^dboje/NIKphilspeech.html

*3 Ibid.

*4 Tim Connor, Still waiting for Nike to do it (San Francisco, CA: Global Exchange 2001). Available at http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/corporations/nike/stillwaiting.html

5. Discussion

Give a short description of Nike Corporation

 What does Nike’s Code of Conduct consist in?

What did the critics accuse Nike of doing within the corporation’s shoe industry in Vietnam?

 In accepting responsibility for the violations of workers’ rights, what initiatives did the corporation adopt to overcome this problem?

Explain the following expression in your own words: “…produced a ripple effect through the apparel and footwear industry”.

What do critics accuse Nike of not doing today?

6. Case Study: Adidas-Salomon

Adidas-Salomon has been outsourcing in Asia for over 30 years, originally with

German managers using Asian agents to develop partnerships. Asia currently represents the most important source of both footwear and apparel for Adidas-Salomon, with 227 of its total of 328 first-tier supplier factories in Asia and 40 of its total of 242 second tier supplier factories in Asia. These supplier factories are located in Cambodia, China, Hong Kong,

India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Philippines,

Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, thus representing a very wide geographic area, one that encompasses significant economic, social, political and cultural differences.

Adidas-Salomon, formerly called Adidas, was founded in 1949 and named after its founder Adolf Dassler. It primarily produces athletic shoes, apparel lines and sports equipment. The company was nearly bankrupt until it shifted production to Asia in the early

1980s and strengthened its budget for marketing.

In the 1990s, the company shifted from being primarily a manufacturing company to a marketing company, getting most of its production from contractors.

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Contrary to the evolution of Nike’s reformulation of system boundaries, the origins of

Adidas’ attention to these issues of working conditions and treatment of workers, developed during the 1990s as it shifted its orientation from that of a marketing company, thereby causing a shift of most of its production to outside contractors.

While Adidas-Salomon makes up only a small percentage of many of the apparel factories’ business, most of its footwear suppliers produce almost exclusively for Adidas-

Salomon. This allows them greater leverage in those circumstances to request modifications with regard to labour practices or issues surrounding safety, health and the environment.

However, Adidas-Salomon states that “outsourcing supply does not mean outsourcing social responsibility”.*

The general director for Adidas-Salomon – North America, Susheela Jayapal, is generally credited with having spearheaded the establishment of the Standards of

Engagement (SoE) at the corporate level in 1997 – witnessing not only an individual capacity for an awareness of the particular, but also an individual capacity for productive imagination. Interest in developing these standards stemmed from a controversy regarding the use of child labour in stitching soccer balls in Pakistan that tarnished the reputations of several firms in the sporting goods and apparel industry, including Adidas-Salomon. Around

1997, Adidas-Salomon, along with Nike and Reebok, were identified in the popular media as violating child labour standards in the production of their soccer balls. These companies or their direct contractors did not directly employ the child workers. They were employed by subcontractors, who, as was customary in the production of soccer balls, performed the stitching operations. Although Nike received more criticism in the United States, Adidas

Salomon, as a European company, was more heavily criticized in Europe.

This episode was viewed as an embarrassment to the company; and the use of child labour in its products was an unsavoury labour practice that conflicted with company values and principles. As a result, Adidas-Salomon worked together with Nike, Reebok, and the nongovernmental organization (NGO), Save the Children , to put an end to the illegal use of child labour in this operation. This resolution also involved efforts to ensure that these children went to school – linking Adidas’ purpose with its priorities in an effort to extend and enhance its stakeholder boundaries. They compensated the children and their families for lost income and guaranteed the children employment at the completion of schooling and the attainment of legal working age. In addition, an effort was made to move subcontracting out of home-based workshops into factory-based stitching centres where use of child labour could more easily be prevented.

After this experience, a proposal was made to establish the Standards of Engagement throughout the system rather than just at the organizational level. The proposed SoE were approved quickly by the Board of Directors of Adidas-Salomon, chaired by CEO Robert

Louis-Dreyfus, and went into effect in 1998. The SoE were established with the aim of ensuring that all Adidas suppliers’ factories are safe, fair places to work. Updated in 2001, the SoE are patterned along the model code of conduct of the World Federation of Sporting

Goods Industries and reflect attention to the following labour, safety, health and environmental issues:

Forced labour

Child labour

Discrimination

Wages and benefits

Hours of work

Freedom of Association and collective bargaining

Disciplinary practices

Environmental requirements

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Community involvement

In an effort to constantly reassess its system-wide efforts at boundary extensions,

Adidas is involved with the Fair Labour Organisation (FLO). The FLA evaluates the performance of member firms as corporate entities in terms of their handling of health, safety, environment and labour issues within their supply chain factories. In addition,

Adidas-Salomon has contracted with NGOs such as Verité to provide external monitoring of conditions in contract factories. Public awareness of the compliance work they are doing with their international suppliers has been enhanced by the publication of an annual Social and Environmental Report beginning in 2001, a first for the apparel and footwear industry.

