Natural Resources and Conflict
A New Security Challenge
for the European Union
A Report for SIPRI by Resource Consulting Services
NICHOLAS GARRETT AND ANNA PICCINNI
June 2012
Contents
Summary
iii 1. Introduction
1 2. The linkages between natural resources and conflict
I. Natural resources and conflict financing
II. Natural resources and state effectiveness
III. Climate change dimensions of natural resource-related conflict
IV. Conflict over natural resources in a multipolar global economy
4 4 5 6 7 3. European Union responses to natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges I. European Union strategies and instruments for achieving access to resources
II. Security responses
III. Climate change responses
15
4. Conclusions and questions for further research
I. Conclusions
II. Research and policy questions
33 33 35 15 27 30 About Resource Consulting Services
Resource Consulting Services Limited (RCS) provides research, audit, advisory and training
in the global extractive industries, conflict minerals, forestry and land investment sectors. We
work with a range of stakeholders to improve the governance, economic performance and
socio-economic dividend of each of these sectors. Clients of RCS include corporations,
governments, development organisations and civil society. Please visit
www.resourceglobal.co.uk or contact us on contact@resourceglobal.co.uk.
About the authors
Nicholas Garrett is a Director of Resource Consulting Services Limited. Anna Piccinni was
formerly a Research Analyst with Resource Consulting Services Limited.
Disclaimer
This report is prepared from secondary sources and data, which Resource Consulting
Services Limited (RCS) believes to be reliable, but RCS makes no representation as to its
accuracy or completeness. The report is provided for informational purposes and is not to be
construed as providing advice, endorsements, representations or warranties of any kind
whatsoever. The authors accept no liability for any consequences whatsoever of pursuing any
of the recommendations provided in this report, either singularly or altogether. Opinions and
information provided are made as of the date of the report issue and are subject to change
without notice.
Summary
The interrelationship between natural resources and conflict is becoming a security challenge
for the European Union (EU). This report suggests the EU needs to elaborate and apply an
effective strategy to meet and overcome this challenge. This strategy should combine existing
policy tools more effectively, while also finding new ways to balance the imperatives of
securing access to natural resources and preventing and resolving conflict. Such an approach
requires a better understanding of natural resource-related security and conflict challenges, as
well as an analysis of how current EU strategies and policy tools affect this challenge.
The debate around how natural resources contribute to conflict financing is prominent, but
the fact that the principal policy responses to the issue—for example, natural resources trade
control mechanisms, such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme—have been unable
to fully meet their intended objectives demonstrates that more work needs to be done. There
is an urgent need to better understand the issue of conflict financing, to tweak existing
responses and, if necessary, develop complementary responses that are implementable in
difficult environments.
The question of state effectiveness features heavily in discussions about natural resources
governance and conflict. With the introduction of the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), many stakeholders in the natural resources sectors have become more
optimistic that natural resource-related corruption and the associated potential for grievancesbased conflict can be prevented or mitigated. The lack of or slow progress governments in
many natural resource-rich countries are making with the implementation of more
expenditure transparency—a part of the value chain unaddressed by the EITI—suggests that
future policies have to be better aligned with implementing governments’ incentive
structures. These, in turn, need to be researched in more depth.
Climate change is a particularly under-researched dimension of natural resource-related
security and conflict challenges, partly because some of the anticipated symptoms are not yet
a reality. The importance that scientists, voters and other constituencies attach to climate
change shows that it will be important to make more significant inroads into understanding
the interrelationship of climate change and natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges, so as to put in place effective mitigation strategies that will help the EU deliver
stability and long-term access to natural resources.
The move towards a multi-polar global economy is an ongoing process, particularly with
the continued ascent of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS countries)
and other emerging economies. In the context of an increasingly multi-polar global economy,
actual and potential natural resource-related security and conflict challenges remain underresearched. The EU must define its role in the future global economy and adapt its strategies
accordingly. This strategy should be based on solid research and analysis.
At present, the EU draws on a broad but often inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated
range of strategies and instruments to manage natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges. The urgency for coordination and alignment is underlined by cases where EU
development priorities and trade objectives contradict each other, for example in the context
of export taxation by African natural resource-exporting countries.
The consequences of these contradictions may undermine the EU’s credibility as a
normative global power committed to the pursuit of an international order based on good
governance, democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights.
iv NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
As a result, the EU should now formulate a practical policy proposal on natural resources
that creates a framework aligning its various trade, security, diplomatic, climate change and
development instruments. This proposal should define a set of strategic objectives for the EU
with the overarching goal of addressing the EU’s natural resource-related security and
conflict challenges, whilst ensuring sustainable access to natural resources. This proposal
would then serve as a strategic framework for rationalizing EU responses and avoiding
contradictory actions.
Such a policy proposal might best fit within a process of reviewing the European Security
Strategy (ESS), which should focus on common security goals rather than identifying
common threats; this would help to promote consensus among EU member states on how to
respond to future crises.1
In order to help the EU formulate a coherent framework, further research should focus on
how the EU can generate a stronger understanding of the ways in which natural resources and
security and conflict challenges relate and interact. This report elaborates some guiding
research themes and questions to this effect. They include questions related to natural
resources security in general; conflict financing; state effectiveness; climate change; and
conflict over natural resources in a multipolar global economy.
Integrating EU responses to natural resource-related security and conflict challenges in a
strategic framework will help to guarantee a more secure international arena and will
transform the EU from a security and policy actor with great potential into a player able to
credibly align and effectively apply its available policy instruments and resources.
1 Andersson, J. et al., ‘European Security Strategy: reinvigorate, revise or reinvent?’, Occasional UI Papers, The Swedish
Institute of International Affairs, no. 7 (2011), p. 13.
1. Introduction
Complex and far-reaching shifts in the global economic order over recent years have created
a fundamentally new configuration of natural resources markets and trading relationships.2
Accelerated economic growth in emerging market economies such as Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa (the BRICS countries) has provided the European Union (EU) with
tangible competition for access to natural resources, but has also led to perceived natural
resources scarcities, such as in the case of rare earth metals. These trends look set to continue
in the future and may even accelerate as a result of increasing demographic pressures, with
the world’s population forecast to reach 9.3 billion by 2050.3 Developing effective responses
to the challenges created by the more strategic role of natural resources in the fast-changing
global political economy is a priority for governments around the world.4
These developments, as well as the rediscovery of natural resources development as a
potential path to achieve growth and poverty reduction, help explain why many governments
now consider natural resources to be a security issue. The growing awareness of the
interrelationships between natural resources and conflict has reinforced this perspective. This
‘securitization’ of natural resources is a strategic challenge for the EU, which is one of the
world’s largest markets for natural resources, and is likely to affect the EU’s security agenda
in four distinct ways.
First, as a major trading bloc, the EU is vulnerable to instability created by natural
resource-related conflict, as it is increasingly dependent on external natural resources
supplies. Energy imports, for example, are expected to account for 75 per cent of the EU’s
consumption by 2030, with key suppliers in Russia, North Africa and the Middle East.5 The
EU thus has an interest in preventing interstate tensions and conflicts related to intensified
competition for access to and control of natural resources.6
Second, state capture and mismanagement of natural resources revenues can be related to
natural resources development. Systemic corruption is a malaise affecting many natural
resource-rich countries. The EU’s continued role as a moral actor would require it to conduct
solid due diligence on its trading partners and assess the interplay between natural resources
revenues, corruption and conflict.
Third, climate change and demographic pressures may aggravate natural resources scarcity
and perpetuate and accelerate migratory movements. This increases the potential for local and
regional conflict in natural resource-exporting countries. The risk to the EU from such
developments may be limited to the issues of natural resources development and trade simply
becoming more complex and expensive; however, it may also induce conflict symptoms
2 For the purposes of this report, natural resources are defined as natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can
be used for economic production or consumption. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Glossary of
statistical terms: natural resources’, <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1740>.
3 United Nations Population Fund, ‘The state of world population 2011’, <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/>.
4 E.g. on 1 Nov. 2011, the Russian General Staff issued a warning about the emergence of new global challenges and
threats relating to the struggle for natural resources, alongside more traditional conflict issues, as a major challenge to
international security. ‘Russian military intelligence expects struggle for resources to intensify’, RIA Novosti, 2 Nov. 2011,
<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-russian-military-intelligence-expects-competition-over-resource-to-instensify718.cfm>.
5 European Council, ‘Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy: providing security in a changing
world’, 11 Dec. 2008, <http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en/081211_EU%20Security%20Strategy.pdf>.
6 Klare, M. T., Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001).
2 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
within the EU and along its borders, for example in the form of increased refugee migration,
which will require careful management.7
Fourth, natural resource-related security and conflict challenges in countries and regions
neighbouring the EU and further afield will have an impact on the EU’s efforts to prevent,
manage and resolve conflicts—notably in Africa—through crisis management operations and
support for regional security organizations such as the African Union (AU). For example,
since 2003 the EU has been involved in crisis management operations in the natural resourcerich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).8 Today the EU either supports or implements
stabilization and democratization programmes in several regions where natural resourcerelated security and conflict challenges are particularly pronounced or emerging, including in
North and Central Africa and in the wider Caspian region.9
Increasing awareness of these natural resource-related security and conflict challenges has
intensified a debate within the EU that transcends traditional stakeholder groups in the natural
resources sectors, and focuses on how the EU should best respond to these challenges.
In 2008 the EU established the Raw Materials Initiative (RMI), a policy document that
prioritizes the EU’s access to natural resources and the regulation of international markets.10
The RMI’s main objective is to devise an integrated strategy for securing reliable and
undistorted access to raw materials in order to maintain the EU’s competitiveness, and thus
allow for growth and job creation. The EU’s RMI policy paper bases the strategy and policy
response on three pillars: (a) ensuring access to raw materials, (b) setting the right framework
of conditions and (c) reducing the EU’s consumption of raw materials.
The elaboration of the RMI is an important step for the EU towards defining and
implementing a strategic framework on natural resources, as well as aligning its various
trade, security, diplomatic, climate change and development instruments. Despite the
development of the RMI, however, natural resource-related security and conflict challenges
remain imperfectly addressed in these instruments. As a result, responses are sometimes
disjointed and compartmentalized, which undermines their overall effectiveness, jeopardizes
reaching strategic objectives, and risks setting the EU’s instruments against each other.11
This report outlines key themes and questions for further research to help the EU formulate
clear and coherent approaches to overcome natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges.
Chapter 2 explains how natural resources and conflict are set to become a more prominent
security challenge for the EU. It elaborates implications of natural resource-related security
and conflict challenges for the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS identifies
strategic security challenges that are then reflected in the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and put in place through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).12
Four sets of natural resource-related security and conflict challenges are discussed: conflict
7 Black,
R., ‘Climate change “grave threat” to security and health’, BBC News, 17 Oct. 2011,
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15342682>. See also Council of the European Union, ‘A secure Europe
in a better world: European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms
Upload/78367.pdf>.
8 Garrett, N., Mitchell, H. and Lintzer, M., Promoting legal mineral trade in Africa’s great lakes region (Resource
Consulting Services: London, 2010).
9 The EU’s energy supply chain is particularly exposed to instability in these regions. Eurostat, ‘Extra–EU trade in
primary goods’, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/ExtraEU_trade_in_primary_goods>.
10 European Commission, ‘The Raw Materials Initiative: meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe’,
Brussels, 4 Nov. 2008, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0699:FIN:en:PDF>.
11 See e.g. European Council (note 5).
12 European External Action Service, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/cfsp>.
INTRODUCTION 3
financing; state effectiveness; climate change; and conflict over natural resources in an
increasingly multipolar global economy.13 The analysis highlights the need to better
understand the linkages between natural resource supply security and supranational security
issues as a first step to building the EU’s strategic response.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the mechanisms through which the EU currently
addresses natural resource-related security and conflict challenges, analysing their successes
and shortcomings in areas as diverse as natural resource-based conflicts and distorted access
to natural resources due to increased multipolar competition. The need to strategically align
and better coordinate the EU’s wide range of policies and tools is highlighted, as is the need
for the mainstreaming security responses in the suggested EU policy framework on natural
resources.
Chapter 4 recommends key themes and questions for further research that the EU should
investigate in order to develop and apply a more effective and integrated response to its
natural resource-related security and conflict challenges, whilst also ensuring sustainable
access to natural resources. This will involve the development of flexible tools that address
the linkages between natural resources and conflict while remaining adaptable to a fastchanging geopolitical context.
13 Melvin, N. and De Koning, R., ‘Resources and armed conflict’, SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011).
2. The linkages between natural resources and
conflict
While the last two decades have seen significant advances in understanding the linkages
between security issues and natural resources, the influence of these linkages on conflict
remains under-researched and incompletely reflected in EU policy. Better understanding
these issues and developing a corresponding policy framework, which integrates traditional
policies and coordinates cross-sector tools, should thus be a strategic priority for the EU.
Since the mid-1990s, researchers have enhanced the understanding of key conflict dynamics
and have unearthed a more direct interrelationship between natural resources development,
trade and conflict.14 Some authors have focused on civil and localized conflict and the ways
in which they are funded, while others have examined how natural resources can help to ease
tensions and kick-start local economic development. Besides explaining how natural
resources can contribute to conflict and development solutions at a local level, this research
situates natural resources in the context of contemporary conflict, arguing for their treatment
as a salient issue in international security, and as a contributor to interstate tensions.15
I. Natural resources and conflict financing
A principal finding of research over the past twenty years into the political economy of armed
conflict suggests that the ability of non-state combatants to mobilize economic resources
depends either on external support, or else on gaining control of locally available economic
resources. With the decline of external support by superpowers for numerous armed
movements following the end of the cold war, predation on civilians and exploitation of and
trade in natural resources emerged as significant financing vehicles (along with diaspora
remittances) of largely self-financing conflicts in the late 1990s.16 As a result of a new
sensitivity to the economic dimensions of conflict, intrastate conflicts in natural resource-rich
countries progressively became understood as ‘resource wars’, and the local economic
systems from which combatants mobilized their resources defined as ‘war economies’.17
Weak state structures, endemic corruption and the illegal international arms trade are seen as
facilitating such economic transactions. The role of natural resources in such local conflicts is
not only of importance for the directly affected countries, but can also have larger
14 The works of a number of authors are particularly relevant, including Berdal, M. R. and Malone, D., Greed and
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, 2000); Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., Greed
and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2000; Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., ‘Greed and
grievance in civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 56, no. 4 (2004), pp. 563–595; Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D.,
‘Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war’, American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1 (2003), pp. 75–90; Jean, F. and
Rufin, J. C., Economie des Guerres Civiles [The Economy of Civil Wars] (Hachette: Paris, 1996); Keen, D., The Economic
Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Papers, no. 320 (Routledge: New York, 1998); Le Billon, P., ‘The political
ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts’, Political Geography, vol. 20 (2001), pp. 561–584; Ross, M., 2003,
‘The natural resources curse: how wealth makes you poor’, in eds I. Bannon and P. Collier, Natural Resources and Violent
Conflict (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2003); Ross, M., ‘A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war’, Annual Review of
Political Sciences, 9 Feb. 2006, pp. 265–300; and Rosser, A., ‘The political economy of the resource curse: a literature
survey’, Institute of Development Studies Working Paper no. 268, April 2006.
