INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TODAY: AN OLD FASHIONED VIEW FROM THE
THIRD WORLD*
B.S.Chimni
I. INTRODUCTION
1.International organizations (IOs) have today acquired a significance for third world states and peoples
that they never possessed before. A network of economic, political and social IOs have been established
or repositioned at the initiative of the First World that together constitute a nascent global state whose
function is to realize the interests of the powerful states in the international system to the disadvantage of
third world states and peoplesi. The evolving global state formation may therefore be described as having
a neo-imperial character.
2. Six overlapping features characterize contemporary developments relating to formal international intergovernmental organizations. First, in all areas of international life IOs have come into existence considerably
limiting the autonomy of sovereign third world states. Second, sovereign economic decision making
authority has been relocated from states to international economic organizations which possess effective
enforcement powers. Third, the UN system is being geared to promote the interests of transnational capital,
among other things by increasing the role that the private corporate sector can play within the organization(s).
Fourth, the relationship between the state and the United Nations system is being explicitly reconstituted
through reconfiguring the principle of sovereignty and its relationship to the protection of human rights.
Fifth, the globalisation process is breaking the historical unity of the state and IOs. A whole range of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have come to participate/influence in diverse ways in the norm creation
and decision making process within IOs. While a large number of NGOs bring to IOs the critical voice of
civil society, others (such as the International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) or the World Economic Forum
(WEF)) seek to promote the cause of transnational capitalii. Even the critical voices often neglect the
concerns of the third world (for example, by attempting to link trade with environment and labor standards)
(Chimni 2002). Sixth, not only legitimacy deficit characterizes crucial IOs but is also accompanied by strong
resistance from powerful States to put in place a transparent and democratic decision making process.
Together, these features limit the possibilities of global redistributive justice and the genuine democratization
of both inter-state and intra-state relations. But a contrary impression is created by steering the knowledge
production and dissemination functions of international institutions.
3. These features of IOs cannot be made sense of without locating them within the larger global social
order, in particular the historical and political contexts in which they originate, evolve and function. Such
an approach allows the insight that a coalition of powerful social classes and states decide when an IO is
the appropriate form in which to pursue their interests, as also its central preoccupations (Murphy 1994:
25 and 44; Cox 1996). The class which exercises the most influence in IOs today is the transnational
fractions of the national capitalist class in advanced capitalist countries with the now ascendant
transnational fractions in the third world playing the role of junior partnersiii. Together, the first and third
world fractions of the world bourgeoisie constitute a transnational capitalist class (TCC) which is in the
process of congealing and establishing a global state constituted of diverse IOs --economic, political and
social-- that help actualize and legitimize its world view.
4. The TCC 'is comprised of the owners of transnational capital, that is, the group that owns the leading
worldwide means of production as embodied principally in the transnational corporations and private
financial institutions' (Robinson and Harris 2000: 22). However class is not to be viewed simply as a
1
structural relation. It is also 'a historical phenomenon' and ' class-consciousness is the way in which these
experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional
forms' (Thompson1975: 10). The TCC culture is lived and produced by a network of high profile
corporate executives, bankers, brokers, financial management experts, media managers, academics and
bureaucrats using the most modern means of communications to create a word of ideas that have material
force. In the production of this culture the third world counterparts essentially act as 'transmission belts and
filtering devices for the imposition of the transnational agenda (Robinson 1996: p.19), albeit there is the third
world globalizing firm that also contributes to the original ensemble of practices (Sklair and Robbins 2002:
81). In sum, the demands of the TCC are articulated by, among others, states, business organizations and
a network of TCC functionaries. It is a variegated and complex process with the states playing a crucial
role in terms of ironing out differences through communicative action and presenting proposals couched
in acceptable language. In other words, there is an internal process of giving expression to the demands
of the TCC. Since some states are more powerful than others they have greater say in the actual
formulation of demands of the TCC. What is more significant however is the overall consensus over the
form of the emerging global state.
5. The thesis that a nascent global state has emerged presumes a particular understanding of state or state
sovereignty. The state in this view is constituted, at the formal level, by a combination of certain legal,
political, sociological and ethical elements. The legal element represents the possibility of adopting and
prescribing general norms, the political element a monopoly over legitimate violence, the sociological
element the demand of effectiveness, and the ethical element the justifications for obeying the general
norms. The nascent global state possesses these elements, albeit not as a single and integrated entity. IOs
without doubt prescribe general norms. The UN, or a coalition of states acting on its behalf, does possess
a monopoly over force, albeit in certain defined circumstances. The social effectiveness of general norms
is ensured by a fragmented and incommensurate structure of states. The ethical element is satisfied, albeit
at a formal level, by the acceptance of sovereign states of international obligations. At the substantial
level, however, IOs suffer from "democracy deficit" explaining why the issue of IO legitimacy has
acquired the contemporary salience it has. It also explains why a democratic global state cannot be created
in the present conditions.
6. The nascent global state and its negative implications for the states and peoples of the third world are
elaborated in Section II below in a highly schematic manner. It is perhaps important to stress here that the
developments in the world of IOs are not entirely one sided; in many ways IOs act as a shield for third
world states and also empower third world peoples against their own states (e,g., human rights and
environmental organisations). Indeed, it is only because IOs offer certain advantages that allows the
collaborating ruling elite in the third world to sell the idea of multilateralism to their people. However, the
essence of contemporary developments is the creation of conditions conducive to the spread and growth
of global capitalism and not the welfare of third world peoplesiv. Section III explores whether things can
be changed. The concluding section deals with some of the possible objections to the thesis advanced
here.
