MEDIA BIAS IN VENEZUELA
A research paper by Michael Rowan*
February 20, 2013
CONTENTS
Part I
Conclusions and recommendations
Part II
TV history since democracy
Part III
Research findings on media bias
Appendix:
Survey Research by 30.11 Consultores and DATOS
August 2012 VenEconomy article by Robert Bottome
*Michael Rowan was a resident of Venezuela from 1993 to 2006; has been a columnist in El Universal
Daily and VenEconomy Monthly from 1995 to the present; was a campaign strategist in 14 countries
since the 1970s; was president of the International Association of Political Consultants in the 1980s; and
authored“Getting Over Chavez and Poverty”(Los Libros de El Nacional) in 2006.
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PART I
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Television advances freedom and democracy when it transmits
information that fosters society’s public dialogue and decision-making.
Likewise, biased TV news reporting does not do that and is per se harmful
to the advancement of freedom and democracy.
When a nation’s TV channels are cloyed with biased slants on the news, the
TV channel has given over its news responsibility to a political party or
ideology. Instead of covering the news as best it can, it becomes a
propaganda arm to slant the news for a partisan result.
When that happens the body politic has been harmed because its ability to
consider both sides of an issue becomes less possible. Tolerance and
dialogue are replaced by ideological rigidity and sometimes violence. That
contributes to the polarization of the society, making consensus progress
difficult or impossible for any government.
That is what happened in Venezuela over the last decade and that’s what
needs fixing for the next one.
The Venezuelan TV audience is already tipping toward the solution: about
80% of that audience regularly watches balanced-news channels
considered credible, which is a good start. But it’s only a start, because
antagonistic and propagandistic channels are provoking conflict which sets
the inflammatory agenda of news for all channels to cover.
As the Huffington Post saw it in 2009, “There is little neutral ground left in
polarized Venezuela, and the media reflect this – either championing the
government or touting the opposition.” Actually, the research shows that
there’s a lot of neutral ground left in polarized Venezuela – 80% or so – and
the work remaining is to improve that to 100%.
With President Chavez sick with cancer and Venezuela wondering about
its future, the time may be ripe to make a renewed effort toward tolerance
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and reconciliation. The test of a democracy is its tolerance for the minority
voice. Whether that minority voice continues is for or against Chavez does
not matter. Allowing for a minority voice is the only way to avoid the
tyranny of the majority.
This analysis suggests that the following recommendations should be
considered and approved by every channel public or private:
The TV Tolerance Principle
Television news and discussion programs are aired to inform the public, to
stimulate dialogue, to increase understanding,and to demonstrate tolerance of
differing views by providing adequate time for the airing of diverse points of view
on important issues of the day.
All stations, private and public, are requested to stop reporting biased and
partisan information as if it is objective news or fair programming.
All stations, public and private, are requested to report controversial news
stories along with countervailing views aired fairly and at the same time if
possible.
The government is requested to reconsider its owning and operating TV
channels that consistently transmit ideologically or politically biased
information.
The government is requested to repeal the legal requirement whereby all
private stations must air presidential speeches and non-emergency official
statements – such broadcasts should be left to the discretion of each
channel.
The television industry needs clear government criteria for licensing and
regulating stations and which leave them free from political pressure or
partisan limitations to free speech.
End of Part I
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PART II:
TV HISTORY SINCE DEMOCRACY
Introduction
Television spread in Latin America at the same time democracy did, which
may not be a coincidence. From 1950 to 2000 all Latin American nations but
one (Cuba) transformed from dictatorship to democracy. Meanwhile the
presence of TV sets grew from zero to almost one hundred percent of Latin
American households.
Unquestionably, TV has played a major role in the continent’s political
development, which includesthe first nation with a national broadcast TV
station (in 1952) and the first nation to foster democracy (in 1958): that
would be Venezuela in both cases.
