ORANGE COUNTY CASE STUDY.rtf

advertisement

ORANGE COUNTY CENTRAL-COASTAL NCCP/HCP

Interviews:

Dave Harlowe , Assistant Field Supervisor, USFWS – CA Office (01/07/98)

Timothy Neely , Administrator Planning and Zoning, County of Orange (1/8/98)

Larry Eng , Assistant Chief Environmental Sciences Division, CA Department

Fish and Game (1/9/98)

Sat Tamarabuchi , Vice President Env. Affairs, Irvine Company (12/16/97)

Peter DeSimone , Manager, Starr Ranch, National Audubon (12/16/97)

Dan Silver , Coordinator, Endangered Habitats League (01/07/98)

I.

BACKGROUND:

Participants: Primary entities involved in developing the Central-Coastal NCCP included: the USFWS, California Department of Fish and Game (DFG), County of Orange,

Transportation Corridor Agency, Irvine Company, area water districts, and environmental representatives serving on the “Working Group” (Endangered Habitats League, Audubon,

Friends of the Irvine Coast, and Stop Polluting Our Newport). Other landowners and a number of municipalities were also signatories to the plan, but their involvement was less extensive. A number of other environmental groups also followed the process and submitted comments on the draft plan, but they were not involved in the Working Group or in separate meetings with the agencies.

Location, Size, and Species Involved: Orange County’s Central-Coastal NCCP is one of eleven NCCP sub-regional planning efforts within the five county southern California area.

Covering 208,000 acres, this NCCP includes the central portion of Orange County from the coast inland to the Riverside Freeway (SR-91). Along the coast, this plan extends from the mouth of the Santa Ana River in Costa Mesa to the mouth of San Juan Creek in Dana Point.

Approximately 104,000 acres within this area are undeveloped, with 34,500 acres considered Coastal Sage Scrub (CSS) habitat. Designed primarily around three CSS target species (California gnatcatcher, coastal cactus wren, and the orange throated whiptail lizard), the Central-Coastal NCCP also provides regulatory assurances for 26 additional CSS species and conditional coverage for 10 other species. Beyond incidental take coverage for these 39 “identified species,” the Central-Coastal NCCP contains a “covered habitats” provision which provides limited regulatory assurances for impacts on other species located within four habitat types outside the proposed reserve.

Status and Duration: Approved on May 31, 1996, the Orange County Central-Coastal

NCCP was the first of the sub-regional plans to be completed. While the plan and take permit are for 75 years, the reserve system is intended to remain indefinitely.

Causes/Catalysts: The overall NCCP program, and the Orange County Central-Coastal plan, were motivated both by a recognition of the increased loss of CSS habitat, and by a fear on the part of some that ESA listing of the gnatcatcher could curtail development. By

1990, CSS in southern California had been reduced to 10-30% of its former range, and gnatcatchers were estimated to number less than 4,000 pairs. A number of unbuilt but approved projects threatened further impacts. Consequently, environmental groups petitioned to list the gnatcatcher under the California and federal ESAs. In response, the California

Legislature passed the NCCP Act in 1991 and shortly thereafter the state’s Fish and Game

Commission voted to not list the gnatcatcher, citing the NCCP program as an appropriate alternative. Though environmentalists sued, implementation of the NCCP program still began.

On March 25, 1993, the USFWS took the unusual move of listing the gnatcatcher as threatened under a special Section 4(d) rule, which endorsed the NCCP program as the process for handling gnatcatcher take. While the Central-Coastal NCCP was initiated prior to the listing, many believe this action was crucial in providing “regulatory teeth” and in motivating landowner participation.

Major Elements of Plan: The Central-Coastal NCCP conservation strategy consists of creation of two habitat reserves (the “coastal” and “central” subarea reserves), designation of

“Linkage Areas” for protection of important habitat not within the reserves, and definition of some lands as “Existing Use Areas.” In these areas, state and federal ESA take prohibitions remain unaffected by the plan. Outside the reserve, linkage, and existing use areas, impacts on occupied habitat of “target and identified” species would be permitted for participating landowners, defined as those entities which contributed significant reserve lands or funding.

