DIPLOMA
Teacher Support Material
PROGRAMME
k
INTERNATIONAL
BACCALAUREATE
ORGANIZATION
History
Internal Assessment
For first examinations in 2003
Diploma Programme History
Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment
February 2002
The International Baccalaureate Organization wishes to acknowledge the work of the following
for their help in the production of this document:
Sonia Clarke, chief examiner
Alaric Dickinson, principal examiner
Brian Mimmack, deputy chief examiner
Cristina Mirkow, deputy chief examiner
International School of Düsseldorf
Washington International School
© International Baccalaureate Organization 2002
International Baccalaureate Organization
Route des Morillons 15
1218 Grand-Saconnex
Geneva, SWITZERLAND
Sample 2
Contents
Checklist
Introduction
1
The Historical Investigation: Guidance for Teachers
2
Frequently Asked Questions
3
The Historical Investigation: Guidance for Candidates
4
The Written Account
5
Outlines for the Historical Investigation
7
The Historical Investigation: Assessed Examples
11
Example 1: To what extent were the first Five Year Plans of Stalin and
Mao successfully implemented?
11
Example 2: How can our understanding of the origins of the Cold War
be aided by a study of different schools of thought on its origins?
17
Example 3: Why did Trotsky leave the Menshevik party and become a
Bolshevik, and how important was his role in the Bolshevik Revolution
of October 1917?
22
Example 4: Why did the Zulu impi defeat the British Army in the battle
of Isandlwana, 1879?
28
Example 5: To what extent was the defeat of the British Army by the
Zulu at Isandlwana in 1879 due to the mistakes made by Lord
Chelmsford?
34
Introduction
This teacher support material has been prepared by senior examiners and practising teachers of Diploma
Programme history. It should be read in conjunction with the Diploma Programme History guide (first
published February 2001). The detailed requirements for the internally assessed components, and the
internal assessment criteria, are given in the “Assessment Details” section of the guide.
In brief, the requirements for internal assessment for the history course (first examinations in 2003) are that:
•
the candidate undertakes a historical investigation of his or her choice
•
the emphasis is on a specific historical inquiry under the guidance of a teacher
•
the candidate applies the skills of the historian to the investigation.
The historical investigation is assessed against six criteria which are related to the objectives of the history
course.
The Purpose of this Document
This teacher support material has been developed:
•
to provide further clarification of the nature of the internal assessment
•
to offer guidance to teachers on their role in the production of internal assessment
•
to provide teachers with examples of the kinds of work that can be undertaken for the historical
investigation
•
to show the application of the assessment criteria.
The document includes four outlines illustrating some possible approaches to the historical investigation.
These are followed by five examples of the full historical investigation, some of which have been devised
by senior examiners and others by students. All five examples include detailed comments and marks on
each criterion, written by senior examiners.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
1
•
The Historical Investigation:
Guidance for Teachers
What is it?
A historical investigation consisting of a written account of between 1500 and
2000 words, divided into six parts: a plan of the investigation, a summary of
evidence, evaluation of sources, an analysis, a conclusion, and a bibliography
or list of sources.
Who does it?
All higher level and standard level history candidates.
How many words
should there be in
each section?
This is not specified but a suggestion is: A 100–150, B 500–600, C 250–400,
D 500–650, E 150–200. Total 1500–2000.
How many marks is
it worth?
It is marked out of 20 for both higher level and standard level and weighted at
20% (for higher level) and 25% (for standard level) of the final assessment.
When is it done?
Timing is up to the teacher, but it is advisable to start the investigation at least
three months before the date that samples for the May and November sessions
have to be with the moderators.
What can it be
about?
Any genuine historical topic, but the teacher must agree it with the candidate.
What should the
teacher do?
1.
2
Explain how the internal assessment works. Candidates should be given a
copy of the instructions for the historical investigation from the “Internal
Assessment” section of the guide.
2. Set a timetable for the different stages, eg choosing the topic, first draft,
final version.
3. Discuss topics and the availability of sources.
4. Agree topics; some teachers institute a specific programme of coordinated
syllabus topics, others allow “free choice”.
5. Give class lessons on how to tackle the exercise, emphasizing in particular
the importance of a well-defined thesis question, the use and evaluation of
sources, note taking, analysis, and the preferred system for references and
the bibliography.
6. Advise the candidates individually if and when necessary.
7. Read the candidates’ first drafts and advise them how their work could be
improved, but do not annotate the written draft heavily.
8. Check and advise about references and the bibliography.
9. Assess all internal assessment according to the criteria in the guide.
10. Complete the appropriate forms: 3/IA and 3/CS. Be sure to affirm that
the internal assessment is the candidate’s own work in the relevant
section.
11. Send samples to the IBO for external moderation.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Frequently Asked Questions
•
Can the investigation be on a topic outside the IB Diploma Programme history syllabus?
Yes, this is perfectly acceptable.
•
How many sources should be used in the investigation?
Candidates should use as many as will produce an effective investigation. Two of these sources
should be selected for evaluation (section C of the investigation).
•
Should the teacher comment on several drafts of the investigation?
No, only the first one which should not be heavily annotated or edited.
•
Is it possible to have historical investigations approved by IBCA before they are undertaken?
This is not a requirement and is not regular practice, but guidance is available from IBCA if the
validity of the investigation is in doubt.
•
Is a penalty imposed when candidates do not follow the recommendations on the length of
the investigation?
No marks will be awarded for criterion F if the investigation is less than 1500 or more than
2000 words. The word limit has been imposed in order to focus the candidate’s investigation, to
ensure fairness for all candidates and to reduce the overload on teachers and candidates.
•
Should the teacher write comments on the finished investigation?
This is not a requirement but comments can be very helpful to the moderator in understanding
how marks have been allocated.
•
Should the teacher make a copy of the candidate’s investigation?
Yes, this is advisable. After the process of moderation, the investigations are kept for several
months by the moderator and then destroyed. The candidate and teacher may therefore like to
keep a record of the finished investigation.
•
What do I do if I suspect that the candidate’s work is not their own?
If you have reasonable evidence that this is the case, make the candidate rewrite his or her
investigation. If time does not permit this, then do not sign the form and submit the reasons for
your suspicion.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
3
The Historical Investigation: Guidance for Candidates
The Historical Investigation:
Guidance for Candidates
Teachers may find that it is useful to photocopy this page and the section entitled “The Written Account”
to give to candidates.
Planning
1. Start by identifying a general area of interest.
2. Narrow it down to a specific question/area of investigation.
3. Choose a working title that may be changed/refined at a later stage.
4. Make sure you can obtain sufficient resources for your planned investigation.
5. Read widely around the area of study and note down resources used.
6. Review your thesis question and refine it if necessary.
7. Take notes from your chosen resources, including exact references.
8. Complete section A (the plan) and show it to your teacher.
9. Re-read your notes and decide where they would fit into the sections of the investigation.
10. Complete your investigation, according to the IBO guidelines.
On completion of the investigation, you may find it useful to use the following checklist.
Checklist
Completed
Does the front cover have your name, candidate number, word count and thesis
question/statement?
Do you have a contents page?
Are all the pages numbered?
Have you completed all the sections of the historical investigation:
A: Plan of the investigation
B: Summary of evidence
C: Evaluation of sources
D: Analysis
E: Conclusion
F: List of sources?
Does your bibliography contain all sources used?
Is your bibliography set out in alphabetical order?
Is your investigation within the word limit of 1500–2000?
Have you signed the declaration on form 3/CS?
4
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
The Written Account
The Written Account
This section is taken from the History guide, but includes further guidance on producing the written
account of the historical investigation.
Regardless of the type of historical investigation chosen, every candidate must produce a written account
consisting of the following six sections:
A Plan of the investigation
B Summary of evidence
C Evaluation of sources
D Analysis
E Conclusion
F
A
List of sources
Plan of the investigation
The plan of the investigation should include:
•
•
the subject of the investigation which may be formulated as a question
the methods to be used in the investigation.
This is a relatively brief but important section. A sharply focused question and a clearly structured plan
will be more likely to produce a successful investigation.
B
Summary of evidence
The summary of evidence should indicate what the candidate has found out from the sources he or
she has used. It can be in the form of either a list or continuous prose. Any illustrations,
documents, or other relevant evidence should be included in an appendix and will not be included
in the word count.
This section should be organized and referenced and provide evidence of thorough research.
C
Evaluation of sources
This section of the written account should be a critical evaluation of two important sources
appropriate to the investigation and should refer to their origin, purpose, value and limitation.
More than two sources may be evaluated but the emphasis should be on the thorough evaluation
of two sources rather than a superficial evaluation of a greater number.
The two sources chosen should be appropriate for the investigation and could be written, oral,
archeological, etc. The purpose of this section is to assess the usefulness of the sources but not to
describe their content or nature.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
5
The Written Account
D
Analysis
The analysis should include:
•
•
•
the importance of the investigation in its historical context
analysis of the evidence
if appropriate, different interpretations.
In this section the elements of the investigation identified in section B will be broken down into key
issues/points. Consideration of historical context can add weight and perspective to the study. Where
appropriate (depending on the scope of the investigation) links can be made with associated events and
developments to aid understanding of the historical importance of the chosen investigation.
E
Conclusion
The conclusion must be clearly stated and consistent with the evidence presented.
This section is a follow-up to section D. It requires an answer or conclusion, based on the evidence
presented, which either partially or fully addresses the question stated or implied in the investigation.
F
List of sources
A bibliography or list of sources must be included although this will not form part of the word
count.
All sources, whether written or otherwise, (including interviews) should be listed. It is recommended that
written sources be listed separately from non-written sources (eg web addresses, oral interviews).
Total: 1500–2000 words, 20 marks
6
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Outlines for the Historical Investigation
These four outlines illustrate some possible approaches to the historical investigation.
1.
An investigation into social history: How successfully did Hitler promote
the ideal of the family in the Third Reich?
A
Plan of the investigation
To establish what Hitler’s ideal for the family was.
To measure how far his vision accorded with reality.
B
Summary of evidence
Background: position of family/women prior to 1933.
Duties of women defined as: children, church, kitchen (kinder, kirche, küche).
Hitler’s ideals: Mein Kampf and other contemporary sources, eg speeches.
Evaluation of evidence: historians of social history of Third Reich.
