CMSI Handout 10
Marcello Antosh
1 Thomas Nagel “Subjective and Objective”
A. Overview
Summary: Nagel tries to identify a common source for several philosophical problems. The
source of all these problems, he argues, is our ability to understand the world in different
ways or from different perspectives. It seems that each of these different ways of
understanding the world allows us to describe a distinct or unique aspect of reality that
cannot be properly explained in terms of some other way of understanding reality. So what
does this all mean? Is there really just one comprehensive way of explaining or describing
reality? Perhaps there are multiple realities.
Some especially important material: (i) the first three paragraphs of the article (p. 196), (ii)
pages 208 and 209 (skipping the first paragraph of 208), and (iii) the last paragraph of 211
until the end of the article (pp. 211-213).
B. Problem 1: The Meaning of Life (pp. 196-197)
The standard problem: What is the meaning of life? What is the point of all this? What is
the purpose of all this? Could there even be a purpose or point to all of this? Life seems kind
of pointless sometimes, but full of significance and importance other times. What the heck is
going on, why is it going on, and why does it involve me? I want some %@*(&#$ answers!
Nagel’s diagnosis of the problem: From the internal/subjective perspective, our lives seem
full of importance, significance, and value. From the external/objective perspective it seems
that nothing justifies us in taking life so seriously – and any justifications we attempt to give
are ultimately arbitrary or circular. And yet we go on living, taking our lives seriously. For
all intents and purposes, we simply ignore the arbitrariness and circularity that underlie the
justifications for everything we do. (For more details, see the notes on Nagel’s other article
“The Absurd”, below.)
C. Problem 2: Free Will (pp. 197-199)
The standard problem: What is the nature of free agency? Are you and I free in a way that
allows us to be responsible for what we do? Are we really in control of our physical actions
or mental states? We may think we are free, but is all this just an illusion? When we think
that we could have done otherwise than we actually did, is this a mistake since, given the
laws of nature we really couldn’t have done otherwise? Oftentimes it seems that nothing
makes us or forces us to do what we do – but since every event has a cause, maybe something
like our brain chemistry really does force us to do what we do without our being aware of it?
Oh dear!
1
Nagel’s diagnosis of the problem: This problem arises because two ways we can
understand the world are somewhat inconsistent or incompatible. From our
internal/subjective perspective, it seems that we are the sole causes of what we do – we make
choices and perform actions without being made to do so by any kind of force or cause
external to us. But from our external/objective perspective, it seems that since every event
has a prior cause, this rules out the possibility of agents ever really causing anything
themselves. For when an agent makes a choice or does some action this is really just some
byproduct or necessary consequence of the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology,
etc.
D. Problem 3: Personal Identity (pp. 199-201)
The standard problem: Everyone has experiences, but what makes the experiences I have
mine? After all, I have different experiences from day to day. And so do you. But I am not
you and you are not me. Why is this so? What exactly makes it the case that I exist through
time as a separate being from you?
Nagel’s diagnosis of the problem: From the internal/subjective perspective, I know that I
am me even though I am much different now than I was in the past. Something about me
experiencing my life and me having my experiences makes this life and these experiences
mine. But from the external/objective perspective, it is not so clear what makes me me or you
you. After all, we could all be cloned, right now, atom-for-atom. Why wouldn’t our clones
also be us?
E. Problem 4: Mind-Body Problem (pp. 201-202)
The standard problem: What is the nature of mental phenomena and its link with physical
phenomena, like the workings of the body? Are mental events physical events? If not, how
do they relate to physical events? How is it that some physical process (like the electric
neuron spikes in our brains) are about other physical processes in the world – that is, how is
it that some electrical code in our brain represents and creates a representation of some
event outside our minds, like a tornado (this is the problem of intentionality)? How do the
physical processes in our mind give rise to self-awareness and consciousness?