Non-participating landowners are given the option of mitigating impacts to lands outside the reserves by paying a fee to the reserve endowment fund. In total, over 38,000 acres of natural habitat would receive protection under the NCCP (35,000 acres within the two reserves and 3,500 acres in linkage areas). This area contains 81% of the surveyed gnatcatcher sites (although the NCCP authorizes a number of projects within the reserves and linkage areas, amounting to take of nine gnatcatcher sites). According to the EIS for the

Central-Coastal NCCP, “Total authorized incidental take would include 1,217 acres of CSS habitat occupied by 121 gnatcatchers (19% of sub-region population). Total conversion of

CSS proposed to be permitted would be 7,444 acres, which is 24% of the remaining CSS habitat within the sub-region.” (Final EIS, p. xviii)

When fully assembled, the entire reserve will be owned and managed by public agencies, with management coordinated by a non-profit corporation created by the NCCP. Currently, less than half of the reserve acreage is publicly owned, with most of the private component belonging to a single landowner (the Irvine Company) and subject to phased open-space dedication agreements which preceded the NCCP. During the phase before the reserves are completed, the NCCP authorizes the Non-Profit, comprised of agency, public, and private members, to carry out management activities and develop an adaptive management program for all reserve lands (i.e. currently public lands, as well as those to be dedicated in the future).

To fund these actions a $10.6 million endowment was created from landowner contributions, transfer of payments from prior take mitigation agreements, and other funds. Reserve assembly does not require federal funds and less than 10% of the management endowment comes from federal or state sources. (Coalition for Habitat Conservation).

A final component of the Central-Coastal NCCP, added at the end of the process, was coverage of the endangered Pacific Pocket Mouse on the 45 acre Dana Point Headlands site.

Targeted for development, this isolated site represents one of only two known populations of this extremely rare species. Generating great controversy, the NCCP provided conditional take coverage for the developer in return for a temporary 22 acre preserve at the site and a fee to be used to study the species and investigate the potential for trans-location.

Monitoring and Implementation: The Central-Coastal NCCP establishes clear and detailed requirements for monitoring, including submission of annual reports. This NCCP does not contain an explicit adaptive management program, a component that is critical to its future success. According to conservation biologist Reed Noss, “Given the condition of the reserve lands, their urban character, and the likelihood of continuing external threats, the scientific elements of long term adaptive management are more crucial in the Orange County plan than most.” (1997. The Science of Conservation Planning, p. 141). However, the

NCCP does mandate that the Non-Profit create adaptive management plans within one year of permit approval. Three elements are required (restoration, fire management, and access management) and these plans must be approved by the USFWS.

A number of changes were made in the final Central-Coastal NCCP which provide for public involvement in implementation. Three “public members” were added to the Board of the

NCCP Non-Profit (the County later interpreted these positions to be one environmental, one recreation, and one small business representative). A provision was made for the appointment of a Technical Advisory Committee to provide scientific input into matters considered by the

Non-Profit. And though likely required by state law, language was added committing the

Non-Profit to open public meetings. Currently, the Board of the Non-Profit meets quarterly, and Tim Neely of Orange County’s Planning Department serves as its director. Funds have been collected, reserve staff hired, research initiated, and monitoring reports and adaptive management plans created. According to some interviewees, it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of the adaptive management plans or to gauge how significant a role the

Technical Advisory Committee will play.

Important External Events: In addition to the listing of the gnatcatcher under the federal

ESA and the special 4(d) rule (described earlier), a number of other events significantly impacted the substance of the Central-Coastal NCCP, who participated, and its public acceptability. An atypical factor that fundamentally shaped this NCCP was that most of the private land base was owned by a single entity (the Irvine Company), which had already agreed to phased open space dedications of some lands in return for development elsewhere.

