Cdr. Joseph Famme, Fidel Sanchez
Capstone Strategy to Mission Ready Ships
ABSTRACT
The challenges for building future US Navy warships include the capital cost and the time required to
define, design and build them. In 2011 the Navy had 285 ships requiring a capital budget sufficient to
build 7 ships per year. The current SCN budget is $14.8B in 2012 and supports building fewer than 7
ships per year. U.S. national security is dependent on the seapower and naval power achieved by the
Navy as it builds to acquire the correct quantity and mix of ship classes that will be effective on launch,
and can be modernized over time to remain combat effective. To help accomplish these goals the Navy
creates capstone strategy documents, most often updated by the current Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), to reflect contemporary priorities. These capstone strategic documents are used as guidance for
performance based trade-off decision making for programming and budgeting for future ships in the
context of U.S. national security strategy, military strategy, policy and operations. Since 1960 the results
of Navy ship building programs has been mixed. The objectives of this paper are to:
 Explore two ship building programs, one that has met all of the performance based capabilities when
delivered, and another class that is starting delivery with questions still being asked about its’
capabilities, roles and missions
 Explore the optimum process for consistently developing ship building programs that provide the
needed capabilities within cost and schedule
 Explore the role of Navy Capstone Strategy documents in assisting with this process
 Present the Navy Capstone Strategy process to a broader base of the Navy
INTRODUCTION
The authors’ path to writing this paper spawned from our working with the American Society of Naval
Engineers (ASNE) and the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) Ship Design
Committee’s Naval Ships panel (SD-8). The panel was tasked with the objectives of identifying ways to
reduce total ownership cost (TOC) of Navy ships in order to stretch the budgets for new ships. As
happens with a panel of talented and imaginative members the concepts for reducing costs in current
classes of ships by adjusting policies, procedures, manning and skills, drifted into discussions of the
larger improvements that could be achieved in reducing TOC by influencing the characteristics and
capabilities of future ships, such as the concept that views “a ship as a truck:” a hull designed to rapidly
accept a wide range of future modular combat capabilities.
These discussions are all very interesting and informative, but defining future classes of ships was beyond
the panel charter. During panel research on ways to reduce TOC the panel had the opportunity to visit the
RADM Wayne Meyer War Rooms that were developed as a product of the CNO Admiral Mullen initiated
2005 Surface Warfare Capabilities Study (SWCS-21). The SWCS-21 program was tasked to “Conduct a
study to assist in defining a compelling and enduring strategy for the evolution and introduction into the
U.S. Navy’s Surface Combatant fleet, especially cruisers and destroyers, capabilities and supporting
infrastructure needed to cope with projected threats of the first half of the 21st century.” (Parker) The
characteristic that distinguishes SWCS-21 from similar work is its reliance on empirical, rather than
mathematic, analysis. The study leaned heavily on an assembly of retired officers, civil servants, and
members of laboratories/industry with impressive and contemporary experience in the areas of
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shipbuilding, fleet operations and major program management to help frame the important issues and to
critique our findings along the way.
The SWCS-21 study reviewed all decision documents from the PMS-400 era DDG/CG/Aegis design
period during the 1970s into the 80s. In order for results of the study to be viewed and understood, the
results of the SWCS-21 study were transformed from paper reports to visual displays on the 4 walls of 7
War Rooms located in Arlington, VA. These War Rooms have been visited by a large number of
reviewers and they were an inspiration to the SD8 Panel.
This paper is built on the understandings of the Capstone Strategy to Mission Ready Ships process
learned through the TOC and SWCS-21 studies. The purpose of the paper is to compare and contrast
different approaches to the Navy processes derive future ship concepts, characteristics and capabilities.
Capstone Strategy documents play a critical role in this process.
