Maria Luisa T. Camagay Interview
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TAPE 007 CONT’D
BEGIN INTERVIEW
DIRECTIONAL
INT: If you can, sort of give a very brief history of sort of the
Philippines from Spanish colonization, you know, since Magellan first landed
on the island, maybe a little bit before that and, you know, described basically
what life under Spanish occupation was -- I know 300 years is quite a long
time.
CAMAGAY: Mm-hm.
INT: If you could just start by giving a very brief ...
CAMAGAY: Just the Spanish period.
INT: Yeah, Spanish period ...
CAMAGAY: Up to the present?
INT: No, not up to the present. Up to like the 1890s and a little
bit before. Okay.
DIRECTIONAL
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, Philippine history is quite long. So it's
really, ah, how to, to compress it. Ah, well, basically the periodizations followed
before was, ah, the Philippines before the coming of the Spaniards, the Philippines
during the Spanish period, and the American period. But very recently histor-Filipino historians have presented the different kind of periodization wherein the
Filipino is the focus. Whatever things that they did should be considered as the
turning points, not what the colonial experience has been. But basically, ah, before
the coming of the Spaniards, the Philippines was in contact with countries in the
region, with China, ah Japan, and, ah, Southeast Asian countries. And, ah, they
were free -- there was free intercourse between, ah, these countries until the
Spanish came and, ah, boundaries were set. In other words, ah, the free movement
of the Filipinos in these countries were a bit curtailed. Ah, for the Spanish period,
which spans three, ah, centuries, ah, there was, ah, at the onset really resistance on
the part of the Filipinos, but ah, little by little, ah, there would be, ah, acceptance
of, ah, Spanish rule in the Philippines. Now basically Spanish colonization would
affect the, ahm, ah, lowland Filipinos, because, ahm, if we considered the
Philippines, there are three communities identifiable, the lowland communities,
the, ah, Muslim community, who were here already even before the Spaniards
came, and the people in the mountains, or the highlands. So these three
communities, if we now consider Philippine seriography, we take a look at how
they experienced Spanish colonization for three centuries. So those who got the
brunt, who bore the brunt of being subjugated would be the lowland Filipinos
because the Muslim Filipinos were able to resist Spanish colonization. So did the
people in the Cordillera, or in the mountain area. So, ah, lowland Filipinos, ah,
Maria Luisa T. Camagay Interview
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were the ones affected by, ah, Spanish colonization. Now, ah -- and, therefore, in
terms of, ah, revolution later on, it would be, ah, the lowland Filipinos who would
really be resisting Spanish rule, because the two communities have been long
resistant even at very early time of Spanish rule.
INT: What was so bad about ah, Spanish occupation? What did
they do? What were some of the injustices?
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, one, ah, would be, ah, the, ah -- probably the
resistance or the non- accept -- the intoleration to indigenous, ah, institutions. Ah,
they -- the Filipinos had a religion at that time, but, ah, since the Spaniards, part of
their colonization was a systematic, ah, conversion of the natives to, ah, to
Catholicism, so that was one point of, ah, friction and conflict between the
Spaniards and the Filipinos. So basically, ah, it would revolve around religion,
even economic institutions. We were not used to paying taxes or tribute. Ah, ah,
we were not ah, we never had the experience of, ah, doing commerce under a
monopol--polistic system and that was what the Spaniards wanted to do. So, ah,
economic institutions also became one source of conflict between the Filipinos and
the Spaniards.
INT: Are you familiar with, ah, US-Filipino relations before the
war? What was American interest in the Philippines, if any?
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, from what we read in the 19th century, there
were already American, ah, ah, businessmen doing some limited trading, mostly
from the Massachusetts area. They were interested in one particular crop of the
Philippines, which is abaca being used for ropes in the -- in their ships. So, ah, the
US was interested particularly in -- in ah, Philippine abaca. No? So there was, ah
-- well, ah, initially interest in trading in the Philippines for the Americans here.
INT: What became the interest later on? Ah, a lot of people say that
it was to get a, gain a foothold in China.
CAMAGAY: Well, that could be part of it because towards the 19th
cen-- later part of the 19th century, the Pacific was a very important area already.