And today, media bias is a significant issue in many countries of Latin
America but especially in Venezuela. Google “Media bias in Venezuela”
and 2,210,000 results come up. For this analysis we reviewed the first three
hundred – there is a lot of redundancy – which tells the story.
This short history of TV media is sourced from web available, mainstream
news accounts. For clarity in the brief story line that follows, we have
adopted thethread of Chapter 12, “The Loneliness of Latin America” from
Michael Reid’s excellent book, “Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin
America’s Soul,” (Yale University Press, 2007). Reid has been the editor of
the Americas section of The Economist since 1999 and also reports for the
BBC – his reportage is insightful and balanced.
1952
Television was introduced in 1952 in Caracas under the dictatorship of
Perez Jimenez. The first stations were privately owned and licensed by a
dictatorship, but not a brutal one by some accounts.
Television spread rapidly in Venezuela because the population was getting
wealthy fast. For the entire 20thcentury Venezuela had enjoyed a
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progressive free market economy, a small but growing population,
agricultural self-sufficiency, local and global enterprise oil development,
but more importantly, one of the lowest inflation rates in the world along
with one of the best economic growth rates in the world.
In fact, by 1958, and the advent of democracy, Venezuela was poised to be
the first Latin American country to join the small club of developed (rich)
nations, which was oft predicted and awaited.
Alas, because of mismanagement of oil revenues and government
corruption, it didn’t happen. In fact, Venezuela’s economic productivity
and real family income has been falling steadily since the 1970s, as its
democracy and market were also in relative decline.
Quite simply, Venezuela’s 20th century story is an inverted V curve: rising
from 1900 to 1975 and falling thereafter. Our review occurs on the
downside of that curve, which is an unfortunate story.
1958
On the cusp of this curve, from 1958 to 1988, Venezuela’s democracy was
dominated by two parties, AD (Democratic Action of the left) and COPEI
(Christian Democratic party of the center/right) in a pact by which they
shared power. If one party held the executive, the other held the
legislature, and vice versa. Smaller parties including an aggressive
Communist Party often backed by Cuba operated a smoldering
revolutionary movement during the early part of this period.
Venezuela sprouted many television stations of which the audienceover
the following years was largely tuning into two: Radio Caracas Television
(RCTV) and Venevision. These two stations arguably built the strongest
TV entertainment industry on the continent through their rivalry,
becoming major exporters of telenovela productions to Latin America,
North America and Europe.
By 1996– three years before Chavez took power -- a book by Harvard
Business School (Venezuela: The Challenge of Competitiveness)found that
the television industry was one of themost productive and competitive
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industries in the country. “The state has made positive contributions to
competitiveness in this sector by promoting private ownership of the
airwaves, allowing competition among producers, and promoting freedom
of expression,” it noted1. After Chavez, this would change.
Television’s popular success with the national audience gave the
mediuminfluence in politics, as always.But the two big TV Networks,RCTV
and Venevision, were covering-- notsupporting -- the two big parties, AD
and COPEI, during this period. In fact, after AD closed the newspaper La
Republica in 1969, no newspapers or other media were formally affiliated
with a political party.
1974
In 1974 the government created Venezolana de Television (VTV) to broadcast
government information-- but not of a politically partisan nature. The
station rarely attracted an audience over a few percent.
After the nationalization of oil and industry in 1976, Venezuela’s economic
slide was structural and steep. Inflation and corruption exploded in the
1980s. The TV stations covered these storiesfully and freely. In 1984 the
Lusinchi government (AD) tried to influence newspaper coverage by
limiting paper imports but no newspapers caved in and the freedom of
speech crisis passed. TV media criticism of politics was robust.
1989
In 1989 there were riots in the streets when President Carlos Andres Perez,
immediately after his 1988 election, tried to raise the price of grosslysubsidized gasoline in order to balancethe budget – at the insistence of the
International Monetary Fund’s austerity plan. The more CAP appeared to
succeed at the IMF’s macro-economic goals, the lower his favorable ratings
sank.(Venezuelans still pay only a few cents (US) for a gallon of gasoline
today).
