Normative Interpretation of Democratic Peace:
Validity and Policy Implications
Jaechun Kim*
Abstract
The normative explanation of Democratic Peace stressing elites’ role asserts that peaceful conflict
resolution norms and cultures of democratic leaders prevent conflicts among democracies from
mounting to military disputes. According to this norm-based explanation of Democratic Peace,
leaders in democracies apply such peaceful conflict resolution norms in their relations with other
democracies, because they try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been
developed within and characterize their domestic political processes. This paper claims that the
behavior of democratic leaders during most of the conflicts with other democracies was not
consistent with the predictions of elites’ norms-based theories. Throughout the conflicts between
the US and other nascent democracies, it was the latter who appealed more to the peaceful conflict
resolution norm in earnest. It was the latter who could use the language of democratic norms and
culture more comfortably. Since the end of the Cold War, quite a few Americans, scholars and
policy-makers alike, have suggested that the export or promotion of democracy abroad should
become the central focus of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Instead of unilaterally
projecting Western-style democracy, the American leaders should grant to the foreign counterparts
the compromise of “embedded democracy.” The Democratic Peace as U.S. foreign policy would do
well to avoid becoming a 21st century American campaign for “benevolent assimilation.”
Key words: US Foreign Policy, Democratic Peace, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Making,
Promotion of Democracy
*
Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Sogang University, Korea
1
Introduction
A body of scholarship identified as Democratic Peace stipulates that democratic states seldom,
if not never, go to war against other kindred democratic states. There a numerous theories that vie
with one another to explain through what causal mechanisms democratic states establish “separate
zone of peace.” Across its many variants, the normative explanation of Democratic Peace (hereafter
DP) stressing elites’ role asserts that peaceful conflict resolution norms/cultures of democratic
leaders prevent conflicts among democracies from mounting to military disputes. According to this
norm-based explanation of DP, leaders in democracies apply such norms in their relations with
other democracies, because they “try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been
developed within and characterize their domestic political processes” (Russett, 1993, p. 35). Dixon
(1993, 1994, 1998) and Risse-Kappen (1995) also postulate that decision makers in democracies
externalize peaceful conflict resolution norms within their states when embroiled in conflicts with
other democratic states.1 Hence, democratic leaders prefer peaceful means of resolving conflicts
with other democracies via third-party arbitration or negotiated settlement to threat or actual use of
violence. As a result, violent conflicts between democracies will be rare. Many variants of
normative DP theories are based on this “democracy-settlement hypothesis,” which rests on
“explanatory logic emphasizing norms of conflict resolution held by democratic leaders” (Dixon,
1994, pp. 14-32; Raymond, 1994). In this paper, I claim that the behaviour of democratic leaders
during most of the conflicts they were involved in was not consistent with the predictions of elites’
norms-based theories. In doing so, I assess the implications of this norm based explanations for the
US foreign policy making
I.
1
Institutional vs. Normative Explanations of Democratic Peace
For a critique of this “externalisation” hypothesis, see Risse-Kappen (1995).
2
Logic of norm-based explanation of DP and its counterexamples
Norms take time to develop, and, hence, it can come as no surprise to normative theory if
violent conflicts occur between mature and newer democracies (Maoz & Russett, 1993). Nascent
democracies aside, however, even the well-established liberal democracy of Chile failed to appeal
to a peaceful conflict resolution norm on the part of American decision-makers. For example, the
evidence suggests that in the early 1970s the American decision-making elites – most notably
Nixon and Kissinger – harbored the utmost disrespect for Chile’s democracy and distrusted
negotiation and diplomacy as means of resolving conflicts with the democratically elected
government of Chile.
In certain cases (most notably Chile, Iran, and the Dominican Republic), some government
officials and members of Congress expressed qualms about their government’s interventionist
policies taken against opposing states. To a large extent, the normative concerns of these elites
were related to the fact that the opposing governments were the products of the democratic political
process. For instance, some of the participating elites in the State Department opposed the
administration’s interventionist policies against Chile on “philosophical ground.” In the case of
Iran, the normative concern of high-ranking officials in the Labour government – notably, Attlee
and Soskice – withstood jingoistic pressure from the public and the Conservative Party, and guided
their colleagues toward restraint. Key government officials (e.g., Acheson and McGhee) in the
Truman administration were also clearly opposed to the policy option of ousting Mossadeq. It
seems one of the reasons the decision makers undertook covert operations was to circumvent
normative restraints of this kind; they prevented the conflicts from escalating into threats or the use
of brute force.
3
But this finding does not reinforce the elites’ norm-based explanation of DP. First, the core
decision-making elites – who approved and ordered the covert action – did not embrace such
normative concern with other participating elites.2 Second, elites’ non-violent norms of conflict
resolution were not sufficient to induce the core decision-making elites to settle the disputes with
the other democratically elected governments in a peaceful manner. During the conflicts with Iran
and Nicaragua, the British and U.S. governments continually frustrated the efforts of the ICJ, UN,
and other concerned member states of the international community to bring a peaceful resolution to
the conflicts. Furthermore, they summarily dismissed the verdicts of the ICJ and the resolutions of
the UN. In the end, democratic decision-makers opted to use secret warfare, whose consequences
were as detrimental as open warfare for the target countries.3 Although the overt use of American
force was not applied, the U.S. launched an equally, if not more, destructive brand of covert
warfare in Chile that was responsible for the demise of Chilean democracy and the rise of a military
dictatorship that would kill more than 60,000 Chileans.
According to the logic of elite-norm theory, democratic leaders may be hesitant to apply a
peaceful conflict resolution norm when faced with non-democracies (or nascent democracies for
that matter) because non-democracies may exploit such democratic norms. Because “democratic
norms can be more easily exploited to force concessions than can nondemocratic ones,” democratic
leaders may adopt “nondemocratic norms in dealing with nondemocracies” (Russett, p. 35). From
this perspective, one may argue that the elites’ decision to apply covert action, rather than
arbitration or negotiation, to resolve conflicts with nascent democracies (Iran, Nicaragua, the
2
It is impossible for major covert operations to initiate and proceed without the knowledge and approval of the core
decision-making elites. Normative concerns of Attlee notwithstanding, the idea of covert action to undermine
Mossadeq came from the Minister of Defence, Morrison, in his government. Given the circumstances, it would have
been impossible for Attlee not to have known about the covert action plan against Mossadeq.