II. EMERGENCE OF A NASCENT GLOBAL STATE: DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS
7. A principal characteristic of the ongoing globalization process is that sovereign third world economic
space is being seceded to IOs. With capitalism entering the phase of globalization, IOs have been assigned a
role played by the state in the early and middle stages of capitalism in removing local impediments to the
process of capital accumulation. It may be recalled that the development of capitalism since the 16th century
called for the destruction of differences in laws, standards, currencies, weights and measures, taxes, customs
2
duties at the level of the nation-state. Globalization, on the other hand, requires the replacement of numerous
national laws and jurisdictions by uniform global standards in order to remove the barriers to capital
accumulation at the global level. Since the early eighties, the advanced capitalist world has pushed through a
series of changes in international economic laws which lay the universal legal foundation for capital
accumulation in the era of globalization (Chimni 1999: 337). These changes are embodied in and enforced by
IOs such as the WTO, IMF and the World Bank. The usual lament that international laws lack enforcement
mechanisms does not apply to these institutions. They do not merely bark but also bite.
8. The WTO is the key institution to which sovereign economic space is being seceded. In crucial areas
such as agriculture, technology policy (intellectual property rights), and regulation of foreign investment
and services sovereign powers have been relocated from third world states and peoples to WTO through
the adoption of uniform global standards. This has been done to accommodate the interests of transnational
corporations 'who are capital exporters, technology leaders and service providers in the world economy. For
them, these new issues represent the final frontier in their global reach to organize production and trade on a
world scale without fetters' (Nayyar 1998: 93). The WTO also hopes to bring within its regulatory ambit,
through the ongoing Doha "round" of trade negotiations, the relations between trade and environment, some
other aspects of the relationship between trade and investment, government procurement policy, competition
policy and so on (see WTO 2002).
9. The international financial institutions (IFIs) encroach on other sovereign areas through the prescription
of conditions or a structural adjustment program for "loans" taken. The need to create a functional unified
global economic space for the operation of transnational capital requires that IOs recommend, prescribe
and enforce appropriate conditions. Given the inability of third world states to provide the material
conditions in which transnational firms can enter productive activity IFIs intervene to create the requisite
environment. They help establish necessary infrastructure and institutional conditions for its operations.
Further, through the prescription of conditionalities or structural adjustment programs the IFIs prescribe
and enforce the goals of liberalization, privatization and deregulation in a bid to pry open the markets of
third world countries, help take over public sector assets at throwaway prices, and avoid regulation of its
activities in public interestv. Finally, the IFIs also actively support the cause of transnational capital
through setting up IOs when necessary. Thus, for instance, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) was established in 1988 under the auspices of World Bank. It insures foreign capital against noncommercial risks.
10. The IFIs also subject the national currency in the third world to growing pressure by insisting on its
deterritorialization. The advantages of monetary sovereignty are well known. It is, among other things, 'a
possible instrument to manage macroeconomic performance of the economy; and […] a practical means
to insulate the nation from foreign influence or constraint' (Cohen 2000: 84). But the IMF actively
"encourages" states to accept capital account convertibility which considerably erodes the autonomy of
states as it cannot effectively regulate marauding and hyper-mobile global finance capital. This has
negative consequences for third world economies (Bhagwati 1998: 7-12). The loss of monetary
sovereignty, as the East Asian crisis showed, has also serious fall outs for the ordinary people in the third
world. Their standards of living can substantially erode overnight.
11. The relationship between the state and the United Nations system is being reconstituted in many ways
viz., by assigning a greater role to the transnational corporate actor within UN bodies, through redefining
the principle of sovereignty in relation to the principle of non use of force in the matrix of international
human rights law, and by prescribing the nature of the state to be created in post conflict societies. This
reconstitution of the relationship between the state and the UN system not only means the erosion of the
3
political sovereignty of the third world but, more significantly, its ability to shape the future world order
by undermining the original purposes of the UN Charter.
12. The private corporate actor is coming to play a greater and active role within the UN system. The
Global Compact idea is its embodiment. However, it is for sometime now that the private actor is coming
to play a key role in different UN bodies. Take for example the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU). According to Braithwate and Drahos: 'Some of the most direct forms of capture of international
regulatory processes are to be found at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), where US
companies in particular use support of their government to gain the chairmanship of technical committees,
which they use to write their own patents into global technical standards. Three hundred companies have
succeeded in placing their employees on ITU committees' (Braithwate and Drahos 2000: 490). The UN is
also turning to the corporate actor for both financing the organization and also adopting corporate
management philosophy in running it (UN 2001; Bennett 2002: 403; Lee, Humaphreys and Pugh 1997:
339; UNHCR 2000). There is the danger of 'such linkages being exploited … while only paying lipservice to the ideals and principles for which the United Nations was created … Moreover, because the
actors who are being linked up with have considerably more financial and political clout, there is a danger
that the United Nations will come out the loser' (Onyango and Udigama 1999). What may be called the
process of privatization of the United Nations system reduces the possibility of the UN forums being at
the center of any collective action by third world States to constrain these giant actors. Consider in this
regard the following developments over the last decade: abandoning of attempts to adopt a code of
conduct for transnational corporations, the shutting down of the UN Center for Transnational Corporations
(CTC), the "repositioning" of UNCTAD, and the marginalization of development issues in the UN system
(South Center 1996). While the UN still continues to pay obeisance to the global poor, it actively promotes
the interests of transnational capital and makes futile appeals to it to serve the cause of international justice.
