University of Leeds
Institute of Communications Studies
Shall We Get Started?
A Policy Approach to Ethno-Cultural Diversity, Cultural
Politics and Audiovisual Media within China
By
Chen Li
(200197981)
MA in Communications Studies
Supervised by: Dr. Katharine Sarikakis
1 September 2006
A dissertation submitted to the University of Leeds in accordance with the
requirements of the degree of MA in Communications Studies in the Institute of
Communications Studies.
博学之，审问之，慎思之，明辨之，笃行之。--子思《中庸》
‘To this attainment there are requisite the extensive study of
what is good, accurate inquiry about it, careful reflection on it,
the clear discrimination of it, and the earnest practice of it.’
–Tsze-sze1, The Doctrine of the Mean: Chapter XX2
1
2
Tsze-sze is the grandson of Confucius.
Translated by James Legge in 1893.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Tables and Figures
Introduction
………………………………………………………….IV
…………………………………………………………..V
…….……………………………………………………..1
1 THE INTERNATIONAL AND THE NATIONAL
……………………………5
International legislation of cultural diversity
……………………….......5
Emergence of ethno-cultural diversity for China
…………………………....7
The Chinese approach to the inclusive and ethno-cultural society ……………...8
Constructing the nationhood
………………………………………….10
2 SURVIAL OR NOT? TRADITIONAL ETHNO-CULTURES MATTER ………..13
Is there any ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet?
………………………………....13
Overview of ethno-cultural policy in China
…………………………………15
Discourse of policy-shifts in the post-Mao era
…………………………………16
Dual-role of audiovisual media in the discourse of ethno-cultural diversity ……...19
3 ETHNO-CULTURAL REPRESENTATION STRATEGIES
THROUGH MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ………...22
Seeking representation strategies: Vibrating between the realistic and idealistic …23
Representing ‘positive stereotypes’ of ethno-cultural diversity
……………….26
Vehicles of Identities
…………………………………………………..27
‘Exotic Images’
…………………………………………………..29
4MAPPING
MINORITY
LINGUISTIC
BROADCASTING
SERVICES
…..……………………………………………….……….31
‘Xinjiang-Tibet’ project: the product of ‘western regional development’ policy …...33
The ‘diversity’ of ethnic minorities’ linguistic satellite media
………………....34
The rise and fall of CCTV Western Region Channel:
In search of a specialised multicultural channel
………...…………………...37
Conclusions
References
Appendix
……………………………………………………………41
……………………………………………………………46
……………………………………………………………55
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This dissertation could not have been finished without the generous help and support
of many people.
First and foremost, I’d like to thank my dissertation supervisor Dr. Katharine
Sarikakis, who is always there to provide me invaluable suggestions to clarify my
thoughts. Her book Media, Policy and Globalisation (2006) teaches me how to
critically examine the role of media policy in different contexts in a logical way.
I’m also grateful to Emeritus Prof. Colin Mackerras at Griffith University, Australia,
who is a leading specialist on Chinese ethnic minorities. Thanks to his generous help,
his insightful journal can be found by me within the UK.
I am indebted to my friends both at home and at Leeds. Few words of courage or even
an eye contact has made me cheer up when coming across difficulties. Special thanks
to Wang Xian, producer from China Central Television 9, who gave me useful advice
and helped in my data collections and Dr. Yu Li at Ohio State University for her
insightful advice and providing related journals.
A profound debt of gratitude is owed to my parents, Jianguo Li and Huafen Chen,
who make my dream of studying at UK become true. Their endless love, supports and
encourages make me gown up.
TABLES AND FIGURES
Tables
Table 3.1
Statistics about CCTV news features
Table 4.1
Basic information about ethnic autonomous regions
32
Table 4.2
Linguistic diversity of Xinjiang People’s Radio Station
33
Table 4.3
Ethnic minority linguistic satellite television
34
Table 4.4
Basic information about CCTV Western Region Channel
38
Figures
Figure 1.1 UNESCO’s logic about cultural expressions, cultural identities,
and cultural industries
6
INTRODUCTION
The international legalisation of cultural diversity was realised through UNESCO’s
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions
on 20 October 2005. Leaving aside the non-stop debates about cultural trade
protection or cultural exception, the essence of cultural diversity as the ‘full
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ was emphasised (UNESCO,
2005).
Bhikhu Parekh (2006: 336) advocates the perspective of multiculturalism to
approach cultural diversity, given that more and more resistance against
‘homogenising or assimilationist thrust’ and demands for ‘political recognition’ are
from diverse groups, such as indigenous groups, ethnic minorities, new and old
immigrants and so forth. In this process, ‘cultural heritage’ of different groups and
societies should be preserved and promoted through various expressions, as a
‘guarantee of the survival of humanity’. Further, the discourse of ‘within societies’
cannot be marginalised, as more attentions have been paid on the international arena,
as in the case of ‘social cohesion’ and multicultural society (UNESCO, 2004). That’s
why ‘ethno-cultural diversity’, one form of culture diversity, has been chosen has the
focus of this dissertation.
As reaffirmed by 2005 UNESCO Convention, cultural expressions can be enabled
to ‘flourish within societies’ on the basis of ‘freedom of thought, expression and
information, as well as diversity of media’ (UNESCO, 2005). Obviously the role of
media, both as one expression and as a technology, can greatly promote the diversity
of cultural expressions. Attempts trying to combine media with ethnic groups are
striking. On the basis of the multicultural society 3 in UK or Canada mainly
3
It is insightful to refer to B. Parekh (2006) that ‘multicultural refers to the fact of cultural diversity’, while
‘muliticulturalism refers to a normative response to that fact’.
characterised by ‘historical and contemporary flows of people and the operations of
power’ (Cottle, 2000: 215), western academic studies like Wober and Gunter (1988),
Cottle (2000), Georgiou (2002) categorise three issues as fundamental studies of
ethnic minority and media: 1) whether ethnic minorities have been negatively
stereotyped, over-represented, under-represented or even invisiblised, which are also
the central themes of Canadian TV and UK’s Cultural Diversity Network 4; for them,
content analysis is typically employed to explore the representations in News
programmes or TV Dramas; 2) Structural Analysis of Minority Language Radio and
Television Stations; 3) specifically, studies of diasporas, as one sub-categories of
minority groups, with their representations and media in the discourse of
globalisation.
Based on this, this dissertation will employ a policy approach to the ethno-cultural
issues, cultural politics and related audiovisual media within China, trying to explore
and identify what factors have shaped its related policy initiatives. Given the complex
Chinese context (like different definitions of ethnic groups, authoritarian regime,
media’s role as mouthpiece, etc.), it seems sensible for us to explore more on the
relationships between the majority Han and ethnic minorities as a way of examining
whether social cohesion exists or not. From the assimilation strategy in Cultural
Revolution to economic-development-dominated current agenda, from anti-splitting
and religious-sensitive censorship to selective identities and exoticisation of
representation, it inevitably gives us a picture of how far China has been away from
the ethno-cultural diversity that is based on freedom of expression and human rights.
Additionally, can those apparently prosperous ethnic minority linguistic services
express their own voices? It will also draw on examples, both regionally and
nationally, to map the ethnic minority linguistic service in China, thus exploring how
the accommodations have been made between ideological-constructing and
commercialisation-fuelled competitions.
In Chapter 1, I will firstly start from the international legislation and
4
Cultural Diversity Network is ‘a network of UK Broadcasters promoting cultural diversity both on and
off-screen’. See more CDN website: http://www.cdnetwork.org.uk/
conceptualisation of cultural diversity, analyse the two implications (as emphasised by
2001 Declaration), as well as China’s standpoint as a nation-station towards the
Convention in the international stage. Further, French-initiated Diversity strategy was
initially utilised to address concerns caused by cultural deficits through ‘identifying
uncontrolled global trade in culture as a threat to cultural diversity’ (Beale, 2002: 85)
and as a continuing way of ‘cultural exception’ to protect cultural industries. But the
meaning of diversity is far more than that. I will adopt Parekh’s (2004) division of
common forms of cultural diversity in modern life, then focusing on communal
diversity (or ethno-cultural diversity in China’s case) to examine its significant role in
the multicultural society. The second part for Chapter 1 will be located into the
Chinese ethnic minorities within its own society, tracing how the notion of Chinese
nation has been conceptualised, negotiated and interpreted by Chinese as an
‘inclusive’ one with ethno-cultural diversities in the historical discourse.
Chapter 2 will start from debates around Dalai Lama’s assertion of Chinese
government’s ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet, as a way of examining the current
ethno-cultural policy system of the Chinese government. Then, I will extend my
discussion to a more range of ethnic minorities to explore the extent to which the
Chinese government have done to preserve and promote (or damage) the diversity of
ethno-cultural expressions as well as ethno-cultural identities. In this process, I will
combine analysis from the UNESCO’s joint-projects and comments, Chinese
government’s white paper documents, western academics’ critiques as well as human
rights monitoring organisations’ accusations, tracing more arguments between
national unity concerns and their ethno-cultural identities. Lastly, I will examine the
role of audiovisual media and how it dual-functions, namely, how it works as one
mean of cultural expression and how it serve as one technology to convey more other
cultural expressions like folks and customs, artistic creation and so forth.
Besides the cultural diversity in employments of broadcasting system (that’s
where the concept originates), it is the representation that associates the ethnic
minorities with the audiovisual media most and attracts most western academics
attention. However, as the focus of this dissertation is on the policy and related
implications, it might seem sensible for me not to conduct a content analysis to
analyse the representation from news programmes, films or TV dramas. Instead, I will
start my research premised on findings of anthropologists as well as media researchers
who are interested in the ethnic minorities’ representations in the mainstream media,
and then associate those characteristics with policies to seek representation strategies,
shifts and implications. It will be the focus of Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 will start from the emphasis of linguistic diversity as the fundamental
to cultural diversity, map and summarise statistically about the ethnic-minority
linguistic radios, satellites, both regionally and nationally, and, lastly, analyse the
demise of China Central Television Western Regional Channel. In this way, I will try
to find out what factors have contributed to this seemingly prosperous media terrain,
then
analysing
the
relationship
between
purpose
of
anti-splitting,
commercialisation-fuelled factor and the expression of ethnic minorities. Ultimately, I
will call for a national channel specialising on ethno-cultural diversity.