1992
Venezuela: The Challenge of Competitiveness, by Michael Enright et al, Harvard Business School, 1996,
St. Martin’s Press, page 83
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In February, 1992, democratic politics plummetedwhen Lt. Col. Chavez
and military conspirators attempted a coup against President Carlos
Andres Perez, who escaped death only to be later impeached and removed
from the presidency while an imprisoned Chavez became a popular hero.
All the TV Networkscovered these events in total freedom of expression
and in some cases, biting sarcasm against government.
1993
By the presidential year 1993, polls showed that AD and COPEI were
severely damaged goods. In an attempt to recover, both parties conducted
presidential primaries for the first time, yet in both cases party insiders and
favorites were surprisingly upset by challengers, further rattling party
bosses. In the 1993 general election, four candidates divided the
fragmented, angry electorate evenly, with former president Rafael Caldera,
the founder of COPEI-- this time running as an independent --emerging the
winner with only 28%. Venezuelans were down on politics and not giving
mandates to anyone.
1996
By 1996, in a lackluster government, Caldera pardoned Chavez,removing
all criminal charges consequent to the coup attempt, whichlegally opened
the path forChavez to run for the presidency in 1998. Meanwhile an
enormous bank scandal under Caldera’s watch stole a hefty slice of
Venezuela’s GDP from the public’s bank accounts without anyone in
government doing a thing about it. When no banker was punished for this
massive heist, another nail was hammered into the coffins of the traditional
parties and Caldera’s government tottered on the brink of falling.Once
again, TV media reported these stories freely and fully.
1998
Still furious two years later, the voters catapultedChavez from 4% to 55%
of the votes in the lead up to the presidential election of 1998. Although
few voters knew much about the elected Chavez, they knew one thing: he
was going to change everything.
During that dramatic 1998 campaign, the TV stations gave Chavez and his
message of anger and resentment plenty of air time, even though
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Chavez’stough message was an assault on them as well. The 1998 election
was run transparently and fairly for all candidates and Chavez won it
going away.
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1999
Early in 1999, polls found President Chavez had over 90% of Venezuelans
hoping for him to succeed at government. This was only months after 46%
had voted against him. There was a feeling of optimism in the air.
But by 2000 Chavez was back down to 55% favorable ratings as the
economy declined, scandals emerged in the Bolivar 2000 spending
programs, and his performance at governance did not impress.
2001
In 2001, President Chavez issued 49 edicts which increased his controls
over the national assembly, judiciary, and other institutions – including the
media -- that had acted as checks and balances of previous executives, if
weakly so.This was seen as a grab for power by Chavez’s supporters and
opponents alike, and that’s how the story played in TV.
Demonstrations erupted in the nation and polarization became extreme.
Virtually all the private TV Networkswere loosely associated with the
demonstrators historically but now there was another reason for
identifying with them: the TV stations were targets of the edicts as well.
President Chavez had a different view: he said that the TV stations were in
a conspiracy with the US, enemies and terrorists to overthrow his
government and assassinate him. This chargestirred his grass-roots
supporters in the barrios to action against the demonstrators increasing
polarization and incidents of political violence.
Several investigations made by the US, European and OAS agenciesin the
years following found no evidence of such a conspiracy.Nevertheless,
Chavez blamed the US, oligarchs, capitalism and terrorists for almost all
his problems thereafter, which further polarized the country.
Polarization worked politically for Chavez who resonated with the 50% to
60% of the population that was poor in what many believed (falsely) was a
rich country: the government had oil income but the population did not
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possess the education, industry and capability to generate great wealth. In
fact, productivity data shows that Venezuela’s economic capability was in
decline since the mid-1970s.
2002
In 2002, polarization came to a head when President Chavez took over the
national oil company (PDVSA) threatening the meritocracy that had been
recently institutionalized there with the 1996 oil “opening” to the world.
