Ethics and ethical theories
Unit 1
Marco EL. Guidi
Positive vs. normative discourse
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True / false
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Good / bad
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(Beautiful / ugly)
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Positive statements:
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Existence, attributes ...
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Description, interpretation, analysis ...
Normative statements:
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Duties, rights, rules, laws …
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Prescription, regulation, ...
Hume’s is / ought distinction
Also known as
“Hume’s guillotine”
David Hume (1711-1776)
Hume’s is /ought distinction
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A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), book III, part I,
section I:
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“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I
have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some
time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human
affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis
necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at
the same time that a reason should be given; for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can
be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from
it.”
Aristotle’s map of philosophy
PHILOSOPHY
theoretical
practical
Logic
Physics
Natural history
Metaphysics
Morals
(government of one’s person)
Economy
(government of the “house”)
Politics
(government of the city)
Positive vs. Normative: proofs
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Positive discourse:
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Verification, falsification
Normative discourse:
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Argumentation, comparison
Living traditions
in contemporary ethics
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Natural Law
How ought I to live?
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Kantian Ethics
What ought I do?
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Normative ethics:
Main approaches:
The Social Contract
Tradition
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Egoism
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Deontology
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Ethic of Prima Facie
Duties
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Virtue Theory
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Rights
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Consequentialism
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Utilitarianism
Natural Law
(Stephen Buckle 1991)
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There is a(n unchanging?) normative order that
is a part of the natural world
Origin: Aristotle, the Stoics
For Aquinas the natural law is natural because
it is in accordance with human nature, and this
nature is a rational nature
The law-like character of natural law is a
function of its rationality → Law = “an ordinance
of reason for the common good”
Natural theology and natural law
Natural Law
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Modern natural law tradition (Grotius,
Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke):
Divine providence is infinitely good → order of
the world (God is a clock-maker)
Two types of laws:
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physical (deterministic)
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moral (requiring voluntary acceptance)
Dualistic notion of law:
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diritto naturale
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diritto positivo
Natural Law
(Stephen Buckle 1991)
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Modern variant: secular theory of human rights
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Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (1625)
Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations
(1672)
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Moral domain: a body of individual rights
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Right as the moral quality of a person
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Morality as the result of human transactions
between independent moral agents (contracts,
consensus, rational choice)
Separateness of persons
Natural Law
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Problems:
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(Stephen Buckle 1991)
“If moral duties depend on my having freely
accepted them, why cannot I renege on them when
I find it convenient to do so?”
Irreducible diversity of human beliefs → pluralistic
view of human goods /ends → no criterion for
human goods above and beyond the preference of
actual human individuals (Bentham: “caprice”)
Two ways out:
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Insisting on the separateness of persons and
distinguishing the possession and justification of rights
from any overarching human good (Nozick’s Anarchy,
State and Utopia)
Weighting individual preferences (preference utilitarianism)
Kantian Ethics
(Onora O’Neill 1991)
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Human morality derives
from reason
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Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals
(1785)
Critique of Practical
Reason (1787)
The Metaphysics of Morals
(1797)
Kantian Ethics
(Onora O’Neill 1991)
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We cannot do without an idea of ourselves as
agents and as moral beings
Human freedom = capacity to act autonomously
→ is not part of the natural world
Causality and freedom apply in separate
domains
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Knowledge is restricted to causality
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Morality is restricted to freedom
Central question: “what ought I do”?
Kantian Ethics
(Onora O’Neill 1991)
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Principles of ethics constructed according to
rational procedures
Minimal question:
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What maxims could be adopted by a plurality of
agents without assuming anything specific about
the agents’ desires and social relations?
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Moral principles ought to be universally valid
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Categorical imperative:
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“Act only on the maxim through which you can at
the same time will that it be a universal law”
Kantian Ethics
(Onora O’Neill 1991)
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Example:
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false promising is wrong not because of its
consequences, but because it cannot be willed as a
universal principle.
Acting according to morally worthy principles is acting
out of duty
Duties:
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Perfect: they hold for all agents in all their actions with
all possible others
–
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(refraining from false promises, coercion, violence)
Imperfect: less complete and lacking counterpart rights
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We cannot help all others in all needed ways, nor can we
develop all possible talents in ourselves
Kantian Ethics
(Onora O’Neill 1991)
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Formulations of the Categorical imperative:
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We ought to to treat “humanity on our own person
or in the person of any other never simply as a
means but always at the same time as an end”
→ Demand for respect for persons
To use another is to treat her as a thing and not as
an agent
It implies doing something to which the other cannot
consent
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Example: deceivers make it impossible for their victims to
consent to their projects
Kantian Ethics
(Onora O’Neill 1991)
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Criticisms:
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Formalism (the categorical imperative is purely
formal)
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Rigorism (no account for cases)
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Abstraction (too abstract principles to guide action)
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Conflicting grounds of obligation (the set of
principles identified by Kantian ethics may come
into conflict. Example: fidelity and helpfulness)
Contemporary deontology
(Nancy Davis 1991)
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Acting morally involves the self-conscious acceptance
of some rules that place limits on the pursuit both of
our interests and of the general good
Deontology vs teleology (John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, 1971):
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Teleology (consequentialism):
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The good is defined independently from the right
The right is defined as that which maximises the good
Deontology:
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the right is not to be defined in terms of the good
The good is not prior to the right
The fact that an act promotes the good does not imply
that the act is right (C, Fried, Right and Wrong, 1978)
Contemporary deontology
(Nancy Davis 1991)
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To act rightly means that we must refrain from doing things
that may be ex-ante said to be wrong
Acts are right or wrong according to some “deontological
constraints”: rules, laws, prohibitions, limitations,
proscriptions, norms, etc.