13. The reconstitution of the relationship between the State and the UN system is also taking place
through an explicit declaration of the principle of sovereignty as an anachronism, particularly in the
context of human rights violations. This has allowed, for example, the UN Security Council to justify the
idea of armed "humanitarian intervention". During the colonial period John Stuart Mill confidently wrote
that ‘nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their
benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners’ (Mill 1984: 118). Today, we are
told that the ‘anti-interventionist regime has fallen out of sync with modern notions of justice’ (Glennon
1999: 2). In other words, what we are witnessing today is a new phase of global dominance accompanied
by the invention of new norms of intervention which justify acts of enormous violence against third world
peoples in the name of human rights (Chimni 2001a; Chimni 2002a). These new norms are given
legitimacy by the UN Security Council vi.
14. Finally, the UN system is seeking to recast its relationship with third world states by prescribing the
neo-liberal state as the norm in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies. Today, as the UN Secretary
General (UNSG) has noted, 'virtually every part of the United Nations system, including the Bretton
Woods institutions, is […] engaged in one form of peace-building or another…(UNDP 2000: Para 21).
Indeed, the UN pretends to be a surrogate state till "peace building" has been successfully achieved and an
accountable state put in place. The meaning of "an accountable post-conflict state" is a state which can
come to terms with the legitimacy crises and social protest generated by the implementation of a neoliberal adjustment program and greater integration into the world economy. In the circumstances formal
compliance with the norms of liberal democracy changes very little (Ihonvbere 2000: 24) The parties
which participate in "post-conflict" elections are compelled, given the absence of adequate resources, to
follow World Bank and IMF prescriptions (Chimni 2002a: 165-66). The post-conflict state therefore
4
continues to be repressive and its resources continue to be privatized. There is consequently little
possibility of implementing a reconstruction agenda which pays heed to peoples needs and frames policies
with their participation.
15. There have also been established a whole range of social IOs in the field of environment, human
rights, and humanitarian law (the different environmental secretariats, the range of human rights treaty
bodies and the thousands of humanitarian non-governmental organisations, and the international criminal
courts) which, along with the economic and political international organisations, considerably diminish
the autonomy of third world states and peoples to adopt social policies that suit their individual cultures
and stage of developmentvii. Thus, in the field of environment ‘a growing number of UN specialised
agencies and other international organisations with some measure of competence over environmental
matters have become important institutions of global and regional environmental governance…Equally
important is the extensive network of supervisory bodies, conferences of the parties and commissions
established by environmental treaties …’ (Birnie and Boyle 2002: 34-35)viii. The operation of
international environmental laws and organisations involve the redistribution of property rights in favour
of the advanced capitalist countries. For when these countries developed, 'global private rights were granted
to polluters; now, developing countries are asked to agree to a redistribution of those property rights without
compensation for already depleted resources' (Uimonen and Whalley 1997: 66).
16. A significant new development is the establishment of international criminal tribunals. The past decade
has seen the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1991), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) and the International Criminal Court (1998). The rapid
strides in international criminal law and jurisdiction, coupled with related developments in international
human rights law (the Pinochet case; Belgium vs. Congo I.C.J. 2001) represent a movement towards making
individuals accountable for their criminal conduct. This is a development which forms a crucial element of
the emerging nascent global State. While welcome in itself, powerful states are unlikely to be the subject of
its attention. To put it differently, a North-South divide characterizes the punishment of international
criminal conduct.
17. It is not merely that third world States are being compelled to secede sovereign economic, political
and social space to IOs. What is worse these States are seceding sovereign space without often effectively
participating in the process of negotiations or in other cases in the decision making afterwards. The
protest by a large group of third world countries, in particular African countries, for being sidelined in the
talks at the WTO Third Ministerial Conference held in Seattle in December 1999 is just one instance that
underscores the problems with the process of decision making in IOs. The weighted voting system within
the two IFIs is equally troubling for it has not allowed any changes in the content of conditionalities
imposed upon third world countries. The Stiglitz critique of the IMF only confirms what has been long
the argument of the third world countries: that the conditionalities have little to do with the welfare of
third world peoples (Stiglitz 2002). Finally, there is the legitimacy deficit of decisions taken by the UN
Security Council which calls for no elaboration (see Ayoob 2001). But in all these regards powerful States
do not feel accountable to citizens of other States as they do to their ownix. Indeed, international law
tolerates the fact that States may treat their own citizens and nationals of other countries by vastly different
standards. This tends to legitimize greater secrecy and absence of democracy in the conduct of international
relations and is best exemplified in the practices of the WTO, IMF, World Bank and the UN Security
Council. In other words, the relocation of sovereignty from sovereign States to IOs has been brought about
without making them in any way accountable to the peoples who are affected by their policies and decisionsx.
5
18. The relocation of sovereign powers in IOs has also transformed the meaning of electoral democracy in
the third world . Thus, irrespective of which party or coalition that you vote to power in general elections the
economic and social policies that it would pursue would remain the same in their essentials. This is a function
of the State undertaking international obligations backed by sanctions that hurt. To put it differently,
international law and organizations are today institutionalizing polyarchy or formal democracy as against
substantial and participatory democracy. Free and fair elections are the norm as against just governance.
