MALDIVES CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
Republic of Maldives
CIVIL AVIATION ADVISORY
PUBLICATIONS
MCAR-AIR OPERATIONS
ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE (AMC)
AND
GUIDANCE MATERIAL (GM)
Revision No: Initial
1st March 2015
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
CAAP-Air Operations
I. Log of Amendments
I. LOG OF AMENDMENTS
Amendment
No.:
Page
No.:
Issue
date:
Date
Inserted:
Inserted
By:
Initial Issue
All
01-3-15
01-3-15
MCAA
Initial Issue
LOA-1
Date
Removed:
Removed
By:
1st March 2015
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
MCAR-Air Operations
Table of Contents
III-TABLE OF CONTENTS
I
Log of Ammendments
II
List of Effective Pages
III
Table of Contents
IV
Introduction
1
GM to Annex I Definitions for terms used in Annexes II-V
2
AMC and GM to Annex II Authority Requirements for Air Operations (PART-ARO)
3
AMC and GM to Annex III Organisation Requirements for Air Operations (PART-ORO)
4
AMC and GM TO Annex IV Commercial Airtransport Operations (PART-CAT)
5
AMC and GM to Annex V Special Operations (PART-SPA)
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MCAR-Air Operations
IV - Introduction
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Autlrority
IV‐
CIVI
INTRODUCTION
AVIATION ADVISORY PI]BLICATIONS
AIROPERATIONS
CIVIL AVIATION ADVISORY PUBLICATIONS-AIR OPERATIONS (CAAP-AIR
OPERATIONS) of 1 January 2015 laying down non-binding Acceptable Means of
Compliance (AMC), Guidance Materials (GM) and other advisory matedals adopted by
MCAA to illustrate means to establish compliance with MALDIVES CIVIL AVIATION
REGULATIONS - Air Operations and its Implementing Rules. An operator may propose an
altemative to an existing acceptable means of compliance or those that propose new means to
establish compliance with this Regulation and its implementing Rules for which no
associated AMC have been adooted bv MCAA.
Where an AMC or GM is not available as a means to comply with the MCARs, operators
may use EASA AMCs and GMs provided that they are used in a manner which do not
con{lict with MCAR and its implementing rules.
Altemative means of compliance to those adopted by MCAA may be used by an operator to
establisl-r compliance with this Regulation and its Implementing Rules. When an operator
subject to certification wishes to use an alternative means of compliance to the acceptable
means of compliance (AMC) adopted by MCAA to establish compliance with this Regulation
and its Implementing Rules, it shall, prior to implementing it, provide MCAA with a full
description of the alternative means of compliance. 'I'he description shall include any
revisions to manuals or procedures that may be relevant, as well as an assessment
demonstrating that the Implementing Rules are met. The operator may implement these
altemative means of compliance subject to prior approval by MCAA and upon receipt of the
notification as nrescribed in PART-ARO.
,28dlt Fcbruary 2015
HUSSAIN JALEEL
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GM to Annex I - Definitions
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
GUIDANCE MATERIAL (GM) TO ANNEX I DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS USED IN ANNEXES II TO VIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GM1 Article 6.4a Derogations
OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
GM2 Article 6.4a (a); (b) Derogations
DIRECT COST
GM3 Article 6.4a (a); (b) Derogations
ANNUAL COST
GM1 Article 6.4a(c) Derogations
ORGANISATION CREATED WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING AERIAL SPORT OR LEISURE
AVIATION
GM2 Article 6.4a(c) Derogations
MARGINAL ACTIVITY
GM1 Annex I Definitions for terms used in Annexes II - VII
DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS USED IN ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE AND GUIDANCE
MATERIAL
GM2 Annex I Definitions
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
GM3 Annex I Definitions
HELICOPTER EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (HEMS) FLIGHT
GM4 Annex I Definitions
HEAD-UP GUIDANCE LANDING SYSTEM (HUDLS)
GM5 Annex I Definitions
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
GM6 Annex I Definitions
NIGHT VISION IMAGING SYSTEM (NVIS)
GM7 Annex I Definitions
OFFSHORE OPERATIONS
GM8 Annex I Definitions
PUBLIC INTEREST SITE
GM9 Annex I Definitions
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS
GM10 Annex I Definitions
V1
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GM to Annex I - Definitions
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
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GM to Annex I
DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS USED IN ANNEXES II TO V
GM1 Article 6.4a Derogations
OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
The term ‘other-than-complex motor-powered aircraft’ is used synonymously with the terms ‘other-than
complex motor-powered aircraft’ and ‘other than complex motor-powered aircraft’. Whenever one of these
terms is used, it includes also non-motor-powered aircraft such as sailplanes and balloons.
GM2 Article 6.4a (a); (b) Derogations
DIRECT COST
‘Direct cost’ means the cost directly incurred in relation to a flight, e.g. fuel, airfield charges, rental fee for an
aircraft. There is no element of profit.
GM3 Article 6.4a (a); (b) Derogations
ANNUAL COST
‘Annual cost’ means the cost of keeping, maintaining and operating the aircraft over a period of one calendar
year. There is no element of profit.
GM1 Article 6.4a(c) Derogations
ORGANISATION CREATED WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING AERIAL SPORT OR LEISURE
AVIATION
An ‘organisation created with the aim of promoting aerial sport or leisure aviation’ means a non-profit
organisation, established under applicable national law for the sole purpose of gathering persons sharing the
same interest in general aviation to fly for pleasure or to conduct parachute jumping. The organisation should
have aircraft available.
GM2 Article 6.4a(c) Derogations
MARGINAL ACTIVITY
The term ‘marginal activity’ should be understood as representing a very minor part of the overall activity of an
organisation, mainly for the purpose of promoting itself or attracting new students or members. An organisation
intending to offer such flights as regular business activity is not considered to meet the condition of marginal
activity. Also, flights organised with the sole intent to generate income for the organisation, are not considered
to be a marginal activity.
GM1 Annex I Definitions for terms used in Annexes II - VII
DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS USED IN ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE AND GUIDANCE
MATERIAL
For the purpose of Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to this Regulation (MCAR Air
Operations), the following definitions should apply:
(a) ‘Committal point’ means the point in the approach at which the pilot flying decides that, in the event of an
engine failure being recognised, the safest option is to continue to the elevated final approach and take-off
area (elevated FATO).
(b) ‘Emergency locator transmitter’ is a generic term describing equipment that broadcasts distinctive signals on
designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be activated by impact or may be manually
activated.
(c) ‘Exposure time’ means the actual period during which the performance of the helicopter with the critical
engine inoperative in still air does not guarantee a safe forced landing or the safe continuation of the flight.
(d) ‘Fail-operational flight control system’ means a flight control system with which, in the event of a failure
below alert height, the approach, flare and landing can be completed automatically. In the event of a failure,
the automatic landing system will operate as a fail-passive system.
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(e) ‘Fail-operational hybrid landing system’ means a system that consists of a primary fail-passive automatic
landing system and a secondary independent guidance system enabling the pilot to complete a landing
manually after failure of the primary system.
(f) ‘Fail-passive flight control system’: a flight control system is fail-passive if, in the event of a failure, there is
no significant out-of-trim condition or deviation of flight path or attitude but the landing is not completed
automatically. For a fail-passive automatic flight control system the pilot assumes control of the aeroplane
after a failure.
(g) ‘Flight control system’ in the context of low visibility operations means a system that includes an automatic
landing system and/or a hybrid landing system.
(h) ‘HEMS dispatch centre’ means a place where, if established, the coordination or control of the helicopter
emergency medical service (HEMS) flight takes place. It may be located in a HEMS operating base.
(i) ‘Hybrid head-up display landing system (hybrid HUDLS)’ means a system that consists of a primary failpassive automatic landing system and a secondary independent HUD/HUDLS enabling the pilot to
complete a landing manually after failure of the primary system.
(j) ‘Landing distance available (LDAH)’ means the length of the final approach and take-off area plus any
additional area declared available by the State of the aerodrome and suitable for helicopters to complete the
landing manoeuvre from a defined height.
(k) ‘Landing distance required (LDRH)’, in the case of helicopters, means the horizontal distance required to
land and come to a full stop from a point 15 m (50 ft) above the landing surface.
(l) ‘Maximum structural landing mass’ means the maximum permissible total aeroplane mass upon landing
under normal circumstances.
(m) ‘Maximum zero fuel mass’ means the maximum permissible mass of an aeroplane with no usable fuel. The
mass of the fuel contained in particular tanks should be included in the zero fuel mass when it is explicitly
mentioned in the aircraft flight manual.
(n) ‘Overpack’, for the purpose of transporting dangerous goods, means an enclosure used by a single shipper to
contain one or more packages and to form one handling unit for convenience of handling and stowage.
(o) ‘Package’, for the purpose of transporting dangerous goods, means the complete product of the packing
operation consisting of the packaging and its contents prepared for transport.
(p) ‘Packaging’, for the purpose of transporting dangerous goods, means receptacles and any other components
or materials necessary for the receptacle to perform its containment function.
(q) ‘Personal locator beacon (PLB)’ is an emergency beacon other than an ELT that broadcasts distinctive
signals on designated frequencies, is standalone, portable and is manually activated by the survivors.
(q) ‘Rotation point (RP)’ means the point at which a cyclic input is made to initiate a nose-down attitude change
during the take-off flight path. It is the last point in the take-off path from which, in the event of an engine
failure being recognised, a forced landing on the aerodrome can be achieved.
(r) ‘Touch down and lift-off area (TLOF)’ means a load-bearing area on which a helicopter may touch down or
lift off.
GM2 Annex I Definitions
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in the Annexes to this Regulation:
A
a/c
AAC
AAL
AC
AC
ACAS
ADF
ADG
ADS
ADS-B
ADS-C
AEA
AEO
aeroplane
aircraft
aeronautical administrative communications
above aerodrome level
advisory circular
alternating current
airborne collision avoidance system
automatic direction finder
air driven generator
automatic dependent surveillance
automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast
automatic dependent surveillance - contract
Association of European Airlines
all-engines-operative
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AFFF aqueous film forming foams
AFM aircraft flight manual
AFN
aircraft flight notification
AFN
ATS facilities notification
AGL
above ground level
AHRS attitude heading reference system
AIS
aeronautical information service
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
ALSF approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance
AML aircraft maintenance licence
AMSL above mean sea level
ANP
actual navigation performance
AOC
aeronautical operational control
AOC
air operator certificate
APU
auxiliary power unit
APV
approach procedure with vertical guidance
ARA airborne radar approach
ARA Authority Requirements for Aircrew
ARO
Authority Requirements for Air Operations
ARP
Aerospace Recommended Practices
ASC
Air Safety Committee
ASDA accelerate-stop distance available
ASE
altimeter system error
ATA
Air Transport Association
ATC
air traffic control
ATIS automatic terminal information service
ATN
air traffic navigation
ATPL airline transport pilot licence
ATQP alternative training and qualification programme
ATS
air traffic services
ATSC air traffic service communication
AVGAS aviation gasoline
AVTAG aviation turbine gasoline (wide-cut fuel)
AWO all weather operations
BALS basic approach lighting system
BCAR British civil airworthiness requirements
BITD basic instrument training device
CAP
controller access parameters
CAT
commercial air transport
CAT I / II / III category I / II / III
CBT
computer-based training
CC
cabin crew
CDFA continuous descent final approach
CDL
configuration deviation list
CFIT controlled flight into terrain
CG
centre of gravity
CM
context management
CMV converted meteorological visibility
CofA certificate of airworthiness
COP
code of practice
CoR
certificate of registration
COSPAS-SARSAT cosmicheskaya sistyema poiska avariynich sudov - search and rescue satellite-aided
tracking
CP
committal point
CPA
closest point of approach
CPDLC controller pilot data link communication
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CPL
C-PED
CRE
CRI
CRM
CS
CVR
commercial pilot licence
controlled portable electronic device
class rating examiner
class rating instructor
crew resource management
Certification Specifications
cockpit voice recorder
DA
decision altitude
DA/H decision altitude/height
DAP
downlinked aircraft parameters
D-ATIS digital automatic terminal information service
DC
direct current
DCL
departure clearance
D-FIS data link flight information service
DG
dangerous goods
DH
decision height
DI
daily inspection
DIFF deck integrated fire fighting system
DLR
data link recorder
DME distance measuring equipment
D-METAR
data link - meteorological aerodrome report
D-OTIS data link - operational terminal information service
DPATO defined point after take-off
DPBL defined point before landing
DR
decision range
DSTRK desired track
EC
European Community
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
EFB
electronic flight bag
EFIS
electronic flight instrument system
EGNOS European geostationary navigation overlay service
EGT
exhaust gas temperature
ELT
emergency locator transmitter
ELT(AD)
emergency locator transmitter (automatically deployable)
ELT(AF)
emergency locator transmitter (automatic fixed)
ELT(AP)
emergency locator transmitter (automatic portable)
ELT(S)
emergency locator transmitter (survival)
EPE
estimated position of error
EPR
engine pressure ratio
EPU
estimated position of uncertainty
ERA
en-route alternate (aerodrome)
ERP
emergency response plan
ETOPS extended range operations with two-engined aeroplanes
EU
European Union
EUROCAE
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
EVS
enhanced vision system
FAA
FAF
FALS
FANS
FAP
FAR
FATO
FC
FCL
FCOM
FDM
Federal Aviation Administration
final approach fix
full approach lighting system
future air navigation systems
final approach point
Federal Aviation Regulation
final approach and take-off
flight crew
flight crew licensing
flight crew operating manual
flight data monitoring
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FDO
flying display operation
FDR
flight data recorder
FFS
full flight simulator
FGS
flight control/guidance system
FI
flight instructor
FLIPCY
flight plan consistency
FLTA forward-looking terrain avoidance
FMECA
failure mode, effects and criticality analysis
FMS
flight management system
FNPT flight and navigation procedures trainer
FOD
foreign object damage
fpm
feet per minute
FSTD flight simulation training device
ft
feet
FTD
flight training device
FTE
full time equivalent
FTL
flight and duty time limitations
g
gram
GAGAN
GPS aided geo augmented navigation
GBAS ground-based augmentation system
GCAS ground collision avoidance system
GEN
general
GIDS ground ice detection system
GLS
GBAS landing system
GM
Guidance Material
GMP general medical practitioner
GNSS global navigation satellite system
GPS
global positioning system
GPWS ground proximity warning system
H
helicopter
HEMS helicopter emergency medical service
HF
high frequency
Hg
mercury
HHO helicopter hoist operation
HIALS high intensity approach lighting system
HIGE hover in ground effect
HLL
helideck limitations list
HOGE hover out of ground effect
HoT
hold-over time
hPa
hectopascals
HPL
human performance and limitations
HUD head-up display
HUDLS head-up guidance landing system
HUMS health usage monitor system
IAF
IALS
ICAO
IDE
IF
IFR
IFSD
IGE
ILS
IMC
In
INS
IP
initial approach fix
intermediate approach lighting system
International Civil Aviation Organization
instruments, data and equipment
intermediate fix
instrument flight rules
in-flight shutdown
in ground effect
instrument landing system
instrument meteorological conditions
inches
inertial navigation system
intermediate point
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IR
IR
IRS
ISA
ISO
IV
Implementing Rule
instrument rating
inertial reference system
international standard atmosphere
International Organization for Standardization
intravenous
JAA
JAR
Joint Aviation Authorities
Joint Aviation Requirements
kg
km
kt
kilograms
kilometres
knots
LDA
LDP
LED
LHS
LIFUS
LNAV
LoA
LOC
LOE
LOFT
LOQE
LOS
LPV
LRCS
LRNS
LVO
LVP
LVTO
landing distance available
landing decision point
light-emitting diode
left hand seat
line flying under supervision
lateral navigation
letter of acceptance
localiser
line-oriented evaluation
line-oriented flight training
line-oriented quality evaluation
limited obstacle surface
localiser performance with vertical guidance
long range communication system
long range navigation system
low visibility operation
low visibility procedures
low visibility take-off
m
metres
MALS medium intensity approach lighting system
MALSF medium intensity approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights
MALSR
medium intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights
MAPt missed approach point
MCTOM
maximum certified take-off mass
MDA minimum descent altitude
MDH minimum descent height
MEA minimum en-route altitude
MED medical
MEL minimum equipment list
METAR
meteorological aerodrome report
MGA
minimum grid altitude
MHA minimum holding altitude
MHz
megahertz
MID
midpoint
MLR manuals, logs and records
MLS
microwave landing system
MLX millilux
mm
millimetres
MM
multi-mode
MMEL master minimum equipment list
MNPS minimum navigation performance specifications
MOC minimum obstacle clearance
MOCA minimum obstacle clearance altitude
MOPSC
maximum operational passenger seating configuration
MORA minimum off-route altitude
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MPSC
MSA
MSAS
MTCA
maximum passenger seating capacity
minimum sector altitude
multi-functional satellite augmentation system
minimum terrain clearance altitude
N
North
NADP noise abatement departure procedure
NALS no approach lighting system
NCC
non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft
NCO
non-commercial operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aircraft
NF
free power turbine speed
NG
engine gas generator speed
NM
nautical miles
NOTAM
notice to airmen
NOTECHS
non-technical skills evaluation
NOTOC
notification to captain
NPA
non-precision approach
NPA
Notice of Proposed Amendment
NVD night vision device
NVG night vision goggles
NVIS night vision imaging system
OAT
outside air temperature
OCH
obstacle clearance height
OCL
oceanic clearance
ODALS omnidirectional approach lighting system
OEI
one-engine-inoperative
OFS
obstacle-free surface
OGE
out of ground effect
OIP
offset initiation point
OM
operations manual
OML operational multi-pilot limitation
ONC
operational navigation chart
OPS
operations
ORO
Organisation Requirements for Air Operations
OTS
CAT II other than standard category II
PAPI
PAR
PBE
PBN
PCDS
PDA
PDP
PED
PIC
PIN
PIS
PLB
POH
PRM
precision approach path indicator
precision approach radar
protective breathing equipment
performance-based navigation
personnel carrying device system
premature descent alert
predetermined point
portable electronic device
pilot-in-command
personal identification number
public interest site
personal locator beacon PNR
pilot’s operating handbook
person with reduced mobility
QAR
QFE
QNH
quick access recorder
atmospheric pressure at aerodrome elevation / runway threshold
atmospheric pressure at nautical height
RA
RAT
RCC
RCF
resolution advisory
ram air turbine
rescue coordination centre
reduced contingency fuel
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RCLL runway centre line lights
RF
fixed radius
RF
radio frequency
RFC
route facility chart
RI
ramp inspection
RI
rectification interval
RIE
rectification interval extension
RMA regional monitoring agency
RNAV area navigation
RNP
required navigation performance
ROD
rate of descent
RP
rotation point
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
RTODAH
rejected take-off distance available (helicopters)
RTODRH
rejected take-off distance required (helicopters)
RTOM reduced take-off mass
RTZL runway touchdown zone lights
RVR
runway visual range
RVSM reduced vertical separation minima
S
SAFA
SALS
SALSF
SAp
SAP
SAR
SAS
SBAS
SCC
SCP
SDCM
SFE
SFI
SID
SMM
SMS
SNAS
SOP
SPA
SPECI
SPO
SRA
SSALF
SSALR
SSALS
SSEC
SSR
STAR
STC
South
safety assessment of foreign aircraft
simple approach lighting system
simple approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights
stabilised approach
system access parameters
search and rescue
stability augmentation system
satellite-based augmentation system
senior cabin crew
special category of passenger
system of differential correction and monitoring
synthetic flight examiner
synthetic flight instructor
standard instrument departure
safety management manual
safety management system
satellite navigation augmentation system
standard operating procedure
operations requiring specific approvals
aviation selected special weather report
specialised operations
surveillance radar approach
simplified short approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights
simplified short approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights
simplified short approach lighting system
static source error correction
secondary surveillance radar
standard terminal arrival route
supplemental type certificate
TA
TAC
TAS
TAWS
TC
TC
TCAS
TCCA
TCH
traffic advisory
terminal approach chart
true airspeed
terrain awareness warning system
technical crew
type certificate
traffic collision avoidance system
Transport Canada Civil Aviation
type certificate holder
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TDP
take-off decision point
TDZ
touchdown zone
THR
threshold
TI
Technical Instructions
TIT
turbine inlet temperature
TMG touring motor glider
TODA take-off distance available (aeroplanes)
TODAH
take-off distance available (helicopters)
TODRH
take-off distance required (helicopters)
TORA take-off run available
T-PED transmitting portable electronic device
TRE
type rating examiner
TRI
type rating instructor
TSE
total system error
TVE
total vertical error
TWIP terminal weather information for pilots
UMS
UTC
usage monitoring system
coordinated universal time
V2
V50
VAT
VDF
VFR
VHF
VIS
VMC
VMO
VNAV
VOR
VT
VTOL
VTOSS
take-off safety speed
stalling speed
indicated airspeed at threshold
VHF direction finder
visual flight rules
very high frequency
visibility
visual meteorological conditions
maximum operating speed
vertical navigation
VHF omnidirectional radio range
threshold speed
vertical take-off and landing
take-off safety speed
WAAS wide area augmentation system
WAC world aeronautical chart
WIFI wireless fidelity
ZFTT
zero flight-time training
GM3 Annex I Definitions
HELICOPTER EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (HEMS) FLIGHT
(a) A HEMS flight (or more commonly referred to as HEMS mission) normally starts and ends at the HEMS
operating base following tasking by the ‘HEMS dispatch centre’. Tasking can also occur when airborne, or
on the ground at locations other than the HEMS operating base.
(b) The following elements should be regarded as integral parts of the HEMS mission:
(1) flights to and from the HEMS operating site when initiated by the HEMS dispatch centre;
(2) flights to and from an aerodrome/operating site for the delivery or pick-up of medical supplies and/or
persons required for completion of the HEMS mission; and
(3) flights to and from an aerodrome/operating site for refuelling required for completion of the HEMS
mission.
GM4 Annex I Definitions
HEAD-UP GUIDANCE LANDING SYSTEM (HUDLS)
A HUDLS is typically used for primary approach guidance to decision heights of 50 ft.
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GM5 Annex I Definitions
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
The open sea areas considered to constitute a hostile environment should be designated by the appropriate
authority in the appropriate Aeronautical Information Publication or other suitable documentation.
GM6 Annex I Definitions
NIGHT VISION IMAGING SYSTEM (NVIS)
Helicopter components of the NVIS include the radio altimeter, visual warning system and audio warning
system.
GM7 Annex I Definitions
OFFSHORE OPERATIONS
Offshore operations include, but are not limited to, support of offshore oil, gas and mineral exploitation and seapilot transfer.
GM8 Annex I Definitions
PUBLIC INTEREST SITE
An example of a public interest sites is a landing site based at a hospital located in a hostile environment in a
congested area, which due to its size or obstacle environment does not allow the application of performance
class 1 requirements that would otherwise be required for operations in a congested hostile environment.
GM9 Annex I Definitions
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS
The ICAO document number for the Technical Instructions is Doc 9284-AN/905.
GM10 Annex I Definitions
V1
The first action includes for example: apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy speed brakes.
GM11 Annex I Definitions
TASK SPECIALISTS
For the purpose of this Regulation, persons that are carried in a specialised operation, e.g. on a parachute flight,
sensational flight or scientific research flight, are considered to be task specialists.
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AMC GM to Annex II - Part-ARO
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
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ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE (AMC) AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL
(GM) TO ANNEX II - PART-ARO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subpart GEN – General requirements
Section I - General
AMC1 ARO.GEN.120 (d)(3) Means of compliance
GENERAL
GM1 ARO.GEN.120 Means of compliance
GENERAL
Section II - Management
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (a) Management system
GENERAL
GM1 ARO.GEN.200 (a) Management system
GENERAL
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
DOCUMENTED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING - GENERAL
AMC2 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING - INSPECTORS
GM1 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management System
SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (d)
RESERVED
GM1 ARO.GEN.205 Allocation of tasks to qualified entities
CERTIFICATION TASKS
AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a) Record-keeping
GENERAL
AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(1);(2);(3) Record-keeping
AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(4) Record-keeping
ORGANISATIONS
GM1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(4) Record-keeping
ORGANISATIONS - DOCUMENTATION
AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(6) Record-keeping
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED IN THE MALDIVES
ESTABLISHED OR RESIDING IN ANOTHER STATE
GM1 ARO.GEN.220 Record-keeping
GENERAL
BY
PERSONS
OR
ORGANISATIONS
Section III - Oversight, certification and enforcement
AMC1 ARO.GEN.300 (a);(b);(c) Oversight
GENERAL
GM1 ARO.GEN.300 (a); (b);(c) Oversight
GENERAL
AMC2 ARO.GEN.300 (a);(b);(c) Oversight
EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
GM2 ARO.GEN.300 (a);(b);(c) Oversight
VOLCANIC ASH SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT - ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
AMC1 ARO.GEN.300 (a)(2) Oversight
OPERATIONAL APPROVALS ISSUED BY NON-EU STATE OF REGISTRY
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GM1 ARO.GEN.300 (d) Oversight
ACTIVITIES WITHIN MALDIVES
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (b); (d) Oversight programme
SPECIFIC NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE ORGANISATION, RESULTS OF PAST
OVERSIGHT
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305 (b) Oversight programme
PROCEDURES FOR OVERSIGHT OF OPERATIONS
GM1 ARO.GEN.305 (b) Oversight Programme
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (b)(1) Oversight programme
AUDIT
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305 (b)(1) Oversight programme
RAMP INSPECTIONS
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (b);(c); (d) Oversight programme
INDUSTRY STANDARDS
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305(c) Oversight programme
OVERSIGHT PLANNING CYCLE
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305(c) Oversight programme
OVERSIGHT PLANNING CYCLE
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305 (d) Oversight programme
DECLARED ORGANISATIONS
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (e) Oversight programme
PERSONS HOLDING A LICENCE, CERTIFICATE, OR RATING
AMC1 ARO.GEN.310 (a) Initial certification procedure - organisations
VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
AMC1 ARO.GEN.330 Changes – organisations
GENERAL
CHANGE OF NAME OF THE ORGANISATION
TRAINING
GM1 ARO.GEN.355 (b) Findings and enforcement measures – persons
GENERAL
Subpart OPS - Air operations
Section I - Certification of commercial air transport operators
AMC1 ARO.OPS.105 Code-share arrangements
SAFETY OF A CODE-SHARE AGREEMENT
AMC2 ARO.OPS.105 Code-share arrangements
AUDITS PERFORMED BY A THIRD PARTY PROVIDER
AMC1 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
WET LEASE-IN
AMC2 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
SHORT TERM WET LEASE-IN
GM1 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
APPROVAL
GM2 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
DRY LEASE-OUT
Section II – Approvals
AMC1 ARO.OPS.200 Specific approval procedure
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL OF CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS
AMC2 ARO.OPS.200 Specific approval procedure
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL FOR REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMA (RVSM)
OPERATIONS
GM1 ARO.OPS.205 Minimum equipment list approval
EXTENSION OF RECTIFICATION INTERVALS
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GM1 ARO.OPS.210 Determination of local area
GENERAL
AMC1 ARO.OPS.215 Approval of helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested
area
APPROVALS THAT REQUIRE ENDORSEMENT
AMC2 ARO.OPS.215 Approval of helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested
area
ENDORSEMENT BY ANOTHER STATE
AMC1 ARO.OPS.220 Approval of helicopter operations to or from a public interest site
APPROVALS THAT REQUIRE ENDORSEMENT
AMC2 ARO.OPS.220 Approval of helicopter operations to or from a public interest site
ENDORSEMENT BY ANOTHER STATE
GM1 ARO.OPS.225 Approval of operations to an isolated aerodrome
GENERAL
Subpart RAMP – ramp inspections of aircraft of operators under the regulatory oversight of another
state
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.100 General
RAMP INSPECTIONS
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.100 (b) General
SUSPECTED AIRCRAFT
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.100(c)(1) General
ANNUAL PROGRAMME
GM1 ARO.RAMP.100(c)(1) General
NUMBER OF INSPECTION POINTS
GM1 ARO.RAMP.105 (b)(2)(i) Prioritisation criteria
LIST OF OPERATORS
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.110 Collection of information
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (a) Qualification of ramp inspectors
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(1) Qualification of ramp inspectors
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SENIOR RAMP INSPECTORS
AMC2 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SCOPE AND DURATION OF INITIAL TRAINING
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
AMC3 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
QUALIFICATION OF THE INSPECTOR AFTER SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF TRAINING
AMC4 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST ON-THE-JOB TRAINING OF INSPECTORS
GM1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of inspectors
PRIVILEGES OF EXPERIENCED INSPECTORS
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2)(i) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SYLLABUS OF THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE FOR RAMP INSPECTORS - INITIAL
(THEORETICAL) TRAINING COURSE
AMC2 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2)(i) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SYLLABUS OF PRACTICAL TRAINING FOR RAMP INSPECTORS - INITIAL (PRACTICAL)
TRAINING COURSE
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(3) Qualification of ramp inspectors
RECURRENT TRAINING
AMC2 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(3) Qualification of ramp inspectors
RECENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CRITERIA FOR TRAINING ORGANISATIONS
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GM1 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST FOR THE EVALUATION OF A 3RD PARTY TRAINING ORGANISATION
GM2 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST FOR THE EVALUATION OF A 3RD PARTY TRAINING ORGANISATION
GM3 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST FOR THE EVALUATION OF RAMP INSPECTIONS TRAINING INSTRUCTORS
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.120 Approval of training organisations
TRAINING ORGANISATIONS PROVIDING TRAINING TO RAMP INSPECTORS
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.125 (b) Conduct of Ramp inspections
GENERAL
GM1 ARO.RAMP.125 (b) Conduct of Ramp inspections
UNREASONABLE DELAY
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AUTHORITY REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR OPERATIONS
(PART-ARO)
Subpart GEN – General requirements
SECTION I - GENERAL
AMC1 ARO.GEN.120 (d) (3) Means of compliance
GENERAL
The information provided following approval of an alternative means of compliance would contain a reference
to the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) to which such means of compliance provides an alternative, as
well as a reference to the corresponding Implementing Rule, indicating as applicable the subparagraph(s)
covered by the alternative means of compliance.