In sum, this dissertation does not serve as a report on telling how successful the
ethno-diversity has been depicted by the Chinese government in various cultural
expressions. Rather, it critically reviews, in the realm of policies, strategies, and laws,
the ethno-cultural landscape within China, by examining the role of ethnic minorities’
groups in the notion of ‘Chinese nation’, the extent to which the political agenda have
influenced the ethno-cultural policy, the representation strategies adopted by the
government-tightly-controlled
media,
and
the
ethno-linguistic
infrastructure
nationwide. Hence, it will come back to the claim made by the 2005 Convention on
how important the role of human rights and freedom of expression, calling for a
framework towards a democratic media system that empowered ethnic minorities
freedom of expression. Only through this way can ethnic minorities represent
themselves better in their own produced programmes or linguistic channels, thus
achieving a true ethno-cultural diversity.
1
THE INTERNATIONAL AND THE NATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY
The 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 5 and the 2005
UNESCO’s Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions 6 (passed by 185-2, with 4 abs), initially proposed by Canada-led
International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP)7, has promoted the idea of cultural
diversity, sometimes referred to as ‘the right of culture’, as a principle of world
communication8 (Madger, 2006: 169-173). Article 4 reads:
‘Cultural diversity’ refers to the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups
and societies find expression. These expressions are passed on within and among
groups and societies. Cultural diversity is made manifest not only through the
varied ways in which the cultural heritage of humanity is expressed, augmented
and transmitted through the variety of cultural expressions, but also through
diverse modes of artistic creation, production, dissemination, distribution and
enjoyment, whatever the means and technologies used.
(UNESCO, 2005)
It is explicitly claimed by UNESCO, especially through its 2001 Declaration, that
5
6
7
8
It will be abbreviated as 2001 Declaration later in this dissertation.
It will be abbreviated as 2005 Convention in this dissertation later.
See more at the INCP Official Website: http://incp-ripc.org/index_e.shtml
Madger (2006: 169) concludes that ‘the right to information’ and ‘the right to culture’ constitutes the core
principles of world communication.
the theory of the inevitable clash of cultures and civilisations proposed by Samuel
Huntington (1996) was rejected. Rather, intercultural dialogue, ‘in the wake of the
events of 11 September 2001’ (UNESCO, 2001), was actively proposed on the basis
of biodiversity as well as humanity so as to avoid ethnical and cultural conflicts or
wars. In other words, the link between diversity and humanity (or pluralism and
humanism), is premised on the recognition of cultural diversity ‘for the full realisation
of human rights and fundamental rights’, thus providing a framework for respect and
tolerance, in a more sense of multiculturalism to ‘celebrate difference’ (Barker, 2003:
414). It is also exemplified by the measures of protecting the traditional heritage.
Furthermore, it reaffirmed that ‘cultural activities, goods and services, mainly derived
from cultural industries, have both an economic and a cultural nature’ (UNESCO,
2005) as a continuing way of French-proposed ‘cultural exception’.
Cultural Policy & Measures
(Specific) State Subsidies, Screen Quotas, Broadcasting Time Quotas,
Measures of Protection & Promotion
Enhancing Local Content, media diversity ( Ethnic Minority Media)
Cultural Diversity (aka. Diversity of Cultural Expressions)
Cultural Content
Vehicles
Cultural Identity (Language as central)
Cultural Activities
Goods and Services
Inter-cultural Communications
(Cultural Industry)
Economic & Cultural Nature
Cinema & Audiovisual Sector
Fingure 1.1 UNESCO’s Logic about Cultural Expressions, Cultural Identity and Cultural Industries
The standpoint expressed by China is clear. As China’s delegates to UNESCO
remarked, ‘China holds a view with most countries like France and Canada, playing a
significant role in promoting the establishment of Convention’9. This reaction, as a
9
See official website of China’s Ministry of Culture, at
http://www.mcprc.gov.cn/xwzx/whbzhxw/t20051024_17491.htm
consequence of long-established alliance with France and Canada in terms of cultural
domain, was based more than on the realisation of the importance of cultural diversity.
In fact, culture, considered as ‘soft power’, has been always placed great emphasis
with China’s domestically ideology constructing, patriotism educating, ethnic
relationships and international image establishing. Despite this, a compromise was
made. China’s commitments10 in audiovisual sector, as an exchanges for entry into
WTO, such as a continuing increase of ‘screen quota’ (from ten in 1995 to fifty in
2005), apparently pushed itself into a fierce competition, and especially an erosion of
its domestic audiovisual industry (Lee, 2003: 14) and a challenge for its own cultural
taste. Yet, for the latter one, it has long before been transformed by the street-flooded
‘pirate DVDs phenomenon’, which is often accused by the Hollywood studio in terms
of revenues but ‘provide[s] unprecedented exposure for the Chinese to the cultural
output of the West and shape their cultural tastes’, especially for the young
generations (Kuo, 2001; Dai, 2002, quoted in Lee, 2003).
EMERGENCE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY FOR CHINA
As the Department of Canadian Heritage, for instance, defines, the concept of
‘diversity’ is ‘moving beyond language, ethnicity, race and religion, to include
cross-cutting characteristics such as gender, sexual orientation, and range of ability
and age’. Indeed, as Bhikhu Parekh (2006: 3-4) suggests, subcultural diversity11,
perspectival diversity12, and communal diversity constitutes the most common forms
that cultural diversity takes in modern society. For the latter one, he articulates that it
is distinctively characterised by (more or less) ‘well-organised communities’, like
long-established groups, newly-arrived immigrants, or indigenous groups, who are
living upon ‘different systems of beliefs and practices’ (ibid.).
10
11
12
It should be noted that China, Mexico and Malaysia are countries both activated commitments in the
audiovisual sector and as members of Canada-led International Work on Cultural Policy (Beale, 2002: 85;
Madger, 2006: 165).
Parekh (2006: 3) defines ‘sub-cultural diversity’ occurs as members share a broadly common culture but seek
for their ‘divergent lifestyle’ rather than for an alternative culture, e.g. gays and lesbians.
As Parekh (2006: 3) suggests, perspectival diversity is characterised by groups (like feminists,
environmentalists) challenge the ‘very basis’ of the existing culture.
Similarly, as for the 2005 UNESCO Convention, one of the defining features of
cultural diversity is the emphasis of ‘groups and societies’ in such a way that the
central agent/player has been transformed from nation-states towards communities.
Originally, Tomlinson (1991: 70-75) outlines the UNESCO’s conceptual ambiguities
caused by ‘vacillat[ion] between the assertion and denial of national identities as
cultural identities’, from the controversy between ‘for the cultural identity of all
people’ as remarked in the opening addressing to ‘…threatens the cultural identity of
the nations’ (UNESCO, 1982: 60). Indeed, as Schlesinger (1987) notes, this
‘conceptual confusion’ may lead to the ignorance of ‘various linguistic groups’ within
or beyond the state, especially on the premise of ‘the centrality of language to culture’
(UNESCO, 1982). In the wake of this, the 2005 Convention emphasised the ‘groups
and societies’, which signifies a ‘communal diversity’, as Parekh (2006) terms,
although difficult to accommodate, requires more strengths to investigate and
develop.
If we locate the concept of ‘communal diversity’ into the context of China, it will
be another story or a narrow sense since the number of immigrants is small compared
to its domestic population that is the largest in the world. Specifically, ethnic groups,
in the case of China, are also differently defined according to Stalin’s definition
(quoted in Mackerras, 2003: 2) as ‘a historically constituted, stable community of
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’13. Despite the deficient
application of the definition itself in China’s case, it seems sensible for us to adopt a
concept of ‘ethno-cultural diversity’, rather than ‘communal diversity’, in the context
of China that rarely has a large group of immigrants or aboriginal people.
THE CHINESE APPROACH TO THE INCLUSIVE AND
ETHNO-CULTURAL SOCIETY
13
This officially-adopted definition is deficiency especially applied to the case of Hui people and Manchu people
who have been assimilated by the majority Han people in terms of language and Hui people also scatter
throughout the country.
The ‘five-thousand-year’ Chinese culture, in a historical discourse, is officially or
typically depicted as ‘inclusive’, ‘magnanimity’ and ‘tolerant’ in a dynamic and
hybrid process14. It, originally based on the Han plain civilisation, has been preserved
by the Han people and so-called ‘barbarian invaders’ who adopted a series of open
policy to change themselves in some ways rather than destroying. On the other side, it
has been promoted by absorbing alien elements, alongside with the ethnic hybridities
caused by it own conquering, so-called ‘barbarian invasions’ as well as immigrations
brought by ‘silk-road’ and marine trades (See, for example, in Fei, 1999).
Source at: <http://www.cein.org.cn/UploadFiles/200511115630861.jpg>
‘Fifty-six nationalities blossom as fifty-six flowers; Fifty-six brothers and sisters
live in one big family.’ As described in this widely-known patriotic song of Loving
China, fifty-six ethnic groups, of which the Han people are 91.59%, constitutes the
‘Chinese nation (Zhonghua Minzu) (Dikötter, 1997: 10) (National Bureau of Statistics
of People’s Republic of China, 2004) or is described as ‘an intriguing demographic
equation’ of ’55 minorities + the Han’ = the Chinese nation (Mullaney, 2004a). The
14
There is also another saying that China, literally translated as ‘Central Empire’, regard that they are civilization
centre surrounded by barbarians.
official justification for this formula is based on the Chinese prominent Sociologist
Fei Xiaotong (1999)’s theory of ‘Multi-factors in One body’, which is allegedly
derived from Chinese philosophy of I-Ching (Huang, 2002) and his decades of study
on the officially sponsored project of ‘Ethnic Classification’ (Mullaney, 2004a; Di,
2005). This will be explored in-depth in the followings.