3
As Marlene Dixon (1985) pointed out, to the Americans, the low-intensity, covert warfare strategy (LIS) against
Nicaragua might have been less intense than was conventional warfare; to the Nicaraguans, however, there was
“nothing low-intensity about it (LIS).”
4
Dominican Republic, and Indonesia) does not deviate from stipulations of elite-norm theory. But
the logical corollary to this line of thinking appears to be that mature democracies would encourage
that such democratic norms take root in the opposing states by preserving the democratic elements
and respecting the democratic political processes there. The foreign policy of mature democracies
toward other states should reflect such concern. On the contrary, the examples that I examined in
this paper prove that the decision-making elites in the U.S. had no qualms about undermining
democratic elements both in mature (Chile) and nascent (Iran, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia,
and Nicaragua) democracies.
In some cases (Chile and Nicaragua), the American elites asserted that the promotion of
democracy in target countries had been one of their key policy objectives. But this claim proved to
be an ideological smokescreen to camouflage the real policy objectives of overthrowing the target
governments.4 Besides, most target countries of US covert intervention had neither the resources
nor the intention to exploit the goodwill of the leaders in the US. Throughout the conflicts between
mature democracies and target governments, it was the latter who appealed more to the peaceful
conflict resolution norm in earnest and solicited
from leaders in opposing states; it was the latter
who could use the language of democratic norms and culture more comfortably. The conflicts
escalated into covert, if not overt, use of force, not because the target governments were
“nondemocratic” and were suspected of exploiting the democratic norms, but because the mere
existence of target governments was perceived as a threat to “national interests,” which in most
cases were narrowly defined by a small group of decision makers. For instance, during the conflict
with Nicaragua, President Reagan once said: “it is preposterous to think we could sign a deal with
the Sandinistas and expect it to be kept.” But in reality it was the Sandinistas, not the Reagan
4
In the case of Chile, this type of assertion was used to justify the U.S. covert action on an ad hoc basis while it was
used to generate the mass public’s consent for the unpopular Contra War during the conflict with Nicaragua.
5
administration that genuinely sought rapprochement with the counterpart. The danger of being
exploited by the Sandinistas was not the reason American decision makers relinquished an effort to
seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict with Nicaragua. As long as the Sandinistas would remain
in power, American decision makers were not interested in a negotiated solution to the dispute
(regardless of the true intention of the Sandinistas). In most cases, the U.S. covert actions resulted
in the installation of a nefarious dictatorship in the target states. But the so-called mature Western
democracies somehow remained on good terms with these autocracies and the conflicts with these
governments seldom escalated into the threat or use of violence.
Democratic norm and the nature of covert action
The tenets of covert action are inherently in conflict with democratic norms and spirits.
Intended to avoid public accountability, covert operations violate one of the most fundamental
principles of democracy – open debate over the propriety of policies and their purported goals. As
Carter III argues, “(if you) take away that defining essence of covert action, then covert action
ceases to exist. If it retains that essence, then it is by definition outside the ambit of democracy.”5
Although there has been a degree of congressional acquiescence, many of the covert operation
programs against the Allende regime in Chile and other democratically elected governments in
Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran have been undertaken without the consultation and awareness of
Congress, extending even to the intelligence committees in both Houses. Most of these covert
operations have been undertaken without either annual authorization or any explicit statutory
authority. Thus, covert actions allowed a small number of decision makers to deliberately
circumvent the system of checks and balances embedded in democratic political institutions. The
covert action in Chile is a good example of how executive powers can be abused when the element
5
The Twentieth Century Fund project (1992), The Need to Know, p. 21.
6
of effective accountability is absent. The deception and privatization that characterized the IranContra affair were the inevitable products of an attempt to evade institutional accountability.
Kissinger (1979: , p. 660) argues that the Nixon administration maintained proper
supervision over covert activities in Chile to ensure they would remain consonant with the national
ethic and the purpose of democratic society.6 Ford, in defense of the covert action in Chile,
asserted that information regarding the action was relayed to responsible Congressional
committees, where it was reviewed. But critics in both the House and Senate challenged Ford on
the grounds that only few senior members of the Armed Services Committee received CIA
briefings and that they were not made aware of the extent of the Chilean operations. 7 A
declassified government document also indicates that the Nixon administration was not eager to
receive due Congressional oversight over its Chilean policy. According to Plans for Congressional
Consultations, “some members of Congress have recently expressed strongly their anger at not
being consulted.” However, the memo recommends that “discussions with the above
(Congressmen) would be general rather than specific, with Chile being only one of several items.”8
It is impossible to maintain proper democratic supervision over covert operations, particularly
when the aim of covert action is to avoid accountability, and checks and balances. Kissinger by his
own admission noted that the aim of Track II was to circumvent the “tedious” procedure of checks
and balances. He also admitted that no supervising or controlling mechanisms remained intact once
the covert operations rolled on (Kissinger, 1979, pp. 660-661).
6
Given Nixon’s willingness to subvert the democratic process in the U.S., Kissinger’s credibility in making this claim
seems to be negligible. See Schell (1976).
7
New York Times, September 17, 1974.
8
Department of State, Memorandum for Henry Kissinger on Chile, December 4, 1970.
7
For its advocates, covert action is justified when the national interest cannot be pursued by
overt means. From this perspective, covert action is a necessary foreign policy tool to defend the
national interest. ey decision-makers in the U.S. have defended covert actions on this practical
ground. For example, Nixon (p. 606) argued:
We live in a far from ideal world. As long as the Communists supply external funds to
support political parties . . . I believe the United States can and should do the same and do
so secretly that it can be effective.
Similarly, Kissinger in his memoir complained that the U.S. did not have at her disposal the
efficient policy instruments of her communist counterparts. He claimed:
I cannot accept the proposition that the United States is debarred from acting in the gray
area between diplomacy and military intervention, a shadow world in which our adversaries
have as instruments a political party, their own infinitely greater foreign resources, and
innumerable forms of organizations to mask their role (Kissinger, p. 346).
Ford also defended the U.S. covert action in Chile on this ground: “I am informed reliably
that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes.” But
the most explicit defense of covert action as a foreign policy instrument came from General Jimmy
Doolittle in 1954. Doolittle wrote:
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world
domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game.
Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United State is to survive,
long standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop
effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and
destroy enemies by more clever, more sophisticated means than those used against us. It
may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and
support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.9
According to this line of argument, the democratic principle has to be sacrificed for the sake
of efficiency. U.S. induced coups, such as those in Chile, Guatemala, Brazil, Indonesia, and many
other countries, can thus be justified as efficient means to protect the U.S. national interests. But
9
Doolittle was heading a panel appointed by Eisenhower to make recommendations regarding covert action as a
foreign policy tool. “Report of the Special Study Group [Doolittle Committee] on the Covert Activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency, September 30, 1954 [excerpts]” in Leary (1984, p. 144).
8
there are differing views regarding the efficiency argument for covert action. First, as Reiter and
Stam (2001) point out, the fears of a Communist advantage during the Cold War era were greatly
overstated, and the benefits of secrecy exaggerated. n regard to warfare, research shows that
democracies are no less efficient than autocracies. For example, democracies are likely to win the
wars they fight and the armies of democratic states fight with higher military effectiveness on the
battlefield. 10 ormer Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who headed a Congressionally created
commission on protecting and reducing government secrets in 1997, pointed out in the report: “We
are not out to put an end to secrecy . . . (but) a competing culture of openness might develop which
could demonstrate greater efficiency.”11 Second, although U.S. covert actions, undertaken without
public consent, might have served the short-term policy objectives of the decision makers, they
usually backfired and undermined U.S. national interests in the long run. Third, some believe that
covert actions have not always been vital to U.S. national security. In the midst of Senate hearings
and investigations, former DCIA Colby declared in 1974 that, considering the “current status of the
world,” there would be no major impact on the nation’s security if the U.S. ceased all “cloak-anddagger” operations against foreign countries.12 Some would argue that the original concept of
covert action was based on a liberal idea aimed at the stabilization of pluralism and the diversity of
societies in Europe after WWII. Colby (1978) in his memoir recalls that during the early Cold War
era, the CIA was widely viewed as a high-quality liberal vehicle in the fight against Communism.
Beyond the question of whether or not covert action is an effective policy tool for democratic
10
See Reiter and Stam (1998, pp. 259-77). Democratic militias are likely to have higher organizational efficacy and a
higher legitimacy of democratic states prompts superior individual soldiering. See also Reiter and Stam (1988a).
11
Cited from Schorr (1988, p. 5).
12
New York Times, September 14, 1974. See also Kissinger (1979, p. 677; 1982, p. 338). Given Colby’s record in
directing the notorious Operation Phoenix in Vietnam, one has good reason to doubt the truthfulness of his statement.
However, during his tenure as DCIA, he made the first genuine attempt to reform the CIA. In 1973, to the chagrin of
Ford and Kissinger, Colby (then DCIA) refused to stonewall the Church committee investigating Chilean covert action
taken by the CIA and the U.S. As a result, Ford replaced him with the compliant George Bush. Colby’s psychological
courage and independence in breaking with agency culture can hardly be exaggerated.
9
governments to achieve lofty foreign policy goals, it is doubtful whether such clandestine
operations can be proper policy instruments of democratic states whose constitutional norms are
based on open, public policy debates and the checks and balances among the branches of
government. In democracies, officials who form the public policy must be accountable to the
public. But the public cannot hold officials accountable for policies of which the public is unaware.
In this respect, the nature of covert action is fundamentally incompatible with a democratic political
system premised on the active consent of the governed. Simmons, a former CIA officer, upon
reviewing the CIA covert action in Guatemala, pointed out:
Defenders of covert action would say we are fighting to preserve liberty and democracy and
the American way . . . But when you get into the details, you wonder if they are talking
about the same thing . . . He may be an SOB and a dictator, but he is our SOB whereas
Arbenz, who was democratically elected, was not an SOB, but he wasn’t ours.
Institutional constraint explanation revisited
The initial consensus in DP scholarship was that the normative explanation is superior in
explanatory and predictive capacity to the institutional one. For instance, in his article reviewing
research on DP, Chan (1997, pp. 77-78) concludes that: “Normative explanations of the democratic
peace have been shown to be more persuasive than structural explanations . . . (and) have faired
better in research.” To a certain extent, this scholarly consensus has undermined (wittingly or
unwittingly) the institutional constraint explanation of early liberals. At one time, the institutional
constraint argument was discredited on the grounds that it can only explain monadic level
phenomenon, which had not been empirically supported by many scholarly works. However, recent
DP scholarship has witnessed a resurgence of convincing researches on DP proposition of which
the core theoretical underpinning is based on the institutional constraint explanation of early
liberals. The emerging view within DP scholarship is also that the monadic effect of democracy –
10
the proposition once rejected even in DP scholarship – is real (Russett & Starr, 2000). In light of
these recent developments, we may well reconsider the validity of the institutional constraint
explanation.
The Kantian claim that democracies do not fight one another is originally based on liberal
theories of “state-society relations,” stressing the ways in which domestic (democratic) political
institutions aggregate the societal interests. The policies of democratic government depend on the
domestic groups – the governed. Because the public is risk-aversive and statesmen are rent-seeking,
fair representation tends to inhibit international conflict (Moravcsik, 1997). For this reason,
Democratic Peace scholars have tended to assess whether a state can be identified as a democracy
in procedural terms (i.e., whether the scheduled elections are held periodically, with free
participation of opposition parties; whether a parliament controls or enjoys parity with executive
branch; and so on). But, if it is the case that shared norms, not institutional constraints, produce DP,
defining democracy in procedural terms can be slippery for the simple fact that defining norm in
behavioral terms is always a controversial business. To incorporate the normative aspect of
liberalism, Maoz and Russett (in Russett, 1993) used two other variables as proxies: stability of
democratic regime and number of political deaths. But these are by no means representative of
democratic norm (although I admit that selective adoption of definitions to a certain extent cannot
be completely avoided in social science research). For this reason, several DP studies premised on
the “shared norm hypothesis” tend to stress the importance of perception. To a certain extent,
however, the emphasis on perception seems to have damaged the original claim of the liberals,
because it is not the democracy per se but the perception of it that ipso facto contributes to the
peace among states.