GM1 ARO.GEN.120 Means of compliance
GENERAL
Alternative means of compliance approved by MCAA for an organization may be used by other organisations
only if processed again in accordance with ARO.GEN.120 (d) and (e).
SECTION II - MANAGEMENT
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (a) Management system
GENERAL
(a) All of the following would be considered when deciding upon the required organisational structure:
(1) the number of certificates, licences, authorisations and approvals to be issued;
(2) the number of declared organisations;
(3) the number of certified persons and organisations exercising an activity, including persons or
organisations certified by other authorities;
(4) the possible use of qualified entities and of resources of other authorities to fulfil the continuing
oversight obligations;
(5) the level of civil aviation activity in terms of
(i) number and complexity of aircraft operated;
(ii) size and complexity of the aviation industry;
(6) the potential growth of activities in the field of civil aviation.
(b) The set-up of the organisational structure would ensure that the various tasks and obligations of the MCAA
do not rely solely on individuals. A continuous and undisturbed fulfilment of these tasks and obligations
would also be guaranteed in case of illness, accident or leave of individual employees.
GM1 ARO.GEN.200 (a) Management system
GENERAL
(a) MCAA would be organised in such a way that:
(1) there is specific and effective management authority in the conduct of all relevant activities;
(2) the functions and processes described in the applicable requirements of this Regulation and its
Implementing Rules and AMCs, Certification Specifications (CSs) and Guidance Material (GM) may
be properly implemented;
(3) MCAA’s organisation and operating procedures for the implementation of the applicable requirements
of this Regulation and its Implementing Rules are properly documented and applied;
(4) all authority personnel involved in the related activities are provided with training where necessary;
(5) specific and effective provision is made for the communication and interface as necessary with other
States; and
(6) all functions related to implementing the applicable requirements are adequately described.
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(b) A general policy in respect of activities related to the applicable requirements of this Regulation and its
Implementing Rules would be developed, promoted and implemented by the manager at the highest
appropriate level; for example the manager at the top of the functional area of MCAA that is responsible for
such activities.
(c) Appropriate steps would be taken to ensure that the policy is known and understood by all personnel
involved, and all necessary steps would be taken to implement and maintain the policy.
(d) The general policy, whilst also satisfying additional regulatory responsibilities, would in particular take into
account:
(1) the provisions of this Regulation;
(2) the provisions of the applicable Implementing Rules and their AMCs, CSs and GM;
(3) the needs of industry; and
(4) the needs of MCAA.
(e) The policy would define specific objectives for key elements of the organisation and processes for
implementing related activities, including the corresponding control procedures and the measurement of the
achieved standard.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
DOCUMENTED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
(a) The various elements of the organisation involved with the activities related to this Regulation and its
Implementing Rules would be documented in order to establish a reference source for the establishment and
maintenance of this organisation.
(b) The documented procedures would be established in a way that facilitates their use. They would be clearly
identified, kept up-to-date and made readily available to all personnel involved in the related activities.
(c) The documented procedures would cover, as a minimum, all of the following aspects:
(1) policy and objectives;
(2) organisational structure;
(3) responsibilities and associated authority;
(4) procedures and processes;
(5) internal and external interfaces;
(6) internal control procedures;
(7) training of personnel;
(8) cross-references to associated documents;
(9) assistance from other authorities (where required).
(d) It is likely that the information is held in more than one document or series of documents, and suitable
cross-referencing would be provided. For example, organisational structure and job descriptions are not
usually in the same documentation as the detailed working procedures. In such cases it is recommended that
the documented procedures include an index of cross-references to all such other related information, and
the related documentation would be readily available when required.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING - GENERAL
(a) MCAA would ensure appropriate and adequate training of its personnel to meet the standard that is
considered necessary to perform the work. To ensure personnel remain qualified, arrangements would be
made for initial and recurrent training as required.
(b) The basic capability of MCAA’s personnel is a matter of recruitment and normal management functions in
selection of personnel for particular duties. Moreover, MCAA would provide training in the basic skills as
required for those duties. However, to avoid differences in understanding and interpretation, all personnel
would be provided with further training specifically related to this Regulation, its Implementing Rules and
related AMCs, CSs and GM, as well as related to the assessment of alternative means of compliance.
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(c) MCAA may provide training through its own training organisation with qualified trainers or through
another qualified training source.
(d) When training is not provided through an internal training organisation, adequately experienced and
qualified persons may act as trainers, provided their training skills have been assessed. If required, an
individual training plan would be established covering specific training skills. Records would be kept of
such training and of the assessment, as appropriate.
AMC2 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING - INSPECTORS
(a) Initial training programme:
The initial training programme for inspectors would include, as appropriate to their role, current knowledge,
experience and skills in at least all of the following:
(1) aviation legislation organisation and structure;
(2) the Chicago Convention, relevant ICAO annexes and documents;
(3) the applicable requirements and procedures;
(4) management systems, including auditing, risk assessment and reporting techniques;
(5) human factors principles;
(6) rights and obligations of inspecting personnel of MCAA;
(7) ‘on-the-job’ training;
(8) suitable technical training appropriate to the role and tasks of the inspector, in particular for those areas
requiring approvals.
(b) Recurrent training programme:
The recurrent training programme would reflect, at least, changes in aviation legislation and industry. The
programme would also cover the specific needs of the inspectors and MCAA.
GM1 ARO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management System
SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL
(a) This GM on the determination of the required personnel is limited to the performance of certification and
oversight tasks, excluding personnel required to perform tasks subject to any regulatory requirements.
(b) The elements to be considered when determining required personnel and planning their availability may be
divided into quantitative and qualitative elements:
(1) Quantitative elements:
(i) the estimated number of initial certificates to be issued;
(ii) the number of organisations certified by MCAA;
(iii) the number of persons to whom MCAA has issued a licence, certificate, rating, or authorisation;
(iv) the estimated number of persons and organisations exercising their activity within the Rpublic of
Maldives and established or residing in another State;
(v) the number of organisations having declared their activity to the competent authority.
(2) Qualitative elements:
(i) the size, nature and complexity of activities of certified and declared organisations (cf. AMC1
ORO.GEN.200(b)), taking into account:
(A) privileges of the organisation;
(B) type of approval, scope of approval, multiple certification, declared activities;
(C) possible certification to industry standards;
(D) types of aircraft / flight simulation training devices (FSTDs) operated;
(E) number of personnel; and
(F) organisational structure, existence of subsidiaries;
(ii) the safety priorities identified;
(iii) the results of past oversight activities, including audits, inspections and reviews, in terms of risks
and regulatory compliance, taking into account:
(A) number and level of findings;
(B) timeframe for implementation of corrective actions; and
(C) maturity of management systems implemented by organisations and their ability to effectively
manage safety risks, taking into account also information provided by other authorities related
to activities in the territory of the States concerned; and
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(iv) the size and complexity of the aviation industry and the potential growth of activities in the field of
civil aviation, which may be an indication of the number of new applications and changes to
existing certificates to be expected.
(c) Based on existing data from previous oversight planning cycles and taking into account the situation within
the State’s aviation industry, MCAA may estimate:
(1) the standard working time required for processing applications for new certificates (for persons and
organisations);
(2) the number of new declarations or changed declarations;
(3) the number of new certificates to be issued for each planning period; and
(4) the number of changes to existing certificates to be processed for each planning period.
(d) In line with MCAA’s oversight policy, the following planning data would be determined specifically for
each type of organisation certified by MCAA as well as for declared organisations:
(1) standard number of audits to be performed per oversight planning cycle;
(2) standard duration of each audit;
(3) standard working time for audit preparation, on-site audit, reporting and follow-up, per inspector;
(4) standard number of ramp and unannounced inspections to be performed;
(5) standard duration of inspections, including preparation, reporting and follow-up, per inspector;
(6) minimum number and required qualification of inspectors for each audit/inspection.
(e) Standard working time could be expressed either in working hours per inspector or in working days per
inspector. All planning calculations would then be based on the same unit (hours or working days).
(f) It is recommended to use a spreadsheet application to process data defined under (c) and (d), to assist in
determining the total number of working hours / days per oversight planning cycle required for certification,
oversight and enforcement activities. This application could also serve as a basis for implementing a system
for planning the availability of personnel.
(g) For each type of organisation certified by MCAA the number of working hours / days per planning period
for each qualified inspector that may be allocated for certification, oversight and enforcement activities
would be determined, taking into account:
(1) purely administrative tasks not directly related to oversight and certification;
(2) training;
(3) participation in other projects;
(4) planned absence; and
(5) the need to include a reserve for unplanned tasks or unforeseeable events.
(h) The determination of working time available for certification, oversight and enforcement activities would
also consider:
(1) the possible use of qualified entities; and
(2) possible cooperation with other competent authorities for approvals involving more than one State.
(i) Based on the elements listed above, MCAA would be able to:
(1) monitor dates when audits and inspections are due and when they have been carried out;
(2) implement a system to plan the availability of personnel; and
(3) identify possible gaps between the number and qualification of personnel and the required volume of
certification and oversight.
Care would be taken to keep planning data up-to-date in line with changes in the underlying planning
assumptions, with particular focus on risk-based oversight principles.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.200 (d) RESERVED
GM1 ARO.GEN.205 Allocation of tasks to qualified entities
CERTIFICATION TASKS
The tasks that may be performed by a qualified entity on behalf of MCAA include those related to the initial
certification and continuing oversight of persons and organisations as defined in this Regulation, with the
exclusion of the issuance of certificates, licences, ratings or approvals.
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AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a) Record-keeping
GENERAL
(a) The record-keeping system would ensure that all records are accessible whenever needed within a
reasonable time. These records would be organised in a way that ensures traceability and retrievability
throughout the required retention period.
(b) Records would be kept in paper form or in electronic format or a combination of both media. Records stored on
microfilm or optical disc form are also acceptable. The records would remain legible and accessible throughout the
required retention period. The retention period starts when the record has been created.
(c) Paper systems would use robust material, which can withstand normal handling and filing. Computer
systems would have at least one backup system, which would be updated within 24 hours of any new entry.
Computer systems would include safeguards against unauthorised alteration of data.
(d) All computer hardware used to ensure data backup would be stored in a different location from that
containing the working data and in an environment that ensures they remain in good condition. When
hardware- or software-changes take place, special care would be taken that all necessary data continue to be
accessible at least through the full period specified in the relevant Subpart or by default in ARO.GEN.220 (c).
AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(1);(2);(3) Record-keeping
AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Records related to MCAA’s management system would include, as a minimum and as applicable:
(a) the documented policies and procedures;
(b) the personnel files of authority personnel, with supporting documents related to training and qualifications;
(c) the results of MCAA’s internal audit and safety risk management processes, including audit findings and
corrective actions; and
(d) the contract(s) established with qualified entities performing certification or oversight tasks on behalf of
MCAA.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(4) Record-keeping
ORGANISATIONS
Records related to an organisation, certified by or having declared its activity to MCAA, would include, as
appropriate to the type of organisation:
(a) the application for an organisation approval or the declaration received;
(b) the documentation based on which the approval has been granted and any amendments to that
documentation;
(c) the organisation approval certificate including any changes;
(d) a copy of the continuing oversight programme listing the dates when audits are due and when such audits
were carried out;
(e) continuing oversight records including all audit and inspection records;
(f) copies of all relevant correspondence;
(g) details of any exemption and enforcement actions;
(h) any report from other competent authorities relating to the oversight of the organisation; and
(i) a copy of any other document approved by MCAA.
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GM1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(4) Record-keeping
ORGANISATIONS - DOCUMENTATION
Documentation to be kept as records in support of the approval include the management system documentation,
including any technical manuals, such as the operations manual, and training manual, that have been submitted
with the initial application, and any amendments to these documents.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.220 (a)(6) Record-keeping
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED IN THE MALDIVES BY PERSONS OR ORGANISATIONS ESTABLISHED
OR RESIDING IN ANOTHER STATE
(a) Records related to the oversight of activities performed in the Maldives by persons or organisations
established or residing in another State would include, as a minimum:
(1) oversight records including all audit and inspection records and related correspondence;
(2) copies of all relevant correspondence to exchange information with other competent authorities relating
to the oversight of such persons/organisations;
(3) details of any enforcement measures and penalties; and
(4) any report from other competent authorities relating to the oversight of these persons/organisations,
including any notification of evidence showing non-compliance with the applicable requirements.
(b) Records would be kept by MCAA having performed the audit or inspection and would be made available to
other competent authorities at least in the following cases:
(1) serious incidents or accidents;
(2) findings through the oversight programme where organisations certified by another authority are
involved, to determine the root cause;
(3) an organisation being certified or having approvals in several States.
(c) When records are requested by another authority, the reason for the request would be clearly stated.
(d) The records can be made available by sending a copy or by allowing access to them for consultation.
GM1 ARO.GEN.220 Record-keeping
GENERAL
Records are required to document results achieved or to provide evidence of activities performed. Records
become factual when recorded. Therefore, they are not subject to version control. Even when a new record is
produced covering the same issue, the previous record remains valid.
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SECTION III - OVERSIGHT, CERTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT
AMC1 ARO.GEN.300 (a);(b);(c) Oversight
GENERAL
(a) MCAA would assess the organisation and monitor its continued competence to conduct safe operations in
compliance with the applicable requirements. MCAA would ensure that accountability for assessing
organisations is clearly defined. This accountability may be delegated or shared, in whole or in part. Where
more than one authority is involved, a responsible person would be appointed under whose personal
authority organisations are assessed.
(b) It is essential that MCAA has the full capability to adequately assess the continued competence of an
organisation by ensuring that the whole range of activities is assessed by appropriately qualified personnel.
GM1 ARO.GEN.300 (a); (b); (c) Oversight
GENERAL
(a) Responsibility for the conduct of safe operations lies with the organisation. Under these provisions a
positive move is made towards devolving upon the organisation a share of the responsibility for monitoring
the safety of operations. The objective cannot be attained unless organisations are prepared to accept the
implications of this policy including that of committing the necessary resources to its implementation.
Crucial to the success of the policy is the content of Part-ORO, which requires the establishment of a
management system by the organisation.
(b) MCAA would continue to assess the organisation's compliance with the applicable requirements, including
the effectiveness of the management system. If the management system is judged to have failed in its
effectiveness, then this in itself is a breach of the requirements which may, among others, call into question
the validity of a certificate, if applicable.
(c) The accountable manager is accountable to MCAA as well as to those who may appoint him/her. It follows
that MCAA cannot accept a situation in which the accountable manager is denied sufficient funds,
manpower or influence to rectify deficiencies identified by the management system.
AMC2 ARO.GEN.300 (a);(b);(c) Oversight
EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
As part of the initial certification or the continuing oversight of an operator, the competent authority should
normally evaluate the operator’s safety risk assessment processes related to hazards identified by the operator as
having an interface with its operations. These safety risk assessments should be identifiable processes of the
operator’s management system.
As part of its continuing oversight, the competent authority should also remain satisfied as to the effectiveness
of these safety risk assessments.
(a) General methodology for operational hazards
The competent authority should establish a methodology for evaluating the safety risk assessment processes
of the operator’s management system.
When related to operational hazards, MCAA’s evaluation under its normal oversight process should be
considered satisfactory if the operator demonstrates its competence and capability to:
(1) understand the hazards and their consequences on its operations;
(2) be clear on where these hazards may exceed acceptable safety risk limits;
(3) identify and implement mitigations including suspension of operations where mitigation cannot reduce
the risk to within safety risk limits;
(4) develop and execute effectively robust procedures for the preparation and the safe operation of the
flights subject to the hazards identified;
(5) assess the competence and currency of its staff in relation to the duties necessary for the intended
operations and implement any necessary training; and
(6) ensure sufficient numbers of qualified and competent staff for such duties.
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MCAA should take into account that:
(1) the operator’s recorded mitigations for each unacceptable risk identified are in place;
(2) the operational procedures specified by the operator with the most significance to safety appear to be
robust; and
(3) the staff on which the operator depends in respect of those duties necessary for the intended operations
are trained and assessed as competent in the relevant procedures.
EVALUATION OF OPERATORS’ VOLCANIC ASH SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
In addition to the general methodology for operational hazards, MCAA’s evaluation under its normal
oversight process should also assess the operator’s competence and capability to:
(1) choose the correct information sources to use to interpret the information related to volcanic ash
contamination forecast and to resolve correctly any conflicts among such sources; and
(2) take account of all information from its type certificate holders (TCHs) concerning volcanic ash-related
airworthiness aspects of the aircraft it operates, and the related pre-flight, in-flight and post flight
precautions to be observed;
GM2 ARO.GEN.300 (a); (b); (c) Oversight
VOLCANIC ASH SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT - ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Further guidance on the assessment of an operator’s volcanic ash safety risk assessment is given in ICAO Doc
9974 (Flight safety and volcanic ash – Risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic
ash contamination).
AMC1 ARO.GEN.300 (a)(2) Oversight
OPERATIONAL APPROVALS ISSUED BY NON-EU STATE OF REGISTRY
When verifying continued compliance of non-commercial operators using an aircraft registered in a third
country holding operational approvals for operations in PBN, MNPS and RVSM airspace issued by a third
country, MCAA would at least assess if:
(a) the State of registry has established an equivalent level of safety, considering any differences notified to the
ICAO Standards for RVSM, RNP, MNPS and MEL; or
(b) there are reservations on the safety oversight capabilities and records of the State of registry; or
(c) operators of the State of registry are subject to an operating ban; or
(d) relevant findings on the State of registry from audits carried out under international conventions exist; or
(e) relevant findings on the State of registry from other safety assessment programmes of States exist.
GM1 ARO.GEN.300 (d) Oversight
ACTIVITIES WITHIN MALDIVES
(a) Activities performed in the territory of the Republic of Maldives by persons or organisations established or
residing in another State include:
(1) activities of:
(i) organisations certified by or declaring their activity to MCAA; or
(ii) persons performing operations with other than complex motor powered aircraft; and
(2) activities of persons holding a licence, certificate, or ratings issued by MCAA of any other State.
(b) Audits and inspections of such activities, including ramp and unannounced inspections, would be prioritised
towards those areas of greater safety concern, as identified through the analysis of data on safety hazards
and their consequences in operations.
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AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (b); (d) Oversight programme
SPECIFIC NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE ORGANISATION, RESULTS OF PAST OVERSIGHT
(a) When determining the oversight programme for an organisation MCAA would consider in particular the
following elements, as applicable:
(1) the implementation by the organisation of industry standards, directly relevant to the organisation’s
activity subject to this Regulation;
(2) the procedure applied for and scope of changes not requiring prior approval;
(3) specific approvals held by the organisation;
(4) specific procedures implemented by the organisation related to any alternative means of compliance
used.
(b) For the purpose of assessing the complexity of an organisation’s management system, AMC1
ORO.GEN.200 (b) would be used.
(c) Regarding results of past oversight, MCAA would also take into account relevant results of ramp
inspections of organisations it has certified or persons and other organisation having declared their activity
or persons performing operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aircraft that were performed in
other States in accordance with ARO.RAMP.
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305 (b) Oversight programme
PROCEDURES FOR OVERSIGHT OF OPERATIONS
(a) Each organisation to which a certificate has been issued would have an inspector specifically assigned to it.
Several inspectors would be required for the larger companies with widespread or varied types of operation.
This does not prevent a single inspector being assigned to several companies. Where more than one
inspector is assigned to an organisation, one of them would be nominated as having overall responsibility
for supervision of, and liaison with, the organisation’s management, and be responsible for reporting on
compliance with the requirements for its operations as a whole.
(b) Audits and inspections, on a scale and frequency appropriate to the operation, would cover at least:
(1) infrastructure,
(2) manuals,
(3) training,
(4) crew records,
(5) equipment,
(6) release of flight/dispatch,
(7) dangerous goods,
(8) organisation’s management system.
(c) The following types of inspections would be envisaged, as part of the oversight programme:
(1) flight inspection,
(2) ground inspection (documents and records),
(3) ramp inspection.
The inspection would be a ‘deep cut’ through the items selected and all findings would be recorded.
Inspectors would review the root cause(s) identified by the organisation for each confirmed finding.
Inspectors would be satisfied that the root cause(s) identified and the corrective actions taken are adequate
to correct the non-compliance and to prevent re-occurrence.
(d) Audits and inspections may be conducted separately or in combination. Audits and inspections may, at the
discretion of MCAA, be conducted with or without prior notice to the organisation.
(e) Where it is apparent to an inspector that an organisation has permitted a breach of the applicable
requirements, with the result that air safety has, or might have, been compromised, the inspector would
ensure that the responsible person within MCAA is informed without delay.
(f) In the first few months of a new operation, inspectors would be particularly alert to any irregular
procedures, evidence of inadequate facilities or equipment, or indications that management control of the
operation may be ineffective. They would also carefully examine any conditions that may indicate a
significant deterioration in the organisation's financial management. When any financial difficulties are
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identified, inspectors would increase technical surveillance of the operation with particular emphasis on the
upholding of safety standards.
(g) The number or the magnitude of the non-compliances identified by MCAA will serve to support MCAA's
continuing confidence in the organisation's competence or, alternatively, may lead to an erosion of that
confidence. In the latter case MCAA would review any identifiable shortcomings of the management
system.
GM1 ARO.GEN.305 (b) Oversight Programme
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Examples of trends that may indicate problems in a new organisation's financial management are:
(a) significant lay-offs or turnover of personnel;
(b) delays in meeting payroll;
(c) reduction of safe operating standards;
(d) decreasing standards of training;
(e) withdrawal of credit by suppliers;
(f) inadequate maintenance of aircraft;
(g) shortage of supplies and spare parts;
(h) curtailment or reduced frequency of revenue flights; and
(i) sale or repossession of aircraft or other major equipment items.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (b) (1) Oversight programme
AUDIT
(a) The oversight programme would indicate which aspects of the approval will be covered with each audit.
(b) Part of an audit would concentrate on the organisation’s compliance monitoring reports produced by the
compliance monitoring personnel to determine if the organisation is identifying and correcting its problems.
(c) At the conclusion of the audit, an audit report would be completed by the auditing inspector, including all
findings raised.
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305 (b)(1) Oversight programme
RAMP INSPECTIONS
(a) When conducting a ramp inspection of aircraft used by organisations under its regulatory oversight MCAA
would, in as far as possible, comply with the requirements defined in ARO.RAMP.
(b) When conducting ramp inspections on other-than-suspected aircraft, MCAA would take into account the
following elements:
(1) repeated inspections would be avoided of those organisations for which previous inspections have not
revealed safety deficiencies;
(2) the oversight programme would enable the widest possible sampling rate of aircraft flying into their
territory; and
(3) there would be no discrimination on the basis of the organisation’s nationality, the type of operation or
type of aircraft, unless such criteria can be linked to an increased risk.
(c) For aircraft other than those used by organisations under its regulatory oversight, when conducting a risk
assessment MCAA would consider aircraft that have not been ramp inspected for more than 6 months.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (b);(c); (d) Oversight programme
INDUSTRY STANDARDS
(a) For organisations having demonstrated compliance with industry standards, MCAA may adapt its oversight
programme, in order to avoid duplication of specific audit items.
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(b) Demonstrated compliance with industry standards would not be considered in isolation from the other
elements to be considered for MCAA’s risk-based oversight.
(c) In order to be able to credit any audits performed as part of certification in accordance with industry
standards, the following would be considered:
(1) the demonstration of compliance is based on certification auditing schemes providing for independent
and systematic verification;
(2) the existence of an accreditation scheme and accreditation body for certification in accordance with the
industry standards has been verified;
(3) certification audits are relevant to the requirements defined in Annex III (Part-ORO) and other
Annexes to this Regulation as applicable;
(4) the scope of such certification audits can easily be mapped against the scope of oversight in accordance
with Annex III (Part-ORO);
(5) audit results are accessible to MCAA and open to exchange of information in accordance with Article
15(1) of this Regulation; and
(6) the audit planning intervals of certification audits i.a.w. industry standards are compatible with the
oversight planning cycle.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305(c) Oversight programme
OVERSIGHT PLANNING CYCLE
(a) When determining the oversight planning cycle and defining the oversight programme, MCAA would
assess the risks related to the activity of each organisation and adapt the oversight to the level of risk
identified and to the organisation’s ability to effectively manage safety risks.
(b) MCAA would establish a schedule of audits and inspections appropriate to each organisation's business.
The planning of audits and inspections would take into account the results of the hazard identification and
risk assessment conducted and maintained by the organisation as part of the organisation’s management
system. Inspectors would work in accordance with the schedule provided to them.
(c) When MCAA, having regard to an organisation's safety performance, varies the frequency of an audit or
inspection it would ensure that all aspects of the operation are audited and inspected within the applicable
oversight planning cycle.
(d) The section(s) of the oversight programme dealing with ramp inspections would be developed based on
geographical locations, taking into account aerodrome activity, and focusing on key issues that can be
inspected in the time available without unnecessarily delaying the operations.
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305(c) Oversight programme
OVERSIGHT PLANNING CYCLE
(a) For each organisation certified by MCAA all processes would be completely audited at periods not
exceeding the applicable oversight planning cycle. The beginning of the first oversight planning cycle is
normally determined by the date of issue of the first certificate. If MCAA wishes to align the oversight
planning cycle with the calendar year, it would shorten the first oversight planning cycle accordingly.
(b) The interval between two audits for a particular process would not exceed the interval of the applicable
oversight planning cycle.
(c) Audits would include at least one on-site audit within each oversight planning cycle. For organisations
exercising their regular activity at more than one site, the determination of the sites to be audited would
consider the results of past oversight, the volume of activity at each site, as well as main risk areas
identified.