CONSTRUCTING THE NATIONHOOD
Central to an inclusive society, as Ratcliffe (2004: 166) argues, it should be built on a
‘One Nation’ culture based on ‘a common-sense of nationhood accompanied by a
respect for, and acceptance of, difference and diversity’. It seems rather difficult for
countries, especially an immigration county, to image this picture. Chris Barker (1999:
4-6) points out the challenge of balancing the diversity and unity, by citing difficulties
of South African’s construction of ‘Simunye’ (we are one) among racially and
culturally people. Canada, notably, is the first and the only country that legitimatise
the ‘multiculturalism’ (Solution Research Group, 2003). What’s China’s story? For
China, it is characterised by two traits, firstly, of the notion of Chinese Nation and,
secondly, of ‘depicting the ethno-cultural diversity’.
But, is it an ‘imaged’ national identity or a ‘utopia’? (Anderson, 1983; quoted in
Gladney, 1994) A distinctive idea is from Su, especially through the Television Series
River Elegy15 (1989; quoted in Dikötter, 1997), who points out that the ‘Chineseness
is seen primarily as a matter biological descent, physical appearance and congenital
inheritance’, and ‘Chinese civilisation or Confucianism are thought to be the product
of that imagined biological group’.
The notion, however, of ‘Chinese Nation’ as a homogeneous whole has been
constructed, both politically and imaginarily, for a long history. For the political
justification, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who led the Revolution of 1911 that ‘abolished the
feudal monarchy and give birth to the Republic of China’ (National People’s Congress
15
This TV Series, broadcasted in 1989, critically reviewed the Chinese Civilisation, which is considered as the
fuse of 1989 Students’ Pro-democratic Movements.
of People’s Republic of China, 1982), changed his slogan of ‘Expel Manchu’, the
ethnic minority ruler of last feudal Qing Dynasty, into ‘Five Ethnic Groups under One
Union’ as one strategy to combine all the strength of all nationalities in China to resist
imperialist intruders. People’s Republic of China adopts Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s concept of
‘Chinese nation’ and further provides the evidence of ‘all nationalities working
together to resist imperialism and feudalism’ as the political justification. In Preamble
of Constitution of People’s Republic of China, it declares, ‘The Chinese people of all
nationalities led by the Communist Party of China with Chairman Mao Zedong as its
leader ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and
bureaucrat capitalism’. In this sense, D. C. Gladney (1994) suggests that ethnic
minorities have been playing the role of OTHER to the Han people who are
subsequently ‘essentialised’, far beyond their ‘objective importance’. This is agreed
by C. Mackerras (1995: 208) who furthers this point by locating this into the context
of ‘the increasing nationalism16 of China as a whole’ in the 1990s.
On the other side, ‘imaginary construction’ of China as ‘a homogeneous organic
entity’ should also be attributed to the myths of ‘Descents from the Dragon, from the
Yellow Emperor and from the Peking Man’ (Sautman, 1997: 76). This way was
greatly challenged especially from the ethnic minorities’ perspectives. A tripod
decorated with fifty-six dragons, representing fifty-six officially-recognised ethnic
groups, presented in celebration of the fiftieth anniversaries of the UN, as Sautman
(ibid.) notes, officially signified all the ethnic groups are ‘Descents from the Dragon’,
which is contradictory given that ethnic minorities themselves have other ‘animal
progenitors’. Striking examples come from ‘the wolf and dog among Mongols, the
Monkey among Tibetans, the bear among Koreans’ and so forth. It is also the same
case that the idea of ‘authentically Chinese’ or ‘fellow-descendents of the Yellow
Emperor’ (ibid.) were rejected by those ethnic minorities, like Uygurs, Kazaks, and
Kirgiz in Xinjiang, who do not ‘physically and culturally resemble the Han’. Another
16
‘Nationalism of China as a whole’ refers to, in a narrow sense, patriotism which is especially based on the
resistance to the imperialism invasion over centuries and nowadays is quite prevalent in the forms of
anti-Japanese in the issue of history textbooks, Japanese PM’s visiting controversial Yasukuni Shrine and
anti-American in the 1999 bombing of Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia.
‘unifying symbol’, culturally and officially portrayed as ‘an embodiment of the spirit
and force of the Chinese nation’, is the Great Wall, which was employed as the
negative barriers of resisting the ancient nomadic people (most of them now are
recognised as ethnic groups in China). Gladney (1994: 8) critically points this out by
referring to one picture published by Nationality Pictorial, portraying some ethnic
minorities proclaiming that ‘I love Great Wall’.
2
SURVIVAL OR NOT?
TRADITIONAL ETHNO-CULTURES MATTER
IS THERE ANY ‘CULTURAL GENOCIDE’ IN TIBET?
Nowadays, strikingly opposed to the Chinese official statistics and proclaimed
accomplishment of preserving Tibetan cultures in series of white papers, ‘some kind
of cultural genocide’17 or ‘developing cultural extinction’ was often quoted by Exiled
Tibetan Spiritual Leader 14th Dalai Lama, mainly premised on increasingly massive
immigration of Han people, especially fuelled by Qinghai-Tibet Railway’s completion.
There might be no room here to explore, in essence, the relationship between the
usage of this expression and political motive of independence, but, it is worthwhile
for us to examine to what extent the Tibetan culture has been preserved and promoted
(or damaged) by the Chinese government especially in the context of globalisation,
immigration mobility as well as cultural hybridity.
The official response from the government white papers like The Development of
Tibetan Culture (2000) furiously denounced Dalai Lama’s accusation and articulated
the legal framework as well as accomplishments in matters of Tibetan-language use at
different occasions, cultural relics and ancient books, public subsidies, administrative
system, religious life, folk festivals, folk songs, literatures, Tibetan studies, cultural
exchanges and so forth. Especially in conclusions, this report (2000) argues by
‘cultural extinction’, it means cultural rule, once monopolised by a few serf-owners,
have become ‘extinct’. Specifically, the status of Tibetan-language was ensured by
17
See at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,169128,00.html
legal framework of the Constitution (1982), Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy
(2001), especially for Tibet, Some Provisions of the Tibet Autonomous Region on the
Study, Use and Development of the Spoken and Written Tibetan Language (1987). A
bilingual education policy also assures Tibetan people’s right to study and use their
own language. Regarding the public subsidies, more than RMB 300m (£ 20m) was
spent on renovations of 1400 monasteries and temples. It is also reported by Financial
Times that another RMB 300m will be spent to ‘further restoration of Potala Palace,
Norbulinka Palace and the Sakya Monastery’, despite the US State Department’s 2004
Report on China’s Human Rights Practices claims that ‘many monasteries have never
been rebuilt or repaired with others partially repaired’ (Flanagan, 2005). Notably,
Tibetan heroic epic King Gesa18r, which has been passed down only by folk artists
orally for over 1000 years, now has been printed out in more than 120 volumes
through more than 20-years attempts of government’s collecting, researching and
publishing. But, as the Chinese government still adopts an ambiguous attitude towards
the Cultural Revolution, this white paper mentioned nothing about the cultural
destruction during the Cultural Revolution but only mentioned the survival of ‘Potala
Palace’19. There, after all, have been signs that the government now have been making
more and more efforts of protecting and promoting Tibetan traditional cultures.
The cooperation between UNESCO and the Chinese government has also been
playing a significant role in this process. Until now, Historic Ensemble of the Potala
Palace 20 , Lhasa was listed as the UNESCO World Heritage in 1994, with the
extension of Jokhang Temple Monastery 21 in 2000 and Norbulingka 22 in 2001.
Further, Yalong, the cradle of Tibetan Culture, was also nominated by the National
Commission of China into UNESCO’s tentative list. Notably, as quoted by white
paper (2000), UNESCO World Heritage Committee considered the Potala Palace as ‘a
18
19
20
21
22
Gesar, collectively created by China's Tibetans, is a heroic epic which originates in ‘the folk oral traditions and
passed down through Tibetan generations in a combination of song and narration for over 1,000 years’. See
more at its special site: http://zt.tibet.cn/tibetzt/gesaer_en/doc/1000.htm
In this report, it mentions as ‘Even in such a special period…, Premier Zhou Enlai gave instructions personally
that special measures be taken to protect major cultural major relics like the Potala Palace from destruction’.
Potala Palace, the former winter palace of Dalai Lama, is considered as the symbol of Tibetan Buddhism.
Jokhang Temple Monastery is an exceptional Tibetan Buddhist religious complex.
Norbulingka is the former palace of Dalai Lama.
miracle in the history of ancient building protection’ and ‘a great contribution to the
protection of Tibetan and World Culture’.
For western scholars, prominent Australian anthropologist Colin Mackerras (2003:
46), based on his four visits to Tibet since 1985, responds to this as:
It is true that the Cultural Revolution saw massive cultural destruction. However,
what strikes me most forcefully about the period since 1980 or so is not how much
the Chinese have harmed Tibetan culture, but how much they have allowed, even
encouraged it to revive, not how weak it is, but how strong.
(Mackerras, 2003: 46)
Insightfully, he argues that ‘a modernisation process going on in Tibet, carried on
the context of Tibet as a part of China, which may dilute tradition’ (ibid.) This
reaffirms his conclusion in the book China’s Minority Cultures: Identities and
Integration Since 1912, where Mackerras (1995: 221) argues that ‘what matters most
is whether features essential to the traditional cultures of particular minorities survive
or not’ as well as the extent of integrations. The following part of this chapter will
extend this specific discussions to the national level, to explore the extent to which the
Chinese government have done to preserve and promote (or damage) the diversity of
ethno-cultural expressions as well as ethno-cultural identities.
OVERVIEW OF ETHNO-CULTURAL POLICY IN CHINA
Parekh (2006: 2) suggests that identities, especially for minorities, can be expressed or
realised by virtue of ‘necessary freedom of self-determination’, ‘a climate conductive
to diversity’, ‘suitable legal arrangements’ and so forth, thus requiring ‘an implicit or
explicit cultural agenda’. As for People’s Republic of China, ethno-cultural policy,
largely influenced by the political agenda, can be roughly divided into two stages.
First stage (1949-1976), characterised by the ‘social reform’, ‘class struggle’ and
‘cultural revolution’, allowed for little or no space for ethnic minorities to develop or
maintain ethnic identities and cultures, which were oppressed and assimilated,
especially with the blow of Cultural Revolution’s ‘dismantling all the traditional
cultures’. In this stage, a slogan of ‘let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred
schools of thoughts contend’ (Zhao, 1998: 21) had no interactions with the artists but
was utilised for the guise of Mao’s political campaign.
