CCMAil December 2006 CONTENTS CASE ALERTS .....................................................................................................................................................................................2 LABOUR COURT & LABOUR APPEAL COURT DECISIONS ...........................................................................................................4 DECISIONS: OTHER DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUMS ..................................................................................................................7 LABOUR WATCH Race discrimination and bias claims ...............................................................................................................................................9 The retrenchment guidelines: are they getting any clearer? .........................................................................................................11 Confusion borne out of public holidays..........................................................................................................................................13 Inherent requirements of the job ...................................................................................................................................................16 GLOBAL TRENDS International Labour Organisation calls for “ambitious reforms” in labour inspection ..........................................................................18 The International Labour Organisation and collective bargaining .......................................................................................................20 EDITORIAL TEAM Alucia Mdaka Dorothy Khosa Lucky Moloi Nersan Govender December 2006 – Page 1 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za By Alucia Mdaka NW4657-04 Bothomane v TUFUSA – Commissioner: Eberdohn Dismissal – Procedural fairness – Bias – Presiding officer in disciplinary hearing involved in pre-investigation. Dismissal – Substantive fairness – Breach of trust – Employee dismissed for arranging amalgamation with another union and breach of employer’s constitution. The applicant was dismissed for unlawfully signing an amalgamation agreement with another union (Mouthpeace Workers Union), and for breaching the employer’s constitution. The applicant claimed that the executive committee had approved the amalgamation agreement. He denied that he had done anything contrary to the union’s constitution. The applicant also claimed that he was not informed of the disciplinary hearing. Substantive fairness Noted: That the applicant had never fulfilled his intentions to call a witness to prove that the executive committee had approved the amalgamation with the Mouthpeace Workers Union. That the respondent’s evidence had proved that the applicant had breached his duties and in so doing had undermined the trust relationship between himself and the union Held: That the substantively fair. applicant’s dismissal was, therefore, Procedural fairness Noted: Turning to the applicant’s procedural challenge, the commissioner noted that the applicant had been notified of the disciplinary hearing. Also noted: That the presiding officer who had chaired the hearing was unsuitable because he was the one who handed the notification of a disciplinary hearing and had also been involved in the investigations. The commissioner also noted that it was impossible for the presiding officer to approach the matter with a balanced and open mind. Further noted: That since the applicant had not attended the hearing, he had been deprived of his right to state his case. Held: That the applicant’s dismissal was procedurally unfair. The respondent was, therefore, ordered to compensate the applicant an amount equivalent to two months’ remuneration. Mahlangu v CIM DELTAK, Gallant v CIM DELTAK (1986) 7 ILJ 346 (IC) WE12675-05 Meleni & Others v Rohloff Administration: Commissioner: Wilson Polygraph test. The applicants were dismissed for refusing to undergo polygraph test after the respondent had experienced a high stock loss in one of its outlets. However, some of the employees had agreed to undergo a test and had passed it and no action had been taken against them. The respondent claimed that several employees had admitted that they were part of a “theft ring”. Noted: That the respondent had led no direct evidence against any of the applicants. The commissioner noted that all applicants had refused to take a polygraph test without giving any reason. Also noted: That it is permissible to dismiss a group of employees who have participated in a collective misconduct if they have a common purpose or if they were aware of the misconduct. The commissioner also noted that a number of respondent’s witnesses had presented hearsay evidence based on the information provided by the informer. However, the probative value of that evidence was good and the employees, upon whose hearsay evidence was based, had refused to testify in spite of having been subpoenaed by the respondent. Further noted: That the presiding officer had given two of the applicants a second chance to undergo polygraph test and when they refused to do so, they were charged with a new offence. Held: The dismissals of the applicants were upheld. Case references Hlatshwayo v Barrier Angelucci MENT 1283 (MEIBC) Federal Council of Retail & Allied Workers v Snip Trading (2001) 7 BALR 669 (P) NUMSA obo Ncongwane v Assmang Chrome Machadodorp Works (MEGA 6803) MEIBC Southern Sun Hotels (Pty) Ltd v SACCAWU & Another JA33/99 (LAC) WE4541-06 X v W – Commissioner: Christie Sexual harassment. Case reference The respondent, a part-time company doctor, was charged with breaching the company’s sexual harassment policy by using December 2006 – Page 2 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za inappropriate method when examining female applicants during pre-employment medical examination. The respondent claimed that he had done nothing wrong during the examinations, but conceded that some women might have felt uncomfortable because of the nature of the examinations. Held: That the application was dismissed. The applicant was, therefore, ordered to pay the respondent’s the amount equivalent five days of the loss of production. Noted: That of the ten employees who had been interviewed during investigations, five had found nothing wrong with the manner in which the respondent had conducted the examinations. The commissioner noted that the South African Health Professions Council had no specific guidelines for conducting examinations. Furthermore, both the company’s code on sexual harassment and the statutory code defined sexual harassment as misconduct of a sexual nature. Amalgamated Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Grobler NO & Others (2004) 6 BLLR 537 (LC) Boschendal Restaurant v Komjwayo (1992) 13 ILJ 573 (LAC) Board of Executors Ltd v McCafferty (1997) 7 BLLR 835 (LAC) Boshoff v Slit Steel (Pty) Ltd (1996) 1 BLLR 42 (IC) Buthelezi v Shoprite (2000) 12 BALR 1359 (CCMA) Chamber of Mines of SA v Council of Mining Unions (1990) 11 ILJ 52 (IC) CAN v CCAWUSA & Another (1991) 12 ILJ 340 (LAC) Cronje v Bloemfontein TLC (1997) 18 ILJ 862 (CCMA) Hoch v Mustek Electronics (Pty) Ltd (1999) 12 BLLR 1287 (LC) Komane v Fedsure Life (1998) 2 BLLR 215 (CCMA) Lahee Park Club v Garratt (1997) 9 BLLR 1137 (LAC) Lekota v First National Bank of SA Ltd (1998) 10 BLLR 1021 (LC) Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC) Maduna v Brollo Africa (Pty) Ltd (1995) 1 BLLR 33 (IC) Mahlangu v CIM Deltak (1986) 7 ILJ 346 (IC) Mncube v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd (1997) 5 BLLR 639 (CCMA) Moloi v Euijen & Another (1997) 8 BLLR 1022 (LC) Mostert v Dorbyl Automotive (1999) 1 BALR 4 (CCMA) NETU obo Upton & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mine & Another (2001) 4 BALR 378 (CCMA) NUM & Others v Driefontein Consolidated Ltd (1984) 5 ILJ 101 (IC) NUM v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co (1992) (1) SA 700 (A) Primo v Pick n’ Pay Durban Hyper (2000) 7 BALR 794 (CCMA) Reyneke v Pick n ’Pay (2000) 4 BALR 394 (CCMA) SACCAWU v Foschini Group (Pty) Ltd (1998) 4 (6) SALLR 322 (CCMA) SACCAWU obo Nyusela v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd (1999) 8 BALR 947 (CCMA) SAMWU obo Damon v Cape Metropolitan Council Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 714 (CCMA) Schana v Control Instruments (Pty) Ltd (1991) 2 (3) SALLR 49 (IC) Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v CCMA & Others (1998) 6 BLLR 622 (LC) Swiles v Pep Stores (Pty) Ltd (1997) 4 BLLR 503 (CCMA) Twana v Weir’s Cash & Carry EC3455-01 Zungu v Steenkamp Transport (1998) 11 BALR 42 (IC) Also noted: That the tests for heart and lung conditions should be conducted when a patient is undressed. Held: That some of the women who had felt uncomfortable while these tests were conducted did not mean that the doctor’s conduct constituted sexual harassment. The commissioner held that by remaining passive during the examinations, the complainants had all impliedly consented to the examinations. Also held: That in the context of a medical examination of intimate parts of the body, a doctor’s conduct only constitutes sexual harassment if it is not conducted for a legitimate purpose. However, the evidence provided by the complainants did not prove that the respondent had an illegitimate purpose. The respondent was, therefore, found not guilty of sexual harassment. ECPE714-05 – Simani v Coca-Cola Fortune - Commissioner: Fouchè Bribe. The applicant was one of the drivers who were dismissed for bribing guards to allow them to remove company stock without authorisation, and sold the stock for their personal gain. The applicant denied involvement in the scheme, and claimed that he had passed a polygraph test during investigation. Noted: That the fact that the applicant had passed the polygraph test did not alter the fact that he was not a credible witness. The commissioner noted that video evidence was also used as another evidence which showed the applicant acting in a suspicious manner. That the respondent’s evidence indicated that the applicant had left the factory with an additional pallet containing 56 cases of soft drinks which ware not accounted for. Case references December 2006 – Page 3 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za By Poso Mogale Labour Court: JS371/03 Van der Velde v Business Design Software (Pty) Ltd & Another (2) Procedural fairness – Dismissals related to s197 transfers. The Labour Court had to determine whether the applicant was automatically dismissed as listed in s187 (1) (g) of the LRA. Alternatively, it had to determine whether he was dismissed for a reason related to the employer’s operational requirements. Almost two years after the applicant was employed as the first respondent’s general