Ah, the United States has reached the limits of its boundaries. It has reached
California. The Westward expansion spirit there was still very strong and the, ah,
logical move to expand would be in the Pacific area. And also we know that the
whaling industry was very strong and, ah, that was one of the reasons why, ahm,
US President Filmore was interested in opening Japan to the outside world, no?
So basically this -- this the value of the Pacific, ah, was dawning on the Americans
and, therefore, wanted a foothold in the Pacific.
DIRECTIONAL
INT: Okay, Now why...Why in 1896 did the revolution begin
after some 270 years of Spanish occupation? Why 1896?
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CAMAGAY: Well, actually, ah, this is not an event which happens
overnight. It happens to be -- it was a time when you would have a confluence of
many events, ah, both outside and, ah, within the Philippines. So, for example,
why 1896? Ahm, well, first, ah, thing was that, ahm, this was a time -- the
Katipunan was ah-- the secret organization was, ah, discovered, but, ah, at the
same time, ah, in the countryside, when we look at it, there was already economic
dislocation, because at that time there was locust infestation of the Philippines. So
people were feeling really the -- the brunt already, little by little. And, ah, also at
this particular point in time all efforts to get reforms from Spain apparently was
futile. So I mean it's, ah, just like the French Revolution. It's a confluence of
many events. There was also bad harvest of wheat in France. And there was also
social dislocation because of this and so on. So, ah, it's 1896 because of a
confluence of events happening in the Philippines. Mm-hm.
INT: Now that -- can you characterize the Katipunan, I understand
that it had a leadership of the illustrados, the elite. Ah, what did that mean in terms
of mass support for revolution? Did it really represent the, ah, issues that affected
everyone or only the elite, and why did they want ...
CAMAGAY: Well, actually, ah, apparently at this point in time, not
only the masses were getting affected, but even the middle class and the upper
class. Ah, for example, those who were planting sugar at the wide scale were
getting affected because of the price of sugar went down. And so they were also
feeling, ah, ah, the bad effects of this drop in sugar prices. So they -- they become
eventually the leaders, the articulators of the masses, the ideologues, in effect.
And so they -- the middle class and the upper class, because the word "illustrad"
actually is a word which means "enlightened Filipino" and it cuts across economic
lines. You can have a poor illustrado. You can have a middle class illustrado and
-- and a rich illustrado, because Mabini, for example, is a poor illustrado. He came
from a very poor, ah, farmer family, but because he finished law, ah, he was
considered an illustrado.
INT: So the Katipunan basically, ah, got its support from all classes?
CAMAGAY: Mm-hm. Yes. Yes.
DIRECTIONAL
CAMAGAY: Okay. So what were the aims of the revolution? It's
basically to destroy the yoke of, ah, subjugation or colonization from Spain. Ah,
and to -- to be independent of one's, ah, one's destiny as a nation and as a people.
So, ah, that, ah, apparently was articulated as early as, ahm, during the reform,
reform period, because we have a reform period, but the futility of getting reforms
from Spain was -- ah, disillusioned quite a number of Filipinos. So the recourse
left was to have a revolution. So they've tried a peaceful means. Now they wanted
a more, ah, radical means of a revolution. Now where did they get the support?
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The initial efforts were from Japan, because at this point in time Japan became a
model, having defeated, ah, the, ah, Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War of 18941895. So it was a model for the Filipinos and there were initial, ah, negotiations
for Japan, ah, to be the source of arms and ammunitions to be used. So, ah, there
are evidences that ah, Bonifacio tried to, ahm, talk to some Japanese military
authorities for a possible purchase of arms, but, ah, this was -- did not materialize
apparently. But it did not make the Filipinos forget about Japan as a possible
source, because even, ah, in 1897-1898, Mariano Ponce was assigned by the
revolutionary government to Yokohama, Japan in order to purchase arms and
ammunitions. One shipment, ah, ah, was sent, but, unfortunately, the boat which
had this load was shipwrecked. The second shipment did not materialize because
apparently Japanese authorities were already survey-- the Filipinos were
under strict surveillance already by the Japanese authorities. And Japan at
that time didn't want to arouse the ire of the United States. So it stopped, ah,
the shipment of these arms. Now ...