This simplified reserve design for the NCCP, as, “it didn’t start with a clean slate, but with

85% of the reserve in place before the process began”(Silver). However, this issue caused a wide diversity of opinion within the public about what this NCCP accomplishes and how acceptable it is. Some interpreted reserve designs that used previously set aside lands for mitigation as “double dipping” by the Irvine Company and considered the only conservation

benefits to be a result of the “paltry” 3,000 acres of additional Irvine Company lands designated for linkages or reserves. Other members of the public had a different view.

Commented Dan Silver of the Endangered Habitats League, “We had to live with a lot of fixed constraints. Considering this and the local politics, we got a lot in terms of the 15% of lands not there before, the connections, restoration, and the coordinated management.”

Another important external issue was the eight-lane toll road planned (now built) through the middle of the coastal reserve. Many environmentalists originally got involved in the Central-

Coastal NCCP as a way to potentially stop this highway, which had been permitted prior to the NCCP’s initiation and was then under construction. The road proponent became one of the participating landowners for the Central-Coastal NCCP, and funds it contributed for mitigation (under the USFWS’ Section 7 consultation) helped fund the reserve endowment.

Still, some of the public’s trust in the process and support for the NCCP program was undermined by the USFWS’ decision to allow mitigation of the highway impacts through the

NCCP’s reserve (1997. NRDC. Leap of Faith).

Significant development pressure and the pro-business politics in Orange County constitute other external factors shaping the provisions and way this NCCP evolved. Reed Noss has characterized Orange County as, “a place of extremes,” adding, “Extreme development pressure has eliminated most of the native habitat and threatens most of what remains. Its standard of living, among the highest in the country, has led to extraordinary property values.

It is also a place of extreme politics, both liberal and conservative, reflecting a highly polarized public” (1997. The Science of Conservation Planning, p.138). Participants noted that both high land prices and unsupportive local politics limited the public’s ability to affect the plan or the process (Neely, Silver).

II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS:

While the 1991 NCCP Act provided some direction, the process used in developing the Central-

Coastal NCCP was largely determined by the 1993 Planning Agreement negotiated between the

USFWS, DFG, Orange County, and the participating landowners. This Agreement established ground rules and included a recommended timeline, a list of participants, commitments of staff and funding, and other sideboards. An early version of this Agreement limited the public to

“informational presentations” during the planning process and to commenting through the NEPA process, while the Irvine Company would have taken charge of drafting the plan and EIS (1997.

NRDC. Leap of Faith). However, this was revised to give the County primary responsibility for the plan and to entitle four environmental representatives to sit on the Working Group and participate in discussions with the design team (1997 NRDC. Leap of Faith). These representatives were selected through nominations from conservation organizations and were expected to communicate with their members and other groups during the preparation of the

NCCP. In addition to these four, the Working Group consisted of representatives of the NCCP consulting team, the USFWS, DFG, and participating landowners. Orange County was not a

member, as Working Group meetings were intended to be closed to the public and their participation would have triggered public notice and open meeting requirements under California’s

Brown Act. Formed from the outset, the Working Group met irregularly. It served in an advisory capacity only, with negotiations and decisions happening separately among the “project team”

(USFWS, DFG, County, participating landowners).

In addition to the Working Group, public involvement occurred through NEPA, a number of additional workshops, and city and county hearings. The first opportunity for the general public to learn about and comment on the Central-Coastal NCCP occurred in July 1993 with the

NEPA scoping period and a County-conducted evening workshop. To inform the public of the content and status of the evolving NCCP, the County held another workshop in November 1994 and also attended a Saturday workshop hosted by environmental groups. The County also provided publicly noticed briefings at several of the planning commissions and councils of participating cities. The four volume Draft NCCP and EIS (serving as an EIR under California’s

Environmental Quality Act) were released for a 45 day public comment in mid-December 1995.

Over 70 substantive comment letters were received. In addition, 34 people requested an extension of the review period, citing the document’s complexity, the holiday release, the federal government shutdown, and difficulties in acquiring it. The County did not officially extend the

January 29, 1996 deadline, but did accept all comments received by February 14. Final opportunities for public comment were provided at County Planning Commission meetings in early 1996 and at the hearing by the County Board of Supervisors in which they approved the plan. (All details from Central-Coastal Final EIS, Response to Comments Volume).