manager and managing director in-waiting, the first respondent was purchased by the second respondent. Subsequent to that, there were concerns that the first respondent had many senior managers. The applicant lost the management buy-out bid to the first respondent’s managing director. The applicant was then given an option to resign, stay on and face disciplinary action or retrenchment. When the applicant opted for retrenchment the company refused and, instead, offered him the post of administration manager on reduced terms. The applicant was, subsequently, dismissed after he rejected that offer. Held: That the first issue for determination was whether the dismissal was related to the transfer. Noted: That different approaches had been adopted to the question of the onus where employees claim that their dismissals were automatically unfair. However, the position appears to be that such employees must establish that they were dismissed, that the action concerned was related to a prohibited reason and that there is a causal link between the dismissal and the transfer. If the employee makes out a prima facie case, the employer must then satisfy the court that the dismissal was for an acceptable reason. Also noted: That the reason and the transfer must be closely related. To balance the interest of employees and employers, employees who claim that their dismissals fall within the scope of section 187 (1) (g) must prove the casual link to the transfer as contemplated by section 197. If the employee discharges that burden, the employer must establish that the true reason for the dismissal was not related to the transfer. Turning to the facts Held: That the applicant had adduced sufficient evidence to prove that his dismissal and the transfer of the business were probably causally linked. Also held: That there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant would have been dismissed were it not for the transfer. The transfer was, therefore, the real and proximate reason of the dismissal. The applicant’s dismissal was, accordingly, automatically unfair and 12 months compensation was ordered. Case references Halgang Properties CC v Western Cape Workers Association (2002) 10 BLLR 919 (LAC) Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd (2005) 12 BLLR 1172 (LAC) NEHAWU & Others v University of Cape Town & Others 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) Labour Court: C334/2005 Wallace v Du Toit: Judge Pillemer (Acting) Discrimination – Automatically unfair dismissal - Dismissal based on pregnancy. The applicant was employed as an au pair. Two years later she fell pregnant and was, subsequently, dismissed. She claimed an automatically unfair dismissal and sought compensation. The employer’s contention was that the applicant was informed during the December 2006 – Page 4 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za interview that her employment would be terminated if she fell pregnant. The applicant, however, disputed that she had been told that being childless was a condition of employment. Held: That on the balance of probabilities, the verbal agreement between the parties did not contain a term that the employment would terminate automatically if the applicant fell pregnant. The Court, accordingly, held that the applicant had been dismissed. Also held: That since it could not be accepted that not being pregnant or a parent was an inherent requirement of the job of an au pair, the dismissal amounted to unfair discrimination and was an automatically unfair dismissal. Turning to the relief Noted: That the employment relationship has broken down and, therefore, reinstatement was not an option. Also noted: That simultaneous claims for damages under the EEA and compensation under the LRA could create an unfair duplication to the respondent. Held: That the applicant should be awarded R25 000 as a solatium and the equivalent of a year’s salary, less the amount that she was given at termination of employment, as compensation for her patrimonial loss. Case references Christian v Colliers Properties (2005) 5 BLLR 479 (LC) Mashava v Cuzen & Woods Attorneys (2006) 6 BLLR 691(LC) Ntsabo v Real Security CC (2004) 1 BLLR 58 (LC) President of the Republic of South Africa & Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) Labour Court: JR251/06 Cell C (Pty) Ltd v Finger & Others Perception of racial bias – Commissioner asked to recuse himself. This was an application to have the commissioner’s decision to recuse himself set aside. The applicant also sought a punitive cost order against the respondent. The employee had, at arbitration, asked for the commissioner’s recusal. His reasons were that he perceived the situation as being “racially imbalanced” against him because the commissioner and the employer’s representative were Indians. The commissioner reluctantly recused himself and ordered a punitive cost order against the employee. Noted: That according to law, a decision by a presiding officer not to recuse himself is appelable. However, the converse will seldom apply, and then only when the review relates to unterminated proceedings where grave injustice might result or where justice might not by other means be attained. Also noted: That to force an arbitrator who has recused himself from a matter, to continue with it, particularly in a case such as this, where the arbitrator was provoked into recusing himself, would be imprudent. Held: That although the commissioner should not have recused himself, it would be inappropriate to set aside his decision. It was also held that the commissioner could have deprived the employee of a remedy until he has apologised and/or retracted his allegations. No costs order was made. The application was dismissed. Case references S v Collier 1995 (2) SACR 648 Newell v Cronje & Another 1985 (4) SA 692 (E) Wahlhaus & Others v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg & Another 1959 (3) SA 113 (AD) S v Suliman 1969 (2) SA 385 (AD) Soller v Soller 2001 (1) SA 570 (C) December 2006 – Page 5 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za Labour Court: JR782/05 Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA & Others Commissioner applying criminal law standards when assessing substantive and procedural fairness of dismissal. The employee was dismissed after the employer had discovered that she was implicated in theft. At arbitration, the employer relied on videotape, which revealed another employee committing theft in the employee’s presence. The commissioner made the following findings: That the video footage did not conclusively prove the employee’s involvement because her face could not be seen and her movements did not necessarily indicate involvement, That since the bag had been returned, the conclusion could not be drawn that theft had actually occurred, and That the dismissal was procedurally unfair and ordered reinstatement. Held: That while purporting to apply the balance of probabilities test, the commissioner had applied the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt. That was in itself a ground for review. As to the of procedural challenge Noted: That while the LRA is silent on the content of the notion of procedural unfairness. The nature and extent of that right is spelled out in the Code of Good Practice on dismissals. The rules introduced by the Code are based on the idea that true justice for workers lies in a procedure for expeditious and independent review of the employer’s decision. The Court also noted that informal disciplinary procedures in the workplace balance the interests of employees and employers. Held: That there was no legal basis for a test for bias to be drawn from the criminal justice model, which the commissioner had applied. That constituted a material error of law which was a further ground for a review. The award was set aside and remitted to the CCMA to be heard by another commissioner. Case references Foschini Group (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2002) 7 BLLR 619 (LC) Hira & Another v Booysen & Another 1992 (4) SA 69 (AD) Markhams (a Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty) Ltd) v Matji NO & Others (2003) 11 BLLR 1145 (LC) MEC, Department of Finance, Economic Affairs & Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani (2005) 2 BLLR 173 (SCA) Mlaba v Masonite (Africa) Ltd & Others (1998) 3 BLLR 291 (LC) National Commissioner of the SA Police Service v Potterill NO & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 1984 (LC) NEHAWU v University of Cape Town & Others 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) NUMSA & Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & Another (2003) 2 BLLR 103 (CC) OK Bazaars (a Division of Shoprite Checkers) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1188 (LC) Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v Commission for Conciliation Mediation & Arbitration & Others (1999) JOL 5246 (LC) Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & Others (2003) 7 BLLR 676 (LAC) December 2006 – Page 6 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za By Dorothy Khosa Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining Council, Johannesburg: MEGA10722 Greyling v IDC CC: Commissioner Gunase Constructive dismissal – Employee resigned and raised litany of complaints – Constructive dismissal not proved – Employee failed to raise issues with employer before resigning. General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council: PSGA 815-05/06 PSA obo Edwards v Department of Education: Commissioner Goldman Payments and benefits – Employee promoted - Employer’s refusal to adjust employee’s salary – Unfair. The applicant had raised several complaints about her conditions of employment. She, subsequently, resigned and claimed that the removal of her company vehicle was the final straw. She alleged that she had been constructively dismissed. The applicant applied for a higher post which had been advertised at level 8. After the interview, she was appointed to the post, but for more than two years she continued to be remunerated at a level 7 salary. She contended that that constituted an unfair labour practice, and sought compensation. The respondent claimed that it had intended to appoint only grade 8 employees to the posts in question, and that it was entitled to pay the applicant at her previous grade until the post in which she then served was re-graded to level 8. The respondent claimed that that had ultimately been done. Held: After analysing the applicant’s complaints, the arbitrator held that most were without substance. The applicant’s mere unhappiness about the manner in which she had been treated was insufficient to prove a claim of constructive dismissal. Objectively viewed, the respondent’s conduct had not been calculated to drive the applicant away. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to raise most of the issues with management before she resigned. The application was dismissed. Case references Amalgamated Beverage Industries v Jonker (1993) ILJ 1232 (LAC) Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a SAA (1995) 16 ILJ 629 (LAC) Lubbe v ABSA Bank Bpk (1998) 12 BLLR 1224 (LAC) Mafomane v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (2003) 10 BLLR 999 (LC) Milady’s, A Division of Mr Price Group Ltd v Naidoo & Others (2002) 9 BLLR 808 (LAC) Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots (1997) 18 ILJ 981 (LAC) Quince Products CC v Pillay (1997) 12 BLLR 1547 (LAC) Riverview Manor (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2004) 2 BLLR 177 (LC) Sappi Kraft (Pty) Ltd t/a Tugela Mill v Majake NO & Others (1998) 19 ILJ 1240 (LC) Smithkline Beecham (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2000) 3 BLLR 344 (LC) Van der Riet v Leisurenet t/a Health & Racquet Clubs (1998) 5 BLLR 471 (LAC) Noted: That the six posts concerned had been advertised as being on salary level 8. The core principle in the regulatory framework created by the Public Service Act 103 (P) of 1994, was equal pay for equal work. Held: That, of the six appointees, the applicant alone had been paid on grade 7 until her post was re-graded. That constituted an unfair labour practice. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant the difference between the amount she received and the one she should have received had she been remunerated on the higher grade. Dispute Resolution Centre, Western & Eastern Cape: MICT 1152 Marks v L & Z Auto Centre: Arbitrator Christie Dismissal – Employee received retrenchment pay – Afterwards employee claimed unfair dismissal for misconduct – Employee to restore severance pay for misconduct case to be heard. The respondent had advised the applicant of a possible dismissal for operational requirements. Consultation meetings were held between the parties but they could not reach consensus. The respondent offered the applicant alternative employment which he denied. The respondent paid out the retrenchment pay to the applicant. After receiving the retrenchment pay, the applicant claimed that he had been unfairly dismissed for misconduct. The respondent denied the claim. December 2006 – Page 7 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za Noted: That the applicant was not entitled to retrenchment pay because he had refused reasonable alternative employment. Held: That the applicant should restore the severance pay that the respondent had paid him, if he wished to pursue his claim for an alleged dismissal based on misconduct. Constitutional Court: CCT 68/05 South African Police Service v Public Servants Association: Judges Sachs & Yacoob Interpretation and application – Employing incumbent employee in higher post without advertising. This was an application for leave to appeal to the Court against a decision given in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). The issue concerned the interpretation to be given to the word ‘may’ in regulation 24(6) of the Regulations for the South African Police Service (SAPS). Noted: That the regulation provides that: “If the National Commissioner raises the salary of a post, she or he may continue to employ the incumbent employee in the higher-graded post without advertising the post if the incumbent – (a) Already performs the duties of the post; (b) Has received a satisfactory rating in her or his most recent performance assessment; and (c) Starts employment at the minimum notch of the higher salary range.” The High Court held that the use of the word ‘may’ in regulation 24(6) was unambiguous and should be given its ordinary permissive meaning. A declaratory order was, accordingly, issued to the effect that regulation 24(6) vests in the National Commissioner a discretion either to advertise the post or continue to employ the incumbent employee in the upgraded post. The Public Servants Association then appealed to the SCA. Three SCA judges held that interpreting the regulation consistently with the right to fair labour practice and the right not to be unfairly dismissed required the retention of the incumbent in a post when it was upgraded. Two judges held that the appeal should fail and that the word ‘may’ should be given its ordinary permissive meaning. Held: That the Commissioner did have a discretion whether to advertise or not, but could not exercise that discretion in a manner which could lead to the redundancy of a satisfactory incumbent. Accordingly, the regulation had to be read in a way that neither produced the rigidity of outcome that would flow from the view of the majority in the SCA, nor carried the risk of consequent redundancy implicit in the minority approach. Accordingly, the provision should be read to permit the Commissioner not to advertise a newly re-graded post, despite the general obligation requiring that all vacant posts should be advertised, in circumstances where an incumbent of a post has been satisfactorily performing the tasks attached to it. Where there is such an incumbent, the Commissioner is obliged to appoint the incumbent to the newly re-graded post on the minimum salary range attached to the new post. Case references Bernstein & Others v Bester NO & Others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) Bhana v Dönges, NO & Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences & Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd & Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) Nel v Le Roux NO & Others 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) South African Railways & Harbours v New Silverton Estate, Ltd 1946 AD 830. Schwartz v Schwartz 1984 (4) SA 467 (A) The National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v The South African Police Union & Others (TPD) Case No 28812/02, 31 October 2003, as yet unreported The Public Servants Association v National Commissioner of the South African Police Service SCA 573/04, 25 November 2005, as yet unreported Van Rooyen & Others v The State & Others 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) December 2006 – Page 8 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za RACE DISCRIMINATION AND BIAS CLAIMS By Dorothy Khosa Introduction The Constitution Act 108 of 1996 is the supreme law of the Republic of South Africa. One of the obligations that it imposes is that of employees’ right not to be unfairly discriminated against. This obligation is also imposed in labour legislation, amongst others, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. According to labour legislation, there are different forms of discrimination that are regarded to be unfair. The focus of the article is on unfair discrimination based on race. Either party involved in the employment relationship can translate such form of unfair discrimination to biasness. Unfair discrimination based on race It is surprising to realise that racial discrimination in South Africa still surface in employment relationships even though it is prohibited by legislation. One would not expect such actions in this era, but the reality is that it still persists. There are situations in which employees, in applying for posts, are made to suffer racial prejudice. The case of Stokwe v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province & Another (2005) 14 (LC) addressed this issue. In this case, the applicant applied for a promotional post of principal and she was interviewed. In the interview, the applicant obtained equal scores with the appointee. The panel then considered other relevant factors in determining the appointment. Eventually, the applicant became the best candidate. Her promotion was then recommended to the school governing body. After perusing the recommendations, the governing body indicated that the candidate who was second best should be appointed to the position. The governing body’s reasons were not clear, but it was indicated that the applicant was not fluent in Afrikaans. The Department of Education established an independent review panel to consider the final recommendation made by the school governing body. The panel insisted that the interview be conducted in Afrikaans, but the applicant refused. The panel indicated that the applicant should not have applied for the position if she was not in a position to communicate in Afrikaans because that was the medium of instruction at the school. Eventually the interviewing panel decided in favour of the other applicant, the appointee. The Labour Court (LC) found that the issue of language arose at the school governing body meeting when it realised that a black woman was to be appointed. The governing body had assumed that a black woman would not be proficient in Afrikaans. That, according to the LC, amounted to racial stereotyping. That manifested bias and prejudice on the part of the school governing body. The applicant was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of race. Mischke (2006 (a)) argued that if proficiency in Afrikaans was a key requirement for the post that should have been clearly set out in the advertisement. To avoid disruptions, at the school in question, an agreement was reached that the applicant should be appointed to a level of principal within the metropolitan area in question. The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the applicant. Employees are sometimes refused promotions because of the employment equity targets that have been set in an organisation. The EEA indicates that it is not unfair discrimination for an employer to take affirmative action measures consistent with its purpose. In the case of Baxter v National Commissioner, Correctional Services & Another (2006) 9 BLLR 844 (LC), the respondent claimed that it did not appoint the applicant to the position because of its employment equity targets. In this case the applicant, a Coloured male, was recommended for appointment to a position. However, the recommendation was turned down on the basis that it did not advance the respondent’s employment equity objectives. The position was re-advertised and an African male was appointed. The successful candidate was subsequently transferred to another post, and another officer transferred to the post in question. In querying the appointment, the applicant was informed that his appointment would not have addressed the respondent’s equity targets. The applicant contended that he was unfairly discriminated because, had he been appointed, he would have been the only coloured in that level in the province concerned. Black males and a female filled the other posts. The applicant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on gender and race. The LC held that the reasons given by the respondents for not appointing the applicant