You can download a pristine copy of this case at: http://laws.findlaw.com/us/367/488.html
The following text includes all of the Supreme Court’s text. I’ve highlighted some of that text with red,
red and yellow, and red and green to signify higher and higher levels of interest and importance.
I also use the color pink to signify something that I don’t believe is true or something that I don’t
understand.
My own comments are presented as [bracketed, bold blue text.]
Alfred Adask
http://adask.wordpress.com
U.S. Supreme Court
TORCASO v. WATKINS, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
367 U.S. 488
TORCASO v. WATKINS, CLERK.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
No. 373.
Argued April 24, 1961.
Decided June 19, 1961.
Appellant was appointed by the Governor of Maryland [Not “The State of Maryland”?] to the office of
Notary Public; but he was denied a commission because he would not declare his belief in God, as required by the
Maryland Constitution. Claiming that this requirement violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, he sued in a state court to compel issuance of his commission; but relief was denied. The State
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing without need for
implementing legislation and requires declaration of a belief in God as a qualification for office. Held: This
Maryland test for public office cannot be enforced against appellant, because it unconstitutionally invades his
freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from infringement by the States. Pp. 489-496.
st
[Damn. As seen in the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, the 1 Amendment is intended to protect the
people of the States of the Union from misconstruction or abuse” of the “powers” of the federal Constitution by
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the officers, officials and employees of the federal government. The 1 Amendment protects the people of the
States against the federal government.
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But here, the Supreme Court indicates that the 14 Amendment is intended to protect the rights of . . .
someone . . . who? “citizens of the (singular) United States”? “Residents”? . . . against “infringement by the
States”. And which “States”? Union or territorial?
The point is that, if we can judge from the Supreme Court’s text, the Bill of Rights protects the People of
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the States from the federal government, and the 14 Amendment protects the federal government from the
People of the States of the Union.
Also, it appears that we no longer have a mere “freedom of religion”. We now have a “freedom of
belief and religion”. It is probably this “freedom of belief” that opens to the door to treating atheistic
philosophies as if they were “religions”.]
223 Md. 49, 162 A. 2d 438, reversed.
Leo Pfeffer and Lawrence Speiser argued the cause for appellant. With them on the briefs were Joseph A.
Sickles, Carlton R. Sickles, Bruce N. Goldberg, Rowland Watts and George Kaufmann.
Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General of Maryland, and Joseph S. Kaufman, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause and filed a brief for appellee. C. Ferdinand Sybert, former Attorney General of Maryland, and Stedman
Prescott, Jr., former Deputy Attorney General, appeared with Mr. Kaufman on the motion to dismiss or affirm.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Herbert A. Wolff and Leo Rosen for the American
Ethical Union, and by Herbert B. Ehrmann, Lawrence Peirez, Isaac G. McNatt, Abraham Blumberg, Arnold Forster,
Paul Hartman, Theodore Leskes, Edwin J. Lukas and Sol Rabkin for the American Jewish Committee et al. [367 U.S.
488, 489]
[I’m surprised as the number of “Jewish-sounding” names that spoke in favor of secular humanism. The
fact that these names sound “Jewish” to me is not proof that any person of the Jewish persuasion worked
diligently to encourage the Supreme Court to not only recognize “secular humanism” and “atheism” as
legitimate religions, but also to protect the government from liability if government “established” the atheistic
“religion” of “secular humanism”. It could very well be that “Abraham Blumberg” was actually a Hindu. Still,
I’m still surprised by the number of persons who appear to be Jews who advocated in favor of secular humanism
as a religion. ]
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides:
"[N]o religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit [private?
Corporate?] or trust [constitutional?] in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God . . . ."
The appellant Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland but was
refused a commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God. He then brought this action in a
Maryland Circuit Court to compel issuance of his commission, charging that the State's requirement that he
declare this belief violated "the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States . . .
." 1 The Circuit Court rejected these federal constitutional contentions, and the highest court of the State, the
Court of Appeals, affirmed, 2 holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing and requires
declaration of belief in God as a qualification for office without need for implementing legislation. The case is
therefore properly here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2).
There is, and can be, no dispute about the purpose or effect of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
requirement before us—it sets up a religious test which was designed to [367 U.S. 488, 490] and, if valid, does bar
every person who refuses to declare a belief in God from holding a public "office of profit or trust" in Maryland.
