Adjudicating Contractors in a Position of Trust
that do not require a Security Clearance
The suggested procedures contained in this document were developed by
Kenneth Sudol & Associates, Inc. as a service to the Personnel Security and
Human Resource community and are intended to be used as a tool to assist
adjudicators, investigators, security managers and human resource personnel
in implementing their programs for adjudicating “contractor personnel” who
are or will be in a Position of Trust that does not require a security clearance
eligibility. These suggested procedures may also prove useful to appeals
panels and attorneys dealing with position of trust decisions.
These are suggested procedures only and do not reflect government policy
and in no way implies a regulatory mandate.
The suggested procedures contained herein may be used in any way that an
agency or activity deems appropriate in formulating their policy for
adjudicating contractors who will be occupying a position of trust that does
not require a security clearance.
These suggested procedures can be changed or modified as necessary to
meet your agencies or activities processing or adjudicative requirements.
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SUGGESTED PROCEDURES FOR
ADJUDICATING CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
IN POSITIONS OF TRUST
THAT DO NOT REQUIRE
ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Part A
Sec. 1 Purpose.
(a) The purpose of this part is to establish suggested criteria and procedures for making
determinations of suitability for employment in Positions of Trust for government contractor
personnel. As a condition of employment consideration of ``age, health, character, knowledge,
and ability for the employment sought must be considered. This section concerns only
determinations of contractor ``suitability'' based on an individual's character or conduct that may
have an impact on the integrity or efficiency of the federal contract service. Determinations made
under this part are distinct from determinations of eligibility for assignment to, or retention in,
sensitive national security positions made under Executive Order 10450 (3 CFR, 1949-1953
Comp., p. 936), Executive Order 12968, or similar authorities.
Sec. 2 Implementation.
(a) An investigation conducted for the purpose of determining suitability for a Position of Trust
for a contractor under this section may not be used for any other purpose except as provided in a
Privacy Act system of records notice published by the agency conducting the investigation.
(b) Under OMB Circular No. A-130 Revised, issued February 8, 1996, the Director of OPM is
to establish policies for Federal personnel associated with the design, operation, or use of Federal
automated information systems. Agencies are to implement and maintain a program to ensure that
adequate protection is provided for all automated information systems. Agency programs should
be consistent with government-wide policies and procedures issued by OPM. The Computer
Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235) provides additional requirements for Federal
automated information systems.
(c) Before making any Position of Trust determination for a contractor, the agency should first
ensure the individual is eligible for the position and among the best qualified,. Because Position of
Trust issues may not be disclosed until late in the approval process, only the best qualified
contractor should require a Position of Trust determination, with appropriate procedures followed
and appeal rights, if any, provided, if Position of Trust issues would form the only basis for
elimination of the contractor from further consideration.
(e) When an agency, exercising authority under this section, makes an adjudicative decision
under this section, or changes a tentative favorable decision to an unfavorable decision, based on
an OPM or other report of investigation or upon a prior investigation the agency should:
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(1) Ensure that the records used in making the decision are accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete to the extent reasonably necessary to ensure fairness to the individual in any
determination;
(2) Ensure that all applicable administrative procedural requirements provided by law, have
been observed;
(3) Consider all available information in reaching its final decision, except information
furnished by a non-corroborated confidential source. Information furnished by a non-corroborated
confidential source should only be used for limited purposes, such as lead information or in
interrogatories to a subject if the identity of the source is not compromised in any way; and
(4) Keep any record of the agency action as required by OPM.
Sec. 3 Designation of Position of Trust and investigative requirements.
(a) Risk designation. Agency heads may designate every public trust position within the
agency at a high, moderate, or low risk level as determined by the position's potential for adverse
impact to the efficiency and integrity of the service. (See Appendix A)
(b) Positions of Trust. Positions at the high or moderate risk levels would normally be
designated as “Public Trust” positions. Such positions may involve policy making, major program
responsibility, public safety and health, law enforcement duties, fiduciary responsibilities, or other
duties demanding a significant degree of public trust; and positions involving access to or
operation or control of financial records, with a significant risk for causing damage or realizing
personal gain.
(c) Investigative requirements. Contractors receiving an appointment to a Position of Trust
must undergo a background investigation. Minimum investigative requirements correlating to risk
levels should be established. Investigations should be initiated before appointment to a Position of
Trust or, at most, within 14 calendar days of placement in the position.
(d) Position of Trust reinvestigations. Agencies relying on authorities such as the Computer
Security Act of 1987 and OMB Circular No. A-130 Revised (issued February 8, 1996), may
require incumbents of certain public trust positions to undergo periodic reinvestigations. The
appropriate level of any reinvestigation will be determined by the agency.
(e) Risk level changes. If an individual experiences a change in position risk level (moves to a
higher risk level position, or the risk level of the position itself is changed) the individual may
encumber or remain in the position. Any upgrade investigation required for the new risk level
should be initiated within 14 calendar days after the move or the new designation is final.
(f) Any Position of Trust investigation completed by an agency under provisions of paragraphs
(d) or (e) of this section must be adjudicated by the employing agency. The subject's employment
status will determine the applicable agency authority and procedures to be followed in any action
taken.
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(g) Position Designation for Non-Classified Contracts. The Contracting Officer’s Technical
Representative (COTR), in conjunction with operating unit management, servicing security officer,
and security contact, will review the work to be performed under contract and assign the highest risk
designation to the entire contract in accordance with the criteria stated below. Accordingly, each
contract employee will undergo investigative processing based on the contract's risk level designation.
1. High Risk. A contract will be designated High Risk if it meets the following criteria:
a. Work requiring continuous foreign travel of 90 days or more at any time during the performance
of the contract under the auspices of the agency;
b. Work involving functions or operations of the agency that are critical to the
accomplishment of the mission of the agency;
c. Work involving investigative, compliance, or senior-level auditing duties;
d. Work involving fiduciary, public contact, or other duties involving the highest degree of
public trust; e. Work involving Automatic Data Processing functions such as:
(1) Planning, directing, and implementing a computer security program;
(2) Planning, designing, directing, and operating a computer system that includes ADP hardware,
software, and/or data communications, regardless of the sensitivity or classification of the
information stored on the system; or
(3) Access to a computer system, during the operation or maintenance process that could
result in grave damage or in personal gain; or
e. Any other work designated High Risk by the contracting officer or by the head of the operating
unit or agency office.
2. Moderate Risk. A contract will be designated Moderate Risk if it meets the following
criteria:
a. Work involving free access and movement during normal work hours within an agency
which houses classified information or equipment with little or no supervision by an
appropriately cleared Federal Government employee.
b. Work occurring during restricted hours within an agency facility which houses classified or
sensitive information or equipment even though supervised by a Federal Government employee;
c. Work in which a contractor is responsible for the direction, planning, design, operation, or
maintenance of a computer system, and whose work is technically reviewed by Federal
Government personnel whose position sensitivity is Critical-Sensitive or above to ensure the
integrity of the system;
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d. Work requiring access to sensitive information (information protected under the Privacy Act or
Title 13 of the U.S. Code); or
e. Work involving foreign travel less than 90 days duration.
3. Low Risk. Work that does not fall into any of the categories noted above will be given a Low Risk
designation.
4. Variance in Contract Responsibilities. In instances where there is a wide variance in the risk level of
the work to be performed under one contract, individual contract employees may be processed at a lower
risk designation based on their duties when approved by the servicing security officer. However, the
contract document must specifically apply controls to ensure that the work of persons in the lower risk
positions will not overlap with that for the higher risk positions. The contract will identify the number of
employees to be processed at the lower risk designation and will specify the duties of the positions. An
example of such a case is custodial work where some contract employees perform work that is not
supervised during security hours in a building which houses classified information, while others may work
under close government supervision during normal work hours. The entire contract might be designated
High or Moderate Risk due to the former case, but those contract employees whose work would be Low
Risk would be processed with the appropriate background investigation. The contract must meet control
obligations to ensure that there is no overlap of work duties between the two groups.
5. Position Designations for Other Non-employee Positions.
a. Experts and consultants are subject to the same security requirements as regular employees of the
agency. Since experts and consultants may be paid at a level equivalent to a GS-13 or above, such
positions should be evaluated based on Public Trust criteria. If a position is not sensitive, experts and
consultants should be evaluated as an employee would be for a High or Moderate Risk position.
b. Guest workers, research associates, trainees, long-term visitors, and other similar types of nonemployees associated with the agency usually serve in a Low Risk capacity. There are no specific
criteria for evaluating their involvement under risk designation criteria; however, the determination
should take into account the potential impact or damage that the non-employee's interaction could
cause. If the involvement of these non-employees falls within the generic description of a sensitive
position, the manager of the operating unit involved must advise the Office of Security.
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Part B - Suitability Determinations
Sec. 1 Standard.
(a.) Subject to Subpart B of this part, an individual in a Position of Trust may be denied Federal
employment or removed from a position only when the action will protect the integrity or promote
the efficiency of the service.
Sec. 2 Criteria.
(a) General. In determining whether its action will protect the integrity or promote the
efficiency of the service, an agency may make its Position of Trust determination on the basis of
the specific factors in paragraph (b) of this section, with appropriate consideration given to the
additional considerations outlined in paragraph (c) of this section, or by utilizing the Suggested
Adjudication Guidelines for Determining Position of Trust Eligibility for Contractors shown in
Appendix B, as well as agency policy requirements. Also use the Issue Characterization Chart in
Appendix A to determine the ranking of the issue. (Minor, Moderate, Substantial or Major)
(b) Suggested potential adjudication factors. When making a Position of Trust
determination under paragraph (a) of this section, the following may be considered a basis
for finding an individual unsuitable: (Also refer to Appendix B for additional guidance)
(1) Misconduct or negligence in employment;
(2) Criminal or dishonest conduct;
(3) Material, intentional false statement, deception or fraud;
(4) Refusal to furnish testimony or corporate in official investigation
(5) Alcohol abuse of a nature and duration which suggests that the individual would be
prevented from performing the duties of the position in question, or would constitute a
direct threat to the property or safety of others;
(6) Illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances, without evidence of
substantial rehabilitation;
(7) Knowing and willful engagement in acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S.
Government by force;
(8) Any statutory or regulatory bar which prevents the lawful employment of the person
involved in the position in question.
(c) Additional considerations. In making a determination under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section, agencies shall consider the following additional considerations to the extent they
deem them pertinent to the individual case:
(1) The nature of the position for which the person is applying or in which the person is
employed;
(2) The nature and seriousness of the conduct;
(3) The circumstances surrounding the conduct;
(4) The recency of the conduct;
(5) The age of the person involved at the time of the conduct;
(6) Contributing societal conditions; and
(7) The absence or presence of rehabilitation or efforts toward rehabilitation.
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(d) Additional Suggested Adjudication Guidelines for Determining Position of Trust
Eligibility for Contractors (No Classified Access). See Appendix B for additions guidance.
A. Allegiance to the United States
B. Foreign Influence
C. Foreign Preference
D. Sexual Behavior
E. Personal Conduct
F. Financial Considerations
G. Alcohol Consumption
H. Drug Involvement
I. Psychological Conditions
J. Criminal Conduct
K. Handling Protected Information
L. Outside Activities
M. Use of Information Technology Systems
Sec. 3 Actions by agencies.
(a) List of actions. For purposes of this part, an action is one or more of the following:
(1) Cancellation of eligibility for a Position of Trust;
(2) Denial of appointment in a Position of Trust
(3) Removal from a Position of Trust
(b) An individual’s eligibility for a Position of Trust may be cancelled, or may be denied
employment, or may be removed when an agency finds that the individual is unsuitable for the
reasons cited in Sec. 2.
(c) An individual may be removed from a Position of Trust on the basis of a material,
intentional false statement, or deception or fraud; or refusal to furnish testimony.
(e) Agencies are required to report to OPM all unfavorable adjudicative actions taken under this
part, and all actions based on an OPM investigation.
Part C – Position of Trust Suitability Action Procedures
Sec. 4 Scope.
(a) Coverage. This subpart sets forth the procedures that may be followed when an agency
proposes to take a final suitability action against an individual in a Position of Trust.
(b) Definition. In this subpart, days mean calendar days.
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Sec. 5 Notice of proposed action.
(a) An agency shall notify the contractor in writing of the proposed action and of the charges
against them (including the availability for review, upon request, of the materials relied upon).
The notice shall state the specific reasons for the proposed action and that the contractor has the
right to answer the notice in writing. The notice shall further inform the contractor of the time
limits for response as well as the address to which such response should be made.
(b) The notice of proposed action shall be served upon the contractor by being mailed or hand
delivered to the contractor's last known residence, and/or duty station, no less than 30 days prior to
the effective date of the proposed action. If the contractor is employed in a Position of Trust on the
date the notice is served, the contractor may be entitled to be retained in a pay status during the
notice period.
Sec. 6 Answer.
(a) Contractor's answer. A contractor may answer the charges in writing and furnish
documentation and/or affidavits in support of the response. The contractor may be represented by
a representative of the contractor's choice, and such representative shall be designated in writing.
To be timely, a written answer shall be made no more than 30 days after the date of the notice of
proposed action.
(b) Agency's answer. The agency shall consider any answer the in reaching a final decision.
Sec. 7 Decision.