contradicted the recommendations of the selection committee. The evidence was, therefore, sufficient to prove that the decision not to appoint the applicant was based on unfair discrimination. The LC ordered the respondents to ensure that the applicant received the salary and benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been appointed to the post, with interest. Allegations of bias The Wikipedia, encyclopaedia, defines the word bias as a “prejudice in a general or specific sense, usually in the sense for having a preference to one particular point of view or ideological perspective. However, one is generally only said to be biased if one’s powers of judgment are influenced by the biases one hold, to the extent that one’s views could not be taken as being neutral or objective, but instead as subjective”. Different forms of unfair discrimination could result into biasness. For instance, the article has discussed cases April 2005– Page 9 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za whereby employers’ biasness had resulted in non-appointment of candidates in promotional positions. Biasness can also become an issue in disciplinary enquiries. Mischke (2006 (b)) argues that allegations of bias usually arise because a chairperson is seen as having a vested interest in the outcome of a case or if he or she has been involved, in some way or another, in the investigation of the disciplinary charges and events. “The rule against bias emanates from administrative law, which requires that an officer presiding at a disciplinary hearing must not only be impartial in fact, but also that there should be no grounds for even suspecting that his or her decision might be shaped by extraneous factors...”. That does not mean that a manager of a company, chairing a disciplinary hearing, would not be able to decide on guilt and sanction objectively. This issue seemed to be relevant to an arbitration case that was held at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), thereafter, referred to the LC. The case was between Cell C (Pty) Ltd v Finger & Others (2006) 10 BLLR 919 (LC). In this case, the applicant, a black man, objected to the arbitrator on the basis of race. The arbitrator was Indian. The respondent’s two representatives were also Indian. The applicant alleged that the situation was racially imbalanced against him. The arbitrator recused himself, and the respondent referred the issue to the LC for review. The LC ruled that an objection to one’s race could never be a reason for a presiding officer to recuse himself or herself. An objection on such grounds would make litigation in a multi-racial country impossible. At the time the LC heard the matter, the case had been postponed by the CCMA and it was to be heard by another commissioner. The case of Marley FloorWorx v MEWUSA (2005) 14 MEIBC is similar to the Cell C one, except that the arbitrator refused to recuse himself. In the Marley case, an application for recusal was made because of a perceived bias on the part of the bargaining council arbitrator against both the union and the employee. The arbitrator stated that one should not give in to the unfounded and ill-informed fears of bias expressed by parties who either want a presiding officer of the choice to hear the matter, or if the party concerned wants to bully the arbitrator into accepting a point of view. Conclusion Discrimination is not always unfair according to legislation of the country. It becomes unfair if certain practices are performed outside the parameters of laws of the country. For example, the EEA states that an appointment of a person that conforms to the requirements of equity targets of the employer cannot be regarded as being unfair provided there is evidence of such a claim. Legislation list certain grounds that are regarded as unfair discrimination, for example, an employer cannot refuse to promote a person because of his or her race. The article also discussed the issue of biasness as a result of one’s race. It focuses mainly on biasness that prevails during disciplinary enquiries. An employee may request a presiding officer to recuse himself or herself if there are reasons to doubt his or her impartially. Employees sometimes doubt the impartiality of a presiding officer because they would like to have someone of their choice to preside over their case. Unfortunately that is not possible in statutory arbitration, like those held at the CCMA. Case references Cell C (Pty) Ltd v Finger & Others (2006) 10 BLLR 919 (LC). Stokwe v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province & Another (2005) 14 (LC) Baxter v National Commissioner, Correctional Services & Another (2006) 9 BLLR 844 (LC) References Grogan, J. Workplace Law, 7th Ed. Juta Law: Lansdowne. Mischke, C. 2006(a). “Race discrimination is alive and well”. IRNETWORK. www.irnetwork.co.za. Accessed in December 2006. Mischke, C. 2006(b). “Bias and race”. IRNETWORK. www.irnetwork.co.za. Accessed in December 2006. Republic of South Africa. The Constitution, Act 108 of 1996. Government Printers: Pretoria. Republic of South Africa. The Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998. Government Printers: Pretoria. Republic of South Africa. The Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995. Government Printers: Pretoria. The Wikipedia. Encyclopaedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bias. Accessed in December 2006. April 2005– Page 10 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za THE RETRENCHMENT GUIDELINES: ARE THEY GETTING ANY CLEARER? Presented by Professor Alan Rycroft Summarised by Alucia Mdaka Introduction Rycroft indicated that her presentation would focus on reviewing the retrenchment cases that were reported since the 2005 Labour Law Conference. Rycroft mentioned that the reason for reviewing those cases was because dismissals for operational reasons remained highly contested. Pre-retrenchment consultation Section 189 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (LRA) imposes on employers three main duties prior to retrenchment process. The duties are as follows: Consultation As regards to consultation it has to take a “meaningful joint decision seeking process”. However, the 2002 amendments changed the wording of section 189 (2) from “the consulting parties must attempt to reach consensus…” to “the employer and the other consulting parties must in the consulting envisaged by subsections (1) and (3) engage in a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process and attempt to reach consensus….”. The amendment was an attempt to give the concept of consultation a deeper meaning. That was approved in the case of Atlas Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1995) 1 BLLR 1 (AD). Rycroft explained that the consultation process is meant to be a rational one. Section 189 (5) and (6) provide that the employer must allow the other consulting party an opportunity to make representations on any matter in which they are consulting. Disclosure of information Section 189 (3) requires an employer to present virtual retrenchment scenarios. The following are the retrenchment scenarios that should be presented: a) b) c) d) e) f) Reasons for the proposed dismissal, The alternatives the employer has considered, The number of employees likely to be affected, Proposed selection criteria, The timing of the proposed dismissal, and The proposed severance pay. The problem an employer faces if it complies with the disclosure requirement at an early stage is that, it appears as if there is a “fait accompli”. After all, what is there to consult about if the employer has gone through all the alternatives to dismissal already? In NEHAWU & Others v University of Pretoria (2006) 27 ILJ 117 LAC, the employer, during the restructuring exercise, came to the consultation table with “predisposition” towards solving its problems through outsourcing. The Labour Appeal Court held that the employer had not acted contrary to the requirements of section 189 (2). Attempt to reach consensus In the case of Robinson & Others v PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) 27 ILJ 836 (LC), the employer’s letter was essentially a specific retrenchment scenario in which it requested employees to submit counter proposals. The problem was that, the very details and specifics had the effect on the employees and they believed that it was unnecessary to consult further because the supported the employees’ attitude. The Labour Court gave little weight to the obligation in section 189 (2) on employees to jointly engage in the consensus-seeking process. The employees’ absence to consultation was excused by the Labour Court because of the tone of the letters given to them. However, even if it was excused in the Robinson’s case, it is important to realise that employees share in the responsibility to consult. Rycroft stated that trade union officials and employees should make creative proposals so that employees cannot later complain that the employer was unfair in not considering, for example, bumping, if they did not raise a possibility in the consensus seeking stage. That has been recognised in the case between SACCAWU & Others v Gallo Africa (2005) 26 ILJ 2397 (LC). It was held that pre-retrenchment consultation is a two way process and if an employee withdraws from consultation, it would not be unfair for the employer to finalise the retrenchment process alone. Similarly, in the case of CWIU & Others v Latex Surgical Products Pty Ltd (2002) 23 ILJ 1386 (LC), the union attempted to frustrate the process to avoid reaching consensus. The employer implemented proposals without reaching the consensus with the union, and the Labour Court held it to be procedurally fair. Issues for consultation Section 189 (7) of the LRA requires that retrenchment must be in accordance with selection criteria that have been agreed upon or that is fair and objective. However, section 189 (6) requires an employer to consider and respond to representations made and to state the reasons for disagreeing. In the recent case of CWIU & Others v Latex Surgical Products April 2005– Page 11 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 292 (LAC), both these aspects were in dispute. The Court confirmed the following principles: If shortly after retrenchment aimed at downsizing an employer employs casual employees to do the same work as those retrenched, a presumption of the unfairness of the retrenchment will arise, An employer is obliged to give serious consideration to a proposal of job-sharing as an alternative, An employer or a union is free to agree upon selection criteria that are or may be subjective, and Where the employer does not use agreed selection criteria to select the employee to be dismissed, it may not use selection criteria other than “fair and objective” selection