(d) For organisations holding more than one certificate, MCAA may define an integrated oversight schedule to
include all applicable audit items. In order to avoid duplication of audits, credit may be granted for specific
audit items already completed during the current oversight planning cycle, subject to four conditions:
(1) the specific audit item would be the same for all certificates under consideration;
(2) there would be satisfactory evidence on record that such specific audit items were carried out and that
all corrective actions have been implemented to the satisfaction of MCAA;
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(3) MCAA would be satisfied that there is no reason to believe standards have deteriorated in respect of
those specific audit items being granted a credit;
(4) the interval between two audits for the specific item being granted a credit would not exceed the
applicable oversight planning cycle.
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305 (d) Oversight programme
DECLARED ORGANISATIONS
For organisations having declared their activity to MCAA, at least one inspection should be performed within
each 24-month cycle starting with the date of the first declaration received.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.305 (e) Oversight programme
PERSONS HOLDING A LICENCE, CERTIFICATE, OR RATING
The oversight of persons holding a licence, certificate, or rating would normally be ensured as part of the
oversight of organisations. Additionally, MCAA would verify compliance with applicable requirements when
endorsing or renewing ratings.
To properly discharge its oversight responsibilities, MCAA would perform a certain number of unannounced
verifications.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.310 (a) Initial certification procedure - organisations
VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
(a) Upon receipt of an application for an air operator certificate (AOC), MCAA would:
(1) assess the management system and processes, including the operator’s organisation and operational
control system;
(2) review the operations manual and any other documentation provided by the organisation; and
(3) for the purpose of verifying the organisation’s compliance with the applicable requirements, conduct an
audit at the organisation’s facilities. MCAA may require the conduct of one or more demonstration
flights operated as if they were commercial flights.
(b) MCAA would ensure that the following steps are taken:
(1) The organisation's written application for an AOC would be submitted at least 90 days before the date
of intended operation, except that the operations manual may be submitted later, but not less than 60
days before the date of intended operation. The application form would be printed in language(s) of
MCAA's choosing.
(2) An individual would be nominated by the responsible person of MCAA to oversee, to become the focal
point for all aspects of the organisation certification process and to coordinate all necessary activity.
The nominated person would be responsible to the responsible person of MCAA for confirming that all
appropriate audits and inspections have been carried out. He/she would also ensure that the necessary
specific or prior approvals required by (b)(3) are issued in due course. Of particular importance on
initial application is a careful review of the qualifications of the organisations’ nominated persons.
Account will be taken of the relevance of the nominee's previous experience and known record.
(3) Submissions that require MCAA's specific or prior approval would be referred to the appropriate
department of MCAA. Submissions would include, where relevant, the associated qualification
requirements and training programmes.
(c) The ability of the applicant to secure, in compliance with the applicable requirements and the safe operation
of aircraft, all necessary training and, where required, licensing of personnel, would be assessed. This
assessment would also include the areas of responsibility and the numbers of those allocated by the
applicant to key management tasks.
(d) In order to verify the organisation’s compliance with the applicable requirements, MCAA would conduct an
audit of the organisation, including interviews of personnel and inspections carried out at the organisation’s
facilities.
MCAA would only conduct such audit after being satisfied that the application shows compliance with the
applicable requirements.
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(e) The audit would focus on the following areas:
(1) detailed management structure, including names and qualifications of personnel required by
ORO.GEN.210 and adequacy of the organisation and management structure;
(2) personnel:
(i) adequacy of number and qualifications with regard to the intended terms of approval and
associated privileges;
(ii) validity of licences, ratings, or certificates as applicable;
(3) processes for safety risk management and compliance monitoring;
(4) facilities – adequacy with regard to the organisation’s scope of work;
(5) documentation based on which the certificate would be granted (organisation documentation as
required by Part-ORO, including technical manuals, such as operations manual or training manual).
(f) In case of non-compliance, the applicant would be informed in writing of the corrections that are required.
(g) When the verification process is complete, the person with overall responsibility, nominated in accordance
with (b)(2), would present the application to the person responsible for the issue of an AOC together with a
written recommendation and evidence of the result of all investigations or assessments which are required
before the operator certificate is issued. Approvals required will be attached to the recommendation. MCAA
would inform the applicant of its decision concerning the application within 60 days of receipt of all
supporting documentation. In cases where an application for an organisation certificate is refused, the
applicant would be informed of the right of appeal as exists under national law.
AMC1 ARO.GEN.330 Changes – organisations
GENERAL
(a) Changes in nominated persons:
MCAA would be informed of any changes to personnel specified in Part-ORO that may affect the
certificate or terms of approval/approval schedule attached to it. When an organisation submits the name of
a new nominee for any of the persons nominated as per ORO.GEN.210 (b), MCAA would require the
organisation to produce a written résumé of the proposed person's qualifications. MCAA would reserve the
right to interview the nominee or call for additional evidence of his/her suitability before deciding upon
his/her acceptability.
(b) A simple management system documentation status sheet would be maintained, which contains information
on when an amendment was received by MCAA and when it was approved.
(c) The organisation would provide each management system documentation amendment to MCAA, including
for the amendments that do not require prior approval by MCAA. Where the amendment requires authority
approval, MCAA, when satisfied, would indicate its approval in writing. Where the amendment does not
require prior approval, MCAA would acknowledge receipt in writing within 10 working days.
(d) For changes requiring prior approval, in order to verify the organisation's compliance with the applicable
requirements, MCAA would conduct an audit of the organisation, limited to the extent of the changes. If
required for verification, the audit would include interviews and inspections carried out at the organisation’s
facilities.
GM1 ARO.GEN.330 Changes - organisations
CHANGE OF NAME OF THE ORGANISATION
(a) On receipt of the application and the relevant parts of the organisation’s documentation as required by PartORO, MCAA would re-issue the certificate.
(b) A name change alone does not require MCAA to audit the organisation, unless there is evidence that other
aspects of the organisation have changed.
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AMC1 ARO.GEN.345 Declaration – organisations
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT
MCAA should acknowledge receipt of the declaration in writing within 10 working days.
GM1 ARO.GEN.350 Findings and corrective actions organisations
TRAINING
For a level 1 finding it may be necessary for MCAA to ensure that further training by the organisation is carried
out and audited by MCAA before the activity is resumed, dependent upon the nature of the finding.
GM1 ARO.GEN.355 (b) Findings and enforcement measures – persons
GENERAL
This provision is necessary to ensure that enforcement measures will be taken also in cases where MCAA may
not act on the licence, or certificate. The type of enforcement measure will depend on the applicable national
law and may include for example the payment of a fine or the prohibition from exercising.
It covers two cases:
(a) persons subject to the requirements laid down in this Regulation and its Implementing Rules who are not
required to hold a licence, or certificate; and
(b) persons who are required to hold a licence, rating, or certificate, but who do not hold the appropriate
licence, rating, or certificate as required for the activity they perform.
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SUBPART OPS - AIR OPERATIONS
SECTION I - CERTIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATORS
AMC1 ARO.OPS.105 Code-share arrangements
SAFETY OF A CODE-SHARE AGREEMENT
(a) When evaluating the safety of a code-share agreement, MCAA would check that the:
(1) documented information provided by the applicant in accordance with ORO.AOC.115 is complete and
shows compliance with the applicable ICAO standards; and
(2) operator has established a code-share audit programme for monitoring continuous compliance of the
third country operator with the applicable ICAO standards.
(b) MCAA would request the applicant to make a declaration covering the above items.
(c) In case of non-compliance the applicant would be informed in writing of the corrections which are required.
AMC2 ARO.OPS.105 Code-share arrangements
AUDITS PERFORMED BY A THIRD PARTY PROVIDER
When audits are performed by a third party provider, MCAA would verify if the third party provider meets the
criteria established in AMC2 ORO.AOC.115 (b).
AMC1 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
WET LEASE-IN
(a) Before approving a wet lease-in agreement MCAA of the lessee would assess available reports on ramp
inspections performed on aircraft of the lessor.
(b) MCAA would only approve a wet lease-in agreement if the routes intended to be flown are contained
within the authorised areas of operations specified in the AOC of the lessor.
AMC2 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
SHORT TERM WET LEASE-IN
MCAA of the lessee may approve third country operators individually or a framework contract with more than
one third country operator in anticipation of operational needs or to overcome operational difficulties taking into
account the conditions defined in Article 13(3) of this Regulation.
GM1 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
APPROVAL
(a) Except for wet lease-out, approval for an operator to lease an aircraft of another operator would be issued
by MCAA of the lessee and MCAA of the lessor.
(b) When an operator leases an aircraft of an undertaking or person other than an operator MCAA of the lessee
would issue the approval.
GM2 ARO.OPS.110 Lease agreements
DRY LEASE-OUT
The purpose of the requirement for MCAA to ensure proper coordination with MCAA that is responsible for the
oversight of the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft in accordance with this Regulation is to ensure that
appropriate arrangements are in place to allow:
(a) the transfer of regulatory oversight over the aircraft, if relevant; or
(b) continued compliance of the aircraft with the requirements of this Regulation.
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SECTION II – APPROVALS
AMC1 ARO.OPS.200 Specific approval procedure
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL OF CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS
When verifying compliance with the applicable requirements of SPA.DG.100, MCAA would check that:
(a) the procedures specified in the operations manual are sufficient for the safe transport of dangerous goods;
(b) operations personnel are properly trained in accordance with the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO Doc 9284-AN/905); and
(c) a reporting scheme is in place.
AMC2 ARO.OPS.200 Specific approval procedure
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL FOR REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMA (RVSM)
OPERATIONS
(a) When verifying compliance with the applicable requirements of Subpart D of Annex V (SPA.RVSM),
MCAA would verify that:
(1) each aircraft holds an adequate RVSM airworthiness approval;
(2) procedures for monitoring and reporting height keeping errors have been established;
(3) a training programme for the flight crew involved in these operations has been established; and
(4) operating procedures have been established.
(b) Demonstration flight(s)
The content of the RVSM application may be sufficient to verify the aircraft performance and procedures.
However, the final step of the approval process may require a demonstration flight. MCAA may appoint an
inspector for a flight in RVSM airspace to verify that all relevant procedures are applied effectively. If the
performance is satisfactory, operation in RVSM airspace may be permitted.
(c) Form of approval documents
Each aircraft group for which the operator is granted approval would be listed in the approval.
(d) Airspace monitoring
For airspace, where a numerical target level of safety is prescribed, monitoring of aircraft height keeping
performance in the airspace by an independent height monitoring system is necessary to verify that the
prescribed level of safety is being achieved. However, an independent monitoring check of an aircraft is not
a prerequisite for the grant of an RVSM approval.
(1) Suspension, revocation and reinstatement of RVSM approval
The incidence of height keeping errors that can be tolerated in an RVSM environment is small. It is
expected of each operator to take immediate action to rectify the conditions that cause an error. The
operator would report an occurrence involving poor height keeping to MCAA within 72 hours. The
report would include an initial analysis of causal factors and measures taken to prevent repeat
occurrences. The need for follow-up reports would be determined by MCAA. Occurrences that would
be reported and investigated are errors of:
(i) total vertical error (TVE) equal to or greater than ±90 m (±300 ft);
(ii) altimeter system error (ASE) equal to or greater than ±75 m (±245 ft); and
(iii) assigned altitude deviation equal to or greater than ±90 m (±300 ft).
Height keeping errors fall into two broad categories:
- errors caused by malfunction of aircraft equipment; and
- operational errors.
(2) An operator that consistently experiences errors in either category would have approval for RVSM
operations suspended or revoked. If a problem is identified that is related to one specific aircraft type,
then RVSM approval may be suspended or revoked for that specific type within that operator's fleet.
(3) Operators’ actions:
The operator would make an effective, timely response to each height keeping error. MCAA may
consider suspending or revoking RVSM approval if the operator's responses to height keeping errors
are not effective or timely. MCAA would consider the operator's past performance record in
determining the action to be taken.
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(4) Reinstatement of approval:
The operator would satisfy MCAA that the causes of height keeping errors are understood and have
been eliminated and that the operator's RVSM programmes and procedures are effective. At its
discretion and to restore confidence, MCAA may require an independent height monitoring check of
affected aircraft to be performed.
GM1 ARO.OPS.205 Minimum equipment list approval
EXTENSION OF RECTIFICATION INTERVALS
MCAA would verify that the operator does not use the extension of rectification intervals as a means to reduce
or eliminate the need to rectify MEL defects in accordance with the established category limit. The extension of
rectification intervals would only be considered valid and justifiable when events beyond the operator’s control
have precluded rectification.
GM1 ARO.OPS.210 Determination of local area
GENERAL
The local area would reflect the local environment and operating conditions.
AMC1 ARO.OPS.215 Approval of helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a
congested area
APPROVALS THAT REQUIRE ENDORSEMENT
(a) Whenever the operator applies for an approval in accordance with CAT.POL.H.420 for which an
endorsement from another State is required, MCAA would only grant the approval once endorsement of
that other State has been received.
(b) The Operations Specification would be amended to include those areas for which endorsement was
received.
AMC2 ARO.OPS.215 Approval of helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a
congested area
ENDORSEMENT BY ANOTHER STATE
(a) Whenever the operator applies for an endorsement to operate over hostile environment located outside a
congested area in another State in accordance with CAT.POL.H.420, the authority of that other State would
only grant the endorsement once it is satisfied that:
(1) the safety risk assessment is appropriate to the area overflown; and
(2) the operator’s substantiation that preclude the use of the appropriate performance criteria are
appropriate for the area overflown.
(b) MCAA would inform the authority responsible for issuing the approval.
AMC1 ARO.OPS.220 Approval of helicopter operations to or from a public interest site
APPROVALS THAT REQUIRE ENDORSEMENT
Whenever the operator applies for an approval in accordance with CAT.POL.H.225 to conduct operations to or
from a public interest site (PIS) for which an endorsement from another State is required, MCAA would only
grant such approval once endorsement of that other State has been received.
AMC2 ARO.OPS.220 Approval of helicopter operations to or from a public interest site
ENDORSEMENT BY ANOTHER STATE
(a) Whenever the operator applies for an endorsement to operate to/from a public interest site in another State
in accordance with CAT.POL.H.225, the authority of that other State would only grant the endorsement
once it is satisfied that:
(1) the conditions of CAT.POL.H.225 (a)(1) through (5) can be met by the operator at those sites for which
endorsement is requested; and
(2) the operations manual includes the procedures to comply with CAT.POL.H.225 (b) for these sites for
which endorsement is requested.
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(b) The authority of that other State would inform the authority responsible for issuing the approval.
GM1 ARO.OPS.225 Approval of operations to an isolated aerodrome
GENERAL
The use of an isolated aerodrome exposes the aircraft and passengers to a greater risk than to operations where a
destination alternate aerodrome is available. Whether an aerodrome is classified as an isolated aerodrome or not
often depends on which aircraft are used for operating the aerodrome. MCAA would therefore assess whether
all possible means are applied to mitigate the greater risk.
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SUBPART RAMP
Ramp inspections of aircraft of operators under the regulatory oversight of another state
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.100 General
RAMP INSPECTIONS
(a) The ramp inspection would normally be performed during a turn-around.
(b) In addition to the applicable requirements, when inspecting the technical condition of the aircraft, it would
be checked against the aircraft manufacturer’s standard.
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.100 (b) General
SUSPECTED AIRCRAFT
In determining whether an aircraft is suspected of not being compliant with the applicable requirements the
following would be taken into account:
(a) information regarding poor maintenance of, or obvious damage or defects to an aircraft;
(b) reports that an aircraft has performed abnormal manoeuvres that give rise to serious safety concerns in the
airspace of a State;
(c) a previous ramp inspection that has revealed deficiencies indicating that the aircraft does not comply with
the applicable requirements and where MCAA suspects that these deficiencies have not been corrected;
(d) evidence that the State in which an aircraft is registered is not exercising proper safety oversight; or
(e) concerns about the operator of the aircraft that have arisen from occurrence reporting information and noncompliances recorded in a ramp inspection report on any other aircraft used by that operator.
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.100(c) (1) General
ANNUAL PROGRAMME
(a) Calculation methodology
MCAA would calculate the number of points to be achieved in the following year. The number of points
would be calculated before the 1st of September prior to the year for which the points apply. For this
purpose the following formula would be used:
Q = (Opr≥12) + (0.2*Opr<12) + (0.001*Lnd), where:
‘Q’ = annual quota;
‘Opr≥12’ is the number of operators whose aircraft have landed in the previous year at aerodromes located in
the State at least 12 times;
‘Opr<12’ is the number of operators whose aircraft have landed in the previous year at aerodromes in the
territory of the State less than 12 times;
‘Lnd’ is the number of landings performed by those operators’ aircraft at aerodromes located in the State in
the previous year.
(b) Inspections would be valued differently in accordance with the following criteria:
(1) prioritised ramp inspections and the first inspection of a new operator conducted on an aerodrome
located within a radius ≤ 250 km from MCAA’s main office have a value of 1.5 points;
(2) prioritised ramp inspections and the first inspection of a new operator conducted on an aerodrome
located within a radius > 250 km from MCAA’s main office have a value of 2.25 points;
(3) inspections conducted between the hours of 20:00 and 06:00 local time, during weekends or national
holidays have a value of 1.25 points;
(4) inspections conducted on operators for which the previous inspection was performed more than 8
weeks before have a value of 1.25 points;
(5) any other inspections have a value of 1 point; and
(6) for specific circumstances falling under two or more of the above situations, the above-mentioned
factors may be combined by multiplication (e.g. prioritised inspection performed at an airport located
at 600 km from the main office, during the weekend on an operator that was not inspected over the last
3 months will have a value of: 2.25 * 1.25 * 1.25 = 3, 52 points).
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GM1 ARO.RAMP.100(c) (1) General
NUMBER OF INSPECTION POINTS
The quotation is a statistical assumption only and does not necessarily mean that operators in the group ‘Opr ≥12’
always need to be inspected. As deemed necessary by the inspecting authorities, operators may be inspected
more than once (taking into account AMC2 ARO.GEN.305(b)(1) whilst sticking to the calculated number of
points; as a result, some operators might not be inspected in any given year.
GM1 ARO.RAMP.105 (b)(2)(i) Prioritisation criteria
LIST OF OPERATORS
The list of operators may include aircraft of operators or aircraft that have been withdrawn from the list of air
carriers subject to an operating ban.
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.110 Collection of information
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
The information would include:
(a) important safety information available, in particular, through:
(1) pilot reports;
(2) maintenance organisation report;
(3) incident reports;
(4) reports from other organisations, independent from the inspection authorities; and
(5) complaints.
(b) information on action(s) taken subsequent to a ramp inspection, such as:
(1) aircraft grounded;
(2) aircraft or operator banned pursuant to Article 6 of this Regulation;
(3) corrective action required;
(4) contacts with the operator's authority; and
(5) restrictions on flight operations.
(c) follow-up information concerning the operator, such as:
(1) implementation of corrective action(s); and
(2) recurrence of non-compliance.
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (a) Qualification of ramp inspectors
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
The background knowledge and/or working experience of the inspector determines the privileges of the
inspector. MCAA would determine what the inspector is entitled to inspect taking into account the following
considerations:
(a) background knowledge;
(b) working experience; and
(c) interrelation of the inspection item with other disciplines (e.g. a former cabin crew member may require
additional training on minimum equipment list (MEL) issues before being considered eligible for inspection
of safety items in the cabin).
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(1) Qualification of ramp inspectors
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
(a) The candidate would be considered eligible to become a ramp inspector provided he/she meets the
following criteria:
(1) has good knowledge of the English language; and
(2) education and experience over the previous 5 years in accordance with one of the following items:
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(i) has successfully completed post-secondary education with a duration of at least 3 years and after
that at least 2 years aeronautical experience in the field of aircraft operations or maintenance, or
personnel licensing;
(ii) has or has had a commercial/airline transport pilot licence and preferably carried out such duties
for at least 2 years;
(iii) has or has had a flight engineer licence and preferably carried out such duties for at least 2 years;
(iv) has been a cabin crew member and preferably carried out such duties in commercial air transport
for at least 2 years;
(v) has been licensed as maintenance personnel and preferably exercised the privileges of such licence
for at least 2 years;
(vi) has successfully completed professional training in the field of air transport of dangerous goods
and preferably after that at least 2 years experience in this field; or
(vii) has successfully completed post-secondary aeronautical education with a duration of at least 2
years.
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SENIOR RAMP INSPECTORS
(a) MCAA would appoint senior ramp inspectors provided they meet the qualification criteria established by
that authority. These qualification criteria would contain at least the following requirements:
(1) the appointee has been a qualified ramp inspector over the 3 years prior to his/her appointment;
(2) the appointee has performed a minimum of 72 ramp inspections during the 36 months prior to the
appointment, evenly spread over this period; and
(3) the senior ramp inspector will remain qualified only if performing at least 24 ramp inspections during
any 12 months period after his/her initial qualification.
(b) If MCAA does not have senior ramp inspectors to conduct on-the-job training, such training would be
performed by a senior ramp inspector from another State.
(c) Additional factors to be considered when nominating senior ramp inspectors include knowledge of training
techniques, professionalism, maturity, judgment, integrity, safety awareness, communication skills,
personal standards of performance and a commitment to quality.
(d) If a senior ramp inspector would lose his/her qualification as a result of failure to reach the minimum
number of inspections mentioned in ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(3), he/she would be requalified by MCAA by
performing at least four inspections under the supervision of a senior ramp inspector, within a maximum
period of 2 months.
(e) Senior ramp inspectors, like any other inspectors, would also receive recurrent training according to the
frequency mentioned in AMC1-ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(3).
AMC2 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SCOPE AND DURATION OF INITIAL TRAINING
Initial training would encompass:
- initial theoretical training,
- practical training,
- and on-the-job training.
(a) Initial theoretical training
(1) The scope of the initial theoretical training is to familiarise the inspectors with the framework and the
Ramp Inspection Programme, and with the common inspection, finding categorisation, reporting and
follow-up procedures. The primary scope of the theoretical training is not the transfer of technical
(operational, airworthiness, etc.) knowledge. The trainees would possess such knowledge, either from
previous work experience or through specialised training, prior to attending the theoretical course. The
duration of the initial theoretical training would be no less than 3 training days.
(2) In case an integrated course is delivered (consisting of both the transfer of technical knowledge and
specific ramp inspection information), the duration of the course would be extended accordingly.
(3) The initial theoretical training will be conducted in accordance with the syllabus in AMC1
ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2)(i).
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(b) Practical training
(1) The scope of practical training is to instruct on inspection techniques and specific areas of attention
without any interference with the flight crew. Preferably, this would be done in a non-operational
environment (e.g. on an aircraft in a maintenance hangar). Alternatively, aircraft with an adequate
turnaround time may be used. In the latter case the flight and/or ground crew would be informed about
the training character of the inspection.
(2) The duration of the practical training would be no less than 1 training day. MCAA may decide to
lengthen the training based on the level of expertise of the attendees. Practical training may be split into
several sessions provided an adequate training tracking system is in place.
(3) The practical training would be conducted in accordance with the syllabus in AMC2-ARO RAMP.115
(b)(2)(i).
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
(c) Scope of on-the-job training
(1) The objective of the on-the-job training would be to familiarise the trainees with the particularities of
performing a ramp inspection in a real, operational environment. MCAA would ensure that on-the-job
training is undertaken only by trainees that have successfully completed theoretical and practical
training.
(2) MCAA would ensure that the area of expertise of the trainee is compatible with the one of the senior
ramp inspector delivering on-the-job training.
(3) When selecting the operators to be inspected during the on-the-job training programme, the senior
ramp inspector would ensure:
(i) that the training can be performed on a sufficient level but without undue hindrance or delay of the
inspected operator; and
(ii) that the ramp inspections are conducted on different operators (i.e., Maldivian operators, third
country operators), different aircraft types and aircraft configurations (i.e., jet and propeller
aircraft, single aisle and wide-body aeroplanes, passenger operations and cargo operations),
different types of operations (i.e., commercial operations and non-commercial, etc., long-haul and
short-haul operations).
(4) On-the-job training would comprise two phases:
(i) observing inspector: during this phase the trainee would accompany and observe the senior ramp
inspector when performing a series of ramp inspections (including the preparation of the
inspection and post-inspection activities: reporting, follow-up); and
(ii) inspector under supervision: during this phase the trainee would gradually start to perform ramp
inspections under the supervision and guidance of the senior ramp inspector.
(d) Duration and conduct of on-the-job training
(1) The duration of the on-the-job training would be customised to the particular training needs of every
trainee. As a minimum, the on-the-job training programme would contain at least six observed ramp
inspections and six ramp inspections performed under the supervision of the senior ramp inspector,
over a period of a maximum of 6 months. In general, on-the-job training would start as soon as possible
after the completion of the practical training and cover all inspection items that the inspector will be
privileged to inspect.
The on-the-job training may be given by more than one senior ramp inspector. In such cases
appropriate records would be maintained for each trainee documenting the training received (when the
trainee is observing the inspection) and his/her ability to effectively perform ramp inspections (under
supervision). For this purpose, the senior ramp inspector would use a checklist containing the
applicable elements presented in GM2 ARO.RAMP.115(c).
(2) Before starting on-the-job training the trainee would be briefed with regard to the general objectives
and working methods of the training.
(3) Before every inspection the trainee would be briefed with regard to the particular objectives and
lessons to be learned during this inspection.
(4) After every day of inspection the trainee would be debriefed with regard to his/her performance and
progress and areas where improvement is needed.
(e) Elements to be covered during the on-the-job training
On-the-job training would address the following elements However, some of the situations described below
do not happen very often (i.e. grounding of an aircraft) and would, therefore, be presented by the senior
ramp inspector during one of the debriefings.
(1) Preparation of an inspection:
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(i) use of the centralised database to prepare an inspection;
(ii) other sources of information (such as passenger complaints, maintenance organisation reports, air
traffic control (ATC) reports;
(iii) areas of concern and/or open findings;
(iv) retrieval of updated reference materials: Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), navigation and weather
charts;
(v) selection of operator(s) to be inspected (oversight programme, priority list);
(vi) task allocation among members of a ramp inspection team; and
(vii) daily/weekly/monthly ramp inspection schedule.
Administrative issues:
(i) ramp inspector’s credentials, rights and obligations;
(ii) special urgency procedures (if any);
(iii) national (local) aerodrome access procedures;
(iv) safety and security airside procedures; and
(v) ramp inspector kit (electric torch, fluorescent vest, ear plugs, digital camera, checklists, etc.).
Cooperation with airport and air navigation services to obtain actual flight information, parking
position, time of departure, etc.
Ramp inspection:
(i) introduction to the pilot-in-command/commander, flight crew, cabin crew, ground crew;
(ii) inspection items: according to the area of expertise of the trainee;
(iii) findings (identification, categorisation, reporting, evidencing);
(iv) corrective actions – class 2;
(v) corrective actions – class 3:
(A) Class 3a) enforcement of restriction(s) on aircraft flight operations (cooperation with other
services/authorities to enforce a restriction);
(B) Class 3b) request of an immediate corrective action(s), satisfactory completion of an
immediate corrective action;
(C) Class 3c) grounding of an aircraft: notification of the grounding decision to the aircraft
commander; national procedures to prevent the departure of a grounded aircraft;
communication with the State of operator/registry;
(vi) Proof of Inspection:
(A) completion and delivery of the Proof of Inspection report; and
(B) request of acknowledgement of receipt (document or a refusal to sign)
Human factors elements:
(i) cultural aspects;
(ii) resolution of disagreements and/or conflicts; and
(iii) crew stress.
(f) Assessment of trainees
The assessment of the trainee would be done by the senior ramp inspector while the trainee is performing
ramp inspections under supervision. The trainee would be considered to have successfully completed the
on-the-job training only after demonstrating to the senior ramp inspector that he/she possess the
professional capacity, knowledge, judgment and ability to perform ramp inspections in accordance with the
requirements of this Subpart.