III. DISCUSSION:

Factors Facilitating Effective Process: Interviewees mentioned the following as positive aspects of the Central-Coastal NCCP process: the Working Group, the gnatcatcher listing, having the right mix of personalities, the County’s strong leadership role, and the additional steps taken under the California Environmental Quality Act. All interviewees felt the Working

Group beneficial in that it clarified understanding and fostered more effective communication.

Sat Tamarabuchi of the Irvine Company felt the Working Group, “was useful and allowed us to check for understanding by greatly facilitating communication beyond what you would ever get from written comments and hearings.” Dan Silver (Endangered Habitats League) described the benefit of the Working Group as, “It allowed us time to understand how the plan developed and evolved -- and it is easier to accept it if you understand the series of step-wise decisions that occurred. We had an opportunity to satisfy ourselves that we couldn’t do certain things like connect the two reserves directly. So while it didn’t allow us to influence the ultimate decisions much, it was valuable in our understanding.” Its small size

(15), member continuity, good attendance rate, and early establishment were cited as factors contributing to its beneficial role.

Overall, the net effect of the gnatcatcher listing on the Central-Coastal NCCP process was positive, though early on this issue did heighten mistrust and frustrations between environmentalists and some plan proponents. The important, dual effect of the gnatcatcher

listing petition and later decision was expressed by Orange County’s Tim Neely, “The environmental community started with a basic antagonism towards the plan because they thought it was being done for ulterior and impure motives – at least initially to thwart listing of the gnatcatcher. So they had the attitude that anything that came from it would be tainted and never be adequate. But, while they blathered on at the time with these emotional outbursts, I do agree that the listing helped focus the process and move it to conclusion quicker and more convincingly…”

Finally, Larry Eng of the DFG felt that the fact that the Central-Coastal NCCP was under the purview of the California Environmental Quality Act “fostered better participation and a fuller process that we would have had with NEPA only.” Specifically, he pointed to this Act requiring hearings within each participating city. This involved more local constituents and,

“thus made it much more likely to pass political muster and not blow up in the end” (Eng).

Effects of Public Participation: While public participation did not affect the long time (four years) or high cost ($3-4 million) of the Central-Coastal NCCP process, it did result in substantive changes to the plan’s coverage and implementation measures. In response to public comment, the final NCCP deleted three grassland species from the list of covered species and shifted three other species to the category of “conditionally covered.” While one interviewee pointed to this change as evidence of the important role public input played, another down-played its significance: “Dropping those species wasn’t any big deal as it was totally ridiculous to have them included in the first place. They threw them on the list on nothing more than a gut feeling and with no baseline information” (DeSimone). Other changes coming out of the comment period include the addition of three public positions to the Non-

Profit Board, the creation of the Technical Advisory Committee, and language clarifying open

Non-Profit meetings and a public process for reviewing annual reports.

Many interviewees expressed that public involvement, especially the Working Group component, improved the plan overall and brought the qualified support of at least some environmentalists. In interpreting the effect of the Working Group Pete DeSimone of

Audubon advised, “You have to look at it from the context of what would have happened without it: the plan would have moved through the NEPA process and been much worse for sure.” Sat Tamarabuchi of the Irvine Company felt the Working Group was, “the key to our success,” explaining its effect as, “Even though we didn’t have all four (environmental members) supporting the plan in the end and might not have enjoyed every minute of working with them, the plan was better because of the Working Group….Its net effect was that the primary organizations in our community were neutral or supportive.” Working Group member

Dan Silver, who publicly endorsed the final plan (with the qualification that he didn’t support the Pocket Mouse portion) felt significant changes were made because of his involvement, but cautioned, “It worked for me, but had I not been part of the Working Group I would not have been able to accept the plan. Having that ability to see it as it was developed was critical.”