11
One of the critical theoretical thrusts of normative explanations of DP has been the
democratic norms that the leaders in one democracy apply to other democratic states in situations
of conflict. Accordingly, democratic decision-makers and democratic norms (i.e., peaceful conflict
resolution norms/culture) unduly came to bear the burden of proof for the DP proposition. As
discussed, however, the results of my case studies indicate that leaders in democracies seldom
conduct themselves as the normative theories predict. Recently, a body of literature began to
surface that focuses less on the idea that democracy evokes normative commitments to the peaceful
resolution of conflicts on the part of leaders, and more on the notion that elites in democracies
simply desire to remain in office. For example, as Ray pointed out earlier, elites in democracies
“might avoid wars against other democratic states not necessarily because of normative convictions
about how political conflicts ought to be resolved . . . but because they feel that fighting such wars
might be harmful to their chances of staying in power” (Ray, 1995, p. 40). Previous researches have
shown that voters do evaluate the candidates on the basis of retrospective appraisal of foreign
policy performance (Fiorina, 1981). Indeed, research based on this constraining mechanism unique
to democratic political institutions sheds light on quite a few empirical regularities in the field of
International Relations that have yet to be satisfactorily accounted for by normative theories.13
According to Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (1999), institutional constraint – in the
form of anticipated electoral punishment – also explains why wars or military conflicts among
democracies are rare. They argue that democratic leaders are more inclined than their counterparts
in autocracies to shift extra resources and show greater caution during wartime, since the elites in
democracies are penalized by prospective voting on policy failure (i.e., losing a war). This makes
13
These empirical regularities include: (1) democracies tend to win the wars they participate in, (2) democracies fight
more efficient wars (fewer battle deaths), and (3) democracies tend to initiate wars against autocracies than do
autocracies against democracies. See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999a), Reiter and Stam (1998c), and Russett and Starr
(2000).
12
democracies unappealing targets and democratic leaders, being more selective in their choice of
targets (also because of potential electoral retribution), tend to avoid fighting other democracies.
But this line of reasoning is not without its shortcomings. According to the logic of Bueno de
Mesquita, we might have to observe the instances in which democracies with a preponderance of
power initiate wars against democratic states not endowed with credible military capabilities – the
cases we have seldom observed in inter-state conflict (Reiter & Stam, 1998b). War and peace
decisions in democracies may be best understood if we examine the interaction between the
constraining mechanisms of political institutions and how the public’s consent is generated in
democracies. The consent generation process in democracies is complex and dynamic, dependent
upon a variety of factors. Reiter and Stam (1998b) point out that public consent for war in
democracies contains at least four components: “that the prospective war can be won, that it will
have acceptably low costs, that the stakes are worth fighting over, and that violent action against
adversary is justified.” The first three components are related to the rational self-interests of the
public, but the fourth appeals to the popular norm. During those conflicts between democracies (or
democracies and democratically elected governments) examined in this paper, the mass public,
attentive elites/public, and participating elites expressed a stronger normative concern than did core
decision-makers toward democracy in opposing states. Taken as a whole, the so-called Joint
Democracy effect was more salient among a larger group of the “public” than a small number of
decision-making elites. Why this asymmetry? Maybe it is because the “public” entails a set of
diverse individuals with divergent opinions. Some may have normative concerns and others may
not. But the public in its collectivity is in a better position to exercise normative restraints more
freely than a small number of decision-makers who often find themselves enmeshed in a
13
parochially defined concept of “national interests.” Certainly, more work is needed on how and in
what manner the popular norm differs from the elite norm in democracies.
Generation of Consent: Impacts of Popular Value, Distinct Mood, and Joint DP
My case studies suggest that both the popular mood/value of the time and the Joint
Democracy effect seem to exert considerable impact on the public’s consent or lack thereof for
overt military adventure abroad. If the public matters in foreign policy making in democracies, it is
necessary to ask on what foundation public opinions are formed. The degree to which public
opinion affects a particular foreign policy decision will depend on a number of intervening
variables such as (a) the salience of the issue, (b) the stage of policy development, (c) the beliefs of
elites and public regarding the proper role of the public in the foreign policy making process, (d)
the quality of decision-makers’ leadership and the public’s political skills, (e) the availability of
information.14 The core popular value/belief system provides clues indispensable to understanding
the formation of popular preferences, because individuals’ responses to policy-relevant information
hinge on a relatively stable core of values and beliefs that constrain the manner in which
information is interpreted. Values differ from attitudes in being more general, central, and
pervasive, less situation-bound, and more resistant to modification (Robinson & Shaver, 1969).
Thus, knowledge of the public’s core value system makes it possible to predict a much broader
array of specific public attitudes. Distinct national mood of the time is another important factor
setting the tone of popular preference regarding the war and peace decision.15
14
For elite beliefs as a mediating variable, see Foyle (1997).
Holmes (1985, p.2) argues: “Public mood is a dominant force in American foreign policy and limits governmental
actions.” Holmes (1985) and Klingberg (1979, 1983) use the term “mood” to explain generation-long societal swings.
This use of “mood” differs from that of Almond (1950), whose use of the term refers to sudden shifts of interest and
preferences on the part of the public.
15
14
At the turn of the century, expansionist romantic nationalism, combined with the notion of
Social Darwinism – as a mirror for the popular value/mood – fueled the American elites’ decision
to annex the entire Philippines archipelago. The Philippines-American War was a costly war in
terms of American lives and financial resources expended. But the concern over the war’s cost
generated only sporadic outbursts of complaints on the part of the American public. A certain
segment of the population spoke out against the war on normative grounds. But appealing to the
predominant value and mood of the time, the elites had a relatively easy time in mobilizing a
“broader” public consent for an imperial war.16 The attitudes of the American public in the 1970s
and 1980s were markedly different from those at the turn of the century. The U.S. conflict with
Nicaragua in the 1980s is a clear-cut case in which the predominant national mood (Vietnam
syndrome) and the intergenerational value shift (post-Materialist value) set the tone for the popular
preference opposing a costly military adventure abroad, thereby deterring the decision-makers from
outright attacking the Sandinistas. Polling results show that, although many Americans considered
the Sandinista regime a threat to U.S. security interests, they also believed that the U.S. should not
go to war unless Nicaragua was prepared to attack the U.S. A majority of Americans also believed
that the taxpayers’ money should be put toward solving domestic problems rather than spent on the
Nicaraguan issue.17 Against this backdrop, the Reagan administration’s appeal to nationalism and
patriotism barely helped sustain the increasingly unpopular Contra War. Due to the dearth of
documentary evidence and polling/survey data, it was harder to gauge the effects of the public
mood/value in other covert action cases. But the circumstantial evidence suggests that such factors
had an impact on public preference regarding the war and peace decision, thereby compelling the
16
It should be also noted that the democratic institutions at the turn of the century America was much weaker than now
in that the enfranchisement was limited mostly to white male. The very elements of the population that currently are
most dovish – women and people of color – were kept out of the system, hence unable to exert restraining effects on
elites’ policy decisions. I owe this point to Russett.