CAPSTONE STRATEGY TO MISSION READY SHIPS
On a daily basis very few Americans think about the Capstone Documents that allow U.S. Citizens to live
freely with Rights from their Creator: the Declaration of Independence, U.S. Constitution and Bill of
Rights. These documents set the philosophy and law for the implementing U.S. civil affairs including
public safety, education, economic and defense policies that flow to national defense and military
strategies. Based on these guiding documents the Navy periodically issues its capstone strategic concepts
and visions for maintaining the current fleet and building the next. A few examples:
 1970 Project Sixty, CNO Admiral Zumwalt
 1978 NWP-1 (A), CNO Admiral Holloway
 1982 The Maritime Strategy, CNO Admiral Watkins
 1991 The Way Ahead, CNO Admiral Kelso
 2002 Naval Power21: A Naval Vision, CNO Admiral Clark
 2010 Navy Strategic Plan, CNO Admiral Roughhead
The Importance of Capstone Documents
Capstone documents are essential to directing national affairs. Consider the
Capstone Rock on top of the earth spire in Bryce Canyon, UT. (Fig. 1) The
capstone is essential as its hard surface deflects rain away so water does not
seep down into and weaken the supporting spire. The supporting spire is
equally important in that its architecture must suitably balance earth materials
and strata layers in a manner that prevents withering away of the spire causing
the capstone to fall. The Bryce capstones are millions of years in the making.
The United States is 237 years in the making. Its Capstone Documents must
defend the Country from outside threat while protecting its robust and free
people and free enterprise economic system.
FIGURE 1. Capstone Structures
Capstone Strategy of Naval Ships as Key to American Prosperity and Security was set
while the U.S. was still a Colony.
History is the crucible of our Future
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We ought to view the building of a fleet as an article of commerce, it being the natural manufactory of
this country. It is the best money we can lay out. A navy when finished is worth more than it cost. And is
that nice point in natural policy, in which commerce and protection are united. Let us build; if we want
them not, we can sell them; and by the means replace our paper money with ready gold and silver. (Paine
1776)
America was a maritime colony before it became a maritime nation. The American Navy has been in the
forefront of all wars and skirmishes since it won American freedom from England and kept the nation
safe ever since while guaranteeing freedom of the seas over which the U.S. conducts in excess of 97% of
its vital economic trade. The need for American maritime dominance was part of the debate before our
capstone documents were authored.
By the time of the War of 1812, USS Constitution had already won all of her engagements in two wars:
the Quasi War with France (1798-1801) and the Barbary Wars (1801-1805). During the War of 1812, to
the surprise of both the Americans and the British, she defeated four English warships, earning each of
her three captains a congressional gold medal. Upon returning to Boston from each victory at sea, the ship
and her sailors were honored with parades and public adoration, and her legend grew into the national
icon that “Old Ironsides” remains to this day. (History)
The Barbary Pirates had been a threat off the coast of Africa for centuries but they encountered a new
enemy in the early 19th century: the young United States Navy. The North African pirates had actually
been an established menace for so long that most nations, by the late 1700s, were paying tribute to ensure
that merchant shipping could proceed without being violently attacked. The first matter the new President
Thomas Jefferson was asked to address was the payment of tribute. He decided to call a halt to the
payment of tribute and a war between the young U.S. Navy and the Barbary pirates ensued with young
America being decisive off the shores of Tripoli. World piracy in many forms continued in many forms at
a low level, but none involving U.S. Ships until the Mayaguez piracy in 1975 and the current piracy off
the African coast with Somali pirates. The U.S. Navy was sufficient to protect the nation during the war
of 1812, but it remained relatively small until late in the 19th century.
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan
In 1885, then Captain, Mahan was appointed as a lecturer in naval history and tactics at the Naval War
College. Before entering on his duties, College President Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce pointed Mahan
in the direction of writing studies on the influence of sea power. The first full strategy for sea power was
written by Admiral Mahan and resulted in him being called "the most important American strategist of
the nineteenth century." His concept of "sea power" was based on the idea that countries with greater
naval power will have greater worldwide impact. Presented in 1890 the concept had an enormous
influence in shaping the strategic thought of navies across the world, especially in the United States,
Germany, Japan and Britain, and ultimately causing a European naval arms race in the 1890s, which was
also reflected in U.S. naval development. Admiral Mahan’s ideas still permeate U.S. Navy Doctrine.
The essence of the Mahan viewpoint is:
Naval Power:
 A great navy is a mark and prerequisite of national greatness.
 Is one designed to fight an enemy in fleet engagements
 Is command of the seas
 Tactics were conditioned by changing types of naval armaments and are aspects of operations
occurring after the beginning of combat.