Nagel’s diagnosis of the problem: From the internal/subjective perspective, there really is
something it is like to be a particular kind of creature for that creature. Being a bat is
different than being a dog which is different than being a human: bats have sonar and are
basically visually blind, dogs don’t see in color, and humans see in color and have linguistic
concepts. But how could the external/objective perspective possibly capture, describe, or
explain these different kinds of experience? Sure, the external/objective perspective can
create some mathematical model about how the bat’s sonar works, or how the dog sees only
in black and white. But wouldn’t such a perspective leave out what it is like for the bat to be
a bat, or what it is like for the dog to be a dog? We could read the best books on how the
bat’s sonar sense operates – but if we never actually experience what it is like to be a bat,
have we really understood what being a bat is like for the bat? If not, then isn’t our
2
external/objective picture of reality incomplete? It leaves out what it is like for the bat, for
the dog, and for that matter, for the human!
F. Problem 5: Agent-Centered Ethics vs. Agent-neutral Ethics (or, as we’ve learned it:
Deontology vs. Teleology); more broadly: how objective and universal is morality? (pp.
202-206)
The standard problem: What should I do? What should you do? How about those people
over there – what should they do? How about those alien invaders – they shouldn’t kill us,
right? Should I maximize utility, like Mill says, or should I follow the Categorical
Imperative, like Kant says? How about the Golden Rule – should I follow that? Should I do
what’s best for my present self, my future self, my family, my country, people in general,
sentient beings in general, earth, the solar system, etc.? Wait – is there really anything that’s
best at all, or best for all of us? Are values just relative? If so, how relative are they? Or are
values really just nonexistent? Maybe ethics is really just some kind of useful fiction, like
Santa Claus: maybe there really are no such things as good, bad, right, or wrong… maybe it’s
just some junk that our parents teach us just to keep us in line. What a sham!
Nagel’s diagnosis of the problem: There are different perspectives we can adopt, when
considering values and norms – like the values and norms we encounter in ethics. One
extremely subjective perspective is that the only thing that matters are my present aims and
desires: on this view, what I should do depends solely on these present aims and desires. One
extremely objective perspective is that there really are no values or norms at all: nothing is
good, nothing is bad, there is nothing that anyone should or should not do, etc. There are
many perspectives in between these extremes. The problem is that each perspective makes
some claim about what we really should be doing and that these claims are often in conflict
with each other.
Examples:
View name
objective or subjective?
View says…
Kantianism
comparatively subjective
Focus on having a good will not the
consequences!
Utilitarianism
comparatively objective
Be impartial! Focus on the effects of
acts on others!
Nagel’s focus = agent-centered views (subjective/internal/Kantian) vs. agent-neutral
views (objective/external/utilitarian):
In this portion of the article Nagel focuses on two kinds of perspectives. One is the
comparatively more objective/external perspective that is more closely associated with
Mill’s focus on maximizing the good of all sentient beings: on this view, what each of us
should do is to try to bring about the best outcome. This view is comparatively objective
3
since it is highly impartial, impersonal, or agent-neutral – what matters on this view is
that, from an impartial perspective, things go best overall, for all sentient beings.
The other is the comparatively more subjective/internal perspective that is more closely
associated with Kant’s focus on having and acting in accordance with a good will. This
view is comparatively subjective since it is concerned most with what the agent does and
the agent’s intention when she does it. It is less concerned with how well things go
overall, or with consequences in general.
Examples of when agent-centered (think Kant) and agent-neutral (think Mill) views
conflict:
Bridge: Five people are stranded on train track and will soon be killed. The only way you
can save these five people is by pushing some bystander in front of the train – this will
kill the bystander, but cause the train to stop. Should you push the bystander?
Grandchild: You and your friends have been in an auto accident on a deserted road.
Your friends are badly injured and the car is totaled. The only hope of help is a nearby
house. You arrive at the house desperate and bloody – the old grandma lets you in. You
try to convince her that you really need help but she becomes terrified and locks herself
in the bathroom with the only phone. She has left her grandchild in the main room. You
might be able to convince her to give you the phone if you twist the child’s arm to make
the child cry. Should you harm the child?
G. Clarification about the “two” perspectives (pp. 206-207)
Really there is a spectrum or continuum of perspectives that we can adopt in order to
understand the world, not just two. There are varying degrees of subjectivity and varying
degrees of objectivity.
