Bandits, Villains and Bosses – Kidnappers in the Southern Philippines
Eric.gutierrez@live.com
March 2012
1. Research Question and Thesis – Kidnappers as new predators?
Kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR) is, officially, a relatively new criminal phenomenon in the Philippines.
Until today, it is not even included in the Philippine National Police’s (PNP) list of ‘index crimes’ –
those that are “significant and occur with sufficient regularity to be meaningful.”1 Yet it is
considered serious enough to prompt the creation and funding of specialised inter-agency task
forces by successive governments – from Fidel Ramos’s Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC); Joseph Estrada’s Presidential Anti-Organised Crime Task Force (PAOCTF); Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo’s Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) and National Anti-Kidnapping Task
Force (NAKTAF);2 to now, the second Aquino government’s Anti-Kidnapping Group (AKG)3.
KFR incidents appear to have sharply increased in the mid-1980s, following the political turmoil
before and after the overthrow of the Marcos regime. As the first Aquino government struggled
against successive coup attempts as well as the Moro and communist insurgencies, kidnapping
activities stepped up. By 1997, the Philippines was tagged the “kidnap capital of Asia”4. In that year
alone, kidnap groups were estimated to have raked in over PhP 310 million in ransom payments
(Hau, 2000: p. 219). Spread over the last 25 years, the kidnap-for-ransom ‘industry’ effectively
made billions of pesos, while causing considerable damage to the economy.
Curiously, the majority of KFR incidents were concentrated in the troubled southern Philippine
regions of central and western Mindanao5. In 1993, the PACC reported that there were 42 kidnap
groups operating in the country, 23 in Mindanao and only 14 in Manila and five in the rest of the
country (Philippines Free Press, 20 February 1993). Through the 1990’s and early 2000’s, a majority
of suspects appearing in ‘wanted’ lists issued by the Department of Interior and Local Governments
(DILG) were from Mindanao. Cases documented in Tulay, the magazine of the Filipino-Chinese
community, reveal that there were more Filipino-Chinese victims kidnapped in Mindanao,
1
The official definition of ‘index crime’ is provided by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (see
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru6/glossary_psj.htm). The crime rate and crime statistics are kept and monitored by
the PNP’s Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM). On the PNP website, however, the
statistics are available in the web pages of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG). See for
example see http://cidg.pnp.gov.ph/crime%20data%20statistics/Statistic%202010/Annual%20%202010all%20crimes.pdf. It is not clear from the PNP website how DIDM and CIDG are connected.
2
Source: History of PACER, as seen on www.pacer.org.ph.
3
See http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/149675/pnp-retires-pacer-unit-forms-new-anti-kidnap-group
4
The label “kidnap capital of Asia” was coined by Fortune Magazine. However, even the Supreme Court used the
label in a December 1997 ruling that has become part of Philippine jurisprudence – see
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/dec1997/117624.htm
5
Central Mindanao includes the Cotabato and Lanao regions. Western Mindanao covers the Zamboanga
peninsula, Basila, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
1
particularly in Cotabato City, even when a great majority of the community resides in Metro
Manila.
The question that must be asked therefore is twofold. Firstly, why are there such high numbers of
kidnappings in central and western Mindanao? Secondly, what factors determine the periods of
heightened kidnappings incidents over the last 25 years in that particular region of the country?
Answering these questions is quite difficult because the reporting and monitoring of kidnappings
over the years have been patchy, inconsistent, even contradictory. The government itself has no
firm guidelines on counting – if 50 bus passengers, for example, were stopped, taken to a hideout,
and ransoms subsequently demanded for their release, should this be counted as 50 individual
cases of KFR, or a single case of hostage-taking? It is not known if legal clarifications exist to
distinguish between ‘kidnapping’, ‘abduction’, ‘hostage-taking’ or ‘serious illegal detention’ – terms
commonly used in the filing of criminal cases. But most importantly, in many criminal cases filed,
the police and prosecution services do not even know who they are after. Cases are lodged in
various courts against “John, Jane, Richard and Peter Does” or “Kumanders” who are presumed to
exist but whose real names are not even known nor whose identities can be firmly established.
As such, it is necessary to first do some form of identification to describe the kidnappers. This paper
argues that the instigators of kidnappings in the southern Philippines can be categorised into
roughly three groups:



The social bandits whose origins lie in non-state armed groups who have emerged as
expressions of local resistance to state neglect and to various forms of predation, but
remain incapable of sustaining a head-on confrontation with the military and are
therefore in no position to mobilise society to a scale that can resolve the stalemate. As
a result, some or parts of these non-state armed groups have become ‘lost commands’
and have resorted to using kidnappings, among others, as political weapons while
raising money, or vice versa.
The villains, or opportunistic criminal entrepreneurs out to make quick money by taking
advantage of the disorder and instability created by the unresolved and protracted
political crisis in the region. Villains include two sub-groups who are similar to each
other in many ways: a) corrupt police and military elements who ‘ride’ and use their
official functions to engage in crime; and b) crooked, gangster elements of non-state
armed groups who use the mantle of a political cause as a cover for what is essentially a
criminal enterprise.
The bosses, predatory local politicians and strongmen who are retaliating or jostling
against enemies, including the central state, or simply engaging in ‘primitive
accumulation’.
Local bosses have the most marked variations in motives for engaging in kidnappings – from
raising money and engaging in ‘primitive’ accumulation; settling a score; demonstrating capacity
for violence; gaining leverage in political competition; to attacking and embarrassing political
enemies. They are unlike the villains who are mainly after money. Social bandits on the other
2
hand demonstrate a predisposition to get ‘proper’ victims – those who have money to pay
ransoms, so that the kidnappings can be justified as a form of income redistribution.
This paper further argues that these categories overlap and are not mutually exclusive. For
example, some social bandits over time either become villains or bosses; bosses have turned
into villains; and successful villains morph into more powerful bosses. Oftentimes, each will also
need the others. Thus, the three sets of actors can be located in three points of a triangle, with
each side representing a spectrum or a range of sub-categories between each point. This is
presented in Figure 1 below.
Bandits
Villains
Bosses
Figure 1 – Three sets of kidnappers
All three groups ‘benefit’ or thrive because of certain structural conditions. First is the weakness of
the state to provide not only essential public services, but most importantly, justice and security.
This makes it possible for each of the three to become private providers of justice and security, and
thus gain de facto legitimacy that they will not normally have if state institutions had been more
robust and effective. A second structural condition is the proliferation of firearms and the
ubiquitous presence of armed groups, state and non-state. Central and western Mindanao has
perhaps the most number of firearms per capita in the country. This creates huge pools of armed
men who when idle or not a mission, are prone to get into some form of criminal mischief. Finally,
a third structural condition is the widespread poverty and the absence of alternative means of
income in the region. This not only induces more predation, it also makes political
entrepreneurship more likely.
These structural conditions enable the three actors to engage in kidnapping at practically any time
they want. However, there are certain events or developments that appear to drive increased
kidnapping activities at particular points in time. For example, the holding of elections may induce a
spate of kidnappings as local bosses engage in ‘fund-raising’ for their campaigns. Local bosses
ousted from their posts by the new Manila government can use kidnappings to embarrass or to
demonstrate the relative weakness of the new local postholders. There have been times when
military offensives – that tied down state forces and rebel movements in fighting – created
opportunities for villains to strike.
3
It can also be that ceasefires – if too prolonged with no final political resolution in sight – can
induce local armed groups to break away as ‘lost commands’ and start engaging in predatory
activities, including kidnappings. Prolonged ceasefires with uncertain endings create pools of idle
armed men with nothing to do and no mission to accomplish, who then drift into criminal activity.
In the same vein, government campaigns to dismantle private armies that do not address the
reasons for why they emerge in the first place may do inadvertent harm. When a local boss’s
private army is disbanded, it also creates pools of unemployed armed men with deadly skills, who
can then easily turn to banditry and kidnapping to support themselves. In a private army, these
men are under some form of supervision and control. They receive some form of wages too, and
can be more quickly located. Released from such control, and left to fend for themselves with no
support to rely on for gaining alternative employment, they can become ‘wild cards’ with huge
potential for more spontaneous, less predictable trouble.
Kidnappings happen in many countries around the world and in other parts of the Philippines. But
what explains kidnapping as the chosen method of extraction by the three groups of predators
appears to be two reasons. First, pendulum swings in the central government response – from a
focus on ‘neutralisation’ in one instance, to very public demonstrations of a policy to reintegrate
kidnappers back into society, in another – ensures that negotiations are possible. Because the state
has no consistent and predictable response, kidnappers can almost always offer a deal. When
rebels stage an ambush, for example, it automatically triggers military retaliation. Kidnappings, on
the other hand, automatically trigger negotiations.
The possibility of negotiations means that kidnappers can have greater chances of controlling the
outcome. As long as they have the hostages, they have strategic leverage. The government’s
inconsistency not only strengthens the kidnappers’ hand; it also reveals a profound disregard for
the welfare of the victims. When the government swings into ‘kill’ mode, it doesn’t matter to them
if the hostages are harmed, as long as the kidnappers are harmed too. When the government
swings into deal-making mode, the victims become the voiceless pawns.
A second reason why kidnapping has become a favoured mechanism of extraction is that much of
the state response is reactive and shaped by media influence. “Playing to gallery” takes on a whole
new meaning here. Kidnappings almost always trigger some kind of media frenzy. Media mileage is
an incentive to the kidnappers, as it improves their bargaining leverage.
The pendulum swings in state response also reveal that government may be misunderstanding
the social links of the three actors. The government seems to assume that it can easily isolate
these actors from their immediate communities. It is quite clear that despite the resources at its
disposal, state authorities are often unable to even recognise bandits and villains. Hence,
prosecutors are left with no recourse but to file cases against ‘John, Jane, Richard and Peter
Does’. Bosses are more recognisable and can be quickly identified if they instigate a kidnapping.
But prosecutors are either hypocritical or simply unable to move against bosses who may be
more well-connected to the state than they do. The bottom line is that the three sets of actors
who instigate kidnappings are more firmly embedded in local communities than police, military,
or prosecutorial authorities. The three sets of actors are the familiar, local guys. The agents of
the central state are the alien strangers.
4
Against this backdrop, the distinguishing lines between state and criminal – particularly when
viewed not just by the victims but by the wider, affected communities – become blurred and
distorted6. Kidnapping is merely a mirror of the typical politics in the Philippines where power is
derivative (derived from connections and personalistic ties) and predatory (meant for the
private extraction and accumulation of human, natural and other resources)7.
To summarise, this paper argues that the kidnappings in Mindanao constitute a new form of
predation that has complex political origins, and that the explanation for both the overall high
number and the waves of heightened activity can be found in the three groups of instigators
and in their interaction with each other, central state institutions, and the structural conditions
they find themselves in. In Figure 2, we revise our diagram to include the state with its uncertain
role in dealing with the three actors.
Bandits
The State and
Its Agents
?