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Sea Power: Six Geopolitical principles underlie national / maritime greatness
 Geographic position
 Physical conformation
 Extent of territory
 Number of population
 Character of the people
 Character of the government
All of the elements of Mahan sea power and naval power addressed above have continued to be
promulgated in one form another to current times, except that the final three, population, character of
people and government seem, now, seem to be taken for granted - but should not be. If America is not
openly conscious of its heritage as a maritime people with an interest in and support of sea power, and
fully understands the Mahan importance of both distinction sea power and naval power, the nation will
face economic decline and unanswered threats from hostile nations and even non-state entities.
Sea Power is the capacity for manufacturing production, its own merchant shipping with a navy
sufficient to protect it, and colonies to absorb the surplus products. Also needed is a population that is
not only large, but that has a number that work and are involved in sea related activity, or at least
readily available for employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval material. The character of
the people in its relation to sea power is, “Almost without exception," Mahan wrote, history shows,
that "aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one
time or another been great upon the sea." Whether a democratic government will have the foresight,
the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the willingness to insure its prosperity by
adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all of which are necessary for military preparation, is
yet an open question. Popular governments are not generally favorable to military expenditure. Sea
power concepts must be taught.
Naval Power is the active and ready fleet properly deployed in deterrence and presence missions.
The Mahan strategic principles supported America well and lead to the emergence of a new powerful
Navy entering the 20th Century with a Great White Fleet touring the world December 16, 1907 to
February 22, 1909, Passing in Review for President Theodore Roosevelt in Hampton Roads, before and
after, and impressing the world, while gaining the experience needed to prevail in WWI.
The sea power principles also were key to winning WWII, where a robust workforce won the war with
hundreds of thousands sailors in ships, and building ships on scale not seen before or since: building a
Liberty ship every day, a destroyer every week and a carrier every month, while also providing the beans
and bullets logistics needed for America’s prevailing naval power. Mahan’s writings were a driving
strategic influence in winning WW I and WW II, and they were the first book handed to one author of this
paper in 1955 as he joined the NROTC in college. The finger prints of Mahan can also be seen
influencing CNO Admiral Holloway, in his personally guiding redrafting of the Naval Warfare
Publication NWP-1 to the (A) edition in 1978, referred to in this paper.
Naval Strategic Concepts to Mission Ready Ships – Two Approaches
Based on the authors’ experience in both the TOC and SWCS-21 Study it became apparent that increased
mission effectiveness and efficiency would be best improved by influencing the requirements for future
ship classes. Thus it was decided that this ASNE paper should review the Capstone Strategic process
rediscovered by the SWCS-21 study that led to the creation of the Admiral Meyers’ War Rooms.
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This paper will compare and contrast the requirements development process of the Aegis/DDG51/CG47
programs with the more recent LCS surface ship program, and ask the questions:


What is the optimum process for consistently developing the ship concepts and missions that will provide
the warfighting concept to mission performance characteristics and capabilities the United States needs?
How well is this process supported via Navy Capstone documents applicable to all ship programs?
Approach One – Aegis/DDG51/CG47
The SWCS-21 studies, the approach used for determining the mission capabilities for DDG51/Aegis was
based on STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF THE U.S. NAVY, NWP- 1 (A), May 1978, signed out by the
CNO Admiral J. L. Holloway III. (Parker) The NWP-1 series began in the 1950s capturing the ship
mission capabilities lessons learned from WWII, as well as the vital importance of comprehensive
logistics and maintenance considerations that must be put in place during the design phase of the ship. In
the NWP-1 update process Admiral Holloway, most likely, also took into consideration his own
experience as Commander 7th Fleet, 27 August 1972. During the Vietnam War 1972 stalemate the
Commander Pacific Fleet, executing U.S. strategy, tasked Vice Admiral Holloway, Commander 7th Fleet,
to send a squadron of two cruisers and two destroyers into the mouth of Haiphong Harbor to destroy the
North Vietnamese (NV) gun emplacements and storehouses to demonstrate overwhelming Naval Power
that would cause NV to return to the negotiations. Admiral Holloway not only gave the order to the attack
squadron, he personally flew by helo to the 8-inch gun Cruiser, Newport News, made it his Flag Ship, and
with his personal Call Sign, “Black Beard,” directed the operation. As a junior officer in 1942, Admiral
Holloway had been a DD gunnery officer in numerous Pacific Island battles. He then became naval
aviator, only to end his seafaring days in a hallmark surface naval power fight! Following his Commander
7th Fleet he served as Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) from 1973-1974 (Holloway), before
becoming VCNO 1974-5, and CNO 1976-8.1
NWP 1 (A) consists of two parts:

PART I -- Generation of Naval Force Requirements is intended to provide a sound, common
basis for the development and articulation of naval force requirements which fully support
national interests and objectives as well as foreign and domestic policies, and which are
consistent, coordinated and thoroughly justified.