(a) The decision shall be in writing, dated, and inform the contractor of the reasons for the
decision. If the decision is unfavorable the employing agency shall remove the contractor from the
rolls within 5 work days of receipt of their final decision.
Part D - Investigative Requirements for Non-Employees
The following information describes the requirements for investigative processing for nonemployees. Appendix C, Processing Personnel Security and Suitability Investigations, provides the
minimum requirements for investigative processing of non-employees for risk positions and for positions
requiring access to classified information.
A. Contractors. Investigative processing for contract personnel is divided into two major
categories: unclassified contracts and classified contracts. Unclassified contracts involve no access
to classified information. Classified contracts involve access to classified information and are
referred as Classified or Sensitive contracts.
1. Non-Classified Contracts.
a. Every contract employee who performs work designated as Low Risk within an agency
facility for longer than 180 days must undergo investigative processing. All other contract personnel must
undergo investigative processing according to the risk level of the contract. The contracting officer's
technical representative (COTR), in conjunction with operating unit management and security contact, is
responsible for assigning a risk designation to each contract where work will be performed in the agency.
Within each contract, the contracting officer must include information that defines the investigative
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processing requirements associated with the contract's risk level. Sample language is included in Appendix
D, Contract Language for High and Moderate Risk Contracts and Appendix E, Contract Language for Low
Risk Contacts.
b. The COTR is responsible for initiating the investigation request package for a contract
employee. The request package is submitted to the Office of Security through the security contact or
servicing security officer. The following procedures describe the investigative requirement for
contract personnel by risk level.
(1) A contract at the High Risk level requires a pre-employment check prior to “entrance-on
duty” with a BI initiated no later than three days after the start of the person's performance on
the contract.
(2) A contract at the Moderate Risk level requires the initiation of an MBI no later than three
days after the start of the person's performance on the contract.
(3) At the Low Risk level, requirements are based on the elected duration of the contract. If the
contract exceeds one year, a NACI must be initiated no later than three days after the start of the
subject's performance on the contract. If the contract will last over 180 days but less than one year, a
SAC must be initiated no later than three days after the beginning of the subject's performance on
the contract. Low Risk contracts with duration of less than 180 days do not ordinarily require
processing. At the discretion of the security contact, a SAC may be requested for Low Risk
contracts of short duration where unusual circumstances exist and warrant the processing for the
contractors involved.
2. Classified Contracts. Individual facility security clearances are required for all contract work
involving access to classified information. On a case-by-case basis, individual contract personnel
security clearances may be granted by the Director for Security for short-term classified work.
B. Guest Workers, Research Associates, Experts, Consultants, Long-Term Visitors, and Trainees.
1. This paragraph prescribes the security requirements, known as "Security Assurance," for guest
workers, research associates, experts, consultants, long term visitors, trainees, and other individuals who
have similar associations with the agency. Check agency policy for information on Voluntary and
Uncompensated Services individuals and Employment of Individual Experts and Consultants.
2. Functions performed by these non employees are assigned risk designations. U. S. citizens serving in
positions designated Low Risk who expects to remain with the agency for more than 180 days shall be
subject to investigative processing. Non citizens serving in positions designated Low Risk who expect to
remain with the agency for more than ten working days within 12 consecutive months shall be subject to
investigative processing. Positions designated at the Moderate or High Risk level must undergo
additional investigative processing. The agency will accept active security assurance reviews conducted
by other Federal agencies if verifiable by a servicing security officer.
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3. Completion of the security assurance processing requirements set forth in this chapter does not
automatically permit visitors or other categories of non-employees associated with the agency
to have access to classified information or to restricted areas. Security clearances for such
purposes, as distinguished from security assurances, must be obtained in accordance with
applicable security regulations.
4. While the agency allows guest workers, research associates, experts and consultants, and
trainees access to its facilities, the final authority for determining the acceptability of such individuals
belongs to the agency. The operating unit head shall make certain that the provisions of the agency
Security Manual are met before assigning or agreeing to assign an individual to an agency facility
within his or her unit, and may prescribe additional control measures as necessary.
5. If the duties of a guest worker, research associate, or trainee appear to fall within the generic
description of a National Security position, the head of an operating unit must provide a written
statement to that effect to the Office of Security through their servicing security officer. The
statement should include information describing the particular type of involvement that appears to
create a similar situation to that for a sensitive position.
C. Short-term visitors are defined as non-Federal employees on official business to agency facilities,
making visits which do not extend beyond 30 working days for citizens or ten working days for
non-citizens within a consecutive 12-month period, and which do not involve access to classified
information or to restricted areas. No security assurance processing is required for short-term
visitors, but managers of operating units to be visited shall make definitive arrangements, such as
escorts, to prevent accidental access to restricted areas or to classified information during these visits. In
general, however, assignments or visits of foreign nationals that entail potential access to restricted
areas or to classified information should be discouraged.
D. Projects Sponsored by Other Federal Agencies. When a project being conducted in an agency
facility is being carried out by another Federal agency, the investigative processing requirements
of the sponsoring agency shall apply unless other arrangements are made.
E. Processing Membership for Departmental Advisory Committees. Security and suitability
processing is required for all nominees for membership on agency advisory committees who
require access to classified information. Committee Liaison Officers for each operating unit coordinate the
process of obtaining access to classified information. The procedures are set forth in Appendix D,
Processing Security and Suitability Investigations.
F. Security Clearance Requirements Applicable to Non-Employees. All non-employees who
require a security clearance to meet contract or other obligations with the agency will be investigated and
granted a security clearance in accordance with the provisions of the National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual (NISPOM) and the agency Security Manual.
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G. Child Care Workers Employed at Agency Facilities.
1. In compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 13Ø1, child care centers located in Agency facilities must have
background checks conducted on their employees. GSA conducts such checks on child care providers when
the child care center is located in a GSA controlled facility. Determine if there are agency facilities using
GSA approved contractors as well as contractors not processed by GSA. The security contact or servicing
security officer must verify that appropriate background checks were conducted on each employee of the
contract provider. When a GSA approved contractor is not used, the security contact or servicing security
officer is responsible to ensure that appropriate checks have been conducted as outlined in 42 U. S.C. § 13Ø1,
the minimum criminal history checks for applicants will be a fingerprint check of the records in the
Identification Division of the FBI and a check of the state criminal history repositories of all addresses listed
on the application for employment as either current or former residences. Additionally, the application for
employment will contain a question asking whether the individual has ever been arrested for or charged with
a crime involving a child, and, if so, the manager will require a description of the disposition of the arrest or
charge. The application shall state that it is being signed under penalty of perjury. Where this language is not
included on the application for employment, a separate sheet with this information should be attached.
2. The servicing security officer will work with the COTR and ensure that the appropriate investigation is
initiated for persons being hired with child care responsibilities at agency facilities. An operating unit may hire
a staff person provisionally prior to the completion of a background check if, at all times prior to receipt of
the background check during which children are in the care of the person, the child care provider must be
within sight and under the supervision of a staff person whose background check has been successfully
completed OPM currently offers the CNACI investigation for child care workers to meet the requirements
of the Public Law. This investigation must be used to comply with the Public Law. An operating unit may
hire a staff person provisionally prior to the completion of the required background check provided that,
when caring for children, the uncleared individual must at all times be within the sight and under the
supervision of a staff person whose background check has been successfully completed.
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Appendix A
Position Designation
A.1 POSITION DESIGNATION REQUIREMENTS
Proper position risk and sensitivity designations are the foundation of effective and consistent suitability
and security programs. Position designations determine the type and level of investigation required for
proper screening of an individual for each Agency position. Additionally, as the level of authority and
responsibility of a position becomes greater, character and conduct become more significant in deciding
whether employment or continued employment would protect the integrity and promote the efficiency
of the Federal service.
All positions in the Agency must have a risk designation based on the duties and responsibilities and
in accordance with the specific criteria outlined in agency Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). In
addition, positions with national security duties and responsibilities must have a sensitivity level
designation. Proper risk and sensitivity position designations ensure that investigative screening of
employees is performed in compliance with 5 CFR 731, 732, 736, Executive Order 10450, and
Executive Order 12968. Investigations for positions without national security access are conducted to
promote the efficiency and integrity of the Federal service. Investigations for national security access
positions are conducted to protect the national security.
The Agency must maintain a Position Designation Record for each and every position in the agency.
These records are maintained by the servicing human resources management offices. Servicing
security offices also should maintain records of positions designated for national security access in the
operating units or offices they support. The following chart provides the position designation codes
for risk and sensitivity along with the impact on the integrity of the Federal service and the national
security.
Although a risk assessment must be prepared for all positions, regardless of sensitivity, the position is
coded in accordance with its highest designation. For national security positions, the code will reflect the
sensitivity designation. If the national security designation is rescinded, the position reverts to the
risk designation coding.
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SUGGESTED POSITION DESIGNATION CODES
POSITION
DESIGNATION
4 - Special-Sensitive (SS)
or
4C - Special-Sensitive (IT)
3 - Critical-Sensitive (CS)
or
3C - Critical-Sensitive (IT)
2 - Noncritical-Sensitive (NCS)
or
2C - Noncritical-Sensitive (IT)
6 - High Risk (HR)
or
6C - High Risk (IT)
5 - Moderate Risk (MR)
or
5C - Moderate Risk (IT)
1 - Low Risk (LR)
or
1C - Low Risk (IT)
IMPACT ON FEDERAL SERVICE
OR NATIONAL SECURITY
Potential for inestimable damage to the national security. Used
for positions that the head of an operating unit designates at a
level higher than Critical-Sensitive due to special requirements
for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) or other
intelligence-related Special Sensitive information.
Potential for exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
These positions may include access up to, and including, Top
Secret defense information; development or approval of war plans,
plans or particulars of future or major or special operations of
war, or critical and extremely important items of war;
investigative duties, the issuance of personnel security
clearances, or duty on personnel security boards; or other
positions related to national security, regardless of duties, that
require the same degree of trust.
Potential for serious damage to the national security. These
positions involve either access to Secret or Confidential national
security information or materials or to duties that may adversely
affect, directly or indirectly, the national security operations of
the Agency.
Potential for exceptionally serious impact involving duties
especially critical to the Agency or a program mission with
broad scope of policy or program authority.
Potential for moderate to serious impact involving duties of
considerable importance to the Agency or program mission
with significant program responsibilities and delivery of customer
services to the public.
Positions involve duties that have a low or limited impact on the
Agency’s mission or on the efficiency of the service.
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Appendix B
Criteria for Adjudicating Contractor
Personnel in a Position of Trust
Suggested Suitability Factors for
Contractors in a Position of Trust
Suitability is defined as identifiable character traits and conduct sufficient to determine whether an individual is
likely or not likely to be able to carry out the duties of a Federal contractor with appropriate integrity, efficiency, and
effectiveness. The following factors may be considered as a basis for finding an individual unsuitable, and the
Adjudicator must state the factors (charges) forming the basis of the decision in the charging document.
SUITABILITY FACTORS
(1) MISCONDUCT OR NEGLIGENCE
IN EMPLOYMENT,
(2) CRIMINAL or DISHONEST
CONDUCT
GENERAL APPLICATIONS/DISCUSSION
The appointment of an individual to a covered position when his or her
employment record shows he or she has engaged in misconduct or
negligence may not promote the efficiency or protect the integrity of
the service.
* Misconduct involves intentionally doing something wrong in the
employer’s estimation, while negligence is an act or omission that
a person in the employee’s circumstances should know is contrary
to the employer’s expectations.
* May or may not have resulted in a disciplinary action, including
dismissal. If dismissed, primary emphasis should be on the act or
conduct which prompted the dismissal. For military misconduct,
the nature of the misconduct is the governing factor, rather than
the type of discharge.
* A favorable litigation decision, including receiving unemployment
benefits, would not necessarily nullity the conduct.
* Includes: poor attendance without cause, insubordination, or other
suitability issues occurring in employment (such as theft, etc).
* Does not include performance (an inability to perform), failure to
complete training, or other qualification issues.
* Misconduct or negligence in current Federal employment is not
generally included unless it is part of a pattern of conduct.
Criminal Conduct: Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls
into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws,
rule or regulations.
* Primary emphasis is on the nature of the criminal conduct, which
may or may not have resulted in arrests, charges, or conviction.
* Details/reasons for dismissal of a charge must be considered;
expungement of records and pardons for an offense would not
nullify the conduct, unless granted on the basis of the person's
innocence.
* Pending charges of a nature that are potentially disqualifying
cannot be adjudicated until case is disposed.
Dishonest Conduct: Dishonest conduct must be intentional, and
includes deliberate lies, fraud, or deceit other than in connection with
examination or appointment. Includes:
* Illegal activities resulting from dishonest acts (such as theft,
acceptance of a bribe, falsification of claims and business records,
perjury, forgery, etc).
* Intentional falsification of non-federal documents.
* Deliberate financial irresponsibility with continuing, valid debts of a
significant nature (such as unwillingness to satisfy debts,
indebtedness
14 caused by frivolous and irresponsible spending and
the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the debt
or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt, history of not meeting
financial obligations, etc)
SUITABILITY FACTORS for
Contractors in a Position of Trust
SUITABILITY FACTORS
GENERAL APPLICATIONS/DISCUSSION
(3) MATERIAL INTENTIONAL FALSE
STATEMENT, OR DECEPTION OR
FRAUD IN EXAMINATION OR
APPOINTMENT.
