1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, as summarized by one of its chief proponents John Stuart Mill
(1806–73), is the moral theory that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” Therefore,
viewing matters as Mill would, Robin Hood is not immoral for stealing from the rich to
give to the poor, because in doing so he is able to produce more happiness in the world
than would have otherwise existed. Likewise, if I possess excess wealth, it would be
immoral of me to withhold that wealth from others for whom it would do more good. If,
for example, I am considering new shoes when my present pair is fully functional, I
should instead donate that excess wealth to famine relief. In both instances, Mill would
have the agent in question perform whichever available action would best reduce
unhappiness and promote happiness in the world.
Utilitarianism is generally understood to be the combination of two separate
moral theories. First, utilitarianism is a form of “consequentialism” since it holds that
the rightness or wrongness of an action depends solely upon the goodness or badness of
that action's consequences. Second, utilitarianism is a form of “welfarism” since it holds
that the goodness or badness of an action's consequences depends solely upon the amount
of happiness and unhappiness brought about by that action (i.e. the action's effect on
someone's welfare). Therefore, any argument for utilitarianism must aim to prove not
one, but two separate claims: a consequentialist “theory of the right” (i.e. what is right
and wrong) and a welfarist “theory of the good” (i.e. what is good and bad).
2. Argument for Utilitarianism
2a. Argument for a Welfarist Theory of Good
Anyone who has experienced happiness and suffering, realizes the unique
qualities of these two experiences. It isn't like experiencing red or a high-pitched sound.
Only the experience of happiness and suffering strikes us as being “good” or “bad”. In
fact, it seems plausible that we wouldn't even have the ideas “good” and “bad” unless we
were beings that experience happiness and suffering. For example, notice that you
couldn't ever communicate to a color-blind person what red is like. I have the idea of red
and know about red only because of my experience of red. Similarly, it seems like you
also couldn't communicate to someone who never experienced happiness or suffering the
ideas “good” and “bad”. Good just is happiness and suffering just is bad and that's why
our understanding of those ideas depends on our being creatures who can and have
experienced happiness and suffering.
Furthermore, everything else we think of as good or bad seems to ultimately
reduce to the goodness and badness of happiness and suffering. We think of things like
lies, betrayal, selfishness, etc. as bad, but when we think hard about it, we realize that
these things are only bad because they lead to more suffering in the world and less
happiness. We also think of things like courage, honesty, and selflessness, etc. as good,
but again only because these things tend to lead to happiness in the world rather than
suffering. This is all the more reason to think that what goodness and badness really
amount to, is simply happiness and suffering (i.e. increases and decreases in someone's
welfare). This support a monist theory of the good (“monist” = one; i.e. a theory where
all good and bad comes down to one thing), and specifically the welfarist theory of the
good (i.e. a theory where the one good is happiness and the one bad is suffering).
2b. Argument for a Consequentialist Theory of Right
Consequentialism is a very intuitive theory of right and wrong action. The idea is
that the right action (i.e. the action we should perform) is the one that brings about the
best consequences and that to perform any other action other than the one that would
bring about the best consequences is wrong (i.e. an action we shouldn't perform).
Consequentialism by itself never tells us what to do, since alone it doesn’t tell us what is
good and bad but only that we should try adding good to the world and eliminate bad. So
the consequentalist theory of the right must be combined with some theory of the good,
and Utilitarians combine it with the welfarist theory of the good we examined above.
Often arguments are not offered for consequentialism, because it is meant to be so
obviously true. After all, why wouldn’t you do what would bring about the most good in
the world? How could an action that brought about less good be the right action to
perform? If action 1 leads to there being more good and less bad in the world and action 2
leads to there being more bad and less good in the world, isn’t it obvious that action 1 is
the right action to perform and action 2 is the wrong action to perform?
While the consequentialist theory of the right does seem very obvious, there are
many worries we might have about it upon deeper reflection. After all, even if an action
would be the one available to us that brings about the most good and eliminates the most
bad, is it really always the case that it will be the right action to perform? Aren’t there
certain actions that are wrong no matter how much good they add to the world? A
deontologist theory of the right takes the opposite approach, arguing that consequences
have absolutely no relevance to the rightness or wrongness of an action (“deontotic” =
rule or law; e.g. Kantian Ethics). Instead, the deontologist argues that a right action is
one in accordance with the true moral rules and a wrong action is any action that violates
the true moral rules (for example, the Kantian Formula of Humanity; “Never treat
humanity whether in yourself or others as a mere means but always as an end in itself”).
The theory of right put forth by Virtue Ethics is more complicated. Virtue Ethics
holds that both consequences and rules matter for determining right and wrong. However,
since these often conflict, skills we can only acquire through experience are needed to
determine which actions are right or wrong.
2c. Argument for Utilitarianism
Once a Utilitarian has convinced us of both a welfarist theory of the good and a
consequentialist theory of the right, the argument for Utilitarianism is simple to construct:
Premise 1. Consequentialist Theory of the Right: An action is right for someone to
perform if and only if, of their available actions, it is the action that would maximize
total net good over bad in existence—otherwise the action is wrong.