PART II -- Planning, Employment and Readiness Doctrine for Naval Operating Forces is
intended to establish a basic system for the employment planning of the operating forces of the
U.S. Navy on both a long and short term basis; and to define the concepts and terms for execution
of current operations, and for the derivation of operational planning factors which are required for
the formulation of programs and the analysis of material readiness, including training,
maintenance, spare parts and modernization. (Holloway)
NWP-1 (A) provides a rigorous, step by step active link “check list” covering 200 listed items each with
submenus and descriptions to insure that a thorough analysis will describe the future fleet. Strategic
Considerations Technology, Translation of Requirements to Programs (PPBS), Threat Assessment, Risk
Analysis, Alternate Force Assessment, Shore Establishment, Operational Status, Readiness, Employment
Cycles. These check lists each expand to specific descriptions of roles and missions for every type of
navy ship, including a capabilities table of operational scenarios and capability, expected weapons and
sensors expected to achieve the objectives for every class of ship include: National Interests, National
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As a side note, one of the authors of this paper was XO of a frigate conducting NGFS and SAR operations 220 NM
south of Haiphong on the same date. His ship took fire from Doa Con Co Island 15 miles off of the Vietnamese DMZ
zone, perhaps because of the events in Haiphong! The gun battle lasted 3 hours – and used the frigates’ LAMPS
helo to spot rounds: advantage ship.
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Objectives, Political Objectives, Economic Objectives, Security Objectives, Naval Capability,
Determining Future Force Structure, Elements of Strategy, Navy Missions, Navy Roles, Posture of
Forces, Forces Requirements, Naval Warfare Areas and Tasks, Categories of Forces, Ships, Subs, Planes
by type, Tactical organization, and Naval Warfare.
Combat Systems Engineering is Essential
While the rigorous NWP-1 process defines the threat, warfare problem and CONOPS leading to
establishment of characteristics and capabilities, for the Aegis programs, the systems engineering
transition from the requirements analysis to the actual system design began early. This set a new standard
for combat systems integration that revolutionized the design process. These combat systems engineering
lessons learned were briefed to industry in May 2012. The Land Based Test Site (LBTS) must become
part of the design. (Pugh)
The SWCS-21 / NWP-1 Process Was Successful
The combined effect of rigorous concept to mission capabilities process provided by the NWP-1
(A) process, combined with combat systems integration, becomes evident as a visitor studies the
Meyer’s War Room centralization, visualization and analysis displays for the Aegis/DDG51
program. The SWCS-21 project was specifically aimed at validating the Aegis/DDG51 program
asking the question as to whether or not the DDG51 platform was the proper candidate on which
to build the next generation DDGs. The answer was, yes. The results are the most capable ships
in the world that are able to quickly respond to a wide range of missions to meet COCOM needs.
In 2010, the Navy commenced modernization of DDGs and designs of the FLT III DDGs for 24
more ships to be built between the years 2016 to 2031. (O’Rourke).
Impact of Post NWP-1 Arbitrary Design Constraints
Members of the SD8 panel discussed, while studying the causes of increasing ship TOC, that if there is a
fault in the DDG51 design that it was designed too tight. In review of professional journals the authors
discovered that others have come to the same conclusion: “DDG 51 had certain arbitrary restraints
imposed including displacement, dimensional, and cost constraints … the ship labor hours per ton of
displacement is an “outlier” when compared to the TICONDEROGA and the SPRUANCE class
warships. The volume density (pounds/cubic foot) of DDG 51 spaces is higher than all other modern
destroyer or cruiser classes.”(Rickets) Hull and machinery arrangements that are too tight produce
dramatic increases TOC by complicating maintenance, damage control and modernization. These
constraints for DDG51 were a policy decision and not an engineering or mission analysis shortfall. The
NEJ article by RADM Rickets is recommended study that complements the use of NWP-1(A) rigorous
definition of characteristics and capabilities with allowance for modernization.