When almost all of PDVSA’s 40,000 employees went on strike, President
Chavez fired them, which turned out some 800,000 people onto the streets
to march in protest. The private TV Networks were covering the peaceful
demonstrators when the shooting began. And then it went massively
violent with killings on the streets that to this day are unresolved about
who killed whom.
During the violence on the street, military officers refusing to follow his
commandarrested Chavez. The military reported hours laterthat Chavez
had resigned (which Chavez later denied). Some in the opposition
immediately jumped into this vacuum of power to offer Pedro Carmona as
president, which the military accepted only for a day, because Carmona’s
first announcement was to disband the constitution and the democracy,
making him a de facto dictator. That turned Americas’ leaders against
Carmona, which prompted Chavez’s supporters to riot in the streets. After
48 hours, thanks to the military, Chavez was back in the presidency acting
contrite.
By covering Carmona as news during these days of turmoil, private media
became associated with him as if they were his propagandists, which
would come back to bite them when Chavez was returned to power.
Partisan coverage and non-coverage of stories by both government and
private media polarized the country, not just the media – and does to this
day.
After a few days of calm, a restored President Chavez characterized the
events of April for the first time as a coup sponsored by the oligarchs, the
US and the TV Networks, and the repetition of that is largely the way
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many people recall those April events a decade later. Actually no hard
evidence of a coup was ever presented, although several books and
investigations on the matter prognosticate on a handful of attempts by
groups to take over during the confusion.
The bottom line is that the military were in control the whole time: they
arrested Chavez and 48 hours later they restored Chavez. Both government
and private networks got that right.
2003
The next moves in the media wars were by President Chavez. In 2003 he
created VIVE television, which broadcast information only from the
perspective of the Ministry of Communication and Information. But only a
few percent of the population watched it.
2004
The opposition then resorted to “a peaceful, democratic solution” by
collecting petitions for the Recall of President Chavez, which he took as an
attempted coup. After collecting some 3.5 million signatures three times,
which gave Chavez breathing space of a year to spend billions of dollars on
new missions in the barrios that helped support his voters, Chavez got 58%
“no” votes on the Recall in 2004, in an election that Harvard and MIT
experts claimed was electronically rigged, but which was supported by
former US President Jimmy Carter and the Organization of American
States. This result left both sides exhausted and unsatisfied.
After the 2004 Recall Referendum, the private television stations went two
different directions. RCTV and Globovisioncontinued the frontal attacks
and extreme rhetoric while Venevision and Televen stopped airing
inflammatory one-sided talk programs, replacing them with both-sides
balanced news reporting or entertainment programming.
2005
By 2005 the private TV stations remained split, with two stations virulently
anti-Chavez (way more than they were pro-opposition) and two stations
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airing balanced equal-time coverage of political news. This split exists to
this day.
But Chavez now went on the warpath against his enemies. He began to air
his weekly Alo Presidente cadena (chain) TV program for hours on end – his
record is over eight hours straight and an estimated 1,600 hours in all –
which is equivalent to 200 eight hour days of TV time on all stations.
The president’s program was mandated by law for all public and private
TV stations to carry. When Chavez went on TV to talk, sing, chat,
telephone, preach, harangue and act up, nothing else appeared on TV.
To crowd out the private stations, Chavez added two more television
channels in 2005: teleSur was Chavez’s political response to CNN, which
he characterized as the (US)“empire’s” corrupt messenger; and ANTV,
which is the programming of the National Assembly (analogous to CSpan). Both stations were openly pro-Chavez and anti-opposition, but
attracted only a few percent of the Venezuelan viewing audience.
And the government station VTV aired aggressive political programming
along the same lines, attracting 5% to 10% of the audience depending on
the program.
2006
Chavez won the presidential election with 63% of the vote on the backs of
massive government spending and a 22-to-1 TV time advantage over
Governor Manuel Rosales, according to a study by the NGO Sumate.