19. Most affected by the loss of sovereignty of third world States is the working class(es). Thus, for
instance, labor market deregulation are an integral part of structural adjustment programs prescribed by
IFIs leading to the deterioration of the living conditions of third world labor (Rittich 2001: 456). It is
recommended 'on the belief that excessive government intervention in labor markets - through such
measures as public sector wage and employment policies, minimum wage fixing, employment security
rules - is a serious impediment to adjustment and should therefore be removed or relaxed' (Lim 1999: 1920; Leisink 1999: 1-26). The growing competition between third world countries to bring in foreign
investment has further led to easing of labor standards and a "race to the bottom" (Oloka-Onyango and
Udigama 1999: para 34). Women workers are, needless to add, the most affected by this trend (Rittich
2001).
20. The relocation of sovereign space in IOs has also undermined resistance in third world countries. For,
as Marks puts it (albeit in a slightly different context), 'however effectively citizens may be able to hold
their own governments accountable in connection with transnational governmental activities, democratic
legitimacy depends on accountability to those affected by such activities' (Marks 2001: 58). Such
accountability is not even theoretically envisaged today. Furthermore, those affected in the third world
are deprived from expressing their doubts directly to the concerned IO. Thus, for example, the WTO has
no address in India. On the other hand, it is impossible for Indian farmers to protest, like their French and
Belgian counterparts, in front of the WTO office in Geneva. It is perhaps true that an international public
sphere is emerging and that IOs 'offer domestic challengers institutional opportunities to transcend their
national arena for consultation, collective action, and contestation at an international level' (Tarrow 2000:
182). It may be equally true that electronic resistance may slowly replace more traditional forms of
protest, but its effectiveness is still very much in doubt given the limited participation of those directly
affected by IO activities.
21. Neither can IOs be held responsible for those affected by its policies and actions. IOs are modern
bureaucracies which exclude the possibility of ascribing individual responsibility for acts of omission and
commission. Thus, to illustrate, UN has in recent times been responsible for inaction in the face of
genocide (Barnett 2002)xi. Yet, since it represents 'the rule of nobody' no one was apparently to blame
(Bauman 2001: 27; Id). In other words, given the “democratization of blame” within modern
organizations such as the UN, nobody could be held responsible for UN inaction. For there are a myriad
small decisions taken and interpretations advanced for which no one in particular is responsible. What is
true of UN is also true of the two IFIs. Structural adjustment policies can have devastating consequences
for the peoples of the country on which it is imposed, yet no one can be assigned the authorship of these
programs. The lack of authorship of decisions makes IOs the perfect vehicle for exploitation and
dominance.
22. Furthermore, IOs not only enforce unjust rules but also legitimate them. The IOs are uniquely placed
to suggest that the interests of the emerging TCC represent the general interests of humankind. The
ideological functions of IOs assume many forms. An IO actively promotes norms of international behavior
which facilitate the realization of its objectives. It also frame issues for collective debate and recommends
6
specific policy responses, including identifying key points for negotiation in order to fill gaps in the
normative framework and to adjust to changes in the external environment. IOs also evaluate the policies of
member states from the standpoint of their mandate and concerns. But above all IOs offer an 'intellectual and
moral unity' to a particular vision of world order in the matrix of which their mandate and functions acquire
meaning (Gramsci 1971: 181; Chimni 1999). To facilitate this process and to seek symbolic validation third
world academics and bureaucrats are co-opted.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE: ANOTHER WAVE OF RENEWAL?
23. Kennedy writes that there have been four waves of 'disciplinary enthusiasm and renewal' in the history of
IOs in the 20th century (Kennedy 1999: 356). These renewals came after the First World War (the founding
of League of Nations), the Second World Wars (the establishment of the United Nations), after the Vietnam
war and the decolonization process (the NIEO program, the Law of the Sea Convention etc), and most
recently since the eighties (emergence of the NGO movement etc), in particular after the end of the Cold War
(Id). According to Kennedy, the renewalists in each generation 'understood themselves as mavericks, …
representing dissident trends … bringing to the field the perspective of the marginal, hitherto unheard voices
which promise to confound traditional categories, shake things up and validate the renewal effort' (Id: 357).
Whereas an 'uncanny continuity' characterizes these waves both in terms of criticism and proposals for
reform; the history of each renewal could be written, as Kennedy points out, as a progress narrative 'away
from positivism, formalism and a focus on States' (Id: 360). This somewhat disconcerting conclusion
coincides with the perception of third world peoples that IOs have never seriously addressed their concerns.
In the circumstances, third world critics are confronted with the choice of accepting the powerful déjà vu
insight and shy away from another effort of renewal/reform or to do so with the argument that some change
is better than none (as Kennedy concedes). Or, on the other hand, accept the Kennedy view that renewalists
should join local re-distributional struggles instead of proposing some grand game plan for initiating global
change through IOs by transforming their character (Id: 375).