C
Evaluation of sources
Comparison of two historical studies, eg Crew, D F. 1994. Nazism and German Society 1933–
1945. Routledge; Noakes, J and Pridham, G. 1984. Nazism 1919–1945, Vol 2. State, Economy
& Society 1933–39, University of Exeter.
D
Analysis
The place of family in Nazi ideology.
Role of men: penalties on bachelors.
Ideal of women as mothers/wives/employees as promoted by Hitler and Goebbels.
Reality of women’s position: Lebensborn (homes for unmarried mothers); employment
patterns—demands of war and re-armament.
E
Conclusion
Evaluation of myth of German family as measured against evidence of family life from social
history studies. Discussion of pressures/outside influences that undermined family policy.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
7
Outlines for the Historical Investigation
2.
8
An investigation of an event represented in newspaper reports: How did
newspaper reports on the death of Kennedy vary, and how reliable were they?
A
Plan of the investigation
To show how the reports of Kennedy’s assassination reflected the impact of the event on
America. To demonstrate how reporting changed with the passage of time.
B
Summary of evidence
Sections on Kennedy and on assassination.
Immediate reactions of the press.
Subsequent press reports.
C
Evaluation of sources
Evaluation of major newspaper reports, such as in the Washington Post and The Times (London).
Either compare contemporary accounts or show how treatment of Kennedy’s assassination
changed over time in one newspaper.
D
Analysis
Importance of context.
Tone of early reportage and analysis of reasons for it.
How newspaper reporting changed with emerging evidence and changing mood of country.
E
Conclusion
Accuracy and effectiveness of reporting.
Discussion of newspapers as sources of historical evidence.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Outlines for the Historical Investigation
3.
An investigation comparing a film and a written account of a historical
event: How and why did the accounts of the storming of the Winter Palace
in October 1917 differ in the film, October, and in the book, A People’s
Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924?
A
Plan of the investigation
To study the film October and compare it with a historical study of the storming of the
Winter Palace.
B
Summary of evidence
Film footage: October, 1927, directed by Eisenstein (account of storming of Winter Palace)—
emphasis on symbols.
Written account: Figes, O. 1996. A People’s Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924. Pimlico.
Details of evidence: discussion of significance.
C
Evaluation of sources
Eisenstein’s October: functions; propaganda creation of a myth.
Historical focus of A People’s Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924.
D
Analysis
Myth of revolutionary uprising—spontaneous or not?
Function of film—giving confidence and pride to an emerging Russian state.
Focus of historian—overall evaluation.
E
Conclusion
Contrast between the two sources.
Analysis of revolutionary myth.
Evaluation of sources and evidence as presented, eg propaganda, western historian’s view.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
9
Outlines for the Historical Investigation
4.
An investigation into local history: How, when and why was the
church/mosque/temple of [name] built and what can be learnt from it
about the village of [name] in a defined period?
A
Plan of the investigation
To establish how, when and why the church/mosque/temple was built, its contribution to
village/town life and what can be learnt from it about the life of the people of [name].
B
Summary of evidence
How: building methods, style, architecture.
When: chronology, origin and changes.
Why: religious motives, social status, demographic context.
History of and from it: demographic changes, religious changes, social implications, war
damage, plague (graveyards).
C
Evaluation of sources
Buildings and artifacts: the church/mosque/temple and its religious “furniture”.
Written sources: parish/local records.
D
Analysis
Religious practices, changes, beliefs.
Impact of political change/revolutions.
Rise and fall in the economic status of the area.
War and plague that hit the area.
Art and architecture.
E
Conclusion
The church/mosque/temple as a historic monument or a living record.
(Buildings such as castles, forts, industrial buildings, bridges, poor houses (unions), could be
treated in the same way.)
10
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
The Historical Investigation:
Assessed Examples
Example 1
Example 1: To what extent were the first Five Year Plans of
Stalin and Mao successfully implemented?
Examiner comments
and marks
A Plan of the investigation (2 marks)
To what extent were the first Five Year Plans of Stalin
and Mao successfully implemented?
Indicates research
question and the subject
of the investigation.
Could say more about
the method to be used
to evaluate success.
1/2 marks? Borderline
This investigation seeks to evaluate the comparative success of
the first Five Year Plans of Stalin and Mao. The main body of
this investigation outlines Stalin and Mao’s particular aims,
describes how these originated, and discusses the economic
focuses of the plans. The successes and failures of each plan
are then analysed, paying particular attention to their economic
and political effects on the people of the USSR and China. Two
of the sources used in this essay, Stalin: Breaker of Nations and
The Rise of Modern China, are then evaluated in detail in terms
of their origins, purpose, value and limitations.
B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
Although this is well
researched and clearly
written, no references
are given to the sources
used.
At the 1926 Party Congress Stalin emphasized that, in order to
advance and modernize the state of the agrarian Soviet
economy, and to bring it into line with the western economies a
dramatic change, (what the Chinese would later call “a Great
Leap”) needed to occur. He realized that to achieve this the
USSR would need to phase out Lenin’s New Economic Policy.
The first Five Year Plan (October 1928–December 1932)
would be the beginning of the means to this end. It was
formulated by the state planning authority, Gosplan. The main
emphasis was placed on heavy industry. Sacrifices would need
to be made because industrialization was to occur without
foreign help. In reality the plan did not specify exactly how the
economy was going to achieve all of these highly optimistic
goals. During the first two or three years it appeared as if
industrial output had increased and was achieving its targets. In
reality it was not. Stalin decided that some means was needed
to ensure that workers could not strike or slow down output.
Between January 1931 and December 1932 legislation
concerning labour discipline was implemented and
imprisonment was enforced for violation of the labour codes.
Pressure began mounting on production managers to meet the
unattainable quota requirements. Stalin then reevaluated the
Five Year Plan and raised the quota objectives to a new
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
11
Example 1
Some references to
sources used are
necessary.
Could include further
findings from the
investigation
(particularly statistics
which could be
mentioned here and
provided in full in the
appendix).
3 marks
optimal level. He received encouraging statistical feedback
although the accuracy of these figures was questionable. After
1929 the agricultural sector was experiencing problems due to
the process of collectivization. Some peasants were resisting
the collectives and feared deportation. However many peasants
enthusiastically adopted the collectivization programme. In
1933 a famine interrupted the plan and killed millions of
people. The results of the plan were few: there were some
short-term advantages, but many long-term disadvantages.
The first Five Year Plan implemented under Mao bore similar
characteristics to that of Stalin. China had historically been
xenophobic and it intended to move away from agrarianism
towards industrialization. The main emphasis would be placed
on heavy industry at the expense of light industry and this
would be supported financially by the agricultural sector. The
agricultural sector was not developed enough to sustain the
industrial drive alone. Chinese hopes turned towards its fellow
communist state, the USSR, for financial support. The
announcement of the first Five Year Plan in 1952 was made at
a time when the economy was heavily skewed towards
agrarianism. The CCP had already accrued a $300 million debt
from the USSR, which put the economy under great strain in
the run up to the first Five Year Plan. The process of
collectivization was begun by the implementation of the
Agrarian Reform Law in 1950 which redistributed the land
among the peasants. The results were probably not as
forthcoming or as dramatic as those of the USSR had been
although Chinese heavy industry did show some significant
improvement. GNP also increased but again this was at the
expense of agricultural output, social benefits and consumer
industries. A UN survey of Asia and the Far East in 1960 was
positive in regard to the Chinese economy. It concluded that
gross industrial production was on the increase and agriculture
was, reportedly, exceeding targets.
C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Excellent evaluation of
origin and purpose, value
and limitations.
Perhaps it would be
better to give the exact
details of each book at
the top and evaluate
each separately rather
than do them together.
12
Stalin, Breaker of Nations was published in 1991 and was
written by Robert Conquest, a, veteran of World War Two.
Conquest is the author of eighteen other books and works as
Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. His stated
purpose for this book was “to give a portrait of Stalin and his
nature” (Conquest xi), and “to use a good deal of fresh material
not available to previous biographers” (Conquest xiii). China
born Immanuel Hsu initially wrote The Rise of Modem China
in 1970. The latest edition was published in 1995 while Hsu
was a professor at Santa Barbara University. Hsu was
American educated and believes that the history of modern
China must be written with a Chinese scholar’s insight and a
foreign scholar’s objectivity (Hsu 15).
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 1
The value of these books would seem to be their recent dates of
publication. Both were published after the break-up of the
Soviet Union, which should make more information available
to the writers. Their viewpoints have the advantage of time and
hindsight and should be more balanced. The limitations
however are that both sources have serious flaws which blur
this objectivity.
Particularly good
evaluation of limitations.
4 marks (4/3 borderline)
Robert Conquest’s approach to Communism is epitomized by
the titles of some of his books: The Harvest of Sorrow;
Common Sense about Russia; Civic and Despotic Cultures.
The title of this source, Stalin: Breaker of Nations, follows the
same trend. Is it likely that this author will sympathetically, or
objectively, deal with the issues? Even in the introduction
Conquest sets the tone: “no other system has ever been so
completely based on falsehood and delusion” (Conquest xv). In
the same vein is, “We see a vast, dark figure looming over the
century” (Conquest xv). When it comes to the first Five Year
Plan, Conquest makes some generalizations such as: “Certainly
not fewer than five million, and more probably at least seven
million died of starvation” (Conquest 163). These figures are
not substantiated by any other source and the origin of this
information is not specified. Where did these figures come
from? As regards the success or failure of the plan, in terms of
economic changes, no information is forthcoming. Conquest
spends much of the chapter recounting anecdotal details from
individuals which, in themselves, are interesting, but add little
to a serious historical study of the topic. The value of this
information is questionable as it is so limited in scope. There is
no mention of any positive outcomes of the first Five Year
Plan. Conquest implies that every outcome was negative.
Immanuel Hsu, on the other hand, clearly substantiates his claims
with statistical evidence on the effects of Mao’s Plan (Hsu 652–
654). However on closer examination the statistics which are
cited come from one book by Hughes and Luard which was
published in 1962! How reliable are these figures? Who are
Hughes and Luard? Why does Hsu use only one source? In all
fairness Hsu does appear to be relatively objective in his
evaluations of Mao and includes three or four Chinese
government spokesmen in his section assessing Mao’s effects on
China (Hsu 778–785). One must however conclude that Hsu’s
analysis has limitations.
