《東吳哲學學報》第 三 十期 (8, 2014), 55-84
© 東吳大學
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Abstract
In his best-selling book on justice the US philosopher M. Sandel discusses the limits of a liberal ethical approach à la Kant and Rawls which is centered on both the individual freedom to choose and the formal procedures that facilitate fair and just conditions for enabling such free choices for everyone. Amongst liberals the contents of the choices are morally indifferent; people are free to choose values and life-styles which are in accordance with existing laws and the freedom of others. Only the
(universal) justification of one’s motives for a particular life choice could claim to have a morally relevant status.
Such a formal approach, so Sandel skeptically, must be complemented by considerations regarding ‘the quality and character of the common life we share’.
Moral commitment is inseparably connected to the ‘good life’ we fancy and pursue, which in turn depends on the establishment of a society that is conducive to it. Moral philosophy, therefore, must be rooted in political philosophy because it is this branch of philosophy which is ex professione concerned with the just integration of the individuals into the social world in which they live — which is, as Sandel wrote previously, the social world of the ‘family or tribe or class or nation or people’. It is so because the individual is an ‘encumbered self’ living within communities — it is a
‘wider subject’. The values shared by a given community, therefore, justifiably narrow the scope of choices (i.e. freedoms) of the individual. It is here that Sandel thinks he can give a philosophical account of such limits.
But he does not succeed in this task because the philosophical concept he applies is both blurred and partly contradictory. In addition, the norms of a just society as propagated by M. Sandel need to be more open for critical assessment by individuals from a global (universal) perspective. Individual freedom cannot be defined by communal norms based on inherent authoritative virtues, but by
 Received September 30, 2013; accepted June 19, 2014
Proofreaders: Yi-Chung Chen, Ya-Ting Yang
 Assistant Professor, Department of Applied English, I-Shou University

56 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) individual considerations that are based on mutual respect. Community-based norms are derivative; it is ethics that defines political justice, not vice versa.
Keywords: political philosophy, justice, ethics, Kant, individualism

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 57
The modern debate in the USA on morality has also been a political debate. It connects the question of morality with the role society and the political order splays for individuals regarding their moral actions. The emphasis of the philosophical deliberations has shifted from the moral individual to the just society as its political and social frame where criteria for moral actions are available. This modern debate has been initiated by J.
Rawls’ Theory of Justice in 1971, but it has only received its significant character as a debate between liberals and communitarians following M.
Sandel’s critique of it in his Liberalism and The Limits of Justice published more than a decade later. Since then observers of the debate have been able to identify two major ‘camps’ despite their sometimes considerable internal differences. The liberals, with their ‘flagship’ J. Rawls (and T. Nagel, R.
Dworkin, etc.), think that a just society should only guarantee freedom of choice and equality of chances for each citizen, but it must not interfere with their personal designs of life and the virtues they honor or dishonor.
The communitarians (M. Sandel, M. Walzer, Ch. Taylor, etc.), on the other hand, think that a just society should promote certain values or virtues for the benefit of both its individuals and the community in which they live.
Each ‘camp’ believes that reflections on this topic are a matter of political philosophy rather than a matter of individual moral philosophy. From here, the focus of their deliberations turns to the definition of justice as an integrative framework for moral actions.
A few years earlier a similar debate had been initiated in Germany regarding individual autonomy and its social limits. The main philosophical blueprints there were the philosophical concepts of I. Kant and G. F. W.
Hegel (seen as a modernized Aristotle) as re-interpreted by some members of the so-called Frankfurt School of critical theory and their intellectual antagonists. Kant stood for the autonomous individual endowed with the moral authority to resist totalitarian societies and politics, whereas Hegel argued for a dialectical position that situates the individual within the framework of the political institutions of a modern state as its true (and necessary) realization. He hoped to bring dialectically together individual freedom with its institutional guarantees.

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It is worth noting that both Kant and Hegel had been used as philosophical ammunition in the intellectual reflections on political totalitarianism and the manipulation of human minds — an urgent topic in the first decade following the end of Nazi Germany in 1945. Gradually, however, the Hegelians have found themselves on the defensive, being accused of propagating accommodation with given political realities at the cost of individual freedom. The Kantians, on the other hand, favored an individualism that legitimately could resist state power if it was deemed necessary.
It seems that in Germany, since the nineteen-eighties, the Kantians have won this intellectual battle, at least in terms of global resonance. The autonomous individual has remained a prevailing topic in modern German debates on ethics. The institutions of the society are legitimized only in their role to ensure this freedom. Consequently, they should refrain from actively propagating certain virtues or ways of life for individuals and should not, as Sandel thinks, ‘try to cultivate good attitudes or discourage bad ones’ (Sandel, 2010: 8). What they must defend instead is the right of people to freely choose the way of life they wish to live from an irreducible plurality of options which naturally might also include ‘bad’ ones. The integration of a society does not happen via commonly shared values regarding good ways of life, but via tolerance towards different ways of life within legal limits. There are social limits as well, but such limits are open and remain in flux. They need permanent revision by and for the individuals, for it is they who are affected by those limits.
This ethical approach favors the Kantian version of morality with its main concern for the freedom of the individual. Restrictions are only legitimate if the individual’s actions would interfere with the freedom of others. They are not legitimate, however, in relation to the specific virtues people hold when positioning their personal lives within their given communities. In principle, modern individuals do not need cultural or communal bonds that tie them inescapably together as groups; they freely find their own bonds.
The ethical debate in Germany has become predominantly a debate over the philosophical foundation of morality, i.e. over the question of how the individual ought to act in morally dilemmatic situations, and how the