24. Before a choice is made it is important to understand why there has been no serious change in the fate of
third world peoples despite successive generation of cooperation initiated through IOs. To third world
peoples the sense of déjà vu is a function of the continuous shadow of imperialism that falls over IOs. If the
story of international law and organizations is read as an integral and inextricable part of the history of
colonialism and imperialism it is perhaps easy to understand why the renewal efforts have had a similar
structure. Albeit it is necessary to recognize the different historical and political contexts in which each wave
of renewal has come and their differential social impact. Otherwise, it would be to privilege form over
content and conflate diverse historical and political conjunctures. Indeed, it has been our contention that IOs
have undergone a qualitative transformation in the past two decades. They have come to play a central role so
far as third world States and peoples are concerned. In the circumstances to suggest that renewalists are
condemned to the role of Sysyphus is perhaps to disarm third world peoples against the most significant
contemporary embodiments of imperialist policies and strategies. But what kind of reforms can possibly be
recommended. Some suggestions follow.
25. First, the increasing numbers and expanding ambits of IOs call for urgent attention to be paid to evolving
criteria to determine the legitimacy and justness of the rules and policies they enforce and recommend. IOs
have today come to represent the interests of powerful states and transnational firms. This trend is justified on
the assumption that what is good for the advanced capitalist states and transnational firms is also good for
third world peoples and states. The posited identity of interests between advanced capitalist countries and
transnational firms with third world peoples is illegitimate. The legitimacy or justness of rules and policies of
IOs should instead be judged by the impact they have on the following groups in the third world: (i) the
7
working class(es); (ii) the land less and poor peasants; (iii) women; and (iv) other marginal sections.
26. Second, there is an urgent need for 'the extension of democracy beyond the nation-state to bring to
account those global and transnational forces which presently escape effective democratic control' (Held
1995: 232). The move to inject greater transparency and openness of governance at the global level
involves both ideological and practical tasks. At the ideological level, there is the need to unmask the
pretense of IOs being "neutral" actors that are in hot pursuit of the common good, as opposed to helping
realize sectional interests. At the pragmatic level, there is above all the need to establish international
negotiating and decision making processes that allow the meaningful participation of third world states
and peoples. There is a need thus to democratize decision-making within IOs such as the IMF and the
World Bank for they have come to exercise unprecedented influence on the lives of ordinary people in the
third world. This calls for imaginative solutions which temper the desire for change with a strong dose of
realismxii. The UN Security Council should also be made a more representative body by expanding its
permanent membership. Rules should also be adopted to make its working more consultative and
transparent. Thus, the United Nations Millenium Declaration resolved 'to intensify our efforts to achieve a
comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects'.
27.Third, there is the need to hold IOs accountable in international law for the consequences which ensue
from their acts of omission and commission. There is in this regard a need to further evolve the law of
international responsibility of IOs. A correlative of IOs possessing legal personality and rights is
responsibility: it is ‘a general principle of international law’ concerned with ‘the incidence and
consequences of illegal acts’, in particular the payment of compensation for loss caused (Brownlie 1990:
701 and 433). This understanding awaits elaboration in relation to IOs. According to one commentator,
'the precise nature of responsibility will depend upon the circumstances of the case and, no doubt,
analogies drawn from the law of state responsibility with regard to the conditions under which
responsibility will be imposed' (Shaw 1997: 919). What these circumstances could be and which
analogies are relevant calls for further examination. Above all, there is the need to develop the law with
regard to individual responsibilityxiii. This would make individuals acting for IOs to be accountable to
those affected by their acts of omission and commission.
28. Fourth, there should be ways designed to limit the apparently illimitable powers of the UN Security
Council. The UN Security Council should be called upon to interpret its Chapter VII authority in a
responsible manner. To contend that the Security Council can endlessly expand its own competence and
authority is to believe that it exists outside the confine of the UN Charter. It is also to naively assume that
the Security Council always acts to defend community interests as opposed to national interests xiv. Some
form of judicial review by the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the UN,
should be envisaged to ensure that the Security Council acts in conformity with the UN Charter. There is
also the need to make the Security Council more representative by expanding its permanent membership.
Rules should also be adopted to make its working more consultative and transparent.
29. Fifth, IOs concerned with human rights must be used to raise the concerns of the marginal and
oppressed sections in the third world. International human rights organizations must consistently and
continuously evaluate international economic laws as well as the policies and actions of IOs such as the
WTO, IMF and the World Bank in order to asses their conformity with international human rights
instruments, in particular economic, social and cultural rights. Some progress has been made in this
direction. Thus, for example, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) adopted a
resolution in 2000 reminding 'all Governments of the primacy of human rights obligations over economic
policies and agreements'. The resolution was passed to meet the concerns expressed with respect to the
8
serious implications of intellectual property rights for the economic and social rights of individuals. The
UNHCR requested 'inter-governmental organizations to integrate into their policies, practices and
operations, provisions, in accordance with international human rights obligations and principles, that
protect the social function of intellectual property'. It then went on to request 'the World Trade
Organization, in general, and the Council on TRIPS during its ongoing review of the TRIPS Agreement,
in particular, to take into account the existing State obligations under international human rights
instrument' (UNHRC 2000). This resolution strengthened the hands of those seeking changes in the TRIPs
text and led to the adoption of the Ministerial Declaration on the Right to Health and the TRIPs
Agreement at Doha in March, 2002.
30. Sixth, steps should be taken to make the transnational corporate actor responsible in international law.
This is necessary in order to reduce its growing influence on, and in, IOs. The steps could include: the
adoption of the draft UN code of conduct on TNCs; the assertion of consumer sovereignty which manifests
itself in the boycott of goods of those TNCs that do not abide by minimum human rights standards; the
monitoring of voluntary codes of conduct adopted by TNCs usually to improve their public image; the use of
shareholders rights to draw attention to the needs of equity and justice in TNC operations; the imaginative
use of domestic legal systems to expose the oppressive practices of TNCs; and the critique of bodies like the
ICC for pursuing the interests of TNCs to the exclusion of all others (Madely 1999: 168-180).