OPM retains jurisdiction in all covered position cases involving
evidence of material, intentional false statement, or deception or
fraud in examination or appointment. Agencies must refer these
cases to OPM for adjudication, or provide required notification to
OPM, if the agency wants to take or has taken action under its own
OWNGRADE (CONVERSION) OF ISSUES
authority
(5 CFR part 315, 5 CFR part 359, or 5 CFR part 752)
A charge under this factor may relate to a person’s assistance of or
Note: Any issues over 108 months are collusion
considered
with one
to be
or more
non-issues.
accomplices. What must be established
is the person’s wrongful intent, not the accomplices’ wrongful
intent.
Providing intentional false statements or engaging in deception or
fraud in the competitive hiring process circumvents the Federal
hiring procedures created to ensure fair and open competition.
* A “Material” statement (as used in the phrase “material,
intentional false statement”) is one that is capable of
influencing, affects, or has a natural tendency to affect an
official decision. The test of materiality does not rest on
whether the agency actually relied on the statement.
* An intentional attempt to withhold information, or furnish false
information, that is capable of influencing decisions about the
individual’s suitability, qualifications, or other matters related
to the appointment process.
* Material, intentional false answers to questions on application
or appointment documents or material, intentional failure to
admit a series of minor issues which demonstrate a pattern of
misconduct, or material, intentional omission of information
clearly related to the position sought (such as a performance
discharge from the same type of job or a conviction for drug use
when applying for a job in the medical field).
* Materially, intentionally falsifying experience, education, etc.
that could influence an official decision (the experience or
education does not have to be required for the position; it only
needs to have a natural tendency to influence the decision).
* The impediment or interference with fair and open competition
in the competitive examining process or with conditions or
qualifications for appointment or restrictions on appointment in
covered positions.
* Impersonation or collusion in examination (such as altering
scores) etc.
* Deception and/or fraud in examination – where a person knew
or should have known his or her conduct had a tendency to
impede or interfere with fair and open competition in a
competitive examination, or to otherwise compromise the
integrity of the competitive examining system.
* Deception and/or fraud in appointment – where a person knew
or should have known his or her conduct had a tendency to
impede or interfere with conditions or qualifications for
appointment or restrictions on appointment in the competitive
service or in a competitive service position.
15
SUITABILITY FACTORS for
Contractors in a Position of Trust
SUITABILITY FACTORS
(4) REFUSAL TO FURNISH
TESTIMONY as required by
5 CFR Part 5, section 5.4.
GENERAL APPLICATIONS/DISCUSSION
Competitive service applicants and employees are required to
give OPM, MSPB, or Special Counsel all information, testimony,
documents, and materials requested in matters inquired of under
the civil service laws, rules, and regulations, the disclosure of
which is not otherwise prohibited by law. Therefore, failure to
provide testimony when requested may be disqualifying.
(Although section 5.4 lists other requirements, the suitability
factor is limited to the requirement to provide testimony when
required by OPM).
Authority to invoke this rule is reserved to OPM, MSPB, or the
Special Counsel; therefore, agencies must not cite this disqualify
factor as a basis for a suitability action. Notification to OPM is
required if the agency wants to take or has taken action under its
own authority (5 CFR part 315, 5 CFR part 359, or 5 CFR part
752).
(5) ALCOHOL ABUSE, without evidence
of substantial rehabilitation, of a nature
and duration suggests that the
applicant or appointee would be
prevented from performing the duties
of the position in question, or would
constitute a direct threat to the property
or safety of the applicant or appointee
or others.
An individual’s use of alcohol may impact on his or her ability to
complete the duties of the job and/or raise questions about his or
her reliability or trustworthiness, thus indicating his or her
employment would not promote the efficiency or protect the
integrity of the service. Includes:
* Current continuing abuse of alcohol.
* A pattern of alcohol-related arrest and/or problems in
employment.
* Rehabilitation, if present, must be carefully considered (clear,
lengthy break in pattern of abuse; strong evidence the abuse
will not occur again).
(6) ILLEGAL USE OF NARCOTICS, DRUGS,
OR OTHER CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES, without evidence
of substantial rehabilitation.
Drug involvement can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability and trustworthiness or ability or willingness to comply
with laws, rules, and regulations, thus indicating his or her
employment would not promote the efficiency or protect the
integrity of the service. Includes:
* Current or recent use of a serious nature.
* A pattern of drug-related arrests and/or problems in
employment.
* Substantial rehabilitation cannot be established if the conduct
is ongoing or recent. However, if the use is not recent,
rehabilitation claims must be carefully considered (clear,
lengthy break since last use; strong evidence the use will not
occur again).
The distinction between this factor and the alcohol abuse factor is
the use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances is
generally illegal; therefore, the conduct need not amount to abuse
or addiction to be disqualifying. The conduct must still be
sufficiently serious to cause a general concern. In cases that do
not involve a criminal conviction, it is important to have clear
evidence the use is illegal.
Criminal conduct is an applicable factor to consider for use of
drugs and would apply in instances of possession charges where
personal use has not been established and the drug factor does
not apply.
16
SUITABILITY FACTORS for
Contractors in a Position of Trust
SUITABILITY FACTORS
(7) KNOWING AND WILFUL
ENGAGEMENT IN ACTS OR
ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO
OVERTHROW THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT BY FORCE.
GENERAL APPLICATIONS/DISCUSSION
All Federal employees must be loyal to the United States.
* Disqualifying acts must be overt, defined as illegal acts.
* Disqualifying advocacy must be the incitement or
Indoctrination to commit defined illegal acts.
* Disqualifying associations require the individual to know of the
organization’s unlawful goals, and for the individual to be an
active member of the organization or to have the specific intent
to further its unlawful goals.
* Membership in organization, alone, is not disqualifying.
(8) Any STATUTORY or REGULATORY
BAR which prevents the lawful
employment of the person involved in
the position in question.
Federal statutes and/or regulations may prevent lawful
employment. Includes:
* Participation in a strike against the government
*Conviction of misdemeanor crime (under Federal or State law)
of domestic violence (use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by current or
former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person
with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person
who is cohabiting or who has cohabited with the victim as a
spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to
a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim).
* Employment is determined to be in violation of the antinepotism statute.
Normally, agencies identify and act on these. (See the Issue
Characterization Chart for additional examples).
Additional Considerations: As outlined in 5 CFR 731.202(c), when making a determination
the adjudicator must consider any of the following additional considerations but only to the
extent he or she deems any of them pertinent to the individual case, and must explain his or
her consideration of applicable factors in the charging document and the final suitability action
letter. Additional considerations not deemed pertinent by agencies or OPM in individual cases
cannot be considered by the Merit Systems Protection Board as aggravating or mitigating
factors during the appeal process.
These Considerations do not apply in statutory or regulatory bars to employment.
17
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1) (1) The Nature of the POSITION for which
the person is applying or in which the person
is employed.
(2) The NATURE AND SERIOUSNESS of the
conduct.
DISCUSSION
The more authority, responsibility, sensitivity and public
trust associated with the position, the higher the
risks involved and the more potential adverse impact
there is to the efficiency and integrity of the service;
thus the misconduct becomes more serious as a
potentially disqualifying issue. However, certain kinds of
conduct may result in disqualification regardless of the
position.
The more serious the conduct, the greater the potential
for disqualification.
(3) The CIRCUMSTANCES surrounding the
conduct
Full facts and circumstances are essential to insure
justice to the person and to protect the interests of the
Government.
(4) The RECENCY of the conduct.
The more recent the conduct is, the greater the potential
for disqualification.
(5) The AGE of the person at the time of the
conduct.
Offenses committed as a minor are treated as less
serious than those committed as an adult, unless the
offense is very recent, part of a pattern, or particularly
heinous.
(6) Contributing SOCIETAL CONDITIONS.
Economic and cultural conditions might be a mitigating
factor if the conditions are now removed. Generally
considered in cases with relatively minor issues.
(7) The absence or presence of
REHABILITATION or efforts toward
rehabilitation.
Clear, affirmative evidence of rehabilitation is required
for a favorable adjudication. Rehabilitation is a
consideration in all cases, not just those involving
alcohol and drug abuse. While formal counseling or
treatment may be a consideration, other factors such
as the individual’s employment record, etc. May also be
indications of rehabilitation.
18
Suggestions For Adjudicating Contractor
Personnel in Positions of Trust
Issue Characterization Chart
1 – INTOXICANTS
A – MINOR
Drunk
Drunk and disorderly
Liquor law violation (use or
possession
by minor)
B – MODERATE
Drinking and driving
Driving under influence
Driving while
intoxicated
C – SUBSTANTIAL
Illegal manufacturing
Illegal sale
D – MAJOR
Pattern of excessive use
as reflected in:
 Convictions
 Job performance
 Employment gaps
 Inability to
function
responsibly
 Medical treatment
or poor health
2 – DRUG USE
A – MINOR
Infrequent use or possession of
marijuana
B – MODERATE
Regular use or
possession of
marijuana
Possession of marijuana paraphernalia
Infrequent use or
possession of other
Arrested or charged with possession of controlled substances
marijuana
Possession of drug
paraphernalia
Cultivating marijuana
for personal use
C – SUBSTANTIAL
Transfer of controlled
substance
Possession for sale or
resale
Prescription fraud or
forgery
Sale of controlled
substance
Unlawful dispensing of
prescription drugs
Smuggling contraband
drug into prison
Regular use of
controlled substances
other than marijuana
D – MAJOR
Pattern of use or
excessive use as
reflected in 1D above.
 Manufacturing
 Addiction
 Exporting
 Trafficking
 Cultivating for
sale
3 – FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
A – MINOR
Bad check
Infrequent, irregular, but deliberate
delinquency in meeting financial
obligations
B – MODERATE
Non-support
Judgment, tax lien or
other default with no
attempt at restitution
Illegal gambling
Eviction
C – SUBSTANTIAL
D – MAJOR
Pattern of
Pattern of irresponsibility
irresponsibility as
as reflected in 3C plus
reflected in:
continuing, major, valid
liabilities
 Credit history
 Disregard for
debts
 Abuse of fiduciary
trust
4 – SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
A – MINOR
B – MODERATE
Indecent exposure
Solicitation
Voyeurism, peeping
C – SUBSTANTIAL
Prostitution
Bigamy or polygamy
Pimping or pandering
Keeping house of ill
repute
Contributing to
tom
Mailing, selling, or
displaying obscene
19
D – MAJOR
Pattern of misconduct
as reflected in
conviction records
Child molestation
Sexual assault
Statutory rape
material
Obscene phone call
Indecent proposal
delinquency
of or corrupting the
morals of a minor
Sexual harassment
Other sexual misconduct
with impact on job
Incest
Bestiality
C – SUBSTANTIAL
Bribery
Embezzlement
Grand larceny
Grand theft
Mail theft
Burglary
Robbery (unarmed)
Perjury
False impersonation
(such as impersonating
a law enforcement
officer)
Interstate transportation
of stolen goods
Black market activities
with intent to profit
Income tax evasion
Receiving stolen
property
D – MAJOR
Pattern of dishonesty as
reflected in:
 Disregard for truth
 Conviction records
 Abuse of trust, or
 Employment records
Blackmail
Counterfeiting
Extortion
Armed robbery
Material, intentional false
statement or deception
or
fraud in examination or
appointment
Deliberate
misrepresentation,
falsification, or
omission
of material fact
5 – HONESTY
A – MINOR
Non-material, intentional false
statement or deception or fraud in
examination or appointment
Deliberate misrepresentation,
falsification, or omission of a nonmaterial fact
B – MODERATE
Altering
Breaking & entering
Forgery
Fraud
Possession of stolen
property
Black market activities
(non-profit)
Petty larceny
Minor stealing or petty
theft
Shoplifting
Abuse of property
Criminal false statement
Filing false instrument
Failure to file income tax
return
6 – DISRUPTIVE OR VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
A – MINOR
Disorderly conduct
Disturbing the peace
Making a threat
Resisting arrest
Abusive language
Unlawful assembly
B – MODERATE
Assault
Damaging property
Destroying property
Hit & run
Vandalism
Criminal or malicious
mischief
Harassment
Cruelty to animals
Hindering prosecution
Eluding police
C – SUBSTANTIAL
Assault & battery
Battery
Manslaughter
(involuntary)
D – MAJOR
Pattern of violence as
reflected in:
 Conviction records

Disregard for life or
property
 Civil actions
 Employment records
 Medical records
Aggravated assault
Assault with deadly
weapon
Assault with intent to
commit rape,
kidnapping or
abduction
Murder
Rape
Arson
Threat or assault upon a
public official
Manslaughter
(voluntary)
Child abuse
7 – EMPLOYMENT MISCONDUCT OR NEGLIGENCE
A – MINOR
Negative Attitude
Personality Conflict
B – MODERATE
Insubordination
Absenteeism or
attendance problems
Rules or regulation
violations
C – SUBSTANTIAL
*
20
D – MAJOR
Pattern of
unemployability based
on misconduct or
negligence as reflected
in employment history
*Other issues (use or possession of intoxicants, controlled substances and marijuana, financial responsibility, criminal
immoral conduct, honesty, disruptive or violent behavior, etc.) which also lead to termination or forced resignation are
raised one level for adjudication purposes. For example, petty theft, a B issue by itself, becomes a C issue if it is the
reason for termination or forced resignation from employment.