15 Melvin and De Koning (note 13).
16 Keen, D., The Economic Function of Violence in Civil Wars (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998).
17 Ballentine, K. and Nitzschke, H. (2005),‘The political economy of civil war and conflict transformation’, Berghof
Handbook, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>.
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT 5
ramifications for the EU, particularly in the context of its security strategy and its
commitment to promoting global peace and security.
The EU has engaged militarily on a number of occasions to manage conflicts in which
natural resources have played a key role. For example, the first military operation launched
by decision of the European Council within the framework of the Common Security and
Defense Policy (CSDP, then called ESDP), was in DRC, where natural resources have played
important and diverse roles in evolving conflict complexes since the final years of the
Mobutu regime.18 More recently the EU has launched civilian and military crisis management
operations within the framework of the CSDP in other countries where natural resources are
closely linked to conflicts. Examples are Moldova and Ukraine in 2005 (EUBAM), Iraq in
the same year (EUJUST LEX), Georgia in 2008 (EUMM) and Libya in 2011 (EUFOR).19
While natural resources and conflict dynamics directly interact in these countries, there are
also less direct impacts to consider. War economies, for example, are a fertile business
environment for international criminal networks and arms traffickers, who seek to exchange
arms and other inputs in return for access to natural resource revenues or commercialization
opportunities provided by high-value commodities such as drugs and gold. The business
opportunities that war economies provide to international criminal networks, which may on
occasion be linked to terrorist financing, are a particularly pertinent example of the
complexity of the EU’s natural resource-related security and conflict challenges.
II. Natural resources and state effectiveness
A second set of findings on the interrelationship of natural resources and conflict highlights
the importance of indirect mechanisms, such as elevated rent-seeking behaviour in natural
resources rich countries and related adverse effects on the quality and effectiveness of
governance.20 These can readily translate into grievances—and potentially grievances-based
conflict—over a lack of equitable growth and socioeconomic development. There are a
number of ways through which institutional effectiveness can be weakened in natural
resource-rich countries, yet the extent to which this happens seems to depend on the initial
strength of the respective institutions.21 Linkages between natural resources and the integrity
of state institutions work in two directions: on the one hand, the development of natural
resources and subsequent substantial increases in fiscal revenue can undermine institutions.
On the other hand, compromised institutions can weaken economic performance, which
negatively affects future natural resources revenues. In other words, state capture and
18 Operation Artemis was launched in DRC in the summer of 2003. European External Action Service, ‘Completed EU
operations’, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations>.
19 EUBAM is an advisory and technical body with the mission to control border traffic in the secessionist region of
Transnistria, along the border between Moldova and Ukraine. This region is strategically important due to gas transiting
from Russia to the EU, and a range of illicit cross-border activities and smuggling had been reported. See Ashton, C.,
‘Statement on Moldova/Transnistria’, 17 May 2010, <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/
2010/2010_05_17_2_en.htm>.
20 See e.g. Boschini, A. D. et al., ‘Resource course or not: a question of appropriability’, Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, vol. 109, no. 3 (Sep. 2007), pp. 593–617; Heller, T. C., ‘African transition and the resource curse: an alternative
perspective’, Economic Affairs, vol. 26, no. 4 (2006), pp. 24–33; Lederman, D. and Maloney, W. F., Natural Resources,
Neither Curse Nor Destiny, (World Bank: Washington DC, 2007); and Robinson, J. A. et al., ‘Political foundations of the
resource curse’, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 79, no. 2 (April 2006), pp. 447–468.
21 Amundsen, I., ‘Revenue management corruption challenges and redistribution’, proceedings from UNIDO Policy
Conference on Competitiveness and Diversification: Strategic Challenges in a Petroleum-Rich Economy, 14 Mar. 2011,
Accra, Ghana, <http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/UNIDO_Worldwide/Africa_Programme/Ghana_Conference/
Inge_Amundsen_Presentation.pdf>.
6 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
mismanagement of natural resources revenues can be consequences of natural resources
development. These dynamics reduce the accountability of governments, as the state is less
dependent on individuals’ taxes and there is less of an incentive for governments to deliver
state services.22 This in turn can expose governments to political opposition from those with
legitimate grievances protesting against their exclusion, or from criminal networks and
insurgents aiming to capture power by violent means.23 For example, some communities
living in the Niger Delta are said to have supported local armed groups.24 This has been
interpreted as a form of protest against an unresponsive government.25 In extreme cases,
mismanagement and systemic misappropriation of natural resources can reach a level where
the state becomes the arena in which criminal groups compete, as illustrated by the drug
trade-related coup in Guinea Bissau in 2010.26 In addition, the lure of potentially lucrative
access to natural resources revenues can become the principal motivation for coups d’état, as
was alleged in Equatorial Guinea in 2004.27 These circumstances provide fertile ground for
very high-risk taking investors to secure lucrative natural resources deals. It is thus in the
interest of the EU to work towards levelling the playing field in such countries through
initiatives that improve security, governance, trade and development and provide EU
investors, who have to adhere to more stringent regulations than their competitors from
further afield, with fairer and more conducive business environments.
III. Climate change dimensions of natural resource-related conflict
In the early 2000s, research on the role of climate change and conflict risks grew in
prominence.28 Research published in 2011 suggests that climate change is perceived as the
third major security issue on the agenda of EU leaders, and that EU citizens perceive global
warming as the second most important threat likely to affect them in the next decade, after
energy dependence.29 A 2008 EU assessment in this context noted conflict risks in the climate
change context and interrelated with natural resources issues, particularly natural resources
scarcity, including land and fresh water.30 Scarcity can trigger conflicts in a number of ways.
Environmental degradation can affect human security and livelihoods. A sudden drop in crop
22 Devarajan, S., Ehrhart, H., Le, T. M. and Raballand, G., ‘Direct redistribution and taxation in oil-rich economies: a
proposal’, Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 281 (Dec. 2011), <http://www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/1425822/>.
23 Melvin and De Koning (note 13).
24 The most important of these groups is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
25 Melvin and De Koning (note 13).
26 Guinea–Bissau has been identified as a significant transit point for narcotics smuggled from South America to Europe.
The USA has recently accused generals there of acting as drug lords. ‘US warns Guinea–Bissau over drug barons in the
military’, BBC Online, 25 June 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10412654>.
27 In 2004 an alleged coup attempt against President Obiang Nguema was meant to serve the interests of western oil
corporations affiliated with those involved in the coup. ‘Q&A: Equatorial Guinea coup plot’, BBC Online, 3 Nov. 2009,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3597450.stm>.
28 Melvin and De Koning (note 13).
29 Mérand, F., Irondelle, B. and Foucault, M., European Security Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall (University of Toronto
Press, 2011), pp. 260–273.
30 European Commission, ‘Climate change and international security’, S113/08, Brussels, 14 Mar. 2008, <http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf>.
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT 7
yields can, for example, trigger unmanaged population movements, which can in turn result
in conflict.31
Climate change is increasingly construed as a security challenge for the EU, due to its
potential contribution to global instability. The security risks directly related to the
consequences of climate change, however, seem most salient outside of the EU, such as in
Africa and Asia, with the EU most likely to be more indirectly affected.32 Energy security is
the issue via which climate change-related conflict risks could emerge as a particular concern
for the EU, as it could become more difficult and expensive to access natural resources in or
transport and trade energy supplies through countries affected by climate change-related
conflict.33
IV. Conflict over natural resources in a multipolar global economy
The fourth interrelationship between natural resources and conflict concerns the growing
international competition over access to natural resources. In an increasingly multipolar
global economy, increased competition over access to natural resources has become a source
of interstate tensions and could in the future become a more prominent conflict driver.34 The
economic rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (known as the BRICS
countries) over recent years has led to a re-examination of the role of natural resources in
international relations, particularly in the context of the increasing scale and frequency of
various forms of export restrictions and restrictions on access to natural resources.35 The
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) World Trade Report 2010 notes, ‘in a world where
scarce natural resources endowments must be nurtured and managed with care, uncooperative
trade outcomes will fuel international tension and have a deleterious effect on global
welfare’.36 The EU’s competitiveness is directly affected by these developments, with
reportedly as many as 30 million jobs in the EU potentially at risk as a result of the EU’s
currently insufficient access to natural resources.37
The possible conflict risks associated with international competition over natural resources
have given rise to a resource geopolitics framework, in which access to natural resources
becomes a primary objective of national security strategies and competition over access to
31 Wirkus, L. and Schure, J., ‘Environmental change, natural resources and violent conflict’, eds L. Wirkus and R.
Vollmer, ‘Monitoring environment and security: integrating concepts and enhancing methodologies’, BICC brief 27, 2008,
pp. 20–27.
32 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Transatlantic dialogue on climate change and security launch’, [n/d],
<http://www.iiss.org/programmes/climate-change-and-security/transatlantic-dialogue-on-climate-change-and-security/tdccslaunch/>.
33 See Jagen, M., in Mérand, Irondelle and Foucault (note 29) and Black (note 7).
34 Melvin and De Koning (note 13).
35 Export restrictions are often in the headlines these days. Russia introduced a ban on exports of wheat and other grains
in Aug. 2010, creating a great deal of anxiety in international grain markets. Earlier, during the ‘food crisis’, dozens of
countries had instituted export restrictions in the face of domestic supply constraints and growing public discontent about
rising prices of food. In 2011 China restricted its exports of rare earth metals to Japan and other industrial countries.
Karapinar, B., ‘Export restrictions on natural resources: policy options and opportunities for Africa’, World Trade Institute,
2011, <http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-trade.ch/news/TRAPCA%20Paper%20(Submitted1711)_BK.pdf>.
36 World Trade Organization, ‘Trade in natural resources’, World Trade Report 2010, <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr10-2a_e.pdf>.
37 Barroso, J. M., ‘Commodities and raw materials: challenges and policy responses’, Keynote speech at Bureau of
European Policy Advisers conference, 14 June 2011, Brussels, <http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/conferences/president-barrosospeech-14-june-2011.pdf>.
8 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
natural resources is considered to potentially fuel instability.38 Conflict is expected to emerge
between established industrialized countries and rising global powers as a result of their
respective appetite for natural resources, as well as between natural resource-exporting
countries and natural resource-importing countries, particularly over terms of trade.39 The
resource geopolitics framework emphasizes competition in the energy sector. Uncertainty
over access to, as well as pricing and scarcity of natural resources, is presented as reshaping
relationships between natural resource-exporting and natural resource-importing countries. In
particular, the nationalization of oil and gas reserves in natural resource-exporting countries
has been viewed in some cases as distorting supply and undermining the market mechanism.
Increased global demand driven by the emerging economies is forecast to further increase
pressure on known reserves. While oil reserves may not run out by 2050, as some have
forecast, market destabilizing price volatility and a longer-term upward price trend are likely
outcomes. Many EU member states are concerned about these developments and have
elaborated national strategies in response. For example, in 2010 the United Kingdom
reviewed threats related to global natural resources shortages, Germany unveiled its raw
materials strategy, and France created a specialized agency for critical resources in February
2011.40
Two dimensions of natural resource-related conflict are often analysed within the resources
geopolitics framework. The first is potential conflict between natural resource-exporting
countries and natural resource-importing countries. The second is conflict between natural
resource-importing countries. The two dimensions have various subcategories and the
following sections analyse these in turn.
Conflict between natural resource-exporting countries and natural resource-importing
countries
Natural resource-exporting countries can restrict access to their production through nonmarket interventions such as export restriction, pricing pressure or supply cut-offs, often in
the name of political and national security ends. The WTO has noted these developments
with alarm, suggesting ‘inadequate or contested rules risk stocking the fires of natural
resource asymmetry across countries and beggar-thy-neighbour motivations dominating trade
policy’.41 Strained relations between natural resource exporting- and importing countries over
supply could even lead to military interventions to secure control over reserves.42 In the
following sections, we examine the different ways for natural resources to become a
contested issue between natural resource-exporting countries and natural resource-importing
countries.
38 Melvin
and De Koning (note 13).
(note 6).
40 For Germany see Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, ‘The German government’s raw materials strategy’
(Publisher: place, 2010), <http://www.bmwi.de/English/Navigation/Service/publications,did=376156.html>. For France see
‘La France concrétise son plan d’action pour les métaux stratégiques’, Euractiv.fr, <http://www.euractiv.fr/france-concretiseplan-action-metaux-strategiques-article>.
41 World Trade Organization (note 36).
42 Peters, S., ‘Coercive western energy security strategies: “resource wars” as a new threat to global security’, Geopolitics,
vol. 9, no. 1 (2004), pp. 187–212.
39 Klare
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT 9
Export restrictions
The export policies of some natural resource-exporting countries can be driven by resource
nationalism and infant industry arguments, reserving all or parts of current and future
production for domestic value addition to support domestic industry. China’s suspension of
rare earth metal exports (see box 3.3) is a relevant example.43 Natural resources also have
been used as tools in bilateral disputes where natural resource-importing countries find their
suppliers trying to influence national policy with the threat of interrupting or cutting off
supplies. The 2008 gas crisis in Ukraine is an example, where Russia responded to a dispute
over gas pricing by cutting off natural gas supplies.44 As a natural resource import dependent
trading block, export restrictions are a pertinent risk that could result in conflict with its
natural resource suppliers.