NOTES.

Adidas-Salomon, “Our World:Social and Environmental Report 2000” (Herzogenaurach, Germany: adidas-Salomon, 2001), 22-23.

6. Discussion

Give a short profile of Adidas-Salomon.

Why were the SoE developed?

Were companies like Reebok. Nike and Adidas-Salomon direct employers of child workers? Discuss.

What was the result of this embarrassing episode for Adidas-Salomon?

 How did the corporations and the NGO “Save the Children” proceed to end illegal use of child labour?

What are the aims of the Standards of Engagement?

What does the code of conduct of the World Federation of Sporting Goods

Industries consist in?

 What is the responsibility of the Fair Labour Organisation ?

Discuss the different ways in which Adidas-Salomon has decided to cooperate with other entities in order to safeguard workers’ rights.

7. The Future of Sweatshops

There are a number of important commonalities in the case studies discussed in the previous reading. These commonalities provide insight into the function and evolution of moral imagination in decision-making at the individual, organizational and systems levels.

The exercise of moral imagination as demonstrated in these cases suggests a diminishing future for sweatshops.

First, both cases illustrate the importance of moral imagination at the individual or managerial level. After being confronted by criticism of the treatment of workers in their respective offshore contract factories, each executive became engaged in a process of retrospective recreation of past practices. They sought to determine what practices would have precluded criticism of their treatment of contract workers. They then produced a revised set of policies for dealing with contract workers in order to avoid future criticism.

Second, both cases illustrate the importance of embracing moral imagination at the organizational level. Today, MNCs have well defined internal decision structures that provide an internal mechanism for enforcing workplace standards. The internal decision structure of an organization comprises offices and levels of responsibility, together with the rules that allow managers to differentiate between corporate-level decisions and the decisions of individual employees. Nike and Adidas have both demonstrated a willingness

35

to envision and actualize the novel, morally justifiable possibilities that their individually empowered managers and other decision-makers have created or imagined.

Third, both cases illustrate the importance of moral imagination at the systems level.

In both instances, these organizations recognized and even helped to engineer an expansion of their systems sphere to include additional, previously ignored, stakeholders. From the original conception of a vertical supply chain where brands were responsible only for their own employees, these two firms re-orientated their concept of accountability to include secondary and sometimes even tertiary stakeholders, such as contractor employees or their families. To that end, Nike and Adidas actively engaged in rebuilding and redefining the relationships they had with their contractors to include codes of conduct, monitoring, working with the contractors to assist them in meeting the code requirements and terminating relationships if they did not meet these standards. In addition, both firms established relationships with worker groups and labour advocacy organizations to ensure a clear line of communication that would not be impeded by a sole link to the contractor.

Initial efforts at corrective moral imagination were driven mainly by negative publicity. A purely strategic response fails when subjected to close, public scrutiny. A reaction that will bear up to public scrutiny is one that takes seriously the basic rights of workers. Knight and Jayapal appear to have initiated a process at both Nike and Adidas where relevant employees were asked to imagine a world in which the rights of contract workers were respected. At the organizational level, this effort resulted in the exercise of productive imagination. Managers at Nike and Adidas were empowered to evaluate the practices of contract factories in order to determine whether labour practices at those factories were consistent with respect for workers’ rights and to be creative and effective in their responses where they were not.

The evolution of the exercise of moral imagination appears to have proceeded to the level of what Kekes terms “exploratory” moral imagination and what Werhane terms a “capacity for creativity.”

Sweatshops in the apparel and footwear industry have not been eliminated. They are still common throughout the developing world and major obstacles to their elimination remain. For example, some MNCs may claim that lower margins and smaller revenue streams limit their ability to ensure that the basic rights of workers are respected. And even companies such as Nike and Adidas do not yet appear to have made significant progress on the question of a living wage. In other words, significant progress could be made if Nike and

Adidas would take two important steps. First, agree to a context-specific method for determining a living wage in individual countries. Second, use this method to show that they are paying a living wage, or raise wages so that the minimum living wage is met.*

However, it is hoped that the corporate programmes will provide positive models for individuals and corporations that wish to exercise moral imagination in the service of humanity. As a result, there could be hope towards a diminishing future for sweatshops globally.

( Adopted from: “Moral Imagination and the Future of Sweatshops” by Denis G.Arnold and Laura P.Hartman; Business and Society Reviews 108: 4 425 – 46)

NOTES:

Arnold and Bowie, “Sweatshops and Respect for Persons”, 233-34.

7. Discussion

How does the exercise of moral imagination diminish the future for sweatshops?

How have Nike and Adidas-Salomon contributed to rebuilding relationships with their contractors?

36

Discuss the link between moral imagination and productive imagination.

How have Nike and Adidas worked towards this goal?