Premise 2. Welfarist Theory of the Good: The only intrinsic good is someone's
happiness while the only intrinsic bad is someone's unhappiness.
Therefore,
Conclusion. Utilitarianism: An action is right for someone to perform if and only if,
of their available actions, it is the action that would maximize total net happiness over
unhappiness in existence—otherwise the action is wrong.
Essentially, the way this argument works is by the consequentialist theory of the right
telling us to do what maximizes good over bad and the welfarist theory of the good filling
in the missing detail about what counts as good and what counts as bad (specifically,
welfare; i.e. happiness and suffering). Once we combine these two, we Utilitarianism: do
what maximizes total happiness over suffering in the world.
3. Objections to Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is undeniably an attractive moral theory. Upon first hearing it,
Utilitarianism often strikes people as obviously true. However, upon further reflection,
many disturbing features become apparent. One of the most disturbing features of
Utilitarianism is that the theory seems to leave no room for justice (i.e. people’s rights
and a just distribution of good and bad to the deserving). That is, if I am morally
obligated to take all means available to me to maximize happiness and minimize
suffering, that might lead me to doing some pretty horrific seeming things to bring about
that greater good. For example, if the only demand morality makes is that I pursue
maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering, won’t I then sometimes be morally
required to sacrifice a few innocent people for the benefit of the many? Could I enslave a
few innocent people if once we compared their suffering and everyone else’s happiness it
turned out that by enslaving those people I increased the overall ratio of happiness to
suffering in the world? This might seem unfair, unjust, and a violation of these people’s
rights, but Utilitarianism doesn’t seem to have any place for worries about fairness,
justice, or rights. If enslaving a small number of people would bring about more
happiness and less suffering overall, it would seem like Utilitarianism would have to
endorse us enslaving that small number of people.
Now, maybe enslaving enslaving a small minority wouldn’t bring about more
overall happiness. Maybe we can produce more happiness by splitting up work more
evenly and trying to add to everyone’s happiness. So, maybe Utilitarianism can say that
slavery is wrong. However, slavery was only one illustration of the real worry that with
the exclusive focus on the greater good, Utilitarianism has no place for the rights of
people. If by violating someone’s rights I could contribute to the overall happiness and
reduce suffering, why wouldn’t I do so?
4. Rule Utilitarianism
a. Rule- and Act-Utilitarianism
One thing a utilitarian can do about objections from people concerned with
justice, fairness, and rights is by just rejecting all of these ideas as mistaken. This is, in
fact, what some utilitarians do. Jeremy Bentham very famously made this response to
worries about justice constraining our pursuit of a better world: “Natural rights are simple
nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts”
(I presume by “nonsense upon stilts” Bentham means high-minded nonsense).
However, other utilitarians think that a moral theory shouldn’t conflict with our
sense of justice, fairness, and what rights people hold. The trick for these utilitarians is
finding a way of making sense of these ideas in a way that can be combined with
Utilitarianism. Since Utilitarianism is all about obtaining a certain goal (i.e. more
happiness, less suffering), it is hard to see what reason a utilitarian could give for
restricting the way be pursue that goal by worrying about people’s rights.
One of the most prominent ways for a utilitarian to deal with objections stemming
from our concerns with justice is called “Rule-Utilitarianism”. Essentially, the idea
behind Rule-Utilitarianism is that even moral rules should be judged by how well they
increase happiness and decrease suffering. A helpful example to think about here is how
a utilitarian would normally handle charity. How much do you think a utilitarian would
say I should donate to famine relief as someone who lives a comfortable life in a firstworld nation? Probably as much as possible; say, 80-90% of my income. This is because
my money would bring about a great deal more happiness and eliminate a great deal
more suffering being used to fight famine than being used by me to buy a bigger
television or a second pair of shoes. So, initially, Utilitarianism seems to make the
following moral demand of me: “Donate 80-90% of your income to famine relief.”
The problem that the rule-utilitarian points out is that if morality demands that
people give 80-90% of their income, then people won’t give any percent of their income!
That is, if we demand too much, then people will feel overwhelmed by the task and just
give nothing. As a result, such a moral demand of people will actually generate more
suffering rather than less (since no one gives anything if morality demanded so much).
Which is to say, Utilitarianism seems to here be working against itself. Utilitarianism
says that morality demands 80-90% of our income in order to fight famine and reduce
suffering, but by demanding so much morality would ends up getting nothing and adding
to the suffering in the world.
Luckily, the rule-utilitarian has a solution. Given that the moral demand, “Donate
80-90% of your income to famine relief” ends up getting people to donate nothing,
morality should “self-correct” and make a demand that people actually will follow and
one that actually will reduce suffering and contribute happiness to the world. For
example, a moral demand like, “Donate 10% of your income to famine relief.” If this is
what morality demanded of us, argues the rule-utilitarian, people might actually adhere to
it and it might actually lead to there being less suffering and more happiness in the world.