The power and authority of the State of Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular sort of believers—
those who are willing to say they believe in "the existence of God." It is true that there is much historical
precedent for such laws. Indeed, it was largely to escape religious test oaths and declarations that a great many of
the early colonists left Europe and came here hoping to worship in their own way. It soon developed, however,
that many of those who had fled to escape religious test oaths turned out to be perfectly willing, when they had
the power to do so, to force dissenters from their faith to take test oaths in conformity with that faith. This
brought on a host of laws in the new Colonies imposing burdens and disabilities of various kinds upon varied
beliefs depending largely upon what group happened to be politically strong enough to legislate in favor of its own
beliefs. The effect of all this was the formal or practical "establishment" of particular religious faiths in most of
the Colonies, with consequent burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of nonfavored believers. 3
There were, however, wise and far-seeing men in the Colonies - too many to mention - who spoke out
against test oaths and all the philosophy of intolerance behind them. One of these, it so happens, was George
Calvert (the first Lord Baltimore), who took a most important part in the original establishment of the Colony of
Maryland. He was a Catholic and had, for this reason, felt compelled by his conscience to refuse to take the Oath
of Supremacy in England at the cost of resigning from high governmental office. He again refused to take that oath
when it was demanded by the Council of the Colony of [367 U.S. 488, 491] Virginia, and as a result he was denied
settlement in that Colony. 4 A recent historian of the early period of Maryland's life has said that it was Calvert's
hope and purpose to establish in Maryland a colonial government free from the religious persecutions he had
known—one "securely beyond the reach of oaths . . . ." 5
When our Constitution was adopted, the desire to put the people "securely beyond the reach" of
religious test oaths brought about the inclusion in Article VI of that document of a provision that "no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
[That’s interesting. Perhaps crucial. Many, perhaps all, of the constitutions of the States of the Union
required that officers of those States must express a belief in God as a prerequisite for taking public office.
Article VI of the federal Constitution declares that there be no such requirement to believe in God as a
prerequisite for holding office or employment “under the United States”. At the State level, officers had to
profess a belief in God; at the federal-territorial level, no such profession was required.
The federal territories like Washington DC, TX, OK, OR, NY, Fl, etc., would definitely be “under the
United States”. The State of the Union would presumably be “over the United States”. The Court does not say
but at least implies that religious tests may be “constitutional” within States of the Union, but not in
“territories”.
The federal government appears to be more open to atheism while atheism was anathema to the
governments of the States of the Union. Once you see that fundamental difference between the States of the
Union mandatory belief in God vs the federal government’s rejection of that requirement, it’s easy to see how a
“spiritual war” might have evolved between the States of the Union and federal government.
The Bible says something in regard to a “House divided” being unable to stand. Can The United States
of America continue to stand if the governments of the States require a belief in God to hold office, but the
federal government does not? Does that dichotomy make spiritual warfare between the States and the federal
government inevitable?
Even so, the States of the Union were free to keep their “religious test” at least until the 14
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Amendment to extend the terms of Article VI Section 3 to the States.]
Article VI supports the accuracy of our observation in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 , that
"[t]he test oath is abhorrent to our tradition."
[Who gives a damn about the Supreme Court’s “observations” or their “traditions”? The issue is
whether something is or is not “constitutional”. Other than that, the Court’s “observations” and “traditions”
may be interesting but carry no de jure authority.]
Not satisfied, however, with Article VI and other guarantees in the original Constitution, the First
Congress proposed and the States very shortly thereafter [367 U.S. 488, 492] adopted our Bill of Rights, including
the First Amendment. 6 [Very interesting. The Article VI Section 3 prohibition against religious requirements for
the feds seen in the Constitution adopted in A.D. 1788 was so some degree “amended” by the subsequent Bill of
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Rights and the 1 Amendment adopted in A.D. 1789 . . . . Of course, the whole thing was again “amended” to
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some degree by the 14 Amendment of A.D. 1968. ] That [First] Amendment broke new constitutional ground in
the protection it sought to afford to freedom of religion, speech, press, petition and assembly. Since prior cases in
this Court have thoroughly explored and documented the history behind the First Amendment, the reasons for it,
and the scope of the religious freedom it protects, we need not cover that ground again. 7 What was said in our
prior cases we think controls our decision here. [They are not controlled by the Constitution, per se, but rather
by “prior cases” decided by previous Supreme Court members.]