Villains
Bosses
Figure 2: The three sets of kidnappers and the state
2. Review of Literature – Social bandits, criminal entrepreneurs and predatory bosses
In July 2001 after the leader of the Pentagon KFR group confirmed over Cotabato City radio station
DXMS that they had taken a Chinese engineer hostage, they received an unusual offer from then
Presidential Adviser for Mindanao Affairs Jesus Dureza. Rather than pay the ransom, Dureza said in
a broadcast aired the next day by DXMS, the government will instead extend support to the
kidnappers so they could “start life anew”. “Under the administration of President Gloria Arroyo,”
Dureza assured the kidnappers that, “you don’t have to perpetrate kidnappings just to get the
6
I am grateful for this insight to Caroline Hau, who wrote in her 2000 essay about the difficulty of distinguishing
“whether the state is behaving like a criminal or it is the criminals who have started to behave like the state”
7
The depiction of Philippine politics as characterised by power that is derivative and predatory comes from John
Sidel’s Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines, 1999.
5
attention of government. Through my office, you can reach the President and discuss with her your
plans of starting life all over again.” (Philippine Star, 13 July 2001).
Dureza’s statement was both unusual and emblematic for at least three reasons. Firstly, it was a
top political official and not a police or law enforcement officer making the statement. Police
principally tasked to capture the kidnappers were sidelined – not trusted enough to ‘call the shots’
in the negotiations. Secondly, Dureza’s proposed solution – to support kidnappers to ‘start life
anew’ – demonstrates a gross misunderstanding of the problem. It not only confuses villain with
victim. It also opens up to a policy of ‘forgive and forget’ that obscures the real reasons for why
kidnappers emerge in the first place, and which demonstrates a near complete disregard for the
victims who have a far better claim to be supported in starting life anew.
Thirdly and most importantly, the kidnappers were very publicly addressed by no less than a Palace
official not as criminals who have broken the law and will therefore be prosecuted before a court of
justice, but as aggrieved individuals with legitimate issues who have too often been ignored by
government, and therefore deserved an audience with no less than the president. Dureza
effectively endorsed the Pentagon group to be social bandits, engaged in some form of social
protest ‘to get the government’s attention’.
The notion of banditry as social protest is not new. It was first elaborated in 1959 by British
historian Eric Hobsbawm. Using a case study of kidnappings by ‘shepherd-bandits’ in the Sardinian
highlands, Hobsbawm explained that “in some way (the kidnappings) can be seen as part of the
resistance of a traditional society against modernization, of lean and poor highlanders, bypassed by
the great economic boom, against the new fat cats, local and foreign, of the coast” (2000: 177).
Hence, Hobsbawm concluded that by imposing their will through extortion, robbery or otherwise
on their victims, bandits “simultaneously challenge the economic, social and political order by
challenging those who hold or lay claim to power, law and control of resources”. Hobsbawm’s
thesis of social banditry makes kidnapping as much political as it is criminal. (ibid. 7-9).
Yet this ‘politicised’ framework, as illustrated by Dureza’s response, has its limits too, especially
when applied for analysing a context as complex as Mindanao. The Pentagon group’s kidnapping of
Zhang Zhong Quiang, the Chinese engineer, could not be portrayed with any credibility simply as
social protest. The motivation is arguably money. Hobsbawm himself acknowledged that the 'new'
technique of extorting enormous ransom payments is a criminal act. This was, he describes,
“banditry merged into Mafia; social protest disappeared behind criminal enterprise” (ibid. 188).
Anton Blok extends the discussion and points that indeed “there is more to brigandage than just
the fact that it may voice popular protest.” Bandits, Blok continues, do not seem to be the
“appropriate agents to transform any organizational capacity among peasants into a politically
effective force”. In fact, Blok points out that in many instances, banditry can be a tool against social
protest. Rather than be actual champions of the poor and the weak, “bandits quite often terrorised
those from whose very ranks they managed to rise, thus suppressing them. Rather than promoting
the articulation of peasant interests, bandits tend to obstruct or to deviate concerted peasant
action. Bandits have fulfilled pivotal roles in the demobilisation of peasants.” Furthermore, Blok
6
continues, brigandage indirectly impedes large-scale peasant mobilisation because it provides
channels to move up the social hierarchy, thus weakening class solidarity. (1972: 494-6).
Blok made another important contention in his analysis. “Given the specific conditions of
outlawry,” he said, “bandits have to rely very strongly on other people. They require protection in
order to operate as bandits and to survive as all. If they lack protection, they remain lonely wolves
to be quickly dispatched.” Blok further explained that the protection can come not only from a
narrow circle of kinsmen and affiliated friends, but also from powerful politicians including those
who hold office. “Our task therefore,” he emphasizes, “is to discover people on whom the bandit
relies.” (1972: 497-8)
Blok made three further useful observations. He cites that the more successful the bandit is, the
more extensive is the protection granted him. The more banditry becomes politically-oriented, the
more likely it becomes anti-peasant. And finally, he points out that a bandit’s loyalty is not to the
peasants.
Blok’s analysis is particularly useful for explaining the main actor in this paper – the kidnappers in
the southern Philippines. But it provides little for explaining the behaviour of the other actors who
interact and behave in a particular way towards the kidnappers. Yes, indeed, kidnappers rely very
strongly on other people – local communities, local politicians, the leadership of the mainstream
rebel movements, and even corrupt police and military officials. But it must be asked, why do those
‘other people’ provide protection to the kidnappers? In the case of ordinary peasants, why have
they given the kidnappers refuge, even when doing so puts their own lives and livelihoods at risk?
What do local politicians stand to gain or lose if kidnappers start to operate within their
jurisdictions? Where do rebel leaderships really stand when kidnappers ‘melt’ to invisibility in areas
they control? And what’s in it for police and military elements who choose to look the other way
when kidnappers with hostages in tow pass their way? Understanding the kidnappers’ relationships
with other actors and the social networks they find themselves in may be the key to answering the
question over the high incidence and waves of heightened activity in Mindanao.
One way of explaining the web of relations is to appreciate kidnapping as an enterprise, with the
kidnapper as the entrepreneur, and the other actors as collaborators or competitors in the
enterprise 8. To begin with, kidnapping is more likely to be an enterprise because it is a more
complex form of banditry. While robbery or extortion can be perpetrated by a lone, individual
robber, KFR is, in a manner of speaking, more labour and capital intensive. Raiding and pillaging can
be done within a few minutes with no regard for the physical safety of the victims. KFR on the
other hand can stretch on for months and even years, with the prey kept unharmed, at least until
the ransom is made or not made. Furthermore, kidnapping, particularly those with political aims,
can be better exploited for holding media and public attention for the duration of the hostagetaking.
8
The notion of kidnapping as an enterprise is derived from an earlier analysis I developed in the article “From
Ilaga to Abu Sayyaf: New Entrepreneurs in Violence and Their Impact on Local Politics in Mindanao” in Philippine
Political Science Journal, Vol.24, No.47, 2003. Philippine Political Science Association: Quezon City”.
7
More importantly, enterprises need protection. Hence, kidnappers will build links and ties with
local power structures, or with whoever can provide that protection. However, that protection will
almost always come with strings attached. Hence, kidnappers are bound to return the favour. Or
they may even be pro-active, and provide something beforehand so they can receive that
protection in return.
But then as men of violence who control labour and capital to get certain things done, kidnappers
can provide protection themselves, or serve a useful political purpose. Thus, Blok’s statement –
that “our task is to discover the people on whom the bandit relies” – needs to be extended. We
need to discover as well when it is when other people themselves begin to rely on the bandit. The
question should have two parts, “who protects the bandit?” and “who does the bandit protect?”
A dilemma emerges when evidence of ‘community participation’ in kidnappings appear. When
hostages are kept in a remote village for months – is that village a victim as well, or are they
collaborators? Should that local community be considered an unwilling contributor or active
participant? Are they unwitting accomplices or interested ‘sub-contractors’ to the enterprise?
Philippine courts have provided an answer to such dilemma. In what is now jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court threw out an appeal of three young women who maintained they were not
accomplices to nine men convicted of kidnapping, since they claim to be victims too kidnapped
earlier to be the sexual partners of those convicted. The three women were arrested with six men
captured following a military operation in relation to the December 1988 kidnapping of eight
Zamboanga City civil servants. The women claimed that their role in the bandit camps – where the
hostages were kept for three months – was merely to cook food, tidy up and look after the welfare
of the captives and captors. A lower court decision to convict them as accomplices was maintained
by the Supreme Court, although the penalties were revised9.
Relationships between bandit groups and local communities seem to be thoroughly
misunderstood. Eduardo Ugarte has written much about the faulty assumptions on bandit groups,
pointing out that it is a mistake to portray them as having the basic features of a conventional
organisation. Ugarte argues that it might not even be appropriate to describe them as
‘organisations’ or coherent groups at all, but rather as networks, with no fixed memberships, no
chains of commands nor hierarchies of authority, and with no binding group loyalty nor regular
leadership. As Ugarte explained:
“The groupings involved in illicit enterprises in the southern Philippines basically consist of
individual units and coalitions whose compositions run the gamut from homogenous kith-andkin alliances, grounded in local or adjacent communities, to sometimes hybrid associations of
seemingly irreconcilable political foes. Their sheer profusion, heterogeneity and temporality –
9
The three women are Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan, and Jaliha Hussin, who were minors when, they claim,
they were forcibly taken from their villages to be wives for MNLF commanders Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais,
and Awalon Kamlon Hassan, respectively. Note as well that in her court testimony on this case, victim Jessica
Calunod identified the captors who took care of her as her ‘foster parents’. The case of the three women
accomplices and testimonies of some of the victims are discussed in
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/100901_08.htm
8
the fact that they coalesce for particular operations and disband on their conclusion – are some
of the reasons why they avoid identification, especially by outside observers entirely dependent
on government and media sources.” (Ugarte 2008)
Ugarte rejects the categorisation of the group he studied – the Abu Sayyaf – as revolutionaries or
political militants, arguing that popular media depiction of the group obscures the temporal nature
of the alliances and agreements that they strike with other political actors, or how their multiple
identities give them constantly shifting loyalties. Thus, he describes the illicit activities as a complex
criminal enterprise, requiring a web of networks, in which political actors can take part as ultimate
sponsors.
Ugarte and Turner have instead applied the concept of 'dark or covert networks' to these bandit
groups. They explain that attempts to transform these dark and covert networks into a formal
organisation with clear boundaries or fixed membership, and which is discrete from the general
population, eventually fail because of the nature of Philippine politics – where “interpersonal
linkages possess an overriding importance that hinders the emergence of any cohesive group
loyalty.” In other words, networks of interpersonal obligations are most decisive in shaping the
behaviour of particular groups – more than declared causes, common goals or formal links. (Ugarte
and Turner, 2011: 416-417). This explains the profusion of ‘commanders’ who have pre-existing ties
and social networks to be successful kidnappers if they choose to.
The tangled ties and networks of interpersonal obligation are persuasive explanations that enable a
more thorough understanding of Mindanao’s kidnappers in their immediate social milieu.
However, a wider context – the relationship of kidnappers with the Philippine state – needs to be
considered and analysed as well.
Over the past 26 years, it can be argued that Manila has not been a benign force or a
‘developmental state’ interested in any consistent way to sort out the political and economic
problems of Mindanao. It has already been pointed out earlier that the majority of kidnapping
incidents has been focused in Mindanao. Yet despite this, the central government, until today, is
still struggling to develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with kidnappings in Mindanao10. On
12 January 2011, after another spate of kidnappings hit Cotabato City, then PNP Director General
Raul Bacalzo openly admitted blame, saying that PACER the special police task force to fight
kidnapping was concentrated only in Metro Manila, and “lacked the capability to address the
problem nationwide” (Manila Times, 13 January 2011)11. PACER was simply continuing the
precedent established by the PACC created in 1992. Metro Manila enjoyed focused, inter-agency
police protection, while the rest of the country, most especially Mindanao, did not.