DIRECTIONAL
START TAPE 008
CAMAGAY: Well, Aguinaldo's emergence as a pow-- as a leader
came from winning in most of the big military battles in Cavite, because Cavite
became the theater of, ah, of, ah, the war, no -- or of the revolution. And so he
seemed to have, ah, shown, ah, exemplary action in battle. And, ah, therefore,
ahm, since the dissolution of the -- of the revolutionary -- of Katipunan as a secret
organization took place in Cavite, much to the surprise of Andres Bonifacio, the
people in the Tejeros convention which decided the fate of the Katipunan,
therefore, drafted mostly Cavitenos and, ah, he was one of those, ah, ah, nominated
for the position of, ah, president. And this, of course, is appointed Andres
Bonifacio because he was thinking that as a supremo of the old organization,
automatically he would get the position. Now what made him, ah, very attractive?
I think it's he has a charisma which, ah, one revolutionary, Mariano Ponce, ah, said
that, ah, it's his being very unassuming that made him attractive, no, ah, and for an
illustrado to say this is, ah, quite significant because they did not perceive him as a
threat, but they were all, ahm -- well, they were all agreeing to themselves that
since he has the charisma, it is better to, ah, support him instead of to, ah, ah,
contradict him or come into conflict with him. So, ah, in fact they didn't know.
Most of those who were in the Hong Kong junta, because after the, ah, first phase
of the revolution, Aguinaldo and some companions went to Hong Kong and that
was the first time that these illustrados, who were of the upper class, got to meet
him. And they were, ah -- they were describing him as a very unassuming
individual. So, ah -- and I think the charisma, because apparently he got a number
of followers, ah, with him. Probably it's the fact that he -- he could identify more
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with the ordinary folks instead of, let's say, somebody from the rich class or the
middle class assuming the leadership of the revolution, it would have been a very
difficult one. But the fact that he could identify, he could understand these, ah,
ordinary people made him, ah, quite a popular, ah, leader during the revolution.
INT: Um, he was not an illustrado?
CAMAGAY: He was not an illustrado. If I defined illustrado as
having gone to finish a degree, have -- assume a profession. No. He, according to
his memoirs, he never was very fond of education. You know, he was more, ah,
keen on doing business because the family had some businesses. And he was more
interested in running the business of the family instead of going to school. But he
had some rudimentary education.
INT: Um, so what, what happened in Hong Kong in terms of the
American generals? I know there was a consul general in Hong Kong, consul
general in Singapore. Um, Virata and Jose have both referred to Aguinaldo's
naivete, you know, with regard to American promises. Could you tell a little
bit about what happened in terms of their promises and also your sort of take
on how he reacted to American intentions?
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, probably ...
DIRECTIONAL
CAMAGAY: Ah, well, probably, ahm, Aguinaldo never knew
about, ah, the Americans, existence of the Americans, or the brewing SpanishAmerican War that was at that time. But he got to know of it when he went to
Singapore because he was, ah, left Hong Kong secretly to go to Singapore to avoid
a lawsuit, ah, because a Filipino was asking for one-half of the, ah, ah, monetary,
ah, compensation of the Treaty of -- of Biaknabato. So, well, he was introduced -Aguinaldo was introduced to, ah, Consul General, ah, Pratt, ah, who was assigned
in Singapore and, ah, brought, ah, offered, supposedly, a sort of an alliance
between the Filipinos and the Americans, because, ah, they have a common foe, he
explained, and these were the Spaniards. So, ah, Aguinaldo apparently asked what
is, ah, their -- what do they have, no, in exchange of this alliance. And, ah, they -Pratt is supposed to have mentioned that we will recognize Philippine
independence. And, ah, assured Aguinaldo that since the Philippines is 20,000
miles away from the United States, it had no interest whatsoever in getting the
Philippines as a colony. So with that assurance, ah, Aguinaldo was asked to go
back to Hong Kong and, ah, board, ah, Dewey's ship which was en route to the
Philippines, but Aguinaldo did not, ah, find Dewey because he departed earlier
and, ah, therefore, it was Consul Wildman who, ah, met, ah, Aguinaldo and, ah,
told him that he was supposed to go to Manila. And, ah, Wildman was given
money by Aguinaldo to buy arms and ammunitions and, ah, I think this purchase
was -- did materialize, but the second order of arms and ammunitions did not
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materialize. Now they say -- now if they -- I think if I were going to put myself in
the shoes of Aguinaldo, being really naive. You know, he was, ah, just a simple
general, ah, in the Philippines, first time to get out of the Philippines, ah, first time
to come into contact with Americans. So he took the word of these Americans as,
you know, accepted it as true. So, ah, he was basically that kind of a person, a
trusting person, a person who believed in the word of honor of people. So, you
know, I'm not saying that he was not naive, but he could be naive because of this
particular, ah, experience. He had no experience in, ah, diplomacy, no experience
in dealing with people, making arrangements like this, hmm?