8 – FIREARMS & WEAPONS
A – MINOR
Possession of an unregistered firearm
B – MODERATE
Possession of a
prohibited weapon
Possession of illegal
ammunition
Carrying deadly weapon
Unlawful discharge of
firearms
C – SUBSTANTIAL
Carrying concealed
weapon or firearm
Brandishing firearm
Possession of firearm by
a felon
Possession of a loaded
firearm
Possession of
explosives
D – MAJOR
Improper or illegal sale
or transportation of
firearms or explosives
Illegal manufacture of
firearms or explosives
B – MODERATE
Traffic violations greater
than A but less than C
Contempt of court
Driving motor vehicle
without owner's
consent
Possession of
instrument of crime
C – SUBSTANTIAL
Vehicular homicide
Refusal to furnish
testimony as required
by 5 CFR 5.4
Tampering with a
witness
Harboring a fugitive
D – MAJOR
Hatch Act violation
Mutilation or destruction
of public records
Engaging in riots or civil
disorders
Striking against the
Government
Desertion (military)
9 – MISCELLANEOUS
A – MINOR
Vagrancy
Loitering
Trespassing
Minor traffic violation (Traffic
violations not required to be admitted
on application material or
questionnaires must not be
considered issues)
21
10 – STATUTORY OR REGULATORY DEBARMENT
The following issues require debarment from Federal employment for the period specified.
CONDUCT
DEBARMENT PERIOD
Habitual use of intoxicating beverages to
excess
Evidence of disloyalty; advocates or is a
knowing member of an organization that
advocates, the overthrow of our Constitutional
form of government
Participation in a strike against the government
Indefinite1 (from positions in the
competitive service only)
Indefinite
5 U.S.C. 7352
Indefinite
Willful and unlawful concealment, removal,
mutilation or destruction (including attempts) of
public records and materials
Inciting, organizing, promoting, encouraging,
participating, or aiding others to engage in riots
or civil disorders or any offense committed in
furtherance of, or while participating in a riot or
civil disorder
Interference with elections by an officer or
member of the armed forces
Unlawful approval of bond or sureties by a
postmaster
Theft or unlawful concealment of money, or
other
property of value, from a bank or safe in, or
adjacent to, a bank which is a Federal Reserve
member or is insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation
Unlawful trading in public property by collection
or disbursing officer
Unauthorized disclosure of information by a
Farm Credit Examiner
Committing treason against the United States
Inciting, assisting, or participating in any
rebellion or insurrection against the United
States
Knowingly and willfully advocating, abetting,
advising, or teaching the overthrow of the
United States Government or any political
subdivision of the United States
Activities intended to impair or influence the
loyalty, morale, or discipline of the United
States Armed Forces
Indefinite
5 U.S.C. 7311;
18 U.S.C. 1918
18 U.S.C. 2071 (b)
LEGAL AUTHORITY
5 U.S.C. 7311;
18 U.S.C. 1918
5 years from the date the Felony
conviction becomes final
5 U.S.C. 7313
Indefinite
18 U.S.C. 593
Indefinite (from employment as
Postmaster only)
Indefinite (from positions of
National Bank Examiner and
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Examiners only)
18 U.S.C. 1732
Indefinite
18 U.S.C. 1901
Indefinite (from employment as
Farm Credit Examiner only)
Indefinite
Indefinite
18 U.S.C. 1907
5 years from the date of the
conviction
18 U.S.C. 2385
5 years from the date of the
conviction
18 U.S.C. 2387
1
18 U.S.C. 655
18 U.S.C. 2381
18 U.S.C. 2383
The length of debarment imposed based on 5 CFR 731.202(b)(5) Alcohol abuse, without evidence of
substantial rehabilitation, of a nature and duration that suggests that the applicant or appointee would be
prevented from performing the duties of the position in question or would constitute a direct threat to the
property or safety of the applicant or appointee or others, would be in accordance with the procedures under 5
CFR part 731.
22
10 – STATUTORY OR REGULATORY
DEBARMENT, Continued
DEBARMENT PERIOD
LEGAL AUTHORITY
Indefinite from any position
requiring the individual to ship,
transport, possess, or receive
firearms or ammunition
18 U.S.C. 922
Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997
(amended the Gun Control Act of
1968)
Indefinite from any position
involving regular contact with, or
control over, Indian children
25 U.S.C. 3207 Indian Child
Protection and Family Violence
Act, dated November 28, 1990,
contains minimum standards.
Refer also to Dept. of Interior or
Health and Human Services
agency regulations
5 U.S.C. 3328
CONDUCT
Conviction of misdemeanor crime (under
Federal or State law) of domestic violence (use
or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed
by current or former spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim, by a person with whom
the victim shares a child in common, by a
person who is cohabiting or who has cohabited
with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian,
or by a person similarly situated to a spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim).
Any individual who has been found guilty of, or
has entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty
to any offense under Federal, State, or tribal law
involving crimes of violence, sexual assault,
molestation, exploitation, contact or
prostitution; or crimes against persons or
offenses committed against children.
Knowing and willful failure to register under
Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act
[50 U.S.C. App. 453]. (Applies to men born after
December 31, 1959, who are or were required to
register and who are not registered, or did not
register before the requirement terminated or
became inapplicable to the individual.
Processing guidance can be found at 5 CFR
300.)
Indefinite (from
positions in executive agencies
only)
11 – LOYALTY & SECURITY
y suit Suitability issues indicating evidence of disloyalty or terrorism that does NOT require statutory debarment will
be adjudicated at level D
Adultery is rarely a suitability issue but, in certain circumstances, may be a security issue and should be reported when
indications of susceptibility to coercion or blackmail are present.
Previous instances of security violations, clearance denials or revocations are included.
Any other issue not listed elsewhere may be a suitability issue considered in security adjudication (e.g., judgment,
reliability, and dependability issues).
Unadmitted/unlisted foreign travel that was required to be reported. Listed foreign travel when foreign connections or
foreign activities are reported, or when problems occurred while traveling outside the United States.
12 – QUALIFICATIONS (INCLUDING HEALTH) (The seriousness of physical and mental health
issues under this Code must be assessed in light of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, amended, and 5
CFR Part 339)
Lack of required competencies or knowledge, skills, and abilities
Inability to perform or poor performance which is not due to negligence or misconduct
Physical health issues
All forms of counseling and therapy
Mental, emotional, psychological, or psychiatric issues which do not include other issues listed in this appendix
13 – ASSOCIATES*
Issues listed in this appendix that relate to the conduct of an associate of the person under investigation
14 – RELATIVES*
Issues listed in this appendix that relate to the conduct of a relative of the person under investigation
*Use issue codes 13 and 14 only when the issue has a bearing on the suitability or security
determination of the person under investigation.
23
GENERAL GUIDANCE
Difficult to Characterize Issues. For Suitability-related conduct not listed in this Appendix, attempt to find
a similar or related issue, and use the characterization of the listed issue. If unlisted conduct does not
associate well with a listed issue, but seems to relate more appropriately to a level where no issues are
identified (such as level A for Issue 4), identify the issue at that level. Resolve any uncertainty about an
issue with an experienced Adjudicator.
Graft and Corruption. Bribery of public officials and witnesses and graft in connection with public service
matters may serve as a basis for debarment. Some misconduct requires automatic removal from Federal
employment, but no automatic debarment.
Criminal Activity Not Covered. Use issue code 9 for any criminal activity that does not properly fall in any
other issue code.
Probation and Parole Violations. The ranking of a probation or parole violation is determined by the
nature of the issue leading to the violation. For example, a probation or parole violation for Driving While
Intoxicated is adjudicated at level B while a violation for Assault With a Deadly Weapon is adjudicated at
level D. Probation and parole violations that cannot be related to conduct in this Appendix (such as failure
to report to probation or parole officer) are adjudicated at level B.
DETERMINING THE RECENCY AND CONTROL DATE – The recency of an issue is the period of time
elapsed between the date the conduct occurred and the control date. The control date is used to
determine the recency of issues for issue upgrade or downgrade (conversion). Use the control date
appropriate for the case type, as shown in this chart:
TYPE OF CASE
CONTROL DATE
Uninvestigated
Applicants (Those who
have not yet undergone
the required level of
OPM investigation)
Investigated Applicant
(Those who have
undergone the required
level of OPM
investigation)
Date the suitability issue information was first considered by the Human
Resources Office (normally the date of the OF 306, if the issue information was
admitted).
(If referred to OPM-FISD- Suitability Adjudications Branch; the date of referral is
used.
Date the subject signed investigative data form.
Date the Subject signed the investigative data form.
Appointee or
Employee
OPM may impose the maximum debarment in directed removal actions that are
based, in whole or in part, on falsification or fraud.

When new actionable issues arise after the original control date, the control date becomes the date
of occurrence of the most recent actionable conduct.

The control date for cases involving an applicant whose previous application was canceled
because of pending charges is the date of referral of the current or most recent application.

If two or more applications for the same person are received for suitability determination, the
control date is the earliest referral date.
24
SUITABILITY UPGRADE. Because the basic suitability evaluation is used to identify the most serious
conduct and recency has a significant affect on this assessment, suitability upgrades only apply to issues
occurring within 0 to 36 months from the control date. Suitability upgrade is based on the premise multiple
issues in the same case raise a more serious question of suitability than would a single issue. Thus, the
upgrade action is applied when there is more than one recent suitability issue in a given case. When an
upgrade occurs due to multiple issues, issues characterized at the lower end of the ranking scale may be
elevated to a higher level if they are repeated issues or occur in conjunction with another issue, as shown
in the following chart:
SUITABILITY UPGRADE
NUMBER OF ISSUES & RECENCY
(FREQUENCY)
UPGRADE ACTION
2 ISSUES IN 0-36 MONTHS
RAISE BOTH ISSUES ONCE
(e.g., “A” to “B”)
RAISE THOSE ISSUES TWICE
(e.g., “A” to “C”)
3 OR MORE ISSUES IN 0-36 MONTHS
Note: When an individual is charged with multiple crimes based on the same incident, there is no upgrade.
Rather, characterize the issue according to the most serious conduct.
Suitability Downgrade (Issue Conversion). Suitability downgrades only apply to issues occurring more
than 36 months from the control date. Suitability downgrade is based on the premise the less recent the
issue, the less serious the question of suitability. Downgrading, hence, reduces the potential for a negative
suitability determination because of presumed rehabilitation over time. Once an issue has been
characterized and its recency established, it then may be downgraded to take into account its age. Use the
following chart:
SUITABILITY DOWNGRADE
(CONVERSION)
RECENCY
(PERIOD IN WHICH ISSUE OCCURRED)
ISSUE
B
C
D
CONVERTS
TO
0-36 Months
37-72 Months
73-108 Months
B, no conversion
Downgrades to A
Downgrades to
NON-ISSUE
C, no conversion
Downgrades to B
Downgrades to A
D, no conversion
Downgrades to C
Downgrades to B
Note: Any issues over 108 months become a NON-ISSUE for purposes of the basic suitability
evaluation.
25
DEBARMENT ACTION:
 Only OPM has authority to impose a Government-wide period of debarment of up to three years from all
covered positions in the Federal service.
 Agencies have the authority to impose up to a three-year period of debarment from either all or specific
covered positions within their own agency when the issues are not recent or serious enough to warrant
referral to OPM to consider imposing a Government-wide debarment from all Federal covered positions.
 Agencies do not have the authority to bar from all covered positions Government-wide. OPM and
agencies have sole discretion to determine the length of debarment to impose.
 These guidelines are intended to promote consistency in adjudicative decisions about the length of
debarment to impose.
(Refer to OPM Suitability Processing Handbook for complete Debarment procedures)
26
(Attached Separately)
A
djudication
Guidelines
Suggested Adjudication Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility for Contractors in a
Position of Trust
(No Classified Access)
Prepared by: Kenneth Sudol & Associates, Inc.
February 2008
27
Appendix C
Suggested Procedures for Processing
Personnel Security Investigations for
Contractors
C.1
INTRODUCTION
C.2
RECORDS AND REPORTING
C.3
PROCESSING INVESTIGATIONS
A.
Personnel Security and Suitability Investigations.
1. Pre-Appointment Checks for Sensitive and High Risk Positions.
2. Waiver Request Memorandum for Critical-Sensitive Positions.
3. Special Agreement Checks (SAC).
4. National Agency Checks and Inquiries (NACI).
5. Access National Agency Checks and Inquiries (ANACI).
6. National Agency Checks with Law and Credit (NACLC).
7. Childcare National Agency Checks with written Inquiries (CNACI).
8. Minimum Background Investigation (MBI).
9. Background Investigation (BI).
10. Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI).
11. Upgrade Investigation (UGI).
12. Update Investigation (UDI).
B. Re-Investigations.
1. Noncritical-Sensitive Re-Investigations.
2. Periodic Re-Investigations (PRI).
3. Single Scope Background Investigation - Periodic Re-Investigations (SSBI-PR).
B.1. INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS
A. Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) are conducted to develop information on the background of
employees, appointees, applicants, and non employees (contractors) associated with the Agency. Suitability
investigations provide an assessment of an individual's potential to promote the efficiency and integrity of the
Agency's operations when filling a particular position. Security investigations are conducted to determine if
an individual's employment or retention in employment is consistent with the national security. The findings
obtained through security investigations are used to determine eligibility far access to national security
information or to special access programs. Investigations on non employees are used to determine the
potential impact or risk the non employee's association would have with the Agency. General guidance on
the minimum type of investigation for each sensitivity or risk level is indicated in the table on page B.4.