The central government’s predisposition has not been surprising, given that Manila is widely
regarded in Mindanao as no more interested in the welfare of the region than a predator would
have for the welfare of its prey. John Sidel’s depiction of the Philippine state as “a complex set of
predatory mechanisms for the private exploitation and accumulation of the archipelago’s human,
10
There is mention of an “anti-kidnapping strategy” in the PACER website, but it consists only of a declaration of
commitment to ‘neutralise kidnappers’ and to ‘educate the public’ by providing such advice as ensuring that
househelpers are properly briefed so that they withhold information from inquisitive strangers.
11
A link to this news report is http://www.newsflash.org/2004/02/hl/hl110424.htm
9
natural and monetary resources” is a fitting description for Manila’s overall policy towards
Mindanao (Sidel, 1999: p.146). Sidel’s list of ‘state-based predations’ seems like a summary of
Mindanao’s history – discriminatory enforcement of laws and regulations; discretionary provision
of monopoly franchises, concessions and contracts; diversionary collection of public revenues; or
personalistic disbursement of public land, funds and employment.
Sidel explains that while the central government appears relatively weak in its failings as a
‘developmental state’, is has shown stronger capacity as a ‘predatory state’. His damning
conclusion is that the Philippine state remained essentially a ‘multitiered racket’. Though never
wholly nor solely a racket, “the Philippine state’s racket-like dimensions decisively shaped electoral
competition, capital accumulation and social relations in the archipelago over the course of the 20th
century” (ibid., p.146-147).
Thus, the kidnappings in Mindanao should therefore be analysed not as simple law and order
problems that can be solved by improved investigation, prosecution and legal or technical fixes.
Instead the kidnapping problem in Mindanao should be understood as another expression of the
unresolved and protracted political crisis in the region created by the central state’s essentially
predatory policies which are then met by sustained local resistance. In this protracted crisis, many
boundaries get to be blurred. It becomes difficult to know, as Caroline Hau puts it, whether the
state is behaving like a criminal, or it is criminals who are behaving like the state (Hau, 2000).
In fact, it is predatory local bosses and strongmen who emerge as the first set of instigators of
kidnappings in Mindanao. Kidnapping was used by local bosses as a political weapon to: a)
embarrass ascendant competitors to power; b) heighten disorder and make it more difficult to
govern; c) settle a score with those who have crossed them; and d) raise money to buy patronage
and fund electoral campaigns. These local bosses involved in kidnappings are not unknown to
Manila and law enforcement authorities. But getting them may prove tricky, especially if they are
the current local allies of the incumbent in Manila. If they happen to be with the opposition,
prosecution may prove difficult nevertheless because these bosses have better and much more
powerful connections than the bandits (social or otherwise) and criminal entrepreneurs. In quite a
few instances, these bosses despite their links to kidnap groups and bandit leaders are relied upon
to be the government’s negotiator in kidnap crises, performing like a trustee of a large organisation
who intervenes with that organisation’s chief executive (the kidnapper) to get hostages released,
bring ransom costs down, and get immunity from prosecution.
To summarise this section, this review of literature has presented frameworks of analysis that
reveal three sets of instigators of kidnappings in Mindanao. First are those who can be categorised
as social bandit in the way Hobsbawm described the concept. Second are the criminal
entrepreneurs as defined by Blok and refined by Ugarte. And third are the predatory strongmen
and local bosses, as explained by Sidel.
3. Methodology
To answer the question of why there are such high numbers of kidnappings in central and western
Mindanao, and what factors determine periods of heightened activity over the last 25 years (1986
10
to 2010), this paper will present three case studies that inform on the three sets of kidnapping
instigators identified and provide the evidence for this paper’s thesis:



Marawi City, 1986 to 1989 – Ali Dimaporo invents a new political weapon
Cotabato City, 1989 to 2002 – The ‘corporate venture’ of the Pentagon group
Basilan, 1992 to 2001 – Lost Commands and the Abu Sayyaf
These three case studies have been selected because they had the heaviest concentration of
kidnappings at particular points in time. Much of the news and press reports on kidnappings in
Mindanao from 1986 to 1989 were coming from Marawi City. From 1990 to 1992, Cotabato City
started to figure more prominently. Then in 1993 and 1994, the most widely reported kidnappings
were those that took place on Basilan Island.
Ideally, there should be a neat fit of case studies with the thesis presented in this paper – i.e. to
have one case study focusing on each of the three actors – bandits, villains, and bosses. However,
the case studies below do not represent a neat fit. The case study on Marawi City is about a local
strongman; the case study on Cotabato City focuses on former Moro rebels who started as social
bandits but increasingly became criminal entrepreneurs in the subsequent years; the case study on
Basilan is most difficult to classify – they appear to be more criminal entrepreneurs who wanted to
portray themselves social bandits.
Below, we present how the case studies may be located within the framework of this paper.
Case study on Cotabato
City and the Pentagon
group
Bandits
Case study on Marawi
and Dimapooro
Case study on Basilan
and the Abu Sayyaf
Villains
Bosses
11
4. The Case Studies
CASE STUDY 1: Marawi (1986-1989) – Ali Dimaporo invents a new political weapon
In this case study, we present an example of a local strongman who, while vaguely denying
involvement, used kidnapping as a political weapon to settle scores, embarrass his local and
national political enemies, and gain leverage in a fast-changing milieu of political competition.
On 4 June 1986, amidst the political turmoil that followed the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos, a
French priest, Fr. Michel de Gigord, was kidnapped right inside the Mindanao State University
(MSU) campus in Marawi, where he served as chaplain. He was released 21 days later in Binidayan,
Lanao del Sur, in a televised and widely reported handover, the first priest to be kidnapped under
the new Aquino regime12. It became a harbinger of things to come.
Just more than two weeks after De Gigord’s release, yet another dramatic kidnapping took place, in
a convent perched atop a hill overlooking Lake Marawi. This time, 10 Carmelite nuns were
abducted, put aboard two motorboats, and brought to a hideout in the Maranao hinterlands. On
the following day, July 12, as the national government in Manila struggled to respond and military
forces in Lanao scrambled to locate the nuns, a Protestant pastor, Brian Lawrence was added to the
list of victims. The kidnappers demanded a $100,000 ransom for the nuns and the implementation
of an autonomy agreement for Muslims (UPI, 15 July 1986)13.
When the Manila government was finally able to issue an official statement three days after the
abduction of the Carmelite nuns, no less than an angry President Corazon Aquino laid the policy.
“The government cannot be blackmailed,” she said, “nor will it adopt a policy of appeasement
toward kidnappers, who have abused the military’s attitude of tolerance.” Yet less than a week
later, that policy had already been ignored. A much smaller ransom was paid ‘to cover
accommodation costs’, and the nuns and the pastor were subsequently released unharmed14.
Kidnappings were not unusual in Marawi in 1986. From 1979 to 1989, military authorities reported
that nearly 300 kidnappings in the Lanao provinces have been staged, involving about 400 victims,
including 35 foreigners. By late 1989, none have been convicted for these kidnappings. The
kidnappings started in 1979, when construction of an 80-megawatt power plant started on the
Agus River ( Associated Press, 10 November 1989; and Manila Standard, 2 November 1990). Also
12
Accounts of Fr. De Gigord’s 1986 kidnapping were first sourced through news clippings, but were confirmed by
Fr. De Gigord himself in a February 2012 correspondence with this paper’s writer.
13
Source: http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07-15/news/mn-21009_1_muslim-population. Note that the 1986
Marawi incidents appear to have started a new kidnapping wave. More kidnappings took place later in July,
elsewhere in Mindanao, such as the kidnapping of Swiss tourist Hans Kunzli on Santa Cruz Island in Zamboanga,
where Japanese tourists have also been abducted. See http://articles.philly.com/1986-0720/news/26098570_1_tarhata-alonto-lucman-filipino-nuns-zamboanga
14
The ransom paid, according to an Associated Press report, was $5000 or about PhP 100,000 based on
exchange rates in 1986. Associated Press, “Kidnappers free 10 nuns unharmed in the Philippines,” by Eileen
Guerrero, 17 July 1986. The news reports do not mention a ransom being made for Lawrence’s release.
12
recorded in 1979 was the abduction of American missionary Lloyd Van Vactor, who was held for 20
days. (UPI, 14 July 1986)
But what was unusual about the June-July kidnappings of 1986 was its symbolic significance. It
happened amidst, or as a result of a local power stand-off and political crisis, sparked by the Aquino
government’s replacement of Marcos ally Mohamad Ali Dimaporo as governor of Lanao del Sur
province and president of the Mindanao State University (MSU). Dimaporo was the quintessential
warlord, who had on call several hundred armed supporters made up of an estimated 450 MSU
armed guards, 300 special action forces, 200 provincial guards, 250 security guards in his different
business interests, over 1500 paramilitary Civilian Home Defence Forces scattered across the 32
municipalities of Lanao del Sur, and including Philippine Constabulary units that were disposed to
and sometimes ordered to cooperate with him (Bentley, 1995).
Dimaporo had put up an armed challenge. But as he became increasingly routed politically
especially because a fractious opposition tenuously united, the chaplain of the MSU was snatched.
According to G. Carter Bentley, the kidnapping of Fr. De Gigord “was revealing of Maranao politics
and of Ali Dimaporo’s mastery of them.” It not only captured maximum publicity; the choice of
victim, place, and timing of the kidnapping, continued Bentley, were calculated for maximum
political effect. De Gigord was a vocal critic of Dimaporo and an advocate of reform in the
university. He was also a citizen of France, the first country to recognise the Aquino government.
The kidnapping also demonstrated the vulnerability of an MSU without Dimaporo. Most tellingly,
De Gigord was kidnapped on the day President Aquino appointed Dimaporo’s replacement as
president of the MSU (Bentley, 1995: p.270).
The kidnapping of the 10 nuns was even more symbolic. Corazon Aquino was not only widely
known in predominantly Catholic Philippines as a Carmelite devotee. In the dying days of the
Marcos regime, she who also was given refuge by the Carmelites and secretly kept in a monastery
in Cebu to protect her from a likely assassination attempt. Those who kidnapped the nuns aired
some political demands too, such as guarantees for autonomy in the Muslim regions. But they
appeared to have simply wanted to settle a score with the nuns – who were Corazon Aquino’s most
visible allies and local symbols in Marawi.
Thus, these kidnappings appear to have been Dimaporo’s way of lashing out against the Aquino
regime and her local allies. He was not to go down without fighting, but he could not afford a
confrontation with the military. Kidnapping the symbols of the new regime was a way to strike
back, without inviting the full force of the military. Even if Dimaporo did not mastermind the
abduction, he has effectively turned kidnapping into a potent political weapon.