DIRECTIONAL
INT: Let’s hear about the meeting between Dewey and Aguinaldo.
What happened exactly?
CAMAGAY: Well, I really have no, ah, idea what really happened,
but I -- I read of impressions of Aguinaldo -- of Dewey, impressions of Dewey of
Aguinaldo. That, ah, he, at the onset, had a very high opinion of Aguinaldo, ah,
but little by little, ah, during, I think, a congressional investigation, made, ah, when
Dewey went back to the United States, there seemed to have a change in opinion.
And, ah, I think this is also the root of, ahm, the growing disillusionment of the
Filipinos with Americans, because they were very, ah, optimistic of, ah, the
promise of Filipino recog-- of American recognition of Philippine independence,
but, ah, later events, ah, were happening that, ah, the Americans, ah, had no
intention of, ah, honoring their word that, ah, they would recognize Philippine
independence. No?
INT: Now what, when troops under General Anderson and Merritt
soon after, came and landed on the Philippines, what was, ah, the reaction? What
was the interaction between Filipinos and US troops? How did they react to one
another?
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, so basically, ah, with the Dewey, he could
not really, ahm, ah, do a land occupation of the Philippines because he had a navy
man with him. So -- and at the time I think the United States was not yet clear as
to what they really wanted of the Philippines, whether to, ah, get the Philippines or
not, and if it's going to get the Philippines, what part of the Philippines, just the
port, the harbor of Manila and leave the rest of islands to other foreign powers.
So, they were really also in a quandary as to, ah, to what to do exactly, though
some historiography would say no, they were there, this was deliberate. Anyway,
it looks like, ah, for me, there was that, ah, moment that they really didn't know
what to do. Now so little by little enforcements were coming when probably the
American government decided what really to do with the Philippines. And, of
course, this would create some friction between the Filipinos and the Americans,
because, ahm, Aguinaldo would come out with proclamations that, ahm, that the
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whole of the archipelago was already in the hands of Filipinos and Intramuros was
the only one left to be taken. And, ah, what was hap-- what happened in the
surrender in the mock battle of Intramuros was that, ah, trenches were now being
made, ah, surrounding Intramuros and, ahm, the Filipinos were in the first line of
the trenches. And, ah, behind them were the Americans. Now, ah, the Spaniards
who were now hold inside Intramuros were trying to negotiate with the Filipinos,
ah, promising them reforms, et cetera, et cetera. But the Filipinos already decided
that they didn't want to have anything to do with, ah, the Spaniards. Now what the
Amer-- the Spaniards did, they had negotiations with Americans, that there would
-- the negotiations resulted that a mock battle would take place and that, ah, for
that to be successful, the Filipinos had to leave their trenches and give their place
to the Americans, because the Spaniards made it very clear that they wanted to
surrender to the Americans and not to the Filipinos. And they wanted it clear that
no Filipinos would enter Intramuros.
INT: Why was that?
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, imagine in -- a former colonial power, it
would be very dishonorable for Spaniards whose, who, ah, who honor, no, who
value honor, it would be very, ah, demeaning for them to surrender to -- to a
former colonial.
DIRECTIONAL
INT: How the US troops sort of saw the Filipinos, the troops
themselves.