The second stage, maybe termed as ‘post-Mao era’ and reforming-opening era,
ethnic minorities’ cultures have gradually become revival, ensured by a framework of
legal system, preferential policies and rise of intellectual discourse but largely subject
to the strict control of expressions caused by politically sensitive issues like national
unity and religious feelings. Especially for the audiovisual policy (see the process of
policy-making at Appendix I), given Chinese media’s functioning as mouthpiece for
the government, the images of ethnic minorities in mainstream media are still largely
framed by the traditional representation strategies (which will be explored in Chapter
3) while the seemingly prosperous developments of ethnic minorities media
(discussed in Chapter 4), despite providing a relatively limited space expression, are
still largely shaped by national policy of anti-splitting, commercial factors and so
forth, under several projects constructed by the State Administration of Film, Radio,
and Television (SAFRT).
DISCOURSE OF POLICY SHIFTS IN THE POST-MAO ERA
Ethno-cultural identities, especially of ethnic minorities, as Mackerras (1995) puts,
are largely characterised or maintained by languages (and by implication education),
religions, folks and customs (including traditional clothing as well as habits),
literature and arts, and so forth. In this case, it deserves explorations of ethnic
minorities themselves, especially in the post-Mao era, with in-depth policy
interpretations, derived both from laws and white papers, from the ethno-cultural
fields.
‘Dismantling all the traditional beliefs and symbols’ in the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976) slaughtered Han-originated Confucianism as well as marginalised ethnic
minorities’ cultures. During this period, class struggles to create a new ‘communist’
culture dominated, which extremely repressed against minorities’ cultures (Mackerras,
1995: 214). In this context, cultural resistances emerged against ‘savage assimilation’
among ethnic minorities, which might take little effects but serve as the basis for their
‘cultural revival’ from 1980 onwards, namely, in the post-Mao era. It should also be
noted the Constitution of People’s Republic of China, the cornerstone of Chinese legal
system, was adopted in 4 December 1982, in which Article 119 says:
The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas independently
administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture
affairs in their respective areas, sort out and protect the cultural legacy of the
nationalities and work for the development and prosperity of their cultures.
(Constitution of PRC, 1982)
Like the language policy mentioned before in the case of Tibetan, minorities’
languages have never been ‘suppressed’, as accused by some Human Rights
monitoring agencies. Rather, with the promotion of the bilingual education system, it
was guaranteed and promoted (It will explore later specifically about minority
linguistic broadcasting system). Strong ethnic identities, for instance, of Uygur,
Tibetan, Korean people also contribute their insistences on using their own written
and spoken languages, while others with weak language traditions (like Zhuang
people who did not have their own written language until invented 50 years ago), by
contrast, might become the focus of concerns (I will talk later about Zhuang’s
language use in broadcasting system) and central tasks for the national preservation. It
should be excluded the cases of Hui and Manchu people who have been assimilated in
the historical discourse and now mostly adopt to use the Chinese language. It might
be influenced or slightly constrained by the policy of promoting Mandarin (the
standard Chinese or Putonghua) as the communication tool between ethnicities as
well as sociologist ideology of promoting a national culture. For instance, Chapter 4
Article 36 of Administrative Regulations on Radio and Television (1997) reads: ‘All
radio or television stations shall use standardized spoken and written language’, and
‘All radio or television stations shall promote the nationwide use of Putonghua’.
Regarding religion, a ‘prime cultural source’ (Mackerras, 1995: 215) of ethnic
identities and the most controversial area of Chinese policy, it becomes more complex
when factors like ethnic unity, national unity are taken into account. Compared to the
banned and persecuted policy in Cultural Revolution, those antitheists of Chinese
Communist Party23 (CCP) members adopt a more tolerant policy towards them. To be
exact, Article 36 of the Constitution ensures citizen’s ‘freedom of religion’ on the
condition that ‘no person may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt
public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of
the State’. Evidently, the central concerns for the Chinese government are those
attempts to use religion for political independence, especially for those who have
strong ethnic identities. It can be better exemplified by the case of 14th Dalai Lama,
who was political ruler as well as spiritual leader. In terms of religious affairs in Tibet,
it’s not a wise way for the Chinese government to completely root up all the religious
images related to Dalai Lama, as in the case of government’s interference with
selection of 10th Panchen Lama and 1996 Tibetan people’s furious reaction against
government’s banning photographs (Mackerras, 2003: 121). Religion of Tibetan
Buddhism is the way of life for Tibetan people. Dalai Lama, after all, is the spiritual
leader of Tibetan Buddhists who have their religious freedom to worship him. At any
rate, the Tibetan Buddhism, most Tibetans believe, have been recovered since 1980s
towards a more revival era. Another striking feature of religious policy is that the
government utilise its power to censor any contents which they assume as ‘insulting
to religious feelings’ (either slightly or largely), especially in matters of Muslims. Hui
people, an Islamic ethnic group but assimilated with Han historically, are always the
focus of ‘ethnic violence’24, thus resulting in the government’s sensitive alertness.
Besides those considered as ‘strong groups’ (Clark, 1987), the government, however,
23
24
It will be abbreviated as CCP in the following discussions for Chinese Communist Party.
See one example at BBC about conflicts between Hui and Han caused by religious insults.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3970611.stm
considered some ‘primitive religious activities’ as ‘superstition’ compared with their
definition of ‘socialist modernisation’, which is challenged by Mackerras (2003: 125)
as ‘irritating people by interfering in personal matters’.
There is a trend that more and more artistic modes of expressions in literature and
art are promoted after Chinese government’s abandoning of assimilative policies
(Mackerras, 1995: 212). It is also claimed by the White Paper (2005) that ’55 ethnic
minorities in China has its own brief written history’. Three major Heroic epics,
namely, Gesar (as mentioned before), Jangar (Mongolian epic) and Manas (Kirgiz
epic) were preserved. Public subsidies, with related administration bodies, were
established to preserve ethnic minorities’ cultural relics (like Potala Palace). With the
cooperation of UNESCO, protections of ethnic minorities’ intangible heritages, like
folk songs, are now run in a sound system of funding, administrative bodies and a
working procedure 25 (UNESCO Beijing Office, 2004). Besides, world cultural
heritages site of the Old Town of Lijiang is also located at ethnic minorities areas.
Lastly, traditional cultures are also maintained by the revival of traditional clothing
and festivals, which is also arguably utilised by the government to conduct a project
named ‘ethnic identification’ (It will be explored later with the issue of representation)
as distinctive characteristics.
DUAL-ROLE OF AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA IN THE DISCOURSE
OF ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Adequate protection and promotion, in accordance with UNESCO’s 2005 Convention,
is needed for the tradition knowledge (especially of indigenous people), either
intangible (language, religions, songs, folks and customs, and other forms) or
‘material wealth’ (cultural sites, books, and so forth). This should be recognised,
appreciated as well as celebrated, no room to compromise or recede. In this context,
the role of audiovisual media (film, radio, television) should be emphasised not only
25
See more at UNESOC Beijing Office: http://www.unescobeijing.org/view.do?channelId=006002002001
as, firstly, integral ‘cultural expressions’ themselves, but also they can also be
considered as the vehicles of other cultural expressions and contents.
In the first instance, it arouses issues like ethno-linguistic diversity as well as ‘fair
and authentic’ ethno-representations in contents (that will be discussed specifically in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). For the other one, it exemplifies the definition of cultural
diversity in 2005 Convention ‘through diverse modes…whatever the means and
technologies used’. In this sense, the audiovisual media function as a way of utilising
technologies to record ethnic minorities’ folks, customs, lifestyles (like the application
of visual anthropology), to transmit necessary information as the basis for cultural
dialogues and social cohesion.
Despite the fact that revised Article 38 in Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy
(2001) requires the autonomous areas to develop their cultural undertakings as well as
audiovisual industry more positively, it still lacks a specific agenda of promoting
ethno-cultural diversity in any articles of SAFRT’s regulations except that Chapter 1
Article 4 of Administrative Regulations on Radio and Television (1997) states, ‘The
State provides financial support to the development of radio and television activities
in minority nationalities autonomous regions and rural or underdeveloped areas’.
Instead, Administrative Regulations on Radio and Television (1997) and
Regulations on the Administration of Movies (2001) were characterised by
precautionary articles that provides legal basis for strict censorship in terms of
anti-splitting affairs as well as religiously sensitive issues. In other words, those
programmes ‘inciting national division and undermining national unity’, as defined by
SAFRT, are strictly prohibited and censored (See Article 32 (3) and Article 24 (3)
respectively). The official interpretation of both articles is characterised by
‘anti-slitting’, ‘prohibiting discriminations against races, ethnicities and genders’ and
‘prohibiting backward habits and customs exhibited, made and shown’. It is also
added that it should be censored contents that ‘might cause the insulting between
ethnic minorities as well as religions’. A striking example, as Mackerras (2003: 44)
observes, are SAFRT’s bans against Australian film Babe (2000) in which the start as
‘a talking pig’ were perceived by SAFRT as ‘upsetting Muslims’. That’s what termed
by Bulag (1999) as ‘Don’t or else’ policy.
Besides legal framework (see the process of policy-making at Appendix I), the
SAFRT, in the light of ‘updated spirit’ reflected in the national ten-year plans, always
inactivate a series of projects as an integral part of the so-called ‘socialist
construction’, like the ‘Xinjiang-Tibetan project’ as one part of ‘Western Region
Development Project’ (discussed later in Chapter 4) and ‘2131 Project’ through which
mountainous areas farmers like most Tibetans can enjoy the films projected by the
specialised teams.
3
ETHNO-CULTURAL REPRESENTATION STRATEGIES
THROUGH MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
The ‘inescapability and desirability of cultural diversity’, as one central insights of
multiculturalism (Parekh, 2006: 338), sensitises us to choose the ‘best way to depict
the ethnoculturally derived differences positively and authentically without
stereotyping’ (Solution Research Group, 2003), especially through the mainstream
media. Only through this way can ethnic groups, with the ‘equal statuses’, utilise the
media to preserve and promote ‘their cultural heritages’ (Barker, 2000: 414), which is
also highlighted by the UNESCO 2005 Convention (see Article 4 Definition of
Cultural Diversity as listed before). This also entails rejecting the ‘assimilationist
model’, through which positive images of ethnic minorities are homogenised and
shaped as the same as the majority to gain acceptance or conformity (Barker, 2000:
413).