2007
In 2007 the Chavez government refused to relicense RCTV because it did
not comply with the technical and legal requirements of the licensing
process. RCTV appealed the government’s decision to the highest courts
but to no avail. Chavez had clearly won this round in his battle with openly
partisan private TV Networks.
Thereupon the political line-up of channels shaped up to what exists today:
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• VTV and all government stations are fully pro-Chavez, but
cumulatively attract less than 10% of the audience nationally;
• Globovision, a regional cable concession, is fully anti-Chavez, but
attracts less than 10% of the audience nationally;
• Televen and Venevision are in the neutral, balanced middle, which
cumulatively attracts up to 80% of the TV audience nationally.
2009
Thirty four radio stations airing anti-government reportage were forced off
the air. Then Public Works Minister Diasdado Cabello (now president of
the National Assembly) said, “The State is retaking control of concessions
that were being used in an illegal manner.” President Chavez said “The
decision is part of a struggle against the media war lies of the bourgeoisie
and the oligarchy.” Countering that view, Human Rights Watch accused
the government of leading “a frontal attack on freedom of expression.”
(AP, August 3, 2009).
Ironically, TV Networks reporting both views were assumed by both
political antagonists to be on the other side. The “listen to both sides”
middle is a difficult place to report from in a polarized country.
2012
Chavez, sick with cancer, won the presidential election with 54% of the
vote on the backs of even greater government spending advantage and a
similar TV time advantage as he enjoyed in the 2006 election.
2013
With Chavez unable to leave his bed in Cuba or Venezuela to govern, VP
Maduro (Chavez’s hand-picked successor) and Assembly president
Cabello have charged Globovision with crimes including terrorism,
government coup and assassination intentions – the same trend as seen
with Chavez since 2002. The government has also announced switching to
digital TV technology that Globovision is not scheduled to share, which
would eventually render its signal ineffective.
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Meanwhile the TV war continues.VTV and the government stations are
stepping up anti-opposition reportage. Globovision is airing strident antiMaduro reportage, charging that the government is illegitimate since
January 10, 2013 when Chavez was to be sworn in for the new six-year
term he won in the October, 2012 election. Polarization has never been
worse.
Televen and Venevision remain in the balanced, both-sides, shrinkingspace middle of the polarized fight. Yet cumulatively these two stations
continue to attract about three out of every four persons watching TV in
the country.
End of Part II
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PART III
RESEARCH FINDINGS ON MEDIA BIAS
In 2012, the Carter Center, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the
Americas Society/Council for the Americas, the Inter-American Dialogue,
and several audience research firms reported on bias in Venezuelan media.
Here is a summary (full reports can be found in the Appendix of this report
or on the websites of the respective institution).
The Carter Center
www.cartercenter.org
Former president Jimmy Carter has long been involved in Venezuela’s
conflict. He has worked for a peaceful and democratic solution to polarized
differences since 2002. The opposition, which has complained about
unfairness and lack of transparency in the electoral process since 2004, does
not believe Carter to be neutral in Venezuela. As late as September 2012,
Carter repeated his assertion that “Of the 92 elections that we’ve
monitored, I would say the election process in Venezuela is the best in the
world.”2
However, in the 2012 presidential campaign, research published on the
website of the Carter Center found that state media was very much biased
toward Chavez.
In “Carter Center Electoral Alert #9 for the Presidential Campaign of 2012
in Venezuela” the center reported that state-owned media (VTV, AVN,
ANTV, RNVy, TVKe and Correo del Orinoco) during the campaign period
were 58.8% favorable to Chavez, 17.1% favorable to Capriles and 24.1%
neutral.
VTV, the largest of the state TV networks, produced coverage of the
candidates very differently: 80% of the coverage was about Chavez, 10%
about Capriles, and 10% neutral.
2www.cartercenter.org
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Committee to Protect Journalists www.cpj.org
The international Committee to Protect Journalists published the report,
“Venezuela’s private media wither under Chavez assault,” by Monica
Campbell, on August 29, 2012. This is an analytical report based upon the
author’s observation.