D Analysis (5 marks)
Some sound analysis, but
different
interpretations could
have been included, and
references given to
indicate sources used.
One of the major difficulties in making any objective analysis or
assessment of Stalin and Mao’s first Five Year Plans is the
reliability of the sources which are being used to make
judgments of the plans’ respective successes or failures. Sources
originating in either the USSR or the PRC may be subject to
censorship or falsification for propaganda purposes (Mao’s
claims for the Great Leap Forward). On the other hand sources
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
13
Example 1
originating in the West may also be skewed by pro or anticommunist sentiments and propaganda. It therefore becomes
very difficult for anyone researching these topics to make valid
and reliable judgments other than in very general terms.
There is!
Some reference to wider
historical context—could
be developed further.
3–4 markband.
(Perhaps generous in
view of the lack of
references.)
There is no doubt that under Stalin’s first Five Year Plan,
which replaced Lenin’s War Communism and NEP, the USSR
transformed itself into a more modern industrial state. The
methods by which this was achieved and the ruthless
elimination of any kulak opposition mean that these industrial
benefits must be counterbalanced against the devastating
effects of the process of collectivization.
Following the victory in the Chinese Civil War, and the
passing of the 1950 Agrarian Reform Law, the introduction of
the first Five Year Plan transformed China from a semi-feudal
agrarian state into a more industrially based modern nation. In
both nations the changes were dramatic because the USSR and
the PRC were starting from positions where, in relation to more
industrialized nations, they were markedly inferior in terms of
the economic structure of each country.
What is interesting to note is that, although Stalin and Mao
were successful in general terms, their success was initially
based on the elimination of any internal opposition that was
perceived to stand in the way of creating a socialist state. The
question that therefore must be asked after examining the
examples of Stalin and Mao is: is the only way by which a
nation state can transform its economic base quickly enough to
achieve rapid economic growth, by acting to the detriment of a
large segment of its population?
The answer would seem to be yes! In order to achieve dramatic
change the traditional structure of the economic base needs to
shift and it is unlikely that this will occur voluntarily. Those
people who hold a comparative economic advantage in real
terms in any society will have to give up their privileged position
to ensure more equal benefits for all. If this is not done willingly,
then the state will have to use force. To Mao this force was
necessary for the creation of a socialist state along Marxist lines.
For Stalin it was necessary for the establishment of an
authoritarian and, soon to be, totalitarian state.
E Conclusion (2 marks)
2 marks
14
The USSR’s first Five Year Plan was more successful in terms
of industrial development. There was certainly improvement,
but statistics do not tell us anything of the immense sacrifices
that were made by the Soviet people during the implementation
of the plan. It must also be remembered that the Soviet Union
had been in existence for a decade before Stalin introduced his
plan whereas the PRC had only been founded in October 1949.
The PRC had inherited a diseased economy, did not possess the
necessary means of production, and was exploited by the
Soviet Union, but still made industrial progress. Historians tend
to be more optimistic and positive as regards Mao’s Five Year
Plan. In contrast to that of Stalin there is no mention of the
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 1
death, famine, and intrigue that occurred as a result of the
implementation of the plan. Of course there were the agrarian
purges with the introduction of the Agrarian Reform Law in
1950 but Communism cannot develop until the elements of
bourgeois capitalism have been removed. Thus, the question of
the relative success of the first Five Year Plans implemented
under Stalin and Mao becomes not one of economics, but one
of ethics. Stalin, whilst observing the Marxist doctrine that the
state is everything, had discarded the notion of the state
actually being the people, and had thus strayed from the path of
socialism. The state, under Stalin, became an enemy of the
people. Mao’s regime on the other hand, did not have focus in
its early years on the establishment of power by a single, lone,
totalitarian ruler. China initially had not lost sight of the
principle aim of socialism–the betterment of mankind–although
this was to change later in the 1960s with the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.
1941 words
2 marks
NB no indication in the
investigation if or where
these sources were
used.
F List of sources (2 marks)
Chubb, Edmund. 1978. 20th Century China. New York.
Columbia University Press.
Conquest, Robert. 1998. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. London.
Phoenix
Hsu, Immanuel. 1995. The Rise of Modern China. Oxford.
Oxford University Press.
Laver, John. 1998. Joseph Stalin: from Revolutionary to
Despot. London. Hodder and Stoughton.
Lee, Stephen J. 1996. The European Dictatorships: 1918–
1945. London. Routledge.
Lynch, Michael. 1998. Stalin and Khrushchev: the USSR,
1924–64. London. Hodder and Stoughton.
McCauley, Martin. 1995. Stalin and Stalinism. London.
Longman.
Nove, Alec. 1992. Stalinism and After. London. Routledge.
Spence, Jonathan. 1991. The Search for Modern China.
London. Norton & Company.
Total: 16 marks out of 20
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
15
Example 1
Assessment Criteria
Criterion
Total
marks
Marks
achieved
A
2
1
Clear statement of the subject and the scope of the investigation.
1 mark is somewhat severe, compensation possible.
B
5
3
Evidence of at least adequate research, though could provide
more statistical support for findings. Lacks referencing. 2 or 3
marks? Bottom of 3–4 markband seems “best fit”.
C
4
4
Especially good evaluation of limitations; pertinent comments
also on origin, purpose and value.
D
5
4
3–4 markband. Although reference could have been made to
sources used and different interpretations, and further reference
made to historical context to show importance of the
investigation, the analysis is generally sound. 4 marks seems
“best fit”, especially as mark was severe for criterion A.
E
2
2
Merits maximum 2 marks. The conclusion is clearly stated and
consistent with the evidence provided.
F
2
2
Within the world count, and the list of sources is comprehensive
and sound in format.
Total
20
16
A well-expressed investigation with some strong sections (C and
D). With a more thorough use of supporting evidence in section
B, this investigation could have achieved a higher mark.
16
Examiner comments
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 2
Example 2: How can our understanding of the origins of the
Cold War be aided by a study of different schools of thought on
its origins?
Examiner comments
and marks
A Plan of the investigation (2 marks)
i Subject of the investigation:
The plan should state the
subject of the
investigation, and how it is
going to be undertaken, ie
a breakdown of what the
candidate is going to do.
The plan does this and
so merits 2 marks.
How can our understanding of the origins of the Cold War be
aided by a study of different schools of thought on its origins?
ii Methods:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Research for bibliography about the origins of the Cold
War. Instrument: Internet. Three main sites were
particularly helpful: CNN the Cold War, Cold War
Policies, Cold War History Project. The main criteria
used for selection were: reliability of the sources and how
recently they were written/updated.
Writing of an annotated bibliography about the topic.
Selection and reading of a book about the origins of the
Cold War. Criteria: the most comprehensive and
recommended.
Search, selection and reading of the authors which
represent the main schools of thought.
Analysis of their main arguments.
B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
Relevant, with some
indication of research
undertaken and what the
candidate has found out,
but could, and should,
say much more about the
nature of the
controversies.
3 marks
1
The origins of the Cold War is one of the most controversial
historiographical issues. However, among the multiple
interpretations and assessments about the topic it is clear or rather
clear that some main schools of thought can be identified: the
orthodox or traditional, the revisionist and the post-revisionist.
The orthodox or traditional interpretation argued that the origins
of the Cold War were due to the aggressive Soviet policy of
expansion in the immediate post-war years. Two of the
proponents of this theory are: Thomas Bailey (1950) and Arthur
Schlesinger (1967). Willaim Appleman Williams (1959) and
Walter LaFeber (1997) are revisionist historians who support the
thesis that the United States had been primarily to blame for the
Cold War. Post-revisionist scholarship has searched for a balance
and argued that the Cold War was caused by misperceptions of
both the United States and the Soviet Union. Melvyn Leffler
(1991) and John Lewis Gaddis (1997) are exponents of this view.1
Martin McCauley. 1995. The origins of the Cold War 1941–1949. Longman: London and New York. pp 9–30.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
17
Example 2
C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Evaluates two sources,
but reference to their
origin, purpose, value
and limitations could be
more thorough—hence 2
marks.
Two of the sources selected for evaluation are Walter LaFeber’s
America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–1996 and John Lewis
Gaddis’s We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History. Both of
them are secondary sources and make use of the latest research
about the Cold War and, particularly, the new Soviet and Chinese
materials which have only recently become available. Both have
long been recognized, by the public and colleagues, as specialists
in Cold War history and their work and information are used
almost in all the works about the topic. Both are representatives of
two main schools of thought about the Cold War. LaFeber is, and
has been, one of the most articulate proponents of the revisionist
approach, while Gaddis is accepted as one of the most, if not the
most, distinguished historian of the post-revisionist perspective.
Both LaFeber’s and Gaddis’s works are their most recent
productions: LaFeber’s is its 8th edition, the first was in 1967.
Gaddis’s is from 1997, although he has written numerous books
and articles about the Cold War. Both are American historians who
have been dedicated to the academic life and scholarly pursuits.
LaFeber is Professor of History at Cornell University, while
Gaddis is Professor of History at Yale University. Their works are
addressed to both their colleagues and students. LaFeber’s views
are considered as a representative of the “New Left” while Gaddis
has been perceived as of more mainstream or conservative bent.
Both authors’ ideological inclinations and approaches, however,
are not new and had been portrayed in their previous works. What
has emerged from the analysis of new archival materials is a better
knowledge of Soviet and Chinese policies which previously had
been unavailable to Western historians. Although their approaches
might present some limitations in terms of the perspective they
present, their value for understanding some historiographic
arguments is undeniable.
D Analysis (5 marks)
Shows perceptive
analysis, including
reference to the
historical context to
explain the historical
importance of the
investigation. However,
some of this material,
particularly in the
second half of the
section, could
have been included in
section B.
2
The study of different schools of thought about the Cold War
provides an interesting perspective not only about the conflict itself
but also about the ideas and developments of the United States at
the time. Thus, the “New Left” and the revisionist school emerged
in the 1960s largely in reaction to the Vietnam War and its
arguments affected much of the US historiography and academic
life until the early 1980s. The new thinking reflected the findings
of the opening of the American archives covering the 1940s. It also
mirrored disillusionment with Johnson’s justification of the
Vietnam War which seemed rather similar to Truman’s use of
communist fear in his appeal for aid to Greece and Turkey.2
The revisionist school analyzes the economic and domestic forces
conditioning American foreign policy, and critically examines
claims of American goodwill in the world. In LaFeber’s view,
American officials were afraid of a recurrence of the Great
Depression of the 1930s. They believed that American prosperity
Joseph Smith. 1998. The Cold War 1945–1991. Blackwell. London. p 23.