IV CONCLUSION: MEETING SOME CRITICISMS
31. In conclusion a few arguments against the thesis advanced need to be considered. First, it may be
argued that it is not merely third world states that have had to secede sovereignty to IOs but all states.
This suggests that IOs are more embodiments of cooperation than instruments of hegemony. This is
without doubt true at a formal level. However, in substantial terms the "erosion" of sovereignty is
empowering for powerful states as their loss is more apparent then real: it is the very exercise of their
sovereign power that continuously shape the objectives of IOs and the rules they enforce. Whereas in the
case of third world States and peoples the erosion of sovereignty is real as they are subjected to rules in
the formulation of which they have often been excluded from participation and are codified to realise the
interests of the powerful States and the TCC.
32. Second, it is often contended that third world States have voluntarily seceded economic, political and
social space to IOs. After all no third world state is compelled to join the WTO or for that matter
approach the IFIs with requests for the use of one facility or another. Such an argument overlooks three
different things: first, it ignores the factor of structural coercion. Given the nature and character of the
global economic system a third world state has been compelled against its wishes to approach the IFIs.
Second, strategies such as the concept of a “package deal” and the “single undertaking” are used to ensure
that the third world state cannot opt out of legal obligations that are inimical to interests of its people.
Third, overt and covert political pressures are used to get third world states on board.
33. Third, at a time when U.S. unilateralism is at its height, and its contempt for the UN made so obvious,
it would appear absurd to suggest that the TCC has unified interests which are being realized through IOs.
It is important here not to be misled by present U.S. policies to conclude that there is no coherent set of
interests that can be attributed to the evolving TCC and therefore that IOs cannot possibly be its agents. In
the same way as the task of the State is not to defend the narrow corporate interests of this or that
capitalist but the general interests of the capitalist class or its dominant fraction, the IO also has as its
focus the interests of the solidifying TCC and not the concerns of a particular segment of it, however
powerful (Gramsci 1971: 181). In more mainstream language, unilateralism is a result of the belief that
9
short term gains exceed long terms benefits which IOs offer. But sooner than later the advantages of lower
transaction costs, the benefits of collective legitimation, and the uncertainty of future tend to prevail.
34. Fourth, it may be argued that since "civil society" has come to play a significant role in IOs it is
difficult to agree with the view that they represent the interests of a TCC. Three points may be made by
way of response: first, that there are all kinds of NGOs with many powerful NGOs (the ICC, Basle
Committee, WEF etc) pursuing the interests of the TCC and not the concerns of marginal and oppressed
groups in the world. Second, NGOs essentially represent new social movements (NSMs) to the exclusion
of old social movements (OSMs) like the trade union, peasant and student movements. To put it
differently, only a particular kind of counter-hegemonic discourse finds its way into IOs. Finally, the
North-South divide is reflected in the world of NGOs as well (Kingsbury 1994: 28). This often means that
the "civil society" becomes the equivalent of Northern NGOs. These NGOs frequently take up causes that
are unfavourable to the interests of third world peoples. A good example is the demand for the inclusion
of environmental and labour standards as subjects of regulation within WTO. Indeed, thanks to the
initiatives of Northern NGOs the trade-environment linkage has been firmly established within the WTO
through the interpretative route (Chimni 2002).
35. Lastly, it may seem premature to contend that a nascent global state has emerged. In response one
may suggest that our imagination of the shape a future global state may assume is often captive to the idea
of a centralized and an integrated state structure having a monopoly over the use of force. In contrast the
future global state, in all probability, will have a fragmented structure with a group of states (a power
bloc) having a monopoly over the use of force with a global reach. Surely, there are those who would
wish a hierarchical and centralized global State upon us. In a fractured world it is difficult to see it
realized other than by the complete subjection of third world peoples and states. This is unlikely. In the
alternative, imperialism is in the process of constructing a fractional global State. Third world peoples
are of course hoping that it will turn out to be a failed State.
10
ENDNOTES
* Global Governance was defined by the Commission on Global Governance as ‘a continuing process
through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be
taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal
arrangements … There is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single structure or
set of structures. It is a broad, dynamic, complex, process of interactive decision-making’ (Commission
on Global Governance 1995: 2-4). The focus of this paper (or rather notes) is on formal arrangements.
i
We therefore sharply differ with the view expressed by Slaughter that IOs are declining in importance
and that "transgovernmentalism" is replacing them in importance. We do not believe that 'the state …. is
disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts' (Slaughter 1997: 184). We believe instead that
"transgovernmentalism" is a process that allows powerful private actors and States to by pass third world
peoples (and often States) in a bid to adopt rules and mechanisms that help embed a neo-imperial vision
of a new world order. For a brief statement and persuasive critique see Marks: 2001: 55-60).
ii
As Braithwate and Davos note: 'A newer kind of national business organization is the corporate front
group which presents itself to the community as an NGO rather than as a business organization.