Dimaporo formally denied any involvement in the kidnapping. However, he was quick to control
the negotiations. First, he let it be known that he probably would have to be personally involved to
guarantee the safety of the victims. Then, he made sure that his political rivals – Saidamen
Pangarungan and Princess Tarhata Lucman – are not able to get credit or political mileage from the
crisis. As noted by Bentley, the ageing warlord first announced that Fr. De Gigord would be
released on June 21. However, because Lucman prepared a public relations plan -- welcoming
ceremonies for the priest at the MSU campus – Dimaporo announced a delay for the release, at the
13
last minute. Dimaporo then moved the press conference to his residence in Binidayan on the
evening of the 24th, but delayed it anew for the next morning to wait for more media to arrive. Fr.
de Gigord was formally handed over by his kidnappers to Dimaporo on the 25th. The next day,
Dimaporo’s photos were all over the newspapers, hailed as the hero who saved the priest (ibid.,
p.272). Bentley documented a revealing quote from Dimaporo when asked by the media about his
suspected involvement:
“I asked the military to investigate. Now that the military believes I have nothing to do with it, it
could be some of my men, it could be rebels, it could be anybody. But I cannot deny that it could
be some of my men for reasons I do not know.” (ibid., p.272)
Dimaporo, the quintessential warlord when he was in control, turned into the quintessential
kidnapping negotiator when he was ousted. Dimaporo’s power was also projected, as he was able
to force the kidnappers – who initially demanded a ransom of PhP 300,000 ($15,000) – to back
down on their demands. It appeared that no ransom was paid. Princess Tarhata Lucman, though
sidelined and outsmarted by Dimaporo on the de Gigord kidnapping, played a much more
prominent role in the negotiations for the release of the 10 Carmelite nuns and Protestant
missionary Brian Lawrence less than a week after they were abducted.
Other suspects were named for possible involvement in the kidnappings. Journalist Ceres P. Doyo
attributes the kidnapping of the nuns to a ‘lost command’ of the Moro National Liberation Front15.
But an Associated Press news report quoted military officials as saying that the kidnappers were led
by a disgruntled former government employee, who just wanted his job back16.
The warring Maranao political clans eventually fought each other in the May 1987 elections.
Dimaporo was elected representative in Lanao del Sur’s second district, and Princess Tarhata
Lucman elected as provincial governor. But this did little to settle the volatile and murky politics of
the region. Just before the elections, on 5 May 1987, five local and two Swiss Red Cross workers
were kidnapped in Marawi. All were released by May 26.17On 8 July 1987, two female employees of
the Department of Social Services were kidnapped, and released unharmed five days later. On 22
July, two MSU High School teachers were snatched in a daring raid during a flag-raising ceremony
right in the middle of the campus – a clear challenge to the authority of MSU President Jun Alonto,
whose office was overlooking the plaza. (Bentley, 1995)
On 7 August, 16 people – 13 students, 2 teachers and one university staff – riding on public
transport on their way to Iligan City were kidnapped right after they left the campus. The
kidnappers and victims were eventually located on Balt Island, near the home of Dimaporo. The
15
See Doyo’s reflections posted on the blog http://bangortobobbio.blogspot.com/2009/11/reflections-onkidnappings-past-and.html
16
See http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/American-Missionary-Released-Unharmed-After-Six-Days-InCaptivity/id-175e095407c071d6fe9f7357d52863d4 . It should be noted that the Mindanao State University is the
largest employer in the Lanao provinces, and is therefore the most important source of patronage for politicians.
A change in its leadership structure often means substantial changes too in its staffing, particularly of
administrative workers, as new officials bring with them new staff and fire old ones loyal to the previous officials.
17
See the ICRC report on http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_Jul-Aug-1987.pdf pp. 27-28
14
initial ransom demanded was PhP 500,000 – this was raised to PhP 62.5 million along with a
political demand and direct challenge to Jun Alonto – his removal from office at the MSU.
Dimaporo was asked by the victim’s relatives to negotiate, and especially because one of the
kidnappers was identified as a leader of the ‘Barracudas’, Dimaporo’s de facto private army.
Dimaporo reportedly refused to help, unless the governor Princess Tarhata Lucman appealed to
him directly. The princess categorically refused to make the appeal, and her son eventually led the
negotiations, securing the release of the captives on 17 August. Almost immediately, another
student was kidnapped at Dansalan Junior College. The wife of the manager of the National Power
Corporation in Iligan City was also kidnapped. (Bentley, 1995b: p.51) Bentley provides another
important observation on these kidnappings:
“Payment of ransom is never publicly acknowledged in Lanao kidnappings, though the amount
paid in each case is usually known. That amount can be viewed as a rough measure of the
effective political power of the officials forced to pay (as well as the value of the hostages), for
in the case of the kidnapped students, professors, social service workers and so forth, it is
usually the responsible office holders who pay the price of maintaining peace and order. The
greater the official’s power, the lower the ransom paid.”
The Alonto family is believed to have paid PhP150,000 to PhP300,000 for the release of the MSU
captives, a sum regarded as high. This means that the Alonto-Lucman clan came to be perceived as
weak, in contrast to Dimaporo who negotiated the release of Fr. De Gigord without a ransom being
paid.
Dimaporo was widely regarded as a corrupt and despotic warlord, yet he commanded widespread
respect as a supremely efficient leader. The political uncertainty brought by his ouster appears to
have created unintended consequences – a spate of kidnappings that demonstrated its value as a
tool for raising money and embarrassing political opponents. Dimaporo died in 2003, but not
before leaving his children and other relatives control over his vast resources, arsenal and political
influence. The combination of an on-going Moro rebellion and continued fighting between the
Maranao elite has created what appears as a low-intensity, protracted political crisis that opened
up the space for kidnappers to do their trade.
After his release 25 June 1986 after 21 days in captivity, Fr. Michel de Gigord took a three week rest
in France, and went back straight to the MSU. Recalling those events, he said, “there was no
question for me to stop my work there (at the MSU), all the more so because I had continuously
told the Christians not to be led by fear, and to stand up for their rights, notwithstanding the
danger of doing so.” The priest was also convinced that “the work of reconciliation between
Christians and Muslims was all the more important considering that there was still so much
violence in the air.”
Fr Michel de Gigord was kidnapped for a second time on 30 December 1989, along with his niece
who was visiting him. Again, the reason, as he explained it himself, was mainly political. “It was
election time,” he wrote, “and to discredit the incumbent mayor, his opponent (name withheld),
had me kidnapped in full day time right in the centre of Marawi City.” “To prove he was an efficient
15
man,” this opponent thereafter, “had me released together with my niece the following day.” It
appears that other aspiring politicos learned a lesson or two from Dimaporo18.
Twenty-five years after these incidents in Marawi, the central government is still struggling to
develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with kidnappings. The lack of a consistent and
systematic government approach is just one of the many problems that make it difficult to analyse
the kidnapping phenomenon in Mindanao. The reporting and monitoring of kidnapping incidents
have been patchy, and the overall policy response fragmented, based mainly it seems on shortterm political expediency rather than on any long-term and comprehensive analysis of the
problem. In a sense, the 1986 Marawi incidents set the precedents that explain why a methodical
strategy versus kidnappings never developed. To begin with, no systematic debriefings of the
victims were ever made. There was confusion on who were actually involved – their exact numbers
were never established; neither did the identities of individual perpetrators become definite. There
was even greater uncertainty on their loyalties and allegiances. Some were reported as relatives of
ousted politicos, while others were tagged as elements of ‘lost commands’ of the rebel Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). Still, others were described simply as ‘disgruntled former
government employees’ who just wanted their jobs back. Hence, investigations were never
completed, and the obvious masterminds were never pursued. As soon as media interest waned,
so did the official action on the matter.
In other words, it is predatory local bosses and strongmen who emerge as the first set of instigators
of kidnappings in Mindanao. Yet whether deliberately or not, the government then as it is now
does not see the scheming and manuevering local bosses as part of the problem, and even almost
always rely on them as part of the solution as appointed negotiators for kidnap crises.
Summary of Marawi and Dimaporo Case Study
Case study: Marawi City – Ali Dimaporo invents a political weapon
Category of kidnapper
A classic example of a boss whose power is derivative and
predatory.
Motive(s)
Mainly political, i.e. to challenge the new central
government and its local allies.
Description of victim
Priests, nuns, teachers and students. It should be noted
though that the priests and nuns were taken not because
they were Christian but because they were visible
symbols
Violence used
No victims physically harmed; most were released after
less than a month in captivity
18
The MSU chaplain became on of the main promoters of a Christian-Muslim dialogue for the whole of
Mindanao, and remained for two years more in Marawi “to show that I was not afraid because with the
Maranao people, courage is a top value.” However, he was forced to move to Iligan because of attempts on his
life. He remained in Iligan, also as university chaplain for another nine years. In June 2001, by personal choice, he
returned to France. He is now his bishop’s representative for the dialogue with Muslims. “It seems,” he says,
“that I will be in this field until the end of my life.”
16
Links and alliances
Triggers of heightened
kidnapping activity
Approach to negotiation
Allied to police and military who cannot attack, arrest or
prosecute because of these links. Military is a major
supplier of firearms. Has own private army, whose
members have nominal or active links with the MNLF.
Elections; power transitions
Manuevered to be the response manager himself.
CASE STUDY 2: Cotabato City (1989 to 2002) – The ‘corporate venture’ of the Pentagon group
This case study looks at a group who as Moro secessionist rebels had active roles in the
frontlines of battle, and were therefore specialists in violence rather than political activists. As
they became increasingly idled by a changing political climate where their specialisation was
less needed and where they had to increasingly fend for themselves, they drifted into criminal
activity. They soon discovered ‘proper’ targets for extraction – the Filipino-Chinese
community—that for them mitigated their criminal acts. They set off to be the ‘social bandits’
engaged in the ‘ancient politics of Robin Hood’.
As already alluded to, most of the incidents of the first wave of kidnappings during the Aquino
regime were in Mindanao, not in Manila. Even the kidnapping of Filipino-Chinese businessmen, a
particularly significant trend, “were reported not in Manila, but in Central Mindanao, specifically in
Cotabato City”. (Hau, 2000: p.225, quoting Teresita Ang See in the Manila Chronicle, 19 November
1995). By late 1989, the Filipino-Chinese community newspaper Tulay started reporting
systematically on kidnapping cases, providing a ‘kidnap watch’, a count of cases and progress of
investigations, and occasional reports on cases not reported to the police.
It was Abogado Bago19, the Moro rebel known as Kumander Mubarak, who is blamed by the police
and intelligence community for starting the kidnapping trend in Central Mindanao that started in
1989. Mubarak is associated with a combat unit of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
called the National Security Command (NASCOM), which operated in Central Mindanao. The Army
commander of the 35th Infantry Battalion in 1989, writing later in a blog of his memoirs, said that
the NASCOM had a force of about 300 men and maintained a camp in the vicinity of Mt. Vitan and
Igabay, near Buldon20.
One of Bago’s key assets was good communications with local politicians and the security services.
In January 1990 after a local peace negotiating committee was ambushed in Buldon, Bago was the
first to inform the Army commander that his men were not involved, and that he had already
19
In some news reports, his name is given as Abogado Gado Salilaguia (Manila Standard, 8 December 1992).