H. Clarification about subjectivity, and Wittgenstein (pp. 207-208)
Don’t worry about this too much or at all – it’s some subtle philosophy stuff. If you’re
curious, you might discuss it with your TA during office hours.
I. Statement of the general problem (pp. 208-210)
Different perspectives compete for being the one and only reality: Creatures like us can
try to understand reality. Part of our ability to understand reality is our ability to understand
reality in different ways or from different perspectives. Sometimes (like in the five problems
above), what one of these ways or perspectives tells us about reality conflicts with what one
of the others ways or perspectives tells us about reality. It might be that there is no way to
resolve the conflicts between these competing conceptions of reality. But if this is so, what is
the real reality – what is reality really like?
4
J. Survey of three types of solutions to the general problem and why Nagel thinks they are
inadequate (pp. 210-211)
Reduction: Try to explain one perspective or way of understanding reality in terms of
another one.
Example: try to explain how mental events in some way reduce to or just are really
complicated physical events.
Elimination: Try to dismiss or eliminate one perspective or way of understanding reality as
illegitimate – that is, try to say of this perspective: “oh, there really is no perspective like that
– that’s just an illusion for some reason. We are just confused – that’s not what reality is
really like”.
Example: try to dismiss Kantian ethics as “rule worship” – hangovers from an earlier
time in human history, when people mistakenly thought that it was important to “act with
a good will”; since Mill, we know better – we know that the welfare of all sentient beings
is all that really matters.
Annexation: Add something new to our reality and show how this new thing resolves the
conflict between the two perspectives.
Example: How does the mental interact with the physical? Easy: we have souls – you
see, souls are non-physical objects that can nevertheless interact with physical object.
Mental events are just stuff that happens to souls. Problem solved… sort of???...
K. Nagel’s proposed solution to the general problem (pp. 211-213)
Multiple Realities: It may be a mistake to think that there is one single reality that can be
understood in one single comprehensive way. Perhaps there are multiple realities, some of
which simply cannot be understood or explained in terms of the perspectives that we use to
understand other kinds or reality. It is not that there is one reality and that no single
perspective can fully explain it. Rather, each perspective can fully explain one reality, and
there are just multiple perspectives (and thus multiple realities).
2 Thomas Nagel “The Absurd”
A. Overview
Overall Summary: Sometimes we feel that life is absurd – perhaps it is absurd all the time.
Nagel considers some standard explanations for why this might be so. He thinks that these
explanations are problematic and cannot fully explain the absurdity of life. But, he thinks that
something about these explanations is correct – he thinks they are metaphors or vague
suggestions about why life really is absurd. He offers a new explanation of why life really is
absurd – or at least an explanation of why it is absurd when we think it is.
5
One really important paragraph and section: read the very first paragraph of the article (p.
11), and all of section II (pp. 13-15).
B. Section I
Section I Summary: Nagel considers three standard arguments according to which our lives
are absurd. He raises objections to each of these arguments. He seems to conclude that each
of these arguments fails in at least one of three ways. In particular, each argument either (i)
fails to establish that our lives are absurd, (ii) fails to explain what makes our lives absurd if
they are, or (iii) fails to explain why our lives are absurd if they are.
“Bad Argument 1”: Distant Future Argument for the Absurdity of Life
(1) If what we do during our lives won’t matter in the distant future, then our lives are
absurd.
(2) What we do during our lives won’t matter in the distant future.
(3) So, our lives are absurd.
“Bad Argument 2”: Tiny and Brief Argument for the Absurdity of Life
(1) If either (i) we are tiny compared to the size of the universe, or (ii) our lives are brief
compared to other events in the universe, then our lives are absurd.
(2) We are tiny compared to the size of the universe, and our lives are brief compared to
other events in the universe.
(3) So, our lives are absurd.
“Bad Argument 3”: The Elaborate Journey to Nowhere Argument for the
Absurdity of Life
Because we are finite beings that will die, there is no final purpose to any of our lives.