What obstacles exist today in the attempt to eliminate sweatshops? abroad = all’estero absolute rights = diritto incontestabile

GLOSSARY

abstract = (agg) astratto; ( n). riassunto; sommario; (leg) estratto; to abstract = estrarre; ricavare; sottrarre

access = accesso; entrata

accession = entrata; ascesa (al trono); accessione (leg); adesione (partito)

accessory = accessorio

accord = accordo; trattato; consenso; to accord = accordare; concedere; mettere d?accordo

accountability = responsabilità

accountable = responsabile; spiegabile; giustificabile

acknowledgement = riconoscimento; ammissione;

activist = attivista

to actualize novel = realizzare, attuare la novità;

address = (n) indirizzo; to address = (v) indirizzare; rivolgere la parola

adherence = devozione; fedeltà

to administrate = amministrare; gestire

administration = amministrazione;

administrative = amministrativo

to adopt = adottare; approvare

adoption = adozione;

advisory = consultivo; advisory committee = comitato consultivo

advocate = avvocato

to aim at = rivolgere; aspirare; mirare

alert = (n) vigile, essere all’erta, to alert = mettere in guardia

alien = straniero

allegiance = fedeltà; lealtà; devozione to allocate = stanziare; assegnare; distribuire; ripartire to allure = allettare; lusingare; affascinare; sedurre al-Qaeda = movimento integralista islamico con obiettivi terroristici ancestor = antenato; avo ancestral = ancestrale annual revenue = reddito annuale antiethical = anti-etico apparel = abbigliamento apparel line = linea di abbigliamento appea l = appello; attrazione; to appeal = fare appello; implorare; appellarsi; fare ricorso to argue = ragionare; argomentare; sostenere; discutere; denotare;indicare; argument = argomento; ragione; discussione; dibattito to arise = sorgere; nascere to arise from = risultare; derivare armed conflict = conflitto armato

Asian Tigers = i potenti delle nazioni asiatiche

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assembly = assemblea; camera parlamentare assessment = valutazione; stima; accertamento assimilation = assimilazione; assorbimento; incorporazione asylum seeker = richiedente di asilo politico atlanticist = fautore dell’atlantismo; sintonia verso i paesi atlantici, più specificamente i paesi del Nord America atlanticist bias = pregiudizio in favore dell’atlantismo atlanticist ideology = ideologia che richiama l’atlantismo authoritarian = autoritario; dispotico; assolutista authoritarianism = ; dispotismo awareness = consapevolezza backlash = reazione di ritorsione; balance = equilibrio; ragguaglio; conguaglio; saldo; to balance = equilibrare; fare quadrare

ban = proibizione; interdizione; to ban = vietare; interdire; proibire

bankrupt = fallito; insolvente; to go bankrupt = andare in fallimento soprattutto

economico; bankruptcy = fallimento

banner = bandiera; vessillo; striscione

barrier = barriera; customs barriers = barriere doganali

to bebased on = basato; fondato

basic education = livello di istruzione essenziale p.es il diploma della terza media

basic human rights = diritti umani fondamentali

basic needs = esigenze essenziali dell’uomo che comprende nutrizione e riparo

basic non-food needs = esigenze essenziali dell’uomo che comprende riparo e cautela sanitaria

basic rights = diritti essenziali

bearing = influenza; effetto

behavioural = comportamentale

belief = fede; credenza; fiducia

to believe = credere

to berate = rimproverare

beyond = oltre; al di la; beyond the bounds = oltre le frontiere; oltre i limiti

bias = pregiudizio; inclinazione

bill of rights = decreto legge sui diritti (UK)

billion = miliardo

to bind = legare; collegare; trattenere; tenere unito

binding = impegnativo; vincolante

Board of Directors = Consiglio di Amministrazione

border = frontiera; margine; estremità; limite

bourgeoisie = la borghesia che secondo la teoria di Marx rappresenti la classe sociale media e benestante, parte del sistema capitalistico

to boycott = boicottare; creare ostruzionismo

brand = marchio

breadwinner = chi recepisce un guadagno per se e per la propria famiglia

to break away = allontanarsi; distaccarsi

to break free = liberarsi

to bring into focus = evidenziare; sottolineare (anche in termini astratti)

budget = bilancio preventivo; stima

to burn at the stake = essere condannato al rogo

campaign = campagna (politica, militare, pubblicitaria)

candidacy = candidatura

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capital mobility = movimento del capitale

care services = servizi sociali

case = caso; condizione; causa (leg); casistica case study = casistica

central executive officer = alto funzionario aziendale; alto dirigente aziendale

chador = velo utilizzato da donne dell’Islam che rendono esclusivamente visibile gli occhi

to chair = insediare; scegliere come presidente; presiedere

chairman = presidente (di azienda)

challenge = sfida

chancellor = cancelliere; alto funzionario; Lord Chancellor = equivale al presidente della corte di cassazione