18
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 2
Analysis repeatedly
makes effective links to
historical context in
this paragraph.
5 marks
and the survival of capitalism depended upon the creation of an
international economic system that would secure and guarantee the
principle of the “open door”.3 This aim clashed with Stalin’s
security considerations. His desire for protection provided by
buffer states resulted in the formation of a Soviet “closed” sphere
of influence in Eastern Europe. The Truman administration sought
to keep the region open by exerting diplomatic and economic
pressures. These were the conflicts and contradictions that the US
faced. That neither Roosevelt or Truman was able to resolve them
“was a major cause of the Cold War.”4
Furthermore, as the US government opposed the Soviet sphere of
interest in Europe, it continued to strengthen its own sphere of
influence in Europe, England and France, through economic loans
in exchange for favourable market conditions for the US, and in
Latin America through hemispheric organizations and agreements
that secured “collective self-defense” in the spirit of the Monroe
Doctrine. The Americans “thought that they had obtained the best
of the two worlds: exclusive American power in the New and the
right to exert American power in the Old”.5 Thus, American
expansionism compelled Stalin to consolidate his control over
Eastern Europe and was therefore responsible for the Cold War.
Opposing the orthodox argument that the United States had no
chance to avoid a cold war since it was dealing with Stalin who
was described as “paranoid” and “mentally ill”, LaFeber sees
Stalin’s policies as realistic and pragmatic. “That interpretation
neatly avoids confronting the complex cause of the Cold War but
is wholly insufficient to explain these causes.”6
Interestingly enough in the 1990s this argument is also part of the
post-revisionist explanation of the origins of the Cold War. The postrevisionist school appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
reflected the “New Right” ideas of the time: the demise of liberalism
and collapse of the Soviet Union.7 Gaddis claims that recent works
based on newly opened archives in former Communist nations have
proven that Soviet aggression, conditioned by Stalin’s personality
and Russian authoritarianism, made the Cold War inevitable and
compromise impossible.8,9 Gaddis essentially accepts US European
policy while separating it from US Third World policies. He accepts
some US responsibility for the Cold War and is critical of US
intervention in the developing nations, for example, yet finds the
Soviet threat in Europe and Japan credible.10
Gaddis’s work suggests insights taken from psychological decisionmaking and literature in political science. There is also some
3
Walter LaFeber. 1997. America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1996. Eighth edition. McGraw and Hill. New York.
pp15–16. 26–27.
4
ibid. p 8
5
6
7
8
9
ibid. p 22
ibid. p 19
Smith; op cit; p 16–26
John Lewis Gaddis. We Now Know. Clarendon Press: Oxford. p 249
10
ibid. pp26–84
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
19
Example 2
emphasis on consistent “misperception” of political power realities
for all concerned. Unintentionally or not, Gaddis revives some of the
arguments which made the orthodox school valid. And for the time
being his views are the virtual canon among many in the field.
E Conclusion (2 marks)
Explains importance of
the investigation,
indicating its
significance to 20th
century history and its
contribution to our
historical knowledge
and understanding.
2 marks
1530 words
The study of the historiography of the Cold War is a very rewarding
exercise for the understanding of the conflict. The Cold War may or
may not be over but it is undeniable that it is one of the most
significant episodes of the twentieth century. It affected and
physically and psychologically transformed the world in which we
live today. To analyse the different theories and schools helps us get
closer to the truth—a rather elusive quest that seems to be neglected
in the pursuit of historical knowledge and education. History might
be an instrument used to promote conformist attitudes and
acceptance of one particular or “official” view. Controversy allows
us to see different angles of the same episode and enhance our
knowledge about it. It is also interesting to see how historians who
doubted the reliability of any Soviet or Chinese sources now accept
them as true and reliable. Thus controversy provides us with insights
about the times in which we live, its ideas and perceptions.
The revisionist school offers a view of a generation very critical of
the US policies and the effects of its economic expansionism. But the
point is that they experienced and saw first hand the effects of the
Vietnam War both nationally and internationally. It is quite possible
that their approach toward Stalin and Communism might be
somehow distorted by their views. But it is also true that in the case
of LaFeber his scholarship is superb and supported by a myriad of
reliable sources and facts in his assessment of Stalin’s foreign policy.
The main issue is that this school is out of “fashion”.
The post-revisionist approach, it is true, allows other options and
seeks to strike a “balance” of responsibility. However, it does not
emphasize economic issues and tends to return to the traditional
assessment of Stalin and Communism. Again, it is a reflection of
our times: the Soviet Union collapsed, the West won. The question
is: do we really know now?
F List of sources (2 marks)
Within the word limit
and key sources are
listed. But should have
used one standard
method of referencing
in the footnotes.
Borderline; “best fit”
seems 1 mark.
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1997. We Now Know. Oxford. Clarendon Press.
McCauley, Martin. 1995. The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949.
(2nd ed.). London. Longman.
LaFeber, Walter. 1997. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–
1996. (8th ed.). New York. The Mcgraw-Hill Companies Inc.
Smith, Joseph. 1998. The Cold War, 1945–1991. (2nd ed.).
London. Blackwell Publishers.
Total: 15 marks out of 20
20
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 2
Assessment Criteria
Criterion
Total
marks
Marks
achieved
Examiner comments
A
2
2
Subject of the investigation, the scope and plan are appropriate
and clearly focused.
B
5
3
Insufficient evidence produced by the candidate, although
there are references.
C
4
2
Has not addressed the criterion thoroughly. Value and
limitations discussed only briefly.
D
5
5
Critical analysis and reference to the importance of the
investigation in its historical context merits 5 marks.
E
2
2
The conclusion is clearly stated and consistent with the
evidence presented.
F
2
1
Within the word limit, but two methods of referencing used in
section B. Not all the sources mentioned in the text are in the
section F list. Generous on section B, so 1 mark here.
Total
20
15
Lacks balance. With further development of sections B and C,
it could have reached a very high score.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
21
Example 3
Example 3: Why did Trotsky leave the Menshevik party and
become a Bolshevik, and how important was his role in the
Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917?
Examiner comments
and marks
A Plan of the investigation (2 marks)
A clear plan; the fact that
one part is too descriptive
does not mean a mark
should be taken off.
The scope of this investigation is to discover Trotsky’s role
as a Russian revolutionary up to the end of the Bolshevik
Revolution in 1917, especially to ascertain why after being a
Menshevik he became a Bolshevik, and how important his
role was in securing success for the Bolsheviks.
In order to carry out this investigation primary and secondary
sources will be consulted, and a bibliography will be
compiled, and attached. The plan is to include in B, the
summary of evidence, sections on:
1. Trotsky’s life and career before the first 1917 revolution
2. Background to the first 1917 revolution
3. Trotsky’s activities, May 1917 to the outbreak of the
second Bolshevik Revolution
4. Trotsky’s role in the revolution
Be careful here, some of
this is too narrative.
2 marks
Two important sources will be evaluated in C, the findings of
the investigation will be analysed in D, and the conclusion
reached stated in E.
B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
1. Trotsky’s life and career before the first 1917
revolution
This is too long and
narrative, and not relevant
for the question posed in
the investigation, although
a few points, such as
interest in political theory,
and relations with Lenin
could be inserted
elsewhere.
22
The real name of Leon Trotsky (1879 to 1940) was Lev
Davidovich Bronstein. He was born in Ianovoka, Ukraine
of Jewish parents. He was well educated, especially in
science and languages, but his main interest was political
theory, especially Marxism. This led to his arrest as a
revolutionary when he was nineteen. He was sent to
Siberia, escaped and joined Lenin in London in 1902. Like
Lenin he wrote, discussed politics and addressed meetings,
but the two revolutionaries often disagreed. Trotsky
accused Lenin of Jacobinism. Lenin regarded this as a
compliment. Trotsky pointed out that Jacobinism did not
end with the ascendancy of revolution but with bloodshed:
“the Jacobins chopped off people’s heads–we want to
enlighten human minds with Socialism” (Deutscher 73).
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 3
This is much too long and
narrative—interesting but
with a stringent word limit,
not necessary.
Hearing about the 1905 Revolution Trotsky returned to
Russia, organised the first Soviet in St Petersburg and
edited a successful revolutionary newspaper. He was
again arrested, sent to Siberia and escaped, becoming an
itinerant revolutionary organiser, journalist and prolific
political writer in Europe and America. He was a
Menshevik who believed in permanent international
revolution, and he continued to debate with other leading
revolutionaries, still differing with Lenin for whom the
revolution rather than the people it was supposed to help
was paramount. Trotsky probably did care about the
effects on peasants and workers. In 1907 Stalin and
Trotsky met—and clashed for the first time, in London.
Trotsky criticised Stalin’s “appropriations”, whilst Stalin
referred to Trotsky’s oratory as “beautiful uselessness”
(Deutscher 102–103).
Trotsky’s anti-war comments led to his banishment from
France and Spain in 1915, thus when revolution broke
out in Russia in February 1917, he was in America. He
embarked for Russia and arrived in May 1917.
2. Background to the first 1917 revolution
Too much background.
Very little of this refers to
Trotsky. Only include points
focused on Trotsky.
The Romanov rulers of Russia were autocratic, and the
country was backward. Tsar Alexander, beginning with
the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, introduced various
reforms, but on the whole they were not very successful
and opposition to Tsarist rule increased, especially
during the reign of Nicholas II (1894–1917). Some
progress was made in industrialization, but this brought
its own problems, and was not accompanied by political
reforms. Terrorism, repression and the opposition parties
increased and these and economic distress came to a
head in the 1905 Revolution. Tsar Nicholas issued the
October Manifesto, but the dumas that were introduced
disappointed the people as they appeared to be subject to
the Tsar. Although the outbreak of war in 1914 was
greeted with patriotic fervour, support for war and the
Tsar soon evaporated with defeat and suffering. The first
revolution developed out of bread riots and strikes. The
Tsar abdicated and a largely liberal, democratic,
republican Provisional government was set up. It did not
satisfy the left wing revolutionary elements, especially as
it continued the war and did not improve working
conditions or give land to the peasants. Probably
whatever had been its policies, Lenin and his Bolshevik
supporters would have opposed it. Key revolutionaries
including Trotsky, still a Menshevik, returned to Russia.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
23
Example 3
3. Trotsky’s activities, May 1917 to the outbreak of
the second Bolshevik Revolution
Trotsky at once began a frenetic existence trying to fan
revolution: “Petrograd was seething, and from the
moment he left his apartment early in the morning until
he returned late at night, Trotsky moved from meeting to
meeting, from assembly to committee, engaged in
speeches, debates and discussions” (Volkoganov 68).