criteria. The case of Robinson also dealt with the issue of selection criteria. In that case, the Court held that cost saving as the only selection criterion was unfair. Criteria must not only be fair and objective, but must also be fairly and objectively applied. Bumping has been reaffirmed as an acceptable practice. In the case of CEPPWAWU obo Gumede & Others v Republican Press (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 335 (LC), the Court held that it was unfair to apply the “last in first out” only on a departmental basis. Alternative employment: How much persuading must an employer do? The Code of Good Practice on Dismissal requires the employer to consider alternative employment. However, in the case where the employee unreasonably refuses to accept the alternative employment, the employer can withhold the severance pay. In L & C Steinmuller (Africa) Ltd & Others v Shepherd (2005) 26 ILJ 2359 (LAC), the respondent was offered an alternative employment in a newly created company. The respondent offered to accept the alternative employment subject to conditions which the company was unable to accommodate. The respondent’s services were terminated on the grounds of redundancy. At the CCMA, it was found that the dismissal was unfair because there were no meaningful consultations and the employer had not made a reasonable effort to convince the employee to accept the offer. However, the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) found that there had been meaningful consultation. The L AC noted that, in terms of the labour law the employer who offers an alternative employment is not obliged to convince the employee to accept the alternative offer. Even if there is no question of convincing involved, there must be compliance with an internal policy dealing with the alternative employment. The case of Absa Investment Services (Pty) Ltd v Crowhurt (2006) 27 ILJ 107 (LAC) dealt with the issue. In this case, the employer had failed in terms of its own policy to offer the option of resignation to an employee as an alternative employment when her position had become redundant. The LAC held that the dismissal was both procedurally and substantively unfair. When is it retrenchment or resignation? Rycroft stated that there is confusion in a situation where an employee has volunteered to resign and when an employee has been retrenched. In NUMSA obo Members v Bavcan (2006) 27 ILJ 414 (BCA), employees who had accepted voluntary retrenchment together with severance package, were found to have terminated their contracts with agreement and had not been dismissed for operational reasons. They were, therefore, not eligible for re-employment in terms of the collective agreement. Reference Rycroft, A. 2006. The Retrenchment Guidelines: Are they getting any clearer? Presentation made at the 19th Annual Labour Law Conference, 5-7 July 2006. South Africa April 2005– Page 12 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za CONFUSION BORNE OUT OF PUBLIC HOLIDAYS By Lucky Moloi Introduction The Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994 is aimed at making “provision for a new calendar of public holidays, to provide that the public holidays be paid holidays, and for matters incidental thereto”. In this Act, “public holidays” means the days mentioned in Schedule 1 of this Act which are: New Year's Day 1 January, Human Rights Day 21 March, Good Friday before Easter Sunday, Family Day Monday after Easter Sunday, Freedom Day 27 April, Workers' Day 1 May, Youth Day 16 June, National Women's Day 9 August, Heritage Day 24 September, Day of Reconciliation 16 December, Christmas Day 25 December, and Day of Goodwill 26 December. The Public Holidays Act also stipulates “any reference in any law to public holidays, shall be deemed to be a reference to the public holidays as defined in this Act”, and continues in section 2 (1) to stipulate that “the days mentioned in Schedule 1 shall be public holidays, and whenever any public holiday falls on a Sunday, the following Monday shall be a public holiday”. Therefore, any of the public holidays mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Public Holidays Act, whether falling on a Sunday or not, should be regarded as non-business day(s) within the meaning of any law relating to bills of exchange or promissory notes. Contending the interpretation and application of section 2 (1) of the Public Holidays Act It has always been acknowledged or construed that the public holiday on the Monday is in substitution for the public holiday on the Sunday. As in the recent judgment of Randfontein Estates Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (case number JR1218/05), handed down by the Labour Court on 14 February 2006, the issue of the interpretation of section 2 (1) of the Public Holidays Act came to the fore. The employer contended that this statutory provision should be interpreted to mean that where a public holiday falls on a Sunday, the following Monday is substituted for that public holiday. The Sunday would then be treated as a normal working day in terms of its collective agreement governing continuous process operations with NUM. The employer claimed that any other interpretation would result in such employees achieving a double benefit in that they would receive two paid days off work instead of one. NUM also contended that section 2 (1) of the Act meant that where a public holiday falls on a Sunday, the following Monday shall also constitute a public holiday. The Labour Court was, therefore, required to determine the proper interpretation of the contended section, that is, where the Monday is substituted for the public holiday, which falls on a Sunday, or whether the Monday constitutes a public holiday in addition to the Sunday. Interpreting statutes in terms of Interpretation Act The process of statutory interpretation begins with an assessment of the ordinary or plain meaning of the language employed. It is only if there is an ambiguity in the plain language that an additional approach to interpretation becomes relevant. The Labour Court noted that section 2 (1) of the Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994 provides that where a public holiday falls on a Sunday, the following Monday shall be a public holiday. The Labour Court have attributed to these words their “ordinary literal grammatical meaning”, which is the first principle regarding the interpretation of statutes. The rationale for this provision is to ensure that employees who do not ordinarily work on Sundays obtain benefits of a paid day off by transferring the benefit to the following day, which would ordinarily be a working day. The transfer of this benefit to the following day is not required in the case of employees who would ordinarily work on a Sunday because those workers obtain the benefit of a paid day off. To allow such employees an additional public holiday on the Monday would mean that they would receive two paid days off. The Labour Court also noted that section 2 (1) of the Public Holidays Act consists of a primary and a subordinate clause. The subordinate clause “and whenever any public holiday falls on a Sunday, the following Monday shall be a public holiday” stands as an additional and distinct clause and does not qualify the primary clause. Since the primary clause defines “public holidays” as inter alia “the days mentioned in Schedule 1”, the date determined to be a public holiday does not change its character merely because it happens to fall on a Sunday. The Court stated that the second clause is in addition to, and distinct from, the first clause, and, in the view of the Court, is not a qualifying clause and is not in substitution of the primary or first clause. Therefore, the celebrations can still take place on the Sunday, even though the next day is deemed a public holiday. The Court held that, since section 2 (1) is not ambiguous, its plain meaning must be followed. Entitlement or benefit to public holidays April 2005– Page 13 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za In terms of section 5 (1) of the Public Holidays Act every employee shall be entitled to “at least the number of public holidays as provided for in this Act”, and payment for every public holiday, which payment should be at least as favourable as the payment provided for by section 18 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA). Section 18 of the BCEA stipulates that an “employer may not require an employee to work on a public holiday except in accordance with an agreement”. That is, any public holiday shall be exchangeable for any other day which is fixed by agreement or agreed to between an employer and employee. One should be bear in mind that when interpreting the BCEA, it applies to all employers and employees except members of the Defence Force, National Intelligence Agency, South African Secret Service, and unpaid volunteers working for charity. It should also be borne in mind that the section regulating working hours does not apply to workers in senior management, sales staff who travel and regulate their own working hours, workers who work less than 24 hours in a month, workers who earn more than R115 572 per year. Workers engaged in emergency work are also excluded from certain provisions. Therefore, one may conclude that section 5 (1) of the Public Holidays Act provides for such an exchange of public holidays for other days where the employer and the employees agreed to do so. As in Tsambo v Ovestone Farms (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 418 (ALC), the respondent's employees had agreed to exchange the public holidays, which fell in the respondent's busiest harvest time, for days off. The applicant had refused to work on 21 March, a public holiday, and was given a final written warning for the offence. After he again failed to work on 17 April, a disciplinary hearing was held. The applicant refused to attend and the hearing was held in his absence. He was dismissed and that sanction was upheld after an appeal hearing. In an application in terms of section 17E (3) of the old Labour Relations Act (LRA) read with the Agricultural Labour Act 147 of 1993, the applicant had testified that he had decided not to work on public holiday and that he had discussed his decision with his fellow-workers, but that he had not done so with management. The Agricultural Labour Court (the ALC) had accepted that a real need existed for the respondent to exchange the public holidays for other days that fell outside the optimum harvest period. The ALC found that it was clear that the Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994 provides for such an exchange of public holidays for other days where the employer and the employees agreed to do so. Such an agreement did not require a unanimous decision, a decision of