AMC3 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
QUALIFICATION OF THE INSPECTOR AFTER SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF TRAINING
Qualification of the inspector after successful completion of training
(a) Successful completion of theoretical training would be demonstrated by passing an evaluation by MCAA or
by the approved training organisation.
(b) Successful completion of practical and on–the-job training would be assessed by the senior ramp inspector
providing on-the-job training, through evaluation of the trainee’s ability to effectively perform ramp
inspections in an operational environment.
(c) MCAA would issue a formal qualification statement for each qualified inspector listing the inspecting
privileges.
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(d) The background knowledge and working experience of the inspector would determine the privileges of the
inspector (the scope of his/her inspection; what he/she is entitled to inspect). The numerous varieties in
backgrounds of the candidate inspectors make it impossible to issue a full set of templates showing the
background-privileges relation. It is, therefore, up to MCAA to determine the eligibility and the related
privileges for the inspector, whereby the following would be considered:
(1) background knowledge;
(2) working experience; and
(3) interrelation of the inspection item with other disciplines (e.g. former cabin crew member may require
additional training on MEL issues before being considered eligible for safety items in the cabin).
(e) MCAA would issue the qualification statement only after the candidate has successfully completed the
theoretical, practical and on-the-job-training.
(f) MCAA would put in place a system that will ensure that their inspectors meet at all times the qualification
criteria with regard to eligibility, training and recent experience.
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AMC4 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST ON-THE-JOB TRAINING OF INSPECTORS
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING OF RAMP INSPECTION INSPECTORS
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
Senior ramp inspector:
Name of trainee:
Place:
Date:
Ramp Inspection Number:
Operator:
A/C Registration:
A/C Type:
A
Flight deck
Check: (Description/ notes)
Observation
Under
Supervision
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
General
door, if required
1
General condition
Note:
iceable (if not, check MEL
2
Emergency exit
limitations)
Note:
ACAS/TCAS II:
required)
RNAV:
3
Equipment
RNAV airspace.
GPWS/TAWS:
terrain avoidance function
Note:
Documentation
4
Manuals
operations manual
-to-date
Authority approval where applicable
content (complies with the requirements)
performance data
aircraft of ex-Soviet design (e.g.
Rukowodstwo.
Note:
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5
Checklists
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
-board
□
□
-board (original or certified copy)
□
□
□
□
-to-date/not for training, etc.
procedures)
being used
Note:
6
Radio navigation/
instrument charts
(available/within reach/ up-to-date)
-route charts
(available/within reach/up-to-date)
Note:
ty/within reach
-to-date/less restrictive than MMEL
7
Minimum equipment list
equipment
with instructions
Note:
-board
& S/N)
8
Certificate of registration
Note:
9
Noise certificate
-board
Note:
10
AOC or equivalent
validity, date of issue, A/C type, OPS
SPECS)
Note:
11
Radio licence
Note:
12
Certificate of
airworthiness (C of A)
Note:
Flight data
-in-ommand/commander
(and where applicable, Dispatch)
13
Flight preparation
Fuel monitoring/management
Note:
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□
□
-board
□
□
-board
□
□
-board (no seatbelt)
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
-board
14
Mass and balance
calculation
distribution
Note:
Safety equipment
15
Hand fire extinguishers
Note:
16
Life jackets/flotation
devices
Note:
17
Harness
member)
Note:
n-board
18
Oxygen equipment
operations manual)
function check of combined oxygen and
communication system
Note:
-board
19
Independent Portable
light
light (departure or arrival at night time)
Note:
Flight crew
-board
needed
-in20
Flight crew
licence/composition
command (PIC)/ATPL)
(concerning the age of pilots)
needed)
Note:
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Journey log book / Technical log or equivalent
-board
Journey log book or
21
equivalent
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
Note:
log has been complied with
22
Maintenance release
expired
-Soviet built A/C
Note:
23
Defect notification and
rectification
and comply with the stated time limits
would be
understandable by captain)
-Soviet built A/C
Note:
24
Pre-flight inspection
Note:
B
Cabin Safety
Check: (Description/ notes)
al condition
1
□
Under
Supervision
□
□
□
Observation
General internal condition
will be
reliable, readily accessible and easily
identified. Instructions for operation will
be clearly marked)
and abnormal duties
Note:
compliance with the requirement
2
Cabin crew stations and
crew rest area
portable light, fire extinguishers, portable
breathing equipment …)
Note:
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3
-board
□
□
-board
□
□
-board
□
□
-board
□
□
□
□
□
□
First-aid kit/ emergency
medical kit
Note:
4
Hand fire extinguishers
Expiry date (if available)
Note:
5
Life jackets/ flotation
devices
Note
6
Seat belt and seat
condition
-tag.
Note:
(condition)
passenger emergency briefing cards)
7
Emergency exit, lightning
and marking, independent
portable light
Possible malfunction/MEL
ent Portable light and batteries
(condition)
Portable light (night operations)
station.
Note:
-board
n
8
Slides/life-rafts (as
required), ELT
Note:
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Oxygen supply (cabin
crew and passengers)
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
and passengers)
-out panels are free to fall
emergency briefing cards)
oxygen, check pressure and mounting
Note:
-board
10
Safety instructions
emergency briefing card for each
passenger)
equipment locations)
Note:
(conditions)
11
Cabin crew members
(appropriate)
board check procedures
Note:
12
Access to emergency exits
ossible obstacles for evacuation
(foldable jump seat or seat backrest table)
Note:
13
Stowage of passenger
baggage
eat (restraint bar)
Note:
14
Seat capacity
Note:
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C
Aircraft condition
Check: (Description/ notes)
Observation
Under
Supervision
□
□
exist)
contamination )
1
General external condition
(water/waste/hydraulic maintenance
panels/refuel panels/cargo door control
panel/RAT door)
al instructions and
registration
Note:
Passenger doors (condition)
2
ent doors (condition)
Doors and hatches
Note:
Flight controls
3
Note! Check for leaks, flap
drooping, wearing, corrosion,
disbonding, dents, loose fittings
and obvious damages.
Note:
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Wheels ( assembly condition, bolts and
paint markings)
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
for cuts, groove cracks, worn out
woulders, blister, bulges, flat spots)
4
Wheels, tyres and brakes
depth)
akes (condition, wearing pins)
pin/check for the limits.
Note:
condition/leaks)
(condition)
length)
Undercarriage
5
Use independent portable
light and mirror
acards and markings (nitrogen
pressure table)
leaks)
Note:
6
Wheel well
g, hoses,
hydraulic containers and devices)
Note:
skin and acoustic panels)
gs (panels aligned,
handles aligned, vortex generators/access
doors)
7
Powerplant and pylon
thrust reverser doors)
panels
behind/reverser duct)
blow-out-doors, possible leaks)
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Note:
foreign object damage, cracks, nicks, cuts,
corrosion and erosion)
Fan blades, propellers,
rotors (main/tail)
8
Note! Wait until rotation
stop! Use independent
portable light and mirror
for the backside of the
blades.
o Leading edge
o Mid-span shroud (no stacked)
o Tip
o Contour surface
o Root area
o platform
Spinner (damages/bolts)
Fan outlet vanes (thorough the fan)
FOD (foreign object damage)
Split fairing
Blades (general condition)
and …)
Note:
9
Obvious repairs
-items notify
unusual design and repairs obviously not
carried out in accordance with the
applicable AMM/SRM
□
□
-items notify
unassessed and unrecorded damages and
corrosion (lightning strike, bird strikes,
FODs, etc…)
□
□
□
□
Note:
10
Obvious unrepaired
damages
Note:
-items notify all
the leaks:
uel leaks
11
Leakage
check the leak rates from AMM etc. if it is
allowable and within normal operation
limits or not.
inspection gears for inspection
Note:
D
Cargo
Check: (Description/ notes)
Observation
Cleanliness
Lightning
□
Under
Supervision
□
systems and smoke detectors
1
General condition of cargo
compartment
s/markings
-out-panels
control panel
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Note:
□
□
□
□
by ICAO Annex 18
9284-AN/905) are applied
If dangerous goods on-board:
2
Dangerous goods
If leak or damage of dangerous goods
cargo:
Note:
and containers/maximum gross weight)
secured)
3
Secure stowage of cargo
Note:
E
General
1
General
Note:
Check: (Description/ notes)
Observation
□
Under
Supervision
□
Additional elements (O) observed/performed (P) during On the Job Training
(Please List)
Assessment
- Was the inspection carried out in a satisfactory manner regarding:
□ Yes □ No (provide further details below*)
- preparation of the inspection
□ Yes □ No (provide further details below*)
- ramp inspection
□ Yes □ No (provide further details below*)
- proof of inspection
□ Yes □ No (provide further details below*)
- human factors elements
- Further training needed:
Additional Remarks:*
Signature of the trainee:
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GM1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2) Qualification of inspectors
PRIVILEGES OF EXPERIENCED INSPECTORS
(a)
The following example shows the typical privileges of an experienced commercial pilot licence/airline
transport pilot licence (CPL/ATPL) holder and of an experienced aircraft maintenance engineer:
Example:
Typical inspection privileges of a CPL/ATPL holder could include the following inspection checklist items
in Appendices III and IV of this section:
A items
B Items
C items
D1/D3 items
Typical inspection privileges of an aircraft maintenance licence (AML) holder could include the following
inspection checklist items:
A items except for A3, A4, A5, A6, A13, A14, A20
B items except for B11, B14
C items
D1 items
(b)
MCAA may decide to enlarge the privileges of the inspector if the basic knowledge of the inspector has
been satisfactory enlarged by additional theoretical trainings and/or practical trainings. This may require
the subsequent following of the relevant module of the ramp inspection training in order to obtain the
necessary knowledge to exercise that new privilege. As an example: if an AML holder has acquired
knowledge on the operational items of the “A” section (flight crew compartment items) of the checklist
(e.g. because he/she obtained his/her CPL), the privileges may be expanded. He/she would be required,
however, to receive the theoretical, practical and on-the-job training on how to inspect those new items.
Considering that the inspector is already qualified, the OJT could:
(1) be performed in a class room environment using various (representative) examples when no aircraft
is required for the training. E.g.: normally the interaction with the flight crew is part of the OJT.
However, if the inspector is privileged on other A-items on the checklist and therefore familiar with
interviewing the flight crew in the flight crew compartment, the OJT of inspection items A13 and
A14 could be done in a classroom; or
(2) be limited in terms of number of inspections depending on the number of new inspection items to be
trained; the minimum number of OJT inspections as described in AMC2-ARO.RAMP 115(b)(2)
point (d)(1) does not apply since the number of 6 observer and 6 supervised inspections is aiming at
a 50 % average coverage of all inspection items during these inspections. For the limited OJT, the
number of inspections would be reasonable and would be determined by the senior inspector
whereby the new items would be inspected at least 3 times as an observer and 3 times under
supervision.
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2)(i) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SYLLABUS OF THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE FOR RAMP INSPECTORS - INITIAL (THEORETICAL)
TRAINING COURSE
-
Module (GEN): GENERAL OVERVIEW (legal)
Module (A): Flight crew compartment inspection items
Module (B): Cabin safety inspection items
Module (C): Aircraft condition inspection items
Module (D): Cargo inspection items
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MODULE (GEN)
a. OVERVIEW OF THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT
i.
Introduction
ii.
d responsibilities of MCAA - Overview
The Ramp Inspection programme - ICAO basic references
– Personnel Licensing
– Operations of Aircraft
– Airworthiness of Aircraft - Main features
-up approach
used attention
iii.
Principles of the Ramp Inspection Programme
EASA
–introduction
iv.
RESERVED
v.
RESERVED
vi.
States
vii.
ANS?ATM
sibilities
viii.
The Air Safety Committee – (ASC)
ix.
The European SAFA Steering Expert Group – (ESSG)
tates and non-EU Member States technical advisory role
Objectives:
1. Trainees would know the background of the Ramp Inspection Programme
2. Trainees would be able to identify the main elements of the Programme
3. Trainees would understand the role of ramp inspections in the general safety oversight context
b. The ramp inspection programme’s legal framework
i.
This Regulation
Scope and relevance
ii.
This Regulation and subsequent amendments
Scope and relevance
This Regulation – General overview
– oversight and enforcement
Objectives:
1. Trainees would fully understand the legal instruments of the Programme
2. Trainees would be able to identify the stakeholders and their responsibilities
3. Trainees would be capable to define the relationship between the Ramp Inspection Programme and the List of
Banned air carriers
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c. The ICAO framework
i.
International Requirements
– general overview
ew
– key ramp inspection-related Articles
– Applicability of air Regulations
– Rules of the air
– Search of aircraft
– Documents carried on aircraft
– Aircraft radio equipment
– Certificate of airworthiness
– Licences of personnel
– Recognition of certificates and licences
– Adoption of international standards and recommended practices
– Departures from international standards and procedures
bis – Transfer of certain functions and duties
ii.
Ramp inspection (RI) and ICAO - Annex 7 (Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks) – Overview
ertificate of Registration
iii.
RI and ICAO - Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft) – Overview
ghts
iv.
RI and ICAO - Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing) – Overview
v.
RI and ICAO - Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) - Overview
anes
vi.
RI and ICAO - Annex 16 (Environmental Protection) – Overview
RI and ICAO - Annex 18 (The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air)
RI and ICAO Doc 7030 (Regional Supplementary procedures)
Objectives:
1. Trainees would be able to outline ICAO’s role and responsibilities within the international civil aviation
context.
2. Trainees would understand the obligations of the signatory States.
3. Trainees would understand the direct relationship between ICAO standards and ramp inspection.
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d. Safety Assessment technical aspects overview
i.
Preparation of the inspection
ii.
Subjects of the inspection:
another State.
.)
iii.
Elements to be inspected:
n (based upon previous checks and/or centralised database)
iv
Planning the inspection:
ns on arrival or departure
v.
Short transit times:
vi.
Toolkit for the RI inspector:
Regulations, updated reference material, etc.)
equipment, etc.)
Vii.
Teamwork:
viii.
The ramp inspection checklist:
ts)
ix.
Starting the Inspection:
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x.
Code of conduct:
xi.
Categorisation of findings:
gory 3 finding with major influence on safety
xii.
Follow-up actions:
action
xiii.
Concluding the inspection:
-in-command/commander/airline representative/subcontractors
e. Ramp inspection centralised database – Hands-on training
– input
– output
– search
-up actions: operator logging
ts
Objectives:
1. Trainees would have the relevant knowledge to input and retrieve data from the RI centralised database.
2. Trainees would know the analysis process and its deliverables.
3. Trainees would understand the analysis dependability on the accuracy of the inspection reports.
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2. MODULE (A)
a. RAMP INSPECTION ITEMS (A)
A1
general condition (flight crew compartment)
l. baggage)
A2
Emergency Exit (flight crew compartment)
mergency exits (flight crew compartment)
A3
Equipment
GPWS - TAWS
avoidance function (7-channel SRPBZ ICAO compliant)
- passed
ACAS/TCAS II
onder and ACAS II (general)
8.33 kHz radio channel spacing
RNAV – BRNAV - PRNAV
principles)
RVSM
MNPS
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A4
Manuals
Authority approval
pdate status
-Soviet-built aircraft Rukowodstwo or RLE
A5
Checklists
(normal, abnormal and emergency)
-Soviet-built aircraft issues (pilot’s checklist and flight engineer’s checklist)
A6
Radio navigation/instrument charts
-route, destination and alternate):
A7
Minimum equipment list (MEL)
tus
-Soviet-built aircraft: ‘Rukowodstwo’ content
A8
Certificate of Registration
nd certified copies acceptability
– location)
A9
Noise certificate
A10
AOC or equivalent
A11
Radio (station) license
tability
A12
Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A)
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A13
Flight preparation
onal flight plan
A14
Mass and balance calculation
A15
Hand fire extinguishers
A16
Life-jackets/flotation devices
A17
Harness
A18
Oxygen equipment
cording to the operations manual (in case of low pressure)
A19
Independent portable light
A20
, serviceability and access
Flight crew licences
A21
um crew requirements
Journey Log book
A22
Maintenance Release
A23
Defect notification and rectification (incl. technical log)
A24
Pre-flight inspection
Objectives:
Trainees would possess the relevant knowledge enabling them to inspect each item.
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MODULE (B)
a. Ramp inspection items (b)
B1
General internal condition
B2
Cabin Crew Stations and Crew Rest Area
B3
First-aid kit/emergency medical kit
cess
B4
Hand fire extinguishers
B5
Life-jackets/flotation devices
ion devices on-board
B6
Seat belt and seat condition
)
B7
Emergency exit, lighting and marking, independent portable light
B8
Slides/life-rafts/ELTs
ocations, types)
- pressure gauge/green band
B9
Oxygen supply (cabin crew and passengers)
nders and generators
- pressure gauge/green band
-out panels/storage of masks
B10
Safety instructions
B11
Cabin crew members
fuelling with passengers on-board (crew positions
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B12
Access to emergency exits
B13
Stowage of passenger baggage’s (cabin luggage)
B14
Seat capacity
Objectives:
Trainees would possess the relevant knowledge enabling them to inspect each item.
MODULE (C)
RAMP INSPECTION ITEMS (C)
C1
General External Condition
(landing lights, NAV-lights, strobes, beacon ...)
C2
-icing requirements
Doors and hatches
– emergency – cargo doors)
C3
Flight controls
C4
Wheels, tyres and brakes
C8
ble damages, leaking and loose parts
Fan blades, propellers, rotors
mages
C1.0
-icing (boots and heating elements)
Obvious repairs
/maintenance release, technical log,
Obvious unprepared damage
C11
Leakage
C9
e etc.
Objectives:
Trainees would possess the relevant knowledge enabling them to inspect each item.
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MODULE (D)
Ramp inspections items (D)
D1
General condition of cargo compartment
xtinguishing systems
-out panels
-net
D2
Dangerous goods
-in-command/commander
ations/restrictions (cargo aircraft ) goods)
D3
Cargo stowage
E1
General
the general items that may have a direct relation with the safety of the aircraft or its occupants
Objectives:
Trainees would possess the relevant knowledge enabling them to inspect each item.
AMC2 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(2)(i) Qualification of ramp inspectors
SYLLABUS OF PRACTICAL TRAINING FOR RAMP INSPECTORS - INITIAL (PRACTICAL)
TRAINING COURSE
-
Module (A): Flight crew compartment inspection items
Module (B): Cabin safety inspection items
Module (C): Aircraft condition inspection items
Module (D): Cargo inspection items
MODULE A
Flight crew compartment inspection items
A1
General condition (of flight crew compartment)
– electrical)
A2
Emergency exit (flight crew compartment)
d)
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A3
Equipment
GPWS-TAWS:
-built A/C systems (if possible): SSOS – SPPZ – SRPBZ
ACAS/TCAS II
8.33 kHz radio channel spacing
dios or approved
training devices)
A4
Manuals (flight manuals only)
-tops)/integrated systems
A5
Checklists
-, abnormal-, emergency checklists and ‘quick reference handbook’
-Soviet-built A/C checklists (recognise/examples)
A6
Radio navigation/instrument charts
-route and instruments approach charts (view examples)
FMS navigation data-base (check the “INIT” page for validity)
A7
Minimum equipment list (MEL)
les)
A8
Certificate of Registration (CoR)
locations in A/C
A9
Noise certificate
A10
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) or equivalent
al (check compliance with the requirement)
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A11
Radio (station) licence
A12
Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A)
A13
Flight preparation
and monitoring (demonstration of various examples)
A14
Mass and balance calculation
and balance sheets/A/C types (manual and computerised)
A15
Hand fire extinguishers
ngs (review examples)
A16
Life-jackets/flotation devices
A17
Harness
Locks (common problems)
A18
Oxygen equipment
– mask check
A19
Independent Portable light
A20
Flight crew licences
icenses of personnel:
- endorsement of certificates and licenses
- validity of endorsed certificates and licenses
- language proficiency
- medical certificate (spare glasses etc.)
- validity of licences
- composition of the flight crew
- age limitations
A21
Journey logbook
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A22
Maintenance release
)
A23
Defect notification and rectification (incl. Tech Log)
A24
Pre-flight inspection
Pre-flight inspection sheet and journey log book (presence and signed off)
Objectives:
Trainees would be able to use their technical knowledge and ramp inspection techniques in a satisfactory
manner during the subsequent on-the-job training
MODULE B
Cabin Safety
B1
General internal condition (cabin)
n features:
- recognise right materials (Cabin visit)
- lavatory smoke detection system/Cabin visit for the locations
- built-in fire extinguisher system for each receptacle intended for disposal of towels, paper or
waste (how to check extinguishers)/Cabin visit for the locations
Guided
tour in cabin for demonstration of duties)
B2
Cabin crew stations and crew rest area
r, material and condition)
t (cabin visit for locations and condition)
B3
First-aid kit/emergency medical kit
(examples)
B4
Hand fire extinguishers
B5
Life-jackets/flotation devices
- jackets and flotation devices
d serviceability
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B6
Seat belt and seat condition
)
B7
Emergency exit, lighting and marking, independent portable light
B8
Slides/life-rafts/ELT’s
lides/rafts general (cabin visit for locations and condition)
tions and condition)
B9
Oxygen supply (cabin crew and passengers)
linders and generators) (cabin visit for locations and condition)
-out panels (cabin visit for locations and condition)
B10
Safety instructions
e meaning of available (within reach)
B11
Cabin crew members
(check cabin crew positions)
B12
Access to emergency exits
and demonstration)
B13
Stowage of passenger baggage (cabin luggage)
B14
Seat capacity
(inoperative seat) and/or B7 (inoperative exit)
Objectives:
Trainees would be able to use their technical knowledge and ramp inspection techniques in a satisfactory
manner during the subsequent on-the-job training
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3. MODULE C
aircraft condition
C1
General external condition
Cleanliness and contamination of fuselage and wings (familiarise and recognise)
-lights, strobes, beacon, etc.) (check the condition)
C2
Doors and hatches
doors
C3
Flight controls
ning strike
C4
Wheels, tyres and brakes
h maintenance manual limits
C5
Undercarriage
C6
Wheel well
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C7
Powerplant and pylon
erplants (type of engines)
-out doors
ypes of pylons) - Recognise pylon doors, panels and blow-out panels and loose rivets – bolts
C8
Fan blades, propellers, rotors
and blade bending)
maintenance manual)
-icing boots
C9
Obvious repairs
es)
C10
Obvious unrepaired damage
C11
Leakage
mples fuel, hydraulic, oil)
-icing fluids on the A/C (aircraft visit for locations)
Objectives:
Trainees would be able to use their technical knowledge and ramp inspection techniques in a satisfactory
manner during the subsequent on-the-job training
MODULE D
Cargo
D1
General condition of cargo compartment
s
- fire containment, detection and extinguishing systems
- ventilation
- heating
- loading systems (rollers)
- lighting
-out panels
G-net
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D2
Dangerous goods (DG)
D3
Secure cargo stowage
s)
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(3) Qualification of ramp inspectors
RECURRENT TRAINING
(a)
Once qualified, ramp inspectors would undergo recurrent training in order to be kept up-to-date.
(b)
MCAA would ensure that all ramp inspectors undergo recurrent training at least once every 3 years after
being qualified as ramp inspectors or when deemed necessary by MCAA, e.g. after major changes in the
inspection procedures.
(c)
Recurrent training would be delivered by a authority or by an approved training organisation.
(d)
The recurrent training would cover at least the following elements:
(1) new regulatory and procedural developments;
(2) new operational practices;
(3) articulation review of other processes and Regulations (list of banned operators or aircraft pursuant
to this Regulation, authorisation of third-country operators); using data collected through ramp
inspections; and
(4) standardisation and harmonisation issues.
AMC2 ARO.RAMP.115 (b)(3) Qualification of ramp inspectors
RECENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS
(a)
The minimum number of inspections required for ramp inspectors to maintain their qualification would be
conducted during any 12-month period after undergoing training, evenly spread during such intervals.
(b)
This number may be reduced by the number of inspections on aircraft operated by domestic operators if
the inspector is also a qualified flight operations, ramp or airworthiness inspector of a authority and is
regularly engaged in the oversight of such operators.
(c)
If the inspector loses his/her qualification as a result of not reaching the minimum number of inspections
mentioned in (a) he/she may be requalified by MCAA by performing a number of inspections under the
supervision of a senior ramp inspector. The number of supervised inspections would not be less than half
the number of missed inspections according to the minimum requirement. The time between these two
inspections would be not more than 90 calendar days.
(d)
If the inspector loses his/her qualification because he/she has not been engaged in performing inspections
on aircraft for more than 12 months, he/she may be requalified by MCAA only after successfully
completing on-the-job-training as prescribed in GM2 ARO.RAMP.115(b)(2) and any recurrent training
required.
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(e)
If the inspector loses his/her qualification because he/she has not been engaged in performing inspections
on aircraft for more than 36 months, he/she would be fully requalified by successfully completing initial
theoretical, practical and on-the-job training.
(f)
MCAA would ensure that all ramp inspectors undergo recurrent training at least once every 3 years after
being qualified as ramp inspectors and whenever deemed necessary due to significant changes of the ramp
inspection programme.
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CRITERIA FOR TRAINING ORGANISATIONS
(a)
The training organisation would appoint a manager who is responsible for ensuring that training courses
are managed and carried out in accordance with the following criteria:
(1) The training organisation would contract sufficient personnel to develop and deliver ramp inspection
training courses in accordance with the technical criteria required.
(2) The size and structure of training facilities would ensure protection from the prevailing weather
elements and proper operation of all planned training and examination on any particular day.
(3) Fully enclosed appropriate accommodation, separate from other facilities, would be provided for the
instruction. In case the training will be given in other facilities than its own training facility, such
facility would meet the same criteria.
(4) Classrooms would have appropriate presentation equipment, of a standard that ensures students can
easily read presentation text/drawings/diagrams and figures from any position in the classroom.
(5) The training organisation would establish appropriate procedures to ensure proper training standards
and compliance with the applicable criteria, including a quality system to ensure adequate control of
the training preparation and delivery process.
(6) The training would be conducted in the English language with the aim to train the trainee in the
jargon to be used during the ramp inspection.
(7) The training organisation would demonstrate that compliance with the applicable criteria is
maintained in time, and that the content of the training course is always kept in line with the
applicable syllabi.
(8) The training organisation would put in place a system to evaluate the effectiveness of training
provided, based upon feedback collected from course participants after each training delivery. An
annual review summarising the results of the feedback system together with the training
organisation’s corrective actions (if any) should be sent to MCAA.
(i) Training organisations providing ramp inspection training courses would use only training
instructors meeting the experience and qualifications criteria listed hereunder:
(ii) knowledge of the Ramp Inspection Programme;
(iii) knowledge of training delivery methods and techniques;
(iv) for instructors delivering training on inspection items and/or delivering practical training:
(A) meets the eligibility requirements for inspectors;
(B) knowledge of the ramp inspection methodology through participation, as an inspector or as
an observer under the guidance of a senior ramp inspector, in at least 30 inspections in the
previous 5 years before being nominated as an instructor.
(v) for instructors delivering training on the regulatory framework and general ramp inspection
process, at least 2 years of direct experience in the ramp inspection programme (previous SAFA
Programme), e.g. either as an inspector or as a national coordinator or as an aviation safety
Regulations/legislation expert.
(9) Fulfilment of the criteria above would be attested by the training organisation based, as a minimum,
on individual self-declaration.
(10) Training organisations would only employ training instructors that have maintained their proficiency
by performing or observing a minimum of six ramp inspections per year.
(11) All instructors would attend a recurrent training workshop organised by MCAA, aiming at updating
their knowledge with new developments of the Ramp Inspection Programme as well as
standardisation and harmonisation issues. MCAA’s workshop would be attended whenever it would
be deemed necessary due to significant changes in the Ramp Inspection Programme’s structure and
procedures, with a minimum of at least once every 3 years.