Still a Menshevik, he joined the Mezhraiontsy, a left
wing faction of the Social Democrats, who favoured, as
Trotsky did, the reunification of Mensheviks and
Bolsheviks (Pipes 275). But Trotsky liked Lenin’s
emphasis on the power of the proletariat and probably
believed that Lenin meant it.
This is an important
section, but some is
analysis, so needs to be in
section D.
Again some of this should
have been in section D. The
whole of the section is
adequately referenced
(note, this is an acceptable
form of referencing).
Events were partly responsible for Trotsky becoming a
Bolshevik. The government accused the Bolsheviks of
being German spies. Lenin, never physically brave, fled.
Trotsky stood up for the Bolsheviks, and published his
support of Lenin. This goaded the Provisional
government into arresting Trotsky, and at the 6th Party
Congress in August, Trotsky was elected honorary
chairman in his absence (Volkogonov 73–74). He was
also elected a member of the new party Central
Committee. He was released from prison in September
and elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. He used
this to increase both the power of the Soviet and his own
power. The Soviet was responsible for the defence of
Petrograd, thought to be under threat from German
forces. Trotsky was thus able to develop the Military
Revolutionary Committee and the Red Guards and
prepare for action. He supported Lenin’s view that the
time was ripe for a further revolution, although many
Bolsheviks disagreed. Stalin, adopted a cautious stance
which later proved embarrassing and had to be falsified
(Deutscher 171–174).
Trotsky was vital in making final plans for the new
insurrection. Lenin left Finland on 10 October but
remained in hiding in the Vyborg district, and
communicated mostly by letter. He wanted an immediate
insurrection because he feared that a right wing
attempted coup would lead to the collapse of the
Provisional government and its replacement by a broad
socialist coalition (Service 59). Lenin did not want to
share power. He did send plans; Trotsky thought that
they were militarily unsound and had too narrow a base
(the party not the Soviet), because he realized that the
workers and peasants were more likely to respond to the
Soviet. Trotsky gained his point and the rising was timed
to coincide with the Second Congress of Soviets. Thus
Trotsky prepared for action.
24
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 3
4. Trotsky’s role in the Bolshevik Revolution,
24–25 October
The whole is too narrative
or descriptive.
3 marks
The actual Bolshevik Revolution caused little bloodshed,
and is often referred to as a coup. “The Provisional
Government of Alexander Kerensky was overthrown in
Petrograd on 25 October 1917. The Bolsheviks,
operating through the Military Revolutionary Committee
of the City Soviet, seized power in a series of decisive
actions. The post and telegraph offices and the railway
stations were taken and the army garrisons put under
rebel control. By the end of the day the Winter Palace
had fallen to the insurgents” (Service 62). According to
Pipes it was not quite so simple. Lenin sent anxious
messages because he feared that the insurrection was not
taking place, then he emerged from hiding and went to
the Bolshevik headquarters during the night of the 24th.
He prepared a statement to be read out at 10am at the
Congress of Soviets, saying that the Provisional
government had fallen. But at this stage the Winter
Palace with members of the government inside, had not
fallen and no revolutionaries could be found willing to
risk death and storm it. The Bolshevik forces “... had no
men willing to brave fire: their alleged 45,000 Red
Guards and tens of thousands of supporters were
nowhere to be seen” (Pipes 494). By midnight most of
the defenders of the Winter Palace had drifted away, and
the mob entered and looted it.
In the early hours of 26 October the Congress of Soviets
opened. The delegates set up a new government to serve
until the Constituent Assembly met. Lenin offered the
position of chairman to Trotsky. Trotsky refused.
C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Pipes, Richard. 1992. The Russian Revolution
1899–1919. London. Harper Collins.
The details of the book are
set out correctly and the
evaluation is perceptive but
purpose, value and
limitation could be clearer.
This book, written by an American academic historian, was
first published in 1990. The author says in his preface that it
is the first attempt to write a comprehensive view of the
Russian Revolution. It is valuable as it does do that. It is long
(945 pages), very detailed, and gives a full picture of what
happened. It includes material about all sections of the
populace, and all the leading participants. It was very useful
for discovering Trotsky’s role. It has been meticulously
researched, and has endnotes for all important points and
references. It narrates, describes and analyses the Bolshevik
Revolution, giving a clear picture of what happened. The
illustrations also help.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
25
Example 3
Volkogonov, Dmitri. 1996. Trotsky the Eternal
Revolutionary. London. Harper Collins.
Assessment is implicit
rather than explicit.
Volkogonov was a Russian army officer who became
Director of the Institute of Military History, but was
dismissed from this post in 1991, because some of his writing
was considered “un-Soviet”. Following the failed coup in
August 1991 he became Defence Adviser to President
Yeltsin. He died in 1995. As well as this work he wrote
biographies of Stalin and Lenin. Both of these are very
critical of the regimes of these two leaders, and were regarded
as controversial in the USSR. This biography of Trotsky was
not so controversial, probably because of Stalin’s actions in
removing as many traces as he could of Trotsky. The Russian
people knew little about him. It also contains some interesting
photographs and was very useful in giving the Russian
perspective.
Borderline 2/3 marks
D Analysis (5 marks)
Too brief, material used in
B should have been in this
section.
Good point.
Good but it would have
been better if the
references were put here.
2 marks
26
This investigation has tried first of all to find out Trotsky’s
motives in joining the Bolsheviks after being a Menshevik for
many years. Trotsky was a “professional” revolutionary. His
time was spent in writing and debating. He wanted to help
bring about an international Marxist revolution. He was a
great orator, and persuaded thousands of workers and
peasants that a Marxist revolution would improve their lives.
The detailed sources used in this investigation show that
Trotsky did play an important role in the Bolshevik
Revolution. Textbooks such as Lowe do not mention his role,
ascribing all success to Lenin, and Figes fails to show his
prominence on the 24 and 25 October. It was Lenin’s
insistence that there must be an uprising against the
Provisional government in October, and Trotsky gave this his
full support and helped to win over doubters. His energy and
enthusiasm kept Petrograd in a state of excitement and unrest,
and thus weakened the Provisional government. It must be
remembered that Lenin was in hiding until late on the night
of the 24 October. It was Trotsky who had insisted in
associating the Petrograd Soviet with the revolution and who
had made the plans for taking over strategic points. Pipes and
Volkogonov give due credit to Trotsky.
It must also be remembered that Stalin, as Lenin’s heir and
Trotsky’s rival and enemy, systematically removed evidence
of Trotsky’s role, sometimes even substituting himself and
always crediting Lenin as the hero and instigator of the
Bolshevik Revolution.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 3
E Conclusion (2 marks)
The conclusion is clearly
stated and consistent with
the evidence presented.
However, should develop
“Trotsky did much of the
groundwork”, though.
2 marks
1637 words
Trotsky as a Marxist revolutionary, changed from the
Menshevik party to the Bolshevik party in order to take part
in a second revolution and oust the weak Provisional
government. As an energetic, fearless campaigner, and
Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet he complimented Lenin,
who was in hiding for the three months leading up to the
revolution. Lenin had the authority in the party, but Trotsky
did much of the groundwork, and thus played a vital role in
the success of the Bolshevik Revolution.
F List of sources (2 marks)
No publication date for
Volkogonov or Pipes, no
publisher for Pipes.
1 mark
Total: 12 marks out of 20
Deutscher, Isaac. 1961. Stalin. Penguin.
Lowe, Norman. 1997. Mastering Modern World History.
Macmillan.
Pipes, Richard. The Russian Revolution 1899–1919.
Service, Robert. 1997. A History of Twentieth Century
Russia. Penguin.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Trotsky the Eternal Revolutionary.
Harper Collins.
Assessment Criteria
Criterion Total marks
Marks
achieved
Examiner comments
A
2
2
The final sentence is not necessary, and could be deleted if the
investigation were over the word limit.
B
5
3
It is too long and parts are not sufficiently focused on the
question.
C
4
2
Evaluation is too superficial. “Best fit” is 2 rather than 3 marks.
D
5
2
Short: lacks depth of analysis.
E
2
2
Short but the conclusion is consistent with the evidence,
therefore 2 marks “best fit,” especially as severe on criterion C.
F
2
1
No date of publication for Pipes and Volkogonov, no publisher
for Pipes; the investigation is within the word limit.
Total
20
12
With a more careful use of the material to fit the criteria, this
investigation could have achieved a higher score.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
27
Example 4
Example 4: Why did the Zulu impi defeat the British Army in the
battle of Isandlwana, 1879?
Examiner comments
and marks
A Plan of the investigation (2 marks)
Why did the Zulu impi defeat the British Army in the
battle of Isandlwana, 1879?
The question and plan
are stated clearly.
2 marks
The defeat of a large well equipped British Army by the Zulu
impi mostly armed with traditional weapons, at Isandlwana, in
1879, has always caused interest and criticism. The aim of my
Internal Assessment is to find out why this defeat took place. I
will research my investigation in some of the many books
published about the Anglo Zulu war since 1879, including some
which include material written by soldiers taking part in the war.
In B, I will describe why the war took place, write a brief
account of the battle, and note the composition and mistakes of
the British and the strength and success of the Zulu. I will
analyse my findings in D and reach a conclusion as a result of
this analysis in E.
B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
Causes
This is too long for an
introduction to the
battle.
In the 1870s the racial situation in southern Africa was
complicated. There were four main colonial territories ruled by
two European races—the Dutch now called Boers, and the British.
The two did not trust each other. There were also various Black
peoples who outnumbered the Whites. Some of these lived in
independent kingdoms, and others lived in the colonial territories
(Clarke Invasion page 17). The Zulu nation ruled by King
Cetshwayo, was the strongest race, and although they and the
British were usually on good terms, tension was increasing, partly
because several years of drought had caused a land shortage, and
partly because the British policy in South Africa was becoming
more aggressive (Clarke Invasion page 19).