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 59 motives leading to such actions can be rationally justified. It is a debate about norms.
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The concept of a just society, without denying its urgency, is left to rather more political or sociological considerations due to the particular and historical nature of its problems and potential solutions.
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For the Kantians, philosophy under modern conditions has no longer the privilege to define certain life designs or virtues as forms of a ‘good life’.
It should, instead, insist on — and provide reasons for — the individual’s freedom of choice. Philosophers don’t know more about good lives than anyone else: Being generous or greedy, i.e. having rather (un)pleasant virtues (or vices), are a matter of character, but not necessarily of moral relevance. Morally relevant are actions and their motives, but not characters or ways of life. There is no ideal good life unless it is individually perceived as such, and such perceptions no longer need to be brought under a common denominator in modern societies. Therefore ‘good’ in relation to one’s personal life is no longer of quasi-ontological significance. It is to be defined solely by the individual, limited only by legal provisions and by considerations that take the effects of the actions on others into account.
Sandel’s focus is on a just society and its values and virtues. In this paper, I am trying to show that his concept of justice falls short of an answer to individual moral dilemmas, which has been the domain of moral philosophy since Kant. In developing this critique of Sandel I have generally called on some of the ideas of J. Habermas and thinkers of his
‘school’ (H. Schnaedelbach, A. Honneth, R. Forst, and others), without, however, elaborating their philosophical positions; they are, more or less, implied how I try to reason. Yet the main ideas on morality I am trying to defend can be found in Kant’s practical philosophy. As with the
Habermasiens , I do not explicitly present his position here in this paper. But anyone acquainted with his writings could see its influence.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the next section I present
M. Sandel’s philosophical position and the limits imposed by modern concepts of philosophy (II) as well as modern concepts of morality (III). It can be, as I believe, demonstrated (IV) that elements of a modernized
1 Typical: Kuhlmann (1986: 195).
2 Disagreeing: Honneth (1986: 187).

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Kantian philosophy would offer solutions for moral dilemmas that are more conducive to modern thinking, whereas Sandel’s position could only resort to a Weltanschauung or world view which would work in conservative circles within the USA, and — interestingly although not surprisingly — within a
Confucian world. This last point might explain his popularity in the East
Asian region where more than one million copies of Justice have been sold within the first two years of publication.
In this paper, M. Sandel is critically discussed as a philosopher, not as a diagnostician of contemporary political or social situations that require ethical solutions.
3
A closer look at the concept of philosophy he applies
(although never delivers in detail)
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and which he thinks provides appropriate solutions is clearly warranted. Here, it is his concept of philosophy , not his diagnosis that elicits a critical response. For me he delivers the wrong philosophical answers to the right political and social questions.
Sandel, in a rather Aristotelian manner, believes that philosophy’s role is to provide general criteria for what it means for individuals to live a good life , i.e. a life that is to be lived within a community that is worthy of being established. Individual moral decisions and ideals of a good life are to be related to the common good or, as it also has been called, the ‘horizon of life’
(Bubner, 1996: 57) where actions receive their moral charges. A ‘good’ life depends on a successful integration of the individual into different layers of the social world in which he or she inescapably dwells: family, community, nation, etc. Our ‘practical wisdom’ ( phronesis ) helps us achieve this goal; it helps us not only ‘to know which habit is appropriate under the circumstances’ (Sandel, 2010: 199), but also to “set up a framework of
3 political target in the USA are the so-called libertarians (Sandel, 2010: 58-64), proponents of a radical free market philosophy who assume that markets are best understood when reckoning with free responsible individuals making rational decisions that must not be interfered with. The leading figure of that philosophy dubbed as the Chicago Schools of Economics, which especially blossomed under Reaganomics, was M. Friedman; one of his best-selling books is entitled ‘Free to Choose’. His philosophical target is the egalitarian liberal à la Rawls.
4 Sandel’s latest book (2012), a kind of sequel to Justice , hardly deals with philosophy at all.

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 61 rights … to form good citizens and to cultivate good character” (Sandel,
2010: 193). Hence we are in the position to privilege certain ways of life vis-à-vis others as more appropriate, because they are better ways of integrating the individual into social realities which unavoidably embrace us.
We are ‘embraced selves’; we are not ‘atomized’ individuals. Moral philosophy must, therefore, emanate from such embraced selves; it must begin with individuals as selves embedded in a whole network of rights, duties and values that form us as persons within a world we consider our home. We are concrete persons, not just abstract individuals.
Each particular layer of the social world, Sandel believes, naturally limits individual freedom through the inherent values by which rewards related to ‘income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honors’ (Sandel, 2010: 19) are granted or denied. These rewards — assurances of our sociability — are beyond the influence of an individual’s free will or choice, but are necessary for one’s personality within a world full of encumbrances. A just society would distribute these rewards ‘in the right way’, giving ‘each person his or her due’, because its members would ‘know which habit is appropriate under the circumstances’.
The individual is an ‘encumbered self’, restrained (or set free) by the public, i.e. by commonly shared duties and loyalties that essentially surround it. A life that harmoniously integrates both individual and social teloi can be considered a ‘good’ life, which, as Sandel assumes, is the supreme telos for human beings — the political as the sphere of freedom (H. Arendt, 1958).
Sandel believes that philosophy has a vital role to play when we try to explore the ‘appropriate habit’ of individuals within their given social circumstances.
Sandel, in Hegelian fashion, sees a dialectical relation between the moral determination of the individuals and the ethical/political building-blocks of the society in which they live: We need to know what a good life is , i.e. how to properly evaluate individual life choices in view of a higher, common goal for us as members of the communities in which we live. Furthermore, we need to know which virtues deserve public ‘offices and honors’ in order to assess or distribute ‘income and wealth’ and ‘rights and duties’ of a just society; and of course we need to know what a just society is — which is not an easy task in a complex world.

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Philosophy is to bring about some clarifications regarding what good virtues are for a society that deserves the predicate ‘good’ or ‘just’. Political philosophy is, for Sandel, in a strong position to deliver such answers; it is able to ‘glimpse’ behind the individual’s freedom “another set of convictions — about what virtues are worthy of honor and reward, and what way of life a good society should promote” (Sandel, 2010: 9). Justice is not only about the “right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things” (Sandel, 2010: 261). How, we have to ask, does philosophy do it? The answer Sandel presents is: Aristotle. It is his philosophy that is guiding Sandel’s ethical undertaking in two ways: First, regarding the socio-ontological nature of mankind; and second, regarding the teleological approach when searching for the ‘appropriate habit’ of individuals in the social world. Both concepts — the socio-ontological and the teleological — deny a deontological approach to justify moral decisions.
The social ontology that Sandel proposes throughout his book targets
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moral philosophies which, unlike a community-based concept of justice, rely on the concept of freedom of action (‘free choice’) and the motives of the acting individual. He thinks that presupposing individual freedom is wrong from the very beginning. Justice has no chance if individuality is conceived of as being free from all social bonding, for it would include freedom from obligations vis-à-vis the social world. Yet the options we have when we act as individuals are not unlimited. There are limits that have to be integrated somehow into the motives when acting in the world:
Individual freedom is always tied to social or public liabilities. Sandel agrees with Aristotle that we are social and political beings who are not sufficiently defined without our koinoniai (communities) — just as one cannot define an organ without taking the whole body into account. We are whole beings, and ‘morality’ is therefore a matter of the whole, i.e. of the public sphere within a political and social unit. Moral justice is rooted in political justice, just as moral philosophy is rooted in political philosophy. Morally right or wrong actions are, therefore, just or unjust actions — hence the title of the book.
Such an approach, however, is highly problematic; it is like a bite
5 I do not consider here Sandel’s elaborate arguments in his book against utilitarianism.