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GM1 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST FOR THE EVALUATION OF A 3RD PARTY TRAINING ORGANISATION
MCAA would ensure that their training programmes and/or their systems for the evaluation of third party
training organisations are amended accordingly to reflect any recommendations arising from the standardisation
audits conducted in accordance with this Regulation.
GM2 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST FOR THE EVALUATION OF A 3RD PARTY TRAINING ORGANISATION
1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
No. DESCRIPTION
Has a manager with corporate authority been
1
appointed?
Has the training provider contracted enough
2
personnel to develop and deliver ramp
inspection training?
Is the development and delivery of training in
3
accordance with the technical criteria required?
2 FACILITIES
Does the size and structure of the available
1
training facilities ensure adequate protection
against weather elements?
Does the size and structure of the available
2
training facilities provide proper training
activities?
3 INSTRUCTIONAL EQUIPMENT
Is the presentation equipment appropriate for
1
the training to be delivered?
Can the trainees easily read the presented
2
material from any position in the classroom?
4 TRAINING PROCEDURE
Has the training provider established
1
appropriate procedures to ensure proper
training standards?
Has the training provider established a system
2
to control the training preparation and delivery
process?
Is the course material written in the English
3
language and will the course be given in the
English language?
Has the training provider demonstrated how
compliance with technical criteria is
4
maintained in time and kept in line with the
training syllabi?
Has the training provider developed a system
5
to evaluate the effectiveness of training
provided?
Has the training provider devised a system to
6
evaluate the effectiveness of the training based
upon the feedback received?
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NO
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GM3 ARO.RAMP.115(c) Qualification of ramp inspectors
CHECKLIST FOR THE EVALUATION OF RAMP INSPECTIONS TRAINING INSTRUCTORS
1 QUALIFICATION CRITERIA
No. DESCRIPTION
YES NO
Do the instructors possess knowledge of the
1
Ramp Inspection Programme?
Do the instructors have the knowledge on
2
training methods and techniques?
Do the instructors delivering training on
inspection items/practical training meet the
3
eligibility and inspection experience
requirements?
Do the other instructors meet the working
4
experience criteria?
2 QUALIFICATION RECORDS
Has the training organisation created and
1
maintained proper records on their instructors?
3 RECENT EXPERIENCE AND RECURRENT TRAINING
Do the instructors meet, if applicable, the
1
requirements on recent experience?
Do the instructors meet the requirements on
2
recurrent training?
REMARKS
ADDITIONAL REMARKS
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.120 Approval of training organisations
TRAINING ORGANISATIONS PROVIDING TRAINING TO RAMP INSPECTORS
(a) MCAA employing a third party organisation for the purpose of ramp inspections related training would put
in place a system to evaluate such an organisation. The system would be simple, transparent and
proportionate. Such a system would take into account evaluations conducted by other State authorities.
(b) When an evaluation is performed on behalf of MCAA the result of this evaluation would be used by as a
basis for its own evaluation.
(c) For each qualified training organisation, MCAA would keep the following details:
(1) full legal name;
(2) address; and
(3) scope of training (i.e. theoretical training, practical training and a combination of these trainings).
AMC1 ARO.RAMP.125 (b) Conduct of Ramp inspections
GENERAL
(a) Ramp inspections would be performed by inspectors possessing the necessary knowledge relevant to the
area of inspection whereby technical, airworthiness and operational knowledge must be represented in case
all items of the checklist are being verified. When a ramp inspection is performed by two or more
inspectors, the main elements of the inspection - the visual inspection of the aircraft exterior, the inspection
in the flight deck and the inspection of the passenger cabin and/or cargo compartments - may be divided
among the inspectors, according to their privileges granted in accordance with ARO.RAMP.115.
(b) MCAA would put in place appropriate procedures to allow them unrestricted access to the aircraft to be
inspected. In this respect ramp inspectors would possess adequate credentials.
(c) Inspectors would identify themselves to the pilot–in-command/commander of the aircraft or, in his/her
absence, to a member of the flight crew or to the most senior representative of the operator prior to
commencing the on-board part of their ramp inspection. When it is not possible to inform any
representative of the operator or when there is no such representative present in or near the aircraft, the
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general principle would be not to perform a ramp inspection. In special circumstances it may be decided to
perform a ramp inspection but this would be limited to a visual check of the aircraft exterior.
(d) The inspection would be as comprehensive as possible within the time and resources available. This means
that if only a limited amount of time or resources is available, not all inspection items but a reduced number
may be verified. According to the time and resources available for a ramp inspection, the items that are to
be inspected would be selected accordingly in conformity with the objectives of the ramp inspection
programme. Items not being inspected may be inspected during a next inspection.
(e) Inspectors would show tact and diplomacy when performing a ramp inspection. A certain amount of
inconvenience to flight and cabin crews, handling agents and other personnel involved in ground handling
activities may arise but inspectors would try to reduce it to the minimum. Unnecessary contact with
passengers would be avoided.
(f) Ramp inspectors would not open any hatches, doors or panels themselves nor would they operate or
interfere with any aircraft controls or equipment. When such actions are required for the scope of the
inspection, the ramp inspectors would request the assistance of the operator’s personnel (flight crew, cabin
crew, ground crew).
(g) The items to be inspected would be selected from the ramp inspection checklist (see Appendices III and
IV). The ramp inspection checklist contains a total of 54 items. Of these, 24 relate to operational
requirements (A-items) to be checked on the flight crew compartment, 14 items address safety and cabin
items (B-items), 12 items are concerning the aircraft condition (C-items) and three items (D-items) are
related to the inspection of cargo (including dangerous goods) and the cargo compartment. In case of any
general inspection items not addressed by the other items of the checklist, they may be administered by the
E-item (General) of the checklist.
(h) Items which have been inspected as well as any possible findings and observations will be recorded in the
Ramp Inspections Report (see Appendices III and IV).
(i) ARO.RAMP.125 (c) requires that the operator is informed about the results of every ramp inspection by
providing it with a copy of the Proof of Inspection (see Appendix III). A signed acknowledgement of
receipt would be requested from the recipient and retained by the inspector. Refusal by the recipient to sign
would be recorded in the document.
GM1 ARO.RAMP.125 (b) Conduct of Ramp inspections
UNREASONABLE DELAY
The inspector(s) intending to conduct the ramp inspection would be able to start the inspection immediately. The
inspector(s) would ensure that the inspection can be carried out expeditiously. Delays related to the availability
of the inspector(s) or the necessary inspection documentation or similar avoidable reasons of delay caused by
the inspector(s), which are not directly related to safety, would be avoided without exception.
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ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE (AMC) AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL
(GM) TO ANNEX III - PART-ORO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subpart GEN — General requirements Section I — General
GM1 ORO.GEN.105 Competent authority
NON-COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS
AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS — CAT OPERATIONS
AMC2 ORO.GEN.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR GROUND PERSONNEL — CAT OPERATIONS
GM1 ORO.GEN.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS
AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(c) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
GM1 ORO.GEN.110(c) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
MEL TRAINING PROGRAMME
AMC2 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
GROUND OPERATIONS WITH PASSENGERS ON BOARD IN THE ABSENCE OF FLIGHT CREW
GM1 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
GROUND PERSONNEL
GM2 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
AERODROME SERVICES
AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (f) Operator responsibilities
STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT
GM1 ORO.GEN.110 (f) Operator responsibilities
STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT
AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (f)(h) Operator responsibilities
ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES
AMC1 ORO.GEN.120 (a) Means of compliance
DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE
AMC1 ORO.GEN.125 Terms of approval and privileges of an AOC holder
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION
AMC1 ORO.GEN.130 Changes related to an AOC holder
APPLICATION TIME FRAMES
GM1 ORO.GEN.130 (a) Changes related to an AOC holder
GENERAL
GM2 ORO.GEN.130 (a) Changes related to an AOC holder
CHANGE OF NAME
GM3 ORO.GEN.130 (b) Changes related to an AOC holder
CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL
AMC1 ORO.GEN.150 (b) Findings
GENERAL
GM1 ORO.GEN.150 Findings
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.GEN.160 Occurrence reporting
GENERAL
Section II — Management
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1);(2);(3);(5) Management system
NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS — GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS — ORGANISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITIES
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GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
SAFETY MANAGER
GM2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS — SAFETY ACTION GROUP
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS — SAFETY POLICY
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
SAFETY POLICY
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS — SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
INTERNAL OCCURRENCE REPORTING SCHEME
GM2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
RISK MANAGEMENT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH KNOWN OR FORECAST VOLCANIC ASH
CONTAMINATION
GM3 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT — RISK REGISTER
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(4) Management system
TRAINING AND COMMUNICATION ON SAFETY
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(4) Management system
TRAINING AND COMMUNICATION ON SAFETY
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(5) Management system
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION — GENERAL
AMC2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(5) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS — SAFETY MANAGEMENT MANUAL
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(5) Management system
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION — GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
COMPLIANCE MONITORING — GENERAL
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
COMPLIANCE MONITORING — GENERAL
GM2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS — COMPLIANCE MONITORING PROGRAMME
GM3 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS — COMPLIANCE MONITORING
GM4 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
AUDIT AND INSPECTION
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (b) Management system
SIZE, NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE ACTIVITY
AMC1 ORO.GEN.205 Contracted activities
RESPONSIBILITY WHEN CONTRACTING ACTIVITIES
GM1 ORO.GEN.205 Contracted activities
CONTRACTING — GENERAL
GM2 ORO.GEN.205 Contracted activities
RESPONSIBILITY WHEN CONTRACTING ACTIVITIES
AMC1 ORO.GEN.220 (b) Record-keeping
GENERAL
GM1 ORO.GEN.220 (b) Record-keeping
RECORDS
Subpart AOC — Air operator certification
AMC1 ORO.AOC.100 Application for an AOC
APPLICATION TIME FRAMES
AMC1 ORO.AOC.100 (a) Application for an air operator certificate
OPERATOR SECURITY PROGRAMME
AMC1 ORO.AOC.110 Leasing agreement
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.AOC.110(c) Leasing agreement
WET LEASE-IN
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AMC2 ORO.AOC.110(c) Leasing agreement
WET LEASE-IN
GM1 ORO.AOC.110(c) Leasing agreement
SHORT-TERM WET LEASE-IN
AMC1 ORO.AOC.110 (f) Leasing agreement
WET LEASE-OUT
AMC1 ORO.AOC.115 (a)(1) Code share agreements
INITIAL VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
AMC1 ORO.AOC.115 (b) Code-share arrangements
CODE-SHARE AUDIT PROGRAMME
AMC2 ORO.AOC.115 (b) Code-share agreements
THIRD PARTY PROVIDERS 3
AMC1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring — aeroplanes
FLIGHT DATA MONITORING (FDM) PROGRAMME
GM1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring — aeroplanes
DEFINITION OF AN FDM PROGRAMME
Appendix 1 to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring — aeroplanes
TABLE OF FDM EVENTS
GM2 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring — aeroplanes
FLIGHT DATA MONITORING
AMC1 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
AMC2 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
COMBINATION OF NOMINATED PERSONS RESPONSIBILITIES
GM1 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
GM2 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
COMPETENCE OF NOMINATED PERSONS
GM1 ORO.AOC.140 (b);(c) Facility requirements
VFR DAY OPERATIONS WITH AEROPLANES WITH A MOPSC OF LESS THAN 7 AND
HELICOPTERS WITH A MOPSC OF LESS THAN 5 TAKING OFF AND LANDING AT THE SAME
AERODROME OR OPERATING SITE
Subpart DEC — Declaration
AMC1 ORO.DEC.100 (d) Declaration
CHANGES
GM1 ORO.DEC.100 Declaration
GENERAL
MANAGED OPERATIONS
SUBPART SPO — COMMERCIAL SPECIALISED OPERATIONS
AMC1 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
AMC2 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
COMBINATION OF NOMINATED PERSONS RESPONSIBILITIES
GM1 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
GM2 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
COMPETENCE OF NOMINATED PERSONS
AMC1 ORO.SPO.100(c) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
LEASING OF THIRD COUNTRY OPERATOR OR AIRCRAFT — INFORMATION TO BE
PROVIDED TO MCAA
GM1 ORO.SPO.100(c) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
LEASE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OPERATORS REGISTERED IN AN EU MEMBER STATE
AMC1 ORO.SPO.100(c)(1) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
WET LEASE-IN OF AN AIRCRAFT REGISTERED IN A THIRD COUNTRY
AMC2 ORO.SPO.100(c)(1) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
WET LEASE-IN
GM1 ORO.SPO.100(c)(1) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
SHORT-TERM WET LEASE-IN
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GM1 ORO.SPO.110 (a) Authorisation of high-risk commercial specialised operations
DECLARATION/AUTHORISATION
GM2 ORO.SPO.110 (a) Authorisation of high-risk commercial specialised operations
VALIDITY OF THE AUTHORISATION
GM1 ORO.SPO.115 (a) Changes
GENERAL
SUBPART MLR — MANUALS, LOGS AND RECORDS
AMC1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
GENERAL
AMC2 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — General
CONTENTS — NON-COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED
AIRCRAFT AND COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT) OPERATIONS WITH SINGLE-ENGINED
PROPELLER-DRIVEN AEROPLANES WITH A MOPSC OF 5 OR SINGLE ENGINED NONCOMPLEX HELICOPTERS WITH A MOPSC OF 5, TAKING OFF AND LANDING AT THE SAME
AERODROME OR OPERATING SITE, UNDER VFR BY DAY AND CAT OPERATIONS WITH
SAILPLANES AND BALLOONS
AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
CONTENTS — CAT OPERATIONS
AMC4 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — General
CONTENTS – NON-COMMERCIAL SPECIALISED OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTORPOWERED AIRCRAFT AND COMMERCIAL SPECIALISED OPERATIONS
GM1 ORO.MLR.100 (k) Operations manual — general
HUMAN FACTORS PRINCIPLES
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (a) Minimum equipment list
GENERAL
NON-SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105(c) Minimum equipment list
AMENDMENTS TO THE MEL FOLLOWING CHANGES TO THE MMEL — APPLICABLE
CHANGES AND ACCEPTABLE TIMESCALES
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (d) Minimum equipment list
MEL FORMAT
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(1) Minimum equipment list
MEL PREAMBLE
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
SCOPE OF THE MEL
AMC2 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
EXTENT OF THE MEL
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
SCOPE OF THE MEL
GM2 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
PURPOSE OF THE MEL
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (e);(f) Minimum equipment list
RECTIFICATION INTERVAL (RI)
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (f) Minimum equipment list
RECTIFICATION INTERVAL EXTENSION (RIE) — OPERATOR PROCEDURES FOR THE
APPROVAL BY MCAA AND NOTIFICATION TO MCAA
GM1 ORO. MLR.105 (f) Minimum equipment list
RECTIFICATION INTERVAL EXTENSION (RIE)
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (g) Minimum equipment list
OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (g) Minimum equipment list
OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (h) Minimum equipment list
OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES — APPLICABLE CHANGES
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (j) Minimum equipment list
OPERATION OF AN AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE MMEL — OPERATOR’S
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL BY MCAA
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (j) Minimum equipment list
OPERATION OF AN AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE MMEL — OPERATOR’S
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL BY MCAA
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AMC1 ORO.MLR.110 Journey log
GENERAL
GM1 ORO.MLR.110 Journey log
SERIES OF FLIGHTS
AMC1 ORO.MLR.115 Record-keeping
TRAINING RECORDS
Subpart FC — Flight crew
Section I — Common requirements
AMC1 ORO.FC.100(c) Composition of flight crew
OPERATIONAL MULTI-PILOT LIMITATION (OML)
AMC1 ORO.FC.105 (b)(2);(c) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
ROUTE/AREA AND AERODROME KNOWLEDGE FOR COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS
AMC1 ORO.FC.105(c) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
ROUTE/AREA AND AERODROME RECENCY
AMC2 ORO.FC.105(c) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
ROUTE/AREA AND AERODROME RECENCY — PERFORMANCE CLASS B AEROPLANES
OPERATED UNDER VFR BY NIGHT OR IFR IN CAT OPERATIONS AND COMMERCIAL
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN CAT
GM1 ORO.FC.105 (d) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
PERFORMANCE CLASS B AEROPLANES OPERATED UNDER VFR BY DAY IN CAT
OPERATIONS
AMC1 ORO.FC.125 Differences training and familiarisation training
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.FC.145 (b) Provision of training
NON-MANDATORY (RECOMMENDATION) ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY DATA
AMC1 ORO.FC.145 (d) Provision of training
FULL FLIGHT SIMULATORS (FFS)
Section II — Additional requirements for CAT operations
AMC1 ORO.FC.200 (a) Composition of flight crew
CREWING OF INEXPERIENCED FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS
AMC1 ORO.FC.205 Command course
COMBINED UPGRADING AND CONVERSION COURSE — HELICOPTER
AMC1 ORO.FC.115&215 Crew resource management (CRM) training
CRM TRAINING — CAT OPERATIONS
AMC1.1 ORO.FC.115&.215 Crew resource management (CRM) training
CRM TRAINER
GM1 ORO.FC.115&.215 Crew resource management (CRM) training
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.FC.220 Operator conversion training and checking
OPERATOR CONVERSION TRAINING SYLLABUS
AMC2 ORO.FC.220 Operator conversion training and checking
OPERATOR CONVERSION TRAINING SYLLABUS — FLIGHT ENGINEERS
GM1 ORO.FC.220 (b) Operator conversion training and checking
COMPLETION OF AN OPERATOR’S CONVERSION COURSE
GM1 ORO.FC.220 (d) Operator conversion training and checking
LINE FLYING UNDER SUPERVISION
AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking
RECURRENT TRAINING SYLLABUS
AMC2 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
GM1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking
LINE CHECK AND PROFICIENCY TRAINING AND CHECKING
AMC1 ORO.FC.235 (d) Pilot qualification to operate in either pilot’s seat
SINGLE-ENGINE HELICOPTERS — AUTOROTATIVE LANDING
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GM1 ORO.FC.235 (f);(g) Pilot qualification to operate in either pilot’s seat
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT-HAND SEATS
AMC1 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant
GENERAL
AMC2 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative training and qualification programme
COMPONENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION
GM1 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative training and qualification programme
TERMINOLOGY
AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 (a) Alternative training and qualification programme
OPERATOR EXPERIENCE
AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 (d)(e)(2) Alternative training and qualification programme
COMBINATION OF CHECKS
Subpart CC — Cabin crew
Section I — Common requirements
AMC1 ORO.CC.100 Number and composition of cabin crew
DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF CABIN CREW
GM1 ORO.CC.100 Number and composition of cabin crew
MINIMUM NUMBER OF CABIN CREW
GM1 ORO.CC.115 Conduct of training courses and associated checking
EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
AMC1 ORO.CC.115(c) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
TRAINING METHODS AND TRAINING DEVICES
AMC1 ORO.CC.115 (d) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
CHECKING
AMC1 ORO.CC.115 (e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT–TRAINING PROGRAMMES AND CRM INSTRUCTORS
GM1 ORO.CC.115 (e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM)
AMC1 ORO.CC.120 (a)(1) Initial training course
NEW ENTRANTS IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN CAT OPERATIONS
AMC1 ORO.CC.125(c) Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion training
TRAINING PROGRAMME — AIRCRAFT TYPE SPECIFIC TRAINING
AMC1 ORO.CC.125 (d) Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion training
TRAINING PROGRAMME — OPERATOR CONVERSION TRAINING
AMC1 ORO.CC.125 & ORO.CC.130 Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion training &
differences training
TRAINING PROGRAMMES
AMC1 ORO.CC.125 (b) & ORO.CC.130(c) Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion training &
differences training
NON-MANDATORY (RECOMMENDATIONS) ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY
DATA
AMC1 ORO.CC.135 Familiarisation
FAMILIARISATION FLIGHTS AND AIRCRAFT FAMILIARISATION VISITS
AMC1 ORO.CC.140 Recurrent training
TRAINING PROGRAMMES
AMC1 ORO.CC.145 Refresher training
TRAINING PROGRAMME
GM1 ORO.CC.145 Refresher training
FREQUENCY OF REFRESHER TRAINING
Section II — Additional requirements for CAT operations
AMC1 ORO.CC.200(c) Senior cabin crew member
TRAINING PROGRAMME
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AMC1 ORO.CC.200 (d) Senior cabin crew member
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE COMMANDER
AMC1 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
UNABLE TO OPERATE
AMC2 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
MOST APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CABIN CREW MEMBER
GM1 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
REPLACEMENT OF INCAPACITATED OR UNAVAILABLE SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER BY
ANOTHER SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER
GM2 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
FLIGHT OR SERIES OF FLIGHTS
GM1 ORO.CC.205 (b)(2) Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground operations and in unforeseen
circumstances
UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES
AMC1 ORO.CC.205(c)(1) Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground operations and in unforeseen
circumstances
PROCEDURES WITH REDUCED NUMBER OF CABIN CREW
GM1 ORO.CC.210 (d) Additional conditions for assignment to duties
OPERATOR’S CABIN CREW UNIFORM
GM1 ORO.CC.215 (b)(2) Training and checking programmes and related documentation
LIST OF AIRCRAFT TYPE/VARIANT QUALIFICATION(S)
AMC1 ORO.CC.250 (b) Operation on more than one aircraft type or variant
DETERMINATION OF AIRCRAFT TYPES AND VARIANTS
GM1 ORO.CC.250 Operation on more than one aircraft type or variant
SAFETY BRIEFING FOR CABIN CREW
Subpart TC — Technical crew member in HEMS, HHO or NVIS operations
GM1 ORO.TC.105 Conditions for assignment to duties
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.TC.110 Training and checking
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.TC.115 Initial training
ELEMENTS
AMC1 ORO.TC.120&.125 Operator conversion training and differences training
ELEMENTS
AMC2 ORO.TC.120&.125 Operator conversion training and differences training
GENERAL
AMC1 ORO.TC.135 Recurrent training
ELEMENTS
AMC1 ORO.TC.140 Refresher training
ELEMENTS
Subpart FTL — Flight time limitations
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (1) Definitions
ACCLIMATISED
GM2 ORO.FTL.105 (1) Definitions
ACCLIMATISED ‘POINT OF DEPARTURE’
GM3 ORO.FTL.105 (1) Definitions
ACCLIMATISED ‘TIME ELAPSED SINCE REPORTING AT REFERENCE TIME’
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (2) Definitions
REFERENCE TIME
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (3) Definitions
ADEQUATE FURNITURE FOR ‘ACCOMMODATION’
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (8) Definitions
DETERMINATION OF DISRUPTIVE SCHEDULES
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (10) Definitions
ELEMENTS OF STANDBY FOR DUTY
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GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (17) Definitions
OPERATING CREW MEMBER
AMC1 ORO.FTL.110 Operator responsibilities
SCHEDULING
AMC1 ORO.FTL.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
PUBLICATION OF ROSTERS
AMC1 ORO.FTL.110 (j) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROSTERS
GM1 ORO.FTL.110 (j) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROSTERS
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(1) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM POLICY
AMC2 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(2) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM DOCUMENTATION
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(4) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
AMC2 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(4) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS RISK ASSESSMENT
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(5) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS RISK MITIGATION
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(6) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM SAFETY ASSURANCE PROCESSES
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(7) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM PROMOTION PROCESS
GM1 ORO.FTL.205 (a)(1) Flight Duty Period (FDP)
REPORTING TIMES
GM1 ORO.FTL.205 (b)(1) Flight duty period (FDP)
REFERENCE TIME
AMC1 ORO.FTL.205 (f) Flight Duty Period (FDP)
UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES IN ACTUAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS — COMMANDER’S
DISCRETION
GM1 ORO.FTL.205 (f)(1)(i) Flight Duty Period (FDP)
COMMANDER’S DISCRETION
AMC1 ORO.FTL.210(c) Flight times and duty periods
POST-FLIGHT DUTIES
GM1 ORO.FTL.230 (a) Reserve
ROSTERING OF RESERVE
GM1 ORO.FTL.235 (a)(2) Rest periods
MINIMUM REST PERIOD AT HOME BASE IF SUITABLE ACCOMMODATION IS PROVIDED
AMC1 ORO.FTL.235 (b) Rest periods
MINIMUM REST PERIOD AWAY FROM HOME BASE
AMC1 ORO.FTL.240 Nutrition
MEAL OPPORTUNITY
AMC1 ORO.FTL.250 Fatigue management training
TRAINING SYLLABUS FATIGUE MANAGEMENT TRAINING
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
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Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC and GM to Annex III
ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR OPERATIONS
(PART-ORO)
SUBPART GEN – GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
SECTION I - GENERAL
GM1 ORO.GEN.105 Competent authority
NON-COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS
(a) For the determination of the principal place of business ‘activities referred to in this Part’ means those
activities to which Part-ORO, Part-NCC or Part-SPO apply. For organisations that also exercise activities
that are not subject to Part-ORO, Part-NCC or Part-SPO, the determination of the principal place of
business should consider that part of the organisation that is responsible for the operation of aircraft subject
to Part-ORO, Part-NCC or Part-SPO. For non-commercial operations, this is usually the home base of the
aircraft concerned, or the location of the flight department.
(b) For organisations that also exercise activities not subject to Part-ORO, Part-NCC or Part-SPO, the reference
to the accountable manager is intended to mean the manager who has the authority to ensure that all
activities subject to Part-ORO, Part-NCC or Part-SPO can be financed and carried out in accordance with
the applicable requirements.
(c) If the accountable manager is not located in that part of the organisation that is responsible for the operation
of aircraft, but the majority of other management personnel are located there, the location of the
accountable manager may not need to be considered for the determination of the principal place of business.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS — CAT OPERATIONS
Without prejudice to CAR Part 19, the CAT operator should establish and maintain a security training
programme for crew members, including theoretical and practical elements. This training should be provided at
the time of operator conversion training and thereafter at intervals not exceeding three years. The content and
duration of the training should be adapted to the security threats of the individual operator and should ensure
that crew members act in the most appropriate manner to minimise the consequences of acts of unlawful
interference. This programme should include the following elements:
(a) determination of the seriousness of the occurrence;
(b) crew communication and coordination;
(c) appropriate self-defence responses;
(d) use of non-lethal protective devices assigned to crew members whose use is authorised by MCAA;
(e) understanding of behaviour of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability of crew members to cope with hijacker
behaviour and passenger responses;
(f) in case where cabin crew are required, live situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions;
(g) flight crew compartment procedures to protect the aircraft;
(h) aircraft search procedures, in accordance with CAR Part 19, including identification of prohibited articles;
and
(i) guidance on the least risk bomb locations.
AMC2 ORO.GEN.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR GROUND PERSONNEL — CAT OPERATIONS
In accordance with CAR Part 19, the CAT operator should establish and maintain a security training programme
for ground personnel to acquaint appropriate employees with preventive measures and techniques in relation to
passengers, baggage, cargo, mail, equipment, stores and supplies intended for carriage so that they contribute to
the prevention of acts of sabotage or other forms of unlawful interference.
GM1 ORO.GEN.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS
ICAO Security Manual Doc 9811 (restricted access) contains guidance on the development of training
programmes.
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AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(c) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
The organisation and methods established to exercise operational control should be included in the operations
manual and should cover at least a description of responsibilities concerning the initiation, continuation and
termination or diversion of each flight.
GM1 ORO.GEN.110(c) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
(a) ORO.GEN.110(c) does not imply a requirement for licensed flight dispatchers or a full flight watch system.
(b) If the operator employs flight operations officers in conjunction with a method of operational control,
training for these personnel should be based on relevant parts of ICAO Doc 7192 Training Manual, Part D3. This training should be described in the operations manual
.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
MEL TRAINING PROGRAMME
(a) The operator should develop a training programme for ground personnel dealing with the use of the MEL
and detail such training in the continuing airworthiness maintenance exposition CAME and OM as
appropriate. Such training programme should include:
(1) the scope, extent and use of the MEL;
(2) placarding of inoperative equipment;
(3) deferral procedures;
(4) dispatching; and
(5) any other operator’s MEL related procedures.