17
In this respect, we can hypothesize that by and large intergenerational shift to Post-Materialist values in democratic
states will strengthen monadic effect of Democratic Peace.
15
elites toward covert action, rather than overt intervention. For example, in the early 1970s
American diplomats often claimed that, given the adverse public mood resulting from the Vietnam
War, an active interventionist policy against Chile was not a viable option for the Nixon
administration. Jingoistic pressure from the British public to apply military force against Iran was
largely related to the nationalistic sentiment or “imperialistic hangover” prevalent in early 1950s’
Britain. The effects of the popular value/mood were less visible in the U.S. decisions to use covert
operations in Iran in the early 1950s, and in the Dominican Republic and Indonesia in the early
1960s. But evidence suggests that the dominant mood/value of the time had limited the public to
elite-directed (as opposed to elite-challenging) participation in the realm of foreign policy making.
For instance, during the conflicts with Iran and the Dominican Republic, U.S. public opinion and
the tone of the press vacillated largely in time with the cues and leads provided by the government.
As I had anticipated, of the cases analyzed, the well-established liberal democracy in Chile
produced the strongest joint democracy effect on the part of Americans. It appears that the positive
identification many Americans held with Chile’s democracy was the most immediate cause of the
public opposition to aggressive interventionist policy toward Chile. American public opinion was
also fairly positive toward the democratic regime of Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic. One of
the reasons for this favorable public opinion apparently was related to the Kennedy
administration’s initial efforts to make the Dominican Republic the showcase democracy under the
“Alliance for Progress.” The Kennedy administration pressured the interim government of
Balaguer/Trujillo Jr. to step aside and to adopt the democratic course. Subsequently, the democratic
presidential election in 1962, which produced the Bosch regime, was highly publicized in the U.S.
Americans had high expectations for democracy in the Dominican Republic. Although the initial
enthusiasm of many Americans began to erode as their government’s policy became increasingly
16
antagonistic toward the Bosch regime, a significant portion of Americans retained the hope for
democracy in the Dominican Republic. In contrast, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and the
Sukarno government in Indonesia failed to generate positive images in the U.S. In the case of
Nicaragua, public rhetoric and the propaganda campaign of the Reagan administration substantially
distorted realities there and brought a majority of the American public to believe that Nicaragua
was a Marxist-Leninist totalitarian state run by a small Communist clique. In the case of Indonesia,
a series of controversial policies adopted by Sukarno, such as “Guided Democracy” and
“Konfrontasi,” were simply not well accepted by most of the Americans. The public perception of
the Mossadeq regime in Iran was favorable in the beginning. The constitutionalist movement and
the nascent democracy in Iran seemed to have produced a normative concern similar to a joint
democracy effect on the part of many Americans, however tenuous that effect may have been.
Although the positive opinion toward Mossadeq deteriorated as the government’s policy became
increasingly anti-Mossadeq toward 1953, a segment of the population – most notably officials in
the Truman administration – clearly objected to overthrowing Mossadeq. Acheson and McGhee
truly believed that the U.S. has no right to overthrow the “constitutionally elected prime minister of
Iran” and that liberal democratic regime was the only viable counterforce to the potential threat of a
Communist takeover in Iran. In Britain, several officials in the Attlee government were opposed to
the military plan to attack Iran on the grounds that the Mossadeq regime was immensely popular
and democratically elected.
Given the predominant mood and value of the time (the Cold War consensus and the
Nationalistic/Materialist values), some might argue that it would not have made much difference to
Americans or the British “had they known of their government’s involvement (in the coup)” in
advance (Dorman & Farhang, 1987, p. 41). In the early 1950s, the public, Congress, and the media
17
in general accepted the primacy of the government in the realm of foreign policy making. In fact,
the Congressional review of covert action was very informal in the early Cold War era; a so-called
“buddy system” emerged between the executive and legislative branches. Many Americans and
British considered the use of military force a legitimate instrument in settling conflicts abroad. But
as Dorman and Farhang later point out, the public may have a higher moral standard than policy
makers will usually admit and may expect its government to act responsibly in the realm of foreign
policy “in a way consonant with democratic values” (Dorman & Farhang, p. 79). This “higher
moral standard” of the American public might have compelled the decision-making elites in the
Eisenhower administration to resort to a covert operation as a way to circumvent the domestic
constraints.
II. PUBLIC, PRESS, ELITES, AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY
There is a rich body of literature concerned with foreign policy making in democratic states.
One particular issue has attracted the attention of many scholars: “Is it the public or elites who are
in charge of foreign policy making?” Who leads whom? What previous research has neglected to a
large extent, however, is the role of the press as an intervening variable to affect the relationship
between the public and elites in the foreign policy making process. Focusing on the triangular
relationship between the elites, public, and the press, rather than on the elites-public dyad, will
provide a more complete picture of the foreign policy making process in modern democratic states.
What follows is an assessment of how the results of my case studies fit into the huge and vexed
subject of the foreign policy making process in democracies.
During the first two decades after WWII, the overwhelming consensus among American
scholars interested in the impact of the public on foreign policy was that: (a) the general public is
18
disinterested in foreign policies and public opinion regarding foreign policies are in general volatile
and poorly organized and (b) the public has little if any impact on the making of foreign policy
(Almond, 1950, 1956; Rosenau, 1961; Converse, 1964; Lippmann, 1962; Cohen, 1973). But
beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, revisionist literature began to challenge what Holsti
(1992) called the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus and gave rise to a new consensus that held that:
(a) the public is relatively well-informed in matters of foreign policy and public opinion concerning
foreign policy is coherent and stable, thus (b) in the final analysis, public opinion influences foreign
policy making processes to a significant extent (Monroe, 1979; Page & Shapiro, 1983, 1992;
Shapiro & Page, 1994; Russett, 1990; Wittkopf, 1990; Hinckley, 1992). Aside from the positivist
question of how foreign policy is formulated in a democracy, the debate has also revolved around
the normative question of how foreign policy should be formulated in democracies. Advocates of
the Almond-Lippmann model in general belong to the realist school of International Relations; they
are skeptical of the public’s contribution to foreign policy making processes. Given the volatile
nature of public opinion, they argue that the influence of the public is detrimental to pursuing
national interests and formulating sound, coherent foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 1990; Morgenthau,
1960; Kennan, 1984). In contrast, the revisionist theories, rich in the Wilsonian liberal tradition,
tend to claim that the public “should” affect foreign policy making because of democratic norms
and the sound effect of the public’s restraining influence on elite choices (Ninic, 1992a, 1992b).