Instability in the European Union’s natural resources supplying countries and regions
The presence of natural resources in the context of weak governance, and incomplete political
reform in particular, could in the future lead to intra- or interstate conflicts, possibly requiring
the deployment of the EU’s military instruments.45 The EU has particularly exposed natural
resource supply chains, in some sectors originating in countries like Russia, Libya and
Algeria, where natural resource-related security risks could escalate. Critical escalation could
force the EU to engage in conflict prevention and management to maintain security.46 The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s involvement in Libya in 2011, for example,
has been cited as an intervention to secure and make more predictable long-term energy
supplies.47 Reports suggested that France signed a deal with Libya’s National Transitional
Council (NTC) ‘to assign 35 per cent of crude oil to France in exchange for its total and
permanent support of the Council’.48 While France categorically denies the existence of such
an agreement, analysts forecast that the French oil company Total and the Italian oil company
Eni will benefit significantly in the post-Gaddafi era, by virtue of France and Italy’s strong
support for the NTC.49 Energy geopolitics also played a key role in the Russia–Georgia crisis
of 2008. The EU’s engagement became important to secure peace, as ‘EU deployment
ensured that the ceasefire between Georgia and Russia held, when no other international actor
could intervene’.50
These examples suggest natural resource dependence is becoming an increasingly
important indicator for evaluating the regions in which the EU may have to take a more
43 Flanders–China trade chamber, ‘WTO rules against China export restrictions’, 11 July 2011, <http://news.flanderschina.be/wto-rules-against-china-export-restrictions>. See also Hook, L. and Dickie, M., ‘China defends policy on rare
earths’, Financial Times, 2011, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4cc15faa-dc3e-11df-a9a4-00144feabdc0.html>.
44 Ischinger, W., ‘The European security architecture two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall: can Russia be
integrated?’, SIPRI Newsletter, Nov. 2009, <http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/nov09>.
45 Andersson et al. (note 1), p. 24.
46 European Union, ‘Extra-EU trade in primary goods’, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/
index.php/Extra-EU_trade_in_primary_goods#Raw_materials>.
47 ‘Gaddafi gold for oil, is the gold dinar behind the war on Libya?’, ETF Daily News, 15 June 2011, <http://etfdailynews
.com/2011/06/15/gaddafi-gold-for-oil-is-the-gold-dinar-behind-the-war-on-libya-nyseslv-nysegld-nyseiau-nysesgolnyseagol/>.
48 ‘France strikes oil deal with new Libyan regime’, Business Live, 1 Sep. 2011, <http://www.businesslive.co.za/
africa/africa_markets/2011/09/01/france-strikes-oil-deal-with-new-libyan-regime>.
49 Sapa, D., ‘Libya promised France 35% crude oil: report’, Times Live, 1 Sep. 2011, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/
2011/09/01/libya-promised-france-35-crude-oil-report>.
50 De Vasconcelos, A. et al., ‘A strategy for EU foreign policy’, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Report no.
7 (2010), <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/A_strategy_for_EU_foreign_policy.pdf>, p. 22.
10 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
assertive security stance in the future. Accordingly, more strategic alignment between the
EU’s security policy and the RMI (see next chapter for a more detailed discussion) would
enhance the capacity of the EU to coordinate such action more effectively. The presence of
strategic natural resources should be a guiding criterion in the adoption of regional security
sub-strategies, as has been the case, for example, for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.51
Increasing bargaining power of natural resource-exporting countries
The political bargaining power of natural resource-exporting countries is increasing, both as a
result of scarcity and the geographical location of reserves. In other words, natural resources
are increasingly becoming a geopolitical bargaining tool, helping natural resource-exporting
countries to promote and sometimes enforce their political, economic and security interests,
or at least influence more effectively international forums, like the United Nations or the
Group of Twenty (G20).52
The EU is losing leverage with key natural resource-exporting countries in the context of
trade negotiations. This is as a result of many natural resource-exporting countries having
reached the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative completion point and also as a result
of emerging powers tabling lucrative proposals with fewer strings attached. For example, in
December 2007 only 15 of 76 target countries agreed to enter into Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) with the EU. Abdoulaye Wade, then President of Senegal, said at the
time: ‘China’s approach is winning more friends; Europe is close to losing the battle of
competition in Africa’.53
Natural resource-rich African countries now play a more strategic role in international
affairs, and global players who understand this and develop greater diplomatic and trade
relations with these countries stand to gain.54 This increased bargaining power also manifests
itself at national and regional levels. Contract revisions, raising royalty payments and
increased export taxation are three recent examples of African states seeking to increase their
share of natural resources revenues.55
The Africa Mining Vision, adopted by African Heads of State at the February 2009 AU
summit, recognizes that stronger regional cooperation could further strengthen African
natural resource-exporting countries’ bargaining power and also reduce regional conflict
potential.56 However, corruption and other governance issues, insufficient capacity and the
challenges of building the necessary solidarity and cooperation often continue to undermine
51 Andersson
et al. (note 45), p.10.
(note 42). See also Mair, S. and Petretto, K., ‘Unremitting challenges for African European relations, beyond
development aid: EU–Africa political dialogue on global issues of common concern’, Europe Africa Policy Research
Network, 2010, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/17854_11110cargill_euaf.pdf>.
53 Grice, A., ‘China the victor as Europe fails to secure trade deal with Africa’, The Independent, 10 Dec. 2007, <http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/china-the-victor-as-europe-fails-to-secure-trade-deal-with-africa-764115.html>.
54 Chatham House, ‘Africa and the changing balance of international power’, [n/d], <http://www.chathamhouse.org/
research/africa/current-projects/africa-international>.
55 For example DRC established an inter–ministerial commission in May 2007 to reread approximately 60–63 contracts
between state–owned enterprises and private companies. It was established to follow up on the commitment made by the
Government during the election process to review the mining contracts. Garrett, N. and Lintzer, M., ‘Democratic Republic of
Congo growth with governance in the mining sector’, Resource Consulting Services, 2008. The third largest gold producer
in Africa, Tanzania, has attracted significant investment in the mining sector over the past decade and was planning to
conclude negotiations with mining companies in September 2011 to allow the Tanzanian Government to raise royalty
payments on gold exports from 3 per cent on net income to 4 per cent of gross export value. ‘Tanzania raises royalty fee on
gold exports’, East Africa Business Week, 28 Aug. 2011.
56 African Union, ‘Minerals and Africa’s development; a report of the international study group on Africa’s mineral
regimes’, Addis Ababa, Aug. 2010.
52 Peters
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT 11
cooperative regional initiatives on natural resources management. An example is the failed
regional energy integration project in West Africa, within the framework of the Organisation
de mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS). Rather than improving diplomatic relations
and sharing the potential of regional water resources to generate electricity, the project is said
to have increased tensions between neighbouring countries.57
Conflict between natural resource-importing countries
Increasing competition over access to natural resources increases the likelihood of tensions
between natural resource-importing countries, despite suggestions that increasing global
economic interdependence can help mitigate the risk of violent interstate conflict.58
Uncooperative behaviour in multilateral forums
Natural resource-related disputes can strain relations between consumer countries and
translate into uncooperative behaviour in multilateral forums, such as the UN, the WTO or
during environmental negotiations, like those at the 2012 Rio+20 summit in Brazil. In the
context of environmental negotiations, clashes of priorities over the use of natural resources
have been evident since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in 1997. Canada withdrew from the convention in 2011, citing compliance
costs and the fact that the world’s largest polluters, China and the United States, were not
covered by the protocol.59 On the other hand, there was an encouraging sign in the result of
the December 2011 climate conference in Durban, South Africa, which agreed that by 2015
governments would finalize a ‘protocol, legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal
force’ that would impose targets on all major emitters, rich and poor. If finalized, it will
probably enter into force by 2020, when existing voluntary targets end—even though this is
not part of the official deal.60
Exacerbation of existing tensions and conflicts
Natural resource geopolitics can have security implications, particularly when applied in
areas already subject to tensions and conflicts and if not accompanied by adequate conflict
prevention and management mechanisms. Natural resource-importing countries’ access
strategies, particularly if implemented in areas characterized by protracted territorial and
sectarian disputes, may trigger violence both in the region and within the natural-resourceimporting countries.61 Without adopting a particular position on the issue, it is fair to say that
57 ‘Intégration
Energétique: Kaléta, un enjeu régional entre les mains de la Guinée’ [Energy integration: Kaléta, a regional
issue for Guinea], Guinée Conakry Info, 7 Sep. 2011, <http://www.guineeconakry.info/index.php?id=118&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=10170&cHash=35b7c38342cd8b06e9e5398a894ca342>.
58 Xu, Y., ‘China and the United States in Africa: coming conflict or commercial coexistence?’, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, v. 62, no. 1 (2008), pp.16–37.
59 ‘Canada to withdraw from Kyoto Protocol’, BBC News, 13 Dec. 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada16151310>.
60 ‘Dangerous decade: what follows the Durban climate deal’, New Scientist, 13 Dec. 2011, <http://www.new
scientist.com/article/dn21278-dangerous-decade-what-follows-the-durban-climate-deal.html>.
61 E.g. competition between Russia, EU, Iran and Turkey for access to the natural reserves of the Caspian region might
have security implications for an area already subject to armed conflicts. Melvin and De Koning (note 13). More recently
access to Cyprus’s gas reserves reignited existing conflicts between the Cypriot and Turkish authorities. ‘EU urges Turkey to
avoid threats in Cyprus gas row’, AFP, 19 Sep. 2011, <http://blogs.voanews.com/breakingnews/2011/09/19/un-eu-call-forrestraint-in-turkey-cyprus-gas-dispute/>.
12 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
the security and political endeavours of industrial powers in the Middle East and the Gulf, as
well as various forms of violent responses both in the region and at home, are often viewed in
these terms.62
Competition for access to African natural resources
Previously unchallenged in their quest to gain access to African natural resources, companies
from industrialized countries now face competition from the BRICS countries, South Korea
and others.63 This has potentially far-reaching consequences for the EU’s security, its global
influence and the sustainability of its preferential trade agreements with African countries.64
Already Africa's largest trade partner, China's economic cooperation with the continent has
increased in recent years, with Africa–China trade surging to a record US$114.8 billion in
2010.65 China’s presence in Africa is not only strengthening African countries’ position in
EPA negotiations, but is also helping to lift African governments into a position where they
can negotiate with several natural resource-importing countries, not just the EU countries,
and choose what they consider to be the most favourable proposal.66 This is an enormous
opportunity for African governments to drive the development of their countries and of the
continent as a whole.
On the other hand, Chinese companies work effectively with African partners even in the
absence of good governance in what has been branded a ‘no-strings-attached’ policy. The
latter can undermine natural resources governance and further weaken already frail
institutions in African natural resource-exporting countries. In these cases, the vision of
equitable growth from natural resources development, as elaborated in the Africa Mining
Vision, may never be achieved. If natural resources revenue is used to finance military
expenditure it may also undermine regional security, as in Sudan, and jeopardize the EU’s
longstanding efforts to support regional stability. The consequences for the EU are manifold
and may include internal EU security threats, regional instability in Africa and natural
resource-rich African economies’ long-term dependence on aid.
Compared to China, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member states have been accused of being ‘slow in recognizing Africa's changing role, and
remaining fixated on purely humanitarian and developmental perspectives’.67
62 Peteres S., ‘Coercive western energy security strategies: “resource wars” as a new threat to global security’,
Geopolitics, vol. no. 1 (2004), pp. 187–212.
63 Kermeliotis, T., ‘Why Asian giants scent opportunity in Africa’, CNN, 4 Aug. 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/
2011/BUSINESS/08/04/china.india.africa.overview/>.
64 Stahl, A., ‘The EU's foreign and security policy in Africa in the context of the growing international role of China’,
Project Research, The Institute for European Studies, <http://www.ies.be/projects/AnnaS>.
65 Kermeliotis (note 63).
66 Ramdoo, I., ‘Implications of the EU Raw Materials Initiative on ACP Countries’, Papers from the Secretariat of the
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, 2010, <http://www.acpsec.org/mines/Implications%20of%20the%20Raw
%20Materials%20Initiative%20EN.pdf>.
67 Chatham House (note 54).
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT 13
Figure 2.1.African imports and exports
Source: Kermeliotis, T., ‘Why Asian giants scent opportunity in Africa’, CNN, 4 August 2011, <http://edition.
cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/08/04/china.india.africa.overview/>.
In response, the EU is working as a matter of priority towards levelling the playing field
between emerging and established natural resource-importing countries.68 Whether this
strategy will be successful remains to be seen; the EU’s and China’s contrasting approaches
over values and interests in Africa will continue to evolve. Competition for African natural
resources—according to some observers—may become an example of the EU’s long-term
economic interests compelling it to compromise on the normative basis of its CFSP, as set out
in the Treaty of Lisbon.69
That said, the EU’s values and principles on the one hand, and a more pragmatic attitude
when securing access to natural resources in developing countries on the other hand, do not
have to be mutually exclusive. This is particularly the case if a strategic vision for improving
access and long-term stability in natural resource-exporting countries is developed, agreed
upon and implemented. In fact, more recently there have been first steps towards proposing
collaborative schemes between Africa, China and the EU. An example is the Trilateral EU,
Africa and China Cooperation proposed in October 2008. This initiative was supposed to
generate a ‘win-win-win’ scenario based on mutual benefits for China, Africa and the EU
from a development and humanitarian perspective, as well as in investment and trade
activities in Africa.70 So far this cooperative mechanism has not yielded significant and
tangible results and doubts remain whether conflict over norms and interests between the EU
and China can be prevented or mitigated over the medium-to-long term.71
68 Stahl
(note 64).
of Lisbon, signed 3 Dec. 2007, entered into force 1 Dec. 2009, <http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty>. According to
the treaty, the EU is allowed to use military force to defend peace but not in its own interests.