So that’s the idea behind Rule-Utilitarianism: morality doesn’t demand that we act
to maximize happiness and minimize suffering (i.e. what we now call “ActUtilitarianism”). Instead, morality demands a list of other rules that have themselves
been picked by how well those rules as moral rules would maximize happiness and
minimize suffering. Which is to say, the goodness of happiness and the badness of
suffering doesn’t mean I am under the moral obligation to maximize happiness and
minimize suffering, instead the goodness of happiness and the badness of suffering means
that I am under the moral obligations that maximize happiness and minimize suffering.
The moral obligations are what we judge by the standard of happiness and suffering, not
our actions themselves. Our actions are then in turn judged by those moral obligations
that maximize happiness and minimize suffering.
So other than lowering our moral responsibility to donate to famine relief from
80-90% down to something more achievable like 10%, what else might RuleUtilitarianism change? Rule-Utilitarianism also holds out the possibility of answering the
objections some people have about Utilitarianism’s uneasy relationship with justice.
Consider the slavery example once again, could it ever be the case that by enslaving a
small number to serve the needs of the many that I could improve the overall amount of
happiness in the world and reduce the overall amount of suffering? It seems like it could
happen, and so perhaps Act-Utilitarianism would demand we enslave the minority in such
a situation. The Rule-Utilitarian, however, has a way out. After all, think of just two of
the problematic features that allowing slavery when it would benefit the greater good
might cause:
(1) People would abuse this allowance and enslave people for selfish reasons
while mistakenly thinking that it was for the greater good;
(2) Even if you were not enslaved, you would feel insecure because you knew that
morality demanded people be willing to sacrifice you at the drop of a hat for
the greater good (like the slaves).
The Rule-Utilitarian then tries to argue that by allowing slavery when it contributes to the
greater good, we ultimately end up hurting the greater good for reasons like the two listed
above. Better for the ratio of happiness to suffering in the world that we just adopt as a
rule something like, “No slavery” rather than allow slavery whenever we think it might
add to the greater good.
This is how Rule-Utilitarianism tries to “self-correct” Utilitarianism. By turning
the theory in on itself and judging the very demands Utilitarianism makes of us by how
well those demands (i.e. rules) contribute to the greater good. One command the ruleutilitarian would probably adjust is lowering the amount we are required to give to
charity since otherwise we aren’t likely to give anything. Another set of commands the
rule-utilitarian is probably going to add is a set dealing with fairness, justice, and people’s
rights in order to establish in people a sense of security and to prevent us from fearing
that at any time someone might come and sacrifice or use me to bring about some greater
good.
A rule-utilitarian is still clearly a utilitarian. They are still only concerned with
happiness and suffering and raising the amount of happiness while lowering the amount
of suffering. However, the rule-utilitarian just thinks the best way of increasing happiness
and decreasing suffering is doing so indirectly. If we do so directly, we end up issuing
commands no one will fulfill or commands that will just make everyone feel insecure or
commands that people will abuse, and so on. As a result, the rule-utilitarian argues,
morality consists of a set of moral rules to follow which themselves are justified by those
rules being the ones that maximize happiness and minimize suffering. When I want to
know what to do, then, I don’t see which of my actions might maximize happiness and
minimize suffering (“donate 80-90% to charity”), instead I look to the set of rules that I
think will maximize happiness and minimize suffering (“donate 10% to charity”).
b. Common Misunderstandings of Rule-Utilitarianism
As a final note, two misunderstandings about Rule-Utilitarianism should be
addressed. First, the rules do not come from any legislative body or general social
consensus. They are moral obligations that we have simply from the fact that happiness is
good and suffering is bad and that these obligations are the ones that maximize happiness
and minimize suffering. To determine which moral rules to follow, I need simply think
about what moral demands would accomplish this goal. For example, while some
demand to give to charity would obviously add to happiness and eliminate suffering, by
thinking about it I realize it can’t be too demanding if people are not going to be
discouraged by it and end up giving nothing. What the exact percent that morality
demands of us then becomes a sociological question to be settled by scientists: how much
can people feel obligated to give before they become discouraged and give nothing?
Second, Rule-Utilitarianism is not the same as the Kantian Formula of Universal
Law. The Kantians are concerned about acting from principle and reason, not about
consequences. The Kantians who argue for the Formula of Universal Law hold that for a
goal to give me a reason to perform an action, then it must also be a reason for everyone
else with that goal to perform that action (i.e. something can’t be a reason for you without
also being a reason for everyone else in the same circumstances). So the Formula of
Universal Law tells us to check to see if that goal could be a reason for everyone to
perform your action? Could everyone use that action to reach that goal, if no, then your
goal isn’t a good reason for your action. Notice that in describing the Formula of
Universal Law I have said nothing about consequences. A Kantian is rejecting performing
an action for a goal because it can’t be done universally, not because it would have bad
consequences if done universally. For example, the problem the Formula of Universal
Law find with cutting in line is that you couldn’t cut in line if everyone tried to, not that it
would be very unpleasant if everyone tried to cut in line. For the Kantian it is a matter of
everyone’s *ability* to do the same thing for the same goal, not whether it would lead to
good consequences if everyone did the same thing for the same goal. The question for the
Kantian is not, “Would it be good if everyone did the same?” it is, “Could everyone do the
same?”