Charter of Fundamental Rights = Statuto Fondamentale dei Diritti Umani

chief = capo; commandante; condottiero

child labour = lavoro minorile

childcare = cura dei minori

childcare coverage = copertura, servizi per la cura dei minori

childrearing = puericultura

circumstances = circostanze; condizioni

to circumvent = circonvenire; circuire; aggirare (un ostacolo); eludere (leg)

citizen = cittadino

citizenship = cittadinanza

civilization = civiltà

to claim = chiedere; esigere; rivendicare; affermare; asserire; sostenere;

clichè = luogo comune; affermazione banale, scontata

climate = clima (fig); ambiente (fig)

coast = (n) costa, litorale; coastal = (agg) litorale

coercion = coercizione; costrizione; imposizione

cogency = forza di persuasione; urgenza

Cold War = la guerra fredda

collapse = crollo; rovina; scoraggiamento

collective territory = territorio comune (con medesimi regolamenti, esenzione tasse, ecc

p.es Europa)

to come into = entrare; entrare in possesso; ereditare

to come to terms = venire a patti

commercial flows = afflusso, movimento commerciale

commitment = impegno; promessa

commodity = merce; articoli; prodotti

commodity owner = proprietario della merce, del prodotto, dell’articolo

common market = mercato comune (con particolare riferimento all’Europa)

commonality = gente comune; il popolo

communal solidarity = solidarietà pubblica

communication = comunicazione

competition = concorrenza

compliance = arrendevolezza; consenso; adesione; remissività; in compliance with =

secondo; in conformità di

comprehensive = tutto incluso; ampio; termine lato

concept = concetto; idea; nozione

conception = concepimento;

conceptual = concettuale;

concern = interesse; affare; preocupazione;sollecitudine

to confer = conferire; assegnare; consultarsi

39

to confine = limitare; restringere;

to conflate = combinare; mettere insieme

conflation = combinazione; fusione

conflict = conflitto; lotta

to conform = adattare; concordare; corrispondere

to confront = affrontare; confrontarsi

connection = collegamento; nesso; rapporto;

consensus = accordo ; consenso

Conservative Party = Conservatori (partito di centrodestra nel Regno Unito)

conspicuous = evidente ; cospicuo ; notevole

constituent = costituente ; constituent assembly = assemblea costituente

to constitute = costituire ; formare ; stabilire ; comporre

constitution = costituzione

constitutional treaty = il trattato sottoscritto per salvaguardare i termini legali di un sistema (EU)

constitutive = costitutivo ; formativo

constraint = costrizione ; limitazione ; restrizione

to construct = costruire; comporre; formulare

consumer = consumatore; utente

contract factory = fabbrica con appalto

contractor = appaltatore

convention = convenzione; assemblea (pol); accordo; patto

corporate = aziendale;

corporation = azienda

costly = costoso

council = consiglio

countenance = approvazione; sostegno; appoggio

counterpoint = contrappunto; contrapposizione

cross-border = attraverso le frontiere

cross-party = attraverso i partiti

current = attuale

currently = attualmente

custom = costume; tradizione; dogana

to deal with = trattare; occuparsi di

debate = dibattito; discussione

debt = debito; obbligo (fig)

decision –making = decisionale

decision-maker = colui che prende decisioni

decision-making body = enti con poteri decisionali

deficiency = carenza; difetto; Mancanza

demands = richiesta; esigenza; pretesa; rivendicazione

to deny = negare; smentire; rifiutare

deprivation = privazione; perdita; destituzione

deputy = vice; delegato; sostituto

designed to = progettato per; designato per; inteso per

destination country = terra di adozione

to devastate = devastare; distruggere; rovinare; saccheggiare

developing countries = nazioni in via di sviluppo

dire level = livello estremo (mass o min)

disabled people = persone diversamente abili

discord = disaccordo; divergenza; dissenso

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disparity = differenza

display = (n) dimostrazione, esposizione; (v) dimostrare, esporre

dispute = (n) controversia; (v) discutere; contendere

domestic judgements = verdetti domestici, locali

domestic labour market = locale mercato di lavoro

domestic law = legge locale, domestica

draft = (n) schema; bozza ;(v) disegnare, redigere

to draw out = trarre; durare

to draw up = compilare; redigere

to be driven by = spinto da; costretto

drug dealing = spaccio di droga dual = doppio

dual citizenship = doppia cittadinanza

dual-earner = doppio stipendio p.es dual-earner family = doppia entrata

duty = dovere; obbligo;