(b) The operator should develop a training programme for crew members and detail such training in the
Operations Manual. Such training programme should include:
(1) the scope, extent and use of the MEL;
(2) the operator’s MEL procedures;
(3) elementary maintenance procedures in accordance with MCARs; and
(4) pilot-in-command/commander responsibilities.
AMC2 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
GROUND OPERATIONS WITH PASSENGERS ON BOARD IN THE ABSENCE OF FLIGHT CREW
For ground operations, whenever passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking in the absence of flight
crew members, the operator should:
(a) establish procedures to alert the aerodrome services in the event of ground emergency or urgent need; and
(b) ensure that at least one person on board the aircraft is qualified to apply these procedures and ensure proper
coordination between the aircraft and the aerodrome services.
GM1 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
GROUND PERSONNEL
For the purpose of the MEL training programme referred to in AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (e) ground personnel
include maintenance personnel, flight dispatchers and operations officers.
GM2 ORO.GEN.110 (e) Operator responsibilities
AERODROME SERVICES
Aerodrome services refer to units available at an aerodrome that could be of assistance in responding to an
urgent need or an emergency, such as rescue and firefighting services, medical and ambulance services, air
traffic services, security services, police, aerodrome operations, air operators.
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AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (f) Operator responsibilities
STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT
(a) Sterile flight crew compartment procedures should ensure that:
(1) flight crew activities are restricted to essential operational activities; and
(2) cabin crew and technical crew communications to flight crew or entry into the flight crew compartment
are restricted to safety or security matters.
(b) The sterile flight crew compartment procedures should be applied:
(1) during critical phases of flight;
(2) during taxiing (aeroplanes);
(3) below 10 000 feet above the aerodrome of departure after take-off and the aerodrome of destination
before landing, except for cruise flight; and
(4) during any other phases of flight as determined by the pilot-in-command or commander.
(c) All crew members should be trained on sterile flight crew compartment procedures established by the
operator, as appropriate to their duties.
GM1 ORO.GEN.110 (f) Operator responsibilities
STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT
(a) Establishment of procedures
The operator should establish procedures for flight, cabin, and technical crew that emphasise the objectives
and importance of the sterile flight crew compartment. These procedures should also emphasise that, during
periods of time when the sterile flight deck compartment procedures are applied, cabin crew and technical
crew members should call the flight crew or enter the flight crew compartment only in cases related to
safety or security matters. In such cases, information should be timely and accurate.
(b) Flight crew activities
When sterile flight crew compartment procedures are applied, flight crew members are focused on their
essential operational activities without being disturbed by non-safety related matters. Examples of activities
that should not be performed are:
(1) radio calls concerning passenger connections, fuel loads, catering, etc.;
(2) non-critical paperwork; and
(3) mass and balance corrections and performance calculations, unless required for safety reasons.
(c) Communication to the flight crew
Cabin crew and technical crew use their own discretion to determine whether the situation is related to
safety or security matters and whether to call the flight crew. Situations requiring information to the flight
crew may include:
(1) any outbreak of fire inside the cabin or in an engine;
(2) a burning smell in the cabin or presence of smoke inside or outside;
(3) fuel or fluid leakage;
(4) exit door unable to be armed or disarmed;
(5) localised extreme cabin temperature changes;
(6) evidence of airframe icing;
(7) cabin/galley equipment or furniture malfunction/breakage posing a hazard to the occupants;
(8) suspicious object;
(9) disruptive passenger;
(10) security threat;
(11) abnormal vibration or noise;
(12) medical emergency;
(13) general drop-down of the oxygen masks in the cabin; and
(14) any other condition deemed relevant by a cabin crew or technical crew member.
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AMC1 ORO.GEN.110 (f)(h) Operator responsibilities
ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES
(a) An operator should establish procedures to be followed by cabin crew covering at least:
(1) arming and disarming of slides;
(2) operation of cabin lights, including emergency lighting;
(3) prevention and detection of cabin, oven and toilet fires;
(4) actions to be taken when turbulence is encountered; and
(5) actions to be taken in the event of an emergency and/or an evacuation.
(b) When establishing procedures and a checklist system for cabin crew with respect to the aircraft cabin, the
operator should take into account at least the following duties:
Pretake off
Duties
(1) Briefing of cabin crew by the senior cabin crew
prior to commencement of a flight or series of
flights
(2) Check of safety and emergency equipment in
accordance with operator's policies and
procedures
(3) Security checks as applicable
(4) Passenger embarkation and disembarkation
(5) Securing of passenger cabin (e.g. seat belts,
cabin cargo/baggage)
(6) Securing of galleys and stowage of equipment
(7) Arming of door/exit slides
(8) Safety briefing / information to passengers
(9) ’Cabin secure’ report to flight crew
(10)
Operation of cabin lights
(11)
Cabin crew at assigned crew stations
(12)
Surveillance of passenger cabin
(13)
Prevention and detection of fire in the
cabin (including the combi-cargo area, crew
rest areas, galleys, lavatories and any other
cabin remote areas) and instructions for actions
to be taken
(14)
Actions to be taken when turbulence is
encountered
(15)
Actions to be taken in case of in-flight
incidents (e.g. medical emergency)
(16)
Actions to be taken in the event of
emergency situations
(17)
Disarming of door/exit slides
(18)
Reporting of any deficiency and/or unserviceability of equipment and/or any incident
In-flight
Prelanding
Postlanding
x
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if required
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if required
if required
if required
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(c) The operator should specify the contents of safety briefings for all cabin crew members prior to the
commencement of a flight or series of flights.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.120 (a) Means of compliance
DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE
In order to demonstrate that the Implementing Rules are met, a risk assessment should be completed and
documented. The result of this risk assessment should demonstrate that an equivalent level of safety to that
established by the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) adopted by the Agency is reached.
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AMC1 ORO.GEN.125 Terms of approval and privileges of an AOC holder
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION
The management system documentation should contain the privileges and detailed scope of activities for which
the operator is certified, as relevant to the applicable requirements. The scope of activities defined in the
management system documentation should be consistent with the terms of approval.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.130 Changes related to an AOC holder
APPLICATION TIME FRAMES
(a) The application for the amendment of an air operator certificate (AOC) should be submitted at least 30 days
before the date of the intended changes.
(b) In the case of a planned change of a nominated person, the operator should inform MCAA at least 10 days
before the date of the proposed change.
(c) Unforeseen changes should be notified at the earliest opportunity, in order to enable MCAA to determine
continued compliance with the applicable requirements and to amend, if necessary, the AOC and related
terms of approval.
GM1 ORO.GEN.130 (a) Changes related to an AOC holder
GENERAL
(a) Typical examples of changes that may affect the AOC or the operations specifications or the operator’s
management system, as required in ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1) and (a)(2), are listed below:
(1) the name of the operator;
(2) a change of legal entity;
(3) the operator’s principal place of business;
(4) the operator’s scope of activities;
(5) additional locations of the operator;
(6) the accountable manager;
(7) any of the persons referred to in ORO.GEN.210 (a) and (b);
(8) the operator’s documentation, as required by this Annex, safety policy and procedures;
(9) the facilities.
(b) Prior approval by MCAA is required for any changes to the operator’s procedure describing how changes
not requiring prior approval will be managed and notified to MCAA.
(c) Changes requiring prior approval may only be implemented upon receipt of formal approval by MCAA.
GM2 ORO.GEN.130 (a) Changes related to an AOC holder
CHANGE OF NAME
A change of name requires the operator to submit a new application as a matter of urgency.
Where this is the only change to report, the new application can be accompanied by a copy of the documentation
previously submitted to MCAA under the previous name, as a means of demonstrating how the operator
complies with the applicable requirements.
GM3 ORO.GEN.130 (b) Changes related to an AOC holder
CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL
The following GM is a non-exhaustive checklist of items that require prior approval from MCAA as specified in
the applicable Implementing Rules:
(a) alternative means of compliance;
(b) procedures regarding items to be notified to MCAA;
(c) cabin crew:
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(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
(1) evacuation procedures with a reduced number of required cabin crew during ground operations or in
unforeseen circumstances;
(2) conduct of the training, examination and checking required by Annex V (Part-CC) and issue of cabin
crew licence;
(3) procedures for cabin crew to operate on four aircraft types;
(4) training programmes, including syllabi;
leasing agreements;
non-commercial operations by AOC holders;
specific approvals in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA);
dangerous goods training programmes;
flight crew:
(1) alternative training and qualification programmes (ATQPs);
(2) procedures for flight crew to operate on more than one type or variant;
(3) training and checking programmes, including syllabi and use of flight simulation training devices
(FSTDs);
fuel policy;
helicopter operations:
(1) airborne radar approaches;
(2) over a hostile environment located outside a congested area, unless the operator holds an approval to
operate according to Subpart J of Annex V (SPA.HEMS);
(3) procedures for selecting off-shore alternates;
(4) to/from a public interest site;
(5) without an assured safe forced landing capability;
mass and balance:
(1) standard masses for load items other than standard masses for passengers and checked baggage;
(2) use of on-board mass and balance computer systems;
minimum equipment list (MEL):
(1) MEL;
(2) operating other than in accordance with the MEL, but within the constraints of the master minimum
equipment list (MMEL);
(3) rectification interval extension (RIE) procedures;
minimum flight altitudes:
(1) the method for establishing minimum flight altitudes;
(2) descent procedures to fly below specified minimum altitudes;
performance:
(1) increased bank angles at take-off (for performance class A aeroplanes);
(2) short landing operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes);
(3) steep approach operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes);
isolated aerodrome: using an isolated aerodrome as destination aerodrome for operations with aeroplanes;
approach flight technique:
(1) all approaches not flown as stabilised approaches for a particular approach to a particular runway;
(2) non-precision approaches not flown with the continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique for
each particular approach/runway combination;
maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an extended range
operations with two-engined aeroplanes (ETOPS) approval:
(1) air operations with two-engined performance class A aeroplanes with a maximum operational
passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less and a maximum take-off mass less than 45 360
kg, over a route that contains a point further than 120 minutes from an adequate aerodrome, under
standard conditions in still air;
aircraft categories:
(1) Applying a lower landing mass than the maximum certified landing mass for determining the indicated
airspeed at threshold (VAT).
AMC1 ORO.GEN.150 (b) Findings
GENERAL
The corrective action plan defined by the operator should address the effects of the non-compliance, as well as
its root-cause.
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GM1 ORO.GEN.150 Findings
GENERAL
(a) Preventive action is the action to eliminate the cause of a potential non-compliance or other undesirable
potential situation.
(b) Corrective action is the action to eliminate or mitigate the root cause(s) and prevent recurrence of an
existing detected non-compliance or other undesirable condition or situation. Proper determination of the
root cause is crucial for defining effective corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence.
(c) Correction is the action to eliminate a detected non-compliance.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.160 Occurrence reporting
GENERAL
(a) The operator should report all occurrences defined in EASA AMC 20-8, and as required by the applicable
MCARs on occurrence reporting in civil aviation.
(b) In addition to the reports required by EASA AMC 20-8, the operator should report volcanic ash clouds
encountered during flight.
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SECTION II –MANAGEMENT
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1);(2);(3);(5) Management system
NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS - GENERAL
(a) Safety risk management may be performed using hazard checklists or similar risk management tools or
processes, which are integrated into the activities of the operator.
(b) The operator should manage safety risks related to a change. The management of change should be a
documented process to identify external and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety. It
should make use of the operator’s existing hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation processes.
(c) The operator should identify a person who fulfils the role of safety manager and who is responsible for
coordinating the safety management system. This person may be the accountable manager or a person with
an operational role within the operator.
(d) Within the operator, responsibilities should be identified for hazard identification, risk assessment and
mitigation.
(e) The safety policy should include a commitment to improve towards the highest safety standards, comply
with all applicable legal requirements, meet all applicable standards, consider best practices and provide
appropriate resources.
(f) The operator should, in cooperation with other stakeholders, develop, coordinate and maintain an
emergency response plan (ERP) that ensures orderly and safe transition from normal to emergency
operations and return to normal operations. The ERP should provide the actions to be taken by the operator
or specified individuals in an emergency and reflect the size, nature and complexity of the activities
performed by the operator.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS - ORGANISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITIES
The management system of an operator should encompass safety by including a safety manager and a safety
review board in the organisational structure.
(a) Safety manager
(1) The safety manager should act as the focal point and be responsible for the development,
administration and maintenance of an effective safety management system.
(2) The functions of the safety manager should be to:
(i) facilitate hazard identification, risk analysis and management;
(ii) monitor the implementation of actions taken to mitigate risks, as listed in the safety action plan;
(iii)
provide periodic reports on safety performance;
(iv) ensure maintenance of safety management documentation;
(v) ensure that there is safety management training available and that it meets acceptable standards;
(vi) provide advice on safety matters; and
(vii)
ensure initiation and follow-up of internal occurrence / accident investigations.
(b) Safety review board
(1) The Safety review board should be a high level committee that considers matters of strategic safety in
support of the accountable manager’s safety accountability.
(2) The board should be chaired by the accountable manager and be composed of heads of functional
areas.
(3) The safety review board should monitor:
(i) safety performance against the safety policy and objectives;
(ii) that any safety action is taken in a timely manner; and
(iii) the effectiveness of the operator’s safety management processes.
(c) The safety review board should ensure that appropriate resources are allocated to achieve the established
safety performance.
(d) The safety manager or any other relevant person may attend, as appropriate, safety review board meetings.
He/she may communicate to the accountable manager all information, as necessary, to allow decision
making based on safety data.
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GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
SAFETY MANAGER
(a) Depending on the size of the operator and the nature and complexity of its activities, the safety manager
may be assisted by additional safety personnel for the performance of all safety management related tasks.
(b) Regardless of the organisational set-up it is important that the safety manager remains the unique focal
point as regards the development, administration and maintenance of the operator’s safety management
system.
GM2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(1) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS - SAFETY ACTION GROUP
(a) A safety action group may be established as a standing group or as an ad-hoc group to assist or act on
behalf of the safety review board.
(b) More than one safety action group may be established depending on the scope of the task and specific
expertise required.
(c) The safety action group should report to and take strategic direction from the safety review board and
should be comprised of managers, supervisors and personnel from operational areas.
(d) The safety action group should:
(1) monitor operational safety;
(2) resolve identified risks;
(3) assess the impact on safety of operational changes; and
(4) ensure that safety actions are implemented within agreed timescales.
(e) The safety action group should review the effectiveness of previous safety recommendations and safety
promotion.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS - SAFETY POLICY
(a) The safety policy should:
(1) be endorsed by the accountable manager;
(2) reflect organisational commitments regarding safety and its proactive and systematic management;
(3) be communicated, with visible endorsement, throughout the operator; and
(4) include safety reporting principles.
(b) The safety policy should include a commitment:
(1) to improve towards the highest safety standards;
(2) to comply with all applicable legislation, meet all applicable standards and consider best
practices;
(3) to provide appropriate resources;
(4) to enforce safety as one primary responsibility of all managers; and
(5) not to blame someone for reporting something which would not have been otherwise detected.
(c) Senior management should:
(1) continually promote the safety policy to all personnel and demonstrate their commitment to it;
(2) provide necessary human and financial resources for its implementation; and
(3) establish safety objectives and performance standards.
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(2) Management system
SAFETY POLICY
The safety policy is the means whereby the operator states its intention to maintain and, where
practicable, improve safety levels in all its activities and to minimise its contribution to the risk of an aircraft
accident as far as is reasonably practicable. The safety policy should state that the purpose of safety
reporting and internal investigations is to improve safety, not to apportion blame to individuals.
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AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS - SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT
(a) Hazard identification processes
(1) Reactive and proactive schemes for hazard identification should be the formal means of
collecting, recording, analysing, acting on and generating feedback about hazards and the
associated risks that affect the safety of the operational activities of the operator.
(2) All reporting systems, including confidential reporting schemes, should include an effective feedback
process.
(b) Risk assessment and mitigation processes
(1) A formal risk management process should be developed and maintained that ensures analysis (in
terms of likelihood and severity of occurrence), assessment (in terms of tolerability) and control
(in terms of mitigation) of risks to an acceptable level.
(2) The levels of management who have the authority to make decisions regarding the tolerability of safety
risks, in accordance with (b)(1), should be specified.
(c) Internal safety investigation
(1) The scope of internal safety investigations should extend beyond the scope of occurrences
required to be reported to MCAA.
(d) Safety performance monitoring and measurement
(1) Safety performance monitoring and measurement should be the process by which the safety
performance of the operator is verified in comparison to the safety policy and objectives.
(2) This process should include:
(i) safety reporting, addressing also the status of compliance with the applicable requirements;
(ii) safety studies, that is, rather large analyses encompassing broad safety concerns;
(iii) safety reviews including trends reviews, which would be conducted during introduction and
deployment of new technologies, change or implementation of procedures, or in situations
of structural change in operations;
(iv) safety audits focussing on the integrity of the operator’s management system, and
periodically assessing the status of safety risk controls; and (v) safety surveys, examining
particular elements or procedures of a specific operation, such as problem areas or bottlenecks
in daily operations, perceptions and opinions of operational personnel and areas of dissent or
confusion.
(e) The management of change
The operator should manage safety risks related to a change. The management of change should be a
documented process to identify external and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety. It
should make use of the operator’s existing hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation processes.
(f) Continuous improvement
The operator should continuously seek to improve its safety performance. Continuous improvement should
be achieved through:
(1) proactive and reactive evaluations of facilities, equipment, documentation and procedures through
safety audits and surveys;
(2) proactive evaluation of individuals’ performance to verify the fulfilment of their safety
responsibilities; and
(3) reactive evaluations in order to verify the effectiveness of the system for control and mitigation of risk.
(g) The emergency response plan (ERP)
(1) An ERP should be established that provides the actions to be taken by the operator or
specified individuals in an emergency. The ERP should reflect the size, nature and complexity of
the activities performed by the operator.
(2) The ERP should ensure:
(i) an orderly and safe transition from normal to emergency operations;
(ii) safe continuation of operations or return to normal operations as soon as practicable; and
(iii) coordination with the emergency response plans of other organisations, where appropriate.
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GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
INTERNAL OCCURRENCE REPORTING SCHEME
(a) The overall purpose of the scheme is to use reported informa tion to improve the level of safety performance
of the operator and not to attribute blame.
(b) The objectives of the scheme are to:
(1) enable an assessment to be made of the safety implications of each relevant incident and
accident, including previous similar occurrences, so that any necessary action can be initiated; and
(2) ensure that knowledge of relevant incidents and accidents is disseminated, so that other persons
and operators may learn from them.
(c) The scheme is an essential part of the overall monitoring function and it is complementary to the
normal day-to-day procedures and ‘control’ systems and is not intended to duplicate or supersede any of
them. The scheme is a tool to identify those instances where routine procedures have failed.
(d) All occurrence reports judged reportable by the person submitting the report should be retained as the
significance of such reports may only become obvious at a later date.
GM2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
RISK MANAGEMENT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH KNOWN OR FORECAST VOLCANIC ASH
CONTAMINATION
(a) Responsibilities
The operator is responsible for the safety of its operations, including within an area with known or forecast
volcanic ash contamination. The operator should complete this assessment of safety risks related to known
or forecast volcanic ash contamination as part of its management system before initiating operations into
airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash.
This process is intended to ensure the operator takes account of the likely accuracy and quality of the
information sources it uses in its management system and to demonstrate its own competence and capability
to interpret data from different sources in order to achieve the necessary level of data integrity reliably and
correctly resolve any conflicts among data sources that may arise.
In order to decide whether or not to operate into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites
known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, the operator should make use of the safety risk assessment
within its management system, as required by ORO.GEN.200.
The operator’s safety risk assessment should take into account all relevant data including data from the type
certificate holders (TCHs) regarding the susceptibility of the aircraft they operate to volcanic cloud-related
airworthiness effects, the nature and severity of these effects and the related pre-flight, in-flight and postflight precautions to be observed by the operator.
The operator should ensure that personnel required to be familiar with the details of the safety risk
assessments receives all relevant information (both pre-flight and in-flight) in order to be in a position to
apply appropriate mitigation measures as specified by the safety risk assessments.
(b) Procedures
The operator should have documented procedures for the management of operations into airspace forecast
to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash.
These procedures should ensure that, at all times, flight operations remain within the accepted safety
boundaries as established through the management system allowing for any variations in information
sources, equipment, operational experience or organisation. Procedures should include those for flight crew,
flight planners, and dispatchers, operations, continuing airworthiness personnel such that they are in a
position to evaluate correctly the risk of flights into airspace forecast to be contaminated by volcanic ash
and to plan accordingly. Continuing airworthiness personnel should be provided with procedures allowing
them to correctly assess the need for and to execute relevant continuing airworthiness interventions.
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The operator should retain sufficient qualified and competent staff to generate well supported operational
risk management decisions and ensure that its staff are appropriately trained and current. It is recommended
that the operator make the necessary arrangements for its relevant staff to take up opportunities to be
involved in volcanic ash exercises conducted in their areas of operation.
(c) Volcanic activity information and operator’s potential response
Before and during operations, information valuable to the operator is generated by various volcano agencies
worldwide. The operator’s risk assessment and mitigating actions need to take account of, and respond
appropriately to, the information likely to be available during each phase of the eruptive sequence from preeruption through to end of eruptive activity. It is nevertheless noted that eruptions rarely follow a
deterministic pattern of behaviour. A typical operator’s response may consist of the following:
(1) Pre-eruption
The operator should have in place a robust mechanism for ensuring that it is constantly vigilant for any
alerts of pre-eruption volcanic activity relevant to its operations. The staff involved need to understand
the threat to safe operations that such alerts represent.
An operator whose routes traverse large, active volcanic areas for which immediate International
Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) alerts may not be available, should define its strategy for capturing
information about increased volcanic activity before pre-eruption alerts are generated. For example, an
operator may combine elevated activity information with information concerning the profile and
history of the volcano to determine an operating policy, which could include re-routing or restrictions
at night. This would be useful when dealing with the 60% of volcanoes which are unmonitored.
Such an operator should also ensure that its crews are aware that they may be the first to observe an
eruption and so need to be vigilant and ready to ensure that this information is made available for wider
dissemination as quickly as possible.
(2) Start of an eruption
Given the likely uncertainty regarding the status of the eruption during the early stages of an event and
regarding the associated volcanic cloud, the operator’s procedures should include a requirement for
crews to initiate re-routes to avoid the affected airspace.
The operator should ensure that flights are planned to remain clear of the affected areas and that
consideration is given to available aerodromes/operating sites and fuel requirements.
It is expected that the following initial actions will be taken by the operator:
(i) determine if any aircraft in flight could be affected, alert the crew and provide advice on re-routing
and available aerodromes/operating sites as required;
(ii) alert management;
(iii) for flight departures, brief flight crew and revise flight and fuel planning in accordance with the
safety risk assessment;
(iv) alert flight crew and operations staff to the need for increased monitoring of information (e.g.
special air report (AIREP), volcanic activity report (VAR), significant weather information
(SIGMET), NOTAMs and company messages);
(v) initiate the gathering of all data relevant to determining the risk; and
(vi) apply mitigations identified in the safety risk assessment.
(3) On-going eruption
As the eruptive event develops, the operator can expect the responsible Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre
(VAAC) to provide volcanic ash advisory messages (VAA/VAGs) defining, as accurately as possible,
the vertical and horizontal extent of areas and layers of volcanic clouds. As a minimum, the operator
should monitor, and take account of, this VAAC information as well as of relevant SIGMETs and
NOTAMs.
Other sources of information are likely to be available such as VAR/AIREPs, satellite imagery and a
range of other information from State and commercial organisations. The operator should plan its
operations in accordance with its safety risk assessment taking into account the information that it
considers accurate and relevant from these additional sources.
The operator should carefully consider and resolve differences or conflicts among the information
sources, notably between published information and observations (pilot reports, airborne
measurements, etc.).
Given the dynamic nature of the volcanic hazards, the operator should ensure that the situation is
monitored closely and operations adjusted to suit changing conditions.
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The operator should be aware that the affected or danger areas may be established and presented in a
different way than the one currently used in Europe, as described in EUR Doc 019-NAT Doc 006.
The operator should require reports from its crews concerning any encounters with volcanic emissions.
These reports should be passed immediately to the appropriate air traffic services (ATS) unit and to the
operator’s MCAA
For the purpose of flight planning, the operator should treat the horizontal and vertical limits of the
temporary danger area (TDA) or airspace forecast to be contaminated by volcanic ash as applicable, to
be overflown as it would mountainous terrain, modified in accordance with its safety risk assessment.
The operator should take account of the risk of cabin depressurisation or engine failure resulting in the
inability to maintain level flight above a volcanic cloud, especially when conducting ETOPS
operations. Additionally, minimum equipment list (MEL) provisions should be considered in
consultation with the TCHs.
Flying below volcanic ash contaminated airspace should be considered on a case-by-case basis. It
should only be planned to reach or leave an aerodrome/operating site close to the boundary of this
airspace or where the ash contamination is very high and stable. The establishment of Minimum Sector
Altitude (MSA) and the availability of aerodromes/operating sites should be considered.
(d) Safety risk assessment
When directed specifically at the issue of intended flight into airspace forecast to be or
aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, the process should involve the
following:
(1) Identifying the hazards
The generic hazard, in the context of this document, is airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating
sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, and whose characteristics are harmful to the
airworthiness and operation of the aircraft.
This GM is referring to volcanic ash contamination since it is the most significant hazard for flight
operations in the context of a volcanic eruption. Nevertheless, it might not be the only hazard and
therefore the operator should consider additional hazards which could have an adverse effect on aircraft
structure or passengers safety such as gases.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Within this generic hazard, the operator should develop its own list of specific hazards taking into
account its specific aircraft, experience, knowledge and type of operation, and any other relevant data
stemming from previous eruptions.
Considering the severity and consequences of the hazard occurring (i.e. the nature and actual level of
damage expected to be inflicted on the particular aircraft from exposure to that volcanic ash cloud).
Evaluating the likelihood of encountering volcanic ash clouds with characteristics harmful to the safe
operation of the aircraft.
For each specific hazard within the generic hazard, the likelihood of adverse consequences should be
assessed, either qualitatively or quantitatively.
Determining whether the consequent risk is acceptable and within the operator’s risk performance
criteria.
At this stage of the process, the safety risks should be classified as acceptable or unacceptable. The
assessment of tolerability will be subjective, based on qualitative data and expert judgement, until
specific quantitative data are available in respect of a range of parameters.
Taking action to reduce the safety risk to a level that is acceptable to the operator’s management.
Appropriate mitigation for each unacceptable risk identified should then be considered in order to
reduce the risk to a level acceptable to the operator’s management.
(e) Procedures to be considered when identifying possible mitigations actions
When conducting a volcanic ash safety risk assessment, the operator should consider the following nonexhaustive list of procedures and processes as mitigation:
(1) Type certificate holders
Obtaining advice from the TCHs and other engineering sources concerning operations in potentially
contaminated airspace and/or aerodromes/operating sites contaminated by volcanic ash.
This advice should set out:
(i) the features of the aircraft that are susceptible to airworthiness effects related to volcanic ash;
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(ii) the nature and severity of these effects;
(iii) the effect of volcanic ash on operations to/from contaminated aerodromes/operating sites,
including the effect on take-off and landing aircraft performance;
(iv) the related pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight precautions to be observed by the operator including
any necessary amendments to aircraft operating manuals, aircraft maintenance manuals, master
minimum equipment list/dispatch deviation or equivalents; and
(v) the recommended inspections associated with operations in volcanic ash potentially contaminated
airspace and operations to/from volcanic ash contaminated aerodromes/operating sites; this may
take the form of instructions for continuing airworthiness or other advice.