Barriers to Effective Process: While the Working Group did have a limited impact on the provisions and acceptability of the Central-Coastal NCCP, there were clearly a number of barriers to its effectiveness. Prime problems for environmental members of the Working

Group were their lack of clout and limited resources. Stated Pete DeSimone, “We had absolutely zero power…Our only leverage was our ability to muster lawsuits, muckrake, and be a thorn in their side. Everyone was aware that we had a history of suing and they didn’t want that to happen – not out of any fear that they would lose but because it would take longer.” While Dan Silver of the Endangered Habitats League also cited the litigation threat, he felt more of their influence in the Working Group came at the end of the process for political reasons: “Early on we had little input. As time wore on, we had more as the resource agencies realized that the NCCP program isn’t going to have much support in Congress or the Legislature if the first one has no conservation group support. … In the end, they (Service

& DFG) made the easy changes because they needed our support politically.” Another factor limiting environmentalists’ sway in the Working Group meetings was their limited expertise or access to expertise: “If we had had money to hire biologists and planners, then we could have brought information to the table that could not have been ignored. We needed a full time land use planner, biologist, and attorney. That was what the other side had. A clear lesson to me is that we need to bring more expertise to it if we want to have significant influence.” (Silver)

A number of agency interviewees (Harlowe, Eng, Neely) mentioned that the lapse in

Working Group contact which preceded the comment period caused problems as well.

Explained Dave Harlowe (USFWS), “There was a hiatus that didn’t help. The Working

Group process began winding down and then much occurred in the final negotiations and so the public participation had to be built back into it after the EIS release to rekindle some of the trust and understanding. That could have been done earlier so that didn’t have to play so much catch-up on explaining the nature of how decisions got made.” Similarly, Larry Eng

(DFG) noted as a lesson learned, “The Working Group should have been kept on longer through the process. By not doing this there was a feeling by some that all their input had been put in and now the real decisions were being made behind closed doors.”

Separate from the Working Group, there were other barriers to an effective public participation process, including: the relationship between developers and local government in

Orange County, the handling of the Pacific Pocket Mouse issue, the short public comment period, and the politicized nature of the resource agencies’ decision making for this NCCP.

While Sat Tamarabuchi of the Irvine Company pointed to the “healthy working relationship between developers, the County, and cities” as a positive aspect of the process, environmental interests clearly felt handicapped by the pro-development culture in Orange

County. Commented Pete DeSimone, “No matter what angle you look at this NCCP from, your view is always going to point right to the local politics. It is all politics and personality.

The toll road is a perfect example. …The politics are so extreme here that you are better off schmoozing with some politician than sitting down and doing some real planning.” Likewise, another interviewee described the situation as, “Everything was behind the scenes. We call it behind the Orange curtain. The County Board of Supervisors is like a big clique. …It is like

another world here where you can’t tell the difference between the landowners and the politicians.” This same local political situation also caused some friction between the resource agencies and the County. According to the County’s Tim Neely, “We kept trying to make it clear to the Service and DFG that we did not have the need for any consensus building from a political standpoint. This was unlike San Diego were there was an absolute need for it because of the local politics. We wanted them to view our NCCP as if it was a separate

HCP application from a private landowner.”

Termed a “black eye on the plan” by some, the last minute and political way that the Pacific

Pocket Mouse issue was incorporated into the Central-Coastal NCCP undermined the public’s trust in the process, plan, and the resource agencies. According to Larry Eng (DFG),

“It (Pocket Mouse issue) could have been handled separately (separate Section 10 permit) with a lot less disagreement. Unlike the rest of the NCCP, it was a decision that was made without spending the time to try and develop understanding among all the players. The decision was made very quickly and by a limited level of high level policy persons. …The way it was handled certainly did not help in terms of acceptability or image.” Dave Harlowe

(USFWS) felt the Pocket Mouse issue, “illustrates the problem of not going back to the

Working Group and the public enough,” and added, “In the long run, this one issue really hurt us in terms of understanding and support.”

As the numerous letters requesting extension attest, the Central-Coastal NCCP process suffered from too short a comment period. Tim Neely of the County acknowledged that a lesson learned was the need for longer review periods (at least 60 days) and cited the reason for not extending the comment deadline as, “we had picked the end date by which we had to have the agreement signed before some of the parties would start to get cold feet and walk.”