The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s (CRTC)
mandate requires ‘[t]he broadcasting system should be a mirror in which all
Canadians can see themselves and see themselves portrayed fairly, accurately and
without stereotypes’. Obviously, this is a basis, especially for those ethnic minorities
who do not have their own media (especially with their own language). In this sense,
representations of ethnic minorities transmitted in mainstream media are fundamental
to this issue. In the context of China, the importance of mainstream media is
reinforced on the ground that most ethnic minorities are living along the borderlines
or in the mountainous areas (except almost assimilated and scattered Hui and Manchu
people), which provides quite a few opportunities for the Han people to communicate
face-to-face. Rather, they learn or get vivid pictures about ethnic minorities through
books (especially textbook), television, films and websites.
SEEKING REPRESENTATIONS STRATEGIES: VIBRATING
BETWEEN THE REALISTIC AND IDEALISTIC
It is not such a hot topic that few studies have carried out for researching the Chinese
Ethnic minorities’ representations. Among those few but prominent studies, Senz and
Zhu (2001) conducted a questionnaire-based interview among 128 Han people in a
city of Eastern area. Given that those ethnic minorities ‘scatter mainly on the border
regions of China’ (Ramsey, 1987), Senz and Zhu (2001: 7) assumes that media is the
‘major instrument’ for the local Han people there to learn about ethnic minorities’
images and information. In this case, their study suggests that among those Han
interviewees, 78% equalised ethnic minorities with ‘good dancers and singers’, 50%
instantly associate them with ‘poverty and backwardness’, and 92% regard them of
great economic and cultural importance to China. Notably, as Senz and Zhu (2001: 10)
emphasise,
those
‘simplified
and
generalised
assumptions’
are
‘applied
undifferentiated’ to all Chinese minorities.
Paul Clark (1987, 1988), however, based on his study of Chinese films since 1949,
proposes an approach to divide ethnic minorities into two camps, namely, ‘hard areas’
and ‘soft areas’. In the first instance, it refers to Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia,
where people have strong ethnic identities and suffered from splitting activities, thus
leading to the film themes on ‘anti-splitting’ and ‘anti-espionages’ like the Guests
from the Ice Mountain (1963) to awaken people’s awareness of national unity. On the
other side, more love themes like memorable film Ashima26 (1950) were portrayed
26
In this film of Ashima, it tells a love story between beautiful Yi-minority girl Ashima and her lover A-hei,
although the film was added the theme of ‘class struggle’ as others in that era. It is argued by Senz and Zhu
(2000) that the aesthetic value of this film made itself become most people’s nostalgia.
among ‘soft areas’ of south-western ethnic groups. It is also added later by Gladney
(1994) that another attracting point for Han people lies in their expectations of ‘exotic
other’, mainly due to different clothing, customs and folks.
Besides ‘exotic other’ films, Li (2000) from Ohio State University analysed
representations of Ethnic minorities in Chinese Propaganda poster from 1957 to 1983,
arguing that Ethnic minorities served as signifiers for ‘socialist prosperity’, ‘lack of
progress and education’, ‘national security’ as well as ‘national unity’. He contends
that ‘identity of ethnic minority people is constructed as little sisters and brothers
being taken care of by the Han big brother in the socialist big family’ (ibid.) Similarly,
Clark (1987, 1988), Gladney (1994), Senz and Zhu (2001), Mueggler (2002) are keen
to observe this phenomenon. In this way, most ethnic minorities’ presences are
typically characterised by their ‘colourful ethnic dresses, dancing movements, and
hearty smiles’ (Gladney, 1994; Li, 2000; Litzinger, 2000; Mueggler, 2002).
Given that both political propaganda posters and media in China function
similarly as ‘mouthpiece for the party/state’, the interactions between cultural
products and state policies has been dominating ethnic minorities’ images in the
minds of Han people, most of whom do not have the opportunity of visiting ethnic
minorities areas directly. It should be pointed out that most signifiers among the four,
as mentioned above, are now still functioning as an extension of state policy that
shape people’s minds for generations. The ‘same encoding strategies’ (Li, 2000), still
employed by the new generation of CCP leaders with a few revision of guise, serve as
the party/state’s means of propaganda, especially confronted in a changing world with
intertwined by splitting activities, religious sensitivity and so forth. Propaganda
agenda, after all, matters.
If we pay attention to 19: 00 News Programmes 27 at CCTV 1, for instance, the
features about ethnic minorities in recent years are: 1) leaders’ visiting ethnic
minorities’ areas with aids and greets in festivals28, as appeared on 08/02/2005; 2)
27
The 19: 00 New Programme in China is an important propaganda progamme of CCP (Zhao, 1998). It is always
a requirement for CPC members to watch in order to study better about the latest CCP meeting’s spirit as well as
the latest accomplishments in the socialist construction. See online at: http://www.cctv.com/news/xwlb/index.shtml
28 This news programme can be seen online at: http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20050208/101271.shtml
meetings talking about how to minimise the economic backwardness of ethnic
minorities’ areas29, as appeared on 28/5/2005; 3) happy gathering at festivals30, as
appeared on 24/2/2005. Specially, the 19: 00 News Programmes related to ethnic
minority affairs from 1/7/2006 to 31/7/2006 are mainly focused on:
Table 3.1 Statistics about CCTV news features
Feature Theme
Feature Numbers
Qinghai-Tibet
Economic
Party
Leader
Ethnic Minority
Rail
Backwardness
Meeting & Visits
Exemplars
17
8
2
2
Source: CCTV News Channel <http://www.cctv.com>
Notably, there are 6, 4 and 2 reportages about controversial Qinghai-Tibet
Railway on 1 July 2006, 2 July 2006, and 3 July respectively. Besides this, as always,
economic backwards, ethnic minorities’ exemplars and party/state ideological
propaganda are emphasised. This example illustrated that traditional representations
strategies remained almost the same with the slightly emphasis change of, namely,
from social backward to economic backward.
Lastly, Gender and ethnicity are ‘intricately intertwined’. Evans (1999: 74)
observes that the ethnic woman ‘emerges as the exotic embodiment of a range of
imaginaries, fantasies, and sublimations that the dominant discourse denied in the
representation of Han women’. Similarly, Gladney (1994: 27-37) tries, from a
feminist perspective, to explore the essence of ethnic minorities' representations in
so-called 'minorities films' as well as its politic implications. Specifically, he starts
from the discussion of 'bathing scene of ethnic minority females' in the cultural
expressions of murals (Like Yuan Yunsheng's Water Festival--Song of Life at Beijing
Capital Airport), paintings, then locating this theme to the works of influential 'fifth
generations' filmmakers. A striking theme of 'explicit, erotic nature', both from
artworks and filmmakings, is found by Gladney (1994), besides exoticisation
mentioned before, especially among females of southwest ethnic minority groups
29
30
This news programme can be seen online at: http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20050528/100726.shtml
This news programme can be seen online at: http://202.108.249.200/news/china/20050224/102138.shtml
(like Dai, Hani and Li) who have a 'custom' of bathing in 'densely populated areas'. If
shot as films, is it offensive to ethnic minorities? Is it like ‘Han voyeurism of minority
women’? Can this be accepted by Han people, among whom women are prohibited to
be naked in public sites? Zhang Nuanxin’s film Sacrificed Youth, for instance,
illustrated this ‘ethnic sensuality’ of Dai ethnic group in Sipsong panna, Yunnan, by
long shot in such a way of integrating this scene into the natural setting. Yuan
Yunsheng's mural was partly covered owing largely to the complaints from Yunnan
Ethnic Groups.
REPRESENTING ‘POSITIVE STEREOTYPES’ OF
ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Obviously, the portrayals of ‘a rich cultural heritage’ of ethnic minorities are prevalent
among Chinese media through their ‘singing, dancing and wearing colourful, exotic
clothing’ (Senz and Zhu, 2001), which induce most Han people to equalise ethnic
minorities with ‘good dancers and signers’, as is in the case of Senz and Zhu’s (2001)
findings of 78%. Western Anthropologist D. C. Gladney (1994: 4-5), through his field
work, also notes the interesting phenomenon at CCTV Spring Festival Happy
Gatherings 31 : Ethnic minorities (or some Han people wearing Ethnic minorities’
clothes) are singing, dancing, smiling, to create an atmosphere of ‘happiness’, which
constitutes almost the half of this programme. Specifically, some singers of ethnic
minorities’ origins sing their native songs in their native languages, with Chinese
characters as subtitles.
Two questions arise associated with those portrayals. Firstly, do those music,
songs, dances and clothes serve as vehicles of ethnic minorities’ cultural identities?
Secondly, how can we understand by ‘exotic images’?
31
China Central Television (CCTV)’s Spring Festival Eve Happy Gathering (Chunjie Lianhuan Wanhui) is a
program broadcasted from 8:00 to 0:00 as the TV way of celebrating Chinese New Year’s arrival, both
nationally and internationally, in the forms of singing, dancing, and various art forms. It firstly appeared in 1983
and then institutionalised as one integral part of Chinese Spring Festive celebration. During this time, most
Chinese sit together with the rest of family number, eating dumplings and talking until the next morning.
VEHICLES OF IDENTITIES?
First and foremost, it was challenged by the argument that ‘most music, songs and
dances are in general adopted to Han people’s tastes’ and aesthetic values, rather than
a ‘transmission of real knowledge’ (Senz and Zhu, 2001) or expression of true cultural
heritage of ethnic minorities.
Moreover, Mueggler (2002) is quite critical of this way of representing ‘ethnicity’
by ‘discrete entity with distinctive costumes and traditions’, through his study of
Yi-ethnic Clothing Competition Festival, arguing that images of ethnic minorities in
China are vehicles of selectively objectifying ‘individual objects’ as ‘ethnic objects’ in
such way of ‘celebrat[ing] the liberation and assert[ing] differences’. Specifically,
Diamond (1994) analysed this phenomena by noting the fact that ‘each ethnic group is
identified by the presence of various customs that differ from those of the Han people/
or from those of neighbouring ones’.