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 63 without teeth when it comes to intellectually digesting morally relevant situations. It neglects the fact that moral decisions result from insights that intellectually transcend the given social context because moral dilemmas often originate from such contexts; the constellation of the problem cannot be a fortiori the force for its solution.
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The perception of a moral solution requires an individual contemplative input which reconfigures the dilemmatic constellation in ways that are not simply given. Perceptions are anchored in distinct biographies, which in turn function as the interpretative basis for ensuing decisions. Such a hermeneutic aspect of moral decision-making, however, is obscured by Sandel’s approach. He takes social realities as if they were ontological facts that defy interpretative access, thus sacrificing individual freedom on the altar of a communality which is presented as if necessitating certain moral obligations.
Undeniably, individuals need to position themselves within their koinonia . What Sandel proposes, however, is asymmetrical accommodation of the individual’s ideas of a ‘best way of life’ to our ‘encumbered selves’.
Individual life designs, so Sandel claims, need to take into account the
“obligations of solidarity and loyalty, historic memory and religious faith — moral claims that arise from the communities and traditions that shape our identity” (Sandel, 2010: 220). He keeps on insisting that they are part of our selves, stemming from our social world from which we cannot and should not even wish to escape: Family, community, and nation — they all “draw on our encumbrances. They reflect our nature as storytelling beings, as situated selves” (Sandel, 2010: 241).
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Assumptions that “we are unbound by any moral ties we haven’t chosen” are simply ‘flawed’, for it is
6 J. Habermas (1999: 38-46) uses a different wording, but stresses the same point.
7 Haidt (2013: 116-117) arrives at similar conclusions from his professional field, experimental psychology. Like Sandel, he opposes an ‘ethic of autonomy’ by invoking an ‘ethic of community’ (and an ‘ethic of divinity’), suggesting that such ‘collective entities’ which include
‘families, teams, armies, companies, tribes, and nations’ upon which ‘everyone depends’, would be destroyed by the dominance of an individualistic ethic. Unlike Sandel, however,
Haidt supports an ‘intuitional approach’ (Haidt, 2013: 107) as the guide for our moral sentiments, rejecting rational, i.e. philosophical reasoning if one wishes ‘to produce good behavior , not just good thinking’ (Haidt, 2013: 106). It seems as if it is ‘good behavior’, but not the philosophical foundation of ethical norms for which Sandel seeks rational justification.

64 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) wrong to assume that “principles of justice that define our rights should not rest on any particular conception of virtue, or of the best way to live”
(Sandel, 2010: 9); this would suggest that we would falsely fancy a world beyond our social nature.
This (as I see it) underestimation of the individual’s contribution in moral decisions aims at what is considered to be a central accomplishment of modern ethics since Kant: The concept of the autonomous self. Its rejection is, of course, Sandel’s outspoken intention
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when he repeatedly states (as I do here) that it is utterly wrong to assume that people living in a
“just society [should] respect […] each person’s freedom to choose his or her own conception of the good life” (Sandel, 2010: 9). The obligations we have vis-à-vis the society do not render us neutral in our moral decisions.
We need to be biased in favor of our social ‘loyalties’, because we are concrete persons living in concrete social environments with limited options for which free consent is ‘not required’: family, community affiliations and national citizenship. These biases inevitably form our personal lives; they are always with us whenever we are to make moral decisions. Moral behavior, therefore, must be embedded in those loyalties instead of wrongfully pretending that they are disposable in situations of free choice.
At this point it is important to briefly reflect upon a background assumption regarding the function of philosophy that lies behind the afore-mentioned assertions (see also Forst, 1994: 181-188). Its critique here prepares the ground for a more specific critique presented in the following section. So far we haven’t been confronted with a concept of philosophy in its own right. This comes as no surprise, for within Sandel’s book there is none to be found. This critical remark needs some explanation. What does
8 Chapter 5 (Sandel, 2010: 103-139) of Justice is about Kant’s concept of autonomy. The critical overtone of this chapter against Kant is, however, not followed by a critical analysis; instead one finds there many questions without answers. A more elaborate
— but not necessarily more illuminating
— analysis and critique of Kant’s moral approach can be found in his book
Liberalism and The Limits of Justice (Sandel, 1982/1998).

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 65 concept of philosophy mean ? The concept of philosophy I am proposing here deals with problems — and interprets them — in a certain way, and, in a typical self-reflective gesture,
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justifies that way through critically discussing the intellectual means with which it operates ‘in the world’. Simply put: A philosophical theory must be in itself philosophical and, therefore, must subject itself to a critique which outlines the reach and limits of its own intellectual efforts. This is what relevant philosophies have been practicing in modern times. There is no reason to fall back below this critical standard.
From such a perspective it is, therefore, intellectually insufficient to claim that philosophy in general should do that and that for that and that goals, without making transparent the intellectual means with which such goals could or should be achieved. A critical account would have to conclude that there is no final definition of what philosophy is ;
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it must remain an open concept. It must remain so because each definition requires interpretation which epistemologically turns what we know into what we think we know . If this (Kantian) assumption is correct, then what follows next is that any interpretation of the world, because it always implies thinking must be (like a definition of philosophy) an open reflective enterprise as well. All we have are assumptions and interpretations of the ‘world’ that leave space for freedom to ‘play’, i.e. to mentally experiment with these assumptions, especially when applying to ourselves what we think of ourselves in practical, i.e. morally relevant, contexts. We are essentially open beings because we cannot possibly know closed worlds (including ourselves) where such worlds would be seen from a ‘God’s eyes view’, a position which regrettably is not available to us.
However, Sandel is not bothered by such considerations. He seems to suggest that a moral philosopher’s job is to describe the social world and its functions tel quel , and to directly infer from these descriptions the moral duties. In this way he assumes the privileged position of an absolute subject in charge of absolute (epistemological) means who purports to know what is right or wrong in moral matters not only for oneself but also for anybody
9 Schnaedelbach (2000: 174) describes this gesture as to ‘reflectively attend what we are doing when trying to understand’.
10 A typical example: Simon (1987: 387-391).