This relates to why the
war took place rather
than why the British lost
the battle of
Isandlwana.
There had been various border incidents between the British and
the Zulu, and the new British High Commissioner, Bartle Frere,
probably wanted to use these as an excuse to get control of
Zululand to include it in his scheme for confederation in
southern Africa. He set up a boundary dispute and when it found
in favour of the Zulu he kept this quiet and raised other issues
such as atrocities committed by Zulu against Blacks living in
Natal, a British colony. Cetshwayo was then sent an impossible
ultimatum, and told that if he did not comply with its terms, the
British would invade (Barthorp page 13).
The British forces
The British troops were commanded by Lord Chelmsford. He
had not seen much active service, but was considered a reliable
commander (Coupland page 45). He was also liked by his
troops, but after the disaster at Isandlwana, many blamed him.
28
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 4
This is mainly focused
and relevant.
He had led the British forces to victory in another war in South
Africa against the Ngqika and Gcaleka, 1877–1878.
Immediately after this war he prepared his forces and plans
ready to fight the Zulu. Chelmsford had various regular British
regiments, half a company of Royal Engineers and a Royal
Artillery gun battery, but he had no regular cavalry. He did have
some mounted infantry, some volunteer cavalry and the Natal
Mounted Police. He also had various native levies. He did not
consider these numbers were adequate so he asked for more
troops to be sent.
Chelmsford thought that his force would be too large to invade
Zululand in the same place, and he also had to defend the border,
so he divided the force into five columns. It was the Third or
Central Column which Chelmsford accompanied and the Second
which arrived as reinforcements, that were defeated at
Isandlwana.
The Zulu forces
This is also relevant and
important.
The original founder of the Zulu nation and army was Shaka,
(1816–1828). All men were divided into regiments according to
age, and each regiment had its own kraal and uniform (Barthorp
pages 16–18). Army life dominated the whole Zulu social
system (Clarke, Invasion page 57). Much time was spent
practising and skirmishing. The impi’s battle formation was
crescent shaped, rather like a charging buffalo. The Zulu
travelled lightly and fast, barefoot carrying their weapons, a
shield and assegi. As there was no other baggage, they were very
mobile. They did not understand defence, but by 1879, some had
guns, and the whole army probably numbered 40,000, divided
into 33 regiments. Discipline was excellent due to devotion to
the king and belief in their customs.
The Battle of Isandlwana
Again relevant and
important, but could
have been more concise.
There is some
referencing, but more
points need references
to sources used. (Note,
this form of referencing
is acceptable.)
The British army faced immediate difficulties when they began
the invasion, because of heavy rain and too much baggage.
These two factors made the advance slow. The Central Column
crossed the border on 11 January 1879, and reached the first
camp at Isandlwana on 20th January. The troops did not
entrench it or make a laager [fortified camp] as they had been
advised by Boers en route. The camp had adequate water and
grass for the horses, but the north was not secure, and it could be
surrounded. The next day the general sent out patrols to
reconnoitre. Meanwhile the main Zulu impi of about 35,000,
was on its way. After travelling for three days from the capital
Ulundi, it hid in dongas a few miles from Isandlwana to wait
until the moon was favourable (Clarke Invasion page 65). This
main impi was not seen by the British, but other Zulu from
nearby were seen by British patrols. On 21st January, a patrol
leader asked Chelmsford for reinforcements, so that he could
engage the enemy the next day. Chelmsford sent some, then
received another request at 1.30 am on the 22nd. Chelmsford
decided that as there was an opportunity for battle he would
march out with half his force. He also decided to send a message
to the relief column and ask its commander Durnford to bring it
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
29
Example 4
3 marks
to reinforce Isandlwana. Clery, a staff officer, wrote a message
to Pulleine, the senior officer left in camp, telling him to defend
it if attacked. The men marched out at daybreak.
Later that day Chelmsford received various messages that there
were problems, but he did not believe them until it was too late.
There had been confusion in camp between Durnford and Pulleine.
Durnford wanted to go out and find the enemy, so sent out some of
his horsemen. They stumbled upon the hidden impi. The Zulu thus
discovered, rose and attacked the camp, surrounding it with their
overwhelming numbers. The British troops fought well, but
without a laager or other defensive position, stood no chance
against the large numbers. After about two hours a retreat was
sounded, and those who were still alive tried to flee, but even most
of these were killed by Zulu who pursued them.
C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Two sources I used are:
Source is set out
correctly.
Section could have been
better focused and
developed.
2 marks
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand 1879.
Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
This book is based on previously unpublished letters, and a diary,
of soldiers who took part in the Zulu War. The main writer was
Colonel Arthur Harness who commanded a battery of artillery. He
was camped at Isandlwana, and marched out with Chelmsford, so
he did not actually fight in the battle. The book covers the whole
war, so only part of it is concerned with Isandlwana, but Harness
was later part of a court of inquiry that investigated the defeat, and
after the war wrote an article defending Chelmsford. There are
many interesting personal details as well as researched
commentaries.
Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London.
Collins.
The main value of this source is that it only covers the battle that
I have been investigating, although of course there is some
background. It seems to be quite balanced and points out the
failures of the general, Lord Chelmsford, but also where he
could not have acted in any other way. It is probably quite
favourable to him overall. It is quite a small therefore
manageable book with 143 small pages. As it was published in
1948, it could be out of date.
D Analysis (5 marks)
The first point to consider is the British preparation and
deployment of forces. The general, Lord Chelmsford, had to
make the best of what was available in South Africa at the time.
This force had spent 1877 and 1878 fighting and suppressing a
rebellion in the Cape. This took longer than expected. It also
gave everyone the wrong idea about fighting Black troops,
because unlike the Zulu the Ngqika and Gcaleka, did not fight
30
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 4
open battles. They attacked and disappeared into the bush. This
was the first reason for the British defeat. Although they knew
that the Zulu were much stronger and better fighters, they were
not prepared for the great difference. Also many soldiers from
the commander down, felt that the first task was to get the
enemy to fight openly (Coupland page 47). Throughout the
move from the Cape to Natal, to prepare for the new war,
Chelmsford was told by many people that all camps had to be
laagered (Morris page 329-331).
Good division into
paragraphs: each
paragraph is one reason
why the Zulu won and
the British lost.
Chelmsford was criticised for dividing his force. His critics say
that he should have kept his force together (Clarke Invasion
253). His defenders say that as he had not only to invade, but
also prevent the Zulu invading Natal, he followed the correct
course. He was also worried about the state of the terrain with a
large force and even larger baggage train. The ground would
have become too beaten up. Logistics and transport were always
difficult for the nineteenth century British army. Chelmsford
cannot be blamed for all its problems. The whole system and the
weather were partly responsible for the British defeat.
The next reason for the British defeat was the failure to laager
the camp. Two reasons were given for not laagering it, the
difficulty in digging defences in the heavy ground, and the fact
that it was only intended to be a short stay camp. The person
commanding the Third Column was theoretically Colonel Glyn
and his staff officer Clery wrote that Glyn did suggest it but
Chelmsford refused (Clarke Zululand page 75). Who was at fault
was not clear, but the failure to laager and form a strong
defensive position enabled the Zulu to capture the camp.
Previous battles in which the Boers had fought the Zulu, and
later battles in the Zulu War such as Rorkes’ Drift and Kambula,
show that a small force in a well fortified position could win.
Another reason for the British failure was weak scouting. Patrols
of scouts were sent out, but they failed to spot the main force.
They were not told to cover a wide enough area. Also the British
were unfamiliar with the terrain and of course the Zulu knew it
well.
A clear but rather
simplistic analysis, but is
very well focused on the
question posed in the
investigation.
Chelmsford not only divided his force at the beginning but also
took half of the men out of Isandlwana, thus leaving a small
force in camp, which proved unable to defend it. To compound
this problem, when messages were sent to the general during the
22nd of January, that the camp was being attacked, he did not
believe them. If he had turned round and led the force back
when he received the first message, the result might have been
different. He and his staff considered that the men in camp
would be able, with their superior fire power, to repel the
attackers (Coupland page 75). There is no doubt that the men left
behind in camp fought bravely and did not disgrace their
general, but they were too few and too exposed, and Chelmsford
had at least some responsibility for getting them into this
situation.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
31
Example 4
3/5 would be a little
harsh—so 4. It does
analyse logically and does
answer the question
posed.
Of course the final reason for the Zulu success was their great
numbers, their fighting skills and clever tactics. They knew the
ground well and their scouting was excellent. They knew exactly
what the British were doing and where they were going. Also
they had more guns than the British thought they had and they
used them better. Their bravery in facing the British fire power
was incredible. They too suffered a large number of casualties,
but with their numbers, just pressed on and on until the small
British force was overcome.
E Conclusion (2 marks)
What is written is fine
but it needs further
development.
1 mark
The Zulu defeated the British because they were excellent
fighters, well trained, mobile and fit. Their scouting was
excellent and they understood the ground. Their far superior
numbers made it certain that they would overcome a much
smaller force that was not defending a fortified position. The fact
that the camp was not fortified was probably because of
misconceptions held by the general, Lord Chelmsford, and many
of the British soldiers after their previous experiences fighting in
southern Africa.
1916 words
F List of sources (2 marks)
2 marks
Barthorp, Michael. 1980. The Zulu War. Poole. Blandford Press.
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand,1879.
Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1984. Zululand at War, 1879. Johannesburg.
The Brenthurst Press.
Coupland R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London.
Collins.
Emery, Frank. 1977. The Red Soldier; Letters from the Zulu War,
1879. London. Hodder and Stoughton.
Morris, Donald. 1966. The Washing of the Spears. London.
Jonathan Cape.
Total: 14 marks out of 20
32
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 4
Assessment Criteria
Criterion
Total
marks
Marks
achieved
Examiner comments
A
2
2
Good. A clear question and plan/method to be followed.
B
5
3
Long, interesting, but far too much background. The later
sections are relevant and important, but too narrative or
descriptive.
C
4
2
Sources are well chosen but the evaluation needs developing.
D
5
4
Good clear analysis which is logical and focused.
E
2
1
Clear, concise, needed developing.
F
2
2
Bibliography is correctly listed and the investigation is within
the word limit.
Total
20
14
B is too long, and C and E are too brief.