A final barrier mentioned by Larry Eng (DFG) was the politicizing of the resource agencies’ decision making: “There was a tendency for people on all sides to run to their highest agency contact to try to get their way. When decisions get made by the high administrators then it doesn’t sit well and is often difficult for those below to incorporate these decisions in a way that upholds the integrity of the process.”

Peer Review: The Central-Coastal NCCP was not peer reviewed. Sections of it were informally reviewed by agency staff and outside consultants, and it in theory was built off of the 1993 programmatic guidelines developed by prominent biologists on the NCCP

“Scientific Review Panel.” Thus, interviewees expressed divergent views regarding the adequacy of scientific input and review. Generally discounting the 1993 guidelines as too broad, environmentalists felt the lack of any outside validation to be a major weakness of the

Central-Coastal NCCP. Commented Dan Silver, “Scientific input has been getting better with each NCCP and Central-Coastal as the first was definitely the worst….The guidelines were so general to be of little help -- they could have been written about almost anything. Besides, there was no attempt to bounce the early drafts off the people who wrote those guidelines, and the devil is in the details.” On the other hand, agency contacts generally felt that Central-

Coastal had been adequately reviewed, though they differed over why review became such a controversial issue. Orange County’s Tim Neely felt the debate over peer review was unjustified and more about claiming influence in the process: “This plan unequivocally had adequate scientific input and review. The Services have sufficient expertise and the notion that those agencies either are not competent to judge these plans or are biased is really just a subversive attempt to try and abrogate power from the appointed decision making bodies.”

From the USFWS’ and DFG’s perspective, there was enough outside input and review, but because of the way it was conducted, the public didn’t realize it. Dave Harlowe noted,

“While not peer reviewed, there was tremendous scientific analysis built into it and that wasn’t reflected publicly as well as it should have been. It was done informally and more through direct contact of the consultants and our biologists with experts, and through the NEPA comment process. …Our scientific review should have been more focused and easily perceived by the broader public so they could see that the guidelines were followed in this sub-regional plan.” Larry Eng had a similar interpretation: “Review was sufficient. We have a lot of expertise within our agency and the USFWS. In those areas we don’t, we had outside people look at parts. But the public didn’t understand the level at which it was happening.”

Landowners generally felt the level of outside scientific input to be “extensive,” pointing to the numerous experts in academia and the agencies which were informally consulted and comment letters received from scientists as part of the NEPA/CEQA review. (Coalition for

Habitat Conservation, 1998, Response to NRDC).

It should also be noted that interviewees on all sides of the peer review issue pointed out that there are limitations to what scientists can bring to the NCCP/HCP process. Explained Tim

Neely, “Our reserve design is not immediately empirically testable. The only way to test it is over the long haul. So most scientists wouldn’t want to be put in the position of evaluating whether our reserve design would adequately function -- as it calls for speculation on their part. …After it is all said and done, this becomes a quasi-political, quasi-scientific process that is infused by practicality.”

Views on NEPA Process: Most interviewees expressed that the NEPA process in this case was not effective at involving the general public or in bringing new issues to light, but was of some use in combination with the Working Group. Larry Eng of the DFG reflected, “The comment period did not provide much from the larger public, but we did get a lot of additional information from the Working Group members, as well as an understanding that there was some misunderstanding even with that group. So we became very aware that we had inadequately explained some things.” The complexity of the documents was one factor discouraging participation by the general public. Explained one contact, “If you weren’t involved in the Working Group or in close communication with the handful of us who were, then you didn’t know what the Hell was going on… This stuff is so complex that if you don’t stay right on top of it there is no way you are going to be able to offer meaningful comments”(DeSimone). Also limiting broad public involvement was the perception that the comment period was too late in the game to have an impact. Many agency contacts recognized this and suggested changes they wished they had made: “The problem was people

felt they had already missed the point to really affect the plan and that decisions were already made. So a lesson we learned and took into the Southern Orange County NCCP is the need to do more public workshops before the comment period-- when it is easier to make adjustments” (Neely). Dave Harlowe (USFWS) also now recognizes the need for more outreach right before the comment period: “This way, we can give more of an overview of the plan and explain decisions made in the final draft so that at least those people who are really interested have a running start going into the comment period.”