Our life only has meaning in terms of further activities and aims. But we know our aims
and activities will run out sometime – so that makes life absurd.
Nagel makes several replies to these arguments. Ask yourself:
1. Do Nagel’s replies show that these arguments are unsound?
2. Do Nagel’s replies show that these arguments don’t even offer part of an explanation
of why life is absurd, insofar as it is?
C. Section II
Section II Summary: Nagel considers some particular situations that seem absurd. These
situations are absurd because there is an obvious discrepancy between (i) how the situation
aims or aspires to be and (ii) how the situation really is. Nagel then presents his explanation
of the more general problem of the absurdity of life. He claims that our lives are absurd
because of a tension or conflict that arises between two different perspectives that we can
adopt with respect to our own lives.
6
Obvious Discrepancy Account - when situations are absurd: Ordinarily, Nagel claims, “a
situation is absurd when it includes a conspicuous discrepancy between pretension or
aspiration and reality” (p. 13)
The “obvious discrepancy” explained more fully: Something can aim or aspire to be a
certain way only if that thing has intentions or plans. Situations don’t have intentions or
plans, so situations can’t actually aim or aspire to be certain ways. So what does Nagel have
in mind when he claims that a situation is absurd because there is an obvious discrepancy
between how a situation aspires to be and how it actually is?
Possible answer: Intuitively, we think certain situations should be a particular way.
Sometimes, however, these situations not only fail to be how we think they should be, but
they turn out to be just the opposite of how we think they should be, and they do so in a way
that seems unreasonable or uncalled for.
Examples:
Situation
Being knighted
Proclaiming love
How this situation should be
noble, honorable, dignified
sincere, moving, emotive
If the situation is actually…
then it is absurd
humiliating, embarrassing
sterile, emotionless
Nagel’s Diagnosis of the general problem of the absurdity of life: In addition to particular
situations sometimes seeming absurd, sometimes life in general seems absurd. Nagel thinks
the reason for this is that there is a conflict between two features about us – the
Unavoidability of Seriousness, and the Inescapability of Doubt:
“We cannot live human lives without energy and attention, nor without making choices
which show that we take some things more seriously than others. Yet we have always
available a point of view outside the particular form of our lives, from which the seriousness
appears gratuitous. These two inescapable viewpoints collide in us, and that is what makes
life absurd. It is absurd because we ignore the doubts that we know cannot be settled,
continuing to live with nearly undiminished seriousness in spite of them.” (p. 14)
Unavoidability of Seriousness: we can’t help taking our lives seriously and judging that our
activities, plans, hopes, desires, etc., have some kind of importance, value, or worth.
Example: Ask yourself these questions: “What did I eat yesterday? Why didn’t I eat a
bowl of rocks instead, or nothing at all? Who are my friends? Why are these people my
friends? Why have friends rather than not? Why did I go to that party last week? Why do
I drink or hang out with people at all?” Don’t your answers show that you care about
some things more than others and therefore that you care about and value some things at
all? Yes!
Inescapability of Doubt: we have the capacity of looking at our own lives from a more
objective or external perspective. From this perspective, the importance, value, and worth
7
that we assign to aspects of our lives, and the seriousness with which we live our lives seems,
in some sense, arbitrary, uncalled for, and unjustified.
Example: In the song “Roc Boys” Jay-Z claims that many people are important - his
drug connect, greedy cops, and most importantly, you, the customer. How can he justify
this claim that these people are important? His justification might be that all these people
are important because they have helped him become successful. But why is success
important? His justification might be that success is important because it allows for him
to have a good life. But why is a good life important? Etc. Nagel thinks that since every
(good) justification ends somewhere, there are only two options for Jay-Z’s justification.
Arbitrary Option: Perhaps Jay-Z’s explanation of why these things are important stops
here: “a good life just is important, period! All these other things are important because
they lead to a good life - end of story.” But there are at least two ways in which this
justification would be arbitrary.
Way 1 - The Stopping Point Is Arbitrary: It is arbitrary that Jay-Z stops his
justification here, with this reason, rather than somewhere else, with some other
reason. Why didn’t his justification stop at “these people just are important, period!”?