earnings = guadagni; profitti; utili

ease = facilità; agevolezza

effectiveness = efficacia; efficienza

egalitarian = egualitario

elderly = anziano

electoral law = legge elettorale

electoral office = ufficio elettorale

electoral system = sistema elettorale

elites = élite; fior fiore

emerging needs = esigenze in crescita

to emphasise = accentuare

empire = impero

to employ = assumere; dare lavoro

employee = impiegato; dipendente

employee welfare = previdenza per il lavoratore

employer = datore di lavoro

employment = impiego; occupazione

employment rights = diritti del lavoratore

empowerment = conferimento di potere

to enable = rendere capace; autorizzare

to enact = decretare; sancire; ordinare; promulgare

to encompass = circondare ; attorniare

to encourage = incoraggiare

to endevour = sforzarsi ; tentare

to endorse = sottoscrivere; approvare; sanzionare

ends = (n) fini; obiettivi; to end = (v) finire; terminare

to enforce = rafforzare ; sostenere ; costringere ; imporre

engagement = impegno

to enhance = aumentare ; accrescere

to enlarge = ingrandire; allargare

to entertain = intrattenere ; nutrire (un idea); covare

entrenchment = trinceramento ; fortificazione

entrepreneur = imprenditore

entrepreneurship = imprenditoria

environment = ambiente ; dintorni

to envisage = immaginare ; prevedere

41

equal opportunities = pari opportunità

equal terms = diritti paritari

equal treatment = trattamento paritario

equivalency courses = corsi di equipolenza

establishment = fondazione; costituzione; sistema; classe dirigenziale

ethos = ethos; costume; norma di vita

europeanisation = europeizzazione

europeanism = europeismo

euroscepticism = euroscetticismo

eurozone = eurozona

exchange = scambio ; cambio

exchequer = erario; finanze; fondi

to exert = esercitare; applicare

expenditure = spesa ; consumo

to exploit = sfruttare

extraneous = estraneo; non pertinente

to face = affrontare; fare fronte a

factory = fabbrica

factual = effettivo; reale

to fail = fallire

fall-out = ricaduta; rinuncia; (fig) derivato; inatteso

family providers = coloro che provvedono al sostenimento della famiglia

farmer = fattore

fathering = assumersi la responsabilità paterna

to favour = favorire; in favour of = essere in favore di

feature = caratteristica; aspetto

federal chamber = camera federale

field study = ricerca sul campo

findings = scoperte

firm = ditta; società

to flee = fuggire; abbandonare

flows = flusso; corrente

to focus on = concentrare; fare convergere

to follow suit = comporarsi come l’altro; fare lo stesso

footwear = calzature

forced labour = lavoro forzato

foreign policy = politica estera

foundation = fondazione; fondamento; base

frame = cornice; composizione; forma

framework = composizione; inquadratura

free choice = libera scelta

free movements rights = diritti al movimento libero

free trade zone = area di libero commercio

freedom = libertà

freedom of association = libertà di associazione

friction = attrito; disaccordo

frictionless = privo di attrito; disaccordo

full-time = a tempo pieno;

fund = fondo; stanziamento

gender balance = equilibrio fra i generi (maschile/femminile)

gender equality = uguaglianza fra i generi (maschile/femminile)

42

gender role differentiation = differenziazione di ruolo (maschile/femminile)

gendered = generato

general director = direttore generale

global labour practices = procedure di lavoro globale

goal = obiettivo

to grant = (v) accordare; concedere; (n) concessione; assegnazione

growing = in aumento, crescente

growing demand = richiesta maggiore, aumentata richiesta

growth = crescita

to hamper = impedire; intralciare

to haunt = ossessionare; tormentare

headscarf = copertura per la testa (es) per le donne musulmane

health = salute; sanità

heritage = eredità; hierarchy = gerarchia

high tax-orientated = orientamento verso l’aumento di tasse

to highlight = sottolineare; evidenziare

hijab = copertura di capo per donne musulmane

host-country = la nazione ospitante

hound = inseguire; perseguitare

household = famiglia, (agg) familiare; domestica

human capital = capitale umano

human rights = diritti umani

hunger = fame

hyperglobalism = iperglobalismo

imbalance = squilibrio; sbilancio

to impinge = interferire; invadere; violare

implementation = adempimento; compimento; effettuazione

implication = implicazione; coinvolgimento

to imply = implicare; racchiudere

to impose = imporre; disturbare, imporre la propria presenza

to impoverish = impoverire; immiserire

to imprison = imprigionare; (fig) confinare, limitare, restringere

imprisonment = reclusione; imprigionamento

in terms of = secondo;

income = entrate; reddito

incorporate = incorporato; unito; associato

incorporation = incorporazione; costituzione, associazione; fusione

to increase = (v) aumentare; incrementare; (n) aumento; incremento

indictment = accusa; incriminazione

individual rights = diritti individuali

industrial relations = relazioni industriali

input = introduzione; immissione

to inscribe = iscrivere; incidere

insight = intuito

instruments = strumenti; mezzi

interchangeable = interscambiabili

to interconnect = collegare; connettere

interconnection = collegamento; connessione

interdependance = interdipendenza

intergovernmental = intergovernativo

43

interventionist = interventista

issue = questione; problema; controversia

jeopardy = azzardo; rischio; pericolo

judicial = giudiziale; giudiziario; imparziale

junk dealer = rigattiere

juridical = giuridico; legale

juvenile = giovanile; minorile

key boundary = frontiera strategica

key role = ruolo chiave

keynesian = che segue la teoria di Keynes

kippah = turbante usato da cultura musulmana

labour = lavoro; impresa

labour abuse = abuso della forza lavoro

labour force = forza lavoro

labour market = il mercato del lavoro

Labour Party = il partito laburista (nel Regno Unito)