66 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) else. Any reflection on the history of philosophy shows that such a concept is hopelessly outmoded. The neglect of its critical heritage turns philosophy it into a servile mental tool that is more descriptive than normative; more deliberative than foundational; and, in its reach, more regional than universal. Philosophy just becomes common sense.
The next section deals with consequences that arise from the vagueness of Sandel’s philosophical position in situations in which we would need ethical guidance. Here its applicability is critically evaluated to test its ability to provide moral orientation by presenting — just as Sandel does in the greater part of his book
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— several scenarios of moral dilemmas as might be encountered in quotidian life.
Sandel’s concept of philosophy is, as just demonstrated, problematic.
He deprives it of its critical nature, or to be more precise, he allows critical inquiry only within limits, but without taking the possibility into account that the limits themselves can be philosophically scrutinized. It is as though the political liberal M. Sandel is at the same time a philosophical conservative.
As we also have seen, his philosophy stresses the importance of institutional frameworks that contain the norms that pervade the social or communal world in which we live, and he recognizes them as legitimized limits for individual moral action. In principle, there is nothing wrong with such Aristotelian/Hegelian insights into the institutional limits of personal freedom because institutions are necessary to stabilize our social relations.
However, Sandel blurs the difference between accepting the necessity of existing institutions which restrain personal freedom, and the way their existence evokes particular attitudes among people exposed to them. He believes that certain institutions require certain attitudes. He grounds the latter in an outdated philosophical consideration labeled teleology that pretends to know which attitudes ‘truly’ fit the ‘nature’ ( telos, purpose ) of
11 In Sandel’s latest book (2012) the number of pages of the descriptions of his examples account for an estimated ninety percent of the total book.

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 67 institutions (Sandel, 2010: 186-190), turning them thereby into sacrosanct realities. They leave little moral space for the individual to move within them despite Sandel’s serious pleas for a ‘politics of moral engagement’ which requires a ‘more robust public engagement with our moral disagreements’ (Sandel, 2010: 268). His defense of a society that only flourishes if it provides an open platform for its citizens for fair and free debates about any contested public topic (this is Sandel the political liberal) seems to be in stark contrast with his dubious concept of philosophy, endowing it with the ability to find the right solutions in such public debates
(this is Sandel the conservative philosopher).
But Sandel the liberal contradicts Sandel the philosopher: A direct consequence from his philosophy is that the debates cannot really be open, for he thinks he can offer philosophical criteria that help decide whether a specific position is right or wrong. The fact alone that Sandel’s philosophy is suggesting that there is not only a right or wrong but also a philosophically right position contradicts his own political concept of a democratic debate on public issues which leaves results to the majority. Of course, one can — and often does — still disagree with majorities, but such disagreements should be expressed as fallible opinions with which we, well, just disagree.
They should not be expressed in the name of a philosophy, especially of a philosophy propagating moral acknowledgment of given social realities and existing institutions which are changeable by their nature.
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For example, we have now become more critical toward torture than two hundred years ago, not because we have philosophically found out something about the essence of torture, but because we simply have changed our perceptions of torture over the course of history. Philosophers may — or may not — have contributed to such a change of perceptions.
Proponents of a more critical concept of philosophy are less impressed by given social realities as M. Sandel is. It deals with how the world should be, leaving no implied social or political limits intellectually untouchable: “Whatever is good for maintaining the functionality of the real
12 J. Rawls (1985) important essay Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical indicates in the second part of its title the necessity to abstain from presumptuous philosophical claims for the political designs of societies.

68 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) world is not necessarily morally good” (Habermas, 1991b: 41).
There are two incompatible interpretations of what moral philosophy is about: A ‘realistic’ (communitarian) model which seeks to explain ‘good’ actions as being in coherence with the given social world; and an ‘idealistic’
(liberal) model which reserves legitimate rights for the individual to justify its moral stance if necessary against the social world and existing institutions in which it is embedded. Subsequently, we have different philosophical concepts of what is morally right or wrong: a realistic (Aristotelian) and a liberal (Kantian) one. Is one more preferable than the other? This question is now discussed in the following sub-section where both models are confronted with controversial moral issues.
Sandel rehabilitates philosophy’s life-orientating role which it shared with religion until the dawn of modernity: To critically define the proper place of individuals in society. Both did so first by defining the essence or the telos of both the society and the individual, and then by providing the relevant criteria supporting such designation. Those criteria seem to result from the afore-mentioned philosopher’s ‘glimpse’ behind the individuals’ freedom into the social virtues they hold dear, then comparing them with the ‘telos’ they ontologically are , and finally reviewing them in view of their worthiness of public ‘honor and reward’. Such a review is apparently encouraged by Sandel as (and I quote again) “one of the greatest questions of political philosophy: Does a just society seek to promote the virtue of its citizens?” (Sandel, 2010: 9) His answer is a clear ‘yes’, suggesting that we can generally know ‘the best way to live’, which is in contrast to liberal positions which don’t ‘tell you how to live your life’ (Sandel, 2010: 216).
The liberals, he thinks, irresponsibly leave the answer to the individual’s free choice, thus disconnecting moral philosophy from the political sphere.
Only a philosophy, however, which “sees justice bound up with virtues and the good life” (Sandel, 2010: 20) takes on this ethical challenge and provides answers as to what that ‘good’ life contains. But which criteria, one now has to ask, could philosophy provide to underscore Sandel’s claim? It is again the question of which philosophy would be able to ‘tell you how to live your life’? Based on what has been discussed above, it would have to be a