1975 Confluence of Admirals
Other factors that are wholly unique to the time period where Aegis ships were developed were the
availability of Spruance hulls that had designed-in margins were able to become CG47 Class cruisers;
DDG51s were designed to return to steel superstructures; and there was the remarkable confluence
of Admirals: Admiral Holloway was VCNO 1974-5, and CNO 1976-78, VADM Doyle was
OPNAV-03 Surface Warfare 1975 – 1980, and Capt. Meyer was PM Missiles 72-74, and then
promoted to RADM and held the PMS-400 reins for ten years to 1985. These three admirals, by
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providence or otherwise, were placed in these capstone positions atop strong spires of motivated
staff just in time to have programs ready to launch under the President Reagan 600 ship Navy
ramp up. It seems more than luck!
Approach Two
The LCS Concept to Mission Capabilities outside the normal requirements process.
The Streetfighter ship concept was conceived by Admiral Cebrowski and Wayne Hughes at the Naval
War College as littoral fighting craft. As of mid-2001 the Office of Naval Research was considering
construction of a Littoral Combat Ship with a displacement of 500 to 600 tons. The LCS would have a
draft of about three meters, an operational range of 4,000 nautical miles, and a maximum speed of 50-60
knots. The cost per ship might be at least $90 million. (Streetfighter)
The concept behind the littoral combat ship, as described by former Secretary of the Navy Gordon
England, was to create a small, fast, maneuverable and relatively inexpensive member of the DDX family
of ships. The ship was to be easy to reconfigure for different roles, including ASW, ASUW, ASM,
reconnaissance, homeland defense, maritime intercept, special operations and logistic. Due to its modular
design, the LCS will be able to replace slower, more specialized ships such as minesweepers and larger
assault ships. (England)
The Naval War College presented a draft the LCS Concept of Operations in 2002. The decision to build
one each of two types: monohull USS Freedom, and tri-hull, USS Independence was made in 2004 by
CNO, Admiral Vern Clark. The ships were delivered in 2008 and 2010 respectively.
In the 2010 LCS CSBA Study, author Martin Murphy, stated: “In 2008, the US Navy commissioned USS
Freedom (LCS-1), the first of a new type of ship, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), produced by Lockheed
Martin. It anticipated commissioning a second, distinctly different LCS variant, to be named
Independence (LCS-2), produced by General Dynamics, late in 2009. Despite initial issues with design,
operational requirements, and especially cost growth, the Navy plans to order substantial numbers of one
variant to help address the problem of declining surface ship force levels. At the urging of then-Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark, both types were designed without passing through the
normal requirements process [bold added]. Thus, by not keeping with previous practice, there was no
formal a priori understanding of how these ships were intended to be used operationally, or what defined
operational requirements they were intended to help meet.”
“Consequently, despite some conceptual work by various Navy organizations such as Third Fleet and
Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), there is rather little understanding of what these ships
may, or should, is able to do once they are out in the Fleet in numbers. While much of this no doubt will
come from future operational testing, evaluation, and experimentation, it is useful to consider what
potential concepts of operation may be possible and worth evaluating further.” (Murphy)
LCS Program Questions
At a 2009 Senate Armed Seapower Subcommittee Meeting in June 16, 2009, Senator Roger Wicker
stated, “The Littoral Combat Ship represents $23.1B of the available $60B for SCN spending options and
alternatives over the next decade. The LCS accounts for around 38.5% of the available SCN funding. It is
legitimate to question whether this platform represents a cost effective investment for the capabilities
delivered and expected over a 30 year hull life. Obviously unmanned technology is the future, and
modularity is a critical technology for the future Navy, but the Littoral Combat Ship is a relatively small
platform for modular payloads, and it is still unclear how big the Navy may desire unmanned
technologies to be for combat operations over the next 30 years. It is also very debatable whether the
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Littoral Combat Ship is well designed for combat in the littorals, considering the LCS was designed with
the survivability rating of a logistics ship. The Navy has not determined yet how much flexibility the LCS
brings to the fleet. Is the LCS too big for littorals? Is the LCS too small to be an effective unmanned
mothership? Does the LCS have enough crew to effectively support manpower intensive operations like
fighting piracy? Does the LCS have enough endurance to meet combatant commander requirements?