28
B. Non-employees working under non IT contracts that do not require access to classified information are
generally considered Low Risk; however, due to the impact on Agency programs, contracts deemed to be of
a higher risk require more extensive investigations of individuals performing under that contract. At a
minimum, a Minimum Background Investigations (MBI) will be required for persons performing work under
a contract designated Moderate Risk and a Background Investigation (BI) will be required for persons
performing work under a contract designated High Risk. When required, the Background Investigation
must be completed prior to performance on the contract. The National Agency Check and Inquiries will be
conducted after an individual begins work under the contract. Investigations must be initiated no later than
three days after the start of the subject's performance under the contact at the facility.
C. Background checks are required for non employees such as guest workers, research associates, and
trainees who will be associated with the Agency for a limited amount of time. For U. S. citizens a Special
Agreement Check (SAC) is required if they are associated with the Agency more than 30 days during a oneyear period A National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI) investigation will be required if they will be
associated with the Agency for more than one year. For non U. S. citizens, a SAC is required if they are
associated with the Agency more than 10 days during a one-year period. A NACI will be required if the
duration of the association is more than one year. For non employees, the SAC and the NACI must be
initiated no later than three days after starting work at the facility or association on a specific project.
B.2 EMPLOYEES (Including Experts and Consultants)
A. Sensitive Positions. For general guidance, see the table on page B.5., Minimum Requirements for
Personnel Investigations.
1. Special-Sensitive. The Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) must be completed prior to
appointment.
2. Critical-Sensitive. The SSBI must be completed prior to appointment; however, a waiver of this
requirement may be requested in an emergency situation.
3. Noncritical-Sensitive. The Access National Agency Check and Inquiries (ANACI) must be
initiated no later than 14 days after the subject’s entrance-on-duty.
B. Non-Sensitive Positions. For general guidance, see the table on page B.5., Minimum
Requirements for Personnel Investigations.
1. High Risk. The Background Investigation (BI) must be initiated upon receipt of a favorable preappointment check. Subjects can enter on duty after pre-appointment checks are favorably
completed.
2. Moderate Risk. The Moderate Background Investigation (MBI) must be initiated no later than 14
days after the subject's entrance-on-duty date.
3. Low Risk. The NACI must be initiated no later than 14 days after the subject's entrance-on duty
date.
29
B.3 NON-EMPLOYEES
A. Contractors
1. Classified Contracts.
a. Critical-Sensitive. The BI must be completed prior to performance on the contract.
b. Noncritical-Sensitive. The National Agency Check with Law and Credits (NACLC) must
be completed prior to performance on the contract.
2. Unclassified Contracts.
a. High Risk contract. A BI is required for individuals performing work under a High Risk
contract of any duration. The BI must be initiated upon receipt of a favorable pre-appointment
check. Subjects can enter on duty (EOD) after pre-appointment checks are favorably completed.
b. Moderate Risk contracts. A MBI is required for individuals performing work under a Moderate
Risk contract of any duration. The MBI must be initiated no later than three days after the subject's
beginning association.
c. Low Risk contracts that exceeds one year. A NACI is required for individuals performing work
under a non-IT, Low Risk contract for more than 365 days. The NACI must be initiated no later
than three days after the subject's beginning association.
d. Low Risk contract less than one year. A SAC is required for individuals performing work under
a Low Risk contract over 180 days but less than 365 days. The SAC must be initiated no later than
three days after the subject's beginning association.
B. Guest Workers, Research Associates, Trainees, and Long-term Visitors
1. Guest workers, research associates, trainees, long-term visitors, and other non-employees
associated with the Agency shall obtain a Security Assurance. For general guidance, see the table
below, “Minimum Requirements for Personnel Investigations.”
2. U.S. Citizen.
a. More than One Year. A NACI is required for U.S. citizens associated with the Agency for more
than one-year. The NACI must be initiated within three days of the individual’s beginning
association with the Agency.
b. 180 to 365 Days. A SAC is required for U.S. citizens associated with the Agency for more than
180 days but less than 365 days. The SAC must be requested prior to the 180th day of the
individual’s association with the Agency.
c. 30 to 180 Days. A SAC may be requested for U.S. citizens associated with the Agency
from 30 to 180 days when there is a potential for increased risk.
30
3. Non-U.S. Citizen.
a. More than One Year. A NACI is required for non-U.S. citizens associated with the Agency for
more than one-year. The NACI must be initiated within three days of the individual’s beginning
association with the Agency.
B.4 PROCESSING INVESTIGATIONS
Guidance for both human resources managers and security contacts to initiate requests for investigations for
national security positions are found in this Appendix.
NOTE: Also check the requirements of HSPD-12 for all contractor
personnel who will require access to your facilities.
31
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
SAC
Special-Sensitive
Critical-Sensitive, Top Secret
Critical-Sensitive, Secret
Noncritical-Sensitive
High Risk
Moderate Risk
Low Risk
Child Care Provider
Contract: Critical-Sensitive/ High Risk
Contract: Noncritical-Sensitive
Contract: Moderate Risk
Contract: Nonsensitive
More than 180 days
Contract: Nonsensitive
Less than 180 Days
Non-Employee: U.S. Citizen
More than One Year
Non-Employee: U.S. Citizen
180-365 Days
Non-Employee: U.S. Citizen
30-180 Days
Non-U.S. Citizen: More than One Year
Non-U.S. Citizen: 10-365 Days
Non-U.S. Citizen: Less than 10 Days
NACI
ANACI
NACLC CNACI
MBI BI
SSBI
M
M
M
M
RI Appendix C
*
*
*
*
M
*
M
M
M
*
M
M
M
M
M
C.3 A.1 & 10
C
.C.3 A.1 & 9
3
C.3 A.1 & 5
C.3 A.1 & 9
A
C.3 A.8
.
C.3 A.4
1
C.3 A.7
C.3
& A.9
C.3 A.5
C.3
1 A.8
0 A.4
C.3
C.3 A.3
M
C.3 A.4
M
C.3 A.3
O
C.3 A.3
M
C.3 A.4
C.3 A.3
C.3 A.3
M
O
M = Mandatory
O = Optional
* RI = Reinvestigation of subject required at 5 or 10 year interval depending on level of security clearance.
C.1 INTRODUCTION
Agency security officers represent the Office of Security when providing support services to operating
units. To fulfill this responsibility, each servicing security officer has the authority to ensure the
requests for personnel security investigations are appropriately processed based upon position
sensitivity. In connection with these responsibilities, the following guidelines and procedures are
provided to ensure a uniform personnel security investigative program among the operating units and the
Agency. For ease of reference, the guidelines have been separated into two basic categories: Records and
Reporting and Processing Investigations.
32
C.2 RECORDS AND REPORTING
A. Records. The Office of Security maintains an electronic database for each employee, contractor,
guest worker, research associate, or other individual associated with the Agency who is granted access to
national security information. The Office of Security will maintain security record information on a cleared
individual for as long as that individual is actively employed or associated with the Agency. Results of
completed suitability determinations are filed in each employee’s Official Personnel Folder (OPF).
The servicing human resources office will provide copies of the OF-79A to the Office of Security indicating the
final suitability adjudication for national security positions only. The Personnel Security database will only
contain the results of determinations for national security positions and will include the following information:
1. Name;
2. Bureau;
3. Position title (or other designation for non-employee);
4. Date and place of birth;
5. Social Security Number;
6. Position sensitivity/risk designation (Special Sensitive, Critical-Sensitive, Noncritical-Sensitive,
High Risk, Moderate Risk, or Low Risk);
7. Date of security briefings/debriefings;
8. Access level (Top Secret, Secret), Special Access (DOE, NATO, SCI, etc.);
9. Security processing action;
a. Date initiated (sent to Office of Security or to OPM)
b. Type of processing or security action (Pre-Appointment Checks, Personnel
Investigation, Security Assurance, Security Access, etc.) to include Agency system of records.
c. Date of completion and results for positions requiring a security determination.
10. Entrance-on-duty date and separation date.
33
B. Personnel Security and Investigative Files.
1. The Office of Security is the only repository for personnel security information in the Agency.
Accordingly, Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act requests for personnel security
information will be referred to the Office of Security for direct response to the requestor. However,
reports of investigations conducted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) or other
investigative agencies remain under the control of that agency; therefore, an individual will be required to
submit their Privacy Act request to OPM or the appropriate agency to obtain a copy of the investigative
file.
2. Success of the Agency's Personnel Security Program depends upon well-defined and open
channels of communication for timely and efficient flow of information. The key link in this
communication chain is the servicing security officer. The servicing security officer is charged with
ensuring that effective channels of communication are developed and maintained within his/her
jurisdiction. Each servicing security officer shall establish communications with a point of contact for each
operating unit within his/her jurisdiction. The operating unit point-of-contact is appointed by the senior
official of that site or program as the security contact. The security contact is responsible for
immediately reporting of all security incidences to the servicing security officer. The servicing security
officer is responsible for keeping the Office of Security headquarters informed of incidents or situations
which may affect the Personnel, Physical or Information Security programs in general, or the safety and
security of the Agency's personnel, property, or programs. The servicing security officer also is
responsible for keeping the appropriate operating unit or site official informed of all appropriate reports
and correspondence.
C. Reports. It is not practical to list all conceivable reporting situations; however, the following items are
necessary to ensure that personnel security records are current and properly maintained.
1. Pending Security Processing. The servicing security officer or security contact will respond to
requests for information concerning cases as requested by the Office of Security headquarters.
2. Personnel Actions. The security contact shall report all appropriate personnel actions to the
servicing security officer for inclusion in the Personnel Security database. The servicing security officer is
responsible for obtaining pertinent SF-50B (Notification of Personnel Action) issued within his/her
jurisdiction, and for forwarding to the Office of Security those forms which indicate actions affecting, or
possibly affecting, an individual's eligibility for security access. The following are examples of the types of
personnel actions, which may have a bearing on the Personnel Security Program. The list is not all inclusive.
a. Terminations for cause;
b. Name changes;
c. Changes in position sensitivity;
d. Separations/transfers, outside of the Agency;
e. Personnel transfers and reassignments;
f. Suspensions and other disciplinary actions;
34
g. Appointments;
h. Details; and
i. Leave without pay in excess of 30 days.
C.3 PROCESSING INVESTIGTIONS
A. Personnel Security and Suitability Investigations. Each servicing security officer has the
responsibility to confirm that all security processing requirements within his/her jurisdiction are met.
The initial responsibility for preparing security and suitability request packages for employees or applicants
is usually that of the servicing human resources officer. The servicing security officer shall provide assistance
to the servicing human resources officer with regard to the processing of paperwork for security and
suitability positions. The Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) has
the initial responsibility for contract workers and their request packages. Managers or other officials who
represent the Agency in interactions with non-employees have the initial responsibility for preparing their
request packages. The servicing security officer is responsible for tracking all investigations for national
security information positions within their respective jurisdictions. Some security and suitability request
packages may require more than one completed original form or copies of a completed original form. An
“original” is a completed form that bears the subject’s original signature.
1. Pre-Appointment Check (Sensitive, High Risk, and Certain IT-related Moderate Risk
Positions).
a. Requirement. A pre-appointment check is optional for Low Risk positions and most
Moderate Risk positions; however it is required for Moderate Risk positions in the Information
Technology occupations, positions that afford “global access” to information systems, and all Sensitive
and High Risk positions. These checks will include favorable National Criminal Information
Center (NCIC) checks for criminal history.
b. Procedure. The servicing human resources office provides the investigative forms to the
applicant in advance of the entrance-on-duty date. The employee completes all forms, obtains a
completed fingerprint card and fingerprints from the servicing security office (or local police station),
and returns the completed forms and fingerprint card to the servicing human resources office. The
servicing human resources office sends the completed package to the servicing security office for
processing.
c. Request Package. The pre-appointment request must include the following:
(1) Pre-Appointment Check Request Memorandum;
(2) Completed questionnaire:
(a) For sensitive positions: Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, or
35
(b) For High Risk positions: Form SF-85P, Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions;
(c) For Moderate Risk positions: Form SF-85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions;
(3) Form SF-87, Fingerprint chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block;
(4) Request for Security Clearance (Agency form), with sufficient justification for access
to the security level requested (for Sensitive positions only);
(5) Form OF-612, Optional Application for Federal Employment, or resume/equivalent;
(6) Form OF-306, Declaration for Federal Employment; and
(7) Credit Release Authorization.
(8) Waiver Request Memorandum. (see paragraph 2 below).
d. Security Office Action. The servicing security officer shall review the pre-appointment
check request package for completeness and forward a copy of the request package to Office
of Security headquarters for action. The Office of Security headquarters will perform the preappointment checks and notify the servicing human resources office of the results. The servicing
human resources office will then notify the Office of Security once the appointment date has been
established.