the majority of workers was sufficient and was binding on the minority. The ALC was satisfied that the majority of the respondent's workers had been in favour of the exchange of the holidays and that an agreement had been reached. The agreement bound the applicant. He nonetheless decided not to work on public holidays but had never communicated his decision to management nor did he follow the established grievance procedure. The ALC, accordingly, found that the applicant's misconduct was a valid and fair reason for his dismissal, and that his dismissal was not an unfair labour practice. The agreement should be mutual and unambiguously communicated, within proper channels, in order for it to be binding on all parties. In SA Chemical Workers Union & Others v C E Industrial (Pty) Ltd T/A Panvet (1988) 9 ILJ 639 (IC), the applicants had been dismissed for failure to work on Easter Monday after the respondent company had issued an instruction to the entire work force on the Thursday preceding Easter Monday that it would be a working day. In an application in terms of section 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act, the respondent alleged that it was policy that non-factory holidays were working days, which were given off only in exceptional cases. It alleged that that the fact that Easter Monday had not been worked in the previous two years did not create a custom, and that a final warning had been issued in February that further trouble would lead to dismissal. The Industrial Court found that the crux of the matter was whether the instruction to work on Easter Monday was lawful and reasonable. That it was lawful was not doubted, but whether it was reasonable and enforceable was another matter. There had been doubt whether it was a clearly understood policy of the company to ordinarily work on non-factory holidays. There were reasonable grounds for workers to assume they would have Easter Monday off. A sensitive management would have taken the initiative to ensure that the day was a holiday as had been the case for the two previous years, would have discussed the matter with the trade union which had only recently taken over from the liaison officers, and would not only have given notice on the day before the long weekend began. The Court rejected the 'reasonable employer' test: fairness is of a subjective nature in regard to which reason is not necessarily applicable. Fairness must take account of human fallibility and of the fact that reason is seldom the sole guide of human behaviour. A sensitive response to deeply felt needs of his work-force, even if objectively those needs are not reasonable in all respects, should be expected of any manager. That did not mean that he must abdicate his responsibilities and refrain from imposing discipline or ensuring that fair rules are adhered to and fair instructions carried out. The Court found, therefore, that the manner in which work on Easter Monday was handled had a distinct element of unfairness. Since there had, however, been a history of deliberate ignoring of instructions and other ill-disciplined actions, the Court refused to reinstate the employees but awarded wages for ten weeks. Terms of payment of remuneration In terms of section 5 (1) (b) of the Public Holidays Act “payment for every public holiday, which payment shall be at least as favourable as the payment provided for by section 11 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1983 (Act No. 3 of 1983)”. April 2005– Page 14 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za Interpreted in terms of the amended Basic Conditions of Employment Act, it would read thus “every employee shall be entitled to at least the number of public holidays as provided for in this Act”, and payment for every public holiday, which payment should be at least as favourable as the payment provided for by section 18 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA). This should be so read or interpreted because the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1983 has been repealed. In National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Another v Steel & Engineering Industries Federation Of SA & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1047 (W), the High Court declared that clause 11(3) of the Industrial Council Agreement for the Iron, Steel, Engineering & Metallurgical Industry was not invalid for being in conflict with section 5 of the Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994. Clause 11 (3) provides that an employee who is required by his employer to work a shift immediately preceding or following a public holiday and who is absent from work is not entitled to be paid for the public holiday save in certain circumstances. The Court examined the objects of the Public Holidays Act and held that the prohibition in section 5 was not enacted in the public interest and could be waived. The Court found that it had been waived by the industrial council agreement which had the force of law. The declaratory order that clause 11(3) was invalid and of no force and effect was, accordingly, not granted. It has been recently held in the Labour Court in the judgment of Randfontein Estates Ltd v NUM (2006) 7 BLLR 683 (LC), that those employees who work a five-day week, and are therefore not required to work on a Saturday or Sunday, for which they do not, in any case, get paid, they would not be entitled to be paid for the public holiday on the Sunday. The reasoning here is that the employee is entitled to the Sunday off without pay, as part of these terms and conditions of employment. The employee is contracted to work only five days per week, and thus a public holiday on the Sunday is not a day on which the employee would ordinarily work, therefore he/she is not entitled to be paid for that day if he/she does not work. Therefore, that is the reasoning of declaring a Monday a public holiday in order to benefit such employees. Such employees would be entitled to have the Monday off on full pay, since the Monday is a public holiday, falling on a day on which he/she would have ordinarily worked. In the case of the seven-day week worker, the public holiday on the Sunday would then fall on a day on which he would ordinarily work, and he must be paid in terms of the BCEA or, obviously, in terms of any collective agreement or main agreement that may be in existence. This payment would probably amount to double the normal wage rate, because it is a public holiday. That is, should that same worker then also work on the Monday, he/ she would again have to be paid double the normal wage rate, because the Judgment states that the public holiday on the Monday is in addition to the public holiday on the Sunday. According to Jackson (1996) “the answer there, in the case of 7-day per week employees, would be for the employer to decide whether they are to work on the Sunday at double the normal wage rate, and have the Monday off work at normal pay, or the other way around, or whether he will give employees both days off on normal pay, since both days would be public holidays”. Conclusion Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994 is aimed at making “provision for a new calendar of public holidays, to provide that the public holidays be paid holidays, and for matters incidental thereto”. Therefore, if a public holiday falls on a Sunday, then an employee would have a day off on the Sunday, irrespective of whether it was a public holiday or not - thus, if it was a public holiday, that employee would be losing out on the benefit of a day off work on full pay. Therefore, the legislature had ruled that the Monday should be a public holiday so that those employees could enjoy the benefits of a day off work on full pay. Case references National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Another v Steel & Engineering Industries Federation Of SA & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1047 (W) Randfontein Estates Ltd v NUM (2006) 7 BLLR 683 (LC) SA Chemical Workers Union & Others v C E Industrial (Pty) Ltd T/A Panvet (1988) 9 ILJ 639 (IC) Tsambo v Ovestone Farms (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 418 (ALC) References Jackson, D. 2006. Two holidays or one? Labour Guide. www.labourguide.co.za Accessed in December 2006. Republic of South Africa. Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printers. Republic of South Africa. Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994. Pretoria: Government Printers. April 2005– Page 15 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za INHERENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE JOB By Poso Mogale Introduction Section 6 (1) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) provides that no person may unfairly discriminate against an employee in any employment policy or practice. The discrimination will be deemed to be fair if it was intended to promote affirmative action or it is an inherent requirement of the job. The purpose of this article is to put the concept of inherent requirement of the job under the microscope and analyse whether it is being properly applied. Hoffman v South African Airways (2000) 12 BLLR 1365 (CC) remains the leading judgement on the issue of inherent requirements of the job. The Constitutional Court held that South African Airway’s (SAA) refusal to employ Hoffman as a cabin attendant because of his HIV status constituted unfair discrimination. SAA was not able to discharge its onus of proving that being HIV negative is an inherent requirement of the job of a cabin attendant. The Labour Court was faced with a similar call in the recent cases of IMATU v City of Cape Town (2005) 11 BLLR 1084 (LC), Wallace v Du Toit (2006) 8 BLLR 757 (LC) and Dlamini & Others v Green Four Security (2006) 11 BLLR 1074 (LC). Employers continue to apply inherent requirements of the job as an excuse or a reason to justify discrimination. The meaning of the word “inherent” The English Oxford dictionary defines “inherent” as “existing in something as a permanent or essential attribute”. This concept found its way into South African labour law through the EEA. However, the Act does not define this concept. Section 6 (2) of this Act provides that discrimination based on the inherent requirement of a job may be regarded as fair discrimination. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) in its consideration of complaints has also considered the inherent requirement exception. Article 1 (2) of the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention No 111 of 1958 affirms what is in the EEA by providing that “any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.” An inherent requirement is something that is essential to the position rather than incidental, peripheral or accidental. The onus is on the employer to determine the inherent requirements of the particular position and consider their application to the specific employee before the inherent requirements exception may be invoked. The inherent requirements should be determined by reference to the specific job to be done and the surrounding context of the position, including the nature of the business and the manner in which the business is conducted. There must be a tight correlation between the inherent requirements of the particular job and the employee’s circumstances. The inherent requirements exception must be interpreted strictly so as not to defeat the purpose of the antidiscriminatory provisions. Employers may decide to follow a similar recruitment process. For example, financial institutions may decide that offences of dishonesty and theft are relevant to jobs in that industry. Determining the inherent requirement of a job at the beginning assists the employer to avoid problems and misunderstandings halfway through the process of employment. The starting point for identifying inherent requirements of the job is to determine the tasks that the employee will be required to perform, the circumstances in which the work is going to be carried out and any organisational requirement of the job. Inherent requirements of the job may be required during the pre-employment process or during the course of employment. When they occur during the course of employment, they may lead to operational requirements dismissals. In Qantas Airways Limited v Christie (1998) 43 AILR, the Australian Court found that the inherent requirement of a job is a requirement which is “fundamental, intrinsic or essential to that position”. In IMATU v City of Cape Town, the respondent refused to employ Mr Murdoch to the position of fire fighter after he had passed the physical fitness test with flying colours. The refusal was on the basis that he was an insulin dependent diabetic. The City’s employment policy and practice was that they do not appoint insulin dependent diabetics as fire fighters. The union argued that the City’s failure to appoint Murdoch constituted, inter alia, unfair discrimination on the grounds of disability. The City’s defence was that its blanket ban on employment of diabetics is fair and justified on the basis of the inherent requirements of the job of a fire fighter. The following principles represent the current state of the law on the aspect: The Labour Court (LC) held that the risks inherent in hypoglycaemia for diabetics, while real, they do not support the What the courts says April 2005– Page 16 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za imposition of a blanket ban. The risk will vary from person to person. The LC, therefore, held that the City had unfairly discriminated against Murdoch and had, accordingly, failed to discharge its onus of proving the fairness of the discrimination. Wallace v Du Toit is another case where the concept of inherent requirements of the job came under the spot light. In this case, the employer argued that as a child minder, the employee’s not being pregnant constituted an inherent requirement of the job. When the employee was employed she was single and indicated to the employer that she had no intention of having her own children. After some years she got married and when she informed the employer of her pregnancy her services were terminated. The employee denied the employer’s contention that as a condition of employment, pregnancy meant termination of the relationship. She further said that she did not see any reason why her motherhood would affect her ability to perform her job well. The employer’s main argument was that a child minder who had her own children would not put his children first. The LC found that the employer’s conduct constituted an automatically unfair dismissal. The employer was also found guilty of contravening the EEA by unfairly discriminating the employee on the basis of pregnancy. Dlamini & Others v Green Four Security, is another example where inherent requirements arose during the course of employment. In this case the applicant and other employees were dismissed because they refused to shave or trim their beards for religious reasons. They alleged that their dismissals were automatically unfair. The employer’s argument was that they were contractually bound to be clean shaven. It further argued that the applicants were beardless when they commenced employment. Over and above the fact that the rule was applied equally and consistently to all employees, the LC noted that grooming enjoys high priority in all security services, including the SANDF, SAPS and Metro Police. The LC held that the applicants failed to prove that the trimming of beards or hair was central to their faith and absolutely prohibited by their church. It, accordingly, held that their dismissals were fair and that the clean-shaven rule is an inherent requirement of the job. Conclusion Surely an employer is entitled to dismiss or not employ an employee on the basis of inherent requirements of the job. However, the employer must be careful to ensure that this is the real reason for the dismissal or non-appointment. It must also ensure that the inherent requirements of the job cannot be performed in a manner that would otherwise accommodate the employee’s shortfall. One can only hope that the escalating number of referrals on this aspect will raise awareness, thereby alleviating its inappropriate application. Case references South Africa Dlamini & Others v Green Four Security (2006) 11 BLLR 1074 (LC) Hoffman v South African Airways (2000) 12 BLLR 1365 (CC) IMATU v City of Cape Town (2005) 11 BLLR 1084 Wallace v du Toit (2006) 8 BLLR 757 Australia Qantas Airways Limited v Christie (1998) 43 AILR References New York. English Oxford Dictionary. 2001. Oxford University Press Geneva, ILO Discrimination (Employment & Occupation) Convention No 111 of 1958 Republic of South Africa, Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, Government Printers, Pretoria April 2005– Page 17 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION CALLS FOR “AMBITIOUS REFORMS” IN LABOUR INSPECTION Summarised by Lucky Moloi The world’s 120,000 labour inspectors face daunting challenges: preventing 2.2 million fatal occupational diseases and accidents each year and contributing to the fight against HIV/AIDS, child labour and forced labour. The Governing Body of the International Labour Office (ILO) has called for an international strategy to modernise and strengthen labour inspection. GENEVA (ILO Online) – The hiring by the Ontario Provincial government in Canada of 200 new labour inspectors over the last two years has had stunning results: not only 9,000 fewer injuries per year but also savings of an estimated 45 million Canadian dollars in workers’ compensation costs. “The example shows that strengthening labour inspectorates not only prevents accidents and saves human lives but also pays for all actors involved”, said ILO labour inspection expert Gerd Albracht. “Following an innovative cooperation agreement with the government, the provincial compensation fund paid the 28 million Canadian dollars in salaries for the new inspectors who only targeted the firms with the poorest occupational safety and health record”. Germany provides another example. There, the prevention inspectors of the mutual accident insurance HVBG identified slipping and falling as a main source of accidents and launched a nationwide awareness raising campaign. Between 2002 and 2004, work related accidents were reduced by 26 per cent and compensation costs dropped by 80 million euros. This kind of effective labour inspection could help to prevent many other occupational accidents and diseases and contribute to the fight against HIV/AIDS, child labour and forced labour, says a new ILO report to the Governing Body. According to the report, several countries have recently begun to reinvigorate labour inspection. “That is the good news. The bad news is that labour administrations in most Englishspeaking African countries receive, for example, no more than 1 per cent of the national budget. In some cases the figure is only 0.1 per cent”, comments Albracht. According to the report, the quality of the overall labour administration system is vital to the effectiveness of a labour inspectorate. The ILO Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No.150), and its accompanying Recommendation (No.158) set out the overall duties of a labour administration as including labour inspection. The ILO Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No.81) and its 1995 Protocol set out the specific measures for the organisation of labour inspection. Labour inspectorates understaffed For the first time, the ILO has set “reasonable benchmarks” for the number of labour inspectors in relation to workers in its report. But many countries do not reach these benchmarks. While the ILO benchmarks range between one inspector to 10,000 workers in industrial market economies and one to 40,000 in less developed countries, the actual ratios range between one to 5,500 in Malaysia and one to 3,200,000 in Bangladesh. Many successful inspectors in developing and emerging countries have joined the private sector attracted by higher remuneration and better career prospects. Often, these officers receive only limited initial training and have little opportunity to receive any in-service training. This leads to a decline in the quality of inspections undertaken, says the report. “Other factors that challenge the authority and credibility of labour inspection services include violence against inspectors and corruption, weak networking structures and no possibilities to establish the electronic databases that can generate annual reports and help in identifying inspection priorities, particularly high-risk workplaces”, says Albracht. According to the report, labour inspectors also play an important role in protecting workers in relation to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and limiting the spread and effects of the epidemic. As such, a role is relatively novel for labour inspectorates in many of the hardest hit countries, the ILO offers support for training on HIV/AIDS prevention and impact mitigation for labour inspectors based on a specially developed handbook for labour inspectors. The report calls for an Integrated Labour Inspection System (ILIS) to integrate administrative, procedural and technical elements into a holistic, coherent and flexible approach to labour inspection: from the global policy level down to the operational level in the enterprise where the quantity and quality of inspections can be significantly improved. “In essence, an ILIS is used to raise worldwide awareness of the social dimension of the workplace, in addition to the economic, financial and environmental