What if the LCS turns out to be only part of the solution to the many requirements this ship is touted to
meet? The LCS is more of a question today than it is an answer, but the Navy touts the platform as if the
reverse was true.” (Wicker)
In a USNI Proceeding article in January 2011, CDR John Patch USN ret., wrote, “It is clear that the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program cannot live up to expectations. Yet the surface Navy still badly
needs low-end ships for littoral and maritime-security missions. Since the concept phase of the LCS
program, supporters and detractors alike have argued for or against the ship class. Recently, however, the
debate has shifted away from pundits to official U.S. government assessors, with arguably damning
conclusions about the ships. Navy leaders espousing the virtues of LCS-1 and -2 are increasingly in the
minority amid a rapidly building case for the program’s dramatic restructuring—or demise. Instead of
muddling forward to an almost certainly marginal outcome, the Navy should cancel the LCS program and
acquire a proven single-mission hull.”(Patch) This referenced USNI Naval Proceedings article provides a
further detailed discussion of the LCS issues.
In the July 2012 Surface Navy Association Newsletter, SITREP, RADM Rowden, OP-96, when interview
stated: For ballistic missile threat we have modernized DDGS and CGs and this decision seems well
justified; for a perceived littoral threat owing to the US focus on the Persian Gulf areas, combined with
the need to reduce personnel costs, we built LCS class ships, but now there are discovered issues to be
rectified. (Rowden)
Andrew Krepinevich, writing about the A2/AD challenges wrote, “Proponents of the LCS would counter
that their smaller crew and lower costs make these risks acceptable. However, this assertion rests on a
key, unproven assertion: that the loss of several small $400 million crewed combatants with 75-person
crews in surprise first salvos would be more politically and operationally palatable than the loss of a $1
billion crewed combatant with a 350-person crew. On the surface, this assumption appears attractive,
especially on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. However, what of the inherent political risks? It is by no
means certain that a political or even an operational war leader would consider the employment of three
smaller, less well-protected ships, each with crews of 75 officers and sailors, to be less risky than
employing a larger, better-protected ship with a crew of 350. After all, a larger ship is more difficult to
sink than a smaller vessel; the hits sustained by the Stark (two Exocet missiles), the Samuel B. Roberts,
Princeton, and Tripoli (mine explosions), and the USS Cole (waterline suicide boat explosion) would all
likely have destroyed or sunk a LCS outright.” (Krepinevich)
“A report by the Pentagon's director of Operational Test and Evaluation found that neither design was
expected to "be survivable in a hostile combat environment" and that neither ship could withstand the
Navy's full ship shock trials. The Navy has responded that the LCS is being built to a Level 1+
survivability standard and that the ships will rely on warnings from networks and the speed of the ship to
avoid being hit, or if hit be able to limp to safety.” (England)
Results of the LCS Capstone Process to Mission Capable LCS Ships: Unsuccessful
The two different Capstone Strategy to Mission Capabilities processes produced significantly different
results. The by-the book NWP-1 (A) process for Aegis/DDG51 was successful. The process that bypassed
the normal mission capabilities analysis before the ship contracted has been, so far, deemed unsuccessful.
The results for these two programs suggests to these authors that the use of the mission to capabilities
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process based on the NWP-1(A) Capstone process used for Aegis/DDG/CG would have reduce the risks
for the LCS program, produced an entirely different ship, or no ship at all. The NWP-1 Capstone based
requirements analysis process is recommended.
NWP – 1 (A) and the Seven RADM Meyer’s War Rooms
The SWCS-21 study validated NWP-1/Aegis/ DDG51/ CG47 Concepts Strategy to Mission Capabilities
processes. This section will provide more discussion of these processes for ASNE members and readers
who may not have the opportunity to visit the War Rooms.
“On 4 May 2004, several eventual contributors to the CNA Capstone Strategies Study met with thenVCNO Admiral Mike Mullen in RADM (Ret) Wayne Meyer’s Arlington, Virginia conference room to
discuss issues related to recapitalizing the surface combatant fleet, cruisers in particular... As one of the
first orders of business a copy of the hand-written listing, Figure 2. that had been provided to Admiral
Mullen was posted on the wall of the study’s first war room as a guidepost for the work to be done. It
remains there to this day.” (Parker)
Figure 2. RADM Meyer’s Notes for Admiral Mullen
Why Visit the War Rooms?