2. Waiver Request Memorandum (Critical-Sensitive Positions Only). When a Critical-Sensitive
position appointment must be filled prior to the completion of an investigation due to an emergency
situation, the individual’s immediate supervisor must submit a waiver request memorandum with the
request for a pre-appointment check. The waiver request memorandum shall be addressed to the
Director for Security requesting a waiver of the requirement for completion of a Single Scope
Background Investigation (SSBI) or Background Investigation (BI) before appointment. The waiver request
must contain sufficient justification concerning the nature of emergency and the benefit to the national
interest. Waiver requests will not be granted to Special-Sensitive position appointments under any
circumstance.
a. Requirement. The Director for Security or his/her designee may grant a waiver of the
requirement for prior completion of a BI or SSBI for appointment to a Critical-Sensitive position. The
appointment must be justified as an emergency and in the national interest.
b. Procedure. The individual’s supervisor or unit manager will be responsible for initiating the
request for a waiver and sending it to the servicing security officer.
c. Request Package.
(1) The SSBI or BI investigative request package coded for 35-day service request;
(2) Waiver request memorandum to the Office of Security from the individual’s supervisor or
office manager, identifying the subject, the subject's proposed position sensitivity level, and
36
the nature of the emergency and the national interest;
(3) Form SF-87, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM's designation in the ORI Block; and
(4) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Officer Action.
1. Confirm that the waiver request memorandum clearly identifies the emergency need and the national
interest; and
2. Forward the waiver request package to the Office of Security headquarters for processing.
3. Special Agreement Check (SAC) (Low Risk Contracts and non-employees).
a. Requirement. Special Agreement Check (SAC) is the minimum investigative requirement for
contract personnel and non-employees performing Low Risk functions.
(1) All U.S. citizens with access to Agency facilities for more than 180 calendar days but less than
365 calendar days are subject to a SAC or higher investigation, if required.
(2) All non-U.S. citizens with access to Agency facilities for more than 10 working days up to 365
days are subject to a SAC or higher investigation, if required.
b. Procedures. The responsible security contact or Contracting Officer Technical Representative
(COTR) initiates the SAC investigation request package. The security contact or the COTR, not the
subject, completes form OFI-86C, Items 1 through 12 and 14. The COTR ensures that confirm code
“R” is clearly written in Block 7 and that the subject has signed and dated Block 13, Authorization
For Release of Information. The completed SAC request package is then sent to the servicing security
officer for processing no later than three working days after the subject’s start of work.
c. Request Package.
(1) Form OFI-86C, Special Agreement Checks;
(2) FD-258, Fingerprint Chart with OPM's designation in the ORI Block.
d. Servicing Security Officer Action.
(1) Review investigative request package for completeness;
(2) Ensure that the subject of each package is identified as contract personnel, the name of the
contracting company or organization of origin is clearly indicated, and that each package is clearly
marked to indicate the contract sensitivity designation; and
(3) Forward completed package to OPM.
37
4. National Agency Checks and Inquiries (NACI) (Low Risk Positions).
a. Requirement. The National Agency Checks and Inquiries (NACI) is the minimum investigation
requirement for appointment to a Low Risk position.
b. Procedure. The servicing human resources office provides the NACI investigative package to the
employee in advance of or on the entrance-on-duty date. The employee completes all forms, obtains a
completed fingerprint card from the servicing security office, and returns the completed investigative
package and fingerprint card to the servicing human resources office within three working days after the
effective date of the appointment. The servicing human resources office sends the completed package to
OPM within 14 calendar days of the appointment effective date.
c. Request Package.
(1) Form SF-85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions;
(2) Form OF-612, Optional Application for Federal Employment or resume/equivalent;
(3) Form OF-306, Declaration for Federal Employment;
(4) Form SF-87 Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block; and
(5) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action. None. The NACI investigative request package will be reviewed by
the servicing human resources offices or designated office for completeness and forwarded to the Office of
Personnel Management for processing.
5. Access National Agency Checks and Inquiries (ANACI) (Noncritical-Sensitive Positions).
a. Requirement. Access National Agency Checks and Inquiries (ANACI) is the minimum investigative
requirement for Noncritical-Sensitive positions requiring access to classified information up to the Secret
level under E.O. 12968.
b. Procedure. The servicing human resources office provides the ANACI investigative forms to the
employee in advance of the entrance-on-duty date. The applicant or employee completes all forms, obtains a
completed fingerprint card and set of fingerprints from the servicing security office (or local police office),
and returns the completed investigative request package to the servicing security officer for processing.
c. Request Package.
(1) Pre-Appointment Check Request Memorandum;
(2) Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions;
38
(3) Form OF-612, Optional Application for Federal Employment, or resume/equivalent;
(4) Form OF-306, Declaration for Federal Employment;
(5) Form SF-87, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block;
(6) Form CD-79, Request for Security Clearance, with sufficient justification for access to the security
level requested; and
(7) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Officer Action. Review the ANACI investigative request package for
completeness and enter relevant data into Office of Security’s electronic database. Forwards a
copy of request package to Office of Security headquarters for information. Upon favorably
completed pre-appointment checks and subject’s EOD date, send the ANACI request package
to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for processing.
6. National Agency Checks with Law and Credit (NACLC) (Noncritical-Sensitive contracts and
non-employees).
a. Requirement. National Agency Checks with Law and Credit (NACLC) is the minimum investigation
requirement for contractor personnel, consultants, experts, associates, or committee members whose work
requires access to classified information up to the Secret level.
b. Procedure. The responsible security contact, COTR (Contracting Officer Technical Representative, or
Agency committee liaison provides the NACLC investigative forms to the individual prior to the start date
or required date of association. The individual completes all forms, obtains a completed fingerprint card and
set of fingerprints from the servicing security office (or local police office), and returns the completed
investigative package to the security contact, COTR, or Agency committee liaison, who forwards the
request package to the servicing security office for processing.
c. Request Package.
(1) Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions;
(2) Form FD-258, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block;
(3) Form CD-79, Request for Security Clearance, with sufficient justification for access to classified
information up to the Secret level; and
(4) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action. Review the NACLC investigative request package for completeness
and enter relevant data into Office of Security’s electronic database. Forward the request package to the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for processing and send a copy to Office of Security headquarters
for information.
39
7. Childcare National Agency Checks with Written Inquiries (CNACI) (Child Care Worker)
a. Requirement. Childcare National Agency Checks with written Inquiries (CNACI) meets
the investigative requirements set forth by Public Law 101-647 and 42 USC § 13041, for
individuals holding positions within childcare facilities. Employees of childcare facilities
sponsored by the Agency are subject to a CNACI investigation conducted by OPM and will
be reinvestigated every five years.
b. Procedure.
(1) The security contact or the COTR of the childcare contractor provides the CNACI investigative forms
to the individual in advance of or on the entrance-on-duty date. The individual completes all forms,
obtains a completed fingerprint card and set of fingerprints from the servicing security office (or local
police office), and returns the completed investigative package to the security contact or COTR, who
forwards the request package to the servicing security office for processing.
(2) The servicing security officer reviews and submits the completed request package to OPM within
three days of the individual’s start of work.
c. Request Package.
(1) Form SF-85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions;
(2) Resume of professional qualifications, and employment history;
(3) Form FD-258, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block; and
(4) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Officer Action. Review the CNACI investigative request package for completeness
and submit it to the Office of Personnel Management for processing.
8. Minimum Background Investigation (MBI) (Moderate Risk Positions).
a. Requirement. The Minimum Background Investigation (MBI) is the minimum investigation
requirement for appointment of employees to a Moderate Risk position.
b. Procedure. The servicing human resources office provides the MBI investigative package to individuals
being appointed to Moderate Risk positions. The employee completes all forms, obtains a completed
fingerprint card from the servicing security office, and returns the completed investigative request package
to the servicing human resources office at the appropriate time for processing. Individuals being appointed
to non-IT related occupations can receive the investigative forms either in advance of or on the entrance-onduty date. Individuals in IT-related positions must receive the investigative forms prior to the entrance-onduty date and be subject to a favorable pre-appointment check prior to appointment.
40
c. Request Package.
(1) Form SF-85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions;
(2) Form OF-612, Optional Application for Federal Employment or resume/equivalent;
(3) Form OF-306, Declaration for Federal Employment;
(4) Form SF-87 Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block; and
(5) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action. None. (Unless accomplished by the Security Office). The MBI
investigative request package will normally be reviewed by the servicing human resource office (HRO)
for completeness and forwarded to the Office of Personnel Management for processing.
9. Background Investigation (BI) (Critical-Sensitive and High Risk Positions).
a. Requirement.
(1) All employees and non-employees appointed to Critical-Sensitive positions that require access to
information up to the Secret level are subject to the completion of a BI prior to appointment.
(2) All appointments to High Risk positions are subject to the prior completion of a BI;
however, subjects can enter-on-duty (EOD) after a pre-appointment check has been favorably
completed.
b. Procedure. The servicing human resources office provides the BI investigative forms to the employee
in advance of the entrance-on-duty date. The employee completes all forms, obtains a completed
fingerprint card and set of fingerprints from the servicing security office (or local police office), and
returns the completed investigative package to the servicing security officer for processing.
c. Request Package.
(1) Pre-Appointment Check Request Memorandum;
(2) Waiver Request Memorandum, if required;
(3) Questionnaire:
(a) For Critical-Sensitive Positions: Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions; or
(b) For High Risk Positions: Form SF-85P, Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions;
41
(4) Form OF-612, Optional Application for Federal Employment, Resume/Equivalent;
(5) Form OF-306, Declaration for Federal Employment;
(6) Fingerprint card:
(a) Form SF-87, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM's designation in the ORI Block; or
(b) Form FD-258, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block;
(7) Request for Security Clearance (agency form) with sufficient justification for access to the security
level requested; and
(8) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action.
(1) Critical Sensitive. Review the BI investigative request packages for completeness
and enter relevant data into Office of Security’s electronic database. Forward the Waiver
Request Memorandum (if required) and Form SF-86 to the Office of Security headquarters for
processing. After favorably completing the pre-appointment check and determining the subject’s
EOD date, submit the BI request package to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for
processing.
(2) High Risk. Review the BI investigative request packages for completeness and upon
favorably completed pre-appointment checks and subject’s EOD date; submit the BI request
package to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for processing.
10. Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) (Special-Sensitive and Critical-Sensitive
Positions).
a. Requirement.
(1) All appointments to Special-Sensitive positions for employees and contract personnel that
require access to classified information at the Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) levels are subject to completion of an SSBI prior to appointment.
(2) All appointments to Critical-Sensitive positions for employees and contract personnel that
require access to classified information at the Top Secret level are subject to the prior
completion of an SSBI.
(3) A pre-appointment check request memorandum is required for both Special-Sensitive and
Critical-Sensitive positions.
b. Procedure. The servicing human resources office provides the SSBI investigative forms to the
employee in advance of the entrance-on-duty date. The employee completes all forms, obtains a
completed fingerprint card and set of fingerprints from the servicing security office (or local police office),
and returns the completed investigative package to the servicing security officer for processing.
When a favorable pre-appointment check has been completed, the servicing security officer
42
submits the investigative package to OPM.
c. Request Package.
(1) Pre-Appointment Checks Request Memorandum;
(2) Waiver Request Memorandum, (Critical-Sensitive Only) if required;
(3) Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions;
(4) Form OF-612, Optional Application for Federal Employment, Resume/Equivalent, or Personal
qualifications statement;
(5) Form OF-306, Declaration for Federal Employment;
(6) Form SF-87, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM's designation in the ORI Block; and
(7) OPM Form 1476, Activity outside of the United States (This form is required only if the subject has
had either extensive employment in foreign countries in the most recent five-year period, or has had
extensive residence in foreign countries during the most recent three-year period);
(8) Request for Security Clearance (agency form), with sufficient justification for access to the security
level requested; and
(9) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action. Review the SSBI investigative request packages for completeness and
enter relevant data into Office of Security’s electronic database. Forward the Waiver Request Memorandum
(if required) and copies of Form SF-86 to Office of Security headquarters for processing. After favorably
completing the pre-appointment check and determining the subject’s EOD date, send the SSBI request
package to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for processing.
11. Upgrade Investigation (UGI).The UGI consists of a National Agency Check (NAC), subject interview,
record searches, credit check, and personal interview with selected sources covering specific areas of the
subject’s background since the last investigation. The investigation is used to upgrade a previous investigation
(SSBI, BI, or ANACI) to provide adequate investigative basis for an employee’s movement to the higher
sensitivity level.
12. Update Investigation (UDI) (Positions/Contracts).The UDI consists of the same coverage as a prior
investigation (SSBI, BI, or ANACI) during the 13 to 60 months since the previous investigation. This
investigation is required when there has been a break in service of more than 365 calendar days since the
previous investigation.
B. Re-Investigations.
1. Noncritical-Sensitive Re-Investigations (Positions/Contracts).
a. Requirement. All individuals occupying positions designated Noncritical-Sensitive are
subject to a re-investigation at least once every ten years. The National Agency Checks with Law
43
and Credit (NACLC) investigation is used for Noncritical-Sensitive position re-investigations,
expiring LBI, MBI, and NACLC investigations.
b. Procedure. The security contact or COTR provides the RI investigative forms to the individual.
The individual completes all forms, obtains a completed fingerprint card and set of fingerprints from the
servicing security office (or local police office), and returns the completed investigative package to the
servicing security officer for processing. When completed, the servicing security officer submits the RI
investigative package to OPM for investigation with a copy provided to the Office of Security
headquarters.
c. Request Package.