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 69 metaphysical concept of philosophy which delivers true answers to those questions since they deal with nothing less than the essences of both, the encumbrances and the individual. Moreover, it would also have to prove that it is capable of delivering true and essential answers. Throughout his book, however, we are not informed of what this philosophy is or how this can be done.
Let us try to understand how a liberal philosophy of deontological character with a critical approach and a less optimistic view about its teleological reach would have to argue in this context.
Liberal moral philosophy, as opposed to Sandel’s philosophical
‘realism’ disguised as teleology, puts itself into a relation with its surrounding social ‘reality’ by firstly distancing itself from that reality in order to qualify its values from a moral point of view , i.e. from a position which seeks to define moral principles of actions that deserve to be universally recognized. ‘Universality’ is a necessary ingredient because it caters to the moral intuition that in dilemmatic situations it would be simply unfair to morally privilege people who happen to be local encumbrances, such as relatives, neighbors or countrymen. Liberal philosophy has developed the following moral principle which it intends to be universally justifiable and which is in this paper presented as a defensible position: Act freely in a way that takes the freedom of others affected by my actions into account.
It should have become clear that this principle must be open to criticism. It is so because it takes mutuality with respect to freedom into account — nothing is imposed on others. Since we have characterized modern philosophy to be reflective (a), it must also carry its reflectiveness into the principle it proposes (b) and into the subject it scrutinizes, i.e. into the moral point of view (c). A modern philosophy would have to argue as follows: (a) Philosophy trying to define moral obligations is an open concept: It critically excludes what it is not rather than determines what it essentially is ; (b) this definitional openness must be reflected in the moral principle it proposes; it does so by mutually guaranteeing freedom for all; (c) accordingly, the social environment should be designed in a way which enables, at best, the realization of that moral principle.
It is clear that from this perspective of philosophy Sandel’s assumed quasi-ontological moral virtues and values that lack of this reflective

70 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) insertion could always be misused by the individual for immoral reasons.
They need, therefore, an additional moral qualification which can only be delivered by a critical reflection of how such virtues are being used and for what purposes. For instance, the virtuous attitude of generosity might be practiced by a, say, tradesman who, quite immorally, expects more personal profit as a result of his/her ‘generous’ behavior.
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Another example are religious values (for Sandel these are encumbrances that deserve absolute respect): It is easy to imagine how central ethical dogmas of Christianity such as ‘love thy neighbor’ or ‘love thy enemy’ can be (and have been) misused for improper, quite un-Christian purposes. Pure religious motives do not qualify per se for moral dignity, for the virtues of generosity or love can be apparently perverted for rather immoral ends. Unless they are applied by an individual with certain, freely chosen motives (=moral re-interpretation), virtues are always on the brink of turning into vices.
Consequently, a critical moral philosophy needs to define, specify and legitimize those ‘certain motives’ in order to guarantee the morality of action. As well, it must get engaged with the motives of the individual in situations of moral uncertainty; and it must try to explain which motives — as opposed to virtues — deserve to be qualified as ‘moral’. In brief, it must define the moral point of view — a rule which would allow us to impartially judge actions in view of their moral content (Habermas, 1991a: 13).
Moral philosophy, we conclude, does not leave virtues untouched, because they are always embedded in concrete situations in which they could be misused. Virtues need moral blessing; they must be scrutinized from a moral point of view. This is a task, however, for which — according to Sandel — philosophy is not in charge. It is rather delegated to the people who live these values and virtues — it is a practical matter that only could be described by philosophy ex post . We are surprised to learn that in Sandel’s concept of justice it is philosophy that has no real say with regard to what the moral values of virtues are , though they are right at the center of his philosophical deliberations. He writes that (by quoting Aristotle) “‘...
13 Kant (1785/1965: 15) provides a similar example, emphasizing the difference between actions done out of inclination and actions done out of duty; only the latter can claim moral relevance:
It “is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it”.

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 71
[m]oral virtue comes about as a result of habit’. It’s the kind of thing we learn by doing” (Sandel, 2010: 197). Here ‘practical wisdom’ ( phronesis ) comes in, which, as Sandel repeatedly affirms, ‘is not philosophizing’
(Sandel, 2010: 199). Sandel’s concept of philosophy is utterly contradictory:
If moral virtues are indeed the result of habits as practiced in the world of
‘encumbrances of the self’, then their intrinsic value apparently stands and falls with the ethical standards of those ‘encumbrances’. What is then left to do for philosophy, especially for a philosophy that raises high expectations with its claim to ‘bring moral clarity’ (Sandel, 2010: 19) in situations where we don’t know what the right thing to do is? Philosophical thinking in this case would be either excluded from the realm of practical wisdom or absorbed by it. In either case it would be rendered irrelevant. It would, as opposed to Sandel’s expectations, lose its grounding in the real world altogether.
Sandel criticizes, as mentioned earlier, the liberal notion of the moral subject as an abstract entity (‘individual’ vs. ‘person’) which for him is falsely placed beyond ‘situated’ contexts of the real world; falsely, for there is no neutrality or empty moral space when it comes to the point of making moral decisions: “To have character is to live in recognition of one’s
(sometime conflicting) encumbrances” (Sandel, 2010: 237). We are nurtured and shaped by the sources we share with others beyond our free will. We need, therefore, to ‘reason together’ about the ‘meaning and significance of the lives we lead’ (Sandel, 2010: 261).
Nothing that Sandel says here about our social nature is objectionable.
Who could deny that we grew up in social worlds which we didn’t choose and which have from the beginning been influencing the understanding of ourselves? It is difficult, however, to comprehend why ‘to reason together’ on the undeniable fact that we are not alone in the world is of any moral relevance. The numerous debates offered by numerous TV stations on the
‘meaning and significance of the lives we lead’ can be watched on a daily basis around the world. Usually, they are subsumed under the category of
‘entertainment’ because of the sheer endless variety of the life-styles people pursue and display in public on TV or on social media. The moral output of

72 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) such programs, however, is rather modest. It is one thing to acknowledge the fact that there are social limits; but it is quite another thing to believe that this very fact triggers moral obligations for anybody who is aware of these limits. Quite often the contrary is the case: It is the existence of certain social limits that provokes an even greater freedom in the choice of individual life-styles. And it seems that the growing awareness of this freedom to choose is increasingly becoming one of the major sources of the
(modern) self — a fact Sandel apparently doesn’t seem to value.
For egalitarian liberals ,
14
unlike communitarians, moral principles must be neutral to personal life-styles, interests,
15
and ends. Otherwise, they would enhance selfish positions at the cost of (the freedom of) others: they would only choose actions guided by self-interest. Personal values
(‘loyalties’) would be imposed on others, thus misusing them as means for very personal aims. Actions may be good for one person, but they may not be right when considering their consequences for others. For Kantians, therefore, the right supersedes the good . An action is moral only when guided by broader, generally (=universally) acceptable rules that set aside personal interests or aspirations regarding ideals of a good (=local, personal) life; instead, they are to be exposed to transparent scrutiny. It is important to bear this semantic distinction between ‘good’ and ‘right’ in mind when considering the examples of moral dilemmas of the following sub-section from a moral point of view.
Who is right? Which position is closer to offering solutions in a real moral scenario? Let us take two examples to which I apply both approaches, and see to what extent they would guide the individual in dealing with moral dilemmas. Example (1): I consider separating from my married partner, knowing that I would hurt her. Example (2): In the culture in which
I live I am expected to do what I personally think is wrong. Apparently, there are different considerations and solutions for people who either
14 A term Sandel uses as opposed to what he calls libertarians, who are, within the US political spectrum, conservative radical free-marketers (see fn. 3); Sandel opposes both (Sandel, 2010:
219).
15 Neigungen .