From “Memories of Buldon” in Ang Sisidlan, a blog by Dodong Pagantihon in
http://yuehmegami.multiply.com/journal/item/21?&show_interstitial=1&u=%2Fjournal%2Fitem
20
17
retreated to Calanogas in Lanao del Sur to avoid a confrontation with Army forces sent to capture
the ambushers. He further assured the Army commander that no rebel troops from the Lanao
areas will be sent to reinforce other rebel groups in Buldon. Bago’s messages, said the Army
commander, were brought to him by Sampiano Ogka, then the mayor of Balabagan in Lanao del
Sur. (Pagantihon blog)
Bago appears to have been avoiding a confrontation with government troops as he was already
consolidating the infrastructure for his kidnapping operations. He needed to be able to move
quickly around the area, and be constantly informed of how military and police forces were
moving. Hence, the connections he built with local officials proved particularly indispensable. For
the next three years, Bago was to prey on mostly Filipino-Chinese businessmen in central
Mindanao. His goal was solely the collection of ransom money – there is no evidence of Bago
making political demands – such as the release of captured comrades or the pull out of Army
troops – in any of his kidnapping operations.
By the time he was killed in Marine-led raid on his hideout in Pantukan, Davao del Norte on
December 7, 1992, Bago is believed to have organised 89 cases of kidnappings of wealthy ChineseFilipinos – or roughly more than two kidnapping operations each month. For these cases, he is
thought to have raked in over P130 million in ransom payments, or an average of P1.46 million for
each kidnapping case (Philippine Star, 16 November 2001).21
The fact that the operation to get Bago needed fresh troops of Philippine Marines is a story in itself.
In March 1991, then Armed Forces Chief of Staff Rodolfo Biazon, who was in the post for only three
months, confirmed widespread suspicions that some soldiers and policemen were actively
colluding with a “Commander Mubarak” and his group in kidnapping Filipino-Chinese businessmen
in Cotabato City. The kidnappings prompted Senator Mamintal Tamano to call for a Senate
investigation because it has already seriously affected trade and economic life in the city. (Manila
Standard, 22 March 1991)
At that time, the military still did not know Mubarak’s real name. Biazon disclosed that at least one
Army captain and three policemen have been placed under ‘preventive custody’, and that charges
will be filed against them based on evidence collected from intelligence gathering. Biazon further
said that other soldiers and policemen were suspected of involvement. However, because evidence
against them was weak, they have just been reassigned to other jurisdictions to ‘neutralise them’.
The intelligence reports, continued Biazon, identified at least 30 more members of Bago’s group
who were based in the outskirts of Cotabato City, and in Matanog and Kabuntalan. (Manila
Standard, 22 March 1991)
The reassignment of suspected soldiers and policemen simply seems to have simply spread the rot.
In November 1992, nine officers of the Army’s Intelligence Security Group (ISG) based in Fort
Bonifacio were arrested for kidnapping of the wife of a Filipino-Chinese businessman in Sariaya,
21
Journalist John Unson of the Philippine Star is based in Cotabato City and has tracked the career of the
Pentagon group members. He filed various reports on Abogado Bago over the years, revising and updating his
information as he was able to gather and consolidate more. His 16 November 2001 report quoted here is the
latest of these reports. http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=140277&publicationSubCategoryId=67
18
Quezon, who paid a ransom of PhP 7 million (Manila Standard,17 November 1992) 22. Earlier in
October 1992, members of the Galicia group lead by an ex-Air Force sergeant, an active duty
Parañaque policeman, and an ex-Navy man were similarly arrested in Tanauan, Batangas. (Manila
Standard, 13 October 1992).
The momentum of the operation to get Bago quickened towards the end of 1992. With the
redeployment of Marine battalions in Central Mindanao, a manhunt codenamed ‘Operation
Barefoot’ was launched by the military on 25 September (Manila Standard, 5 December 1992). On
November 28, the 29th Military Intelligence Company engaged a group of Bago’s men in a firefight
in a raid in Kabuntalan, Bago’s birthplace (Manila Standard, 1 December 1992). But Bago was
hiding elsewhere – in the house of one his wives in Barangay Matiao, Pantukan, Davao del Norte.
He was 29 when he was killed. (Manila Standard, 8 December 1992).
In a May 17, 1991 interview by Carolyn Arguillas, then Maguindanao representative Michael
Mastura sarcastically called the spate of kidnappings as a “corporate venture, requiring no
application with the Securities and Exchange Commission” that, he continued, “is even tax-free”23.
He alluded that various actors – including politicians, policemen, and the military – can be
‘incorporators’ in this venture. Powerful individuals who see the profitability of the venture, he
continues, can easily muscle in to ‘buy stocks’ or try to be part of the enterprise, for example as
‘negosyo-tors’ (mediators or negotiators) who would jack up a P500,000 ransom demand from
kidnappers to P5 million, and then pocket the difference24. (Arguillas, 1991)
But most importantly, Mastura in the same interview warned that while the ‘chief operators’ of
these ‘ventures’, such as Abogado Bago, would come out to be known and identified, most of the
‘incorporators’ and ‘stock owners’ behind the scenes would remain unknown – a problem more
difficult to deal with. Mastura’s view was supported by both Norodin Matalam, then the governor
of Maguindanao province, and by Colonel Herminio Limon, head of an inter-agency anti-kidnapping
task force formed to respond to the spate of kidnappings. Matalam said that Bago was wellconnected with politicians. He told reporters, for example, that Bago was the chief security of an
assemblyman in the defunct autonomous regional assembly. Limon provided more specific details
of police and military involvement in the kidnappings, saying that they acted as lookouts and
provided security during abductions25. Limon’s superior, then Major General Gumersindo Yap of
the Southern Command, provided subsequent information that 19 elements from the police and
five from the Army were taken under protective custody for their involvement in kidnappings26.
22
The nine Army men were identified by Task Force Habagat chief Panfilo Lacson as Master Sgt. Danilo More,
Technical Sgt. Fernando Bengusta Jr., and Staff Sgts. Guillermo Umbao, Danilo Cerdeña, Oscar Crisostomo,
Ernesto Bileta, Baltazar Ranoa, Camilo Dana and Romeo Dionson.
23
Source:
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1370&dat=19910517&id=c6AVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=AgsEAAAAIBAJ&pg=61
51,2576663
24
The term ‘negosyo-tors’ is a play on the words negosyo (business) and negotiator, and implies a negotiator
who is actually out to make money or earn a commission, rather than facilitate the speedy release of hostages.
25
The military is strategically positioned in high ground around Cotabato City, and therefore hold numerous
vantage points from which they can observe traffic flow on the highways.
26
Note that Arguillas further reported that Yap and Limon were however bawled out by then Armed Forces Chief
Rodolfo Biazon for disclosing police and military involvement to the press ‘prematurely’ and not clearing it with
19
Limon further added that both the MNLF and MILF supported Mubarak, a charge which the two
groups subsequently denied. (ibid.)
Limon disclosed further details about Bago. Bago was said to be in Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia in
1982 as a contract worker, but then fled as the only survivor in a shootout following a bank robbery
that his group perpetrated. He became a member of NASCOM, which Limon described as an elite
combat unit that took orders directly from MNLF chair Nur Misuari. In 1988-89, Bago was linked to
the group of MNLF commander George Awal, and then later on with the group of MILF commander
Sammy Tilaka. (ibid.).
More details about Bago emerged after his death. A report said that he started his kidnapping
activities after his group killed a young army officer and seven of his men in an encounter. Now
armed with high-powered armalite rifles he seized from the slain army men, Bago launched his first
kidnapping -- victimising Lu Ela, a Filipino-Chinese trader in Cotabato City, whose family paid PhP 2
million for his release. (Manila Standard, 8 December 1992).
Mastura’s metaphor of kidnappings as a ‘corporate venture’ with unseen ‘incorporators and stock
owners’ was prescient, in the sense that the arrest or killing of the ‘chief operator’ Kumander
Mubarak in December 1992 did little to stem the tide of kidnappings. It appears that Bago had by
then already laid down the infrastructure and social networks that would enable his ‘corporate
venture’ to thrive. A handful of his associates and followers – Faisal Marohombsar, Alonto Tahir,
Mayangkang Saguile, Musa Ali and Samad Pandita (all former MNLF men) – soon came up to
continue the venture. They broke up into different groups that would later come to be collectively
known as the Pentagon group, and wreak havoc for the next decade.
This time though, the key group leader who emerged, Faisal Marohombsar, went further to
rebrand the ‘corporate venture’. In radio interviews and according to a former mayor in central
Mindanao, Marohombsar explicitly wanted to be known as a new Robin Hood, and took pains to
make sure the media gets the message that he was not anti-poor and that government neglect was
to blame for his emergence and continued predation as a kidnapper. Marohombsar’s entry into the
scene demonstrated that the kidnapping problem was as much political as it was criminal.
Marohombsar called himself ‘Mubarak II (the second)’, clearly indicating from where he drew
inspiration. His mother was from Kabuntalan in Maguindanao, the same town where Abogado
Bago came from, and to whom he is believed to be related. His father is from the Marohombsar
clan, one of the noble families settled around Lake Lanao. His father was born in Ganasi, a
hinterland town in the second district of Lanao del Sur. (Philippine Star, 26 August 2002)
Marohombsar left the MNLF in the early 1980s and surrendered to the government to avail of the
benefits of the rebel-returnee programme. But he soon became frustrated by broken promises of
government support and unimplemented livelihood projects to rehabilitate ex-combatants back
into the economic mainstream. He further claimed that some of his followers continued to be
hunted by government forces, or forced to be informants for government operations (Santos, et
him. Biazon then ordered a separate investigation into the Army and policemen mentioned by Yap. However,
Biazon retired even before he can get the investigations going.
20
al., 2000: p. 394). He consequently drifted back to the MNLF, this time to the NASCOM under
Abogado Bago. When Bago started his kidnapping spree, Marohombsar acted as the group’s chief
strategist, plotting the kidnappings from 1990 to 1992 (Philippine Star, 26 August 2002). When
Bago was killed in 1992, it was easy for Marohombsar to claim the throne, and name himself
successor to the original Mubarak.
Marohombsar quickly became known as the new ‘Robin Hood’ in southern Lanao where he gave
away big parts of his loot. Muslim preachers in Malabang, for example, confirmed that he paid for
the repair of mosques, and provided food and other forms of support to the poor communities
surrounding his hideouts. According to one of his followers, this was one of the reasons why it
became difficult for authorities to catch him. “None other than the civilians themselves around him
gave him refuge and protection,” observed Moctar, once a follower of Marohombsar, in an
interview by John Unson. (Philippine Star, 26 August 2002)
This role as a modern day Robin Hood proved critical. The ransom money he collected easily made
Marohombsar better resourced than most local governments in the region. His ‘contributions’ –
like the livestock he gave to people for raising – went a long way to reinvigorate economic activity
in small, neglected and nearly invisible villages. Abusive landlords or traders were given warnings.
Furthermore, his presence alone provided security to these villages – other bandits, predatory
politicians or abusive government forces will think twice before preying on a village known to be
protected by a powerful and notorious figure. Villagers bringing their harvests to sell in the town
and city centres, for example, gained leverage in negotiating their way through checkpoints. The
petty crooks who manned those checkpoints to extort from common folk avoided having to mess
up with the dreaded Pentagon group and set themselves up as open targets. Marohombsar was
described “a witty and ambitious man, who always looked forward to becoming popular”.
