NOTTINGHAMSHIRE FIRE & RESCUE
PEER REVIEW REPORT
March 2009
Chris Geyton
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 3
KEY ISSUES AND OBSERVATIONS .................................................................................................... 4
SUMMARY FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................... 6
KEY IMPROVEMENT PRIORITIES ....................................................................................................... 9
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 10
INTRODUCTION
A team of five peer assessors, led by Chris Geyton of Excellence in Business, were invited to conduct the
peer challenge. The team comprised:
David Escudier
Steve Green
David Minnery
Keith Jones
Kent Fire and Rescue Service
South Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service
Associate Consultant
Associate Consultant
The peer challenge was undertaken in line with the following stages:
Initial review of self-assessment and identification of key site visit issues;
Team planning meeting and pre-assessment brief;
Opening meeting to confirm scope and establish Nottinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service needs from the
process;
3 day site visit involving detailed planning, presentations, individual one to one interviews, small focus group
discussions with key staff. Colleagues at all levels of the organisation were consulted across the 3 days;
Team consensus and review discussion;
Hot de-brief/feedback;
Review of draft findings and reporting;
Senior management team feedback and improvement planning.
A number of general observations about the self-assessment have also been noted to help inform the
changes/improvements the Authority may wish to make and build the outcome of the assessment into future
improvement planning and its communication to the wider authority.
Finally, the assessment team would like to thank the colleagues from Nottinghamshire Fire & Rescue for the
hospitality extended to them during the assessment, as well as those who participated in interviews for their
helpful contribution to the process.
KEY ISSUES AND OBSERVATIONS – CORPORATE OVERVIEW
During this Peer Review, the assessment team has sought to operate as ‘critical friends’ and be supportive of
the FRA’s desire to open up to ‘semi-external’ challenge. Therefore, in reading this report and using it to
focus any subsequent improvement activity, it will be important to acknowledge that this is a ‘snapshot’ based
on the areas covered during the site visit activity. The aim is to reflect back and offer objective interpretation
on evidence presented to it through documentary and interview based information. The team have identified
both strengths and areas for improvement and it is important to read these in conjunction rather than in
isolation of each other, as a stated strength may also have an area for improvement associated with it and
vice versa.
With regard to the key themes, issues and observations the team would like to draw attention to the following
factors:
1.
There is full and unequivocal support for the Chief and the direction the service are taking and a strong
‘can do’ culture exists. This was supported by staff at all levels and there were many references to
improvements in the last 18 months with particular examples given regarding empowerment of people
and teams;
2.
There is a fully integrated approach to Integrated Risk Management Planning with the outcome of this
process being embedded within the wider Community Safety Plan;
3.
There are strong partnerships with certain partners and good evidence of effective community
engagement through the LAAs. In addition staff were very positive about the excellent local level
partnerships and approach to community engagement within the designated districts;
4.
There is clear evidence and a strong track record of improvement and capacity to improve at a local
level. For example, there has been a comprehensive review of Training & Development and the
recommendations are currently being implemented. Similarly, there are excellent examples of
improvements within the central team at Headquarters which are well regarded by staff across the
organisation e.g. the formation of the Operational Assurance Team;
5.
Whilst there are some good and well established partnerships at a local level there does not appear to
be a strong FRA framework, priorities established within and between LAA partners nor resource to
service, drive/control and co-ordinate the impact of partnering to benefit the FRA. There was some
discussion regarding a ‘recent partnering audit’ but staff we unclear of the outcome of this review and
the report was not available during the review;
6.
Whilst there are clear plans towards developing the next IRMP 2010-13 staff awareness of this is varied
and staff commented that there are currently a number of potentially conflicting projects being delivered
in perceived ‘silos’. For example, decisions regarding the resourcing of future community safety
activity. Staff commented that they were unclear on how projects such as this were reflected in a
current year IRMP action plan;
7.
With regard to communications at a number of levels there was a confused picture amongst those staff
interviewed. The current communications strategy is dated 2005 and staff were not clear what has
been done to review, improve and update this. There is a perceived fall back with some staff stating
that ‘its in the intranet’ However, there is no signposting, there are currency issues and staff feel that
the intranet is not particularly user friendly. There are however positive examples of progress in some
areas for example the media team;
8.
There are some perceived issues amongst staff with regard to the alignment or harmony between
management and staff, uniform/non-uniform, retained/whole time etc. Staff stated there are many plans
in place at different levels but the cohesion between these is not strong and there is no ‘understood’
clarity of purpose. This points back to the lack of a properly integrated strategy or plan which people
recognise as the current IRMP. For example, there is a perceived lack of strategic context for much of
what the service is doing for example the move back to a more targeted Community Safety Task Force
from the previous resource, the move to mainstream retained support officers, the linkages between fire
protection and operations, the link from SDC back in to the wider brigade;
9.