The visitor to the War Rooms will discover the need to return to the proven themes from Thomas Paine to
Admiral Mahan as carried forward by Admiral Holloway as described in SWCS-21 Study (Parker) and
the CNA Capstone Studies analysis. (Swartz) War Room visitors may wish to read this paper or its
references before visiting.
The War Rooms also serve to show the Navy’s defendable story and how the codified in NWP-1 connects
major surface combatants to the fleet in a way understandable to the public, Congress and the Material
Establishment. This story must be sustained by:
 continuously explaining the relevance of the Navy to the Public;
 translating fully the war fighting requirements focusing action required by the material
establishment; and
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
sustaining the understanding of operational priorities that is essential for maintaining support of
the vital shore infrastructure in maintaining the Navy.
Today, the Navy story must be transmitted through more powerful filters than was the case decades ago
in order to help unify the services. The United States Navy League begun in the era of President
Theodore Roosevelt is a prime
example.
As of 2010, most of the study’s war
rooms have been presented to more
than 2000 people, including military
officers of most ranks and services, the
former Secretary of the Navy,
congressmen, academics, defense
industry executives, field engineers,
and many others. Their comments and
perspectives have enriched our
discussions and have had a significant
effect on how we set up and work on
problems. (Parker)
The result of using the NWP-1 (A)
process for Capstone for Mission
Figure. 3 SWCS-21 Seven War Rooms
Capabilities analysis becomes evident
via the SWCS-21 War Room. The centralization, visualization and analysis process for the DDG51/Aegis
programs has proven its value. DDG 112 will deliver in FY 2012, completing the legacy, a 62-ship
DDG51 line. In FY 2010, the DDG 51 line was restarted to continue production of this highly capable
platform.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE CAPSTONE ANALYSIS
What stands out in the timeline for the period 1970 – 2009 is the importance of the historical and rigorous
process of NWP-1 that was first drafted in the 1950s to capture the operational and logistical lessons
learned in WWII, and subsequently updated to NWP-1(A) in 1978 by CNO Admiral Holloway. Admiral
Holloway’s career spanned this period.
A barrier to immediate re-use of the NWP-1(A) Capstone process was discovered in that both the NWP-1
and NDP series of warfare and doctrine publications that lead to the successful DDG5/CG47/Aegis
programs are no longer published. They were supported by and then superseded by Joint Doctrine
Publications starting in 1994. However, for the Navy, the joint doctrine publications do not cover the full
spectrum of naval warfare, having no doctrine for AAW, ASW and ASUW mission areas. The joint
publications are of no use in requirements definition for new naval combatant ships such as CVN, CG,
DDG, DD, FFG, FF or LCS, for the rigorous analysis seen displayed and documented in the War Rooms.
Future Considerations
The SWCS-21 study has demonstrated the potential for defining mission ready ships if the historic
principles are maintained. It seems taken for granted today’s weapon systems that if viewed from the
perspective of WWII capabilities are purely Star Wars! American history shows that with serious
determination and the support of the American people with a robust economy that our Navy can meet the
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challenges we can foresee. In Naval War College (NWC) fashion, (circa. 1972-8), the eras of Admirals
Turner, LeBourgeois, Meyer, Doyle and Holloway, with the strategic view of Payne and Mahan looking
on, the authors suggest a list of emerging strategic to mission capabilities issues that should be considered
by the U.S. Navy in two NWC categories: The quantifiable (Quant) and the non-quantifiable (NonQuant), for short.
Quantifiable Considerations
Future requirements requiring engineering, science and technology:
 Anticipate the revolutionary, game changing capabilities of the DDG1000 Class, perhaps the
foundation for future Navy cruisers (Walsh)
 Match increasing asymmetrical threats in all warfare domains
 Ensure operations countering the A2/AD threat
 Reconcile the crushing cost of missile based weapon systems where the cost of the missiles is
greater than the value of the targets.
 Increase S&T and engineering research & development toward some form of directed energy
weapons as a means to respond to emerging threats for air and surface threats.