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 -304, we said:
[The Supreme’s use of the word “we” to reference a decision issued by a previous court indicates that
the 9 members of the Supreme Court regard themselves as members of the same “Court” that existed 50 years
earlier or even 200 years earlier. They apparently do not view the court as changing to reflect changes in actual
membership. They apparently see all current and former, living and dead, members of the Supreme Court as
still being part of the “we” that constitute a singular institution (the Supreme Court) that’s gone on for decades
or centuries.
This is interesting in that we might expect that whenever we take a case to the Supreme Court based on
a constitutional issue, that the current Supreme Court judges would decide the case based strictly on their
understanding of the Constitution. But, insofar as the Court is a “we” that includes former and deceased
members, our case is not simply decided by the nine justices who sit on the court today. It is also decided based
on case decisions and “votes” of the former justices (now dead) dealing with the subject.
In a sense, my case to the Supreme Court might not be decided by a vote of 5 to 4, but—if we include all
of the former justices opinions on the subject—by a vote of, say, 123 to 45. I doubt that there’s anything to be
done about this situation of posthumous “votes,” but it is an intriguing observation.]
"The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. . . . Thus the Amendment
embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be."
[I’ll bet that these “two concepts” evolved into the “two purposes”: 1) for the purpose of individual
expression of personal faith; and 2) for the purpose of governmental “establishment” of religion. If so, the
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previous case has laid the foundation for bifurcating the 1 Amendment to allow individuals to take “secular
humanism” as their faith, but prevent the public from challenging the federal government’s imposition of
secular humanism as government-established religion.
Why, “in the nature of things,” can’t Congress and the States be prevented from enforcing the 1
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Amendment’s prohibition against the “establishment” of the “secular humanism” religion? I suspect that the
answer is only that the Supreme Court knows that this nation was built on spiritual principles that are no longer
politically predominant and are therefore to be abandoned, suppressed or forgotten—but without bothering to
amend the Constitution to get the People’s approval.
I’ll bet that the “in the nature of things” comment is subject to attack as reflecting the Supreme Court
being controlled by a non-constitutional “nature”.
Also, the Supreme Court’s reference to “legislatures of the states” may be ambiguous. Does the
Supreme Court refer to legislatures of the States of the Union? Or do they refer to the legislatures of “territorial
states”?]
Later we decided Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 , and said this at pages 15 and 16:
"The `establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor[367 U.S. 488, 493] the Federal Government can set up a church. [Not even 501(c)3?] Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. [If a case can
be made that government has “established” secular humanism as the “national” and/or “state”
religion, then if I were to advance a defense based on the Christian faith, the result might be an
unresolvable “conflict of law”. If the government cannot “prefer” one religion over another, then it
can’t “prefer” secular humanism over Christianity. Once I defeat any presumption that I’m a member
of the secular humanist faith, I doubt that gov-co can easily subject me to laws based on the secular
humanist faith (atheism).] Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. [They can’t force you
to “profess” a belief in one religion or another. Therefore they won’t ask you about whichever faith
you embrace. Insofar as anyone says anything about your faith, it’s up to you to inject some statement
of personal faith. If you make no such statement of personal faith, the government can probably
presume that you embrace one faith or another. If they see things like So-So Security, drivers licenses
or bank accounts as evidence of your faith is secular humanism, they might be able to presume your
faith and try you as a “secular humanist” without any of the God-given, unalienable Rights first
declared in our “Declaration of Independence”. However, if you make an effective, sworn statement of
your faith in the God of the Bible, and introduce that statement as evidence into the court record, I’ll
bet that any “secular humanist” presumptions that might be based on SS,DL and bank accounts could
fail. This implies that it might be possible to embrace SS, DLs and bank accounts without suffering any
additional liability under secular humanism—provided that you also introduce sworn evidence into the
record that you are not a secular humanist, not an atheist, and do believe in our Father YHWH ha
Elohiym. . . . I’m reminded of verses in the Bible where the Christ warns that those who ashamed of
Him and don’t mention Him in this life will be abandoned by the Christ in the next. In a sense, that’s
somewhat similar to the hypothesis I’m advancing here: If you don’t expressly declared your faith in
the Christ and the God of the Bible in court, you will be abandoned to the earthly fate reserved for all
secular humanists and atheists: you’ll probably be found guilty. On the hand, if you expressly declare
your faith in God and the Christ very early on in any proceeding, you just might win in court. ] No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, [You can’t be
punished for a “belief,” but you and I can still be punished for an act based on those beliefs. However,
this case apparently allows Congress to act by passing laws that favor and “establish” a secular
humanist religion for the American people. The Congress is thus above the law, the People are not. The
Congress would seem to be the sovereign(s) while the people are subjects. This implies that the
Congress is acting in a territory rather than a State of the Union.] for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. [This opens the door to challenging any tax (or at least portion of tax) that clearly supports any
institution based on secular humanism. For example, it’s arguable that I can’t be taxed to support the
drug war, the prison-industrial complex, Obamacare, the FDA, the major pharmaceutical corporations
or American medicine insofar as those institutions are based on the “man or other animals”
presumption that the people are mere “animals”. (See, http://adask.wordpress.com/category/man-
or-other-animals/ and especially, http://adask.wordpress.com/2008/06/17/man-or-otheranimals-1/ ] Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson [written in a
mere private letter to some friend, but not written in any official capacity], the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect `a wall of separation between church and State.'"