What makes one stopping point better than another? In some sense, nothing! It’s just
some kind of habit of ours to go on offering justifications until we can’t think of any
more, or to think that some justifications are more basic than others and to stop our
justifications at these more basic. But that makes the particular stopping points we
choose arbitrary.
Way 2 - The Reason Itself Is Arbitrary: For that matter, why didn’t his justification
stop at “My stage name is ‘Jay-Z’ and that makes these people important” or “These
people are important because they don’t live on Mercury” or “these people are
important because there are more than fifty seven stars in the sky”? What makes the
reasons we typically offer any good? If we were different kinds of creatures, with
different histories, other reasons might be considered good. So, it’s kind of arbitrary
that we offer the particular reasons we do.
Circularity Option: Perhaps Jay-Z could justify why these people are important by
appealing to the importance of something else, like success. And perhaps he could justify the
importance of success by claiming that it leads to a good life. And perhaps he could justify
the importance of a good life by claiming that it leads to knowing important people. But then
his justification would be circular. Ordinarily that’s a bad thing.
A Reconstruction of Nagel’s Argument For The Absurdity Of Our Lives
(1) There are some doubts about the seriousness, worth, value, or importance of our lives,
and these doubts cannot be settled - they are relentless.
(2) If there are such doubts, then our lives are absurd if, after learning of these doubts, we
continue to treat our lives with about the same amount of seriousness, worth, value, and
importance as we did before we learned of these doubts.
∴ (3) So, our lives are absurd if, after learning of these doubts, we continue to treat our lives
8
with about the same amount of seriousness, worth, value, and importance as we did
before we learned of these doubts.
(4) After learning of these doubts, we continue to treat our lives with about the same amount
of seriousness, worth, value, and importance as we did before we learned of these doubts.
∴ (5) So, our lives are absurd.
D. Section III
Objection to Nagel: these doubts can be settled if we justify our lives or things that we value
in terms of things that are greater or larger than us, such as our country or our faith.
Nagel’s Reply: Wrong. The doubts still remain. Why think these other things are important?
The justifications are just as arbitrary and circular and we ignore this and keep on living as
usual!
Camus and the Myth of Sisyphus
E. Section IV
Objection to Nagel: The perspective you speak of doesn’t exist! Here’s the dilemma: If we
look at our lives objectively, like you say, Nagel, then either we assess them with our same
values or not. If we assess them with these values, then our lives still are important, and for
precisely the reasons we provide. If we look at our lives without using any values at all, or
some other set of values (like the values of an Alien), then this tells us nothing! Who cares
what an Alien thinks about our lives?! Who cares if some “outside” observer thinks we’re
silly?!
Nagel’s Reply: Wrong! You’re misunderstanding what I’m saying! I’m not saying that there
is some objective answer about what really is important for all beings or creatures and that
our lives don’t measure up to this standard. Rather, I’m saying that there is no standard that
applies independently of the kind of being you are. But the kind of being you happen to be is
full of contingency and thus arbitrariness! You can’t justify the importance of your life
except from the perspective of some values like yours! But recall that these justifications will
ultimately be arbitrary or circular! And our lives are absurd because we ignore the fact that
there’s no non-arbitrary non-circular way to justify anything that we think is important! But
don’t these important things that mean so much to us deserve some non-arbitrary, noncircular justification!?!
F. Section V
The Connection Between The Meaning of Life and The Justification Of Knowledge:
Roughly the doubts that threaten our ability to know anything at all are of the same kind as
the doubts that threaten our ability to justify the importance of our own lives.
G. Section VI
9
Why The Bad Arguments For The Absurdity Of Life: they are metaphors for the
absurdity that I, Thomas Nagel, have pointed out.
Why The Life Of A Mouse Is Not Absurd: The mouse can’t question itself and raise
doubts about its life like we can about ours.
Must We Solve The Problem Of The Absurdity Of Life?: Nah. Don’t worry – it’s kind of
ironic and curious. But don’t worry! Be happy now, in a funny, Woody Allen sort of way.
10