At the time of the review the sharing of best practice was limited across Directorates for example the
REACT meeting is restricted to the Response side of the organisation and colleagues from Control, Fire
Protection etc. are not engaged in this forum. There are no current central records across the Brigade
of the current skill base and experience. Although there was a full RDS survey in 2005/06 there are no
current records/database of this nor plans to address this. Staff feel this will hamper the Chief’s desire
to have a ‘competent brigade’ by 2010;
10.
Staff feel that there is no clear approach to review and evaluation at many levels for example:
Training & Development there is limited evidence that the impact and outcome of training
delivered is evaluated;
The evaluation of the role and effectiveness of the Risk Reduction Team leading to a more
targeted Community Safety Task Force;
The evaluation of wider Community safety Campaigns.
That said there are some specific task and finish projects such as the current and ongoing local RDS
review where evaluation is stronger. Key staff were also clear how this type of activity will be used to
inform the future IRMP planning process was understood.
11.
There is a strong perception amongst staff that the FRA have not effectively communicated the
published business case for certain key initiatives, actions or decisions. For example, creation of a
Community Safety Task Force, the move towards peripatetic trainers etc. Whilst there is evidence of
how these issues have been dealt with at an FRA level staff understanding was varied;
12.
Whilst there is evidence that the latest updated IT strategy was taken to Policy and Strategy Committee
in Feb 2008 and approved many staff interviewed during the review were unaware of the Strategy and
its implications. Consequently there are concerns that technology based improvements and systems
are not fully aligned with the FRA strategy and priorities, which in turn are not clear or current to staff.
This has led to concerns amongst staff about the suitability of systems, the competence of staff to
operate systems such as CFMIS, connectivity, fallback and contingency etc. There are also no plans in
terms of succession management for key personnel such as the Information Manager. The IT systems
that are used to inform decisions are not currently subject to any local performance indicators nor are
there any user satisfaction surveys to demonstrate that system users are actually receiving the
information they want and need;
13.
There is a clear issue with regard to document control, timeliness and the accuracy of data and
information. For example, there are ‘current’ documents without clear document control details, such
as issue date, owner, revision number etc. Staff felt that this made it difficult at times to be clear on the
current issue of documents, policies and related information. Also there does not appear to be a
register of key documentation and policies with regard to ownership and review schedules etc;
14.
There is a dedicated Health and Safety auditing system which is proving its worth in improving safety
and supporting policy;
15.
There was some concern amongst staff that certain areas of policy and strategy are less clear to staff.
For example, whilst people were able to quote the 10 minute response standard staff were unable to
point to a more formal/documented Response Strategy detailing this;
16.
There was limited evidence that the efficiency agenda is being addressed across the current
partnerships which the FRA support/sit on;
17.
Whilst Community, staff and stakeholder consultation and engagement in certain areas is weaker for
example staff consultation on policy and structural change there are clear and structured plans in place
for the development of the next Community Safety Plan 2010-13;
18.
With regard to organisation and structure there was some confusion at the time of the review due to
ongoing changes not being completed. For example, the was some uncertainty with regard to the
Community Safety Task Force;
19.
The current chair and senior management team are clearly aware of the impact of the potential political
change. At the time of the review there was clearly a strong relationship and understanding amongst
key members senior officers and a recognised risk as the FRA move towards a new and potentially
more challenging IRMP. On this basis there are clear plans in place to mitigate this risk and manage a
potential political change and induction of new members in a structured and systematic way to minimise
any impact.
SUMMARY FINDINGS
Community Risk Management
There are systematic plans in place to develop the next 3 year IRMP 2010-13 informed by activity such as this
review. There is also a comprehensive framework of intelligence gathering that informs the development and
delivery of community safety activity and the priorities of the service. This includes the FSEC and “Mosaic”
tools.
There has been a much more focused and risk based approach through 2008 which has seen the total
amount of prevention based activity reduce in terms of volume (e.g. HSCs) but the potential impact increase.
However, whilst most staff interviewed were clear on the FRA approach they stated this does not appear in
any current strategy or communication document such as the annual report produced over the last few years.