Example 4 is an investigation based on a rather general question, relating to the battle of Isandlwana,
in the Zulu War of 1879. Example 5 has a sharper focus which helps to achieve a much better
in-depth analysis. The aim of these two related examples is to show how two investigations of the
same topic can be tackled differently.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
33
Example 5
Example 5: To what extent was the defeat of the British Army
by the Zulu at Isandlwana in 1879 due to the mistakes made
by Lord Chelmsford?
Examiner comments
and marks
A clearly focused
question.
This sets out the aim of
the investigation and
how it is to be carried
out.
2 marks
A Plan of investigation (2 marks)
To what extent was the defeat of the British Army by
the Zulu at Isandlwana in 1879, due to the mistakes
made by Lord Chelmsford?
The defeat of the British at Isandlwana on 22 January 1879 by the
Zulu was a great shock for the British army, government and
public. Many people then, and later, attributed much blame to the
general commanding the British forces, Lord Chelmsford. The
aim of this investigation is to find out how far this blame is
justified. The investigation will cover the causes of the Zulu War
(briefly in the first section on Chelmsford and the situation in
southern Africa), the composition and nature of both the British
and Zulu armies, and the events of 22 January 1879. An analysis
of these sections should indicate the extent of Chelmsford’s
responsibility for the defeat and other factors that contributed to
the Zulu victory. Much of the research will be from letters written
by soldiers who took part in the Zulu War.
B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
1. Chelmsford and the situation in southern Africa
This is necessary
background because it
affected Chelmsford’s
conduct of the war—and
the battle of
Isandlwana, which is the
focus of the
investigation.
In the 1870s southern Africa was troubled, with Boers
(Dutch), British and African peoples disputing land, which
was scarce due to drought and farming methods.1 Lord
Chelmsford (1827–1905), an experienced soldier, regarded as
a reliable commander2 was sent to the Cape in 1877 to
command British troops fighting the rebellious Ngquika and
Gcaleka in the Ninth Frontier War, which lasted longer than
expected because of the difficulty of bringing the enemy to
battle. This experience affected Chelmsford’s conduct of the
subsequent Zulu War. The general realized that the Zulu
would be a much harder enemy to beat, but did not
comprehend that modern weaponry, especially the MartiniHenry rifles would not automatically defeat the Zulu.
After victory over the rebels in June 1878, Chelmsford was
ordered to Natal to prepare for the expected war against the
Zulu.3 Although the Zulu king Cetshwayo regarded himself
as a friend of the British, they either regarded his army as a
danger to peace,4 or wished to use border disputes and
incidents as an excuse to bring the Zulu Kingdom under
British rule. The new British High Commissioner Bartle
Frere favoured confederation for South Africa, and is
blamed by many for instigating the war.5
34
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 5
2. The British forces
This part is also very
relevant and necessary
for the historical
context of the
investigation.
Referencing is full but
suitable. The battle
section is concise and
clear.
Chelmsford assembled the available forces, equipment and
means of transport in strategic places in Natal. He had five
battalions of regulars, two companies of engineers, and two
artillery batteries, but no regular cavalry. Volunteer and
irregular units were formed to overcome this serious
problem. Mounted infantry were used, and the Natal
mounted Police and a naval battalion were called to action.
Black levies were raised and trained hastily. Estimates vary,
but the number probably exceeded 17 000. Chelmsford
decided that he could not invade with his force in one
column, partly because of the transport necessary to carry
his equipment which in spite of recent improvements was
still impossibly weighty, and partly because he also had to
defend the Natal border. He divided the force into five
columns, each with their own commander. Chelmsford and
his staff accompanied Number 3 Column, or the Central
Column, that was defeated at Isandlwana.
3. The Zulu forces
The Zulu nation and army was feared throughout Southern
Africa since its foundation by Shaka (1816–1828). All men
were divided into regiments according to age, each with its
own uniform and kraal. Army life dominated the social
system and the warriors were not allowed to marry until they
had proved themselves and were given permission by the
king. Much time was spent in military training, and the men
reached a high standard of physical fitness. They travelled
barefoot, without baggage except for their weapons,
traditionally a shield and assegai (although by 1879, some
had guns). The impi was fast and mobile.6 Its battle
formation was crescent formation, likened to a charging
buffalo. Defence was not understood, but bravery, discipline
and scouting was excellent. In 1879 the army numbered
about 40 000, and was divided into 33 regiments.7
4. Isandlwana
On 11 January 1879 Chelmsford conducted the Central
Column across the Buffalo river into Zululand. He had
received much advice on route, including the necessity to
laager at every step,8 and probably felt confident. Progress
was hampered by heavy rains. On 20 January, most of the
column reached Isandlwana, the site chosen by the general
for the first camp. It was not laagered [fortified]. The next
day patrols were sent out to reconnoitre. One led by Dartnell
saw groups of Zulu and mistaking them for part of the main
impi asked for reinforcements in order to attack. A second
message reached camp at 1.30 am, 22 January. Clery, the
staff officer, took it to Chelmsford who decided to take half
the force out of camp to join Dartnell.9 The general also
decided to send for the Second Column under Durnford to
reinforce the camp. Just before the men marched out at
daybreak, Clery realised that nothing had been said to
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
35
Example 5
Pulleine, the senior officer left in camp. Clery rectified this,
with instructions, written and oral, to defend the camp.10
Chelmsford did not find the enemy, but he received various
messages which he or his staff ignored, reporting Zulu near,
then attacking, the camp. Finally at 3.30 pm, he received a
report which convinced him. He marched back to the
devastated camp.
5 marks
Meanwhile, in response to the British invasion, the Zulu impi
travelled for three days from Ulundi to near Isandlwana, and
were concealed in dongas waiting for a propitious moon11
before they attacked. Durnford arrived in camp, sent a patrol
out to reconnoitre, which stumbled upon the concealed Zulu,
who rose, attacked and engulfed the camp. Their vastly
superior numbers ensured victory.
C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Two of the sources used were:
The details of the two
books evaluated are
stated fully and
correctly. Value and
limitations are assessed.
This section might have
been fuller if the word
limit allowed.
On balance 4 marks
36
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand 1879.
Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
This book was based on previously unpublished material from
the Brenthurst Library, Johannesburg. Although the book deals
with the entire war, there are important sections concerning
Isandlwana, letters from Colonel Arthur Harness R.A., an article
from him rebutting charges made by a war correspondent,
Archibald Forbes, against Chelmsford, and letters by the
Lieutenant Governor of Natal, Sir Henry Bulwer. Harness’s
letters, written to his sister and father, a former Royal Engineer,
are valuable as an eyewitness account of the campaign. He was
encamped at Isandlwana and marched out with four of his guns,
with Chelmsford, at daybreak on 22 January. Their limitations
could be that he was not actually in camp for the battle and he
appears as a supporter of Chelmsford. But perhaps this makes
his criticism of the general even more telling. Bulwer wrote of
the difficulties he encountered dealing with Chelmsford and his
staff before the war commenced.
Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London.
Collins.
The main value of this source is that apart from introductory
material it only covers events relating to Isandlwana. It was
written by an eminent British historian who specialised in
colonial history. Its limitations could be its early date: much of
the material in the Brenthurst library was unknown to Coupland,
and to a certain extent it was written with the aim of presenting a
true picture after a book had severely criticized Chelmsford.12
However it presents a very balanced view of both Chelmsford,
and the battle, with numerous references to sources, including
war office material.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 5
D Analysis (5 marks)
The analysis is easily
followed, logical, well
focused and answers the
question posed in the
investigation. It points
out areas where doubts
remain.
Referencing is full, and
helps to give credence to
the analysis.
The first area to analyse is Chelmsford’s preparations for the
campaign. He cannot be criticized for the number of British
troops. They were probably sufficient anyway if deployed
properly, and the general did request reinforcements especially
cavalry. Transport and the commissariat were problems, but
Chelmsford and many officers spent much time procuring
horses, mules carts, and supplies.13 It could be argued that far
too much baggage was taken, but this was how the army
worked, and it was not Chelmsford’s task to remedy it. Did
Chelmsford listen to advice? He received much, that the Zulu
were excellent fighters, and he must make a laager [fortified
camp]. Bulwer thought that his ‘military arrangements are good
and sure to succeed... I should think that he is a good general
officer, very very careful very painstaking, very thorough.’14 But
he added, ‘He and Major Crealock his military secretary are not
very pleasant to deal with.’15 Here was undoubtedly a problem,
Crealock was considered a snob—Wolsley called him a military
wasp,16 and he was perhaps incompetent. Critics such as Clery
deplored Chelmsford’s weak staff,17 but it is clear from letters
written by Crealock and Clery to the chief of intelligence18 that
these two officers disliked each other.
It is difficult to judge if dividing the force into five columns was a
mistake. The fear of an invasion of Natal and hence the need to
guard the border was probably unnecessary. It is doubtful if
Cetshwayo had planned to invade.
Perhaps the most serious mistake made by Chelmsford was his
failure to make a laarger or otherwise defend the camp at
Isandlwana, in spite of the advice he had received from
experienced colonists including Paul Kruger.19 On 18 March
Clery wrote that Glyn, the nominal commander of the central
column, had suggested forming a laager, but the general had
rejected the idea with ‘why it would take a week to make one.’20
Was this true or was Clery covering his own position? It is
impossible to say. Although Harness did his best in his article
written in 1880 to justify Chelmsford’s choice of Isandlwana
with its grass and water.21 In his letter home on 12 February he
wrote, ‘We have [at Helpmekaar] a large wagon laager... It is the
way the Dutch Boers always entrench themselves and which if
we had had at Isandlwana camp on the fatal 22 January we
should have beaten the Zulus completely.’22
Good, the problem of
assigning blame or
responsibility is brought
out well.
The next point to assess is Chelmsford’s direction of events on
the 21 and 22 January. He sent out various patrols but failed to
spot the enemy. His intelligence failed to inform him of Zulu
movements.23 He ordered the patrols to return, but Dartnell did
not and asked for reinforcements. It was said at a later enquiry
that Chelmsford was annoyed,24 but with Dartnell’s second
message, he took half the force out of camp. This suggests a
misreading of events. It was a sensible precaution to order
Durnford’s column to reinforce the camp, but the message as
written by Crealock was ambiguous25 and when Durnford
h d
h
d
tt
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
it
Fi ll
it
th t
37
Example 5
reached camp, he rode out to reconnoitre. Finally, it appears that
Chelmsford failed to instruct Pulleine about what to do in his
absence, and that Clery did it on his own initiative.26 Later when
Chelmsford found out that instructions had been given to
Pulleine, he was relieved and took credit for them. But that is
Clery’s interpretation.