DIRECTIONAL
CAMAGAY: Okay. So, ah, this, ah, the relations between the
Filipino and, ah, Spanish -- the American soldiers, ah, actually there would be,
ahm, directives from Aguinaldo to -- to telling the Filipinos soldiers to be more
patient. You know, ahm, ah, as much as possible avoid conflict, you know, with
the American soldiers. So, ah, that was the policy of -- of Aguinaldo. And, ah, the
Filipino soldiers apparently hated this policy, ah, but, you know, it's also, ahm, if
you take a look at the other sources, like the French consular dispatches. So the
French consul also was, ah, a witness to this happening and, ah, well, he was also
quite critical of American soldiers, because he would say that, ahm, they would
just enter the homes of Filipinos and then just play the piano. And for this -because these are cultural, no? So if, ah, you know-- in the Filipino culture, you
just don't enter the house and, you know, play the piano. But, ah, they were rather
shocked by these, ah, things. So these were -- in other words, American soldiers,
in their mind, whose actions or activations were not -- were not refined. They find
-- they found that as an observation. But, ah, ah, to -- to -- as a whole, the Filipino
soldiers were really quite, ah, respectful, you know, of this directive of Aguinaldo.
That's why when the February 4 outbreak of the fil-- Spanish-Amer-- Filipino-
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American war, Aguinaldo immediately told, ah, the head of the occupied forces
here in the Philippines that, ah, "Let's talk this out," but apparently the reply was,
"Well, it has started. Let's go on with it."
INT: How did -- so tensions between the treaty ...
DIRECTIONAL
INT: Why does fighting break out in February?
CAMAGAY: Well, the -- according to the -- the narration of the
incident, ah, because Manila was already divided into lines, what was American
line and what was Filipino line, apparently there was this Filipino soldier who was
approaching the -- the line of the Americans and, ah, he was given the -- a warning
of halt. Now a Filipino soldier was not understand the word "halt". So ignoring
that warning, continued, no? He continued, ah, to move towards the American
lines. And, ah, that was how, you know, firing -- the Americans fired from their
end and, ah, there was now a reply on the Filipino end. And, ah, but Aguinaldo,
upon learning about this particular incident, wanted to isolate it is as much as
possible and not to escalate the -- the conflict, but that was, ah, reply, that "It has
started and it might as well go on."
INT: Yeah. Now during this time how would you characterize -- I
know Otis was, was the governor general of the US military. How would you
characterize American military leadership at the time? A lot of people compare
it to Vietnam, ah, in that, you know, they didn't really keep in touch with -- they
sort of censored the press, they, ah, exaggerated about American successes. Can
you sort of go into that a little bit?
CAMAGAY: Well, that's we -- what we also hear from, ah, the
sources, ah, the critical sources in the Philippine-American war from the American
side, that, ah, it was Otis who really ordered strict censorship of press releases
coming from the Philippines, because, well, ah, it was also election year in the
United States. President McKinley was very much concerned with American
opinion and he didn't want, ah, that to affect his candidacy for the Presidency. So
very positive things were reported about, ah, the Philippines, that the insurrection
would, ah, be contained in a very short time, et cetera. But actually it did prolong,
go on, despite these, ahm, press releases of things being under control.
INT: Also Aguinaldo and a lot of the leadership of the rebels -- the
revolutionaries were getting sort of misrepresentations of what the general mood
in the United States was in terms of Bryan might beat McKinley back in 1900.
Can you talk about the source of the misconception on the part of Aguinaldo?
CAMAGAY: Ah, that ah ...Bryan, ah, was supportive of, ah ...
INT: Or that he might win?
CAMAGAY: He might win. Therefore, the imperialist -- antiimperialists, ah -- well, I really, ah, have no idea about, ah, how far Aguinaldo was
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being fed with this information, because, ahm, ah, clearly, ah, with the -Philippines there, there was, there would be two camps in the United States, those
who were in favor of getting the Philippines, ah, with, of course, all the lobby
groups there, and those who were against, like the Democrats were against and the
anti-imperialist leagues, no? Now how far of that kind of discourse trickled down
in the level of Aguinaldo is another question, because apparently this would be, ah,
a discourse done, ah, and prevailing among the, ah -- the, ah, ideologues of the
revolution. But, ah, probably if we take a look at the proclamations of Aguinaldo,
there would be some inkling, but I doubt whether he had a grasp of this particular
discourse.
DIRECTIONAL
INT: So sometime in this period -- this is while Aguinaldo was
awaiting this election, or at least that's my understanding of it, because the
anti-imperialists might win, the US might get out of the Philippines -Aguinaldo changed his tactics in terms of warfare. Could you describe that
change and why it took place and what it really involved?