While there were strong dissents in the Everson case, they did not challenge the Court's interpretation of
the First Amendment's coverage as being too broad, but thought the Court was applying that interpretation too
narrowly to the facts of that case. Not long afterward, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203 , we were urged to repudiate as dicta the above-quoted Everson interpretation of the scope of the First
Amendment's coverage. We declined to do this, but instead strongly reaffirmed what had been said in Everson,
calling attention to the fact that both the majority and the minority in Everson had agreed on the principles
declared in this part of the Everson opinion. And a concurring opinion in McCollum, written by MR. JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER and joined by the other Everson dissenters, said this:
"We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more
penetrating [367 U.S. 488, 494] in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an `established
church.'. . . We renew our conviction that `we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith
that complete separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion.'" 8
[Frankfurter was a liar, a treasonous whore, and/or a fool. The two fundamental principles found in the
Declaration of Independence are: 1) We each receive our most important and unalienable Rights from God; 2)
the primary objective for government is “to secure these (God-given) rights”. It’s impossible to have a complete
separation of church and state if government’s primary duty is to secure our God-given, unalienable Rights.
Also, when Frankfurter talks about “our country,” I wonder if he’s speaking about “The United States of
America” or some other secular and/or corporate entity like the singular “United States”. When Frankfurter
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referenced “our country,” who did he include in the term “our”? All of the people? All of the 14 Amendment
citizens? All federal officers? Who does “our” represent? Is “our country” the people’s “country”? Or the
government’s “country”?
Likewise, who does Frankfurter refer to with the word “we” when he wrote “we have staked the very
existence of our country on . . . .”? Who is that “we”? The People of The United States of America? The 14
th
Amendment “citizens of the United States”? Those who graduated from law school and are licensed to steal by
State Bars?]
The Maryland Court of Appeals thought, and it is argued here, that this Court's later holding and opinion
in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 , had in part repudiated the statement in the Everson opinion quoted above and
previously reaffirmed in McCollum. But the Court's opinion in Zorach specifically stated: "We follow the McCollum
case." 343 U.S., at 315 . Nothing decided or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the Court there
intended to open up the way for government, state or federal, to restore the historically and constitutionally
discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or
perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept. 9 [367 U.S. 488,
495]
[It’s possible that that “policy” has been “constitutionally discredited.” But has that “policy” also been
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repealed by amending the Constitution? No. At least not expressly. The 14 Amendment may have provided
some constitutional basis for discrediting a previous policy, but insofar as that “policy” was part of the
constitutions of many of the States, the only effective amendment process should’ve been a constitutional
convention where the people of each State of the Union voted in support of such amendment.
However, if the people are presumed to live in a territories rather than States of the Union, it might be
possible for a single decision by the US Supreme Court to effectively amend all of those “state-territorial”
constitutions. ]
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally
force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." [I can’t be forced to believe in “secular
humanism” or any other atheistic faith—even if that religion is the government’s favorite. Thus, if I were to see
laws based on any atheistic principles (for example, that man in nothing but an evolved animal), I might have
grounds to reject being subject to those atheistic laws based on my belief in Christianity. ] Neither can
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, 10 and neither
can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs. 11 [Footnote 11 is the dynamite in this case decision. The idea that a “religion” can be based on ideas
that reject the existence of God is as stupid and blasphemous as the idea of marriages for gays. A belief
without God is a philosophy. A belief with God is a “religion”. To argue that any idea that expressly believes or
disbelieves in God is a religion is a contrivance by the Supreme Court to disable this nation’s spiritual
foundation. As such, it appears to be an act of treason.]