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 73 pursue liberal or communitarian goals. Let us apply the principles of either side, see how helpful they are in choosing actions, and how they can be morally defended.
Example (1) : A communitarian approach in our first example (my separation from a married partner) would obviously have to consider a number of key issues: the circumstances of my partner, of myself as a person, and of the community which we share (the ‘common good’). There are numerous encumbrances and memberships that have shaped us as partners which, as we are told, have to be recognized before acting. One such encumbrance would apparently have to be the knowledge of a ‘certain conception of the telos of marriage’ (Sandel, 2010: 253), that is, its inner virtue, which is for communitarians of supreme importance for a moral decision. Several questions, however, come up immediately: How could these considerations be implemented, i.e. translated into concrete action?
Could that just be by describing the concrete situation in which I am?
I am clearly in a concrete situation where, of course, I have to consider the options which are available to me. It goes without saying that my free choice has limits; but where are the limits that affect my moral decision-making with respect to breaking or not breaking up a marital relationship? The various encumbrances may suggest certain actions, but they simply do not tell me what the right thing is for me to do. It is true that ‘obligations of loyalty and solidarity’ are certainly of a high value, as expressed in Sandel’s imperative that one must ‘take loyalty seriously’
(Sandel, 2010: 237). But to whom is this loyalty directed: to myself; to my partner’s family; or to my family? Do I stay in solidarity with my friend (or one parent) who advised me to break up? Or should I express loyalty to another friend (or the other parent) who advised me not to break up? Who or what ‘tell[s] me how to live [my] life’ and why should I listen to them?
These questions go further: How would a just society that promotes virtues help me resolve my dilemma in which I clearly don’t know what to do?
Which virtues would help me and who can reliably inform me about the
‘ telos of marriage’?: Is it the Catholic Church; my gay friend; Aristotle or R.
Rorty; farmers or cosmopolitans or others living in my community? And so on.
These questions are difficult if not impossible to answer; they may

74 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) even be the wrong questions. It seems that the ethical ingredients of justice, as suggested by Sandel, leave us in this specific case quite helpless: Our
‘glimpse’ in the direction of the virtues gallery might give us hints on how to act but does not get what it looks for. We simply don’t know “which habit is appropriate under the circumstances” because the circumstances themselves are diffuse, especially in a modern world where a plurality of life-styles is the rule, not the exception. It is rather that these circumstances and their interpretation are the problem, but not the solution. The solution must be found by the agent within and, sometimes, despite the circumstances which do not say by themselves what the right thing is to do.
These diffusions — standard situations in modern societies — have to be critically reflected if one wishes to avoid the sometimes dubious forces, which, with their own priorities and interests, could become masters of your decisions. Kant would qualify such actions as ‘heteronomous’ (as opposed to autonomous), actions which are determined by factors outside my reach, and Sandel seems to agree with Kant on this point that morality is not served well in such a constellation. But he does not pursue this quite important point of moral philosophy further by, for instance, connecting it with the ‘encumbrances’ which likewise need to be scrutinized in view of their support or non-support of autonomous actions.
The limits affecting my decisions are apparently not to be found in the
‘encumbrances’, but rather how I perceive these encumbrances and, consequently, how I act based on my perceptions of them, i.e. what norms I consider relevant ‘under the circumstances’. A moral individual is to be the master of the (interpretation of) encumbrances, not their victim. My perceptions and norms may be in conflict with those of the community in which I live. But why, as Sandel suggests, would the concrete encumbrances embracing me have to be decisive for my action? Naturally, there is no doubt that I would have to take them into account, but, again, this does not mean that I am to be necessitated by them. If Sandel means that the encumbrances may clash with our convictions, forcing us to ‘move back and forth between our judgments and principles, revising each in the light of the other’ so that finally we ‘may revise our judgment about the right thing to do’ (Sandel, 2010: 28), then nothing important of moral relevance is said: I still could decide against the ‘common good’ as perceived by

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 75 whomever. (Who, by the way, is in charge of defining it?) If this ‘turning of mind’, as Sandel writes, is ‘what moral reflection consists in’ (Sandel, 2010:
28), then we still don’t know how to act, even if we would know ‘which habit is appropriate under the circumstances’. We are left alone, for the suggestions lack a normative component needed to qualify the morality of actions at my disposal.
Example (2) : The second example (culture vs. individual) presents a similar moral dilemma: Say you are a foreigner in a country of different traditional origins from yours. People there expect a certain behavior from you in certain situations. For instance, you, a westerner, are going to marry your spouse who grew up in a traditional family. Your future in-laws ask you to celebrate the wedding in accordance with the local customs, customs, however, which you utterly disagree with for whatever reasons. What should you do in case your in-laws in spe insist on their way of doing things?
Deny your ‘person’ (your ‘concrete personality’); give in and do as the
Romans do; or refuse to give in, thus ignoring local encumbrances?
Things are getting complex again upon reflection. How would I have to act if I try to act in accordance with Sandel’s concept of ‘moral reflection’ in mind? Firstly, as we now know, I would have to consider the specific situation. Fine. I do. But how? The concrete situation tells me that I do not agree with the local marriage arrangements (let’s ignore here, for the sake of the argument, my future wife’s opinion). My judgment is very firm because my local (western) encumbrances are quite clear to me: Don’t follow the local tradition. So: Whose encumbrances are more important?
Theirs or mine? The ones where I live at the time? But why? Should I not expect tolerance vis-à-vis those who are in the minority or are guests? Why wouldn’t they have to respect my encumbrances? And so on.
Secondly: Considering the common good, a must for Sandelians: Do I really promote the common good if I followed common local practices? We can ask again: The common good of what or of whom? Of my future in-laws? Well, the wedding in my version has no intention to hurt them, so reasons for them to be gravely offended would be rather insubstantial.
Furthermore: How far do the boundaries of the ‘common good’ reach?
Which is the relevant encumbering unit: the family; the village; the city; the nation; friends? Who is to define the common good? It is indeed difficult to