Continuing Public Participation Process: Many interviewees pointed to the public role in implementation which the Non-Profit Board provides as a critical component of the Central-

Coastal NCCP. Some consider management to be an especially important aspect of this

NCCP because of its limited and fragmented reserves. Thus, the three public members on the

15 member Non-Profit Board will act as watchdogs, informing the agencies and outside groups if inaction or deviations occur. Calling the Non-Profit “one of the strongest aspects of this NCCP” Dave Harlowe of the USFWS explained, “As some of the wounds heal from the earlier battles, I think more people will come around to appreciate this element of the final plan. It is a very positive, partnership building mechanism. It essentially gives continued life to the plan so that it doesn’t become like many processes where frankly the final product is largely forgotten by the public.” Interestingly, the impact of having public representatives on the Board may already be evident, as much of the discussion of substantive points that has occurred in Board meetings to date has originated from the public members (Neely).

Satisfaction with Process/Product/Participation: Overall, the Central-Coastal NCCP plan and process was considered moderately satisfactory by most of the interviewees. The lowest satisfaction ranking was from Pete DeSimone of Audubon (2s for process and product), while Dave Harlowe of the USFWS, who was not involved until the end of 1994, gave the highest scores(4.5 for process and 4 for plan). Agency and applicant satisfaction with the level of public participation that occurred was average (scores of 3 to 3.5), though more comment letters were submitted than two had anticipated. (Tamarabuchi, Eng).

Environmentalists’ Dan Silver and Pete DeSimone were less satisfied with the level of participation that occurred (2.5 and 2). The County’s Tim Neely partially explained this dissatisfaction: “They kept wanting to see more and to participate in more meetings. Basically they wanted to affect the negotiations and there was constant resistance to that. Their frustration was that they would be listened to but were never part of the first line document drafting.” Finally, it should be noted that the Central-Coastal NCCP was quite controversial in the broader environmental community, and many groups or individuals who were not party to the Working Group were highly dissatisfied. Some became quite upset with some Working

Group members as well for participating and positions taken.

IV. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS:

The process used to develop the Orange County Central-Coastal NCCP clearly offered more public involvement than what is legally required under NEPA and the California Environmental

Quality Act (CEQA). On the other hand, there were significant constraints on the role of the

Working Group, and the public workshops and hearings had a limited reach and minimal impact on the decision-making. Compared to other sub-regional NCCP planning efforts (i.e. San Diego

Multi-Species plan), the Central-Coastal NCCP process especially looks inferior from the standpoint of adequate outside scientific review, the sharing of power, developing trust and ownership, and including the broader public. This was not a true steering committee approach, but rather a process born of careful compromise between applicants and a County who viewed public participation largely as a required but token component and resource agencies (USFWS and DFG) which felt it important for civic, programmatic, and political reasons. The process worked in some respects-- at least for the Working Group members: there was a free flow of information, improved understanding of the fixed constraints and decision making, misunderstandings were caught and clarified, and some substantive changes were made in the end. Yet, as many interviewees noted, mistakes were made and the plan only grew more controversial as it neared completion. By any measure, there was not a shared, high level of satisfaction with the final product. It should be noted that a number of the variables causing dissatisfaction and shaping the process were unique to this plan. These include: most of the private land owned by a single entity and under previous agreements, a major planned development (toll road) that escaped the purview of this plan but impacted it tremendously, and a highly unsupportive local socio-political context. Nevertheless, as the state’s first NCCP plan to be approved, the Central-Coastal case still illustrates a number of valuable lessons applicable to the

NCCP program and to HCP processes nation-wide:

1. External issues will impact the plan -- affecting the motives, trust, and positions of involved stakeholders and the broader public. Hence, it is critical to define at the outset which issues will be addressed, and to stay true to that definition throughout the process.