Consumers for World Trade (a pro-GATT industry coalition), Citizens for Sensible Control of Acid Rain
(a coal and electricity industry front), and the National Wetlands Coalition (US oil company and real
estate developers) are examples. These 'astroturf' (as distinct from grass-roots) NGOs, of which there are
dozens in the US, are the most sincere form of flattery the business community pays to the efficacy of
social movement politics' (Braithwate and Davos 2000: 489)
iii
On the emergence of a transnational capitalist class see Robinson and Harris 2000: 53. A 'fraction
denotes segments within classes determined by their relation to social production and the class as a whole'
(Id).
iv
It would be readily recognized that our political referents and priorities, be it "the people" or the "third
world" or "women" 'are not there in some primordial, naturalistic sense' or 'reflect a unitary or homogeneous
political object' (Bhabha 1994: 26). These need to be specified and imaginatively worked into operational
categories of international law.
v
A new statement on conditionalites has been adopted by the Executive Board of the IMF on September
22, 2002. It will remain to be seen whether this will mean any change on the ground.
vi
We however recognize two exceptions subject to certain pre-conditions being met. First, the Security
Council may authorize armed humanitarian intervention to prevent or stop genocide. But even here a
number of pre-conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the decision in favor of armed humanitarian
intervention should not reflect merely the consensus of the veto powers but within the entire Security
Council and the international community. Second, all available facts and interpretations of those facts
should be taken into account to ensure that the Security Council is going to intervene in a situation where
genocide is a real possibility. Third, the force used should not be excessive in relation to the objectives to
be achieved and should be in accord with international humanitarian lawsvi. Fourth, all attempts should be
made to exhaust the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. The second exception relates to unique
situations where securing consent of the host State is either not a possibility or will entail massive
suffering of peoples concerned. In such cases the consent of the host State may not be seen as a precondition for offering humanitarian assistance and a degree of force be used to secure the delivery of
11
humanitarian assistance. But in all cases the force used should be proportionate and under UN command
(for details see (Chimni 2001a; Chimni 2002a).
vii
'The upshot of the activities of international organizations is that today most citizens greatly
underestimate the extent to which most nations' shipping laws are written at the IMO in London, air safety
laws at ICAO in Montreal, food standards at the FAO in Rome, intellectual property laws in Geneva at
the WTO/WIPO, banking laws by the G-10 in Basle, chemical regulations by the OECD in Paris, nuclear
safety standards by IAEA in Vienna, telecommunication laws by the ITU in Geneva and motor vehicle
standards by the ECE in Geneva' (Braithwate and Drahos 2000: 488).
viii
Some of the IOs with mandate to protect the environment include the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Commission on Sustainable
Development, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Educational and
Social Organization (UNESCO), the five UN regional commissions etc (Birnie and Boyle 2002: 47ff).
Besides there are the treaty mechanisms and bodies established by individual international environmental
law conventions (Id).
Weber explained the general phenomenon in the following way: 'everywhere that power interests of the
domination structure toward the outside are at stake …we find secrecy' (Weber 1970: 233 Emphasis in
original). This trend is sharply accentuated when it comes to IOs which are outside the outside that
Weber had in mind. There is thus a curious sanction for the pursuit of power politics beyond State
boundaries.
ix
'As the relationship between international organizations and the people remains indirect, being mediated
as it is by the representatives of member states and governments, ordinary people or citizens normally
have no access to the international arena, nor consequently any role to play in it' (Heiskanen 2001: 6).
x
What is worse, no one is responsible for the withdrawal of peacekeepers in face of mounting evidence
that genocide was impending (Barnett 2002).
xi
xii
Thus, for example, instead of a one state one vote formula the third world countries as a whole could be
assigned 50 per cent of the votes (See generally Gerster 1993: 121).
xiii
Thus, for example, Barnett holds the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali responsible in
many ways for the inaction of the organization in the face of Rwandan genocide. According to Barnett,
'passionate pleas from Boutros-Ghali' could have 'overcome the objections' to intervention by the
powerful. But 'no such words were ever delivered' (Barnett 2002: 15). Indeed, it would appear that
Boutros Ghali held back crucial information from the Security Council: 'Boutros-Ghali possessed
information that illuminated the nature of crimes. He had an obligation to transmit that information to the
Security Council but failed to do do' (Id: .20). In the circumstances should he not be held responsible in
law for his actions.
xiv
Therefore, as Judge Fitzmaurice argued years ago, some limitations on the powers of the Security
Council are necessary '. They are needed:
because of the all too great ease with which any acutely controversial international situation can be
represented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even where it is really too remote
12
genuinely to constitute one. Without these limitations, the functions of the Security Council could
be used for purposes never originally intended….[where there was] no threat to peace and security
other than such as might be artificially created as a pretext for the realisation of ulterior
purposes…(Namibia case I.C.J Reports 1971: para 116). Emphasis added.
REFERENCES
Anghie Antony (1999) "Universality and the Concept of Governance in International Law" in
E.K.Quashigah and O.C.Okafor eds., Legitimate Governance in Africa The Hague: Kluwer Law
International 21-40.
-------------------- (2000) "Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions
and the Third World", New York University Journal of International Law and Politics vol.32:2, pp.243290.
Barnett, Michael (2002) Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda Ithaca: Cornell
University Press
Bauman, Zygmunt (2001) The Bauman Reader (Peter Beilharz ed) Malden: Basil Blackwell
Bennett, Juliette (2002) "Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict", Journal of
International Affairs 55:2 393-410.
Bhabha, Homi K (1994) The Location of Culture London: Routledge
Bhagwati, Jagdish, (1998) "The Capital Myth" Foreign Affairs, May/June, pp.7-12.