Obviously, it was largely caused by the ‘ambitious, painstaking’ project of ‘ethnic
identification’, which ended in the late 1980s with the results of recognising 55 ethnic
groups in China among then hundreds of groups applying for ‘minority status’
(Gladney, 1994: 2). The definition of ethnic groups is determined by Stalin’s
definition
and
historical
criteria,
namely,
linguistically,
geographically,
economically, and psychologically ‘manifested in a common culture’, or, in a narrow
sense, distinctive from the majority Han (Gladney, 1994; Fei, 1999; Mackerras, 2003).
In this process, ‘selective cultural features’ are generalised or universalised as
forceful emblems of one ethnic group, which could ignore the variations of, either
dressing or language, within one officially defined ethnic group. For instance, those
Miao ethnic group ‘most frequently shown on television’, as Diamond (1994: 98)
notes, are just belong to one sub-group of Miao, who wear ‘elaborate silvers
headdresses for festivals or marriages ceremonies, but largely different from the rest
most. In this case, it would, through the television or film, give those know nothing
about Miao a misleading impression, making them stereotyped Miao as a wealthy
ethnic group wearing lots of silver jewelleries every day. But, for the purpose of
‘ensuring or representing a place’ in the refigured ‘Chinese nation’ family, an
accounting of 'cultural difference' (Lizinger, 1998) or ‘relationally described
identities’ (Gladney, 1994) must be considered or invented, and ‘happily accepting the
objectivised identity’ were portrayed through the media (Gladney, 1994: 7).
Besides these symbolic practices of objectifying cloth and dance as ethnic identity,
it should be noted there still exists another ‘subjective process of this identity
formation’ (Litzinger, 2000: 47). In other words, it way employed, either by ethnic
minorities’ elites or Han people, is to ‘restore or reclaim authentic pasts (such as
inventing a festival, universalising a dance with ignoring its origin), either as common
or not, as traditions or foundations for identity’ to pave the way for the essentialist
process, especially in a ‘self-reflective symbolic activity’ of cultural politics.
Ritualised dance for the Yi-people, as Mueggler (2002) points out, is only for some
sub-groups of Yi people on the past ritual day, which, however, is now utilised as the
universalised festivals.
‘EXOTIC IMAGES’
The only exposure many Chinese have had to them [ethnic minorities] in the past has
been in the official media's carefully-posed pictures of exotically dressed tribal people
attending the annual meeting of the National People's Congress in Beijing.
----- BBC Correspondent Tim Luard
Ethnic minorities wearing their traditional clothes
Source: <http://www.gmw.cn/content/2005-03/08/content_192499.htm>
Indeed, this approach in China’s context is termed with ‘exoticisation’ by American
Anthropologist D. C. Gladney (1994) in the sense that almost ethnic minorities sing
with different languages, and dance with colour, exotic clothing. E. Mueggler (2002)
even radically named them with ‘dancing fools’. Not surprisingly, for most prominent
Western anthropologists (like Colin Mackerras, Erik Mueggler and Ralph A. Litzinger)
who were allowed to come to China in the late 1980s, they were astonished at ‘images
of the charming and distinctive dances, clothing, dwellings and customs of 55 ethnic
minorities’, displayed or framed through various expressions, ranging from ‘museum
displays’ to audiovisual programmes, from ‘dance extravaganzas’ to ‘theme parks’.
But, that’s what the way how most Chinese people, especially the majority Han who
live far away from areas of them, learn about their ‘brothers and sisters’ around the
borderland, especially through the media. That’s what they believe as ‘cultural
diversity’.
That’s, however, another story for most Western anthropologist. Strikingly, they
critically called this as a ‘new mode of imaging the nation in the post-Mao era’
(Mueggler, 2002: 4). Through this, as Ralph Litzinger (1998) argues, a ‘vibrant
totality, diverse yet unified’ was invented or imagined with the ‘flavour of cultural
plenitude’, in which ethnic minorities are, in fact, included as ‘limited participants’.
Mueggler (2002) attributes this change to the extension of the concept of ‘Chinese
nation’ and the policy shift brought by the reforming and opening-up policy, instead
of assimilation and class struggle in the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Gladney
(1994: 4), from the perspective of ‘relation identity’, argues that at the expense of ‘the
exoticisation of the minority’. ‘the homogenisation of the majority’ (namely Han
people) is essentially constructed in such way of ‘formulat[ing] the Chinese nation
itself’, due in part to the assumption that ‘Han is generally equal to the Chinese’.
This exoticisation also promotes the prosperity of Chinese films framed as
'national style'. Paul Clark (1987b, 101; quoted in Gladney, 1994: 28) commented to
point this intriguing phenomenon, as ‘paradoxically, one of the most effectives to
make films with Chinese styles was to go to the most foreign cultural areas in this
nation’, which refers to the ethnic minorities’ culture that are easily ‘objectified’ and
more vibrant. For instance, Tian Zhuangzhuang, the representative of influential 'fifth
generation' filmmakers, claimed in New Chinese Cinema (1988; quoted in Gladney,
1994: 27) that '[the ethnic minorities] are actually about the fate of the whole Chinese
Nation', which encouraged him to give the influential ‘minority films’ like On the
Hunting Ground (1985) and Horse Thief (1986), to let ‘film audiences travel to
foreign lands without crossing the nation's borders'.
4
MAPPING MINORITY LINGUISTIC BROADCASTING
SERVICES
UNESCO’s Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions reaffirms ‘linguistic diversity’ as well as education play ‘fundamental
roles’ in the preservation and promotion of cultural expressions. Similarly, Parekh
(2006: 143) emphasises that culture is basically ‘reflected in the language’ and Barker
(1999) asserts that ‘language is central’ to the constructions of identities. It is also
defined by 2005 UNESCO Convention that ‘diversity of media enables cultural
expressions to flourish within societies’.
According to the Article 4, Chapter 1 of Constitution of People’s Republic of China, it
reads:
Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live
in compact communities; in these areas organs of self- government are established
for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are
inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. The people of all nationalities
have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and
to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.
(Constitution of PRC, 1982)
Table 4.1 provides the basic information about the five ethnic autonomous regions,
which is helpful for us to get a better understanding of the geographic information
later.
Name
Area
Seat
of
(10,000
Government
sq km)
Population*
(10,000 persons)
Inner
Mongolia
Hohhot
Autonomous Region
118.30
2,377
Guangxi
Zhuang
Nanning
Autonomous Region
23.63
4,788
Tibet Autonomous Region
122.00
263
Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Yinchuan
Region
6.64
563
Xinjiang
Uygur
Urumqi
Autonomous Region
160.00
1,876
Lhasa
Table 4.1 Basic Information about Ethnic Autonomous Region
*At the end of year 2001 Source: Xinhua Online, Available online at:
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-02/19/content_815536.htm>
Obviously, China’s Ethnic minorities are characterised by ‘living[ing] in compact (or
concentrated) communities’ (Constitution, Article 4, 1982), which is also a basis for
establishing autonomous regions, prefectures, as well as towns. As Wober and Gunter
(1988: 148) points out, ‘demographic feature’, the degree of dispersion of the
minorities, plays a significant role in shaping the construction of ethnic minorities’
media, both structurally and in contents. If population concentrated in ‘particular
areas’, it should be more reflected through the local media. Indeed, to develop an
ethnic-minority linguistic broadcasting system respectively in their ‘compact
communities’ deserves great efforts, especially given the poor infrastructure.
In this context, three projects related to ‘ethnic minority areas’ were emphasised
by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), namely,
‘Xinjiang-Tibet Project’, ‘Broadcasting in every village’, as well as ‘film-projecting
2131 in villages’ projects.
‘XINJIANG-TIBET’ PROJECT: THE PRODUCT OF ‘WESTERN
REGION DEVELOPMENT’ POLICY
According to Administrative Regulations on Radio and Television, Chapter 1 Article 4
states:
The State provides financial support to the development of radio and television
activities
in
minority
nationalities
autonomous
regions
and
rural
or
underdeveloped areas.
(Administrative Regulations on Radio and Television, 1997)
‘Xinjiang-Tibet’ project, beginning on 16th September 2000, constitutes an integral
part of ‘Western Region Development’ policy, with aims to ‘improve broadcasting
infrastructures as well as long traditional ideology constructing’. Besides this, the
primary motivation can be reflected from then President Jiang’s so-called ‘16
September Directions’32:
We must care for the broadcasting in Tibet and Xinjiang, to change the current
situation of ‘Enemy strong but we weak’, for the sake of ‘safeguarding the
national unification, solidifying the national unity and promoting the social
construction’.
Table 4.2
Linguistic Diversity of Xinjiang People’s Radio Station
Language
Uygur-language
Targeted Audience
Percentages*
Uygur Ethnic Minority
45.62%
Channels
Frequencies
1
Chinese (Mandarin) Han, Hui Ethnic Minority etc. >44.53%
19
13
19*4
Kazak-language
Kazak Ethnic Minority
6.99%
1
6
18.5
Kirgiz-language
Kirgiz Ethnic Minority
0.90%
1
3
4
0.86%
1
5
14.5
Mongolian
Mongolia Ethnic Minority
4
11
Hours/Day
Note: *Data for 2003.
32
It was cited by Shi Linjie (2001), the Director of Xinjiang Radio Station.
Source: Based on Data from Xinjiang Radio and China POPIN, 2006.
Beside the conventional objective of ‘letting voices of party/state into every
household’ as mouthpiece, it should be noted the transforming role of Xinjiang media
from a local one to a trans-national one, due mainly to the linguistic link with
neighbouring countries and areas. By ‘letting the voice of China into worldwide’,
obviously, it serves as the official response to the officially-alleged separatists’
challenges (namely East Turkistan and the ‘Exiled Tibet Government’ organised by
Tibetan spiritual leader 14th Dalai Lama).
Besides the stability concern, as Shi Linjie,
the Director of Xinjiang Radio Station points out, ‘radio is being marginalised’ in
terms of technological infrastructures as well as governmental subsidies. At any rate,
the situation was greatly changed by the ‘Xinjiang-Tibet’ project, especially as
Xinjiang AR got the investments most. The prosperity of ethnic minorities’ media will,
at least, provide the space for the cultural diversity of ethnic minorities. Limited space
is better than nothing.