On the whole, the results of the case studies favor the perspective of the revisionist theories.
First, it seems that the pubic did affect foreign policy making processes. In most of the cases I
reviewed in this study, the elites’ decisions to use particular means of resolving conflict with
foreign governments were heavily influenced by domestic political considerations. This does not
necessarily mean that the public dictated the specifics of every foreign policy decision. The public
19
provided a set of limits within which the decision-makers devised the specific foreign policies. In
some cases, foreign policy decisions in democracies are made in the absence of broad public
consensus (Risse-Kappen, 1991, p. 481). But my study confirms that foreign policy decisions
involving the potential use of military force cannot forego the will of the public in democratic
states. Nonetheless, decision-making elites did not merely passively register public preference. To
implement belligerent policies against foreign governments or states, they attempted to mobilize
the public’s consent (the Philippines and Nicaragua). When the generation of broad public consent
seemed highly unlikely, they were still able to achieve the premeditated policy objectives by
skirting the institutional constraints imposed on them. But this does not mean that public opinion
did not count. It can be said that the influence of the public can be measured in proportion to the
efforts of the elites to manipulate and deceive the public (Dorman & Farhang, 1987, p. 20).
Second, the covert action cases reviewed in this study indicate that circumvention of due
processes of open debate and institutional checks and balances tends to result in ill-fated foreign
policy decisions (Moynihan, 1998). Covert operations, undertaken in the absence of broad public
consensus, might have served the immediate policy objectives of the decision-making elites, but on
balance they backfired, leaving legacies of anti-U.S. sentiment and damaging the national interests
of the U.S. in the long run (Iran and Chile). It is doubtful whether Mossadeq would have caused as
much trouble as Khomeini had; an effort to make Nicaragua “say uncle” nearly cost Ronald Reagan
his presidency. After the overthrow of Arbenz, Guatemala became home to the most brutal military
regime in Central America. As McGeorge Bundy pointed out: “The dismal historical record of
covert military and paramilitary operations over the last 25 years is entirely clear.”18 Open policy
can be subjected to the test of reason, and mistakes can be corrected after consultation with the
Congress and deliberations within the Executive branch itself. But secret policies inevitably
18
New York Times, June 10, 1985.
20
become the private preserve of the few and mistakes are inexorably perpetuated. Although the U.S.
covert actions embrace a wide range of operations, they have typically involved one particular type:
waging “unofficial wars.” That is, covert actions have often used as a means to pursue foreign
policy objectives that is contradictory to the avowed polices and lack public and Congressional
support. But the history suggests that a policy that is well conceived and at least arguably related to
the nation’s interests will receive adequate support from Congress and the public.
Is the opinion of the public stable and rational? The revisionist scholars, most notably Page and
Shapiro (1992), claim that collectively, American public opinion is remarkably stable and rational.
For example, Mueller’s analyses (1973, 1994) of American public opinion of the Korean, Vietnam,
and Gulf Wars show that public support for war declined as a logarithmic function of casualty
rates. This finding suggests a consistent, rational use of a casualty-rate heuristic by most
Americans; it supports the “rational public” thesis. But Mueller’s finding seems to apply to a
chiefly post-WWII era. In the case of the Philippines War, the concern for American casualties
generated only occasional outbursts on the part of the American public; the Philippines-American
War continued despite heavy American casualties. The evidence also suggests that public opinion
during the conflict with Iran and the Dominican Republic was vacillating in accordance with the
direction of the government’s policy.
If the public does and should matter in the realm of foreign policy making in democratic
states, the role of the press would seem to be critical because most of the public’s understanding of
foreign policy issues is affected by media coverage.19 In modern democracies, the mass media
performs the vital function of transmitting information from one aspect of the political system to
another. Not only does the mass media transmit information from decision-makers to the public,
but it also relays the public’s opinions to its elected representatives (Seaver, 1998). Because of the
19
For a contending view, see Cohen (1963).
21
multidirectional nature of media effects, it is hard to gauge the impact of the media on the foreign
policy making process. Arguably, there are two groups of theories concerning the media’s role in
foreign policy making. The “agenda-reflecting” school of thought credits decision-making elites
with preponderance of power over the public, arguing that the media merely reflects or relates the
government’s agenda and passively transmits it to the public (Carpenter, 1995; Neuman, 1996;
Chomsky & Herman, 1988).
“agenda-building” school, on the other hand, gives greater weight to
the public, asserting that media influences the foreign policy agenda only to the extent that the
public accepts or shares the media’s agenda (Genest, 1995; Robinson, 1999).
The case studies in this report suggest that the capacity and willingness of the mass media to
affect the foreign policy making process were also closely related to the dominant mood/values of
the time. During the early years of the Cold War, like many American citizens, the American mass
media on the whole conceded government elites the exclusive right to formulate and execute
foreign policies. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the media’s coverage of events abroad followed in
principal the official cues provided by the government, thus serving the policy objectives of the
government leaders. The propriety of the U.S. foreign policy actions did not concern most of the
American media. At the early stages of the oil conflict with Iran, the U.S. media’s portrayal of the
Mossadeq regime was fairly positive. But the press coverage of the Mossadeq regime grew
increasingly hostile as the U.S. government’s policy toward Iran became gradually anti-Mossadeq.
The tendency of the media to conform to governmental leads is also observed in the case of the
Dominican Republic. During the short-lived presidency of Juan Bosch, the tone of the American
press drifted from optimism and enthusiasm to pessimism and skepticism in accordance with the
shift in the government’s policy. In the case of Indonesia, however, the inordinately harsh treatment
22
of Sukarno by the American press hindered to a certain extent the elites’ efforts to implement a
more proactive Indonesian policy.
The American press failed to report the U.S. complicity in the 1953 coup to overthrow
Mossadeq, although it was aware of the American involvement. Both British and American
newspapers denigrated those who insisted on the Anglo-American conspiracy. Not until the
revolution erupted in Iran in 1978 did the American press start to uncover the U.S. covert
involvement in the overthrow of the Mossadeq regime
years earlier. During the critical period
from 1965 to 1966 in Indonesia, the evidence suggests that the American press was relatively well
informed of the roles played by the U.S., but it opted to keep them a secret from the American
public. Only after the mass killing ended did the American press start to analyze the coup and the
holocaust that cost nearly a million Indonesians. But somber reflections had been rare in the U.S.
press after the coup and massacre. The American press welcomed the bloody events as the triumph
of “moderates” bringing “stability” and a “gleam of light in Asia.” It was “the west’s best news for
years in Asia” (Time) that gave “hope where there was once none” (U.S. News & World Report).