Birnie, P.W and Boyle A.E (2002) International Law and the Environment Second edition Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Braithwaite, John and Drahos, Peter (2000) Global Business Regulation Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Brownlie, Ian (1990) Principles of Public International Law Fourth edition oxford: Clarendon Press
Chimni, B. S. (1999) "Marxism and International Law: A Contemporary Analysis", Economic and Political
Weekly, February 6, 1999: 337-349.
----------------(2000) First Harrell-Bond lecture "Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee
Protection", Journal of Refugee Studies vol.13:3: 243-262.
----------------(2001) "The International Law of Humanitarian Intervention", in State Sovereignty in the 21st
Century New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses: 103-132.
---------------(2002) "WTO and environment: Legitimization of unilateral trade sanctions", Economic and
Political Weekly January 12-18, 2002: 133-140.
13
---------------(2002a) "Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective" in Newman,
Edward and Schnabel, Albrecht eds., Recovering From Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and
Development London: Frank Cass 163-180.
Cohen, Benjamin (2000) "Money in a Globalized World" in Ngaire Woods ed., The Political Economy of
Globalization London: Macmillan
Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighborhood Oxford: Oxford University Press
Cox, Robert W with Sinclair, T.J (1996) Approaches to World Order Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Furedi, Frank (1997) "The Moral Condemnation of the South", in Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkins
eds., Globalization and the South London: Macmillan 76-89.
Richard Gerster (1993) "Proposals for Voting Reform within the International Monetary Fund", Journal of
World Trade 121-133
Gramsci, Antonio (1971) Selections from Prison Notebooks London: Lawrence and Wishart
Heiskanen, Veijo (2001) "Introduction" in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen eds., The Legitimacy of
International Organizations Tokyo: United Nations University Press 1-45.
Ihonvbere, J.O (2000) "The State, Constitutionalism and Democratization", Seminar 490 21-32.
Kennedy, David (1994) "A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow", Transnational Law and
Contemporary Problems 4:2 329-375.
Kingsbury, Benedict (1994) "The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, The World Trade Organisation, and the
Liberal Project to Conceptualise International Law", Yearbook of International Environmental Law 5: 140.
Lee, Kelley, Humphreys, David and Pugh, Michael (1997) ""Privatization" in the United Nations System:
Patterns of Influence in Three Intergovernmental Organizations", Global Society, 11: 3 339.
Leisink, Peter (1999) Introduction in Leisink ed., Globalization and Labour Relations Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar 1-35
Lee, Kelley, Humphreys, David and Pugh, Michel (1997) ""Privatization" in the United Nations System:
Patterns of Influence in Three Intergovernmental Organizations", Global Society, 11:3 339
Lim, Lin Lean (1999) More and Better Jobs for Women: An Action Guide, Geneva: ILO
Madeley, John (1999) Big Business Poor Peoples: The Impact of Transnational Corporations on the
World's Poor London: Zed Books
14
Marks, Susan (2001) "Democracy and international governance" in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo
Heiskanen eds., The Legitimacy of International Organizations Tokyo: United Nations University Press 4769.
Murphy, Craig N (1994) International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850
Cambridge: Polity Press
Nayyar, Deepak (1998) "International Trade and factor Mobility: Economic Theory and Political
Reality", in Nayyar, D., ed., Economics as Ideology and Experience: Essays in Honour of Ashok Mitra
London: Frank Cass 81-96.
Oloka-Onyango, J and Udigama, Deepika (1999) The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights rights E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13,
15 June 2000, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-Second session.
Rittich, Kerry (2001) "Distributive Justice and the World ank: the pursuit of gender equity in the context
of market reform", in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen eds., The Legitimacy of International
Organizations Tokyo: United Nations University Press 438-482
Robinson, William I and Harris, Jerry (2000) "Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the
Transnational Capitalist Class", Science and Society 64:1 11-54.
Robinson, William I (1996) "Globalization: nine these on our epoch", Race and Class vol.38: 13-31.
Shaw, Martin (1997) International Law Fourth edition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Sklair, Leslie and Robins T, Peter (2002) "Global capitalism and major corporations from the Third World",
Third World Quarterly 23:1 81-100.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, (1997) "The Real New World Order", Foreign Affairs 76: 183.
Stiglitz, Joseph E (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
South Center (1996) For A Strong And Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform
Geneva: South Center.
Tarrow, Sidney (2000) "Transnational Contention" in Kate Nash ed., Readings in Contemporary Political
Sociology Malden: Blackwell Publishers 177-203.
Thompson, E. P (1963) The Making of the English Working Class Hammondsworth: Penguin
Uimonen, P and Whalley, J (1997) Environmental Issues in the New Trading System London: Macmillan
Press Ltd,
UN doc. A/56/323 : Cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant partners, in particular the
private sector: Report of the Secretary-General
UN Doc. A/RES/55/2; United Nations Millenium Declaration adopted by the United Nations General
15
Assembly on 8th September 2000, para 30.
UNDP (2000) Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy:
Governance in Post-Conflict Countries. http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/crisis/monograph/Monograph.htm
UNHCR
(2000)
UNHCR
Corporate
Code
of
Conduct
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home?page=PARTNERS&id=3d904d954&ID=3d904d954&PUBLISHER=TWO
UNHRC (2000) Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights--E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7:
The realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights.
Weber, M (1970) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
WTO, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1: 14 November 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Fourth Session, Doha.
16