NB: agent should act rightly even when they foresee that
this will result in greater harm (non-consequentialism)
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Example 1: harming an innocent person to save the life of 5
other persons (→ no impartiality)
Example 2: saving a life by lying to an evil agent, when the
lie will prevent the loss of life by deceiving him and
dissuading his intention to kill (no prevention of wrongdoing)
Problem: what makes wrong acts wrong?
Prima facie duties
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William D. Ross, The Right and the Good (1930):
pluralism vs monism (of either Kantians and
Utilitarians)
We have a prima facie duty to help others, to keep
promises, etc. These things matter morally. If we follow
a certain duty, our action is right to that extent. To each
case its relevant prima facie duty: no a priori hierarchy
We often know what are our prima facie duties, but we
can never know what are our duty proper (one we
ought overall to do)
The truth of a principle can be discovered only in
moral experience.
Virtue Theory
(Greg Pence 1991)
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Aims at describing types of character we might
admire.
Elisabeth Anscombe (“Modern Moral Philosophy”,
1968) and Alsdair MacIntyre (After Virtue, 1981): duty
cannot become an end in itself, separated from the
kind of person we desire to be, and the meaning we
attribute to our life.
Utilitarianism and Kantianism: a faceless moral agent
Ancient Greek foundations: Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle → virtues (traits of character) are the subject
of ethics
Virtue Theory
(Greg Pence 1991)
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Question: can an ethical theory which eliminates
principles and is entirely based on character do all the
work of ethics?
You can be honourable, courageous, noble,
appropriate, good, in taste, and fight for a wrong cause
(example: a Confederate officer)
Virtue ethics is perfectionist (maximum development of
what makes human human, Thomas Hurka 1993), and
the main examples of perfectionist theories are
incompatible with modern moral equality
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Greek philosophers were perfectionists and favourable to
slavery and to aristocratic government (the so-called
Athenian democracy was not democratic!)
Friedrich Nietzsche’s ideal of Übermensch is inegalitarian
Rights
(Brenda Almonds 1991)
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Inalienable rights of individuals: declarations of rights
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Natural Law roots
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Ronald Dworkin (Taking rights seriously, 1977): rights
as moral facts, used as “trumps” in moral disputes
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Example, the right of an heir against confiscation for the
common good
Robert Nozick (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974):
rights as side-constraints (setting limits on the actions
of government)
Rights are in favour of potential oppressed
Rights
(Brenda Almonds 1991)
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Rights as:
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Claims (to have something: it creates a
corresponding duty)
Powers (to distribute something, to affect the rights
of other people)
Liberties (by not imposing a burdensome
requirement on individuals, like giving evidence
against a spouse)
Immunities (being protected from the actions of
others, as the right to join a union that cannot be
forbidden by the employer)
Rights
(Brenda Almonds 1991)
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How can rights be justified?
Social contract: Hobbes, Locke , Rousseau →
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971)
Utility (J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, 1861): but not the
ultimate goal
They are exigent in themselves
Consequentialism
(Philip Pettit 1991)
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The first question in a moral theory is what is good or
valuable.
A moral theory has two components:
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A theory of the good
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A theory of the right
Consequentialism: whatever values we adopt, the
proper response to those values is to promote them
(teleological)
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a morally right action is one that produces a good outcome.
Non- Consequentialism (deontological): there are
values we should honour in every circumstance,
independently of the effects
Consequentialism
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Types of consequentialism:
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Egoism (see below)
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Altruism (Auguste Comte)
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Racism
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Nationalism
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Specism
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Pluralism / Rule consequentialism (Amartya Sen)
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Egalitarianism
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Collectivism
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Utilitarianism
Consequentialism
(Philip Pettit 1991)
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Criticism:
1.consequentialism potentially induces individuals to
do horrendous deeds (for the sake of the value
which is pursued); nothing is absolutely forbidden
2.No right is a constraint to action.
3.No distinction between permissible, obligatory and
supererogatory options
4.Impersonality
5.Individuals incessant calculators
Consequentialism
(Philip Pettit 1991)
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Objections:
1.Deontology also recommends horrible deeds
2.No consequence is considered when deciding the
rightfulness of actions
3., 4. and 5. Distinction between justification and
deliberation
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A general defence: methodological virtue of
simplicity
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Non- consequentialists argue that some values
must be honoured (loyalty, respect) but other values
must be promoted (safety, security, prosperity)
Egoism
(Kurt Baier 1991)
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Psychological egoism: every individual is an
egoist; apparently altruistic behaviour is
ultimately egoistic (Helvétius)
Egoism as a means to common good: Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand”. Is it always possible?
→ some ends are conflicting
Rational egoism: it is rational to act according
to self-interest
Ethical egoism: it is moral to act according to
self-interest
Egoism
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Types of ethical egoism:
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Libertarianism
Individual anarchism (Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own
(Der Einzige und sein Eigentum), 1844)
Enlightened self-interest (Helvetius, J.-B. Say)
Neo-Hobbesian contractarian theory (David Gauthier,
Morals by Agreement, 1986): cooperating is strategically
rational for individual utility
Objection: this moral rule does not regulate
conflicting interests