In upholding the State's religious test for public office the highest court of Maryland said:
"The petitioner is not compelled to believe or disbelieve, under threat of punishment or other
compulsion. True, unless he makes the declaration of belief he cannot hold public office in Maryland, but
he is not compelled to hold office."
The fact, however, that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for
barring him [367 U.S. 488, 496] from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the [federal] Constitution. This
was settled by our holding in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 . We there pointed out that whether or not "an
abstract right to public employment exists," Congress could not pass a law providing "`. . . that no federal
employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.'" 12
This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief
and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him. [Our freedom of religion (which almost inevitably
requires a faith in God) has been expanded to a “freedom of belief” which allows us to believe there is no god.]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concur in the result.
Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] Appellant also claimed that the State's test oath requirement violates the provision of
Art. VI of the Federal Constitution that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office
or public Trust under the United States." Because we are reversing the judgment on other grounds, we find it
unnecessary to consider appellant's contention that this provision applies to state as well as federal offices.
[ Footnote 2 ] 223 Md. 49, 162 A. 2d 438. Appellant's alternative contention that this test violates the
Maryland Constitution also was rejected by the state courts.
[ Footnote 3 ] See, e. g., I Stokes, Church and State in the United States, 358-446. See also cases cited,
note 7, infra.
[ Footnote 4 ] The letter from the Virginia Council to the King's Privy Council is quoted in Hanley, Their
Rights and Liberties (Newman Press 1959), 65, as follows:
"According to the instructions from your Lordship and the usual course held in this place, we
tendered the oaths of supremacy and allegiance to his Lordship[;] [Baltimore] and some of his followers,
who making profession of the Romish Religion, utterly refused to take the same. . . . His Lordship then
offered to take this oath, a copy whereof is included . . . but we could not imagine that so much latitude
was left for us to decline from the prescribed form, so strictly exacted and so well justified and defended
by the pen of our late sovereign, Lord King James of happy memory. . . . Among the many blessings and
favors for which we are bound to bless God . . . there is none whereby it hath been made more happy
than in the freedom of our Religion . . . and that no papists have been suffered to settle their abode
amongst us. . . ."
Of course this was long before Madison's great Memorial and Remonstrance and the enactment of the
famous Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, discussed in our opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 11 13.
[ Footnote 5 ] Hanley, op. cit., supra, p. 65.
[ Footnote 6 ] "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
[ Footnote 7 ] See, e. g., the opinions of the Court and also the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 ; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 ; West
Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 ; Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 ; Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 ; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 .
[ Footnote 8 ] 333 U.S., at 213 , 232. Later, in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 322 , MR. JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER stated in dissent that "[t]he result in the McCollum case . . . was based on principles that received
unanimous acceptance by this Court, barring only a single vote." [What a buffoon. The word “unanimous” does
not mean 89% or even 99.9%. It means “all” in the sense of 100%.]
[ Footnote 9 ] In one of his famous letters of "a Landholder," published in December 1787, Oliver
Ellsworth, a member of the Federal Constitutional Convention and later Chief Justice of this Court, included among
his strong arguments against religious test oaths the following statement:
"In short, test-laws are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because men of loose principles will,
by an external compliance, evade them. If they exclude any persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who
will rather suffer an injury, than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences. . . ." Quoted in Ford, Essays on
the Constitution of the United States, 170. See also 4 Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 193. [That’s an intelligent comment. But being written in nothing more
than a “letter” it carries no more legal authority than a limerick written on the wall of a toilet stall in a public
men’s room.]
[ Footnote 10 ] In discussing Article VI in the debate of the North Carolina Convention on the adoption of
the Federal Constitution, James Iredell, later a Justice of this Court, said:
". . . [I]t is objected that the people of America may, perhaps, choose representatives who have no
religion at all, and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices. But how is it possible to exclude any
set of men, without taking away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?"
And another delegate pointed out that Article VI "leaves religion on the solid foundation of its own
inherent validity, without any connection with temporal authority; and no kind of oppression can take place." 4
Elliot, op. cit., supra, at 194, 200.
[ Footnote 11
] Among religions in this country which do not teach
what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God
are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.