70 Bodomo, A., ‘In my father’s house there are many rooms: towards an Africa-driven win-for-all investment policy in
Africa’, Paper précis for the China-Europa Forum in Macau, 9–12 July 2010, <http://www.hku.hk/scoh/African
Studies/OxfamHKUWorkshop_on_Africa-China_RelationsAnnoucement.doc>.
71 Lirong, L., ‘The EU and China’s engagement in Africa: the dilemma of socialisation’, European Union Institute for
Security Studies, Occasional Paper 93, Aug. 2011, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The_EU_and_Chinas_
ment_in_Africa.pdf>.
69 Treaty
14 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
At the same time, there are signs of Chinese investors becoming more risk conscious
towards countries with weak democratic credentials or questionable integrity and uncertain
long-term stability. Conflict in these countries would put China on the frontline and it is
realizing that it might no longer be able to keep a low military profile in Africa. Similarly to
the EU, it also needs to reflect security and conflict challenges more effectively in its strategy
to access natural resources.72
Natural resource-related security and conflict challenges are particularly pertinent if
commitments are long-term and deals include large upfront infrastructure developments,
which are part of concessional loans backed with future natural resource development rights,
as China has negotiated in DRC, for example. As with European companies in the past,
Chinese companies have begun to experience and confront security risks in Africa: Chinese
operators have been the object of attacks and threats, for example by the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria.73 Recognizing its new security
challenges, China is contributing to UN peacekeeping operations, with about 75 per cent of
Chinese peacekeepers serving in Africa. Part of this strategy may well be to project a positive
image of China’s ‘harmonious society’ in order to balance Western influence.
These developments might represent an opportunity for more effective cooperation and
also for closer aligned operating standards for Chinese and European companies in Africa.
This would have to be an incremental process; China is highly unlikely to adopt the same
normative approach underlying the EU’s CFSP. Its current approach is simply too successful
in providing China with access to natural resources to merit a more fundamental shift.74
72 Holslag, J., ‘China’s new security strategy for Africa’, Parameters (Summer 2009), <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/
usawc/parameters/Articles/09summer/holslag.pdf>.
73 Since 2006 China’s state oil firm, SIPEC, has been awarded four oil exploration licences in the Niger Delta and
controls a $2.2 billion stake in an oil field in the region. The company struck crude in 2009. The Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta has threatened to kidnap Chinese operators in oil installations, along with other foreignborn oil workers operating in the region. Timberg, C., ‘Militants warn China over Oil in Niger Delta’, Washington Post,
1 May 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001022.html>.
74 Lirong (note 71).
3. European Union responses to natural resourcerelated security and conflict challenges
The multi-dimensionality of the EU’s natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges means they are difficult to manage without integrating different sets of
instruments for diplomacy and trade, as well as for climate change, development and security.
The EU’s current strategies and instruments can be grouped into three broad categories.
The first category includes the EU’s strategies to achieve access to natural resources,
particularly by managing its relationships with both natural resource-exporting countries and
competing natural resource-importing countries and promoting a level playing field in the
global natural resources sectors. These actions are of particular relevance to avoid unfair
competition and protectionist policies adopted by natural resource-exporting countries.
The second category includes the EU’s security strategies and instruments and the third
category includes the EU’s strategies and instruments to fight climate change.
These strategies and instruments are often employed independently of the EU’s diplomatic,
trade and development strategies and instruments. This disconnect undermines the
effectiveness of the EU’s current responses to natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges and action should be taken to align available strategies and instruments to ensure
they effectively reinforce each other.
I. European Union strategies and instruments for achieving access to
resources
Diplomatic strategies and instruments
Diplomatic instruments can help decrease dependency by diversifying the number of natural
resource suppliers and thereby reduce the EU’s exposure to natural resource-related security
and conflict challenges.75 The EU not only employs its diplomatic instruments with natural
resource-exporting countries, but also leverages its diplomatic relationships with natural
resource-importing countries on bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, with the intention
to improve cooperative natural resource management at the global level ‘on the basis of
mutual interest’.76 The RMI, launched in 2008 by the European Commission, calls for
enhancing the EU’s Raw Material Diplomacy.77
Diplomatic engagement with natural resource-exporting countries
In line with the EU’s Raw Material Diplomacy strategy, diplomatic relations and platforms
for dialogue are an opportunity for the EU to strengthen bilateral agreements on access to
natural resources, particularly with natural resource-exporting countries. The EU has
75 Keppler,
J. H., ‘International relations and security of energy supply’, Directorate-general for external policies of the
Union, 2007, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies/default.htm>.
76 Barroso (note 37). See also European Parliament, ‘On an effective raw materials strategy for Europe’, Committee on
Industry, Research and Energy, 2011/2056(INI), 25 July 2011, Brussels, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0288&language=EN>.
77 European Commission, ‘Raw Material Initiative’, 2008, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
COM:2011:0025:FIN:EN:PDF>.
16 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
diplomatic relations with nearly all countries in the world, maintained through a network of
136 EU delegations and these are frequently used to engage countries on natural resources
questions. During a landmark visit in June 2011, the European Commissioner for Industry,
Antonio Tajani, promoted raw materials cooperation with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, all of
which are major natural resource exporters.78 The EU–South Africa summit and the EU–
Russia Strategic Partnership, launched in 1999, are further platforms for dialogue on strategic
issues, particularly around natural resources.79 These are dynamic relationships that continue
to evolve. For example, the EU–Russia Strategic Partnership promotes democracy and
stability, and assists European countries to gain access to Russian natural resources,
particularly in the energy sector.80 However, the Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis of 2008–2009
cast doubts over Russia’s longer-term reliability as a natural resource exporter to the EU. As
a consequence, the EU is looking to diversify its energy supplies (see box 3.1.).81
As part of its bilateral agreements with potentially less stable natural resource-exporting
countries, the EU has established programmes to enhance democratization and stabilization.
In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy with southern Mediterranean
countries, policy instruments have worked hand in hand with trade tools to support
democratic transition and address specific country situations that followed the Arab Spring.
Since March 2011 the EU has launched dialogues with Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and
Egypt to implement the ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’. The partnership
provides incentives, such as upgraded economic and trade relations, to partners committed to
democratic transition. Future trade agreements, such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Areas (DCFTAs), also include provisions on investment protection and further
liberalization.82
While this shows that the EU is actively pursuing diplomatic opportunities, the success of
this strategy needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Diplomatic engagement with regional blocs representing natural resource-exporting
countries
The EU has opted for regional dialogues and partnerships with other regional blocs that
include natural resource-exporting countries. Dialogues and partnerships seek to promote
economic integration, sometimes through the establishment of free trade agreements (FTAs)
and the promotion of political dialogue on energy security.83 This is the case for the EUEastern Partnership, for example, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine. Security and stability in this region are particularly relevant for the EU
in the context of its efforts to diversify and secure its long-term energy supplies (see box 3.1).
78 European Commission, ‘Visit of Vice-President Tajanito Chile, Argentina and Brazil’, 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?lang=en&item_id=5179&tpa=0&displayType=news>.
79 European Union External Action, ‘What we do’, <http://eeas.europa.eu/what_we_do/index_en.htm>.
80 Solana, J., ‘The EU–Russia strategic partnership’, Speech by the High Representative designate of the European Union
for common foreign and security policy, Stockholm, 13 Oct. 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/discours/59417.pdf>.
81 Paillard, C.A., ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s mutual energy dependence’, Journal of International Affairs,
SIPA, vol. 63, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010), pp. 65–84, <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99smutual-energy-dependence>.
82 European Union External Action, ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity: report on activities in 2011 and
roadmap for future action’, 2012, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/pship_democracy_report_roadmap_
en.pdf>.
83 European Union External Action, ‘Eastern Partnership’, <http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm>.
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 17
Box 3.1.The EU and gas pipeline geopolitics
Currently the EU relies on Russia for 40 per cent of its gas imports.84 The EU is using diplomatic tools to
diversify its access to energy resources by securing alternative gas supplies. For example, it supports the
proposed Nabucco pipeline, transporting natural gas from the Caucasus through the Caspian region to European
markets. Following a decision of the European Council, the European Commission in September 2011 started
negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over access to gas deposits to fill the Nabucco pipeline. Along
with Iraq, these two countries are expected to be the main suppliers.85 Analysts are sceptical about the viability
of the Nabucco project due to high costs and difficulties in finding sufficient supplies in the region.86 Analysts
consider the Nabucco project a rival to the Russia-backed South Stream project.87 Russia suggests South
Stream’s gas is secure and will reduce costs by avoiding transit tolls by bypassing Ukraine. While this would
also reduce future conflict potential with Ukraine, the costs of laying a pipeline under the Black Sea are
significant.88 The shareholder agreement reached in September 2011 to implement the South Stream project
should allow for the construction of the first branch, to be launched in December 2015, with the other three
expected to be commissioned every twelve months until 2018.89 Both gas pipeline projects compete for funding
and future market share.
Source: Alexandrova, L., ‘Neither EU, nor Ukraine to impede Russia’s plans for South Stream’, ItarTass
Russian News Agency, 19 Sep. 2011.
84 Enviro
Finland, ‘EU to enforce single energy market rules’, 29 Sep. 2011, <http://www.energy-enviro.fi/index.php?
PAGE=2&NODE_ID=4&ID=3819>.
85 Lazaj, A., ‘Le gazoduc South Stream accentue la guerre des gazoducs en Europe’ [The South Stream pipeline
accentuates the pipeline war in Europe], Radio France Internationale, 16 Sep. 2011, <http://www.rfi.fr/europe/20110916-legazoduc-south-stream-accentue-guerre-gazoducs-europe>.
86 Caspian Intelligence, ‘South-Eastern Route has more chances to deliver Azerbaijani gas to Europe’, 12 Dec. 2011,
<http://caspianintelligence.blogspot.com/2011/12/interviews-with-trend-news-agency.html>.
87 The South Stream project plans to carry 63 billion cubic metres of Russian natural gas per year through the Black Sea
to Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary and Austria. The shareholders in the project's offshore section are Gazprom (50 per cent), Eni (20
per cent), and Wintershall Holding and EDF (15 per cent each).
88 Alexandrova, L., ‘Neither EU, nor Ukraine to impede Russia’s plans for South Stream’, ItarTassRussian News Agency,
19 Sep. 2011, <http://pda.itar-tass.com/en/c154/228683.html>.
89 Pipelines International, ‘South Stream finds new shareholders’, 19 Sep. 2011, <http://pipelinesinternational.com/
news/south_stream_finds_new_shareholders/063632/#>.
18 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
Energy infrastructure projects such as gas pipelines, or oil and gas exploration endeavours are particularly
vulnerable to geopolitical developments. For example, Cyprus’s announcement in September 2011 that it would
begin exploration for oil and gas off its coast sparked a reaction from Turkey, which does not officially
recognize the island. Turkey, which would host part of the Nabucco pipeline, announced that it would in turn
start oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean under the protection of the Turkish navy. It also
warned that it would freeze diplomatic relations with the EU if Cyprus assumes the rotating EU Presidency in
2012 before a solution is reached on the divided island. This raised additional concerns about the future of the
Nabucco project. On 19 September 2011, the EU called on Turkey to refrain from making threats in the context
of the oil and gas dispute with Cyprus.90 These are important developments that underline the sensitivity of the
subject area and demonstrate the close interrelationship of natural resources and conflict and security challenges
for the EU.
Since 2003, the EU has also negotiated a FTA with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.91
Oil represented 73.4 per cent of total EU imports from this region in 2009. FTA negotiations
covered sensitive issues including human rights, illegal immigration and terrorism. However,
the longer-term effectiveness of the EU’s political dialogue within the FTA framework
remains to be tested—for example, in light of the Bahraini Government’s crackdown on
demonstrators calling for greater political freedoms in February 2011.
The EU also has existing regional cooperation agreements on raw materials with the AU.
During the annual AU–EU summit held in November 2011, delegates reviewed the potential
for further cooperation on raw materials in 2012 and 2013 (see box 3.2).92
Diplomatic engagement through multilateral platforms
In the context of an increasingly multipolar global economy the EU also employs diplomatic
engagement through multilateral platforms to secure access to natural resources. For
example, the EU proposed ‘the establishment of an international regulatory platform,
ensuring access to and supply of raw materials, ensuring open global markets and promoting
international cooperation on sustainable extraction of raw materials and an efficient use of
natural resources based on mutual interest’.93 The European Commission identified the G20
‘as the most appropriate forum for bringing together both producer and consumer countries
and called for coordinated international action on commodities price volatility and growth in
demand for raw materials’.94 The final declaration of the November 2011 G20 Cannes
Summit encouraged effective management of natural resources in developing countries and
called upon multinational enterprises to improve transparency and full compliance with
applicable tax laws. It also made provisions to improve transfer-pricing legislation in
developing countries and encouraged all countries to join the Global Forum on Transparency
and Exchange of Information on Tax Purposes.95
90 ‘EU urges Turkey to avoid threats in Cyprus gas row’, AFP, 19 Sep. 2011, <http://blogs.voanews.com/breakingnews/2011/09/19/un-eu-call-for-restraint-in-turkey-cyprus-gas-dispute/>.
91 European Commission, ‘Regions: Gulf region’, [n/d], <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateralrelations/regions/gulf-region/>.
92 African Union and European Union, ‘Africa EU Joint Task Force meeting’, 19 Oct. 2011, Addis Ababa, <http://europa
frica.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/jtf_report_october-2011.pdf>.
93 European Parliament (note 76).
94 Barroso (note 37).
95 Group of Twenty and Group of Eight, ‘Cannes Summit Final Declaration’, 4 Nov. 2011, <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8g20/g20/english/for-the-press/news-releases/cannes-summit-final-declaration.1557.html>.