In addition to Campbell’s lead report, the CPJ report includes: “Stifling
debate, state media focus on opposition, critics,” by Carlos Lauria of CPJ,
“Pro-government hackers hound Venezuelan journalists,” by John Otis of
CPJ, and otherreports, in a package that formed the basis of panel
discussions at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington D.C. on
September 13, 2012; and a panel discussion at the America’s
Society/Council of the Americas in New York on September 19,
2012.Quotes from these reportsand panels relating directly to media bias
follow:
“There is a systematic campaign to stifle dissent, gradually breaking down the
ability of media to provide in-depth information on issues of vital public interest.”
CPJ
“Attempts to create ‘communications hegemony’ in Venezuela have been taking
place since the administration began building a robust state media conglomerate…
According to reports from Espacio Publico, since 1999 there have been more than
1,600 hours of presidential broadcasts…”
IAD
“Still, some critics say the station (Globovision) exacerbates polarization of the
press and is as guilty of one-sided coverage as its pro-Chavez counterparts.”
CPJ
“When critics accuse Chavez of a media power grab his loyalists counter that the
government effectively democratized the press by wrestling control from a
powerful oligarchy with its own agenda.”
CPJ
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“The next government’s main challenge will be to restore a climate of tolerance
and dialogue.”
IAD
Venezuelan TV Audience Research
Two survey research firms, 30.11 Consultores and DATOS, both of Caracas,
conducted independent audience surveys on media bias in Venezuela
using the same questionnaire in March, 2012 – the presidential election was
in October, 2012. In balance, the 30.11 firm more often has the government
as client and DATOS more often has opposition as client.
“Image and Perception of the Venezuelan TV Networks” is a summary of
findings from both survey firms written by a third independent survey
researcher, Alfredo Croes of Caracas, who presented and analyzed the data
(see Appendix). The major findings:
TV Audience % Share by Channel
Channel
Total watching
Venevision
45
Televen
32
VTV (government)
12
TNT
10
Discovery
8
Fox
8
Venevision Plus
8
Globovision
7
Meridiano
7
Notes to the audience-share table:
• Cumulatively 19%watch the pro-government VTV (12%) orantigovernment Globovision (7%).
• Cumulatively 77%watch the balanced-news channels Venevision
(45%) and Televen (32%).
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• The rest of the TV audience (41%) is divided up by US based cable
channels, Venevision plus which is a movie channel, or Meridiano
which is a sports station.
• The TV audience adds up to multiple-responses of 137% because the
audience is watching more than one channel regularly.
Audience % That Does Not Believe TV channels
Channel
Don’t believe them
Globovision
28
VTV
22
Televen
7
Venevision
7
The biggest credibility gap in TV belongs to the opposing polarized
channels VTV and Globovision.
News Bias of TV Channels (according to % of audience saying so)
Channel
Is Balanced
Has Political Inclination
VTV (government)
17
80
Globovision
19
76
Venevision
77
21
Televen
80
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Two channels are clearly perceived as reporting biased news – VTV and
Globovision -- and two channels are perceived as reporting balanced news
– Venevision and Televen.
Since the political division of votes in Venezuela is in the 55/45range, an
80/20 response on TV biasstatistically must involve a consensus of Chavez
and opposition voters on the question. Bias in TV is an issue that four out
of five Venezuelans can agree upon.
Cadenas del Presidente Chavez
% of audience that watches:
60%
% of audience that does not watch:
37
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The research shows that half of the 60% regularly tuning into President
Chavez’s cadenas don’t stay tuned for the whole thing -- the program
typically goes for several hours – but the cadenas are widely seen in
Venezuela.
Overall finding from the research:
About 80% of the Venezuelan TV audience is watching balanced TV news
which they find believable, and 20% are watching biased TV news, half
from VTV and half from Globovision.
End of Part III
APPENDIX:
Survey Research by 30.11 Consultores and DATOS
August 2012 VenEconomy Monthly article by Robert Bottome
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