aspects. The implementation of core labour standards at the national level can be significantly enhanced if the capacities and quality of national labour inspectorates are strengthened by ambitious reforms as already seen in some countries”, explains Albracht. The bedrock for such reforms is ILO Convention No.81 on labour inspection in industry and commerce. With 135 April 2005– Page 18 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za ratifications, it is one of the ten most ratified ILO conventions to date and serves as a good international guide to secure the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers. References A Handbook on HIV/AIDS for Labour and Factory Inspectors, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2005 Strategies and Practice for Labour Inspection, report of the Committee on Employment and Social Policy to the Governing Body (GB.297/ESP/3), November 2006. April 2005– Page 19 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Summarised by Lucky Moloi Collective bargaining is fundamental to the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Since the inception of the International Labour Organisation (the ILO) in 1919, collective bargaining has been acknowledged as an instrument of social justice. The ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, part of the ILO Constitution, recognises the obligation to further “the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining”. The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work recalls that all member States have an obligation to respect, promote and realise the principles concerning fundamental rights, whether or not they have ratified the relevant Conventions. These fundamental rights include freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. States should promote voluntary collective bargaining, where necessary. However it does not specify how this is to be done. Convention No. 154 and Recommendation No. 163 shows how it can be done in a practical way. Together they show how the right to bargain collectively can be effectively exercised. The Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 154) was adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1981. It promotes free and voluntary collective bargaining. However there are several other ILO Conventions and Recommendations that relate to collective bargaining. These are – Collective bargaining is an important form of social dialogue. Institutions for social dialogue and collective bargaining help protect the fundamental rights of workers, help provide social protection and promote sound industrial relations. Social dialogue, in turn, is an important part of good governance. Because social dialogue involves the social partners (employers’ and workers’ organisations) it further encourages accountability and participation in decisions that affect the lives of all society. These factors directly contribute to better government. The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); The Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91); The Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92); The Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 150); The Labour Administration Recommendation, 1978 (No. 158); The Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151); The Labour Relations (Public Service) Recommendation, 1978 (No. 159); and The Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 1981 (No. 163). One of the most well known and widely ratified Conventions that relate to collective bargaining is No. 98 – the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949. This fundamental Convention says that member States should encourage systems of voluntary negotiations in order to regulate terms and conditions of employment through collective agreements. All the other Conventions and Recommendations listed above complement Convention No. 98 through clarifying concepts and supporting the principles that it defines. The Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 154) and its accompanying Recommendation (No. 163) are key to furthering the promotion and implementation of the basic principles of Convention No. 98. This convention provides that member Because it is promotional in nature, Convention No. 154 is very flexible. There are many ways of implementing it, respecting each national context and local preference. It can be implemented in countries with different economic and social situations, in different legislative frameworks, and in a variety of industrial relations systems. Collective bargaining and social dialogue The ILO defines social dialogue to include “all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between representatives of governments, employers and workers”, and involves “issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy.” This definition brings together the elements of various understandings of social dialogue into one inclusive concept. Convention No. 154 and Recommendation No. 163 acknowledge that information, consultation and negotiation are inter-linked and reinforce each other. While focusing on negotiations, both highlight the importance of a common information base for meaningful negotiations, and the role of consultation in deciding measures to encourage and promote collective bargaining. From the ILO perspective, collective bargaining is an important way for workers, employers and their organisations to reach agreement on issues affecting the world of work. While collective bargaining can often be an adversarial process, it should better be used to build trust between the parties. This trust can be reinforced through dialogue which can continue after bargaining ends. April 2005– Page 20 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za Solutions that are built on trust and enjoy the genuine support of both sides are more likely to be respected. This is due to the sense of participation and ownership inherent in the process. As a result, unnecessary disputes, and disruptions through industrial action, can more easily be prevented. The practical means that can be used to develop effective collective bargaining as set out in Convention No. 154 and Recommendation No. 163 necessarily promote social dialogue. In so doing they help to develop a broader culture of dialogue, reinforcing better governance, participation and accountability. Only collective bargaining in good faith is worth promoting. Good faith bargaining requires the parties to make reasonable efforts to enter into an agreement. Genuine, constructive negotiations and the avoidance of unjustified delays are essential if worthwhile collective agreements are to be reached. Ways of promoting collective bargaining Adapted to national conditions Recommendation No. 163 outlines in more detail measures the Government and the parties might take to promote collective bargaining. These measures, adapted to national conditions, should aim at – Because the measures to promote collective bargaining are to be adapted to national conditions, no one set of measures is required. Convention No. 154 respects different national conditions, including various industrial relations systems. National law and practice also apply to collective bargaining in the public service, as well as to the role of workers’ representatives in the process. The Convention also expressly does not preclude collective bargaining within the framework of voluntary conciliation or arbitration procedures. Facilitating the voluntary establishment and growth of free, independent and representative employers’ and workers’ organisations; Ensuring that such employers’ and workers’ organisations are recognised for the purposes of collective bargaining; Establishing objective criteria to determine the organisations that may undertake collective bargaining. The criteria should be decided in consultation with representative workers’ and employers’ organisations, and should relate to the representative nature of the organisation that may be eligible; Allowing collective bargaining to take place at any level, from single workplaces, the organisation or firm, the occupation, the industry, or at the regional or national levels; Ensuring that both parties have access to the information required for meaningful negotiations; and Establishing, if necessary, procedures for the settlement of labour disputes that help the parties find a solution to the dispute themselves. The parties to collective bargaining should – Ensure negotiators have the opportunity to obtain appropriate training, and may ask the public authorities to provide it; and Ensure negotiators have the necessary mandate to conduct and conclude negotiations. Governments have a key role in promoting collective bargaining through providing a legislative framework and establishing supportive institutions. This includes dispute resolution machinery that facilitates bargaining. Initiatives taken by a number of countries include the following: Maintaining statistics on the number and type of collective agreements and their coverage; Providing training on collective bargaining and dispute prevention and settlement; and Offering dispute resolution services by labour authorities. Progressive application of the Convention The Convention states that collective bargaining should be progressively extended to all the matters set out in the Convention. The matters are the following: determining working conditions and terms of employment; regulating relations between employers and workers; and regulating relations between employers or their organisations and workers’ organisations. Ratifying the Convention, therefore, means that collective bargaining should apply to some of these areas initially. Extending collective bargaining to all of these areas can be done over a reasonable period of time. Ways of giving effect to the Convention There are several ways to give effect to the Convention. The Convention gives priority to its application through collective agreements, arbitration awards, or “such other manner as may be consistent with national practice”. To the extent that the Convention is not applied through these means, it is to be given effect through national laws or regulations. This is consistent with the central principle of the Convention: as far as possible, collective bargaining should be the province of the parties involved. Reference Olney, S, & Rueda, M. 2005. Collective Bargaining Convention. Social Dialogue, Labour Law and Labour Administration Department. International Labour Office. Geneva. Maintaining public databases on agreements concluded, thus providing a valuable source of information for the social partners; April 2005– Page 21 The CCMAil is distributed quarterly. If you would like to make a contribution, subscribe or have any comments, e-mail HO@CCMA.org.za