labour practice = procedura, esecuzione del lavoro

labourer = lavoratore

lack of = mancanza di; scarsità; difetto

landowner = proprietario terriero

landownership = la proprietà terriera

large-scale = in grande, su vasta scala

latent = latente; nascosto; potenziale

law-making = l’atto del legiferare

to lay claim = pretendere; rivendicare

League of Nations = Lega delle Nazioni

leave provisions = provvedimenti di congedo

legacy = lascito; imposta

to legislate = legiferare

leverage = moltiplicazione; autorità; influenza; potere

life-style = stile di vita

light-manufacturing = produzione leggera

load = carico; peso

loan = prestito

local meetings = riunioni locali

localisms = provincialismo; campanilismo

to locate = localizzare

Lombard League = Lega Lombarda

long-term = a lunga scadenza

low margin = quota minima

lower assembly = camera parlamentare

Maastricht Treaty = il Trattato di Maastricht

major flows = flusso, corrente maggiore

majority vote = voto maggioritario

to manage = riuscire; amministrare; gestire

management = amministrazione; gestione

to manufacture = fabbricare, produrre

manufacturing = fabbricazione; produzione

manufacturing company = impresa di produzione

market = mercato

market agenda = agenda di mercato

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market citizenship = cittadinanza di mercato

market demand = esigenza di mercato

market driven = gestito dal mercato

market integration = integrazione del mercato

market niche = nicchia del mercato

marketing company = impresa di mercato

maternity leave = permesso di maternità

means = mezzi

measures = misure; provvedimenti

medical neglect = malasanità

medicine man = medico

member state = stato membro

membership = appartenenza; socio

merger = fusione

Ministry for Equal Opportunities = Ministero delle Pari Opportunità

minority groups = gruppi di minoranza

mixed system = sistema misto; coalizione

multinational corporations = società multinazionali

Muslim = musulmano

national provision = provvedimento nazionale

nazi = nazista

needs = esigenze; bisogni

nongovernmental organizations = organizzazioni non governative

obligations = obbligazioni; doveri; impegni

to obstruct = ostruire; impedire; ostacolare

obstruction = ostacolo; impedimento

offshore = lontano dalla costa; all’estero

on behalf of = per conto di

one-parent family = famiglia composta da un genitore

opposing position = posizione contraria; al contrario

to optimize = ottimizzare, essere ottimista

ostensibly = in modo apparente, evidente

outcome = risultato; esito

output = produzione; utile; rendimento

to outsource = estendere la propria produzione fuori dalla realtà locale

outsourcing = produzione fuori dalla realtà locale

overload = sovraccarico

overseeing = sorveglianza; ispezione

oversight = svista; sbaglio; omissione; sorveglianza

overtime = lavoro straordinario

pace = passo; andatura

paid employment = impiego retribuito

panel = lista; elenco; sezione

parental = genitoriale

parenthood = genitorialità

particularist = fautore del particolarismo

partner = socio

partnership = società

party lists = liste di partito

party-list system = sistema di liste di partito

pay = retribuzione

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pay entitlement = diritto retributivo