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 19
Box 3.2. AU–EU cooperation on raw materials
At the Addis Ababa meeting in June 2010, the AU and EU agreed various aspects of raw materials cooperation,
fully taking into account the Africa Mining Vision of February 2009 and the EU RMI of December 2008.96 For
the EU, this process is an opportunity to improve its access to natural resources and to engage African countries
as strategic partners, rather than as aid recipients. The AU’s aims for the process are a stronger contribution of
member states’ natural resources sectors to growth and progress towards achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The cooperation agreement focuses on a range of issues including capacity
building, governance, infrastructure and investment, as well as geological knowledge and skills.97 The
proceedings from the meeting suggest African partners still need to agree on common goals for cooperation in
specific areas and the AU and EU also still need to identify available instruments through which the EU can
support most effectively the African countries’ work in those areas.98
On careful reading, the priorities of the EU and AU seem to diverge on key issues and this may undermine
the effectiveness of future cooperation. For example, the EU emphasizes the importance of—and its willingness
to provide assistance to—improving fiscal regimes, allowing African countries to maximize natural resources
revenues. In many African countries fiscal regimes require improvement, but EU calls to remove mineral export
taxes are opposed by the AU. In June 2010 the AU presented a paper to the European Commission to this effect,
stating, ‘the EC’s proposal to prohibit the use of export taxes and quantitative restrictions under the EPA is an
unnecessary WTO-plus requirement that would limit the policy space to use these measures for value-addition,
diversification, infant industry promotion, food security, revenue and environmental considerations’.99
This suggests there is insufficient alignment between the EU’s development and security policies and its trade
policy to secure access to raw materials. This is confirmed, for example, by a 2011 EU Parliamentary
committee, which criticized the RMI for being inconsistent with the EU’s commitments to development and
human security.100 An EU Parliamentary Report noted, ‘the EU’s opposition to export taxes, that informed FTA
and EPAs, should be balanced by employing a differentiated approach for developing countries.’101 The EU
should promote investment agreements that are mutually beneficial and fair, and which can in turn underlie
long-term trade partnerships that will allow developing countries to diversify and industrialize their economies,
while also supplying the EU with natural resources.
This was an opportunity for the EU to take the lead in a key multilateral platform to
promote regulation of the global natural resources markets.102 The EU’s actions underline its
willingness to work through multilateral platforms, but also suggest there is a need to move
beyond bilateral agreements on natural resources, particularly in the context of global
regulatory matters.
96 Africa–EU partnership, ‘Africa–EU cooperation on raw materials’, 22 June 2010, <http://www.africa-eupartnership.org/node/1115>. In 2009, together with United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Union
launched the Africa Mining Vision 2030 with a view to establishing a ‘transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of
mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development’. Ramdoo, I., ‘Shopping for
raw materials: should Africa be worried about EU Raw Materials Initiative?’, European Center for Development Policy
Management Discussion Paper no. 105, 2011, <http://www.ecdpm.org/dp105>, p. 42.
97 Cooperation is specifically foreseen in the areas of governance, infrastructure and mining investments, and research.
African Union and European Union, ‘Joint Africa EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011–2013’, 2010, <http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/118211.pdf>.
98 Carvalho, A., ‘Raw materials co-operation: a win-win for Africa and the EU’, proceedings from first meeting of the
ACP Ministers in charge of the development of mining resources, Brussels, 13–15 Dec. 2010, <http://members.acp.
int/mining_ppt/The%20EU%20Raw%20Materials%20Initiative.ppt>.
99 Lazzeri, T., ‘EPAs and the European Raw Materials Initiative’, Africa and Europe Faith and Justice Network, 2011,
<http://www.aefjn.org/index.php/352/articles/epas-and-the-european-raw-materials-initiative.html>.
100 FairPolitics, ‘Raw materials discussed thoroughly in the European Parliament’, 28 June 2011, <http://www.fair
politics.nl/europa/cases/new_scramble_for_africa/2011_06_28_raw_materials_discussed_thoroughly_in_the_european_parli
ament__>.
101 European Parliament (note 76).
102 Barroso (note 37).
20 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
Investment-related strategies and instruments
Investment facilitation in natural resource-exporting countries
The EU also employs investment facilitation strategies and tools to achieve access to natural
resources by taking steps to help improve the business climate, facilitating mergers and
acquisitions and promoting investment, including the following.
1. Negotiation of investment agreements (Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)). These
facilitate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in producer countries and protect EU investors.
2. Inclusion of investment chapters in EPAs. These can contain strong provisions to
promote European FDI in Africa.103 The EU has increased its efforts to secure pre- and postinvestment rights for European investors in non-service sectors by proposing EPAs that
would cover market access for European investors. This would remove restrictions on
European companies wishing to open subsidiaries in Africa to develop raw materials.104
3. Facilitation of investments in the natural resource sectors in cooperation with European
Financial Institutions. The European Commission (a) assesses the feasibility of increasing
lending (which may include grant-loan elements) to industry, including mining and refining
projects and in particular post-extractive industries and (b) investigates the possibility of
promoting financial instruments that reduce risk for operators on the basis of guarantees
supported by the EU, including by the European Development Fund.105
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is engaged in financing cooperation and private
sector projects in Africa through the Africa Financing Partnership, which includes eight
development finance institutions. Through its operations in the industrial sector, the EIB aims
to optimize natural resources development and encourage productivity gains.106 On behalf on
the EU–Africa Infrastructure Fund, it has been lending to mining projects and geological
surveys. This is aligned with priorities identified in the AU–EU raw materials cooperation.107
The European Commission also supports private investments that promote local economic
diversification through value addition and infrastructures accessible to local industry in nonmining sectors.108 For example, the EU Economic Development Fund supported a United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) initiative to help design more
effective investment promotion policies. The Africa Investment Monitoring Platform
illustrates how data from investor surveys in 20 African countries can support private
investors and local institutions.109
103
Sauvant, K., ‘Africa: the opportunities are local’, International Trade Forum, 2007, <http://www.trade
forum.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1129>.
104 Lazzari, T., ‘EU’s Raw Material Initiative’, Africa Europe Faith Justice Network, [n/d], <http://www.aefjn.org/index.
php/369/articles/the-eus-raw-materials-initiative.html>.
105 European Commission, ‘Integrated strategic vision to tackle challenges in commodity markets and on raw materials’,
2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0025:FIN:EN:PDF>.
106 European Investment Bank, Investment Facility, ‘2010 Annual report’, <http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/
if_annual_report_2010_en.pdf>.
107 European Commission (note 105).
108 EU–Africa Business Forum, ‘Economic growth: the private sector, a crucial partner for shaping the future of Africa’,
26–27 Nov. 2010, Tripoli, <http://acpbusinessclimate.org/euafrica/agenda.pdf>.
109 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), ‘Investment Monitoring platform’, [n/d],
<http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=532>.
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 21
Improving natural resources governance
To improve access to natural resources and to level the playing field between the EU and
other natural resource-importing companies, the EU is placing emphasis on improving natural
resources governance, particularly through increasing transparency and accountability. Key
initiatives include the following.
1. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EU has endorsed and is
actively promoting the EITI, which requires the annual disclosure of company payments and
government revenues in implementing countries.110 The published EITI reports reconcile
audited government receipts and companies’ audited accounts, exposing discrepancies, which
can then be investigated.111 The results are independently validated and provide civil society
organizations and other interested parties in natural resource-exporting countries with access
to information on natural resources revenues. This information can help to hold governments
and companies to account. While improving revenue transparency, issues related to revenue
expenditure remain largely unaddressed. Expenditure transparency can have transformative
power in terms of conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, as well as poverty reduction
and growth, since long-term economic development objectives depend on how natural
resource rents are utilized. While the EITI is a fundamentally important step towards a
greater contribution of natural resources revenue to economic growth and development, this
very objective is being undermined by a persistent gap in governments’ expenditure
transparency and accountability.112
2. The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Initiative (PEFA). The EU
supports the establishment and strengthening of institutional and regulatory frameworks in
natural resource-exporting countries. The objective is to improve different dimensions of
natural resources governance, such as domestic fiscal and economic policy-making, as well
as economic and public financial management (PFM). The latter includes guidance and
capacity building support in the context of equitable benefit-sharing and economic
diversification.113
In the absence of a sound PFM system expenditure effectiveness is undermined and rentseeking opportunities arise. This is why the EU supports the multilateral Public Expenditure
and Financial Accountability Initiative (PEFA). It supports integrated and harmonized
approaches to reform in the field of public expenditure, procurement and financial
accountability.114 However, despite many years of technical assistance, PFM systems remain
weak in many natural resource-exporting countries. This shows the difficulty for donors to
110 Ten EU members also endorsed the initiative as supporter countries. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
‘Supporting governments’, <http://eiti.org/supporters/countries>.
111 Global Witness, ‘The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Time to go global’, 16 Oct. 2006, <http://www.
globalwitness.org/library/extractive-industries-transparency-initiative-time-go-global>.
112 Resource Consulting Services, ‘Policy brief to guide DFID engagement with the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative’, Unpublished report (Resource Consulting Services: London, 2011).
113 Clingendael International Energy Programme, ‘Expert roundtable cooperation’, Mar. 2010, <http://www.polinares.eu/
docs/polinares_rmi_pietersen_ciepexpertmeeting.pdf>.
114 Since 2006, the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Initiative has developed a robust tool for measuring
PF performance and providing sound assessments of the quality of PFM systems for countries at all income level.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Report on the use of country systems in public financial
management’, 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Accra, 2–4 Sep. 2008, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
29/20/41085468.pdf>.
22 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
engage effectively in this area and highlights the need to design reform initiatives in
alignment with the incentives structures of the implementing governments.115
3. Conditional budget support. The EU uses budget support as a privileged aid modality,
but often delivers aid on the condition of policy reforms. In recipient countries, the EU and
other donors establish Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAFs) to monitor
improvements in implementing institutional reform and PFM. Capacity building and good
governance are also pursued within the framework of the AU–EU raw materials cooperation,
as mentioned above.116 These initiatives have been successful to the extent that the EU has
negotiated the inclusion of the implementation of NRM activities in recipients’ national
priorities.117 It is the implementation of the NRM activities that some recipient countries still
struggle with.
Natural resource management-related strategies and instruments
The EU is investing in NRM initiatives, some of which aim to address natural resourcerelated conflicts and improve sustainable access to natural resources.118 The EU’s natural
resource management initiatives are sometimes disconnected from central development
cooperation issues, such as human development, rural development, social cohesion and
employment, and water and sanitation.119 This distance undermines the EU’s effectiveness in
terms of harnessing natural resources for growth and development, and in the worst-case
scenario, makes the implementation of NRM activities in conflict-affected regions potentially
more harmful than beneficial.120
Natural resource trade formalization schemes
1. The Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Initiative (FLEGT) is an EUsupported initiative that aims to resolve natural resource-related conflict and counter illegal
logging and the trade in associated timber products. FLEGT is based on the development of
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPA) to promote good governance in natural resourceexporting countries and to support the legal timber trade. The EU has signed FLEGT VPAs
with Cameroon, Ghana and DRC. The programme has also supported the drafting of
legislation, known as the EU Timber Regulation, to ban illegally produced wood products
from the EU market.121 According to secondary sources, at the time of writing, the
115
Dorotinsky, B., ‘Public expenditure and financial accountability’, IMF Direct, 2008, <http://blogpfm.imf.org/
pfmblog/2008/04/public-expendit.html>.
116 Grice (note 53).
117 Ramdoo (note 66).
118 Council of the European Union, ‘The Africa–EU Strategic Partnership: a joint Africa–EU Strategy’, 16344/07 (Presse
291), Lisbon, Dec. 2007, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf>.
119 Feil, M., Klein, D. and Westerkamp, M., ‘Regional cooperation on environment, economy and natural resource
management: how can it contribute to peacebuilding?’, Initiative for Peacebuilding, Apr. 2009, <http://www.initiative
forpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Synthesis_Regional_cooperation_on_environment_economy_and_natural_resource_management.
pdf>.
120 As the European Security Strategy and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be
sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no
sustainable peace. European Council (note 5), p.8.
121 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Initiative, ‘Voluntary Partnership Agreements’, <http://www.euflegt.
efi.int/portal/>.
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 23
implementing regulations were still being designed, which means it is too early to judge the
long-term success of FLEGT.122
2. The EU also supports the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which seeks
to eliminate conflict diamonds from the world diamond trade. The KPCS is undermined by
its inability to control sub-national trading chains, particularly in artisanal diamondproducing countries, due to insufficient monitoring capacity. This means the KPCS currently
cannot guarantee that all KPCS-certified diamonds are ‘conflict-free’. In response to
criticism, during the EC chair of the KPCS in 2007, important reform pledges were made,
though with limited success in terms of implementation. They included pledges to strengthen
the implementation of the peer review system, increase the transparency and accuracy of
statistics, promote research into the traceability of diamonds, and broaden the involvement of
governments and civil society.123 In December 2011, Global Witness, an advocacy group and
a co-founder of the KPCS, left the process, saying ‘the scheme has failed…and has become
an accomplice to diamond laundering’.124
Promoting free trade strategies and instruments
The EU is concerned about the impact of direct and indirect strategies by non-European
countries to limit access to natural resources at reasonable prices and on the basis of equitable
market conditions. According to the European Commission, negotiating with one voice will
increase the EU’s chances to achieve and maintain ‘a level playing field in natural resources
markets where the risks are optimally distributed and the prices are effectively decided thus
preventing regulatory arbitrages’.125 Increasing free trade is therefore a key cornerstone of the
EU’s endeavours to gain access to natural resources. As discussed above, as part of the Raw
Materials Initiative, for example, the EU is seeking ‘sufficient market access to raw materials
at fair and undistorted prices and on non-discriminatory terms’.126 The European Commission
suggests an active approach in trade agreement negotiations and a proactive policy of
enforcing existing trade rules. The following paragraphs provide key examples.
Bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations
The EU seeks to convince its trading partners to abolish trade and investment policy
instruments that limit free trade and investment in natural resource sectors.127 It does so by
including what are termed ‘discipline tools’ on natural resource export restrictions (including
bans, quotas, duties and non-automatic export licenses). This is the case for the FTAs with
the Republic of Korea and India, and for provisions on export duties on several raw materials
in the context of Russia's WTO accession.128 Since 2008, the EU also has tried to eliminate
restrictions on natural resources exports in the context of EPA negotiations.129
122
European Retail Round Table, ‘Certification and legality, timber retail coalition’, <http://www.errt.org/uploads/
TRC/TRC%20Certification%20and%20Legality%2027%20April%202011.pdf>.