Operator/contracted organisations’ personnel
Definition of procedures for flight planning, operations, engineering and maintenance ensuring that:
(i) personnel responsible for flight planning are in a position to evaluate correctly the risk of
encountering volcanic ash contaminated airspace, or aerodromes/operating sites, and can plan
accordingly;
(ii) flight planning and operational procedures enable crews to avoid areas and aerodromes/operating
sites with unacceptable volcanic ash contamination;
(iii) flight crew are aware of the possible signs of entry into a volcanic ash cloud and execute the
associated procedures;
(iv) continuing airworthiness personnel are able to assess the need for and to execute any necessary
maintenance or other required interventions; and
(v) crews are provided with appropriate aircraft performance data when operating to/from
aerodromes/operating sites contaminated with volcanic ash.
Provision of enhanced flight watch
This should ensure:
(i) close and continuous monitoring of VAA, VAR/AIREP, SIGMET, NOTAM, ASHTAM and other
relevant information, and information from crews, concerning the volcanic ash cloud hazard;
(ii) access to plots of the affected areas from SIGMETs, NOTAMs and relevant company information
for crews and personnel responsible for the management and the supervision of the flight
operations; and
(iii) communication of the latest information to crews and personnel responsible for the management
and the supervision of the flight operations in a timely fashion.
Flight planning
Flexibility of the process to allow re-planning at short notice should conditions change.
Departure, destination and alternate aerodromes
For the airspace to be traversed, or the aerodromes/operating sites in use, parameters to evaluate and
take account of:
(i) the probability of contamination;
(ii) any additional aircraft performance requirements;
(iii) required maintenance considerations;
(iv) fuel requirements for re-routeing and extended holding.
Routing policy
Parameters to evaluate and take account of:
(i) the shortest period in and over the forecast contaminated area;
(ii) the hazards associated with flying over the contaminated area;
(iii) drift down and emergency descent considerations;
(iv) the policy for flying below the contaminated airspace and the associated hazards.
Diversion policy
Parameters to evaluate and take account of:
(i) maximum allowed distance from a suitable aerodrome/operating site;
(ii) availability of aerodromes/operating sites outside the forecast contaminated area;
(iii) diversion policy after an volcanic ash encounter.
Minimum equipment list (MEL)
Additional provisions in the MEL for dispatching aircraft with unserviceabilities that might affect the
following non-exhaustive list of systems:
(i) air conditioning packs;
(ii) engine bleeds;
(iii) pressurisation system;
(iv) electrical power distribution system;
(v) air data system;
(vi) standby instruments;
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(vii) navigation systems;
(viii) de-icing systems;
(ix) engine-driven generators;
(x) auxiliary power unit (APU);
(xi) airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS);
(xii) terrain awareness warning system (TAWS);
(xiii) autoland systems;
(xiv) provision of crew oxygen;
(xv) supplemental oxygen for passengers.
(9) Standard operating procedures
Crew training to ensure they are familiar with normal and abnormal operating procedures and
particularly any changes regarding but not limited to:
(i) pre-flight planning;
(ii) in-flight monitoring of volcanic ash cloud affected areas and avoidance procedures;
(iii) diversion;
(iv) communications with ATC;
(v) in-flight monitoring of engine and systems potentially affected by volcanic ash cloud
contamination;
(vi) recognition and detection of volcanic ash clouds and reporting procedures;
(vii) in-flight indications of a volcanic ash cloud encounter;
(viii) procedures to be followed if a volcanic ash cloud is encountered;
(ix) unreliable or erroneous airspeed;
(x) non-normal procedures for engines and systems potentially affected by volcanic ash cloud
contamination;
(xi) engine-out and engine relight;
(xii) escape routes; and
(xiii) operations to/from aerodromes/operating sites contaminated with volcanic ash.
(10) Provision for aircraft technical log
This should ensure:
(i) systematic entry in the aircraft technical log related to any actual or suspected volcanic ash
encounter whether in-flight or at an aerodrome/operating site; and
(ii) checking, prior to flight, of the completion of maintenance actions related to an entry in the aircraft
technical log for a volcanic ash cloud encounter on a previous flight.
(11) Incident reporting
Crew requirements for:
(i) reporting an airborne volcanic ash cloud encounter (VAR);
(ii) post-flight volcanic ash cloud reporting (VAR);
(iii) reporting non-encounters in airspace forecast to be contaminated; and
(iv) filing a mandatory occurrence report in accordance with ORO.GEN.160.
(12) Continuing airworthiness procedures
Procedures when operating in or near areas of volcanic ash cloud contamination:
(i) enhancement of vigilance during inspections and regular maintenance and appropriate adjustments
to maintenance practices;
(ii) definition of a follow-up procedure when a volcanic ash cloud encounter has been reported or
suspected;
(iii) thorough investigation for any sign of unusual or accelerated abrasions or corrosion or of volcanic
ash accumulation;
(iv) reporting to TCHs and the relevant authorities observations and experiences from operations in
areas of volcanic ash cloud contamination;
(v) completion of any additional maintenance recommended by the TCH or by the MCAA
(f) Reporting
The operator should ensure that reports are immediately submitted to the nearest ATS unit using the
VAR/AIREP procedures followed up by a more detailed VAR on landing together with, as applicable, a
report, as defined in MCARs, and an aircraft technical log entry for:
(1) any incident related to volcanic clouds;
(2) any observation of volcanic ash activity; and
(3) any time that volcanic ash is not encountered in an area where it was forecast to be.
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(g) References
Further guidance on volcanic ash safety risk assessment is given in ICAO Doc. 9974 (Flight safety and
volcanic ash — Risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination).
GM3 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) Management system
SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT — RISK REGISTER
The results of the assessment of the potential adverse consequences or outcome of each hazard may be recorded
by the operator in a risk register, an example of which is provided below.
Monitoring and
Reviewing
Requirements
Actions and Owners
mitigation)
Outcome (Post-
Risk
Link hood
Severity
Additional Mitigation
Required
mitigation)
Outcome (Pre-
Risk
Link hood
Severity
Existing Controls
Incident
Sequence
Description
Hazard
Description
No.
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AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(4) Management system
TRAINING AND COMMUNICATION ON SAFETY
(a) Training
(1) All personnel should receive safety training as appropriate for their safety responsibilities.
(2) Adequate records of all safety training provided should be kept.
(b) Communication
(1) The operator should establish communication about safety matters that:
(i) ensures that all personnel are aware of the safety management activities as appropriate for their
safety responsibilities;
(ii) conveys safety critical information, especially relating to assessed risks and analysed hazards;
(iii) explains why particular actions are taken; and
(iv) explains why safety procedures are introduced or changed.
(2) Regular meetings with personnel where information, actions and procedures are discussed may be used
to communicate safety matters.
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(4) Management system
TRAINING AND COMMUNICATION ON SAFETY
The safet y training programme may consist of self-instruction via the media (newsletters, flight safety
magazines), class-room training, e-learning or similar training provided by training service providers.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(5) Management system
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION - GENERAL
(a) The operator’s management syst em documentation should at least include the following information:
(1) a statement signed by the accountable manager to confirm that the operator will continuously work in
accordance with the applicable requirements and the operator’s documentation as required by this
Annex;
(2) the operator's scope of activities;
(3) the titles and names of persons referred to in ORO.GEN.210 (a) and (b);
(4) an operator chart showing the lines of responsibility between the persons referred to in
ORO.GEN.210;
(5) a general description and location of the facilities referred to in ORO.GEN.215;
(6) procedures specifying how the operator ensures compliance with the applicable requirements;
(7) the amendment procedure for the operator’s management system documentation.
(b) The operator’s management system documentation may be included in a separate manual or in (one
of) the manual(s) as required by the applicable Subpart(s). A cross reference should be included.
AMC2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(5) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS – SAFETY MANAGEMENT MANUAL
(a) The safety management manual (SMM) should be the key instrument for communicating the
approach to safety for the whole of the operator. The SMM should document all aspects of safety
management, including the safety policy, objectives, procedures and individual safety responsibilities.
(b) The contents of the safety management manual should include all of the following:
(1) scope of the safety management system;
(2) safety policy and objectives;
(3) safety accountability of the accountable manager;
(4) safety responsibilities of key safety personnel;
(5) documentation control procedures;
(6) hazard identification and risk management schemes;
(7) safety action planning;
(8) safety performance monitoring;
(9) incident investigation and reporting;
(10) emergency response planning;
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(11) management of change (including organisational changes with regard to safety responsibilities);
(12) safety promotion.
(c) The SMM may be contained in (one of) the manual(s) of the operator.
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(5) Management system
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION - GENERAL
(a) It is not required to duplicate information in several manuals. The information may be contained in any of
the operat or manuals (e.g. operations manual, training manual), which may also be combined.
(b) The operator may also choose to document some of the information required to be documented in
separate documents (e.g. procedures). In this case, it should ensure that manuals contain adequate
references to any document kept separately. Any such documents are then to be considered an integral part
of the operator’s management system documentation.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
COMPLIANCE MONITORING - GENERAL
(a) Compliance monitoring
The implementation and use of a compliance monitoring function should enable the operator to
monitor compliance with the relevant requirements of this Annex and other applicable Annexes.
(1) The operator should specify the basic structure of the compliance monitoring function applicable
to the activities conducted.
(2) The compliance monitoring function should be structured according to the size of the operator and the
complexity of the activities to be monitored.
(b) Organisations should monitor compliance with the procedures they have designed to ensure safe activities.
In doing so, they should as a minimum, and where appropriate, monitor compliance with:
(1) privileges of the operator;
(2) manuals, logs, and records;
(3) training standards;
(4) management system procedures and manuals.
(c) Organisational set up
(1) To ensure that the operator continues to meet the requirements of this Part and other applicable Parts,
the accountable manager should designate a compliance monitoring manager. The role of the
compliance monitoring manager is to ensure that the activities of the operator are monitored for
compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements, and any additional requirements as
established by the operator, and that these activities are being carried out properly under the
supervision of the relevant head of functional area.
(2) The compliance monitoring manager should be responsible for ensuring that the compliance
monitoring programme is properly implemented, maintained and continually reviewed and
improved.
(3) The compliance monitoring manager should:
(i) have direct access to the accountable manager;
(ii) not be one of the other persons referred to in ORO.GEN.210 (b);
(iii) be able to demonstrate relevant knowledge, background and appropriate experience related to
the activities of the operator, including knowledge and experience in compliance monitoring;
and
(iv) have access to all parts of the operator, and as necessary, any contracted operator.
(4) In the case of a non-complex operator, this task may be exercised by the accountable manager
provided he/she has demonstrated having the related competence as defined in (c)(3)(iii).
(5) In the ca se the same person a cts a s compliance monitoring manager and as safety manager,
the accountable manager, with regards to his/her direct accountability for safety, should ensure that
sufficient resources are allocated to both functions, taking into account the size of the operat or and
the nature and complexity of its activities.
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(6) The independence of the compliance monitoring function should be established by ensuring that
audits and inspections are carried out by personnel not responsible for the function, procedure or
products being audited.
(d) Compliance monitoring documentation
(1) Relevant documentation should include the relevant part(s) of the operator’s management system
documentation.
(2) In addition, relevant documentation should also include the following:
(i) terminology;
(ii) specified activity standards;
(iii) a description of the operator;
(iv) the allocation of duties and responsibilities;
(v) procedures to ensure regulatory compliance;
(vi) the compliance monitoring programme, reflecting:
(A) schedule of the monitoring programme;
(B) audit procedures;
(C) reporting procedures;
(D) follow-up and corrective action procedures; and
(E) recording system.
(vii) the training syllabus referred to in (e)(2);
(viii) document control.
(e) Training
(1) Correct and thorough training is essential to optimise compliance in every operator. In order to
achieve significant outcomes of such training, the operator should ensure that all personnel
understand the objectives as laid down in the operator’s management system documentation.
(2) Those responsible for managing the compliance monitoring function should receive training on
this task. Such training should cover the requi rements of compliance monitoring, manuals and
procedures related to the task, audit techniques, reporting and recording.
(3) Time should be provided to train all personnel involved in compliance management and for
briefing the remainder of the personnel.
(4) The allocation of time and resources should be governed by the volume and complexity of the
activities concerned.
GM1 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
COMPLIANCE MONITORING - GENERAL
(a) The organisational set-up of the compliance monitoring function should reflect the size of the operat or
and the nature and complexity of its activities. The compliance monitoring manager may perform all
audits and inspections himself/herself or appoint one or more auditors by choosing personnel having the
related competence as defined in AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(6) point (c)(3)(iii), either from within or
outside the operator.
(b) Regardless of the option chosen it must be ensured that the independence of the audit function is not
affected, in particular in cases where those performing the audit or inspection are also responsible for
other functions for the operator.
(c) In case external personnel are used to perform compliance audits or inspections:
(1) any such audits or inspections are performed under the responsibility of the compliance
monitoring manager; and
(2) the operator remains responsible to ensure that the external personnel has relevant knowledge,
background and experience as appropriate to the activities being audited or inspected; including
knowledge and experience in compliance monitoring.
(d) The operator retains the ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of the compliance monitoring function
in particular for the effective implementation and follow-up of all corrective actions.
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GM2 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Manag ement system
COMPLEX OPERATORS - COMPLIANCE MONITORING PROGRAMME
(a)
Typical subject areas for compliance monitoring audits and inspections for operators should be, as
applicable:
(1) actual flight operations;
(2) ground de-icing/anti-icing;
(3) flight support services;
(4) load control;
(5) technical standards.
(b) Operators should monitor compliance with the operational procedures they have designed to ensure
safe operations, airworthy aircraft and the serviceability of both operational and safety equipment.
In doing so, they should, where appropriate, additionally monitor the following:
(1) operational procedures;
(2) flight safety procedures;
(3) operational control and supervision;
(4) aircraft performance;
(5) all weather operations;
(6) communications and navigational equipment and practices;
(7) mass, balance and aircraft loading;
(8) instruments and safety equipment;
(9) ground operations;
(10) flight and duty time limitations, rest requirements, and scheduling;
(11) aircraft maintenance/operations interface;
(12) use of the MEL;
(13) flight crew;
(14) cabin crew;
(15) dangerous goods;
(16) security.
GM3 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS - COMPLIANCE MONITORING
(a) Compliance monitoring audits and inspections may be documented on a ‘Compliance Monitoring
Checklist’, and any findings recorded in a ‘Non-compliance Report’ . The following documents may
be used for this purpose.
COMPLIANCE MONITORING CHECKLIST
Year:
Date
Subject
checked
Flight Operations
Aircraft checklists checked for
accuracy and validity
Minimum five flight plans checked
and verified for proper and correct
information
Flight planning facilities checked for
updated manuals, documents and access
to relevant flight information
Incident reports evaluated and
reported to the appropriate
competent authority
Ground Handling
Contracts with ground handling
organisations established and valid,
if applicable
Instructions regarding fuelling and
de-icing issued, if applicable
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Instructions regarding dangerous
goods issued and known by all
relevant personnel, if applicable
Mass & Balance
Min. five load sheets checked and
verified for proper and correct
information, if applicable
Aircraft fleet checked for valid
weight check, if applicable
Minimum one check per aircraft of
correct loading and distribution, if
applicable
Training
Training records updated and
accurate
All pilot licenses checked for
currency, correct ratings and valid
medical check
All pilots received recurrent training
Training facilities & Instructors
approved
All pilots received daily inspection
(DI) training
Documentation
All issues of operations manual (OM)
checked for correct amendment status
AOC checked for validity and
appropriate operations specifications
Aviation requirements applicable and
updated
Crew flight and duty time record
updated, if applicable
Flight documents record checked and
updated
Compliance monitoring records checked
and updated
NON-COMPLIANCE REPORT
No:
To
Compliance
Manager
Category
Flight Operations
Training
Description:
Monitoring
Reported by:
Ground Handling
Documentation
Date:
Mass & Balance
Other
Reference
Level of finding:
Root-cause of non-compliance:
Suggested correction:
Compliance Monitoring Manager:
Corrective action required
Responsible Person:
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Corrective action:
Reference:
Signature Responsible Person:
Compliance Monitoring Manager
Correction and corrective action
Date:
verified Report Closed
Signature Compliance Monitoring Manager:
Date
GM4 ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6) Management system
AUDIT AND INSPECTION
(a) ‘Audit’ means a systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining evidence and evaluating it
objectively to determine the extent to which requirements are complied with.
(b) ‘Inspection’ means an independent documented conformity evaluation by observation and judgement
accompanied as appropriate by measurement, testing or gauging, in order to verify compliance with
applicable requirements.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (b) Management system
SIZE, NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE ACTIVITY
(a) An operator should be considered as complex when it has a workforce of more than 20 full time equivalents
(FTEs) involved in the activity subject to this Regulation.
(b) Operators with up to 20 FTEs involved in the activity subject to this Regulation may also be considered
complex based on an assessment of the following factors:
(1) in terms of complexity, the extent and scope of contracted activities subject to the approval;
(2) in terms of risk criteria, whether any of the following are present:
(i) operations requiring the following specific approvals: performance-based navigation (PBN), low
visibility operation (LVO), extended range operations with two-engined aeroplanes (ETOPS),
helicopter hoist operation (HHO), helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS), night vision
imaging system (NVIS) and dangerous goods (DG);
(ii) commercial specialised operations requiring an authorisation;
(iii) different types of aircraft used;
(iv) the environment (offshore, mountainous area, etc.).
AMC1 ORO.GEN.205 Contracted activities
RESPONSIBILITY WHEN CONTRACTING ACTIVITIES
(a) The operator may decide to contract certain activities to external organisations.
(b) A written agreement should exist between the operator and the contracted organisation clearly
defining the contracted a ctivities and the applicable requirements.
(c) The contracted safety related activities relevant to the agreement should be included in the operator's safety
management and compliance monitoring programmes.
(d) The operator should ensure that the contracted organisation has the necessary authorisation or
approval when required, and commands the resources and competence to undertake the ta sk.
GM1 ORO.GEN.205 Contracted activities
CONTRACTING - GENERAL
(a) Operators may decide to contract certain activities to external organisations for the provision of services
related to areas such as:
(1) ground de-icing/anti-icing;
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
ground handling;
flight support (including performance calculations, flight planning, navigation database and dispatch);
training; and
manual preparation.
(b) Contracted activities include all activities within the operator’s scope of approval that are performed by
another organisation either itself certified or authorised to carry out such activity or if not certified or
authorised, working under the operator’s approval.
(c) The ultimate responsibility for the product or service provided by external organisations should always
remain with the operator.
GM2 ORO.GEN.205 Contracted activities
RESPONSIBILITY WHEN CONTRACTING ACTIVITIES
(a) Regardless of the approval status of the contracted organisation, the contracting operator is responsible for
ensuring that all contracted activities are subject to hazard identification and risk management, as required
by ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3), and to compliance monitoring, as required by ORO.GEN.200 (a)(6).
(b) When the contracted organisation is itself certified or authorised to carry out the contracted activities, the
operator’s compliance monitoring should at least check that the approval effectively covers the contracted
activities and that it is still valid.
AMC1 ORO.GEN.220 (b) Record-keeping
GENERAL
(a) The record-keeping system should ensure that all records are accessible whenever needed within a
reasonable time. These records should be organised in a way that ensures traceability and retrievability
throughout the required retention period.
(b) Records should be kept in paper form or in electronic format or a combination of both. Records stored on
microfilm or optical disc format are also acceptable. The records should remain legible throughout the
required retention period. The retention period starts when the record has been created or last amended.
(c) Paper systems should use robust material which can withstand normal handling and filing. Computer
systems should have at least one backup system which should be updated within 24 hours of any
new entry. Computer systems should include safeguards against the ability of unauthorised personnel to
alter the data.
(d) All computer hardware used to ensure data backup should be stored in a different location from
that containing the working data and in an environment that ensures they remain in good condition.
When hardware or software changes take place, special care should be taken that all necessary data
continues to be accessible at least through the full period specified in the relevant Subpart. In the
absence of such indication, all records should be kept for a minimum period of 5 yea rs.
GM1 ORO.GEN.220 (b) Record-keeping
RECORDS
Microfilming or optical storage of records may be carried out at any time. The records should be as legible as
the original record and remain so for the required retention period.
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SUBPART AOC – AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATION
AMC1 ORO.AOC.100 App lication for an air operator certificate (AOC)
APPLICATION TIME FRAMES
The application for the initial issue of an AOC should be submitted at least 90 days before the intended start
date of operation. The operations manual may be submitted later, but in any case not later than 60 days before
the intended start date of operation.
AMC1 ORO.AOC.100 (a) Application for an air operator certificate
OPERATOR SECURITY PROGRAMME
In accordance with this Regulation, as part of granting the AOC, the CAT operator should provide MCAA with
the operator’s security programme, including security training. The security programme should be adapted to
the type and area of operation, as well as to the aircraft operated.
AMC1 ORO.AOC.110 Leasing agreement
GENERAL
The operator intending to lease-in an aircraft should provide MCAA with the following information:
(a) the aircraft type, registration markings and serial number;
(b) the name and address of the registered owner;
(c) a copy of the valid certificate of airworthiness;
(d) a copy of the lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial arrangements;
(e) duration of the lease; and
(f) in case of wet lease-in a copy of the AOC of the third country operator and the areas of operation.
The information mentioned above should be accompanied by a statement signed by the lessee that the
parties to the lease agreement fully understand their respective responsibilities under the applicable
regulations.
AMC1 ORO.AOC.110(c) Leasing agreement
WET LEASE-IN
If the operator is not intending to apply Maldivian safety requirements for air operations and continuing
airworthiness when wet leasing-in an aircraft registered in a third country, it should demonstrate to MCAA that
the standards complied with are equivalent to the following requirements:
(a) Annex IV (Part-CAT);
(b) Part-ORO:
(1) ORO.GEN.110 and Section 2 of Subpart GEN;
(2) ORO.MLR, excluding ORO.MLR.105;
(3) ORO.FC;
(4) ORO.CC, excluding ORO.CC.200 and ORO.CC.210 (a);
(5) ORO.TC;
(6) ORO.FTL, and
(7) ORO.SEC;
(c) Annex V (Part-SPA), if applicable;
(d) for continuing airworthiness management of the third country operator, Part-M6 Subpart-B, Subpart-C and
Subpart-G, excluding M.A.707, and M.A.710;
(e) for the maintenance organisation used by the third country operator during the lease period: Part-1457; and
(f) the operator should provide MCAA with a full description of the flight time limitation scheme(s), operating
procedures and safety assessment demonstrating compliance with the safety objectives set out in points (b)
(1)-(6).
AMC2 ORO.AOC.110(c) Leasing agreement
WET LEASE-IN
The lessee should maintain a record of occasions when lessors are used, for inspection by the State that issued
its AOC.
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GM1 ORO.AOC.110(c) Leasing agreement
SHORT TERM WET LEASE-IN
In anticipation of an operational need the operator may enter into an framework agreement with more than one
third country operator provided that these operators comply with ORO.AOC.110 (c). These third country
operators should be placed in a list maintained by the lessee.
AMC1 ORO.AOC.110 (f) Leasing agreement
WET LEASE-OUT
When notifying MCAA. the operator intending to wet lease-out an aircraft should provide MCAA with the
following information:
(a) the aircraft type, registration markings and serial number;
(b) the name and address of the lessee;
(c) a copy of the lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial arrangements; and
(d) the duration of the lease agreement.
AMC1 ORO.AOC.115 (a)(1) Code share agreements
INITIAL VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
(a) In order to verify the third country operator’s compliance with the applicable ICAO standards, in
particular ICAO annexes 1, 2, 6, Part I and III, as applicable, 8 and 18, the operator should conduct an
audit of the third country operator, including interviews of personnel and inspections carried out at
the third country operator’s facilities.
(b) The audit should focus on the operational, management and control systems of the operator.
AMC1 ORO.AOC.115 (b) Code share arrangements
CODE-SHARE AUDIT PROGRAMME
(a) Operators should establish a code-share audit programme for monitoring continuous compliance of the
third country operator with the applicable ICAO standards. Such code-share audit programme should
include:
(1) the audit methodology (audit report + compliance statements);
(2) details of the specific operational areas to audit ;
(3) criteria for defining satisfactory audit results;
(4) a system for reporting and correcting findings;
(5) A continuous monitoring system;
(6) auditor qualification and authorisation; and
(7) the frequency of audits.
(b) The third country code-share operator should be audited at periods not exceeding 24 months. The beginning
of the first 24-month oversight planning cycle is determined by the date of the first audit and should then
determine the start and end dates of the recurrent 24-month planning cycle. The interval between two
audits should not exceed 24 months.
(c) The operator should ensure a renewal audit of each third country code-share operator prior to the
audit expiry date of the previous audit. The audit expiry date for the previous audit becomes the audit
effective date for the renewal audit provided the closing meeting for the renewal audit is within 150 days
prior to the audit expiry date for the previous audit. If the closing meeting for the renewal audit is
more than 150 days prior to the audit expiry date from the previous audit, then the audit effective
dat e for the renewal audit is the day of the closing meeting of the renewal audit. Renewal audits are
valid for 24 consecutive months beginning with the audit effective date and ending with the audit
expiry date.
(d) A code-share audit could be shared by several operators. In case of a shared audit the report should be made
available for review by all duly identified sharing operators by any means.
(e) After closure of all findings identified during the audit, the operator should submit an audit compliance
statement to MCAA demonstrating that the third country operator meets all the applicable safety
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standards.
AMC2 ORO.AOC.115 (b) Code share agreements
THIRD PARTY PROVIDERS
(a) The initial audit and/or the continuous monitoring may be performed by a third party provider on behalf of
the operator when it is demonstrated that:
(1) a documented arrangement has been established with the third party provider;
(2) the audit standards applied by the third party provider addresses the scope of the regulation in
sufficient detail;
(3) the third party provider uses an evaluation system, designed to assess the operational,
management and control systems of the third country code-share operator;
(4) independence of the third party provider, its evaluation system as well as the impartiality of the
auditors is ensured;
(5) the auditors are appropriately qualified and have sufficient knowledge, experience and training,
including on-the-job training, to perform their allocated tasks;
(6) audits are performed on-site;
(7) access to the relevant data and facilities is granted to the level of detail necessary to verify
compliance with the applicable requirements;
(8) access to the full audit report is granted to the operator;
(9) procedures have been established for monitoring continued compliance of the third country codeshare operator with the applicable requirements, taking into account the timelines in AMC1
ORO.AOC.115(b)(b) and (c);
(10) procedures have been established to notify the third country code -share operator of any noncompliance with the applicable requirements, the corrective actions to be taken, the follow up of
these corrective actions and closure of findings;
(b) The use of a third party provider for the initial audit or the monitoring of continuous compliance of the third
country code -share operator does not exempt the operator from its responsibility under ORO.AOC.115.
(c) The operator should maintain a list of the third country code-share operators monitored by the third
party provider. This list and the full audit report prepared by the third party provider should be
made available to the MCAA upon request.
AMC1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring - aeroplanes
FLIGHT DATA MONITORING (FDM) PROGRAMME
(a) The safety manager, as defined under AMC1-ORO.GEN.200(a)(1), should be responsible for the
identification and assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the
process(es) concerned. The latter should be responsible for taking appropriate and practicable safety
action within a reasonable period of time that reflects the severity of the issue.
(b) An FDM programme should allow an operator to:
(1) identify areas of operational risk and quantify current safety margins;
(2) identify and quantify operational risks by highlighting occurrences of non-standard, unusual or
unsafe circumstances;
(3) use the FDM information on the frequency of such occurrences, combined with an estimation of
the level of severity, to assess the safety risks and to determine which may become unacceptable if the
discovered trend continues;
(4) put in place appropriate procedures for remedial action once an unacceptable risk, either actually
present or predicted by trending, has been identified; and
(5) confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring.