76 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) say, especially in a modern, globalizing world where the individual is less and less absorbed by its neighborly surroundings, and more and more
‘encumbered’ by others who share similar interests, but who may live thousands of miles apart.
It must be concluded that a position that does not insist on given loyalties and memberships, but instead insists on tolerance for ways of life different from each other’s is a fairer position. It is a position which does not impose one’s ideal (or should I say: one’s personal choice?) of a good life on others. Such an imposition would be immoral, because it favors one
(=my own) position at the cost of the other. The moral position liberals favor consists of reciprocal respect for each other’s values. It insistently secures freedom of choice for myself and, in turn, also for all the others who are (possibly) affected by my ensuing actions. It is true: the in-laws don’t get their wedding. But it’s my wedding. If it would be their wedding and they would have it in my country I would not see myself in the position to tell them how to marry — we simply have to tolerate each other’s way of
(‘good’) life no matter where we are — which is best guaranteed by laws neutral to anyone’s ways of life. The liberal moral point of view reckons with the freedom of all others involved; it is morally superior.
Of course I am aware that in my version of wedding the others would have to give in. Is it therefore an unjust position? It is not so because otherwise a position would be supported that does not respect the freedom of others. Again, this looks like a doctrinaire position — which it is, somehow, but it is doctrinaire in the name of freedom. I agree with Sandel that we are always judgmental (Sandel, 2010: 261). The question, however, is: Which judgment could we morally defend best? The answer I suggest is the promotion of the judgment that provides the most freedom for all involved. This principle or, in Sandel’s words, ‘opinion and conviction’, I believe is easy to ‘articulate and justify’ (Sandel, 2010: 29); it is of universal reach, despite the many contestants who would argue in the name of their local encumbrances, thus forfeiting the moral point of view which includes all human beings — this is why they are morally wrong.
I conclude that the communitarian approach could not offer a solution to quite common moral dilemmas as described here.

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 77
Sandel repeatedly affirms that any moral solution must seek to find essential qualities of the phenomena in question, and, in addition, criteria that adequately reflect those essences. Justice, claimed by Sandel, is ‘about the right way to value things’ (Sandel, 2010: 261). But does he finally deliver a convincing answer regarding the ‘right way’? In order to exemplify our alternative points of view let us take the example which Sandel discusses in his book (Sandel, 2010: 253-260): same-sex marriage . Would we get an answer from his example?
A neutral (=liberal) moral point of view would have to put aside moral, religious or other ‘biased’ interpretations of what marriage is when deciding whether or not gay marriage should be accepted. A liberal position leaves the definition of ‘marriage’ to the people concerned; they should decide for themselves how to approach same-sex marriages. It is their freedom of choice. There are no ontological or social standards available that are morally binding. The content of the decision itself, whatever its result
(‘good’ life), is of no moral relevance as it is solely the quality of the motive guiding the process of decision-making. Outside forces like the state, consequently, must remain neutral on this question. Its representatives are not in the position to privilege or disfavor certain models of marriage as long as mutual consent is existent — this is why you cannot marry your dog.
If you wish to marry six wives who agree to that deal, then the lawmakers have something to discuss. It is for politics, not for metaphysics to decide.
Yet the state, so Sandel argues, must not be neutral; it isn’t anyway. It has always preferred certain types of marriage to others which implies a definition of the nature of marriage: For instance, polygamy or the idea of marriages as solely private arrangements, are options that are simply excluded. A truly neutral position, however, would have to include all possible options — which for Sandel is not the case: Existing values are already prefigured in social and legal provisions which makes us unavoidably ‘judgmental’. So “the real issue in the gay marriage debate is not freedom of choice but whether same-sex unions are worthy of honor

78 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) and recognition by the community — whether they fulfill the purpose of the social institution of marriage. In Aristotle’s terms, the issue is the just distribution of offices and honors. It’s a matter of social recognition”
(Sandel, 2010: 258, 254). ‘Worthiness’ of any marriage is defined by Sandel as ‘purpose, or telos, of marriage as a social institution’ (Sandel, 2010: 258), a definition which “carries us onto contested moral terrain, where we can’t remain neutral toward competing conceptions of the good life” (Sandel,
2010: 260).
Sandel’s position evokes in the reader’s mind the expectation that he would now provide the right definition of the telos of marriage, which would disqualify the others simply as deficient and wrong. But, again, we are left without a conclusion. What we have before us are contradictions stemming from his insistence on a metaphysical/ontological/teleological position that he thinks is well-suited for the search of the true purpose of things or of social institutions. The contradiction is as follows: This existing true purpose logically and necessarily binds all the other searches to look likewise for this very true one — simply because a true purpose ontologically exists .
Sandel insists, on one hand, that among competing conceptions of good life — and therefore of marriage — there are ‘qualitative differences’ which
‘require us to question or challenge the preferences and desires we bring to public life’ (Sandel, 2010: 261). He insists that we can know “which interpretation of marriage celebrates virtues worth honoring” (Sandel, 2010:
259) so as to “fulfill the purpose of the social institution of marriage”
(Sandel, 2010: 257-258). This metaphysical (ontological) position assumes the existence of a true telos of marriage which, of course, is the only one worth honoring.
Yet, on the other hand Sandel talks about the advantage of pursuing
‘the right way to value things’ (Sandel, 2010: 261) by way of “reason together about the meaning of the good life, and to create a public culture hospitable to the disagreements that will inevitably arise” (Sandel, 2010:
261). This very purpose of things worthy of offices and honors now becomes ‘a matter of social recognition’ (Sandel, 2010: 258) — a position which sounds rather Kantian, obviously honoring the procedural side of individual decision-making because ‘social recognition’ does not exclude per se ways of life deviating from the norm. If what marriage is is no longer a