payroll = busta paga

peer = coetaneo

point of entry = zona di entrata

point of view = punto di vista; posizione

policy = politica; linea di condotta

poll = urna

pool = ammasso; pool; consorzio

populous = densamente popolato

to portray = dimostrare; rappresentare

pound = lira britannica

poverty rate = indice di povertà

press = stampa

to prevail = prevalere; avere la meglio

primarily = principalmente; soprattutto

prior = antecedente; precedentemente

productive imagination = immaginazione produttiva

profit maximation = l’aumentare dei profitti

provision = provvedimento; misura

public awareness = consapevolezza pubblica

public discussion = discussione pubblica

public health = sanità pubblica

public office = ufficio pubblico

public order = ordine pubblico

public recognition = riconoscimento pubblico

public support = sostegno pubblico

to publicise = pubblicizzare

to pursue = perseguire; portare innanzi; attendere a

pursuit = ricerca

quality education = alta istruzione

random = casuale; fortuito

range = gamma; assortimento

to range from = estendere; variare; oscillare

to realize = realizzare; rendersi conto

reasoning = ragionamento; argomentazione

recovery = ripresa; recupero

to redress = (v) raddrizzare, ristabilire; (n) compensazione, risarcimento

reform agenda = agenda della riforma

regent = re; reggente

regional blocs = blocchi regionali

regionalism = regionalismo

to reject = respingere; rifiutare

rejection = rifiuto

to relate = riferire; riportare; collegare; connettere

to relate to = riferire a; riguardare

relation = in rapporto a

relationship = rapporto resource = risorsa

to restrict = limitare

restriction = limitazione

to retain = trattenere; conservare; sostenere

46

revenue = entrata; reddito

review = rivista; esame

right = diritto

right to vote = diritto di voto

to rise up= aumentare; accrescere

role = ruolo

role acquisition = acquisizione di ruolo

role-structure = struttura di ruolo

Roma = rom

root= radice; origine; causa

routine matter = fatto di routine, quotidiano

rule = regola; norma

running = gestione

to safeguard = salvaguardare; difendere; tutelare

safety = sicurezza; incolumità

safety standards = livelli di sicurezza

sample = esemplare; campione

scrap metal = rottami di ferro

secularism = laicismo

to seek shelter = rifugiarsi

self-centred model = modello centrato su se stesso

self-determination = auto determinazione

to settle= decidere; determinare; stabilire

sex-based quota = quota basata sulle differenze sessuali, p.es quota rosa

sexism = discriminazione sessuale

sex-quota = quota rosa

sexual exploitation = sfruttamento sessuale

shape = forma; modello; specie

shared values = valori azionari

sharing of responsibility = responsabilità suddivisa

shift = turno (di lavoro)

shopkeeper = proprietario del negozio

side-step = eludere; evitare

signatory states = stati firmatari

single currency = moneta unica

single-earner = monoreddito

site of controversy = fonte di controversia

skill = abilità

skilled = qualificato; specializzato

social rights = diritti sociali

social security rights = diritti di sicurezza sociale

societal = societario

sound = sano; solido; efficace; fondato

soundness = efficacia; buono stato

source = fonte, origine

sovereignty = potere supremo spearhead = essere in testa a; condurre

to split = dividere; spaccare

stakeholder = curatore; azionista; chi tiene le poste

to stand in elections = candidarsi alle politiche

standing = posizione; condizione; (buona) reputazione

47

statement = dichiarazione; affermazione; esposizione

statesman = statista

to stem from = derivare da; discendere da

stockholder = azionista

stream = corrente; flusso

to stress = (v) enfatizzare; (n) enfasi;

to strike = (v) scioperare; (n) sciopero

subcontractor = subappaltatore

subject = soggetto; argomento

subject to = predisposto a; sottoposto a

submission = sottomissione

to submit = sottoporre; presentare; affidare; rimettere

subtext = significato (senso) nascosto di un testo

to summarize = riassumere

summit = vertice

superstate = superstato

supplier = fornitore

to supply = fornire; provvedere a

supply chain system = sistema a catena di produzione

to support = (v) sostenere; (n) sostegno

support role = ruolo di sostentamento; di supporto; di mantenimento

supporter = sostenitore

survey = esame; ricerca

survivability = sopravvivenza

to sustain = sostenere; reggere; sopportare

sustainability = sostenibilità

sweatshop = sfruttamento del lavoratore

to take off = decollare; partire

to take the lead = condurre

to tap into = incidere; ottenere

to tarnish = offuscare

tax = tassa

tax cuts = taglio delle tasse; taglio fiscale

tax harmonisation = armonizzazione fiscale

tend = con tendenza a; inclinare; volgere

tendancy = con tendenza a ; disposizione; inclinazione

term = termine; rapporto; sessione

thatcherite = che riconduce al sistema politico adattato dalla ex-premier britannica,

Margaret Thatcher

third country = paese del terzo mondo

threat = minaccia;

to threaten = minacciare

threshold = soglia; limite

threshold conditions = condizioni limitate

to tie = (v) legare, unire; (n) vincolo, legame

tier = fila; ordine; chi lega

to toil = affaticarsi; faticare

top-down = dall’alto in basso

top-heavy = sbilanciato dall’alto

to trade = (v) commerciare; (n) commercio

trade union = sindacato

48

treaty = trattato

trend = andamento; tendenza; orientamento

ultimate = ulteriore; definitivo; finale

underdeveloped = in via di sviluppo

underlying = basilare; fondamentale

underpayment = retribuzione al di sotto della soglia legale

to underpin = minacciare

under-represented = rappresentato al di sotto della soglia legale

to undertake = intraprendere; assumere

uniform = uniforme; invariabile; costante

union = unione, alleanza; sindacato

unlawful = illegale; contro la legge

unsavoury = sgradevole; brutto

unskilled = manovalanza; non-specializzato

upper assembly = senato; assemblea superiore

vague = vago; incerto; indistinto

values approach = approccio valutativo

vertical supply chain = catena di produzione in verticale

wage = paga; retribuzione

wage law violations = violazioni della legge sulle retribuzioni

wage-related = collegato alla retribuzione

warrior = guerriero

web = rete; connessione

welfare = previdenza

welfare capitalism = capitalismo previdenziale

welfare citizenship = cittadinanza protetta dalla previdenza

welfare rights = diritti previdenziali

welfare state = lo stato sociale

whistle-blower = controllo illegale di un collega per denunciarlo al datore di lavoro (una delle pratiche del mobbing)