In this case, frustrations rose among the major participants and the public’s support eroded because of different understandings of which issues would and would not be addressed (i.e. toll road and Pacific Pocket

Mouse coverage). More initial effort at trying to jointly agree on the planning sideboards might have improved the level of trust, communication, and final acceptability.

2. Broad stakeholder support for the final plan typically requires a learned understanding of the way that decisions evolved and fixed constraints played out. This condition is unlikely to be achieved unless a recognized public group is formed at the outset and infused with at least review authority . Though the original version of the Central-Coastal NCCP Planning Agreement did not provide for the Working Group, it proved crucial in the end. All of the contacts indicated that the Group served a beneficial role in building awareness of how and where agreements originated and developed.

3. If it is to influence changes and build credibility, scientific review must be from outside sources, early in the process, somewhat structured, and well documented. General guidelines alone are insufficient without peer review to check for valid incorporation.

Because most reserve lands were predetermined and many management issues delegated to the Non-Profit, the Central-Coastal

NCCP was relatively simple scientifically. Yet, its limited level of outside review and the way that review was handled still caused unnecessary problems. For there to be trust in the process and more support for the plan, there needs to be non-agency experts involved and in ways that are easily discerned (i.e. forums, technical advisory group, an official paper-trail). Because of the difficulty of altering negotiated provisions and reluctance on the part of agency staff to have their decisions “second guessed,” external review must come early in the process to be effective.

4. For both the general public and more involved stakeholders (i.e. Working

Group members) the NEPA comment period comes too late and is often too short to serve as an effective involvement mechanism.

This is true even with general disclosure and input solicitation in the early phases of plan development (i.e.

scoping), as much of the critical negotiation occurs after this point. Hence, applicant and agency outreach (workshops, informal meetings, newsletters) should be emphasized immediately after the dust has settled from major negotiations but prior to the release of the official draft documents.

5. Local politics and previous relationships can accentuate power imbalances, magnify distrust, and create significant barriers for outsiders to affect the process or plan. For those disadvantaged, it thus becomes crucial to try to change the local politics and/or to identify places and means to leverage their influence in the process.

In their assessments, environmental Working Group contacts repeatedly pointed to the politics and development pressure in Orange

County. Their ability to impact the plan rested primarily on legal threat and limited clout with the resource agencies. Advised Dan Silver, “The Central-Coastal NCCP demonstrates that the environmental community needs to put more emphasis on getting good people elected locally. Those are who write the rules about land use, even with the ESA.”

6. With management focused plans, it is critical to build in implementation mechanisms which feature a formal public role, as this better insures that funds are collected, monitoring conducted, and actions undertaken.

While some consider the three public positions on Central-Coastal’s 15 member Non-

Profit Board insufficient to affect decisions (which are by majority vote), the real benefit of this public representation is the continued watchdog function it provides. As the County’s Tim Neely described: “Ours went further than any other NCCP in terms of thinking through all of the implementation details and providing a program that is

going to lead to a clear end product. Others focus all their efforts towards reserve creation and leave the rest to an ambiguous presumption of future government funding, with no one in the driver’s seat, and no clear idea of how they are going to monitor for success. So you end up with everyone feeling good, but often a state of benign neglect.”

“A lot was gained with the Working Group model, but then you also have to consider the black eye of pocket mouse addition and the lack of validation by outside scientific review. It did work from the standpoint that when the EIS came out we were not surprised with what was on the table and understood the thinking behind decisions. It was making the best of a bad situation. Out here the development pressures are intense and the politics lousy. Anything we can save in this context is a victory.

-- Pete DeSimone, Audubon

“While it was simpler, the problem with our approach was that at the end everyone who was not a part of it, either by being part of the core group or the Working Group, didn’t feel invested in it and took pot-shots at it and tried to bring it down. That was a risk we knew going in. But we recognized that many of these criticisms were peripheral to the main issue, which was a plan that would meet any legal challenge and provide permits to allow development. This wasn’t supposed to be a popularity contest, but a technical study that produced a defensible plan.”

-- Tim Neely, Orange County Planning Administrator

Download