(Philippine Star, 26 August 2002, and information supplied by a former Maguindanao mayor)
Through the 1990s, the government filed charges in court against Marohombsar and his men and
put up substantial rewards for their capture. Below are some of his men identified in ‘wanted’ lists
published by the DILG from 1993 to 1998, along with the rewards offered:






Ibrahim Cabugatan, aka Brix – P350,000 reward offered
Saydale Caya, aka Saydie – P350,000 reward offered
Dimasira Dimnatang, aka Kumander Dimas – P350,000 reward offered
Macalubi Pendatun, aka Piping – P350,000 reward offered
Omar Marohombsar, aka Rolly – P350,000 reward offered
Gani Saligan – P350,000 reward offered
Marohombsar was to continue his kidnapping career much longer than Bago. He survived the
various Task Forces set up under the Ramos administration to hunt him down27. By 2001, he has
27
Ramos’ PACC operated mainly in Metro Manila. In Mindanao, anti-kidnapping operations were still handled by
the military and the police, through task forces with names such as Task Force Kutawato or Task Force Tugis.
Some of these task forces faced serious problems of coordination, especially from civilian authorities given the
21
expanded his operations to Manila. He was arrested in Quiapo in February 2002, and identified
himself as a police asset with safe conduct passes given by then PNP Chief Leandro Mendoza and
Interior Secretary Jose Lina. Both Lina and Mendoza had a difficult time disproving Marohombsar’s
claim. Four months later, he escaped by walking out of his cell and taking a commercial flight back
to Mindanao28. In August 2002, he was back in Manila and killed in Cavite by a small army of three
anti-crime units from the police and the military. (Rimban, 2003)
Another important kidnap group leader to emerge was Alonto Tahir. It should be noted that
‘Alonto’ is his first name, not his surname. Alonto Tahir is often mistaken to be a member of the
Alonto clan of Lanao, an upper class Maranao family. He is actually a Maguindanao surnamed Tahir,
and was born in Barangay Cudal in Pagalungan, the strategic town in the Liguasan Marsh where
various rivers converge, which is also the birthplace of former MILF chief Hashim Salamat. Tahir is
believed to be a member of the Salamat clan (a nephew of the MILF chief). (Philippine Star, 16
August 2004).
Tahir, who also goes by the name of Tigre, is a battle-tested guerrilla, and is easily identifiable from
the numerous scars he suffered from fighting. The role he played for the Pentagon group is said to
be indispensable, as he controlled a big force of men home grown in the Liguasan Marsh, a
strategic sanctuary to both the MILF and kidnap groups. Tahir was the lord of the marsh who
provided safe haven to escaping rebels and bandits, as well as hideouts for keeping hostages. He
appears to have led in kidnapping operations himself in the Koronadal Valley and the areas south of
the Liguasan Marsh, and was identified as responsible for kidnappings in the General Santos City
and Davao del Sur areas29. (Philippine Star, 29 November 2000) The former Central Mindanao
Police Director Bartolome Baluyut described Tahir as an indispensable asset to the MILF, because
he generates the much-needed financial support through kidnap-for-ransom and other criminal
activities.
Tahir is thought to have organised at least 10 kidnappings himself in the mid-90s. In 1999 however,
his kidnapping of Vicente Cavalida, Eduardo Cavalida, Cheryl Pagales, Rose Suares and Richard
Cerelles in Digos City led to his arrest, after his location was tipped off to pursuing army troops
(ibid.). During the rescue, hostages Suares and Cerelles were killed by Tahir and his men. Charges
were eventually filed by the surviving victims through state prosecutor Stewart Mariano. Mariano
won his case at the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, where the case was transferred due to
prevailing atmosphere of mistrust. Some local officials, including a former central Mindanao mayor, hesitated to
join these task forces for fear of being linked to who could be the real kidnapping masterminds.
28
The PCIJ reported in 2003 that the best time for ‘big-time’ criminals to ‘escape’ from jail is during shake-ups
within the PNP (see http://pcij.org/imag/PublicEye/jailbreaks.html). Marohombsar casually walked out of the
National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force's maximum security detention cell in Camp Crame on June 19, 2002, a few
days before Hermogenes Ebdane was to leave his post as deputy PNP director and NAKTAF chief and take over
from PNP Director General Leandro Mendoza, who had been named secretary of transportation. Apparently,
said other sources in Camp Crame, there had been tensions between Mendoza and Ebdane, and Marohombsar’s
escape was ‘allowed’ as a way of embarrassing the incoming PNP chief.
29
Information on this was also gathered from Supreme Court resolution G.R. 177139. See
http://www.chanrobles.com/scresolutions/2011marchresolutions.php?id=101
22
security conditions in Cotabato City. In 2003, the court meted the death penalty on Tahir and his
co-accused30.
The penalty, however, could not be imposed as Tahir had by then already bolted the Sarangani
provincial jail where he was detained, along with 65 other inmates, including 20 of his men. Police
say that rebel guerrillas from the MILF, reportedly led by Tahir’s wife, used rocket propelled
grenades to destroy prison walls to spring the prisoners from jail on 7 November 2000. Guards as
well as inmates were killed in the daring rescue. Tahir is thought to have retreated back to his
hideouts in the Liguasan Marsh, and was quickly back in business. On 28 November 2000, Jesse
Santiago, the high school son of bank executive Florante Santiago, was kidnapped on his way to
school at the Notre Dame Marbel for boys. A ransom note written by Tigre was delivered to the
elder Santiago. The boy was however abandoned, after Army troops closed in on the group’s
hideout in Polomolok. (Philippine Star, 29 Nov 2000).
Among those who escaped with Tahir from the Sarangani provincial jail was Abdul Basit Usman, a
wanted militant said to have with the Abu Sofia and Al-Khobar groups31. The military describes
Usman as having trained the MILF and other groups in bomb-making. In a press report, MILF
spokesman Eid Kabalu said Usman was a Maguindanao born in Ampatuan town. Usman, however,
was never a member of the MILF but had a brother, Ustadz Mohiden, who belonged to the
religious committee of the MILF. (The Muslim Observer, quoting Philippine Daily Inquirer Reports,
28 Jan 2010). The celebrated escape and association with Usman, who appears on international
terrorists lists, brought Tahir himself in the wanted lists of the US government. Usman indeed had
international connections. In January 2010, he was reported killed in a US drone attack in
Waziristan, the mountainous tribal region in Pakistan. (ibid.)
Like Marohombsar, Tahir played the role of Robin Hood. “He has that tradition of sharing with the
community where he hides whatever he earns from his kidnapping activities. That practice made
him difficult to find in areas where he has supporters,” said an unnamed mayor in Maguindanao in
a 2004 interview. (Unson, Philippine Star, 16 Aug 2004).
The Pentagon group appears to have regrouped in April 2001, when Tahir, Marohombsar, Raul
Ingad, Ibrahim Sagandal alias Jun Sarat, and Datu Udasan met in Digos City to discuss higher profile
operations, such as the kidnapping of Italian priest Guiseppe Pierantone in Zamboanga, and
including an expansion into Manila. Marohombsar and the other men were captured one after the
other in Manila in early 2002. Marohombsar would escape, but was dead by August 2002. Tahir is
thought to have taken over the Pentagon group from thereon.
In 2004, after his conviction and because of a $1-million bounty put on his head by the US
government, the military launched an operation to capture Tahir. His lair was pinpointed and an
aerial bombardment followed. The military initially claimed he was killed, along with 17 followers.
30
The source of this information is the blog Spotlight on a Fellow Atenean by Jose Angelo Delos Trinos.
According to Santos, et.al (2000), Abu Sofia and Al-Khobar are separate and distinct groups operating in
central Mindanao. Abu Sofia has links with both MILF and Abu Sayyaf. Al-Khobar is into extortion, with the
bombing of passenger buses as its ‘signature’ armed action. See p. 400-401 of Primed and Purposeful.
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SAS_ArmedGroups_HumanSecurityEfforts_Philippines.pdf
31
23
In 2005, three policemen who were said to be negotiating for the surrender of Tahir were killed.
The authorities were never able to lay their hands on Tahir again. In September 2011, his relatives
informed the military that he had passed away, due to complications brought by diabetes. He was
said to have been buried in Sultan sa Barongis, protected to the very end by the community he
embedded himself in. (source)
Aside from Tahir, Samad Pandita was another key kidnapping figure in Central Mindanao. Pandita
was also known as Sammy Tilaka, a notorious figure who moved along the fringes of the MILF to
take advantage of money-making opportunities. For example in March 2003 as serious fighting
raged between the Army and MILF troops in the Buliok complex around Pikit and Pagalungan
towns, resulting in what the Army claimed of up to 200 rebel casualties, Pandita was busy
distributing extortion letters to businessmen in General Santos City, demanding P15,000 each32.
The extortion letters came from the “Pentagon Allied Group Top-40 Special Bombing Operations”,
and signed by ‘Commander Sammy Tilaka’. It assured the businessmen of their firms’ safety if they
paid the amount, which Tilaka said they needed urgently. Another group that Pandita created was
called the “Dangerous 8”. Pandita carried a P1 million bounty on his head. (Manila Bulletin, 13
March 2003)
A key associate of Pandita is Mayangkang Saguile, who also carried a P1-million bounty. Also known
as Borongos, Saguile operated in Cotabato City and in areas west of the Liguasan Marsh, where his
kidnapping activities brought him into conflict with local warlords such as the Sinsuats of Upi who
wanted to protect business in their turf. Saguile is known to have cultivated ties with the MILF,
providing cover to some MILF operations, such as the takeover of Talayan municipality in January
2000. Saguile has also been reported by the intelligence community to have ties with Muslimin
Sema, a Maguindanao politician who is head of the MNLF Executive Committee of 15, and mayor of
Cotabato City from 1998 to 2007. Both Pandita and Saguile remain at large.
In May 2002, because of the increasing embarrassment of being associated with KFR groups, the
MILF agreed to the creation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group or AHJAG, a mechanism for joint
operation or coordination of the MILF and the military and police “to help isolate or interdict KFR
gangs” (Manila Bulletin, 30 April 2011). Dismissing the KFR groups as ‘lost commands’ who were no
longer under MILF control became insufficient, in light of the numerous links group members have
with the MILF mass base. However, both sides remain wary of the arrangement. The MILF does not
want AHJAG as a tool to weaken their presence in areas they claim to control. On the other hand,
government peace negotiators are wary about the MILF starting to have policing functions and
increasingly become de facto state authorities. The government emphasizes coordination, and has
asked the MILF not to do police work unilaterally.
Summary
Case study: Cotabato City (1989 to 2002) – The Pentagon group and their corporate
venture
32
The heavy fighting in Buliok resulted from an attempt of the MILF to take control of the two-storey house of
Hashim Salamat, which was taken over by the 7th Marine Battalion Landing Team in fighting the previous month.
24
Category of kidnapper
Motive(s)
Description of victim
Violence used
Links and alliances
Triggers of heightened
kidnapping activity
Approach to negotiation
Social bandit when they started, but arguably became
more criminal as they became successful.
Mainly financial.
Main victims were Filipino-Chinese businessmen. Later in
their careers, they started targeting upper class settlers
in Mindanao.
Most victims were not physically harmed, although some
died in the crossfire or were executed as government
forces attempted a rescue.
Active collusion with police, military and local officials.
Disowned by rebel leaderships, although ‘allowed’ to
melt in rebel-held areas and not betrayed by rebel forces.
Military or rebel offensives. Prolonged ceasefires.
Media savvy negotiators.
CASE STUDY 3: Basilan Island (1993 to 2001) - Lost Commands and the Abu Sayyaf Gang
In this case study, we argue that the Abu Sayyaf needs to be distinguished from ‘lost
commands’, and could be more appropriately referred to, not as a rebel or terrorist grouping,
but as a ‘gang’ primarily engaged in a complex criminal enterprise rather than a political
project. To differentiate lost commands from gangs, we present here a comparison of the
group of Julhani Jillang, a lost command, with the Abu Sayyaf gang.