123 European Union at the United Nations, ‘Kimberley Process: European Commission leads UN General Assembly
debate on conflict diamonds’, 27 Nov. 2007, <http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7557_en.htm>.
124 MacNamara, W., ‘Founder pulls out of “failed” Kimberley Process’, Financial Times, 5 Dec. 2011.
125 Barroso (note 37).
126 European Commission (note 105); and European Commission (note 77).
127 Ramdoo (note 66).
128 European Commission (note 105).
129 Since 2002 most African countries have entered into EPAs that transform preferential agreements into reciprocal free
trade agreements. Ramdoo (note 66).
24 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
Box 3.3. Can trade control schemes stem natural resource-related conflict?
The development and trade of natural resources are often understood to cause conflict or to be a ‘root cause’ of
conflict. In response, the EU, among other international donors, supports a number of natural resources trade
control schemes that seek to prevent the development and trade of natural resources from fuelling conflict. In
the minerals and metals sectors, evidence on the ground suggests trade control schemes are unlikely to prevent,
mitigate, or resolve conflict, unless they are implemented in alignment with effective security sector and
governance reform initiatives. In fact, depending on how trade control schemes are implemented, they may even
exacerbate conflict.130
Research suggests that it is impossible to completely formalize the trade in high value and low volume
metals, such as gold, in countries with low sub-national implementation and monitoring capacity—even in the
absence of armed groups preying on mining and trade. In these countries, networks of local traders with good
territorial knowledge will always manage to smuggle goods across borders. Even in developed countries it is
impossible to completely stop smuggling, as the cocaine trade from Mexico into the US suggests.131 At the same
time, not all mineral and metal trading chains are entirely informal. In eastern DRC, a prominent case that
features frequently in the media, the artisanal gold trading chain is almost entirely informal, while trading chains
in high volume minerals, such as tin ore (cassiterite), formalize to a significant degree at the point of export.132
These trading chains—whether formalized or informal—generate the necessary hard currency to finance and
sustain what, in the context of eastern DRC, is an import-dependent local economy. Trade control schemes
introduced with the idea to prevent armed groups from profiting from the development and trade of natural
resources, such as traceability schemes, can therefore have negative externalities in the short to medium term.
They can reduce the overall trade in high volume minerals (that are more difficult to smuggle) causing local
conflicts due to population movements from mining areas rich in high volume minerals (tin-ore) into mining
areas rich in low volume metals (such as gold). The schemes rarely affect the mining and trade in low-volume
metals, as they are too easily concealed and transported, to effectively control them in the context of weak state
enforcement capacity.133 This suggests the promotion of natural resources trade control schemes may not have
the desired effect on the ground—at least in the short to medium term.
As part of the WTO’s on-going Doha round of negotiations, the EU has proposed to
strengthen the discipline on export restrictions.134 Accordingly, the EU has turned to counterstrategies, including calling on the WTO’s dispute settlement body, where natural resourceexporting countries employ export restrictions on natural resources.135 In the 2011
Communication on the RMI, the EU also presented several proposals to promote free trade in
natural resources, including: (a) pursuing the establishment of a monitoring mechanism for
export restrictions that hampers the sustainable supply of raw materials, and tackling barriers
distorting the raw materials or downstream markets with dialogue as the preferred approach,
but using dispute settlement where justified; (b) encouraging the inclusion of relevant nonOECD members in the work on raw materials, and exploring further multilateral and
plurilateral disciplines, including consideration of best practices; and (c) using competition
policy instruments to ensure that supply of raw materials is not distorted by anti-competitive
agreements, mergers or unilateral actions by the companies involved.136
130 Garrett, N. and Mitchell, H., ‘Beyond conflict: reconfiguring approaches to the regional trade in minerals from Eastern
DRC’, Resource Consulting Services, 1 Sep. 2009, <http://www.resourceglobal.co.uk/documents/Beyond%20Conflict_
RCS_CASM.pdf>.
131 United
Nations Activities, ‘Mexico and the US neighbours confront drug trafficking’, 2001,
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/218561.pdf>.
132 Garrett, N. and Mitchell, H., Trading conflict for development (Resource Consulting Services: London, 2009), <http://
www.resourceglobal.co.uk/documents/Trading%20Conflict%20for%20Development.pdf>.
133 Garrett and Mitchell (note 132).
134 Ramdoo (note 66).
135 European Commission (note 105).
136 European Commission (note 105).
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 25
Box 3.4. The rare earths case
China announced in September 2009 that it would start to apply export quotas on rare earth metals of which it is
the world’s largest supplier (95 per cent for rare earth concentrates).137 The Chinese Government is said to use
its power over rare earth production also to enforce bilateral issues. In September 2010, the Chinese
Government apparently blocked the export of rare earth metals to Japan—a move the Chinese Government
denies—over a maritime dispute.138
Since 2010, the EC has challenged the legality of export restrictions on rare earth metals, as it considers them
to threaten EU industries. In March 2012 the EU, the US and Japan together launched a WTO case against
Chinese rare earth export restrictions. By collaborating in this way, Brussels, Washington and Tokyo hope to
avoid retaliation from China such as the cuts in rare earth exports to Japan in 2010.139
This case demonstrates how access to resources is becoming fiercely contentious and observers are
suggesting, ‘the world economies need clear rules to avoid competition that could spark new trade wars’.140
However, the European Commission also seems to recognize that the unilateral approach
‘has not been well received by other countries’141 and it therefore increasingly emphasizes
strengthening multilateral platforms to counter export restrictions. For example, there has
been a call from the European Parliament for the setting up of a Raw Materials and Rare
Earths Stability Board in the G20.142
Regulatory strategies and instruments
Recent discussions within the EU have highlighted the need for the right level of regulation
of natural resources sectors in order to achieve a level playing field and a better growth and
development performance of the natural resources sectors.143 Currently, the EU supports a
number of voluntary, industry self-regulatory codes. These codes have different scopes and
can include issues ranging from broader environmental sustainability to financial
transparency and human rights. Industry self-regulation can help to avoid market distortions,
as long as it includes credible monitoring mechanisms. More importantly, industry selfregulation monitoring mechanisms must have universal application to truly contribute to
levelling the playing field. The EU is focusing on five areas in particular.
1. Traceability and certification. These types of schemes can contribute both to securing
access to natural resources and creating a level playing field. However the effectiveness of
the schemes depends on their real-world applicability: too weak and companies can get away
with transgressions; too draconian, and companies are likely to only sign up on paper or
ignore them.
2. Financial disclosure. In 2011, the European Commission proposed to introduce a system
of Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR). This system would apply to EU privately owned
137
Ramdoo (note 66).
Hook, L., ‘China’s rare earths stranglehold in the spotlight’, Financial Times, 13 Mar. 2012, <http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/e232c76c-6d1b-11e1-a7c7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1w5gS7PX8>.
139 Beattie, A. and Hook, L., ‘Fight against China on rare earths’, Financial Times, 13 Mar. 2012, <http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/4c3da294-6cc2-11e1-bd0c-00144feab49a.html#axzz1w5gS7PX8>
140 ‘Nobody should be fooled. It’s protectionism’, New York Times, 18 July 2011.
141 Hachfel, D., ‘A preliminary analysis of the new EC communication “Tackling the challenges in commodity markets
and on raw materials”’, Seattle to Brussels Network, 2011, <http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/
RMI_analysis_DH.pdf>.
142 European Parliament (note 76), p.15.
143 Euractiv, ‘Europe, US clash with Asia on commodities regulation’, 16 June 2011, <http://www.euractiv.com/
specialreport-rawmaterials/europe-us-clash-asia-commodities-regulation-news-505653>.
138
26 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
large companies or companies listed in the EU that are active in the oil, gas, mining or
logging sectors. CBCR is a different concept from regular financial reporting as it presents
financial information for every country that a company operates in rather than a single set of
information at a global level. Reporting taxes, royalties and bonuses that a multinational pays
to a host government will show a company's financial impact in host countries. This more
transparent approach would encourage more sustainable businesses and also level the playing
field for companies operational in key natural resource-exporting countries. In order to cover
the various types of companies active in these industries under the CBCR system, the
Commission is proposing to revise both the Transparency Directive to cover listed companies
and the Accounting Directives to cover large non-listed companies.144 If and when the
Council of Ministers adopts the Directive, it will become operational on a voluntary basis
until each member state adopts it into national law.
3. Anti-corruption. The EU has ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC) and supports its implementation. UNCAC is the first treaty that tackles
international corruption with preventative and punitive measures. About three-quarters of the
world’s countries (140 countries) are bound by the terms of UNCAC, which has now reached
critical implementation stage.145 In spite of the Convention’s comprehensiveness there are
some areas that need developing. In order to be more effective, the convention should take a
stronger stance in tackling political corruption (transparency in political financing is a mere
recommendation). Further, the review mechanism that was incorporated into the convention
in 2010 has very basic requirements and so relies heavily on the goodwill of counterparts to
make the most of the review process. It must be noted that the UNCAC is not a blueprint for
anticorruption reform and it does not constitute an end in itself.
Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union lists prevention and combating of corruption as
one objective enabling the creation of a European area. To this end, the EU Commission
recommended that the European Community adhere to the Council of Europe’s conventions
on corruption and participate in its monitoring mechanism, Group of States Against
Corruption (GRECO).146 This mechanism urges countries to agree on a common definition of
offences and common penalties regarding corruption. Nevertheless, EU countries reportedly
are still not implementing GRECO.147
Europol’s mandate has been extended to deal with almost all cases of money laundering,
which is of relevance particularly if high-value natural resources, like gold and diamonds, are
used in money laundering activities.148 Also, article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
EU by the Treaty of Lisbon inserted the Public Prosecutor post, which had as its main role the
responsibility for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment the offences against the
EU’s financial interests.149
144 European Commission, ‘More responsible business can foster more growth in Europe’, Press release, 25 Oct. 2011,
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1238&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangua
ge=en>; European Parliament, ‘Directive 2004/109/EC (Transparency Directive)’, 15 Dec. 2004; European Parliament,
‘Directive 78/660/EEC (Accounting Directive)’, 25 July 1978; and European Parliament, ‘Directive 83/349/EEC
(Accounting Directive)’, 13 June 1983.
145 European Commission, ‘Promising anti-corruption convention to be put into action?’, EuropeAid, <http://capacity
4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/promising-anti-corruption-convention-be-put-action>.
146 The Council of Europe is not part of the EU, although it contains EU member states.
147 European Commission, ‘A comprehensive EU anti-corruption policy’, European Commission, <http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/fight_against_corruption/l33301_en.htm>.
148 European Council Act, ‘Europol: European Police Office (until 31.12.2009)’ <http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/institutional_affairs/institutions_bodies_and_agencies/l14005b_en.htm#AMENDINGACTS>.
149 Treaty of Lisbon (note 69).
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 27
4. Human rights. The Council of Europe proposed in 2010 to establish a regulatory
framework to ensure that European firms fully respect human rights standards, by introducing
laws to protect individuals from abuses, and setting up the Council of Europe ‘label’ for
assessing the best business in terms of social responsibility practices.150 The latter would aim
to provide consumers with consistent and independent information on companies’ human
rights records. Such a scheme has yet to be implemented.
5. Sustainability. The performance standards of the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) must be met by any project prior to the granting of IFC funding.151 The standards
include a broad range of sustainability standards, including leading edge environmental
standards, and have been adopted by the European Development Finance Institutions as best
practice.152 These principles specifically relate to conflict as, contrary to other standards, they
include mechanisms to avoid conflict between, for example, local communities and
multinational (including European) companies. The IFC standard has become the most
widely accepted framework for managing environmental and social risks. This might be due
to its flexibility, enabling it to introduce improvements easily or to the fact that enforcement
takes place when there is a mishap. However, the narrow timeframe for improvement (a
maximum of 60 days) and the amount of flexibility act against the IFC Performance
Standards’ full effectiveness.153
While individual EU member states have endorsed further standards and the OECD is
active in drafting and promoting voluntary good practice standards and implementation
guidelines, we have limited this section to regulatory tools that the EU itself is actively
involved in.
II. Security responses
The Treaty of Lisbon amends the EU’s CFSP institutions established in the Treaty of Rome
and the Maastricht Treaty.154 With the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, Europe has affirmed
its ambition to emerge as a coherent foreign policy actor.155 Within the much broader
framework of CFSP, the CSDP is an international crisis management policy, which expands
the framework of military and civilian crisis management operations to include ‘deterring,
reducing and preventing intra-state conflict in a broad sense, whether it be a result of public
disorder or of mass persecution’.156 In the CSDP, the EU affirms its commitment to
150
Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Human rights and business’, 27 Sep. 2010,
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12361.htm>.
151 International Finance Corporation, ‘Performance standards and guidance notes, 2012 edition’, <http://www1.ifc.org/
wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/ifc+sustainability/sustainability+framework/Sustainab
ility+Framework+-+2012/#PerformanceStandards>.
152 Levin, E. and Stark, A., ‘Benchmark study of environmental and social standards in industrialised precious metal
mining’, Solidaridad Network, 2011, <http://solidaridadnetwork.org/what-we-do/cases/benchmark-study-environmentaland-social-standards-industrialised-precious-metals-m>.
153 Levin and Stark (note 152), p. 51.
154 The Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1993.
See Menon, A., ‘European defence policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 53, no. 3
(June–July 2011), pp. 75–90, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2011/year-2011-issue-3/european-defencepolicy-from-lisbon-to-libya/>.
155 De Vasconcelos (note 50), p. 19.
156 European External Action Service, ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’, EEAS, Brussels, <http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0026_en.htm>. See also De Vasconcelos (note 50),
pp. 22, 34.