However, local business plans do not relate back to specific IRMP objectives so it is difficult to track which
section of the Community Safety Plan is being supported by an individual business plan. For example, the
current draft objectives under the ‘Response Delivery’ Core work state two corporate aims which conflict with
the three that are stated in the CSP and Annual Report. In addition, whilst there is some evidence that
uniformed personnel are consulted/engaged with the IRMP process there is evidence to suggest that this
does not extend to non-uniform staff. Some of these staff seemed to not be fully engaged and to regard IRMP
issues as an afterthought and in fact have and operate plans which fall outside of its ‘umbrella’ for example
the 2008/09 Fire Prevention Plan and the stated links to strategic objectives. These are simply stated as
‘CSP 2007/10. There were other key issues with regard to Community Risk Management, for example the
decision to review the operation of the Service Risk Reduction Team does not appear to have been taken as
a consequence of the IRMP process. Whilst there is evidence of FRA engagement in this process the
rationale etc. is not well understood by members and some officers.
Whilst there is reference to an annual refresh of the Community Safety Plan there is no evidence that this
process involves any formal consultation with staff or stakeholders and the last published CSP Annual Plan
update is dated 2007. In contrast there is an annual report published for April 07 – March 08 whilst this
restates the vision and aims the wider objectives, targets and measurements for the period are not stated.
For example, during this period the Risk Reduction Team was redeployed outside of a published/stated
assessment of risk
Prevention
The service can demonstrate a sound process for identifying risk and population demographics using various
data sets. These are available to Station and Group Managers for district profiling. The same information and
intelligence is shared with FRA partners via a data sharing protocol. There are also a number of examples of
real positive action driving the prevention agenda. For example, the recent Smoking Cessation events for Fire
Fighters has influenced some colleagues in their approach to HSC and there are also referrals now coming in
as a result of this. A Nottinghamshire County Strategic Road Safety Partnership has been established. It has
clear objectives which has allowed four sub groups to be established. The strategic board and subsequent
sub groups have attendees from within the FRA. The FRA is also clearly proactively promoting its services to
the wider public; it has a dedicated employee to ensure that prevention activities are available to black,
minority and ethnic groups. Its internal policies and procedure have been Equality Impact Assessed.
However, the frequency of review is not clearly understood and there are also no current systems in place to
coordinate information and feedback from the LAA and/or monitor the contribution that the FRA makes.
Evidence provided as part of the review process confirms all key community safety activities are embedded.
However it is noticeable that outcomes are proving difficult to measure and report accurately. Limited review
and scrutiny of these activities has taken place. Whilst there are a wide range of Community Safety activities
are undertaken at station and district level. These are locally targeted and managed by the responsible
individuals. There are variations in performance and standards relating to community safety activities. Staff
feel that a lack of more formal systems hinders performance and effects efficiency. There is however a clear
consultation process within prevention which involves a number of partners and stakeholders. However there
is no evidence that a review process exists to measure the effectiveness of the consultation process.
Protection
The FRA uses the CFRMIS system to collate and store information on the “risk” properties. The system is
able to produce locality based reports on individual classes of properties, e.g. care homes, in individual station
areas. In addition information is accessible on the last inspection and any risks identified at that time. The
Fire Protection Enforcement Team also leads on evidence gathering in connection with potential prosecutions.
Two cases have recently been before the courts resulting in successful prosecutions; a further case is in
progress. This compares with no prosecutions in the previous ten years. There are also examples where the
FRA are using enforcement powers to influence owners/occupiers. There is a performance measurement
framework in use within the FRA within which Station Managers assume the prime responsibility for reporting
on Fire Protection activities
While the topic of public protection is a theme within the Community Safety Plan (IRMP) there is a lack of
clearly defined links between the Plan and specific actions and targets. Business plans simply carry a general
reference to the CSP rather than cross referencing to one or more specific objectives. There is no evidence
that there is a regular and systematic approach to testing the accuracy of the data used to underpin the
inspection activity that is undertaken. There is also a strong view amongst staff that current performance
targets still focus to an extent on quantity rather than quality, e.g. by focus on the number of inspections
carried out rather than the relevance of the inspection to “serious risk to life” premises.
There is currently no harmonisation between the various intelligence systems used by the FRA, nor have the
types of information stored within the system and the types of report required by users been clearly defined.
This has led to confusion amongst staff on what information is stored where. There is also limited evidence of
a process that enables issues arising from the Regional Resilience Forum to be incorporated within the
forward inspection framework.
Response
Following a structural review (June 2007) the top-tier restructure was undertaken to provide greater clarity and
focus to prevention and intervention respectively. Staff have commented during the review there is now
greater clarity at a strategic level but that this is affected by a less tangible link back to the most recent IRMP.