(1) Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions;
(2) Fingerprint card:
(a) Form SF-87, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block (employee), or
(b) Form FD-258, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block (contractor); and
(3) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action. Review the re-investigative request package for completeness and
forward it to the Office of Personnel Management.
2. Periodic Re-Investigations (PRI) (Critical-Sensitive with Secret Access and High Risk
Positions).
a. Requirement. All individuals occupying positions designated Critical-Sensitive with access to Secret
information or High Risk is subject to periodic re-investigation at least once every five years.
b. Procedure. The security contact provides the PRI investigative forms to the individual. The
individual completes all forms, obtains a completed fingerprint card and set of fingerprints from
the servicing security office (or local police office), and returns the completed investigative
package to the servicing security officer for processing. When completed, the servicing
security officer submits the PRI investigative package to OPM for investigation with a copy
provided to the Office of Security headquarters.
c. Request Package.
(1) Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, updated by the subject with the top
portion of the form completed by the security contact;
(2) Fingerprint card:
(a) Form SF-87, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block (employee), or
(b) Form FD-258, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM’s designation in the ORI Block (contractor); and
44
(3) Credit Release Authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action. Review the re-investigation request package for completeness and
submit it to the Office of Personnel Management for processing.
3. Single Scope Background Investigation - Periodic Re-Investigations (SSBI-PR) (Special and
Critical-Sensitive Positions with Top Secret Access).
a. Requirement. All individuals occupying positions designated Special-Sensitive or Critical Sensitive
are subject to a reinvestigation at least once every five years.
b. Procedure. The security contact provides the SSBI-PRI forms to the individual. The individual
completes all forms, obtains a completed fingerprint card and set of fingerprints from the servicing
security office (or local police office), and returns the completed investigative request package to the
servicing security officer for processing. When completed, the servicing security officer submits the
SSBI-PR investigative package to OPM for investigation with a copy provided to the Office of Security
headquarters.
c. Request Package.
(1) Form SF-86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, (Part I must be fully
completed);
(2) Form SF-87, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM's designation in the ORI Block; and
(3) Credit release authorization.
d. Servicing Security Office Action.
(1) Special-Sensitive Positions: Review the SSBI-PR request package for completeness and submit
it to the Office of Personnel Management for processing.
(2) Critical-Sensitive Positions: Review the SSBI-PR request package for completeness
and submit it to the Office of Personnel Management for processing.
45
Appendix D
Suggested Contract Language
for High and
Moderate Risk Contracts
This appendix establishes the security processing requirements for High and Moderate Risk contracts.
SECURITY PROCESSING FOR HIGH AND MODERATE RISK CONTRACTS
Each person employed under a High or Moderate Risk contract shall undergo security processing by the
Agency's Office of Security before being eligible to work on the premises of any Agency owned, leased, or
controlled facility in the United States or overseas. All Agency security processing pertinent to this contract
will be conducted at no cost to the contractor.
A. Non-U.S. citizens to be employed under this contract within the United States must have:



Official legal status in the United States
Continuously resided in the United States for the last two years; and
Advance approval from the security contact and servicing security officer of the contracting
operating unit, and in consultation with the Office of Security (OSY). (OSY routinely consults with
appropriate agencies regarding the use of non-U.S. citizens on contracts and can provide up-to-date
information concerning this matter.)
B. Processing requirements for High and Moderate Risk Contracts are as follows:
1. A proposed contract employee will submit the SF-85P, Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions, FD258, Fingerprint Chart with OPM's designation in the ORI Block, and any requested releases to the
servicing security officer.
2. Upon completion of the security processing, the Office of Security, through the servicing security officer
and the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR), will notify the contractor in writing of the
individual's eligibility to be given access to the HCHB or other Agency buildings and facilities.
C. Security processing shall consist of limited personal background inquiries pertaining to verification of
name, physical description, marital status, present and former residences, education, employment history,
criminal record, personal references, medical fitness, fingerprint classification, and other pertinent
information. It is the option of the Office of Security to repeat the security processing on any
contract employee at its discretion.
46
D. If the Office of Security receives disqualifying information on a contract employee, the COTR will be
notified. The COTR, in coordination with the contracting officer, will immediately remove the
contract employee from duty requiring access to Agency facilities. Contract employees may be barred
from working on the premises of a facility for any of the following:




Conviction of a felony of a crime of violence or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
Falsification of information entered on security screening forms or of other documents submitted to
the Agency.
Improper conduct once performing on the contract, including criminal, infamous,
dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct or other conduct prejudicial to
the Government regardless of whether the conduct directly related to the contract.
Any behavior judged to pose a potential threat to Agency information systems, personnel,
property, or other assets.
NOTE: Failure to comply with the requirements may result in termination of the contract or
removal of some contract employees from Agency facilities.
E. Compliance with these requirements shall not be construed as providing a contract
employee clearance to have access to classified information.
47
Appendix E
Suggested Contract Language for
Low Risk Contracts
This appendix establishes the security processing requirements for Low Risk contracts.
SECURITY PROCESSING FOR LOW RISK CONTRACTS
Each person employed under this Low Risk contract for over 180 days shall undergo security processing by
the Agency’s Office of Security before being eligible to work on the premises of any Agency owned, leased,
or controlled facility in the United States or overseas. All Agency security processing pertinent to this contract
will be conducted at no cost to the contractor.
A. Non-U.S. citizens to be employed under this contract within the United States must have:



Official legal status in the United States;
Continuously resided in the United States for the last two years; and
Advance approval from the servicing security officer in consultation with the Office of Security.
B. Processing requirements for Low Risk Contracts are as follows.
1. Contract employees employed from 180 to 365 days require a Special Agreement Check (SAC), Form
OFI-86C, to be processed. The COTR will forward a completed Form OFI-86C along with the FD-258,
Fingerprint Chart, to the servicing security officer, who will send the investigative packet to the Office of
Personnel Management for processing.
2. Contract employees employed for more than 365 days will require a National Agency Check and
Inquiries (NACI) to be processed. The COTR will forward a completed Form SF-85 and Form FD-258,
Fingerprint Chart, to the servicing security officer within three working days from start of work, who will
send the investigative packet to the Office of Personnel Management.
3. Any contract employee with a favorable Special Agreement Check who remains on the contract over
364 days will be required to have a NACI conducted to continue working on the job site.
C. The scope of the SAC will include checks of the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII), other
agency files (INVA), Defense Clearance Investigations Index (DCII), FBI Fingerprint (FBIF), and
the FBI Information Management Division (FBIN). For those individuals who are not U.S. citizens
(immigrants), the COTR will request an INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) check on the
SAC, Form OF-86C, by checking Block #7, Item I. In Block 13, the COTR should enter the
employee’s Alien Registration Receipt Card number to aid in verification.
48
D. If the Office of Security receives disqualifying information on a contract employee, the COTR
will be notified. The COTR, in coordination with the Contracting Officer, will immediately remove the
employee from duty requiring access to Agency facilities. Contract employees may be barred from
working on the premises of a facility for any of the following reasons:




Conviction of a felony of a crime of violence or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
Falsification of information entered on security screening forms or of other documents submitted to
the Agency.
Improper conduct once performing on the contract, including criminal, infamous, dishonest,
immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct or other conduct prejudicial to the Government
regardless of whether the conduct directly related to the contract.
Any behavior judged to pose a potential threat to Agency information systems, personnel,
property, or other assets.
NOTE: Failure to comply with the requirements may result in termination of the contract or removal
of some contract employees from Agency facilities.
E. Compliance with these requirements shall not be construed as providing a contract
employee clearance to have access to classified information.
49
Appendix F
Child Care Provider Processing
General Guidance for
Investigations
F.1 REQUIREMENT
All child care providers working in owned, leased, or sponsored Agency child care facilities will be
processed for background checks utilizing the Child Care National Agency Check with Inquiries
(CNACI). The scope of the CNACI includes the National Agency Check with Inquiries and state
criminal history check for all states of residence. The CNACI meets the intent of the Crime Act of
1990, as amended, as well as the minimum suitability investigation directed for Federal employment
under Executive Order 10450. An operating unit may hire a staff person provisionally prior to the
completion of the required background check provided that, when caring for children, the uncleared
individual must at all times be within the sight and under the supervision of a staff person whose
background check has been successfully completed.
F.2 BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION
A. Procedures. Prior to the employment of a child care provider in any Agency sponsored child
care facility, the facility director/manager shall be responsible to ensure that the applicant has submitted
to the servicing security officer the required documentation resulting in a “completed” CNACI by the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and favorably adjudicated by the Office of Security.
Facility managers should work in concert with their servicing security officer for the submission
of the investigation packet to OPM. Upon the completion of the adjudication by the Office of Security,
the facility manager will receive, through the servicing security officer, a letter of favorable adjudication
authorizing the applicant to work in the facility.
B. Request Package. The Child Care National Agency Check with Inquiries (CNACI) Package will
include the following documents.
1. Original SF-85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions, with “CCP” marked in Block 1
(Position Title) to distinguish it as a Child Care Provider case.
2. Type of Investigation will be annotated as “02” and Extra Coverage Block will be
code “8.”
3. Form FD-258, Fingerprint Chart, with OPM's designation in the ORI Block.
50
C. Processing.
1. The packet will be submitted to the servicing security officer who will forward the investigative
packet to OPM.
2. Upon completion of the CNACI, OPM will forward the packet to the Office of Security for
adjudication.
3. Upon favorable determination by the Office of Security, a certificate of favorable background
investigation will be sent to the facility manager through the servicing security officer.
4. CNACI investigations shall be updated every five years.
5. As required by 42 U.S.C. § 13041, the Office of Security will maintain a database to reflect the
current background investigation status of child care providers and to determine when they need an
updated background investigation.
NOTE: Failure to comply with these requirements will result in the applicant being determined
ineligible to work in an Agency owned, leased, or sponsored child care facility.
51
A
djudication
Guidelines
Suggested Adjudication Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility for Contractors in a
Position of Trust
(No Classified Access)
Prepared by: Kenneth Sudol & Associates, Inc.
February 2008
52
ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES
A. Allegiance to the United States
p. 6/7
B. Foreign Influence
p. 8/9
C. Foreign Preference
p. 10/11
D. Sexual Behavior
p. 12
E. Personal Conduct
p. 13/14/15
F. Financial Considerations
p. 16/17
G. Alcohol Consumption
p. 18/19
H. Drug Involvement
p. 20/21
I. Psychological Conditions
p. 22/23
J. Criminal Conduct
p. 24/25
K. Handling Protected Information
p. 26/27
L. Outside Activities
p. 28
M. Use of Information
Technology Systems
p. 29/30
53
Suggested Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for
Contractors In a Position of Trust
1. INTRODUCTION
The following suggested adjudicative guidelines are established for U. S.
Government contractors within the (insert your agency) for a Position of
Trust position. They apply to persons being considered for initial or
continued eligibility for a position of trust, to include sensitive positions
that do not require access to classified information but may have a need
for access to other types of protected information.
Decisions regarding eligibility for a position of trust with the Federal
government takes into account factors that could cause a conflict of
interest and place a person in the position of having to choose between
his or her commitments to the United States, including the commitment
to protect government facilities and/or sensitive information, and any
other compelling loyalty. Position of trust decisions also take into
account a person’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect all
agency proprietary and/or sensitive information. No coercive policing
could replace the self-discipline and integrity of the person entrusted
with the nation’s sensitive information as the most effective means of
protecting them.
When a person’s life history shows evidence of
unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the person
can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for
working in an environment where protecting government facilities and/or
sensitive or agency proprietary information is paramount.
2. THE ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a
person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an
acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to government facilities or
to government sensitive or agency proprietary information is predicated
upon the individual meeting these guidelines. The adjudication process
is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the wholeperson concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past
and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in
reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's
conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
54
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) The extent to which participation is voluntary;
(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes;
(7) The motivation for the conduct;
(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and
(9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination
remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any
doubt concerning personnel being considered for a position of trust will
be resolved in favor of this agency and the Federal Government.
(c) The ability to develop specific thresholds for action under these
guidelines is limited by the nature and complexity of human behavior.
The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of
eligibility for a position of trust is clearly consistent with the interests of
this agency or the Federal Government must be an overall common sense
judgment based upon careful consideration of this agencies written
policies and the following guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in
the context of the whole person.
(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States;
(2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign Influence;
(3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign Preference;
(4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual Behavior;
(5) GUIDELINE E: Personal Conduct;
(6) GUIDELINE F: Financial Considerations;
55
(7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol Consumption;
(8) GUIDELINE H: Drug Involvement;
(9) GUIDELINE I: Psychological Conditions;
(10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal Conduct;
(11) GUIDELINE K: Handling Protected Information;
(12) GUIDELINE L: Outside Activities;
(13) GUIDELINE M: Use of Information Technology Systems;
(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion or policy
may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual
may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring
pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally
unstable behavior. Notwithstanding, the whole person concept, pursuit
of further investigation may be terminated by this agency in the face of
reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.