The Indonesian masses and the PKI were blamed for the mass murder because they “had subjected
the country to a bloodbath” (Los Angeles Times). Similarly in 1965, when the Johnson
administration sent U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic to subdue the constitutionalist
counter-coup, the mainstream American news media fed the public the government’s official
position and baseless charges of “communist threats.” But due to the repeated lies and denials of
the Johnson administration regarding military intervention in the Dominican Republic, by 1965 the
term “credibility gap” entered the American political and journalistic vernacular.
The American mass media in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, was much more
aggressive in challenging governmental leadership in foreign policy. The war in Vietnam and the
23
Watergate scandal were watershed events that reset the relationship between the press and the
government.20
On top of that, a series of technological breakthroughs enabled the mass media to
scrutinize the activities of the government more closely. Nonetheless, in the early 1970s the U.S.
media accepted at par value the officially pronounced policy of the Nixon administration. In March
1972 columnist Jack Anderson published in the Washington Post a series of columns revealing an
anti-Allende plot carried out by the CIA in collaboration with the ITT. But the Nixon
administration flatly rejected the accusations of Anderson and the Track II policy rolled on in
Chile. In the end, however, a series of articles by “Sy” Hersch published in the NYT in 1974
uncovered incontrovertible evidence of U.S. complicity in Chile, which ultimately led to extensive
Congressional investigations and hearings on the U.S. covert action in Chile. In the case of
Nicaragua, the Washington Post was first to reveal the existence of a covert war on February 14,
1982. On March 9, the Washington Post further disclosed that President Reagan had approved the
covert war plan. Although the Reagan administration responded that the purpose of the covert war
was not to overthrow the Sandinista regime but to interdict the arms flow from Nicaragua to
Salvadoran rebel forces, on November 8, 1982, Newsweek, in its lead story entitled “American
Secret War: Target Nicaragua,” revealed that the covert paramilitary war was indeed aimed at
overthrowing the Nicaraguan government.
How decision-makers perceive and react to public opinion may depend on how they view
the proper relationship between public opinion and foreign policy choices (Foyle, 1997). But as the
evidence in this study suggests, decision-making elites in general consider the segments of the
public world – the news media and the citizenry alike – elements ripe for the influence. For
example, the policy memoranda disclosed in the Pentagon Papers repeatedly discuss ways to move
20
The publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times in 1971 is generally considered the beginning of
investigative journalism.
24
the domestic audiences in the desired direction, via the controlled release of information, secrecy,
and appeals to patriotic stereotypes. Governments rarely reveal exactly what they seek to
accomplish or how they intend to accomplish it. Research reveals that a well-informed public
generates effective and superior public policy (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). In this respect, a
strong, independent, and free press is instrumental to sound policy making because it can restrict
the elites’ ability to control and manipulate information.
The effect of new communications technologies is noteworthy in that they fundamentally
changed the way that states interact. In the early half of the 20th century, communications
technology worked to a large extent to the advantage of the decision-making elites. Theodore
Roosevelt succeeded in binding the U.S. with a common national story by using the telegraph and
wire services. Today, the proliferation of new technologies enables anyone in the world to be
exposed to a constant flow of global real-time news. Everyone knows about a government decision
or action the moment it takes place. In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. press instantly blew the cover
for sizeable U.S. covert actions. There have not been any major U.S. covert wars against foreign,
democratically elected governments since the late 1980s. This result has important implications for
research on democracy and international conflict because new communications technologies might
provide a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries,
which have been identified as a key impediment to negotiation (Schultz, 1998). It is noteworthy
that nearly all wars initiated by democratic states (and so-called “close-calls”) occurred in the 19th
century, when communications technologies were underdeveloped and the transmission of news
was slow. If war breaks out between democracies in the 21st century, misperception can no longer
be a legitimate excuse.
25
To a large extent, the new communications technology made the Hi-Low politics distinction
obsolete, reinforcing the public’s influence on elites’ foreign policy making. Modern technology
may prove a mixed blessing, since it can also increase authorities’ ability to keep citizens under
surveillance and pry into private lives. The net effect, however, still appears to be positive. The
revolution in communications technology has weakened the power of the bully pulpit rather than
strengthened it. It is expected that the elites’ ability to control and manipulate information will be
impeded further by the digital revolution – the reduction of all forms of communication to a series
of 0s and 1s.
III. CONCLUDING REMARK: DEMOCRATIC PEACE AS FOREIGN POLICY
In the 1990s the Democratic Peace proposition has not only emerged as conventional
wisdom in academic circles, but also has become the central pillar on which the U.S. post-Cold
War foreign policy is based. Since the end of the Cold War, many Americans, scholars and policymakers alike, have suggested that the export or promotion of democracy abroad should become the
central focus of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The Democratic Peace theory
inspired the Clinton administration’s strategy of expanding the zone of democracy. In his State of
the Union Address in 1994, President Clinton noted:
Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support
the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other, they make better
trading partners and partners in diplomacy.
In Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union, the U.S. national interest was
identified with the success or failure of democracy because, as former Secretary of State Warren
Christopher pointed out, “Americans will be more secure and prosperous if democratic institutions
26
and market economies take hold” abroad.21 But the Democratic Peace as U.S. foreign policy
initiative is not an idea unique to the Clinton administration. Before the Clinton administration put
the principle of the Democratic Peace into practice, the Bush administration had implied that the
promotion of democracy be one of the keys to ensuring U.S. security in the post-Cold War era.22
The Kennedy administration’s policy under the “Alliance for Progress” was also premised upon the
basic tenets of the Democratic Peace principle. Since the Wilson administration, U.S. officials often
professed that decent, democratic regimes abroad are closely related to the security and prosperity
of the U.S. Kissinger in his book, Diplomacy, points out:
Woodrow Wilson was the embodiment of the tradition of American exceptionalism, and
originated what would become the dominant intellectual school of American foreign policy
. . . The idea that peace depends above all on promoting democratic institutions has
remained a staple of American thought to the present day. Conventional wisdom has
consistently maintained that democracies do not make war against each other (Kissinger,
1994, pp. 33, 44).