See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 249 F.2d 127; Fellowship of
Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394; II Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 293; 4
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957 ed.) 325-327; 21 id., at 797; Archer, Faiths Men Live By (2d ed. revised by
Purinton), 120-138, 254-313; 1961 World Almanac 695, 712; Year Book of American Churches for 1961, at 29, 47.
[Interesting. What may be one of the most important results of this case (that “secular humanism” be
recognized as a religion) only appears as a FOOTNOTE.
The Supreme Court’s’ footnote #11 applies to “religions in this country”. I wonder what “country”
they’re referring to. Are they referring to the several “United States,” the singular “United States,” or “The
United States of America”?
After all, our “Declaration of Independence” declares in its second and third sentences:
1) “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
And,
2) “That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men. . . . .”
Thus, the two fundamental principles of the Declaration are: 1) We each receive our most important
rights from God; and 2) the primary duty of government is to “secure” those God-given, unalienable Rights to
each of us.
I have contended for several years that it’s these God-given, unalienable Rights that elevate each of us
to the status of an individual sovereign and reduce the government to the status of our public servant.
I’ve contended that government doesn’t want to be our public servant and has therefore worked
diligently to cause us to forget that this country started with the spiritual principle that each living man and
woman is endowed by their Creator with “certain unalienable Rights”.
In any case, it’s clear from the “Declaration of Independence” that the nation named “The United States
of America” (as per the Articles of Confederation in A.D. 1781) was built on the spiritual foundation laid by the
“Declaration of Independence” of A.D. 1776.
Thus, it seems inexplicable and perhaps impossible that the nation called “The United States of
America” could be deemed to have any “religions” that did not include a “god” in the sense of an individual
“Creator”.
I.e., insofar as Buddhist, Taoists, Ethical Culturists, and Secular Humanists deny the existence of a god
who acts as their Creator, the practitioners of those godless “religions” have no moral standing to claim the
God-given, “unalienable Rights” on which “The United States of America” was founded. If the members of those
godless “religions” can’t claim “unalienable Rights,” then it follows that such atheists cannot be individual
“sovereigns” and, in relation to such atheists, the government may have no duty to “secure” any God-given,
unalienable Rights.
That means that, in relation to members of any atheistic “religion,” the government need not be the
“public servant” but can instead be the “master”.
Insofar as government seeks to rule rather than serve, government must separate us from the idea that
we are each endowed with certain unalienable Rights by our “Creator”. Every atheistic “religion” (such as
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culturalism, and Secular Humanism) thus enhances government’s power and capacity
for oppression.
All of which brings me back to the Supreme Court’s reference to “in this country”.
Insofar as the nation named “The United States of America” is built on the premise that we are each
endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable Rights, and insofar as that “Creator” must be “God,” then I
don’t believe that the governments of “The United States of America” can recognize any philosophy as a
“religion” that doesn’t include “God”. The idea of an atheistic “religion” seems absolutely contrary to the
spiritual principles on which this nation was built. Given that “The United States of America” was based on
spiritual principles that depend on the existence of a “Creator,” it seems virtually impossible that that nation
could ever recognize an atheistic “religion”.
Yes, Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culturalism, and Secular Humanism may be godless philosophies, but
within the nation named “The United States of America,” they can’t be “religions”.
So, when the Supreme Court declares that, “Among religions in this country which do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular
Humanism and others,” I’m left to wonder to what “country” does the Supreme Court refer?
Over the years, I’ve seen evidence to support the hypothesis that, at the “State” level, the terms “The
State” and “this state” may signal whether we’re dealing with a State of the Union or a Territory. Is it possible
that at the federal level, the term “this country” may be code to signal some atheistic country other than the
nation named “The United States of America”?
st
If you go back to the beginning of this case, you’ll see that it hinges on both the 1 Amendment
th
st
(freedom of religion) and the 14 . I have absolutely no doubt that the 1 Amendment is intended to protect the
States of the Union styled “The United States of America”. I have no doubt that “The United States of America”
is built on spiritual principles that include recognition of the existence of God and therefore cannot be an atheist
“country”.
th
But is it possible that the 14 Amendment created a singular “United States” that is an atheist
“country”?
th
Did the 14 Amendment lay the foundation for a new “country” other than “The United States of
America”?]
[ Footnote 12 ] 344 U.S., at 191 -192, quoting from United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
100 .[367 U.S. 488, 497]