28 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
expanding its defence capacities and to building on its status as a credible security actor on
the global stage.157
Despite the EU’s commitments, it has frequently found it difficult to live up to these
ambitions. These difficulties are reflected in the contents of the often vague and unspecified
European Security Strategy (ESS) drafted in 2003.158 Despite evolutions in security and
defence tools, the strategy lacked an overarching strategic framework and did not stipulate
specific conditions for applying security tools.159
A 2008 review led to an implementation report that was more an inventory of existing
security tools and resources than a revision of the ESS. A key reason for this was member
states’ concerns that revision would imply ‘securitizing’ a number of EU policies, such as in
the energy sector.160
In its 2008 review of the ESS, the EU listed a number of natural resource-related issues as
EU security and conflict challenges. First, the review referred to ‘an array of security
challenges’ associated with energy dependence on a limited number of countries ‘many of
which face threats to stability’. Second, it identified climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’
leading to increased competition for natural resources, potentially resulting in conflict. Third,
it suggests, ‘ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of
conflict’.161
While the ESS of 2003 mentions enhancing conflict prevention, crisis management and
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction capacities as the most relevant in the security
field of action, its analysis and early warning capacities are still to be improved.162 The EU’s
capacities in these fields encapsulate a number of specific tools that, within broader contexts
and if they are slightly adapted, could be directed to address natural resource-related security
and conflict challenges, as identified in the 2008 review of the ESS.
The European Union’s crisis management operations
The EU seeks to play its full role on the international stage through ‘effective EU-led crisis
management’.163 This has been viewed as an important element of the EU’s role as a strong
political actor and is considered integral to the maintenance of its ‘normative power’.164 The
EU runs military, political and civilian missions to help build and secure peace in a number
of countries in Europe, as well as in Africa and beyond.165
In the past, EU involvement in African security was seen as a sort of testing ground for
what was then the ESDP. This was due to a variety of reasons, including historical factors
157
European External Action Service (note 156). See also Giegerich, B. ed., Europe and Global Security (International
Institute for Strategic Studies: London, 2010), <http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphis-2010/europe-andglobal-security/>.
158 European Council (note 5).
159 Andersson et al. (note 1), p. 18. See also Roger, C. et al., ‘Guide to the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP)’, French Delegation to the EU Political and Security Committee, Nov. 2008, <http://www.rpfrance.eu/IMG/pdf/
Guide_to_the_ESDP_nov._2008_EN.pdf>, p. 6.
160 Andersson et al. (note 1), p. 23.
161 European Council (note 5).
162 European Council (note 5), p. 6.
163 Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency conclusions: Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999’, <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm>, p. 34.
164 Many authors argue the EU role in international relations has primarily been normative, rather than civilian or
military. See e.g. Manners, I., ‘Normative power Europe: the international role of the EU’, Archive of European Integration,
unpublished report, 2001, <http://aei.pitt.edu/7263/>.
165 European Union External Action (note 82).
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 29
that create strong links between, for example, the UK and France and various Anglophone
and Francophone African countries; the pressing conflict-related problems some African
countries were experiencing; and the effects these produced within the EU, particularly given
Africa’s close proximity to the EU’s borders (for example human trafficking and illegal
immigration).166 Based on the concept of human security, European experts and scholars have
defined the security and stability of African countries as a global public good.167 This
argument suggests that EU involvement in crisis-management operations in Africa is driven,
at least in part, by the EU’s objective of guaranteeing its member states’ security and
stability.
Security Sector Reform
Since 2005, security sector reform (SSR) has been a significant component of EU missions,
starting with the EU advisory and assistance mission for SSR in DRC. The EU considers SSR
to be ‘a holistic, multi-sector approach that seeks to find linkages between existing local
security actors when carrying out reform activities, rather than concentrating on one or a very
limited number of actors, often independent of each other, as previous donor actions have
tended to do’.168 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities are an
important part of the EU’s SSR work.169
A number of studies have highlighted that where natural resources are related to conflict,
NRM interventions by themselves cannot be effective conflict resolution tools, unless they
are integrated and aligned with SSR initiatives.170 The effectiveness of SSR missions, in turn,
is enhanced when a holistic approach is implemented to strengthen the civilian authorities
under which the security sector should operate. This includes strengthening civilian rule
consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, transparency and the
rule of law.
Within the framework of the CSDP, the EU has conducted three dedicated SSR missions
(namely EUPOL RD Congo on police reform; EUSEC RD Congo on defence reform; and EU
SSR Guinea Bissau, closed in September 2010), encompassing the defence, police and justice
sectors.171 However, the extent to which these SSR missions have incorporated NRM
initiatives in their design, particularly those in DRC where the natural resource-conflict link
is strong, is limited. This suggests that alignment of the EU’s SSR and NRM work can be
improved.
166 Collantes Celador, G. et al., ‘The EU and its policy towards security sector reform: a new example of the “conceptual–
contextual” divide?’, proceedings of the 6th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean, Fundacio
CIDOB, Barcelona, 5–6 Nov. 2007, <http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/monographs/monographs/6th_international_
seminar_on_security_and_defence_in_the_mediterranean_human_security>.
167 Human security has been defined as ‘in ethical terms … both a “system” and a systemic practice that promotes and
sustains stability, security and progressive integration of individuals within their relationships to their states, societies and
regions. In abstract but understandable terms, human security allows the individuals the pursuit of life, liberty and both
happiness and justice.’ Liotta, P. H. and Owen, T., ‘Why human security?’, Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and
International Relations (Winter/Spring, 2006), pp. 37–54.
168 Collantes Celador (note 166), p. 156.
169 Council of the European Union, ‘EU concept for ESDP support to security sector reform’, 13 Oct. 2005,
<http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/resources/EU_Concept_for_ESDP_support_to_Security_Sector_Reform.pdf>.
170 Garrett and Mitchell (note 132).
171 Council of the European Union, ‘Enhancing the EU’s capacities for support to security sector reform’, Common
Security and Defence Policy Newsletter, vol. 11 (Winter 2010–2011), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/
110131_CSDP_Newsletter_gp_cwi_final.pdf>.
30 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
The European Union–African Union Partnership on Peace and Security
In 2007, the EU established the EU–AU Partnership on Peace and Security as part of the
Joint Africa–EU strategy, adopted in the same year.172 The Partnership has two principal
objectives:(a) Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and Europe through
dialogue and information sharing; and (b) Coordination of action to address common and
global peace and security challenges, such as transnational organized crime, international
terrorism, mercenary activities, human and drug trafficking, illicit trade in natural resources,
illicit proliferation, accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as climate change and conflict.173
The EU is a major financial partner both in military and non-military assistance to the AU,
but it is aware of increasing Chinese involvement in African security, particularly through
China’s contribution to UN operations, which increases the importance the EU assigns to the
Partnership.174 So far the Partnership has focused on visible outcomes, such as the
establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and contributing
funding towards AU-led peace operations through the African Peace Facility (APF), which
was originally established in 2004.175 Support for APSA has come in the form of trilateral
agreements, support to coherent agendas on African training centres, operationalization of the
Continental Early Warning systems and support for the first Pan African initiative on the
control of illicit arms trafficking.176 There are a number of challenges for the consolidation of
the partnerships; greater political dialogue between the EU and AU is required as a need for
more effective consultation processes.177 There is also a real need to strengthen coordination
of positions on conflict and crisis situations that the AU can be affected by and to respond to
these in a concerted manner. The objectives of the partnership may in the end only be
complete once cooperation between Addis Ababa and Brussels improves and EU financial
support is expanded.
III. Climate change responses
Despite the correlation between climate change and conflict, which has been studied since the
1980s, the key event for the development of a European policy recognizing this connexion
was the presentation of a document by the High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the European Commission to the European Council in 2008. In
particular, this document officially recognized that ‘climate change will fuel existing conflicts
172 Council of the European Union, ‘The Africa–EU Strategic Partnership: a joint Africa–EU strategy’, 16344/07 (Presse
291), Lisbon, Dec. 2007, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf>. See also
European Commission, Europeaid, ‘African Peace Facility’, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/
peace/>.
173 Shinkaiya, J. K. et al., ‘Ensuring peace and security in Africa: implementing the new Africa–EU Partnership’,
Proceedings from conference on current state of, and future prospects for EU–African cooperation on security in light of the
Africa–EU Strategy, Chatham House, London, Oct. 2010, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/
Research/Africa/271010shinkaiye.pdf>.
174 Lirong (note 71); and Stahl (note 64).
175 Mair and Petretto (note 52). In Aug. 2011 the EU made available €300 million for the APF from 2011–2013. It will be
used primarily for continental and regional activities in the areas of peace building and conflict prevention, management and
resolution. Mungcal, I., ‘EU unveils support for peace building in Africa’, 31 Aug. 2011, <http://www.devex.com/en/blogs/
the-development-newswire/eu-unveils-support-for-peacebuilding-in-africa>.
176 Africa and Europe in Partnership, ‘Achievements/Milestones’, <http://www.africa-eupartnership.org/achievements
milestones>.
177 Africa and Europe in Partnership, ‘Future Challenges’, <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/future-challenges>.
EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES 31
over depleting resources’, which raised the subject’s profile in the EU’s domestic and foreign
policy agendas.178
Furthermore, under the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU developed a new inter-sectorial strategy
of high level protection and improvement of the quality of the environment at the national,
regional and international levels. In this way, the EU reinforced its legislative regulations at
the domestic level, while also working to promote a more effective global response to climate
change in international forums and in its bilateral relations with third countries.
At the domestic level, the European Commission strengthened its legislative efforts in
order to develop a climate and energy package that was adopted in 2009, providing a binding
greenhouse gas reduction target for 2020 and a set of policies to achieve the 20-20-20
targets.179 As part of a longer-term strategy, the Commission set up a new Roadmap in March
2011. The Roadmap provides guidance for EU countries to move towards a low-carbon and
resource-efficient economy through national and regional strategies for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emission. This new EU plan proposes a cut of the EU’s greenhouse emission
by 80 per cent by 2050 (compared with 1990 levels). This strategy would have several
benefits for the whole EU, notably by decreasing European dependence on oil and gas
imports, and consequently improving Europe’s energy security. Thanks to this ambitious
policy, the EU is currently the leading supranational organisation in the fight against climate
change.
The EU is a very active player in international climate change negotiations. Since 1992 it
has supported the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Further, since
the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 2007, several negotiations have been under way to agree
on further climate action, resulting in the three key conferences held in Copenhagen (2009),
Cancún (2010) and Durban (2011). During these conferences, for example, the EU
committed to providing €7.2 billion (8.97 billion dollars) to strengthen developing countries’
resilience to climate change over the period 2010–2012 and helped launch negotiations on a
global legal framework applicable to all countries.
Moreover, the EU’s engagement is reflected in the development of initiatives such as the
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), a technical and financial cooperation aimed at the
promotion of dialogue and exchange of experiences for innovative and effective approaches
to delivering climate change finance. From 2008 to 2011, the GCCA allocated more than
€200 million (249 million dollars) for support to 31 programmes around the world.180
Recognising the potentially significant security implications associated with climate
change, and as the largest contributor of climate finance flows to developing countries
affected by climate change, the EU is collaborating on a regional basis with its partners for
shaping adaptation policies and mitigating the risk of climate change-related violent conflicts.
To achieve more effective cooperation in this regard, the EU has promoted and financed new
178
European Commission, ‘Climate change and international security’, S113/08, Brussels, 14 Mar. 2008, <http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf>.
179 The 20-20-20 targets refer to a) a reduction in the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels ;
b) a requirement that at least 20% of the EU’s energy consumption should come from renewable resources; and c) a 20%
reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels, to be achieved by improving energy efficiency. European
Commission, ‘The EU climate and energy package’, 18 Oct. 2010, <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.
htm>; and European Commission, ‘Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and
assessing the risk of carbon leakage’, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 265, Brussels, 26 May 2010,
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0265:FIN:EN:PDF>.
180 European Union, ‘Using innovative and effective approaches to deliver climate change support to developing
countries’, 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/environment/documents/gcca_brochure_en.pdf>.
32 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
studies and initiatives on a region-by-region basis to in order to investigate the correlation
between climate change and natural-resource related conflict.
An example is the Initiative for Peacebuilding–Early Warning to Action (IfP–EW), a
consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission. One of IfP—
EW’s main clusters of investigation is the inter-relationship between climate change and
conflict. This research aims at understanding how these issues could be addressed, as well as
improving political will and trust in order to convince partners that climate change actions
and more effective approaches to resource management are vital to sustainable
development.181 The EU also is engaged in several regional initiatives, such as the climate
change regional cooperation programme, EUROCLIMA, which addresses complex
multisectoral issues including policy dialogue in Latin America and ClimDev Africa, a
programme aiming at facilitating the development of effective climate change policies in
Africa.182
In this more comprehensive approach adopted by the EU, actions against climate change
are also key priorities in its poverty reduction strategy. Examples include the European
Community Humanitarian Office’s provision of humanitarian assistance in cases of climate
change-related natural disasters such as floods, drought or food crisis, and the financing by
the Development and Cooperation Directorate–General (EuropeAid) of projects supporting
biodiversity, resources and energy management.
181
Ruettinger, L. et al., ‘Water, Crisis and Climate Change Assessment Framework (WACCAF)’, Initiative for
Peacebuilding–Early Warning Analysis to Action, June 2011, <www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/201106IfPEWWACCAF.pdf>.
182 Mwiturubani, D. A., and Van Wyk, J., ‘Climate change and natural resources conflicts in Africa’, Institute for Security
Studies Monograph no. 170, 2010.
4. Conclusions and questions for further research
I. Conclusions
The four principal dimensions of the interaction between natural resources and security and
conflict challenges have all developed significantly over the past two decades and further
changes are inevitable.
The debate around how natural resources contribute to conflict financing is prominent, but
the fact that the principal policy responses to the issue—for example, natural resources trade
control mechanisms such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme—have been unable
to fully meet their intended objectives demonstrates that more work needs to be done. There
is an urgent need to better understand the issue of conflict financing and also to tweak
existing responses or else develop complementary responses that are implementable in
difficult environments.
The question of state effectiveness features heavily in discussions about natural resources
governance and conflict. With the introduction of the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), many stakeholders in the natural resources sectors have become more
optimistic that natural resource-related corruption and the associated potential for grievancebased conflict can be prevented and/or mitigated. The lack of or slow progress governments
in many natural resource-rich countries are making with the implementation of more
expenditure transparency—a part of the value chain unaddressed by the EITI—suggests that
future policies have to be better aligned with implementing governments’ incentive
structures. These, in turn, need to be researched in more depth.