The Achilles’ heel of the Democratic Peace as U.S. foreign policy proposition is that it is at
odds with historical experiences of the U.S. Far from enlightening foreign countries about
democracy, the U.S. has impeded democracies on many occasions by overthrowing democratically
elected governments, installing and supporting dictatorships, and overlooking or encouraging
terrorism. On a number of occasions, the promotion of democracy abroad proved to be mere
rhetorical charades to mask the real policy objective of furthering the U.S. interests as parochially
defined by a small group of elites. Particularly during the Cold War, the American elites had their
doubts about the efficacy of democracy. For example, President Nixon had seen the simultaneous
Warren Christopher, “Statement by the Secretary of State,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5 (2) February
1994. Top foreign policy officials in the Clinton administration, such as the Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott,
and the National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, made similar comments on a number of occasions. See Strobe
Talbott, “Democracy and the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Dec./Nov. 1996, vol. 75, pp. 47-63.
22
See the statements presented by Secretary of State James Baker under the Bush administration before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the World Affairs Council of Boston. James Baker, “Securing a Democratic Peace,”
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 3 (15) April 1992; James Baker, “From Cold War to Democratic Peace,” U.S.
Department of State Dispatch, vol. 3 (26) June 1992.
21
27
development of democracy and Communism in democratic Uruguay and capitalistic Venezuela,
and had deduced that neither the democratic system nor the system of private enterprise necessarily
presents a safeguard against Communism. This suggests that, if international relations is poorly
organized, the benign effect of the Democratic Peace can be diminished. The diplomatic record of
the U.S. in the 20th century also suggests that the domestic political structure of states has not been
the most important domestic-level variable in influencing the foreign policy decisions of the
American decision-making elites. But such factors as ethnicity, religion, and language have been
equally, if not more, influential as that which distinguishes a democracy from a non-democracy,
particularly when the U.S. policy makers have dealt with so-called Third World countries.23
During the conflicts that that I examined in this paper, these countries have been treated by the
American decision-makers paternalistically at best and from a Social Darwinian perspective at
worst, which in turn has led to the virtual denial of politics and the potential for democratic selfgovernance in these countries.
It is hard to deny the pacifying effects of democracy. It carries overwhelming advantages,
including a close correlation with prosperity There is little doubt that the world populated with
more stable and mature democracies would be a much safer place to live in. The Democratic Peace
principle may well prove the loadstar guiding U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. But without a
proper understanding of the cultures and histories of foreign counterparts, the U.S. efforts to export
“liberal” democracy could easily backfire. As Oren points out, the current definition of liberal
democracy is embedded in U.S. historical development; the definition of democracy was
compromised in the political reality of the U.S. following the outbreak of the Cold War (Oren,
1995, p. 150). We often forget that the kind of democracy defined and coded by American scholars
Key U.S. decision-makers in the early 1970s – notably, Nixon and Kissinger – believed that even in Chile there was
no politically conscious or rational mass. Hence, they asserted that their unwanted struggle for democracy would only
open doors for Communist intrusion.
23
28
is not the only possible form of democracy. For example, in contrast to conventional wisdom in the
West, Asian cultures are in fact rich in democratic tradition. Almost 2 millennia before Locke
claimed that sovereign rights reside with the people and that, based on a contract with the people,
leaders are given a mandate to govern (which the people can at any point withdraw), Chinese
philosopher Meng-tzu preached similar notions. There are no ideas more fundamental to
democracy than the teachings of Confucianism and Buddhism; despite the lack of a liberal
tradition, Asia gave rise to democratic philosophers and institutions as profound as those of the
West.24 This world is populated with states that vary significantly in cultural, historical, and
religious experiences. Instead of unilaterally projecting Western-style democracy, the American
leaders should take this fact into account and grant to the foreign counterparts the compromise of
what I would call “embedded democracy.”25 The Democratic Peace as U.S. foreign policy would
do well to avoid becoming a 21st century American campaign for “benevolent assimilation.”
24
Europeans institutionalized comprehensive and effective electoral democracy first, however. This invention of the
electoral system is Western democracy’s greatest accomplishment.
25
See Ruggie (1982) for “embedded liberalism.”
29
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Duke University Press.
■ 국문초록
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민주평화론의 규범적 해석: 이론적 적실성과 정책함의
민주평화론의 규범적 이론은 민주주의 국가들만이 공유하는 평화적 분쟁해결문화 또는 민주적
규범이 민주평화현상을 설명할 수 있다고 해석하고 있다. 성숙한 민주주의 국가는 분쟁을
평화적이고 민주적인 방식으로 해결하는 규범이 뿌리내려 있어, 민주사회의 구성원들이
분쟁에 휘말릴 경우 폭력에 의존하는 해결방식보다는 법에 의거한 평화적 해결방식으로
분쟁을 해결하기를 선호한다. 이러한 규범적 해석에 의하면 민주주의 국가 역시 다른
민주주의 국가와 분쟁에 휘말리게 될 경우, 전쟁과 같은 폭력적 수단으로 분쟁을 해결하려
하기보다는 외교적 수단으로 이를 해결하거나, 제 3 국이나 국제기구의 중재 또는 국제법에
의거한 평화적 분쟁해결방식을 선호한다는 것이다. 그러나 본 연구에서 검토한 사례연구에
의하면
미국의
정치지도자들은
미국과
갈등을
겪고
있던
다른
민주주의
국가에게
민주평화론이 제시하는 규범적 절제를 보여주지 못했고, 미국의 정치지도자의 이러한 태도는
다른 국가의 정치지도자들이 미국의 선의와 민주적 규범을 역이용하려 할지도 모른다는
의심과는 아무런 상관이 없었다. 이러한 사례연구는 민주국가의 지도자들의 평화적 분쟁문화
공유를 강조하는 규범적 해석에 의문을 제기한다. 민주평화론은 자유주의 국제관계이론의
핵심으로
부상하였을
뿐
아니라,
실제로
냉전
후
미국의
클린턴
대통령의
민주주의
확장정책(Enlargement)의 이론적 기반과 조지 W. 부시 대통령의 테러와의 전쟁의 명분을
제공해주었다. 미국의 민주주의 전파정책은 다양한 민주주의를 존중하고 타문화와 국가의
민주성과 민주적 잠재력을 상호 인정할 경우에만 성공할 수 있을 것이다.
핵심어: 미국외교정책, 민주평화론, 여론과 외교정책, 민주주의 전파정책
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