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 79 matter of the true telos but instead a matter of social recognition, then we must assume that, at least in liberal democracies, this ‘social’ aspect of what things are would have to induce us to leave their definitions and interpretations to those who are affected by them, even if they are in the minority. Democracy in fact guarantees the protection of rights of minorities as long as they are in accordance with national and international laws (human rights) and maintain a mutual respect of individuals.
At one point, Sandel seems to propagate teleological approaches only for the sake of using them in debates with others for heuristic reasons . But many passages suggest that Sandel is more serious, more metaphysical about the ‘truth’ of the subject of the debate: There is indeed something which must be true for everybody. Yet: We are still left alone when it comes to understand what this something , “the telos of marriage” for instance, really is. Sandel’s deliberations suggest that a clear answer is possible. But we are looking for it in vain. Only at one point does he seem to claim the reproductive function of marriage as its true purpose (“Many opponents of same-sex marriage claim that the primary purpose, or ‘ telos’, of marriage is procreation” [Sandel, 2010: 258]), a virtue gay couples indeed would not be able to fulfill — which is why a just society, in Sandel’s view, would not honor couples without such virtues. But this claim is not further elaborated; and it is seemingly at odds with the previous remark that just societies should “create a public culture hospitable to the disagreements” on any social topic, leaving the outcome open to the course of the debate. It is not easy to understand why a community that ‘knows’ what the right thing is to do should wish to establish a ‘public culture’ in which what is affirmed to be right could be questioned again. The telos of marriage Sandel seems to support is, by the way, such a pre-modern concept (=‘procreation’) that we wonder in which society of today such a restrictive idea of marriage is honored by a significant majority (the Vatican and the State of Texas may be an exception). Obviously, there are limits also for Sandel’s political liberalism.
Sandel does not state clearly his own position on this topic, neither does he so in many of the copious examples of moral dilemmas he presents throughout his book, despite his insistence that philosophy needs to ‘bring moral clarity’ (Sandel, 2010: 19). I tried to argue that this result is exactly

80 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014) what is to be expected with a concept of philosophy that has no concept.
Sandel’s philosophical position is problematic; it is problematic because of the ambivalence it produces when claiming ontological solutions but actually delivering procedural ones. It is also problematic when it ties the individual so closely to the community in which it is embedded. Sandel has problems explaining if, when, to what extent, and based on what criteria, the community members are allowed to morally distance themselves in case of disagreement with the prevailing values of other members of the same community. Moral decisions are always decisions of individuals that require
(in most cases) some distance, at least in some aspects, to the social world in which they morally act. It is a significant signature of modernity that individuals have become reflective citizens, i.e. they design or choose their life-world in accordance with their own ideas, thus breaking with the
‘normative force of the factual’ (Habermas, 1991b: 38) in view of an imagined better world or of better circumstances in which they wish to live.
This ethical impulse for reforms and changes — also appreciated by
Sandel — is, however, philosophically excluded if resorting to ontological or teleological categories as Sandel does.
I would claim that it is no longer the task of philosophy to find essential parameters of personal and public life in the twenty-first century.
Sandel’s book on ‘Justice’, however, is meant to be an alternative to those who share my view. But his proposal for what philosophy could do about it is contradictory. It is metaphysical in the sense that it assumes it can know
(or it strives to know) the essence of what there is; that the individual has to find his or her proper place in the social world; and that there is a way to philosophically find out what this particular proper place is.
This metaphysical task — as it is conceived by Sandel — is, however, eodem actu transferred into a practical discourse. In it, these very same criteria for a good life should be publicly debated, obviously leaving the outcome of the debate to the public — and not to philosophical contemplations. Sandel’s solutions are confusing: Is it the contemplative individual who has read Aristotle (and Sandel) and who seems to know
‘through introspection alone’ (which of course Sandel denies but which he

Philosophical and Moral Limits of Political Philosophy 81 nevertheless insinuates) the criteria for a good life? Or is it the public that, not after having exchanged ‘opinions and convictions’ in ‘concrete situations’, now provides propositions for what a good life is, regardless of the ideals the contemplative philosopher proposes? Is the ‘good life’ something which can be defined by the philosopher as the privileged form of life; or is it something which is to be defined by each member of the public for him or herself, which would, therefore, function as a practical category no longer in the reach of a theoretical master mind dealing with teloi ?
If the latter is the case, as I think it is, then there is no privileged access to what ‘good life’ means. And if we are no longer in the position to qualify a priori a form of life as ‘good’, then the notion ‘good life’ is no longer an insight of moral relevance. The moral substance, as a consequence, emigrates from there to the motives of individual decisions that take — or do not take — into account the freedom of others for making their choices regarding concepts of a good life. The rest is politics.

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Sandel, M. (2010). Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?
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84 《東吳哲學學報》三十期 (8, 2014)
*
韓 賀 伯
**
摘 要
在其暢銷著作《正義》中，美國哲學家桑德爾 (M. Sandel) 針對康德和羅
爾斯 (J. Rawls) 提出的個人自由選擇與評估其選擇的道德價值的正當理由，
批判性地探討「自由主義」的道德極限。對自由主義者而言，決定的內容沒
有道德相關性；只要按照法律規定，人們有自由選擇想要生活的價值觀。只
有個人選擇特定人生的動機的（普遍）證成可以主張道德相關的地位。
然而，很可疑的一點是，桑德爾認為，這種形式的方式必須透過「我們
分享的共同生活的品質和性質」來完成。道德承諾與我們喜愛和追求的美好
生活密不可分，而這又取決於建立一個有助於它的社會。因此，道德哲學必
須根植於政治哲學，因為此哲學分支正是探討個人和社會的關係 —— 如他在
其早期著作寫到：「家庭、部落、階級、民族或人民」的社會世界。這是因
為個人是生活在社群裡「有阻礙的自我」 (encumbered self) —— 是「更廣泛的
對象」 (wider subject) 。因此，特定社群共享的價值觀合理地限制個人選擇（自
由）的範圍。桑德爾認為他能針對這種限制提出哲學反思。
我認為，桑德爾的哲學構思模糊且矛盾重重。再者，桑德爾所提出的公
正社會的規範，需要透過個人從全球（普遍）角度更嚴格的評估，進而透過
康德式的基於互相尊重的個人關懷來定義個人自由，而非透過基於固有權威
的公共規範。以社群為基礎的規範是衍生的；定義政治正義的是道德，但反
之則不然。
關鍵詞：政治哲學、正義、道德、康德、個人主義

投稿日期： 102 年 9 月 30 日。接受刊登日期： 103 年 6 月 19 日。責任校對：陳怡仲、
楊雅婷。

義守大學應用英語系助理教授