The physical arrangements for the provision of operational risk information on the incident ground via the
Vehicle Mounted Data System (VMDS) terminals on fire appliances is effective and well regarded by crews,
control and Fire Protection colleagues. Operational crews interviewed by the review team gave a positive view
of the system expressing that it had improved their capability to manage operational incidents.
Following on from OASD in 2006 the FRA have also established an internal Operational Assurance function
which is well regarded as effective by colleagues across the FRA. There is evidence that lessons learnt are
fed through into revised policy, SDC and training and that this is subsequently monitored. There is clear
evidence of exercising and incidents being debriefed and the lessons distributed by the Operational
Assurance team through their monthly briefing sheets. The Operational Assurance team attend, in an
observation capacity, and contribute to debriefing and then in cascading learning/lessons from operational
incidents.
However, there is widespread concern amongst staff that the current Community Safety Plan (IRMP) is out of
date, there are some (c30% of the Response Directorate) more detailed planning and risk analysis elements
in place but much of what is done/happening at present is not linked to a wider and more current annual
action plan. For example the last annual update to the IRMP was dated 2007/08. PB Views is used widely as
a tool to access performance data which is then considered at the various performance management based
meetings. There is a concern however that targets such as FDR1 completion are not properly considered or
consulted on. For example, staff gave varying responses with regard to the target for completion.
There is no evidence that NFRS have documented and published their risk based response standards and
arrangements in the form of a formal Response Strategy. This was stated in the original IRMP in 2003/04
which is now out of date and to be replaced by the 2010-13 plan. However, all staff are aware of the 10
minute standard.
Although a process for debriefing exists and regular reports (monthly and quarterly), the process for audit and
follow up is not robust with no formal central ownership of issues arising and actions required. To date there
have been capacity issues in pursuing this however there are now clearer plans in place.
Health & Safety
Although there are updates through the intranet there is limited awareness across the wider organisation
amongst new and existing staff of the existence or contents of the Written Safety Policy. However, a full
range of Standard Operating Procedures exist that cover expected operational activities that are based upon
the generic operational risk assessments which staff are clearly aware of. They contain risk card and flow
charts to facilitate staff understanding and easy reference. There is also a systematic process for their review
following safety events, updates to legislation and more general currency and effectiveness. All Job
Descriptions contain Health and Safety responsibilities specific to that post and referenced to the National
Occupational Standards and staff are supported with training and personal development to meet these
responsibilities.
Whilst staff perception of trials is that their feedback is not always given proper consideration when equipment
is being purchased, e.g. procurement of new helmets. However, there are other examples where staff have
had specific involvement in the design and selection of new EPU appliances.
There is a strong view amongst staff interviewed of a lack of a more strategic and better co-ordinated
approach to risk management. Responsibilities are felt to be divided between post holders but not apparently
co-ordinated under a wider strategic risk management plan which reflects the different aspects of risk from
corporate, finance, safety, environmental etc.
Training & Development
There is a Personal Development Review policy that requires all staff to be reviewed annually and
incorporates the Fire Service Personal Qualities and Attributes for operational staff. The plan to roll out
peripatetic training is well received at stations and is seen as a way to improve technical competence,
enhance station based practical training and allow more operational staff an opportunity to develop their
training skills and enhance training capacity. The Service Development Centre is also NVQ and ILM
accredited offering leadership and management qualifications at crew, watch and station management level,
in conjunction with Nottingham Trent University. There are clear examples of self reviews carried out and
business cases developed to enhance the quality of training and development e.g Institute of Advanced
Motorists accreditation on all blue light driving courses which reduced insurance premiums.
However, there is no visible Learning and Development strategy which is linked to the current and published
organisational objectives. There is also a view of limited communication to staff when new HR policies are
introduced with staff feeling that there is too heavy a reliance on the Intranet which is recognised as needing
refinement as a knowledge management tool.
With regard to Competence Portfolios these are not being completed by some crews with a stated reliance on
stations creating their own methods of recording workplace activity against the Training Assessment Plans.
Call management & incident support
NFRS have a well established suite of policies and procedures relating to call handling and management
which are subject to regular (annual) audit and review. These are also tested through the regular programme
of exercising and in acting on debriefs etc. There are also some excellent examples of improved data sharing
with other agencies and partners, for example Police through the seconded post and the plans now for an
FRA funded Adult and Social Care post into the future. Existing data sharing is enhancing incident support
and more specifically prevention based activity which is clearly delivering results.