‘Lost command’ and ‘gang’ are two concepts invariably applied to kidnap groups that need to be
clarified. In the Philippines, writes Ugarte, “a ‘lost command’ is commonly understood to be a
grouping within the AFP, MNLF or MILF that unties itself from its parent organisation and, bereft of
an institutional mooring and ideological compass, drifts into criminal activities such as extortion
and kidnapping” (Ugarte, 2009b: p.306). A ‘gang’, on the other hand, is less properly defined, even
though the term is widely used in the media, the intelligence industry, and academia, as it is widely
acknowledged that there is a proliferation of gangs in the country. The broadest definition that
seems implicit in common use is that a ‘gang’ is a group involved in some illicit activity.
It is not known, however, when a group, like a lost command, becomes a gang. Most of the reports
and references used in this paper, for example, refer to Marohombsar’s group as the Pentagon
Gang, but then refers to a Basilan-based group as the ASG or Abu Sayyaf Group33. What explains
the difference – isn’t the Pentagon an armed group too, while the Abu Sayyaf can be referred to as
a gang instead in its broad sense? What makes an armed group a group and a gang a gang? Does a
33
Even in the book Primed and Purposeful, for example, Pentagon is consistently referred to as a ‘gang’, and Abu Sayyaf as a
‘group’. No explanation is provided on what ‘gang’ means or why it is not applied to the Abu Sayyaf.
25
lost command increasingly become a gang the further it is untied to its parent organisation and the
more it engages in criminal activity?
The idea of a ‘lost command’ seems to have been invented so that the ‘parent organisations’ can
distance themselves away from, or ‘wash their hands’ of the criminal activity undertaken by the
‘splinter’, ‘breakaway’, or ‘lawless’ group that they do not anymore ‘control’. But then could it be
that ‘lost commands’ were actually ‘gangs’ in the first place, incorporated into the parent
organisation ‘to give them a purpose’, who then just naturally broke away and went back to their
usual trade when achieving that purpose became doubtful?
For the purposes of this paper, we provide some preliminary definitions and differentiation. Firstly,
we will categorise ‘lost commands’ as primarily (not totally) social bandits because: a) they have
been involved, as previous components of parent organisations, in the promotion and articulation
of Moro and peasant interests; b) they will tend not to obstruct or deviate concerted Moro and
peasant actions; c) they can still perform roles in transforming any organisational capacity among
Moros and peasants into a politically effective force. Secondly, we make the case that gangs are
mainly about and for themselves. They are not part of larger movements; they consistently
differentiate themselves from these movements; and are mainly located in the interstices of these
movements. Gangs will not promote or articulate wider interests, they will promote their own.
They will obstruct or deviate concerted action, unless they can capture the leadership. They are
more interested in building their own capacity, not transforming anyone else into a politicallyeffective force. In this sense, therefore, gangs constitute the instigators of kidnappings that we
have earlier called the villains or criminal entrepreneurs.
In 1992 and early 1993, before the Abu Sayyaf Gang consolidated in Basilan Island34, a group of
about 30 MNLF rebels led by Julhani Jillang staged a series of kidnappings that captured wide
media attention. Jillang was at this time unknown and not named in the news report.
These kidnappings appear to have been timed during politically-charged and tense periods before
and after elections. Filipino-Chinese businessman Ramon Sua Jr was kidnapped on 15 May 1992,
four days after the national and local elections. Dr Nilo Barandino and his family were kidnapped
on 27 November 1992, just as the campaign for the elections to the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao went underway35. Spanish priest Fr. Bernardo Blanco was kidnapped on 18 March 1993,
a week before the ARMM elections. (Ugarte, 2009b: p.304).
There were other kidnappings at around these dates, but as of this writing, it hasn’t been
confirmed if Jillang’s group was responsible. On 22 October 1992, and American Franciscan
missionary, Brother Gerald Fraszczak, 55, was kidnapped and was threatened to be killed unless a
ransom of PhP 5 million is paid (Manila Standard, 28 December 1992). On March 10, 1993, a week
before Fr. Blanco’s kidnapped, Luis Biel Sr, his grandson 4-year old Luis Anthony Biel, and their
driver were kidnapped. The elder Biel and the driver was released after the elections, after paying a
34
The Abu Sayyaf, according to various sources (including Ugarte and Torres Jr.) were already present in Basilan
but appears only as one of many armed groups, and has not yet projected itself.
35
Isabela City, which is the capital of Basilan, is not part of the ARMM. But so is Cotabato City, the main
population centre in Maguindanao, but ironically hosts the ARMM offices.
26
ransom of PhP 1 million, while the boy was held for two more months in return for a ransom of PhP
4 million. (Manila Standard, 12 May 1993).
Because of the ransoms involved, the abductions were ostensibly for the purpose of raising money,
but victim Dr. Nilo Barandino believes it was also about settling a score – he suspects that a mayor
at that time contracted the abduction after Barandino refused to sell his farm to that mayor36. The
Suas are also known to have been involved in land disputes in Lamitan. These incidents were the
predecessors to the mass kidnapping on June 8, 1994, when Jillang’s gang who were by then
lumped together and called ‘Abu Sayyaf’ by the military, abducted 73 civilians including Fr. Cirilo
Nacorda, then a newly-ordained Catholic priest.
It is important to attribute these 1992 to 1994 Basilan kidnappings not to the ‘Abu Sayyaf’ but to
Jillang’s group. Jillang and his men were considered a ‘lost command’ of the MNLF, composed of
active and semi-active guerrillas, not the young Muslim students from Basilan who called
themselves the al-Harakatul Islamia. But even the tag of ‘lost command’ can be challenged. Ugarte,
who interviewed Barandino and Blanco, noted that during those kidnappings, Jillang’s group “did
not seem ‘lost’ at all”. It was clearly in touch “and working in tandem with senior MNLF
commanders”. Furthermore, Barandino “was contacted by phone and in person at the Jillang
band’s hideout by a succession of MNLF commanders and their armed retainers for a variety of
reasons”37. (Ugarte, 2009b: p.306).
What is now known as the ‘Abu Sayyaf’ was at that time still a fledgling group whose original
members included the founder and ideologue Abdurajak Janjalani; his brother Hector; Edwin
Angeles or Yusuf Ibrahim (later discovered to be a military asset); and Wahab Akbar, who later
broke away ostensibly because he was not chosen as leader of the group and was then elected as
governor of Basilan province in 1998. The lack of knowledge and confusion over this group is
manifested in no less than the tag that stuck to it – ‘Abu Sayyaf’. The name of the group was AlHarakatul Islamia, and ‘Abu Sayyaf’ was actually the nom de guerre of Abdurajak Janjalani, the
group’s founded and chief ideologue (Torres, 2001: p.33)38. Jillang and his men came to be allied
with and at the same time heavily influenced by the group that came to be known as ‘Abu Sayyaf’;
but to call Jillang’s group simply as ‘Abu Sayyaf’ is to confuse the genealogy of these groups.
Ugarte presented a most important argument that is necessary to understand, not only why ‘lost
commands’ emerge, but more importantly, how they project their power. His key argument is that
the links and alliances of these ‘lost commands’ are their sources of strength. In other words, the
tangled web of connections that they build and develop is the key to understanding their resilience
and the logic of their actions.
36
See an account on Barandino in the report: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GA12Ae02.html
The reasons were documented in detail. A Commander Abugao requested Barandino to provide an M-14 and a
baby armalite. A Commander Bolon came to discuss and secure Barandino’s release. An Ustadz Munie B. Jamili
said Barandino and his family would be freed if he could show proof of having contributed financially to the
MNLF.
38
This account is taken mainly from the interview Ahmad Sampang (a nom de guerre), an original member of the
al-Harakatul Islamia who was interviewed by Jose Torres Jr for his book Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu
Sayyaf, Claretian Publications, 2001.
37
27
Jillang’s group, in this sense, are not ‘lonely wolves’ that can be quickly dispatched. Firstly, even if
they are considered a ‘lost command’, they maintain nominal links with the MNLF at the same time
that they nurtured links with the radical students of al-Harakatul Islamia. They may all squabble
with each other over turf and control of sources of support, but the bottom line is that they all
unite, come together, and fight as one should any one of them come under attack from their
common enemy - government troops.
Jillang’s group is not only linked to the other rebel groups, they are also well-connected with local
politicians. Nilo Barandino is convinced that the mayor whose displeasure he had incurred
contracted Jillang to abduct Barandino and family. Another kidnap victim, Cirilo Nacorda, is
convinced that a local politician who has since retired was responsible for selling firearms to these
groups, in exchange for the protection of his logging interests in Basilan. Furthermore, Nacorda
believes that the business of illegal logging forged a partnership between the Marines and the
various ‘lost commands’ including the young firebrands that by 1994 started to be called in the
media as the ‘Abu Sayyaf’. This led local Church leaders to demand the pull-out of the Marine
contingent in Basilan in 1994 (Vitug and Gloria, 2000: 218).
Ugarte observes that the alliances and connections that Jillang and his group has built are not
surprising – they reflect and are similar to the alliances and networks that are the building blocks of
political power in the Philippine archipelago and elsewhere in insular Southeast Asia. Such alliances
are, historically, the distinguishing characteristic of political formations. Power is built and
preserved by having such links and connections. In this regard, kidnap and other bandit groups
should not be seen as ‘lonely wolves’ preying on communities. Rather, they are better understood
as well-connected political entrepreneurs in tangled webs of inter-relations that have so far
received little scrutiny.
This pattern of inter-connectedness can be seen as well with the other kidnap groups. The core of
the Abu Sayyaf, despite its militant rhetoric and connections with global terrorist networks, have
not escaped being regarded as a ‘special projects’ infiltrated by military spies (source). Some
relatives of Faisal Marohombsar suspect him of being a government agent too, because of vital
information being passed on to the police and military, leading to the deaths of his followers in
alleged shootouts, including seven of his Maranaw hatchet men. There are stories too of how
Marohombsar allowed himself to be used by other relatives to terrorise voters during elections.
One such story is about a relative who gave him a customised .45 caliber pistol as a gift, after
helping deliver the much-needed votes in the 1998 local elections that brought that relative to
power.
A report to police headquarters prepared in February 2002 by then Central Mindanao Police
Director Bartolome Baluyut claimed that the kidnap groups were supposed to operate in obscurity
and appear detached from the MILF, but were in fact created by the rebel organisation for fundraising and tactical reasons. Baluyut alleged that the Pentagon group was created as the military
and then President Joseph Estrada prepared an all out war against the MILF in 1998. He said it was
initially called Al Hassad, and had about 100 men recruited mainly from Mubarak’s original kidnap
28
group. He further claimed that some Pentagon leaders received training from the MILF. (Philippine
Star, 18 February 2002)
Jillang was eventually captured, largely due to Barandino’s personal campaign to exact revenge.
Nilo Barandino paid a huge personal price. Aside from the abduction of his family and the rape of
his wife, a son was murdered in 1999. Barandino doggedly tracked his abductors, carefully keeping
files on the individuals he hunted. Eight of his abductors have since went missing. In September
2000, Zamboanga City Regional Trial Court judge Carlito Eisma sentenced Julhani Jillang and two of
his followers who were captured to life imprisonment. In Barandino’s files, he recorded a total of
183 victims kidnapped by the ‘Abu Sayyaf’ from 1992 to 200139.