Climate change is a particularly under-researched dimension of natural resource-related
security and conflict challenges, partly because some of the anticipated symptoms are not yet
a reality. The importance that scientists, voters and other constituencies attach to climate
change shows that it will be important to make more significant inroads into understanding
the interrelationship of climate change and natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges, particularly so to put in place effective mitigation strategies that will help the EU
to deliver stability and long-term access to natural resources.
The move towards a multipolar global economy is an ongoing process, particularly with the
continued ascent of the BRICS and other emerging economies. Actual and potential natural
resource-related security and conflict challenges, in the context of an increasingly multi-polar
global economy, remain under-researched. The EU has to define its role in the future global
economy and adapt its strategies accordingly. This strategy should be based on solid research
and analysis.
The EU draws on a broad but often inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated range of
tools to manage natural resource-related security and conflict challenges. The urgency for
coordination and alignment is underlined by cases where EU development priorities and trade
objectives contradict each other, for example in the context of export taxation by African
natural resource-exporting countries.
The European Union now needs to elaborate a comprehensive strategy to overcome the
challenge that natural resources pose to the future security of its region. The EU should
formulate a practical policy proposal on natural resources that creates a framework aligning
its various trade, security, diplomatic, climate change and development strategies and
instruments. The proposal should define a set of strategic objectives for the EU with the
34 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
overarching goal of addressing the EU’s natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges, whilst ensuring sustainable access to natural resources and respecting the EU’s
development priorities. This proposal would then serve as a strategic framework for
rationalizing EU responses and avoiding contradictory actions. This will help enhance its
ability to engage effectively with the strategic challenges emerging in this area and, thereby,
maintain its own security and enhance international peace and stability. In other words,
developing and implementing and integrated strategy would help the EU to transform itself
from a security and policy actor with great potential into a more effective actor with
strategically focused policy instruments and resources.183
The initial task for the EU is to clarify the actual challenges that natural resources pose to
the CFSP. The analysis in this report is only the first step to achieving the required level of
understanding to build a coherent EU policy. The EU should therefore establish a
commission to prepare a working document that will identify and analyse, in a forwardlooking way, key natural resource-related security and conflict challenges and trends. This
task is particularly important considering the dynamic and evolving nature of natural
resource-related conflict and security challenges.
In fact, now is an opportune moment to suggest a strategy under which the EU could speak
with a single voice. After years of institutional fatigue following the failure of the
Constitutional Treaty project, the EU needs to focus on strategic priorities on which European
member states can act together. However, unless institutional challenges are also attended to,
the EU’s capacity to perform beyond the dimensions of its traditional trade- and aid-related
external policies will be hindered.184
Therefore, it is crucial to determine which institutional framework will most effectively
champion cross-sector policy proposals addressing natural resource-related security and
conflict challenges. The reason is that these challenges often emerge in grey areas where
trade, foreign affairs security and development policies overlap. The question of who should
speak on this subject—whether it is member states, the European External Action Service or
the various Commission directorates general—will need to be answered. Similarly, the
question of whether this entity should speak on behalf of member states, the EU as a whole,
or a body, such as the EC, will need to be resolved.185 Such a policy proposal might best fit
within a process of reviewing the ESS, which should focus on common security goals rather
than identifying common threats; this would help to promote consensus among EU member
states around how to respond to future crises.186
In order to progress this agenda, there is a need for additional research and analysis in the
area of natural resource-related security and conflict challenges to identify new approaches,
or else modify existing EU approaches. The following section outlines a series of research
and policy questions that the EU should consider. The first set of questions relates to natural
resources security in general; the second set covers four key areas: conflict financing, state
effectiveness, climate change and conflict over natural resources in a multipolar global
economy.
183
Giegerich (note 157).
De Vasconcelos (note 50), pp. 21–31.
185 In this regard, recent developments—including the British Foreign Office’s warning that it would resist any attempt by
the EU to encroach on British foreign policy rights—should be taken into consideration. See ‘Meanwhile on planet
Brussels’, The Economist, 18 Oct. 2011.
186 Andersson et al. (note 1), p. 13.
184
CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 35
II. Research and policy questions
General research and policy questions
Given the differences between EU member country priorities, can the EU develop a broadly
supported and practically applicable natural resources policy?
EU member states apply different approaches to energy needs and raw materials supply.187
Some member states seek access to natural resources through established relationships, such
as through former colonial relationships; for example, France has been relying on Algeria for
its gas supply and Italy on Libya.
Not all members view the EU’s security role in Africa as a priority. Member states directly
affected by terrorism, piracy, organized crime and migration, and those with strong business
links to Africa, emphasize the importance of minimizing security risks stemming from
Africa. Central European member states, on the other hand, tend to be more interested in the
issue of Eurasian energy security, for example.
There is a thus a risk of security free-riding among member states, which can translate into
a lack of political support to put the EU’s crisis management ambitions into action.188 It is
therefore necessary to map the key priorities of member countries and reflect this mapping
exercise in concrete policy proposals.
How feasible is a globally integrated natural resources management policy framework?
The EU should investigate the feasibility of defining a globally integrated and multilateral
natural resources management policy framework to address conflict and security challenges.
The EU has in fact been taking steps to increase multilateralism as part of its security
strategy, as well as its raw material strategy.189 Such a framework would offer the EU an
opportunity to address natural resource-related security and conflict challenges through a
holistic approach that integrates regulation, transparency and more effective development
policies.
Drawing from the experience of different industry self-regulatory tools, the feasibility of
setting mandatory minimum standards for industry should also be investigated, using the EU–
UN Extractive Industries and Conflict Initiative as a starting point.190
Potential proposals to be formulated within such a framework might include:
•
Incorporating the EU’s emphasis on accountability within an internationally binding
code for investments;
187 Lesourne, J., ‘Le changement du paysage géopolitique de l’énergie’ [Changes in the geopolitical landscape of energy],
Actuelles de l’IFRI, Aug. 2011, <http://www.ifri.org/?page=detail-contribution&id=6719>.
188 See Lirong (note 71), p. 15; and Helly, D., ‘R2P, Africa and the EU: towards pragmatic international subsidiarity’, ISS
Analysis, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Nov. 2008, <http://www.iss.europa.eu>, p. 2.
189 As part of the ESS, the EU is looking for partnerships that contribute to more effective multilateralism. See Roger
(note 159). In the field of security the EU has been collaborating closely with the UN, supporting all UN peacekeeping
operations. Moreover, within the framework of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy, the EU has enhanced African capacities in
crisis management and early warning. Also within the framework of the RMI, the EU has been calling for a multilateral
approach recognising that ‘only by integrating regulation, transparency and more effective development policies will the
responses to natural resources related challenges be effective.’ Barroso (note 37).
190 UN–EU Partnership, ‘Strengthening capacities for the consensual and sustainable management of land and natural
resources’ (Extractive Industries and Conflict Initiative). See also UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action
and EU, ‘Extractive industries and conflict’, 2010, <http://www.unep.org/conflictsanddisasters/Portals/6/ECP/4page_
Extractive_LowRes.pdf>.
36 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
•
•
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Developing an international anti-bribery act;
Establishing compliance mechanisms at the international level; or
Complementing investments in extractive industries with investments in other sectors,
such as manufacturing, telecommunications, services and infrastructure.191
Should EU natural resources strategies focus more on conflict prevention?
The vast majority of the EU’s policy tools are reactive. A greater emphasis on conflict
prevention, with a focus on interventions designed to prevent natural resource-related security
and conflict challenges, requires formulation of integrated security and economic preventive
measures. For example, efforts to establish early warning and conflict prevention systems
should allow a timely identification of natural resources as drivers of certain conflicts.192
Another initiative could include identifying effective mechanisms through which the EC can
monitor international agreements made by natural resource-rich countries with non-EU
member states.
How can the EU integrate natural resource issues within the European Security Strategy?
Currently, the ESS is not successfully addressing natural resource-related security and
conflict challenges. The EU’s crisis-management operations would prove more effective if
the role that natural resources play in influencing a security environment were more
effectively taken into account. This point was emphasized in the European Parliament’s July
2011 Report on the Raw Materials Initiative: ‘the question of access to natural resources
should be integrated successively into peace building and conflict prevention policy
measures, as a substantial number of conflicts have re-emerged in certain regions’.193
Natural resources and conflict financing
What are the economic, political and social impacts of natural resources trade control
mechanisms?
Technical interventions to control the trade in natural resources and break the link between
natural resources development and trade and conflict financing, such as the KPCS, often miss
their intended objective. These control mechanisms are more suited to achieving greater
formalization and professionalization of the trade in natural resources, than preventing natural
resource-related conflict financing.
Some schemes have been successful in making a number of OECD-based companies more
responsive to transparency and sustainability issues, largely due to consumer demands for
more ethically sourced products. However, they also have been severely criticized for having
caused economic hardship, political tensions and social fault lines in natural resourceexporting countries. Considering the level of financial and political support that some natural
resources trade-control mechanisms enjoy, their ability to bring about positive outcomes
requires further research.
191
An example is India’s strategy to secure raw materials in Africa while also developing opportunities in a wide array of
sectors where the subcontinent has a strategic interest. In South Africa, from where India sources raw materials, the Tata
Group has also opened a vehicle assembly plant. See Kermeliotis (note 63).
192 European Parliament (note 76).
193 European Parliament (note 76).
CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 37
How do remittances from European Union-based diaspora communities interact with natural
resource-related security and conflict challenges?
In areas such as eastern DRC, diaspora remittances have become an important revenue stream
for non-state armed groups whose access to revenues from the development and trade of
natural resources has reduced. NRM and SSR schemes aimed at breaking the linkage between
natural resources and conflict may therefore need to be complemented by more stringent
controls over diaspora remittances. However, diaspora remittances control is an area that
remains under-researched.
How can natural resources management and security sector reform be integrated effectively?
A number of studies have highlighted the fact that NRM interventions by themselves cannot
be effective conflict-resolution tools unless they are integrated and aligned with SSR
initiatives.194 Research must therefore focus on how to best align NRM and SSR interventions
so that they mutually reinforce each other.
What is the role of natural resources in conflict resolution?
Natural resources play a critical role in financing conflict, but also in creating strategic
incentives for peace-supporting action. Peace agreements have to create conditions in which
belligerents have more of an incentive to become part of a peace economy than to remain in
the shadow economy. How such conditions can be created remains under-researched. In order
to achieve security in resource-rich regions, such as the Great Lakes, ‘trade is the only way to
realize the value of the natural resources and so provides the means for poverty reduction’.195
Transforming conflict-financing trade into legal trade should therefore be a key research
focus.
Natural resources and state effectiveness
What are the security merits of investing in people affected by natural resources development
in producer countries?
The EU should commission research into the security merits of investing in people living in
natural resource-exporting countries, to determine whether or not to prioritize such
investments in its development policy.196 Two sets of tools—development programmes and
sustainability performance schemes at sites where natural resource development takes
place—aim at the same results: preventing conflict related to resources by reducing poverty,
and creating sustainable conditions for sourcing natural resources.
194
Garrett and Mitchell (note 132).
Sunman, H. and Bates, N., ‘Trading for peace: achieving security and poverty reduction through trade in the Great
Lakes area’, Department For International Development, USAID and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
2007, <http://www.envirosecurity.org/actionguide/view.php?r=205&m=publications>.
196 E.g. there is ample scope to establish long-term strategies to address the particular needs of artisanal mining
communities in terms of sanitation, water and schools, or to establish specific programmes to support entrepreneurialism and
economic diversification in local communities, including through infrastructure and agricultural development or by
supporting reforms in the employment-generating mining sector. Garrett and Mitchell (note 132).
195
38 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
What kinds of credible partnership offers can be made to natural resource-rich developing
countries?
By placing great emphasis on promoting its values and principles—for example by attaching
conditions to partnerships—the EU risks losing some of its political and economic influence
with resource-rich countries and emerging economies.197 African states are aware of the
political bargaining power that control over natural resources provides. The EU needs to
know what it can offer to avoid losing its economic influence in Africa, while also
maintaining an effective dialogue on domestic reforms and economic development.
Natural resources and climate change
Which resource-rich areas will be most affected by climate change and how can the EU best
respond to the associated conflict and security challenges while maintaining access to
resources?
Some key natural resource-rich countries, particularly in the tropics, will be relatively more
affected by climate change-related conflict and security challenges than others. The EU
should commission a mapping exercise as well as a country-specific institutional and
stakeholder assessment and, based on this knowledge, develop an effective long-term
engagement strategy that will help to mitigate natural resource-related security and conflict
challenges.
Conflict over natural resources in a multipolar global economy
What are the BRICS countries’ strategies for accessing natural resources and how can the
EU compete going forward?
The EU should understand and address the BRICS countries’—and in particular China’s—
growing influence on EU access to natural resources. This will help the EU to formulate a
position on the character of its relationship with these strategic competitors and potentially
partners, which can subsequently guide EU actions.
Does the trade diplomacy approach bear scrutiny?
The EU should investigate whether and how trade and diplomacy tools should be better
aligned with respect to securing access to natural resources.198 The European Parliament’s
International Trade Committee has called on the EU to create synergies between all European
policies and stakeholders, for example by setting up national strategic metals committees.
While these proposals have evident merits, they may also contain pitfalls and their usefulness
should therefore be further researched.
197 The EU offers little in the way of incentives for producer countries to sign up to its agenda. There is, therefore, a need
to define a true Africa–EU partnership. China’s success on the African continent with respect to securing access to resources
is largely due to the attractive and more partnership-orientated terms of China’s proposals, which respond to African
countries’ immediate needs and include combinations of preferential loans, credit, infrastructure development and
development assistance with few apparent and immediate strings attached. Ramdoo (note 66).
198 ‘The EU’s strategy on raw materials should include targeted diplomacy towards strategic supplier countries based on
their industrial and agricultural policy agenda and in line with its development and environmental policy’. European
Parliament (note 76).