THE ‘DIVERSITY’ OF ETHNIC MINORITIES’ LINGUISTIC
SATELLITE MEDIA
Table 4.3 provides the information about ethnic-minority linguistic satellite television.
Table 4.3
Language
Uygur
Television Name
Ethnic-Minority Linguistic Satellite Television
Satellite
XJTV-2
APSTAR-6
Time Duration
19hr/day
Coverage
Xinjiang AR,
Surrounding Countries
Kazak
XJTV-3
APSTAR-6
17hr30min/day
Xinjiang AR,
Surrounding Countries
Mongol
Mongol STV
APSTAR-6
18hr35min/day
8 provinces/AR
Mongolia; Russia
Tibetan
Tibetan Satellite TV
Tibetan
Qinghai General STV
APSTAR-6
18hr/day
Tibetan
Qinghai Satellite TV1
APSTAR-6
1.4hr/day
Qinghai, other 20 cities
20hr/day
Yanbian and Korean
Korean*
Yanbian Satellite TV2
APSTAR-6
APSTAR-6
20hr/day
*It is the first satellite television that belongs to the autonomous county.
Source: China Satellite TV Net, at < http://www.ctvro.com/starcs.asp>
Tibet
Qinghai, Tibet
It should be noted that Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, by far, still doesn’t
have a special channel broadcasted only by Zhuang-language, except for the news
broadcasted in Zhuang-language. It is estimated that Zhuang-language are now
spoken by 17 million people, as the most-largely-spoken ethnic minority language. It,
however, cannot be compared to Yanbian Satellite TV, one-prefecture level TV station,
now already owns its satellite channel. Essentially, it is largely defined by the role of
those autonomous regions’ satellites TVs that the government defines. For most
instances, satellite Television, which can be broadcasted in a wide range of areas, are
typically empowered the task by the central government to ‘domestic propaganda’,
through which ‘a voice of the party/state should be penetrated into every household’,
which is the normative function of every medium in China must own. Especially for
ethnic-minority-language media, they are also employed as the toolkits to compete
with and conquer the voices given by officially-alleged separatists’ media (Free Tibet
for instance) and propaganda the Chinese government’s policy and standpoints to
other surrounding countries speaking the same language, especially fuelled by the
Satellite to promote the area coverage. Zhuang-ethnic people, despite speaking a
language different from Han-ethnic, are far from this schedule as there are almost no
separatists’ activities in their ‘compact communities’. Besides this, some claims that it
should be attributed to that there was no a standard Zhuang spoken language (as
divided into north and south dialects) as well as its written language only having 45
years history, but it was challenged by the fact that the current Satellite TV broadcast
Zhuang-language News reports. It would also be fine to broadcast by the two dialects
respectively in its own Zhuang-language speaking channel. In sum, ethnic minorities’
television stations are now playing a role of ‘anti-splitting’ and ‘party-propaganda’,
more than its functions as representing and portraying the cultural humanity.
As one article posted in one local government (Wuming County) website bulletin
boards33, saying:
33
See at http://www.wuming.gov.cn/bbs/dispbbs.asp?boardID=27&ID=3512&page=1
It is now ridiculous for some Zhuang people who cannot write the
Zhuang-language and cannot communicate with others due to dialect differences,
which would be definitely changed if with availability of a Zhuang-language
Television station.
Leaving this aside, the role of the local government should also be emphasised in the
light of so-called ‘autonomous regions or counties’, which entails that the local
government can play an active party in legislation, for instance, within the range of
‘not destroying the national law and unity’. A striking example is Liangshan Yi
Autonomous Prefecture Television in Sichuan province, which launched a
Yi-language television station on 1 January 2004 as the only one of prefecture level
nationwide. It clearly set three goals as guiding lines, firstly and undoubtedly,
working as the mouthpiece to ‘pass the voice of the party/state to the Yi ethnic
minority people; secondly, propaganda the great changes this region has undergone,
especially since the economic reform and opening policy, and lastly, promoting the Yi
ethnic minority cultures. Despite the function of promoting ethnic minorities’ cultures
has traditionally marginalised, it cannot be ignored the significant role at the county
level, at least, far beyond the programme form of ‘telling news and propaganda’ as
appeared in the autonomous region level, such as Guanxi Zhuang Autonomous
Regions’ absence.
THE RISE AND FALL OF CCTV WESTERN REGION
CHANNEL—IN SEARCH OF A SPECIALISED MULTICULAL
CHANNEL
There is, by far, no one national Television channel specialising ethnic minorities’
affairs in China, albeit the ‘powerful’ China Central Television (CCTV) owning 16
satellite channels. Yet, that might be, arguably, to assert there once was a
quasi-ethnic-minorities channel named Western Channel, as an influential toolkit to
propaganda the Central government’s ‘Western Region Development’ policy34.
China’s ‘Western Region Development’ policy, firstly proposed by then President
Jiang Zemin in 17 June 1996, is based on the realisation of deepening development
disparity between the western region area vis-à-vis the eastern coastline where most
investments are accumulated, encouraging more people, especially college students,
to work for the ‘socialist construction’ in the west part and adopting series of favour
policies (including governmental subsidies to the cultural industries) to improve
infrastructures as well as to attract, both domestic and foreign, investments35. In the
framework of this, the western region is defined as 1 municipality (a city with equal
status to a province), 6 provinces, all the 5 Ethnic minorities Autonomous Regions
and 3 Ethnic minorities Autonomous Prefectures36. In this sense, this ‘Western Region
Development’ policy is an impetus to the economic development of Ethnic minorities’
regions. It, however, is perceived by some dissidents as a policy to encourage Han
immigrants into the Ethnic minorities’ region, most of which lie in the western region,
and an exploitation of natural resources, largely harmful to the environment protection,
in ethnic minorities regions. As Prof. Peter Ferdinand (quoted in Luard, 2004) claims,
the issue of migrant workers will be upgraded from locally to nationally.
34
35
36
See at CCTV Western Channel website, http://www.cctv.com/west/index.shtml, which is now still preserved but
without updates as a consequent of this channel’s closing.
See more at Leading Office of Western Region Development, State Council website:
http://www.chinawest.gov.cn/web/index.asp This office is established for designing favour polices.
In this defined western region, there now live 51 ethnic minorities.
After all, the implication, in the politic sense, is that macro-policy like western
development policy, aiming to promote less-developed western China, has a
determining factor in the audiovisual policy involved with ethnic minorities. In this
context, CCTV Western Region Channel was established on 12 May 2002, with the
aim to ‘let the world know the western region, and let the western region know the
world’ (remarked by then Director of SAFRT). It, furthermore, utilised a strategy of
cooperate with provincial/Autonomous Region Television Stations to form a model of
‘CCTV-centred, provincial/Autonomous Region-alliance’ (Ma, 2005: 4) to, in nature,
propaganda the Central government’s policy directions. Besides this, this channel, at
least, played an irreplaceable role in promoting the ethnic minorities’ cultures
nationwide and communications between Han and ethnic minorities, which, with
resorting to the ‘powerful’ CCTV, will exert a more influential influence than those
provincial television stations (This will be explored later as also an arguable reason
for the demise of this channel).
Specially, as to evaluate the extent to which the CCTV Western Regional Channel
promote the ethnic minorities’ cultures, it might be useful for us to analyse the content
composition of this channel, especially for those programmes specialising on ethnic
minorities’ cultures. Besides news programmes specialising on reporting this region,
programmes focusing on culture are listed as the following:
Table 4.4 Basic Information about CCTV Western Region Channel
Programme Name
Contents
Travelling Golden Line
Time Durations
Promoting regional tourism
20 min/week
Bon Voyage
Quiz about culture, songs and dancing
60 min/week
Magic 12 Questions
Uncovering mysteries of primitive
30 min/week
ethnic minorities’ tribes as well as cultures
Heaven, Earth, and
Western Region
People1
Folksong2
Geographic, historical accounts to explore cultures
Demonstrating folksongs of all ethnic minorities One TV Contests
‘Magic Western Region’ Spring
Festival Gathering
1
180 min/week
Various art forms of ethnic cultures,
1 term/year
only once in 2003
habitués and customs
This programme is produced by provincial/Autonomous Region Television Stations entrusted by the CCTV, as a
way of better exemplifying the local culture and reducing the cost. It also adopt the international code of 27-min
documentary programmes.
2
This programme is considered as a rescuing measure of ethnic minorities’ folk songs through the audiovisual
techniques.
Sources: Ma, 2005: 28-48 and <http://www.cctv.com/west/index.shtml>
Undoubtedly, the CCTV Western Regional Channel will correct the stereotyped
image of western region, especially the ethnic minorities’ regions, as ‘mystery,
blindness and less-developed’. But, due to the largely geographic, cultural, customary
diverse, the programmes of Heaven, Earth, and People, for instance, cannot form a
habituated audience (Ma, 2005: 33), which also contributed to its demise in the era of
‘reception determines’.
All of these now have become memories since it was replaced by CCTV 12,
focusing on law and social affairs, on 28 December 2004. Officially, it was attributed
to the limited coverage of this channel in western region, poor reception and fulfilling
tasks of propaganda the ‘Western Region Development’ policy (Remarked by
Vice-director of CCTV, quoted in Ma, 2005: 43). Ma (2005) articulates this as the
scapegoat of dilemma between official propaganda and marketisation operations,
whereby the local provincial/autonomous region TV stations were desired of
obtaining advertise profits as much as possible, even competing with supposed
alliance, uncompetitive CCTV. Despite that an accommodation of advertisements
revenues was achieved by 60% of CCTV and 40% of regional (Ma, 2005), this
impossibility of consensus in nature, to a larger degree, resulted to the insufficient
coverage of this so-called ‘Western Region Channel’ in the western region, only
covering 14.3% households nationwide (c. f. CCTV 1 covering 94.4%; CCTV 2
covering 63.6%). As prominent scholar Zhao Yuezhi (1998: 159-165) points out in her
Media, Market, and Democracy in China, that ‘there are far more instances of
accommodation’ between ‘ideological control of the party’ and ‘commercialised
outlets’, and between ‘national and regional interests’, towards the emergence of an
hybrid ‘propagandist/Commercial’ model. The CCTV Western Region Channel,
ideally expected as the first ethnic minorities channel, finally demised on the grounds
of its ill-defined ethnic-minority characteristics, repeated contents ‘borrowed’ from
other channels, as well as, fundamentally, the dilemma of propaganda and
commercialisation.