 Investigate applications of ceramic armor
 Improve preservation techniques, materials and coatings materials
 Increase use of robotic and autonomic systems, individual and multiple, teamed with humans,
operating in concert with current and future ships concepts to reduce TOC and to mitigate loss of
human life (Famme - Automation)
 Develop and employ naval energy sources and power generation capabilities based on
engineering science rather than political science given the role of CO2 as a building block of life
and Earth’s need for more CO2 not less. (Rutan) (Lindzen)(Robinson)
 Investigate 3D printing technologies to manufacture replacement parts and similar applications
(Catia)
 Continue the discussion of CNO Admiral Mullen’s concept of “the 1000 Ship Navy,” the synergy
of continued strategic, policy, technical and tactical exchange with reliable allies in creation of
the “presence” of 1,000 ships.
Non-Quantifiable Considerations
Future requirements requiring a Mahan approach that considers the character of the people and the
government at war using philosophy, religious and psychological analysis:
 Resolve the strategic, technical, economic and cultural impacts of the ethical challenges as the
American Judeo-Christian construct, with the human rights of America’s national founding
documents, are challenged directly and indirectly by the ethical-religious constructs of other
nations and cultures. Compare the manner in which the U.S. Military dealt with the WWII Shinto
philosophy that spawned waves of Kamikaze suicide attacks on our fleets in the 1940s, and the
recent history of the manner in which the U.S. is dealing with Islamic / Jihad that motivated the
suicide attacks of USS Cole in 2000 and the World Trade Centers in 2001. Philosophical and
religious suicide attacks will continue to befuddle U.S. peace and warfighting policies, strategies,
concepts, missions, capabilities and characteristics of the future Navy until the U.S addresses
ethics in national security decisions. (Famme-Ethics)
 Strategies, tactics and operational constructs for overt and covert unconventional and
psychological warfare over a protracted period
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CONCLUSIONS
There is a continuing justification for the the structured NWP-1 (A) process that not only tells the Navy
story to the American people but also provides the rigorous framework for defining future ships as
rediscoverd as this paper reviewed the themes from Thomas Paine to Admiral Mahan, and as this rigor
has shown its effectiveness SWCS-21 War Rooms. It is recommended that he NWP-1(A) and NDP series
of warfare and doctrine publications that lead to the successful DDG5/CG47/Aegis programs be
reconstituted in contemporary form. RADM Thomas Rowden said as much when he was interviewed for
the Surface Navy Association, SITREP Newsletter, July, 2012, and asked the question, he answered,
“Where are we going in the future? We need to be thinking about fleet design and the execution of
operations in the 2025 and beyond timeframe. There is a lot to be learned … from the officers that went
before us, like Admirals Joe Metcalf, Jim Doyle, Wayne Meyer and others, that through their
perseverance provided us with the fleet - unparalleled on the face of the earth. It’s our responsibility as
we execute that.” These authors cannot add more to Admiral Rowden’s assessment:
History is the crucible of our future.
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Author’s Biographies
Cdr. Joseph B. Famme USN (ret.) is the principal author and president of ITE Inc., an engineering and
technology consulting firm. He has a BS Degree in Industrial Management and Master’s Degree from the
Naval War College. Cdr. Famme is a veteran of the Vietnam War ’68, ’69, ’72 and Arab-Israeli War ’73.
Cdr. Famme served on seven ships including XO and CO of Knox Class Frigates. Ashore he served as a
training systems acquisition specialist in the development and procurement of modeling and simulation
systems. In industry with Singer Link and CAE Electronics, he developed shore and embedded ship
training systems as well as automated machinery control systems such as the DARPA PROA and the
SMCS / BDCS Control system for the first SmartShip, USS Yorktown (CG 48).Cdr. Famme worked in the
development of physics based design tools integrated with 3D CAD such used in the design of DDG1000
and Virginia Class Submarines.
Fidel Sanchez is a systems engineer at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in
Laurel, MD. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 2003 he deployed to the Arabian Gulf and
assisted in humanitarian assistance operations in Indonesia. Following his time in the Navy he worked on
various naval projects including DDG-1000, CG(X), Tomahawk, and Next Generation Jammer. He is an
active member of ASNE and chairs the Joint ASNE/SNAME Navy Ships Panel, SD-8.
The content of this paper was presented at a Poster Session
During the ASNE Day Symposium 2013
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