CAMAGAY: Well, actually, ah, the -- the use of guerrilla warfare
is, ah, one of the things that they already -- or Aguinaldo already toyed with in the
light of a scarcity of arms and ammunition. You can not really do conventional
warfare in this particular time. So the scarcity of arms and ammunitions forced
Aguinaldo, he came out with a proclamation that then on, we are now going to
resort to guerrilla warfare. And, ah, well, ah, there are accounts which say that in
the light of scarcity of arms and ammunitions, there would be one line of Filipinos
there facing the Americans when they fall. Another line of Filipinos get the guns
and then face the Americans, ah, like the first line. So it, ah, was, I think, a tactic
or a strategy which made long the -- the insurrection or the war, the PhilippineAmerican war, the use of this tactic.
INT: Okay. I'm going to jump back pretty significantly because
there’s something I’d just like to bring up. There’s something I forgot to ask you.
Um, I want to talk a little about the, ah, temporary government organized in
Malolos. When did that happen and why did the US sort of pick on the fact
that Filipinos were in fact capable of self-government after this? If you could just
define what happened there briefly and then say if there was any US reaction to it
at all or if it was completely ignored.
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, things would really happen starting, ah, May
in the Battle of Manila Bay. June 12th, there was declaration of Philippine
independence by Aguinaldo in Cavite. And, ah, ah, by August or September they
were now thinking of a, ah, Malolos Congress. The Malolos Congress was first
perceived as an advisory body to Aguinaldo because he made a proclamation
calling all the bright people to help him, ah, run the government. So it was per--
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conceived first as an advisory body until there was now the plan to make this
congress draft a constitution. So, ah, the, the congress, therefore, became a
constitutional body to draft a constitution and they did draft a constitution which
was the Malolos, ah, Constitution. Now, ah, what were the Americans, ah -- how
did they perceive this? Well, I think they intentionally did not, ah -- they did not -they did not -- they were not present. They were invited in the inauguration of the
Malolos Republic, but they did not come. Ah, they were also invited in the June
12th declaration of Philippine independence. Except for one American, who, I
think, went there in individual capacity, the Americans also did not go. So, ah, I
think at this point in time, the Americans purposely did not, ah, personally go to
these, ah, events which were very important to the Filipinos because, ah, going
there would mean recognition of, ah, Philippine independence and also the
inauguration of the Malolos Republic.
INT: And also on July 4th, Aguinaldo did not attend some sort of
Fourth of July celebration that was taking place?
CAMAGAY: No. No. Mm-hm. July 4th celebration in the
Philippines?
INT: Yeah. You know, that the US soldiers were having at the time
or something?
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, I don't know if they were invitations, ah,
sent, ah, to Aguinaldo, but, ah, if, ah, if we go into the context of Aguinaldo trying
to really have good relations with Americans, he could have sent -- he could have
gone himself or sent a representative.
INT: Yeah.
DIRECTIONAL
INT: One last question. When Roosevelt was President year
later, he referred to the Philippines as an achilles heel in terms of US defense.
Can you talk a little bit about what he meant by that, not only from the US
perspective, strategy in terms of (Unintell.) halfway around the world, but
also in terms of, you know, the Filipino perspective, that it couldn't be
governed necessarily from so far away and, therefore, it sort of represented
the failure of the imperialists.
CAMAGAY: Well, ah, if it was considered an achilles heel by the
Americans, ah, they could have easily left, scuttled the Philippines, but, ah, when
we consider the geopolitics at that time, ah, it -- the Americans felt it still had a
value, a strategic value at that, and, therefore, they were not willing to, ah, give it
up, ah. The 1930s during the -- the Depression, that's when again that issue of the
Philippines becoming an achilles heel comes again, because, ah, there was, ah,
Japanese expansionism in Asia and, ah, defending the Philippines was really going
to be a liability -- I mean the Philippines was a liability than an asset because they
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11
were constrained to defend the Philippines and, ah, well, ah, that was good for the
Filipinos because, ahm, the independence mission sent to the US at the time was
successful in getting an independence law for the Philippines, ah, because, ah, the
Tidings-MacDuffy Law, ah, stated that the Philippines would be, ah, set free or
would be given independence after a ten-year transition period, no? So it was
good for the Filipinos.
INT: Yeah.
DIRECTIONAL
END INTERVIEW