Compared to Canadian indigenous people’s own TVNC network as well as a
certain period time on national mainstream media (legally ensured by Northern
Broadcasting Policy in 1983), the only thing for the Chinese to be proud of now might
be a programme named ‘Chinese Nation’37 in CCTV 1 (covering 94.4% nationwide),
starting broadcasting in 1996, with 50% ethnic minorities origins, although
broadcasted at an unpopular time of 15: 30 on every Monday. This programme,
especially in the context of demise of CCTV Western Region Channel, plays a
significant role in introducing the traditional cultures, folks and customs to the
audiences, sponsored mutually by the China Central Television and CCP Committee
of Ethnic Minority Affairs.
Chinese Anthologist Yuan Xihu, based on his visits to Australia and Canada,
proposes an establishment of a CCTV Multiculturalism Channel, which can broadcast
ethnic-minorities-produced programmes using their own languages but with the
Chinese as subtitles38. He furthers this method by a series strategies by setting up
tentatively in several big cities and then popularising them nationwide.
37
38
See more information at CCTV website: http://www.cctv.com/program/zhmz/20030609/100888.shtml
This report was appeared in the officially sponsored magazine Chinese Nations 2001 (9).
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that this dissertation, premised on an interdisciplinary theoretical basis,
follows a trajectory of examining ethno-cultural status quo within Chinese societies,
by focusing on ethnic minorities, cultural politics, audiovisual sectors, as well as
related policies, justifications as well as implications. It starts, in Chapter 1, from the
international legalisation of cultural diversity and China’s attitude towards this
Convention as a nation-state; by locating ‘communal diversity’ proposed by Parekh
(2006: 3-4) into the complicated context of China, it, interestingly, generates the issue
of ethno-cultural issue within Chinese society. In Chinese context, but, given the
different definition of ethnic groups as well as unique strategy of constructing a
Chinese nation, it worthwhile to explore how accommodation has been made between
the majority Han and other fifty-five ethnic minorities. In Chapter 2, on the contrary
to the alleged ‘cultural genocide’, the policy strategies, shifted after the Cultural
Revolution, become more tolerant towards the diversity of cultural expressions, thus
largely preserving the traditional cultural heritage of ethnic minorities, while those
‘soft areas’, like those groups in southwest, have received little attention, among
whom their religions are still being accused as ‘superstition’. Besides, the Chapter 2
also examines the double-role of media, which serves either one expression or
technique, and its policy links with preserving ethno-cultural diversity. In Chapter 3,
it narrows down in the specific area of mainstream media, tries to summarise the
representation strategies premised on reviewing previous research results, and, lastly,
identifies the selective identities, shaped as backward , exoticisation and so forth,
which, however, constitutes the ‘positive stereotype’ which dominates people’s
impressions as well as policy initiatives. The last chapter—Chapter 4 can be seen as a
structural approach to mapping ethno-minority linguistic audiovisual media within
China, both nationally and regionally, as basic access for information. It then
questioned the demise of Western Region Channel at China Central Television,
pointed out the conflict between party control and market-driven forces. Last but not
least, I agree with Yuan (2001) to call for the arriving of CCTV Multiculturalism
Channel, as well as creating more opportunities to increase the possibility of
expression in such a party-monopolised state.
Fundamental questions arise: How can the policy system assure a balance of so
many factors in a democratised process? How can ethnic minorities, in essence, on the
basis of freedom of expression and information, human rights, to realise the genuine
expression of heritage? How can ethnic minorities ‘transparent[ly] reflect their
pre-existing reality’ (Morley, 1992: 179) as well as get the ‘authentic and fair’
representation (rather than positive stereotypes) in news programmes or TV drama, in
their own produced programmes on mainstream media? Obviously, the current
cultural and media terrain within Chinese society cannot provide a satisfying answer,
given the monopoly party control, commercialisation-fuelled programmes producing
and audience-targeting, as well as poor infrastructures, limited expressions and human
rights without autonomous right in autonomous region broadcasting systems.
It is prominent to see the revised articles in Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy
(2001), in which Paragraph I of Article 38 was revised as:
The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas shall
independently
develop
literature,
art,
the
press,
publishing,
radio
broadcasting, the film industry, television and other cultural undertakings in
forms and with characteristics unique to the nationalities. Investment in
cultural undertakings shall be increased, the construction of cultural facilities
shall be strengthened, and the development of various cultural undertakings
shall be speeded up.
(Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy, 2001)
Admittedly, this revised article paved the way for the framework of ethno-cultural
diversity in a macro-way. Yet, it is easy said than done. So far, it is no significance for
us to see the related organ to propose a series positive mandates or alternatives to the
current cultural systems. Positive stereotypes, accompanied annual CCTV Spring
Festival Happy Gatherings, reinforced people’s impressions of ‘exotic’ and curiosity
of learning the rest of ‘Other Chinas’ (Litzinger, 2000). Furthermore, given that China
adopts a system of ethnic minority autonomous administrative, can they really obtain
the ‘autonomy’ in their cultural and media agenda (Zhao, 1998: 194), with their own
stipulations of promoting ethno-cultural diversity?
First and foremost, it is largely subject to the demand of democratisation of both
society and media system. In her framework towards a ‘Democratic Media System’ in
China, Dr. Zhao Yuezhi (1998: 186-194) contends that, based on McQuail’s (1991)
three fundamental principles of public communication (namely, freedom, equality and
order/cohesion), besides expanding ‘media freedom’, it is, too, of great importance to
improve media services and access for social groups especially for ethnic minorities
who are ‘scattering mainly on the border regions of China’ (Ramsey, 1987). Inequality
for access for ethnic minorities is quite prevalent, which cannot be only solved by a
so-called ‘film-projection’ team who project translated films for the people as in the
case of Tibet mentioned before. Without the availability of infrastructure and access,
how could we imagine the freedom of expression? Hence, Zhao (1998) also calls for
the ‘local expressions’ needs more discussions of ‘community issues’ as well as ‘the
promotion of local and folk culture’, in the highly-problematic media system of ‘party
control and market forces’.
Further, a commercial factor should be considered but it might be another story
within China. As in the case of Canada, Beale (2002: 86) provides Canadian strategy
of ‘diversity’ in realisation of ‘government-private alliance’, through which private
leaders of ‘films, broadcasting and cable industries’ develop specific mandates for the
market strategies targeted at previously ill-served minority market. It, however, would
be another story for China, by comparison, that almost media are state-owned39 and
the poor market in ill-infrastructure border regions can never arouse the interests of
practical investors, while such historically mysterious places as Shangri-La might be
39
It should be noted that films and cinema-managing can be operated as joint-venture, but 30% of shares should
be given the state-owned film cooperation, according to the Regulation on Film and Cinema.
exceptions. It, thus, should not be confined only to tourism in the ways of promoting
the traditional cultures. But, with respect to mainstream media, those images or
representations are mainly portrayed by the Han people according to the taste of
majority Han people, with ignorance of those, say, ethnic minorities living in the poor
economic conditions.
It might be useful with reference to Canadian Northern Broadcasting Policy
(1983), which was initially designed for indigenous broadcasting system and gave the
birth of first Canadian indigenous TVNC network (Baltruschat, 2004: 50). At the
policy level, ‘regular consultations’ are made to ensure the interactions between
indigenous representatives and the officials. Secondly, the right of determining of
‘character, quantity and priority’ in programmes broadcasted in their communities and
of producing contents in programmes regarding their issues, are empowered to the
indigenous people and their own broadcasters, which entails assuring the freedom of
expression. Lastly, on the basis of improved infrastructures, freedom of information,
either to maintain their own traditional culture or to get ‘informed or entertained’, are
ensured by the ‘greater accesses’. Also, a certain period of hours (although maybe on
unpopular time) is ensured for broadcasting indigenous people’s programmes on the
national mainstream media.
Although there is an organ named ‘Ethnic Minorities Television Committee’ in
China Television Artists Association, it might be a pity to see no concrete proposal of
promoting ethno-cultural diversity has been produced so far. Compared to indigenous
people in Canada who own their own broadcasting network as well as actively
involved with producing programmes, the case of China is still largely subject to other
factors like anti-splitting, religiously sensitivity, and even lack of self-produced
programmes 40 . Surprisingly, Tibetan TV station, for instance, even repeated one
translated programme for more than 30 times in one week, largely due to insufficient
Tibetan programmes, skilled producers and funds. In this way, how can they achieve
40
After the Tibetan Satellite TV was launched, the broadcasting areas can cover up almost 83% of the
autonomous areas. Ironically, the TV stations suffers from the problem of no enough Tibetan programmes,
which indirectly leads to the SAFRT call for producers nationwide to denote TV dramas and translated them into
Tibetan edition. In this case, in addition to lack of producing team, it can be a hard thing for them to express
themselves in the confined spaces.
their expressions of cultural heritages? It become worse if taken into human rights
issues and freedom of expression into account, as basis of cultural expression defined
in 2005 Convention (UNESCO, 2005). It is reported by South China Morning Post (1
August 2006), for instance, a Tibetan female writer Woeser was dismissed from her
job as a editor because her travelogue Notes on Tibet was banned by the Propaganda
Department as it provides a different perspective from the official story of Tibetan
history and culture.
‘Give them voice, and let them represent their own interests.’ Mogul-origin,
Cambridge-educated Sociologist Bulag (1999: 24) calls for it. But, it can be hardly
imaged a democratisation process of China’s political system and subsequently its
media system, as Zhao (1998) predicts. Can those ethnic minorities really obtain their
autonomy in cultural domain, in accordance with so-called ‘autonomous’ in
administrative system? How can the party/state organs find a balance, among
anti-splitting, religious sensitivity, as well as freedom of expression? Taking these
factors, it is no surprise to find no existence of such a legal act within China as
Canadian Northern Broadcasting Policy (1983), which provides a platform for ethnic
minorities to realise expressions of their own cultural heritages. For depicting
ethno-cultural diversity in China, it’s still a long, long way to go.
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