Perhaps the most critical reason why a comprehensive policy and strategy against kidnapping has
not emerged in the Philippines, despite it being the ‘kidnap capital of Asia’, is that the government
is muddled and inconsistent in its understanding of the problem. This is best illustrated by its
description and statements towards the Abu Sayyaf over the years which contradict each other.
Ugarte calls this “the wilderness of mirrors’.
Ugarte has painstakingly showed what is wrong with the government’s understanding of the Abu
Sayyaf. For example, he points out that from June 2007 to June 2008, government and media
reports portrayed the ‘Abu Sayyaf’ as a loose assortment of two-bit bandit gangs, whose command
and control structure have been destroyed by the arrest and killing of its top leaders. Their
numbers were down, they have been pushed back deeper into the jungles of Sulu and Basilan,
were not connected to international terrorist organisations, and were at their weakest in terms of
funding and support. Back in 2001, Presidential Spokesman Rigoberto Tiglao, citing intelligence
reports, said that while Al-Qaeda may have funded the Abu Sayyaf in the early 1990s, there had
been “no bin Laden links since 1995” because the “bin Laden people thought the Abu Sayyaf were
too ignorant or too mercenary to join a terrorist organisation”. The Abu Sayyaf therefore, predicted
Palace and security officials, was on its way to being destroyed permanently. (Ugarte, 2009a: p.383
and 395)
Yet from June 2008 to January 2009, this assessment of the Abu Sayyaf made a 180-degree turn in
government assessments. Government intelligence and media reports depicted the Abu Sayyaf as a
powerful and sophisticated Islamist terrorist group. It had a radical agenda, maintained ties to
international terrorist organisations, and had substantial funds of over PhP1.4 billion accumulated
from illicit activities from 1992 to 2007. It was largely portrayed as a single organisation with a
harmonised and large membership base capable of planning, funding, coordinating and executing a
wide array or criminal plots across the length of the Philippines, including Metro Manila. It was
flagged as a menace to society. (ibid., p.384)
Ugarte wonders about the sheer scale and recurrence of these “contradictions, inaccurate
forecasts, and meaningless reassurances which has happened for at least 15 years”. He also asked
why none of the official sources who predicted the impending demise of the Abu Sayyaf were
never questioned or ever held to account for their false predictions. And most importantly, among
39
Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GA12Ae02.html
29
others, he asked why there was general silence among government officials and security agencies
over the involvement of regional and local powerbrokers in the kinds of illicit activities habitually
ascribed to the Abu Sayyaf.
As already stated earlier in this paper, the 1992 to 1994 kidnappings in Basilan should not be
attributed to the radical students of the al-Harakatul Islamia (the core of what has come to be
known as the ‘Abu Sayyaf’) but to the lost command of Julhani Jillang. The kidnappings that can be
fully attributed to this inner core of militants appear to be those that started in 2000-2001. But
then, even some of these kidnappings could not be described as a single and organised operation
put up by an organisation with a distinct command structure. It was more like a mob coming
together in a riot, a hybrid association of different groups who coalesced for that particular
operation, and then disbanded on its conclusion. The case of 17 convicted men over the June 2,
2001 kidnapping in Lamitan, as discussed in a Supreme Court decision GR 186523, gives us this
insight40.
Court records show that in the early morning of June 2, 2001, a group 30 of armed men led Abu
Sabaya and Khadafy Janjalani arrived in Lamitan, along with the hostages they have taken from the
Dos Palmas Resort in Palawan six days earlier on May 27. They headed towards the Jose Torres
Memorial Hospital, apparently to link up with the group of 60 armed men led by Abu Umran who
arrived earlier in Lamitan. But the two groups were not able to meet, as fighting soon erupted.
Fighting ensued between Sabaya’s group and the military in the vicinity of the hospital. A group of
civilian volunteers led by a retired Colonel Baet, who was killed in the encounter, also engaged the
groups of kidnappers in a firefight. By the evening of June 2, however, Sabaya’s group slipped
through the hospital despite heavy firing, taking with them more hostages – at least three nurses
and hospital’s accountant.
By June 3, Sabaya and Janjalani’s group arrived in Sinagkapan, Tuburan and linked up with another
armed group identified as led by Abu Ben. The next day, they were joined by Hamsiraji Sali with 60
other men. On June 12, Abu Sabaya told the hostages that American captive Guillermo Sobero had
been beheaded. Up to 10 more captives were beheaded. By the third week of July, the various
bandit groups that had ‘coalesced’ were able to get in contact again with Abu Umran (known real
name is Sattar Yacup). New hostages were added, taken from the Golden Harvest plantation by
Hamsiraji Sali and Isnilun Hapilon.
One of the nurses who was taken was 23-year old Reina Malonzo. She was separated from the
other hostages on October 1, and taken by Abu Arabi to Zamboanga City. By this time, she had
undergone a transformation, and had become the lover of Khadafy Janjalani41. On October 13, after
a firefight between his captors and government troops, Joel Guillo (the hospital accountant) and
three other hostages would escape. Later, nurse Sheila Tabuñag and two other hostages from Dos
40
See http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/186523.htm . Note not all that the names of the
17 as listed in the DoJ Annual Report for 2006, is consistent with the 17 names listed in the Supreme Court
decision.
41
Reina Malonzo becoming a lover of Khadafy Jajalani was not mentioned in the Supreme Court account but was
reported here - http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/13/world/nation-challenged-philippines-muslim-separatiststerrorize-filipinos-with.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
30
Palmas were released after paying a ransom. On November 1, Malonzo herself was released, on
orders of Khadafy Janjalani.
The third nurse taken hostage, Edilborah Yap, died at the hands of her captors months later, on 7
June 2002, in Siraway, Zamboanga del Norte, after a shootout between her captors and the
military. Subsequently, 17 men identified as ‘Abu Sayyaf bandits’ were captured42. They were
charged, eventually convicted and meted the death penalty. They appealed their convictions.
Some of the 17 told the court that they were forced to become ‘Abu Sayyaf’ members out of fear
for their lives and their relatives. The defence also argued that four of the seventeen were minors
when the kidnapping took place. Two of those who claimed they were minors at the time of the
abduction, also told the court that they were deep penetration agents of the military. The Supreme
Court, however, upheld the convictions, saying that the testimonies of the victims were superior
evidence, and that the defence of alibi put up by most of them was weak and unavailing.
Indeed, the 17 men were participants in the kidnapping, as they were positively identified by the
hostages as their guards during captivity. However, what remains doubtful is if they were Abu
Sayyaf militants, or just plain bandits taking part to earn their keep. Note that before they were
arrested, the government did not even know these men. The original criminal cases filed in court
were against “Khadaffy Janjalani, Aldam Tilao alias ‘Abu Sabaya’, et.al., and many other John Does,
Peter Does,” as stated in the title of the case. The 17 men have not been linked before to either
Janjalani or Tilao, or any of the group leaders identified as participants in the June 2 kidnapping –
i.e. Abu Umran, Abu Ben, Hamsiraji Sali and Isnilon Hapilon.
The point being made here is that the Abu Sayyaf needs to be demystified. The first step is for the
government, especially the various security agencies tasked to hunt kidnappers, to make up its
mind on how to regard the ‘Abu Sayyaf’. What is now known as the Abu Sayyaf should be
differentiated from the various armed groups and lost commands in Basilan, Sulu and the
Zamboanga peninsula. Once that is done, the Abu Sayyaf, despite its fiery rhetoric, emerges mainly
as a gang of dangerous criminal entrepreneurs.
Summary
Case study: Basilan Island (1993 to 2001) - Lost Commands and the Abu Sayyaf Gang
Category of kidnapper
Jillang’s group fits more as social bandit; the Abu Sayyaf
gang are more criminal entrepreneurs.
Motive(s)
Mainly financial for Jillang. Initially political for Abu
Sayyaf, but later become financial.
Description of victim
Mostly ordinary and middle class folk – teachers, nurses,
students, priests.
Violence used
Extremely violent. Many victims executed, some through
42
It is not clear from the court decision if the 17 were captured all in one place – Siraway, or if they were
captured in different locations. This point needs further research.
31
Links and alliances
Triggers of heightened
kidnapping activity
Approach to negotiation
beheadings – ostensibly to deliver a message of
toughness.
Active collusion with police, military and local officials.
Disowned by rebel leaderships, although ‘allowed’ to
melt in rebel-held areas and not betrayed by rebel forces.
Elections. Military or rebel offensives. Prolonged
ceasefires.
Media savvy negotiators.
Conclusion: Predatory bandits, villains and bosses in a predatory state
Why has there been a particularly high concentration of KFR incidents in central and western
Mindanao, and what explains its seeming ebb and flow kidnapping in the southern Philippines since
1986? Based on our case studies, we can say that there has been a high concentration of cases in
western and central Mindanao because there are three groups of kidnappers that are more firmly
embedded in this region. These are:



local political bosses and strongmen who are retaliating or jostling against enemies,
including the central state, or simply engaging in ‘primitive accumulation’;
non-state armed groups using kidnappings as political weapons while raising money, or
vice versa, and then often going on to take the mantle of ‘social bandit’; and,
opportunistic criminal entrepreneurs, including corrupt police and security officials, out
to make quick money given the example of the first two groups, and to take advantage
of the disorder and instability created by the unresolved and protracted political crisis in
the region.
The periods of heightened activity, on the other hand, can be explained by prevailing local conditions
of contest and violence.
32
References:
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Manila Standard, “Strong evidence against Galicia gang – PACC” by Fel V. Maragay and Marichu
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PDF file, 37 pages, downloaded from http://www.doj.gov.ph/?page=3&ID2=5&ID3=0
_____ (2003). Year 2003 Accomplishment Report. PDF File, 11 pages.
_____ (2004). 2004 Accomplishment Report. PDF File, 19 pages.
36
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Kamlon, et. al. This case covers the criminal cases in connection with the 12 December 1988
kidnapping of eight employees of the Zamboanga City government who were kidnapped while
out inspecting projects of the city government. The victims were Felix Rosario, Monico
Saavedra, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro,
Edilberto Perez and Allan Basa.
Supreme Court (Second Division), G.R. No. 186523, June 22, 2011 – Automatic review of lower court
decision on charges filed versus involving 17 named Abu Sayyaf members, including Aldam
Tilao and Khadafy Janjalani, and “many other John Does, Peter Does, and Richard Does”,
relating to the kidnapping and killing of some hostages taken from the Jose Torres Memorial
Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan on 2 June 2001.
Letters/ correspondences and personal blogs
Correspondence with Fr. Michel de Gigord (kidnap victim in 1986 and 1989 in Marawi City) – personal
email to Eric Gutierrez, 17 February 2012.
Correspondence with a former central Mindanao mayor (anonymity requested)
Correspondence with a former PNP official based in Camp Crame (anonymity requested)
Dodong Pagantihon (commander of the Army 35th Infantry Battalion in 1989, based in Maguindanao) –
“Memories of Buldon” in Ang Sisidlan. http://yuehmegami.multiply.com/journal/item/21
Spotlight on a fellow Atenean – Atty. Stewart Allan Mariano – blog by Angelo delos Trinos
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