wide range = vasta gamma

will = volere; testamento

to withdraw = ritirare

withdrawal = ritiro

witness = testimone

working conditions = condizioni di lavoro

work-life balance = equilibrio lavoro-vita domestica

workplace = posto di lavoro

worldwide = in tutto il mondo

to yield = dare, produrre; concedere; rendere

youth = gioventùyouth worker = lavoratore giovanile

zipper system = sistema a chiusura intrecciato (fig)

ABBREVIATIONS

AD = Anno Domini (After Christ)

ASI = Adam Smith Institute

BBC = British Broadcasting Corporation

49

BC = Before Christ

BHPS = British Household Panel Study

BOC = British Opportunities Commission

BoD = Board of Directors

CAP = Common Agricultural Policy

CEO = Central Executive Officer

CEU = Central European Union

CFI = Court of the First Instance of the European Communities

CoC = Code of Conduct

CT = Constitutional Treaty

CUP = Cambridge University Press

EBRD = European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EC = European Community

EC = European Commission

ECB = European Central Bank

ECHR = European Convention on Human Rights

ECJ = European Court of Justice

EEA = European Environment Agency

EESC = European Economic and Social Committee

EIB = European Investment Bank

EMU = European Monetary Union

EOC = Equal Opportunities Commission

EP = European Parliament

ERA = European Research Area

ESDP = European Security and Defence Policy

ESF = European Social fund

EU = European Union

FAO = Food and Agricultural Association

FAQ = Frequently Asked Questions

FLO = Fair Labour Organization

GDP = Gross Domestic Product

GMO = Genetically Modified Organisms

GNP = Gross National Product

HRA = Human Rights Act

50

ICC = International Criminal Court

IGC = Intergovernmental Conference

ILO = International Labour Organization

IMF = International Monetary Fund

INA = Immigration and Nationality Act

IOM = International Organization for Immigration

MNC = Multinational Corporation

NASDAQ = National Association of Security Dealers Automatic Quotation System

NGO = Non Governmental Organization

NHS = National Health Service

OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSHA = Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OUA = Organization of African Unity

OUP = Oxford University Press

PEL = Personal Exposure Limits

PSC = Political and Security Committee

SDA = Sex Discrimination Act

SDP = Social Democratic Party

SEA = Single European Act

SEE = South East Europe

SGP = Stability and Growth Pact

SOCCARE = Social Care

SoE = Standards of Engagement

SPA = Social Policy Agreement

TEU = Treaty on European Union

UDHR = Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UK = United Kingdom

UNCRC = United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

UNGA = United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR = United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF = United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund

UNO = United Nations Organization

USA = United States of America

WEU = Western European Union

51

WFSGI = World Federation of Sporting Goods Industries

WTO = World Trade Organization

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INDEX

TITLE PAGE

ABSTRACT 1

Section One: Rights to Cultural Diversity and the European

Identity

1. The Right to Cultural Diversity

2. “European Identity” : An Emerging Concept

3. A Model of European Citizenship: Market Citizenship

4. The Convention on the Future of Europe and

the Constitutional Treaty

1

1

2

4

5

54

TITLE

Section Two: British Euroscepticism and the Global

Markets

1. British Conservatives and Globalization

2. Hyperglobalism, Intergovernmentalism

and Open Regionalism

3. Euroscepticism in other Nations

Section Three: European Legislation on Human Rights

1. A Theory of Human Rights

2. Open Markets versus Welfare Citizenship

3. Human Rights and Citizenship

4. Review by Emek M.Uçarer on Lydia Morris’

Managing

Migration: Civic Stratification on Migrants’ Rights

5. The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: South East Europe and the Universalist Theory

Section Four: Women’s Social and Working Rights In Europe

1. Socio-historical paths of the Male Breadwinner Model

2. Managing the Family and the “Male Veto”

3. Parity, Power and Representative Politics: Gender Equality in

Europe

4. The Headscarf Debate: French Law n° 2004 – 228 of 15

March 2004

PAGE

6

6

7

8

9

9

12

13

14

16

17

17

19

21

24

55

TITLE PAGE

Section Five: Violation of Human Rights: Children’s Rights in

South East Europe, Moral Imagination and Sweatshops

1. Children’s Rights in South East Europe

27

27

2. What is intended by Child Labour? 28

3. Moral Imagination 29

4. The Globalization of the Apparel and Footwear Industry System 30

5. Case Study – Nike 32

33 6. Case Study – Adidas-Salomon

7. The Future of Sweatshops

GLOSSARY

35

37

49 ABBREVIATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY 52

56

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