There is also clear evidence that arrangements to accurately forecast resource availability are enhancing
standards of operational response and responsiveness. For example, new technology is leading to more
dynamic mobilisation (AVLS) and there are procedures in place which are aimed at reducing unnecessary
appliance mobilising through call challenge and revised PDAs. The debriefing procedure involving control
operators has recently improved, with control staff now attending debriefs of all large incidents (although
Watch change over can sometimes affect the timeliness of this). Alongside this, Control have also devised
their own debrief procedure. The control debrief procedure is effective and has identified a number of key
improvements to call management and technology enabling potential difficulties in call handling to be
resolved. This system is not currently formalised and incorporated into the FRA debrief procedure/policy.
There is limited evidence of fully effective audit or review process in Control and a lack of a fully structured
audit process for collecting independent information to assess the efficiency, effectiveness and reliability of
the control management systems. There is also a lack of a more systematic performance based audit system
used to improve individual and collective call management and incident support performance and it is not
clear how partners and other stakeholders are consulted in the review and audit of control and call
management process and procedure.
KEY IMPROVEMENT PRIORITIES
As a result of this peer review and subsequent discussion during the initial assessment feedback and
following the assessment, the team believe the following improvement areas would be the most beneficial for
the FRA to address at this point in time. They are not listed in any order of priority and it will be important for
the FRA to consider these in the context of its own priorities, pressures and constraints. The list below should
not preclude the FRA addressing other improvement activity which may arise from this point forward:
1. There is a need to bring the current planning processes together to enable the ‘golden thread’ to
be more clearly demonstrated from corporate priorities through to team and individual targets. At the
time of the review there were clear plans regarding the future development of the Community Safety
Plan (IRMP) 2010-13. However, there was also a project within Response leading to the
development of more focused business plans. These projects/activities were not aligned and there is
a danger of future conflict.
2. Whilst there are some excellent examples of how the organisation is managing change there are still
some pockets of the organisation that are resistant to change and a more co-ordinated approach to
Managing Change with clear project controls in place would be beneficial.
3. Whilst a partnership audit has been conducted within 2008 staff were unclear regarding the outcome
of this project. Clearly there is an opportunity to review this outcome and use further review to inform
the IRMP 2010-13. In addition the FRA would benefit from a more structure Partnering
Framework/Strategy which details the FRAs approach, key priorities and how this will be
measured/evaluated in the context of the FRA Community Safety Plan (CSP) and LAA related
objectives.
4. The current Response Standard is not clearly document in the form of a Response Strategy –
Clearly this will be addressed in the 2010-13 IRMP. There is an opportunity to also reiterative
ownership and review/evaluation arrangements to assure its ongoing currency and performance
against this.
5. Whilst there are clear examples of the FRA’s prevention activity extending beyond Fire staff felt that
the lack of a current CSP/IRMP affected understanding at a strategic level and the measurement of
effectiveness. A clear and more diverse prevention strategy will address this and provide a clearer
focus for the new Community Safety Task Force. It will also provide a framework to better co-ordinate
‘prevention’ activity across partner organisations and the wider community.
6. At the time of the review there were various projects underway such as the Response Business
Planning Project which have the potential with centrally led activity. A clearer corporate
improvement plan owned centrally will address this and ensure that future improvement activity is
both better co-ordinated and less likely to overlap or conflict with projects elsewhere in the FRA.
7. Review and evaluation – there is an opportunity to develop a ‘local and internal peer review’
framework along the lines of what some FRAs are doing. This would use a small team(s) from
across the organisations to review colleagues in other divisions/districts. Similarly, these teams could
review central functions too. This would demonstrate a much more comprehensive capacity to
improve when subject to external scrutiny and inspection.
CONCLUSION
On behalf of the team I hope that the senior management team and the Fire Authority finds this report
constructive and helpful in strengthening its approach to operational assurance, focusing subsequent
improvement activity and communicating key strengths and areas for development to the wider organisation.
Throughout the ‘Peer Challenge’ assessment, the team have sought to operate as ‘critical friends’ and be
supportive of the Authority’s desire to open up to a team of peers.
In conclusion I have presented our findings in respect of the key areas of strength, our thoughts on possible
areas for development and would like to close by referring to a few key themes which underpin what we have
found.
There is a strong level of self-awareness evident across the organisation which you are committed to
sustain;
There is a clear commitment to improve communication and ensure that key messages are cascaded
across all levels;
Improvements to review will enable the service to develop a more structured and systematic approach
where identified;
The continued development of risk and intelligence data and performance management will enable the
service to better evidence the link between community safety activity and the key outcomes.
Chris Geyton
Team Leader