Good point.
This sets the analysis in
its historical context.
5 marks
Chelmsford was also criticised for ignoring signs and messages
that the camp was under attack. He felt confident that the force
left behind was adequate to repel the Zulu.27 There was a report,
perhaps apocryphal, that when Crealock was told of an attack he
retorted, ‘Actually attacking our camp, how amusing!’28 Harness
actually turned round his guns to return to help when he heard
gunfire but was stopped by one of Chelmsford’s aides. ‘It is all
bosh, I do not hear big guns!’29 Was this the general’s order?
Again it is impossible to tell. It must be said that it would have
been too late to save the camp except after the first message
received at about 8 am, saying that a force of Zulu had been
sighted. Chelmsford’s conduct suggests at best a misreading of
the situation, at worst arrogance and complacency. The men he
had left behind fought bravely,30 but they were too few and too
exposed. Chelmsford had left them exposed to Zulu attack—and
death: very few escaped.
Finally it must be said that the Zulu victory was due to their
overwhelming superior numbers, scouting, intelligence,
knowledge of the terrain, bravery and tactics. They also
possessed more firearms than expected. No one can judge if the
situation would have been different if Chelmsford had been
present and in command, but after Isandlwana he changed tactics
and the British won the war.
E Conclusion (2 marks)
The conclusion is clearly
stated and consistent
with the evidence.
Lord Chelmsford, the British commander, must bear some
responsibility for the British defeat at Isandlwana. In spite of
advice from those who lived in southern Africa, he failed to
understand the fighting strength of the Zulu, partly because of
his experiences fighting the Ninth Frontier War. He was not
necessarily arrogant but had misconceptions.
He was probably not an imaginative general (unlike Wood, one
of the few British soldiers to emerge with an increased
reputation from the Zulu War).
Again this puts the
investigation into the
context of wider issues.
2 marks
1986 words
38
Chelmsford should have laargered his camp and constructed other
defences. The later British successes at Rorkes’ Drift and Kambula,
showed that it was possible for a smaller British force to defeat a
much larger one from behind a solid defensive position. His
scouting and intelligence was weak and he should not have left his
camp with so few men to defend it. But credit must also be given to
the Zulu forces for their positive fighting qualities. It could be
argued that the Zulus won the battle rather than that the British,
under Chelmsford’s command, lost it. But after this salutary lesson
Chelmsford changed tactics and won the war.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 5
F List of sources (2 marks)
End notes are perfectly
acceptable. Some might
prefer footnotes.
Endnotes
1. Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand, 1879.
Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press. P 17.
2. For details of Chelmsford’s career, ibid. P 240.
3. Ibid. P 35.
4. Morris, Donald. 1966. The Washing of the Spears. London.
Jonathan Cape. P 268.
5. Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London.
Collins. Pp 30–32.
Barthorp, Michael. 1980. The Zulu War. Poole. Blandford
Press. Pp 9–12.
6. Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1984. Zululand at War, 1879.
Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press. P 20.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Clarke. Invasion. P 56.
Ibid. P 65.
Clarke, Zululand. P 83.
Ibid.
Clarke, Invasion. P 63.
The book heavily critical of Chelmsford’s conduct is
French, G, 1939, Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War,
London: John Lane, The Bodley Head.
Clarke. Invasion. P 48.
Ibid. P 213.
Ibid. P 214.
Preston, Adrian, ed. 1973. The South African Journal of Sir
Ganet Wolseley, 1879-1880. Cape town. Balkema. P 52.
Wolseley superceded Chelmsford, and was very critical of
him. But the majority of soldiers were glad that Chelmsford
had defeated the Zulu at Ulundi before Wolseley arrived.
Clarke. Zululand. P 53.
Zululand at War is based on a collection of letters written
from officers serving in the Zulu War, mainly to Alison. It is
interesting to see how the officers are critical of each other.
See above, note 11.
Clarke. Zululand. P 75.
Clarke. Invasion. P 254.
Ibid. P 95.
Chelmsford failed to try to win the confidence of neighbouring
Zulu, especially those who did not regard Cetshwayo so
highly, and thus gain intelligence, as Evelyn Wood,
commander of Number 4 Column and victor of Kambula, did.
Coupland. P 76.
For the full text of the message see Clarke, Zululand, P 76.
Ibid.
Coupland. Pp 70–76 for full details of Chelmsford and the
messages.
Clarke. Zululand. P 78.
Ibid.
For an eye witness description of the battle from a survivor,
see Emery, Frank, 1977, The Red Soldier; letters from the
Zulu War, 1879, London, Hodder and Stoughton, p 88.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
39
Example 5
The bibliography is
correctly listed.
Bibliography
Barthorp, Michael. 1980. The Zulu War. Poole.
Blandford Press.
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand,1879.
Johannnesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Zululand at War, 1879. Johannesburg.
The Brenthurst Press.
Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London.
Collins.
Emery, Frank. 1977. The Red Soldier: Letters from the Zulu
War, 1879. London. Hodder and Stoughton.
Morris, Donald. 1966. The Washing of the Spears. London.
Jonathan Cape.
Preston, Adrian, ed. 1973. The South African Journal of Sir
Garnet Wolseley, 1879-1880. Cape Town. Balkema.
2 marks
Total: 20 marks out of 20
Assessment Criteria
Criterion
Total
marks
Marks
achieved
A
2
2
A clearly focused question plus aims and methods to be
used in the investigation.
B
5
5
All the material/findings refer directly to the question posed
and have been considered in order to answer it; referencing
is good.
C
4
4
The two sources evaluated are stated fully and correctly and
their value and limitations are assessed.
D
5
5
The analysis is exactly focused on the question posed in the
investigation.
E
2
2
The conclusion is clearly stated and is consistent with the
evidence.
F
2
2
The bibliography is correctly listed and the investigation was
within the word limit.
Total
20
20
This is not a “perfect” piece of work, but it shows how full
marks can be obtained, closely following the criteria and
focusing on the question posed.
40
Examiner Comments
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 5
This is an example of B in point or note form. It is an equally acceptable way of presenting the
summary of evidence.
Examiner comments
and marks
B
Summary of evidence (5 marks)
1.
Chelmsford and the situation in southern Africa
1870s, southern Africa was troubled, with Boers (Dutch),
British and African peoples disputing land, which was scarce
due to drought and farming methods used.1
Lord Chelmsford (1827–1905), an experienced soldier and
reliable commander,2 was sent to the Cape, 1877, to
command British troops fighting the rebellious Ngquika and
Gcaleka (Ninth Frontier War). War lasted longer than
expected owing to difficulty in bringing the enemy to battle.
This experience affected Chelmsford’s conduct of the Zulu
War. He knew that the Zulu were stronger, but expected
British superior weapons (Martini-Henry rifle) would
ensure victory.
Rebels were defeated, June 1878, and Chelmsford was
ordered to Natal to prepare for the expected war against Zulu.3
Cetshwayo, Zulu king, regarded himself as a friend of the
British, but they feared his standing army.4
Some British, including Bartle Frere, new British High
Commissioner, who wanted to bring Zululand under control
in order to implement his proposed confederation policy5,
sought to use border incidents and land disputes as an
excuse for war. An ultimatum was issued to Cetshwayo and
Zululand was invaded.
2.
The British forces
Chelmsford assembled the available British troops, 5
regular battalions, 2 companies of engineers, 2 artillery
batteries plus transport and equipment in Natal.
There was no regular cavalry, so volunteer and irregular
units were recruited and some infantry were mounted. A
naval battalion and Natal Mounted Police joined the force.
Black levies were raised and trained quickly.
Estimates vary, but the force was about 17 000 fighting
men.
Transport was a problem because of heavy equipment,
unknown terrain and rain.
Therefore Chelmsford, instead of invading in one column,
divided the force into 5 columns, each with its own commander.
The general and his staff accompanied No. 3 Column
(Central Column), which was defeated at Isandlwana.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
41
Example 5
3.
The Zulu forces
Founded by Shaka c. 1818, the Zulu army was feared
throughout southern Africa.
All men were divided into regiments, with own uniform
and kraals.
Army life dominated Zulu life: warriors who performed
services for the king as well as fighting could not marry
until he gave permission—usually after a successful battle.
Warriors spent much time in military training and were
very fit.
They travelled barefoot, without baggage, except for
weapons, shield and assegai (a few had guns).
An impi was fast and mobile.6
Battle formation was a crescent, likened to a charging
buffalo; defence was unknown, scouting and discipline
excellent.
In 1879 army numbered about 40 000, divided into 33
regiments.7
4.
This section (B) is full,
enough references to
sources are given, and all
have relevance to the
question posed in the
investigation.
Isandlwana
11 January Chelmsford conducted his force (c. 4000 men)
across the Buffalo river and invaded Zululand.
He had received much advice en route, including the
necessity of laagering all camps.
Rain and transport problems impeded progress.
20 January reached Isandlwana, first camp, which was not
laagered or fortified.
21 January, patrols sent out to reconnoitre. A patrol, led by
Dartnell, saw some Zulu, mistook them for impi, and asked
for reinforcements in order to attack.
22 January, 1.30am, second message form Dartnell reached
camp; Clery, staff officer, took it to Chelmsford, who
decided to take half the force out of camp,9 and to send No.
2 Column to reinforce it.
Men marched out at daybreak, Clery realizing no orders
had been given to the senior officer left behind. Pulleine,
gave him written and oral instructions to defend the camp.10
Chelmsford did not find the impi, but he received various
messages reporting Zulu near, then attacking, the camp.
Messages were ignored until 3.30pm, when one convinced
him.
He led men back to devastated camp.
Meanwhile Zulu army had left Ulundi (capital), travelled 3
days, reached Isipezi near Isandlwana, unseen.
They hid in dongas waiting for a ‘propitious moon.’11
42
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
Example 5
Durnford arrived, sent a patrol which stumbled on the
concealed Zulu.
Zulu rose, attacked, engulfed Isandlwana.
5 marks
Their vastly superior numbers (c. 25 000) ensured victory;
few British escaped.
Diploma Programme History Teacher Support Material: Internal Assessment, February 2002
43