(e) When potentially unfavorable information becomes known about an
individual who is currently eligible for a position of trust, the adjudicator
should consider whether the person:
(1) Voluntarily reported the information;
(2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where
appropriate;
(4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security
concern;
(5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and
employment;
(6) Should have his or her access to a position of trust temporarily
suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
56
(f) If after evaluating potentially unfavorable information of concern, the
adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to
warrant a recommendation of disapproval or removal from a position of
trust, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that
future incidents of a similar nature may result in removal from a position
of trust.
57
Suggested Adjudicative
Guidelines for Contractors in a
Position of Trust
GUIDELINE A
ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES
3. The Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to
the United States. The willingness to safeguard agency proprietary or
other sensitive information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect
an individual's allegiance to the United States.
4. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any
act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against
the United States of America;
(b)
Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to
commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
(c)
Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal
or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
(1) overthrow or influence the government of the United States or
any state or local government;
(2) prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from
performing their official duties;
(3) gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal,
state, or local government;
(4) prevent others from exercising their rights under the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
58
5. Conditions that could potentially mitigate the trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual
or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
(b)
The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or
humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
(c)
Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period
of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
(d)
The involvement or association with such activities occurred under
such unusual circumstances, or so much time has elapsed, that it
is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s
current reliability, trustworthiness, or loyalty.
59
GUIDELINE B
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
6. The Concern. Foreign contacts and interests may be a concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this
Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but
not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is
known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information
and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
7. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s
obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information;
(c) Counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates
that the individual’s access to protected information may involve
an unacceptable risk to national security;
(d)
Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of
foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(e)
A substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business,
which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign
influence or exploitation;
(f)
Failure to report, where required, association with a foreign
national;
60
(g)
Unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent,
associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(h)
Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country
are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible
future exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or
coercion;
(i)
Conduct especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may
make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or
coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.
8. Conditions that could potentially mitigate the trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of
those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between
the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or
government and the interests of the U.S.
(b)
There is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in
favor of the U.S. interest;
(c)
Contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk
for foreign influence or exploitation;
(d)
The foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government
business or are approved by the cognizant security authority;
(e)
The individual has promptly complied with existing agency
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or
threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign
country;
(f)
The value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or
property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a
conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate,
or pressure the individual.
61
GUIDELINE C
FOREIGN PREFERENCE
9. The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate
a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she
may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful
to the interests of this agency or to the United States.
10. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship
after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a
family member. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) Possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country;
(3) Accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or
other such benefits from a foreign country;
(4) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship
requirements;
(5) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business
interests in another country;
(6) Seeking or holding political office in a foreign country;
(7) Voting in foreign elections;
(b) Action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an
American citizen;
(c)
Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so
as to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization or
government in conflict with the national security interest;
(d)
Any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other
than the United States: for example, declaration of intent to
renounce United States citizenship; renunciation of United States
citizenship.
62
11. Conditions that could potentially mitigate the trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a
foreign country;
(b)
Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual
citizenship
(c)
Exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign
citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or
when the individual was a minor;
(d)
Use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security
authority;
(e)
The passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated;
(f)
The vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States
Government
63
GUIDELINE D
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
12. The Concern. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense,
indicates a personality or emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or
discretion, or which may subject the individual to undue influence or
coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise questions about an
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect sensitive
information. No adverse inference concerning the standards in this
Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of
the individual.
13. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual
has been prosecuted;
(b)
A pattern of compulsive, self-destructive or high-risk sexual
behavior that the person is unable to stop or that may be
symptomatic of a personality disorder;
(c)
Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to
coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(d)
Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects lack
of discretion or judgment.
14. Conditions that could potentially mitigate the trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
The behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is
no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(b)
The sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment
(c)
The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation,
or duress;
(d)
The sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet.
64
GUIDELINE E
PERSONAL CONDUCT
15. The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of
candor, dishonesty or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations
can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and
ability to protect sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure
to provide truthful and candid answers during the personnel security
investigation process or any other failure to cooperate with the personnel
security investigation process.
The following will normally result in an unfavorable action or
administrative termination of further processing for a position of trust
eligibility:
(a)
Refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or
cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to
meeting with a security investigator for subject interview,
completing security forms or releases, and cooperation with
medical or psychological evaluation;
(b)
Refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful
questions of investigators, security officials or other official
representatives in connection with a trustworthiness
determination.
16. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying also include:
(a)
The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant
facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history
statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations,
determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status,
determine eligibility for a position of trust, or award fiduciary
responsibilities;
(b)
Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer investigator, security official,
competent medical authority, or other official government
representative;
65
(c)
(d)
Credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas
that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other
single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports
a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to
comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics
indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected
information;
Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under
any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an
adverse determination, but which, when combined with all
available information supports a whole-person assessment of
questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of
candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or
other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly
safeguard protected information. This includes but is not limited
to consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information,
unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other government
protected information;
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the
workplace;
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other
employer’s time or resources;
(e)
Personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation,
or duress, such as:
(1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the
person’s personal, professional, or community standing, or
(2) while in another country, engaging in any activity that is
illegal in that country or that is legal in that country but illegal
in the United States and may serve as a basis for exploitation or
pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other group;
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(f)
Violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the
individual to the employer as a condition of employment;
(g)
Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
17. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the
omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted
with the facts;
(b)
The refusal or failure to cooperate, omissions, or concealment was
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate
advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or
instructing the individual specifically concerning the security
clearance process. Upon being made aware of the requirement to
cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated
fully and truthfully;
(c)
The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt
on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d)
The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to
alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and
such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e)
The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress
(f)
The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of
questionable reliability;
(g)
Association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased
or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to
comply with rules and regulations.
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GUIDELINE F
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
18. The Concern. Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy
debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack
of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of
which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness and ability to protect sensitive or agency proprietary
information. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of
having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Compulsive gambling
is a concern as it may lead to financial crimes including espionage.
Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a
concern. It may indicate proceeds from financially profitable criminal
acts.
19. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
(b)
Indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending and
the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the debt
or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt;
(c)
A history of not meeting financial obligations;
(d)
Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement,
employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account
fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional
financial breaches of trust;
(e)
Consistent spending beyond one’s means, which may be indicated
by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high
debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis;
(f)
Financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism,
gambling problems, or other issues of security concern.
(g)
Failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns as
required or the fraudulent filing of the same;
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(h) Unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard of living,
increase in net worth, or money transfers that cannot be explained
by subject’s known legal sources of income;
(i)
Compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an unsuccessful
attempt to stop gambling, “chasing losses” (i.e. increasing the bets
or returning another day in an effort to get even), concealment of
gambling losses, borrowing money to fund gambling or pay
gambling debts, family conflict or other problems caused by
gambling.
20. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concern include:
(a)
The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not
cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment;
(b)
The conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely
beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the
circumstances;
(c)
The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being
resolved or is under control;
(d)
The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue
creditors or otherwise resolve debts.
(e)
The individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of
the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or
provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue;
(f)
The affluence resulted from a legal source of income.
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GUIDELINE G
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
21. The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the
exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses, and
can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness.
22. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while
under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the
peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the
individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(b) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or
duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the
job, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol
abuser or alcohol dependent;
(c) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an
alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(d) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g. physician,
clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol
dependence;
(e) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol
treatment program;
(f) Relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and
completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program;
(g) Failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education,
evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.
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23. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a) So much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) The individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of
alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this
problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol
dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
(c) The individual is a current employee who is participating in a
counseling or treatment program, has no history of previous
treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress;
(d) The individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified
consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment
recommendations, such as participates in meetings of Alcoholics
Anonymous or a similar organization, and received a favorable
prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional, or a licensed
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol
treatment program.
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GUIDELINE H
DRUG INVOLVEMENT
24. The Concern. Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug
can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness,
both because it may impair judgment and because it raises questions
about a persons ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and
regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances,
and include:
(1)
Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds
identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of
1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis,
depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens)
and
(2)
Inhalants and other similar substances.
(b) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in
a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
25. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Any drug abuse (see above definition);
(b)
Testing positive for illegal drug use;
(c)
Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing,
manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of
drug paraphernalia;
(d)
Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g. physician,
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug
dependence:
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(e)
Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical
social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug
treatment program;
(f)
Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program
prescribed by a duly qualified medical professional;
(g)
Any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance;
(h) Expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly
and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use.
26. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or
does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b)
A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such
as:
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used;
(3) an appropriate period of abstinence;
(4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of
clearance for any violation;
(c)
Abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness
during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since
ended;
(d)
Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program,
including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare
requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable
prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional.
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GUIDELINE I
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS
27.
The Concern.
Certain emotional, mental, and personality
conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal
diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under
this guideline. A duly qualified mental health professional, (e.g. clinical
psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, or acceptable to and approved
by the U.S. Government, should be consulted when evaluating
potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this guideline.
No negative inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be
raised solely on the basis of seeking mental health counseling.
28. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Behavior that cast doubt on an individual’s judgment, reliability, or
trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline,
including but not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible,
dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or bizarre behavior;
(b)
An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the
individual has a condition not covered under any other guideline
that may impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness1;
(c)
The individual has failed to follow treatment advice related to a
diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g., failure
to take prescribed medication.
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29. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
The identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and
the individual has demonstrated ongoing and consistent
compliance with the treatment plan;
(b)
The individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment
program for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and the
individual is currently receiving counseling or treatment with a
favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health professional;
(c)
Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional
employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S.
Government that an individual's previous condition is under
control or in remission, and has a low probability of
recurrence or exacerbation;
(d)
The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one
caused by death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has
been resolved, and the individual no longer show indications of
emotional instability;
(e)
There is no indication of a current problem.
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GUIDELINE J
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
30. The Concern. Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's
judgment, reliability and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into
question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and
regulations.
31. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;
(b)
Discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions;
(c)
Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of
whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or
convicted;
(d)
Individual is currently on parole or probation;
(e)
Violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a courtmandated rehabilitation program;
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32. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened,
or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b)
The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and
those pressures are no longer present in the person’s life;
(c)
Evidence that the person did not commit the offense;
(d)
There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not
limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal
activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher education,
good employment record, or constructive community involvement.;
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GUIDELINE K
HANDLING PROTECTED
INFORMATION
33. The Concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules
and regulations for protecting sensitive or other protected information
raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, judgment, reliability,
or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious
security concern.
34. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Deliberate or negligent disclosure of sensitive or other protected
information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to
personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present
at seminars, meetings, or conferences;
(b)
Collecting or storing sensitive or other protected information in any
unauthorized location.
(c)
Loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or
otherwise handling sensitive reports, data, or other information on
any unapproved equipment including but not limited to any
typewriter, word processor, or computer hardware, software, drive,
system, gameboard, handheld, “palm” or pocket device or other
adjunct equipment;
(d)
Inappropriate efforts to obtain or view sensitive or other protected
information outside one’s need-to-know;
(e)
Copying sensitive or other protected information in a manner
designed to conceal or remove sensitive or other document control
markings;
(f)
Viewing or downloading information from a secure system when
the information is beyond the individual’s need-to-know;
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(g)
Any failure to comply with rules for the protection of sensitive
information;
(h)
Negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by
management;
(i)
Failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in damage
to the National Security, regardless of whether it was deliberate or
negligent.
35. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
So much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened
so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b)
The individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial
security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward
the discharge of responsibilities;
(c)
The violations were due to improper or inadequate training.
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GUIDELINE L
OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES
36. The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment
or activities is of concern if it poses a conflict of interest with an
individual's responsibilities and could create an increased risk of
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or other protected information.
37. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a) Any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer,
with:
(1) The government of a foreign country;
(2) Any foreign national, organization, or other entity;
(3) A representative of any foreign interest;
(4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person
engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on
intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology;
(b) Failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is
required.
38. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
Evaluation of the outside employment or activity by the
appropriate security or counterintelligence office indicates that it
does not pose a conflict with an individual's responsibilities or with
the national security interests of the United States;
(b)
The individual terminated the employment or discontinued the
activity upon being notified that it was in conflict with his or her
responsibilities.
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GUIDELINE M
USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS
39. The Concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or
regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise
concerns about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, calling
into question the willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive
systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems
include all related computer hardware, software, firmware, and data
used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation,
and storage, or protection of information.
40. Conditions that could raise a trustworthiness concern and may
potentially be disqualifying include:
(a)
Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology
system or component thereof;
(b)
Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or
denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in
an information technology system;
(c) Use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized
access to another system or to a compartmented area within the
same system;
(d) Downloading, storing, or transmitting sensitive information on or to
any unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology
system;
(e) Unauthorized use of a government or other information technology
system;
(f)
Introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware,
software, or media to or from any information technology system
without authorization, when prohibited by rules, procedures,
guidelines or regulations;
(g)
Negligence or lax security habits in handling information
technology that persist despite counseling by management;
(h) Any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or
negligent, that results in damage to the national security.
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41. Conditions that could potentially mitigate trustworthiness
concerns include:
(a)
So much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b)
The misuse was minor and done only in the interest of
organizational efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another
person use one’s password or computer when no other timely
alternative was readily available;
(c)
The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by
a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and by
notification of supervisor.
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