(c) FDM analysis techniques should comprise the following:
(1) Exceedance detection: searching for deviations from aircraft flight manual limits and standard operating
procedures. A set of core events should be selected to cover the main areas of interest to the
operator. A sample list is provided in Appendix 1 to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130. The event detection
limits should be continuously reviewed to reflect the operator’s current operating procedures.
(2) All flights measurement: a system defining what is normal practice. This may be accomplished by
retaining various snapshots of information from each flight.
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(3) Statistics - a series of data collected to support the analysis process: this technique should
include the number of flights flown per aircraft and sector details sufficient to generate rate and
trend information.
(d) FDM analysis, assessment and process control tools: the effective assessment of information obtained
from digital flight data should be dependent on the provision of appropriate information technology tool
sets.
(e) Education and publication: sharing safety information should be a fundamental principle of aviation
safety in helping to reduce accident rates. The operator should pass on the lessons learnt to all relevant
personnel and, where appropriate, industry.
(f)
Accident and incident data requirements specified in CAT.GEN.MPA.195 take precedence over the
requirements of an FDM programme. In these cases the FDR data should be retained as part of the
investigation data and may fall outside the de-identification agreements.
(g) Every crew member should be responsible to report events. Significant risk-bearing incidents detected by
FDM should therefore normally be the subject of mandatory occurrence reporting by the crew. If
this is not the case then they should submit a retrospective report that should be included under
the normal process for reporting and analysing hazards, incidents and accidents.
(h) The data recovery strategy should ensure a sufficiently representative capture of flight information to
maintain an overview of operations. Data analysis should be performed sufficiently frequently to enable
action to be taken on significant safety issues.
(i) The data retention strategy should aim to provide the greatest safety benefits practicable from the
available data. A full dataset should be retained until the action and review processes are complete;
thereafter, a reduced dataset relating to closed issues should be maintained for longer-term trend
analysis. Programme managers may wish to retain samples of de-identified full-flight data for various
safety purposes (detailed analysis, training, benchmarking etc.).
(j) The data access and security policy should restrict information access to authorised persons. When
data access is required for airworthiness and maintenance purposes, a procedure should be in place to
prevent disclosure of crew identity.
(k) The procedure to prevent disclosure of crew identity should be written in a document, which should be
signed by all parties (airline management, flight crew member representatives nominated either by
the union or the flight crew themselves). This procedure should, as a minimum, define:
(1) the aim of the FDM programme;
(2) a data access and security policy that should restrict access to information to specifically
authorised persons identified by their position;
(3) the method to obtain de-identified crew feedback on those occasions that require specific flight
follow-up for contextual information; where such crew contact is required the authorised
person(s) need not necessarily be the programme manager or safety manager, but could be a
third party (broker) mutually acceptable to unions or staff and management;
(4) the data retention policy and accountability including the measures taken to ensure the security of
the data;
(5) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should
always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner;
(6) the conditions under which the confidentiality may be withdrawn for reasons of gross negligence or
significant continuing safety concern;
(7) the participation of flight crew member representative(s) in the assessment of the data, the
action and review process and the consideration of recommendations; and
(8) the policy for publishing the findings resulting from FDM.
(l) Airborne systems and equipment used to obtain FDM data should range from an already installed
full quick access recorder (QAR), in a modern aircraft with digital systems, to a basic crash-protected
recorder in an older or less sophisticated aircraft. The analysis potential of the reduced data set available in
the lat ter case may reduce the safety benefits obtainable. The operator should ensure that FDM use does
not adversely affect the serviceability of equipment required for accident investigation.
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GM1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring – aeroplanes
DEFINITION OF AN FDM PROGRAMME
For the purposes of this Guidance Material, an FDM programme may be defined as a proactive and
non-punitive programme for gathering and analysing data recorded during routine flights to improve
aviation safety.
(a) FDM analysis techniques
(1) Exceedance detection
(i) FDM programmes are used for detecting exceedances, such as deviations from flight manual
limits, standard operating procedures (SOPs), or good airmanship. Typically, a set of core events
establishes the main areas of interest to operators.
Examples: high lift-off rotation rate, stall warning, ground proximity warning system
(GPWS) warning, flap limit speed exceedance, fast approach, high/low on glideslope, and
heavy landing.
(ii) Trigger logic expressions may be simple exceedances such as redline values. The majority,
however, are composites that define a certain flight mode, aircraft configuration or payload related
condition. Analysis software can also assign different sets of rules dependent on airport or
geography. For example, noise sensitive airports ma y use higher than normal glideslopes on
approach paths over populated areas. In addition, it might be valuable to define several levels of
exceedance severity (such as low, medium and high).
(iii) Exceedance detection provides useful information, which can complement that provided in crew
reports.
Examples: reduced flap landing, emergency descent, engine failure, rejected take-off, goaround, airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) or GPWS warning, and system
malfunctions.
(iv) The operator may also modify the standa rd set of core events to account for unique situations they
regularly experience, or the SOPs they use.
Example: to avoid nuisance exceedance reports from a non-standard instrument departure.
(v) The operator may also define new events to address specific problem areas.
Example: restrictions on the use of certain flap settings to increase component life.
(2) All-flights measurements
FDM data are retained from all flights, not just the ones producing significant events. A
selection of parameters is retained that is sufficient to characterise each flight and allow a
comparative analysis of a wide range of operational variability. Emerging trends and tendencies
may be identified and monitored before the trigger levels associated with exceedances are reached.
Examples of parameters monitored: take-off weight, flap setting, temperature, rotation and lift-off
speeds versus scheduled speeds, maximum pitch rate and attitude during rotation, and gear
retraction speeds, heights and times.
Examples of comparative analyses: pitch rates from high versus low take-off weights, good versus bad
weather approaches, and touchdowns on short versus long runways.
(3) Statistics
Series of data a re collected to support the analysis process: these usually include the numbers of flights
flown per aircraft and sector details sufficient to generate rate and trend information.
(4) Investigation of incidents flight data
Recorded flight data provide valuable information for follow-up to incidents and other technical
reports. They are useful in adding to the impressions and information recalled by the flight
crew. They also provide an accurate indication of system status and performance, which may help
in determining cause and effect relationships.
Examples of incidents where recorded data could be useful:
 high cockpit workload conditions as corroborated by such indicators as late descent, late
localizer and/or glideslope interception, late landing configuration;
 unstabilised and rushed approaches, glide path excursions, etc.;
 exceedances of prescribed operating limitations (such as flap limit speeds, engine
overtemperatures); and
 wake vortex encounters, turbulence encounters or other vertical accelerations.
It should be noted that recorded flight data have limitations, e.g. not all the information
displayed to the flight crew is recorded, the source of recorded data may be different from the
source used by a flight instrument, the sampling rate or the recording resolution of a parameter
may be insufficient to capture accurate information.
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(5) Continuing airworthiness
Data of all-flight measurements and exceedance detections can be utilized to assist the
continuing airworthiness function. For example, engine-monitoring programmes look at measures
of engine performance to determine operating efficiency and predict impending failures.
Examples of continuing airworthiness uses: engine thrust level and airframe drag measurements,
avionics and other system performance monitoring, flying control performance, and brake and
landing gear usage.
(b) FDM equipment
(1) General
FDM programme s generally involve systems that capture flight data, transform the data into an
appropriate format for analysis, and generate reports and visualisation to assist in assessing the
data. Typically, the following equipment capabilities are needed for effective FDM programmes:
(i) an on-board device to capture and record data on a wide range of in-flight parameters;
(ii) a means to transfer the data recorded on board the aircraft to a ground-based processing station.
(iii) a ground-based computer system to analyse the data, identify deviations from expected
performance, generate reports to assist in interpreting the read-outs, etc.; and
(iv) optional softwa re for a flight animation capability to integrate all data, presenting them as a
simulation of in-flight conditions, thereby facilitating visualisation of actual events.
(2) Airborne equipment
(i) The flight parameters and recording capacity required for flight data recorders (FDR) to support
accident investigations may be insufficient to support an effective FDM programme. Other
technical solutions are available, including the following:
(A) Quick access recorders (QARs). QARs are installed in the aircraft and record flight data onto a
low-cost removable medium.
(B) Some systems automatically download the recorded information via secure wireless
systems when the aircraft is in the vicinity of the gate. There are also systems that
enable the recorded data to be analysed on board while the aircraft is airborne.
(ii) Fleet composition, route structure and cost considerations will determine the most cost-effective
method of removing the data from the aircraft.
(3) Ground replay and analysis equipment
(i) Data are downloaded from the aircraft recording device into a ground-based processing
station, where the data are held securely to protect this sensitive information.
(ii) FDM programmes generate large amounts of data requiring specialised analysis software.
(iii) The analysis software checks the downloaded flight data for abnormalities.
(iv) The analysis software may include: annotated data trace displays, engineering unit listings,
visualisation for the most significant incidents, access to interpretative material, links to
other safety information and statistical presentations.
(c) FDM in practice
(1) FDM process
Typically, operators follow a closed-loop process in applying an FDM programme, for example:
(i) Establish a baseline: initially, operators establish a baseline of operational parameters against which
changes can be detected and measured.
Examples: rate of unstable approaches or hard landings.
(ii) Highlight unusual or unsafe circumstances: the user determines when non-standard, unusual or
basically unsafe circumstances occur; by comparing them to the baseline margins of safety,
the changes can be quantified.
Example: increases in unstable approaches (or other unsafe events) at particular locations.
(iii) Identify unsafe trends: based on the frequency and severity of occurrence, trends are identified.
Combined with an estimation of the level of severity, the risks are assessed to determine which
may become unacceptable if the trend continues.
Example: a new procedure has resulted in high rates of descent that are nearly triggering GPWS
warnings.
(iv) Mitigate risks: once an unacceptable risk has been identified, appropriate risk mitigation actions
are decided on and implemented.
Example: having found high rates of descent, the SOPs are changed to improve aircraft
control for optimum/maximum rates of descent.
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(v) Monitor effectiveness: once a remedial action has been put in place, its effectiveness is
monitored, confirming that it has reduced the identified risk and that the risk has not been
transferred elsewhere.
Example: confirm that other safety measures at the aerodrome with high rates of descent do not
change for the worse after changes in approach procedures.
(2) Analysis and follow-up
(i) FDM data are typically compiled every month or at shorter intervals. The data are then reviewed to
identify specific exceedances and emerging undesirable trends and to disseminate the information
to flight crews.
(ii) If deficiencies in pilot handling technique are evident, the information is usually de-identified in
order to protect the identity of the flight crew. The information on specific exceedances is
passed to a person (safety manager, agreed flight crew representative, honest broker)
assigned by the operator for confidential discussion with the pilot. The person assigned by
the operator provides the necessary contact with the pilot in order to clarify the circumstances,
obtain feedback and give advice and recommendations for appropriate action. Such
appropriate action could include re-training for the pilot (carried out in a constructive and
non-punitive way), revisions to manuals, changes to ATC and airport operating procedures.
(iii) Follow-up monitoring enables the effectiveness of any corrective actions to be assessed. Flight
crew feedback is essential for the identification and resolution of safety problems and could be
collected through interviews, for example by asking the following:
(A) Are the desired results being achieved soon enough?
(B) Have the problems really been corrected, or just relocated to another part of the system?
(C) Have new problems been introduced?
(iv) All events are usually archived in a database. The database is used to sort, validate and display the
data in easy -to-understand management report s. Over time, this archived data can provide a
picture of emerging trends and hazards that would otherwise go unnoticed.
(v) Lessons learned from the FDM programme may warrant inclusion in the operator’s safety
promotion programmes. Safety promotion media may include newsletters, flight safety
magazines, highlighting examples in training and simulator exercises, periodic reports to industry
and MCAA. Care is required, however, to ensure that any information acquired through FDM is
de-identified before using it in any training or promotional initiative.
(vi) All successes and failures are recorded, comparing planned programme objectives with expected
results. This provides a basis for review of the FDM programme and the foundation for future
programme development.
(d) Preconditions for an effective FDM programme
(1) Protection of FDM data
The integrity of FDM programmes rests upon protection of the FDM data. Any disclosure for
purposes other than safety management can compromise the voluntary provision of safety data, thereby
compromising flight safety.
(2) Essential trust
The trust established between management and flight crew is the foundation for a successful FDM
programme. This trust can be facilitated by:
(i) early participation of the flight crew representatives in the design, implementation and
operation of the FDM programme;
(ii) a formal agreement between management and flight crew, identifying the procedures for the use
and protection of data; and
(iii) data security, optimised by:
(A) adhering to the agreement;
(B) the operator strictly limiting data access to selected individuals;
(C) maintaining tight control to ensure that identifying data is kept securely; and
(D) ensuring that operational problems are promptly addressed by management.
(3) Requisite safety culture
Indicators of an effective safety culture typically include:
(i) top management’s demonstrated commitment to promoting a proactive safety culture;
(ii) a non-punitive operator policy that cover the FDM programme;
(iii) FDM programme management by dedicated staff under the authority of the safety manager, with
a high degree of specialisation and logistical support;
(iv) involvement of persons with appropriate expertise when identifying and assessing the risks
(for example, pilots experienced on the aircraft type being analysed);
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(v) monitoring fleet trends aggregated from numerous operations, not focusing only on specific
events;
(vi) a well-structured system to protect the confidentiality of the data; and
(vii) an efficient communication system for disseminating hazard information (and subsequent
risk assessments) internally and to other organisations to permit timely safety action.
(e) Implementing an FDM programme
(1) General considerations
(i) Typically, the following steps are necessary to implement an FDM programme:
(A) implementation of a formal agreement between management and flight crew;
(B) establishment and verification of operational and security procedures;
(C) installation of equipment;
(D) selection and training of dedicated and experienced staff to operate the programme; and
(E) commencement of data analysis and validation.
(ii) An operator with no FDM experience may need a year to achieve an operational FDM
programme. Another year may be necessary before any safety and cost benefits appear.
Improvements in the analysis software, or the use of outside specialist service providers, may
shorten these time frames.
(2) Aims and objectives of an FDM programme
(i) As with any project there is a need to define the direction and objectives of the work. A phased
approach is recommended so that the foundations are in place for possible subsequent expansion
into other areas. Using a building block approach will allow expansion, diversification and
evolution through experience.
Example: with a modular syst em, begin by looking at basic safety-related issues only. Add engine
health monitoring, etc in the second phase.
Ensure compatibility with other systems.
(ii) A staged set of objectives starting from the first week’s replay and moving through early
production reports into regular routine analysis will contribute to a sense of achievement as
milestones are met.
Examples of short-term, medium-term and long-term goals:
(A) Short-term goals:
- establish data download procedures, test replay software and identify aircraft defects;
- validate and investigate exceedance data; and
- establish a user-acceptable routine report format to highlight individual exceedances and
facilitate the acquisition of relevant statistics.
(B) Medium-term goals:
- Produce an annual report — include key performance indicators;
- add other modules to the analysis (e.g. continuing airworthiness); and
- plan for the next fleet to be added to programme.
(C) Long-term goals:
- Network FDM information across all of the operator’s safety information systems;
- ensure FDM provision for any proposed alternative training and qualification programme
(ATQP); and
- use utilisation and condition monitoring to reduce spares holdings.
(iii) Initially, focusing on a few known area s of interest will help prove the system’s
effectiveness. In contrast to an undisciplined ‘scatter-gun’ approach, a focused approach is more
likely to gain early success.
Examples: rushed approaches, or rough runways at particular aerodromes. Analysis of such
known problem areas may generate useful information for the analysis of other areas.
(3) The FDM team
(i) Experience has shown that the ‘team’ necessary to run an FDM programme could vary in
size from one person for a small fleet, t o a dedicated section for large fleets. The
descriptions below identify various functions to be fulfilled, not all of which need a dedicated
position.
(A) Team leader: it is essential that the team leader earns the trust and full support of both
management and flight crew. The team leader acts independently of others in line
management to make recommendations that will be seen by all to have a high level of
integrity and impartiality. The individual requires good analytical, presentation and
management skills.
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(B) Flight operations interpreter: this person is usually a current pilot (or perhaps a recently
retired senior captain or instructor), who knows the operator’s route network and
aircraft. This team member’s in-depth knowledge of SOPs, aircraft handling characteristics,
aerodromes and routes is used to place the FDM data in a credible context.
(C) Technical interpreter: this person interprets FDM data with respect to the technical aspects of
the aircraft operation and is familiar with the power plant, structures and systems departments’
requirements for information and any other engineering monitoring programmes in use by the
operator.
(D) Gate-keeper: this person provides the link between the fleet or training managers and
flight crew involved in events highlighted by FDM. The position requires good people
skills and a positive attitude towards safety education. The person is typically a
representative of the flight crew association or an ‘honest broker’ and is the only
person permitted to connect the identifying data with the event. It is essential that this
person earns the trust of both management and flight crew.
(E) Engineering technical support: this person is usually an avionics specialist, involved in
the supervision of mandatory serviceability requirements for FDR systems. This team
member is knowledgeable about FDM and the associated systems needed to run the
programme.
(F) Replay operative and administrator: this person is responsible for the day-to-day running of
the system, producing reports and analysis.
(ii) All FDM team members need appropriate training or experience for their respective area of data
analysis. Each team member is allocated a realistic amount of time to regularly spend on FDM
tasks.
Appendix 1 to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring - aeroplanes
TABLE OF FDM EVENTS
The following table provides examples of FDM events that may be further developed using operator and
aeroplane specific limits. The table is considered illustrative and not exhaustive.
Event Group
Rejected take-off
Take-off pitch
Unstick speeds
Height loss in climb-out
Slow climb-out
Climb-out speeds
High rate of descent
Missed approach
Low approach
Glideslope
Approach power
Approach speeds
Landing flap
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High speed rejected take-off
Pitch rate high on take-off
Pitch attitude high during take-off
Unstick speed high
Unstick speed low
Initial climb height loss 20 ft above ground level (AGL) to 400 ft above
aerodrome level (AAL)
Initial climb height loss 400 ft to 1 500 ft AAL
Excessive time to 1 000 ft AAL after take-off
Climb-out speed high below 400 ft AAL
Climb-out speed high 400 ft AAL to 1 000 ft AAL
Climb-out speed low 35 ft AGL to 400 ft AAL
Climb-out speed low 400 ft AAL to 1 500 ft AAL
High rate of descent below 2 000 ft AGL
Missed approach below 1 000 ft AAL
Missed approach above 1 000 ft AAL
Low on approach
Deviation under glideslope
Deviation above glideslope (below 600 ft AGL)
Low power on approach
Approach speed high within 90 seconds of touchdown
Approach speed high below 500 ft AAL
Approach speed high below 50 ft AGL
Approach speed low within 2 minutes of touchdown
Late land flap (not in position below 500 ft AAL)
Reduced flap landing
Flap load relief system operation
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Landing pitch
Bank angles
Normal acceleration
Abnormal configuration
Ground proximity warning
Airborne collision avoidance
system (ACAS II) warning
Margin to stall/buffet
Aircraft flight manual limitations
Pitch attitude high on landing
Pitch attitude low on landing
Excessive bank below 100 ft AGL
Excessive bank 100 ft AGL to 500 ft AAL
Excessive bank above 500 ft AGL
Excessive bank near ground (below 20 ft AGL)
High normal acceleration on ground
High normal acceleration in flight flaps up (+/- increment)
High normal acceleration in flight flaps down(+/- increment)
High normal acceleration at landing
Take-off configuration warning
Early configuration change after take-off (flap)
Speed brake with flap
Speed brake on approach below 800 ft AAL
Speed brake not armed below 800 ft AAL
Ground proximity warning system (GPWS) operation - hard warning
GPWS operation - soft warning
GPWS operation – windshear warning
GPWS operation - false warning
ACAS operation – Resolution Advisory
Stick shake
False stick shake
Reduced lift margin except near ground
Reduced lift margin at take-off
Low buffet margin (above 20 000 ft)
Maximum operating speed limit (VMO) exceedance
Maximum operating speed limit (MMO) exceedance
Flap placard speed exceedance
Gear down speed exceedance
Gear selection up/down speed exceedance
Flap/slat altitude exceedance
Maximum operating altitude exceedance
GM2 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring - aeroplanes
FLIGHT DATA MONITORING
Additional guidance material for the establishment of flight data monitoring can be found in UK Civil Aviation
Authority CAP 739 (Flight Data Monitoring).
AMC1 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
(a) The person may hold more than one of the nominated posts if such an arrangement is considered suitable
and properly matched to the scale and scope of the operation.
(b) A description of the functions and the responsibilities of the nominated persons, including their
names, should be contained in the operations manual.
(c) The holder of an AOC should make arrangements to ensure continuity of supervision in the absence of
nominated persons.
(d) The person nominated by the holder of an AOC should not be nominated by another holder of an AOC,
unless agreed with the competent authorities concerned.
(e) Persons nominated should be contracted to work sufficient hours to fulfil the management functions
associated with the scale and scope of the operation.
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AMC2 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
COMBINATION OF NOMINATED PERSONS R ESPONSIBILITIES
(a)
The acceptability of a single person holding several posts, possibly in combination with being the
accountable manager, should depend upon the nature and scale of the operation. The two main areas
of concern should be competence and an individual’s capacity to meet his/her responsibilities.
(b) As regards competence in different areas of responsibility, there should not be any difference from
the requirements applicable to persons holding only one post.
(c) The capacity of an individual to meet his/her responsibilities should primarily be dependent upon
the scale of the operation. However the complexity of the organisation or of the operation may
prevent, or limit, combinations of posts which may be acceptable in other circumstances.
(d) In most circumstances, the responsibilities of a nominated person should rest with a single individual.
However, in the area of ground operations, it may be acceptable for responsibilities to be split, provided
that the responsibilit ies of each individual concerned are clearly defined.
GM1 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
The smallest organisation that can be considered is the one-man organisation where all of the nominated
posts are filled by the accountable manager, and audits are conducted by an independent person.
GM2 ORO.AOC.135 (a) Personnel requirements
COMPETENCE OF NOMINATED PERSONS
(a) Nominated persons in accordance with ORO.AOC.135 should be expected to possess the experience
and licensing provisions that are listed in (b) to (f). Exceptionally, in particular cases, MCAA may
accept a nomination that does not meet these provisions in full. In that circumstance, the nominee should
have comparable experience and also the ability to perform effectively the functions associated with the
post and with the scale of the operation.
(b) Nominated persons should have:
(1) practical experience and expertise in the application of aviation safety standards and safe operating
practices;
(2) comprehensive knowledge of:
(i) the applicable safety regulations and any associated requirements and procedures;
(ii) the AOC holder's operations specifications; and
(iii) the need for, and content of, the relevant parts of the AOC holder's operations manual;
(3) familiarity with management systems preferably in the area of aviation;
(4) appropriate management experience, preferably in a comparable organisation; and
(5) 5 years of relevant work experience of which at least 2 years should be from the aeronautical industry
in an appropriate position.
(c) Flight operations. The nominated person should hold or have held a valid flight crew licence and the
associated ratings appropriate to a type of operation conducted under the AOC. In case the nominated
person’s licence and ratings are not current, his/her deputy should hold a valid flight crew licence and the
associated ratings.
(d) Crew training. The nominated person or his/her deputy should be a current type rating instructor on a
type/class operated under the AOC. The nominated person should have a thorough knowledge of the AOC
holder’s crew training concept for flight, cabin and when relevant other crew.
(e) Ground operations. The nominated person should have a thorough knowledge of the AOC holder’s ground
operations concept.
(f) Continuing airworthiness. The nominated person should have the relevant knowledge and appropriate
experience requirements related to aircraft continuing airworthiness as detailed in Part-M.
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GM1 ORO.AOC.140 (b);(c) Facility requirements
VFR DAY OPERATIONS WITH AEROPLANES WITH A MOPSC OF LESS THAN 7 AND
HELICOPTERS WITH A MOPSC OF LESS THAN 5 TAKING OFF AND LANDING AT THE SAME
AERODROME OR OPERATING SITE
Taking into account the size of the operator and the type of operations, appropriate facilities may consist in
arrangements for:
(a) suitable office accommodation for the nominated person(s), as requested by ORO.AOC.135, and
(b) adequate working space for the flight preparation to be performed by the flight crew.
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SUBPART DEC — DECLARATION
AMC1 ORO.DEC.100 (d) Declaration
CHANGES
The new declaration should be submitted before the change becomes effective indicating the date as of which
the change would apply.
GM1 ORO.DEC.100 Declaration
GENERAL
The intent of the declaration is to:
(a) have the operator acknowledge its responsibilities under the applicable safety regulations and that it holds
all necessary approvals;
(b) inform the competent authority of the existence of an operator; and
(c) enable the competent authority to fulfil its oversight responsibilities in accordance with ARO.GEN.300 and
305.
MANAGED OPERATIONS
When the non-commercial operation of a complex motor-powered aircraft is managed by a third party on behalf
of the owner, that party may be the operator in the sense of the Essencial Requirements, and therefore has to
declare its capability and means to discharge the responsibilities associated with the operation of the aircraft to
MCAA.
In such a case, it should also be assessed whether the third party operator undertakes a commercial operation in
the sense of the Essencial Requirements.
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SUBPART SPO — COMMERCIAL SPECIALISED OPERATIONS
AMC1 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
(a) The person may hold more than one of the nominated posts if such an arrangement is considered suitable
and properly matched to the scale and scope of the commercial specialised operation.
(b) A description of the functions and the responsibilities of the nominated persons, including their names,
should be contained in the operations manual.
(c) A commercial specialised operator should make arrangements to ensure continuity of supervision in the
absence of nominated persons.
(d) The person nominated by a commercial specialised operator should normally not be nominated by another
commercial specialised operator.
(e) Persons nominated should be contracted to work sufficient hours to fulfil the management functions
associated with the scale and scope of the commercial specialised operation.
AMC2 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
COMBINATION OF NOMINATED PERSONS RESPONSIBILITIES
(a) The acceptability of a single person holding several posts, possibly in combination with being the
accountable manager, should depend upon the nature and scale of the commercial specialised operation.
The two main areas of concern should be competence and an individual’s capacity to meet his/her
responsibilities.
(b) As regards competence in different areas of responsibility, there should not be any difference from the
requirements applicable to persons holding only one post.
(c) The capacity of an individual to meet his/her responsibilities should primarily be dependent upon the scale
of the commercial specialised operation. However, the complexity of the organisation or of the operation
may prevent, or limit, combinations of posts which may be acceptable in other circumstances.
(d) In most circumstances, the responsibilities of a nominated person should rest with a single individual.
However, in the area of ground operations, it may be acceptable for responsibilities to be split, provided that
the responsibilities of each individual concerned are clearly defined.
GM1 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
NOMINATED PERSONS
The smallest organisation that can be considered is the one-man organisation where all of the nominated posts
are filled by the accountable manager, and audits are conducted by an independent person.
GM2 ORO.SPO.100 (a) Personnel requirements
COMPETENCE OF NOMINATED PERSONS
(a) Nominated persons in accordance with ORO.AOC.135 should normally be expected to possess the
experience and meet the licensing provisions that are listed in (b) to (f). There may be exceptional cases
where not all of the provisions can be met. In that circumstance, the nominee should have comparable
experience and also the ability to perform effectively the functions associated with the post and with the
scale of the specialised operation.
(b) Nominated persons should have:
(1) practical experience and expertise in the application of aviation safety standards and safe operating
practices;
(2) comprehensive knowledge of:
(i) the applicable safety regulations and any associated requirements and procedures;
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(ii) the operator’s high-risk specialised operation authorisation, if applicable; and
(iii) the need for, and content of, the relevant parts of the commercial specialised operator’s operations
manual;
(3) familiarity with management systems preferably in the area of aviation;
(4) appropriate management experience, preferably in a comparable organisation; and
(5) 5 years of relevant work experience of which at least 2 years should be from the aeronautical industry
in an appropriate position.
(c) Flight operations. The nominated person should hold or have held a valid flight crew licence and the
associated ratings appropriate to the type of commercial specialised operations conducted by the operator.
In case the nominated person’s licence and ratings are not current, his/her deputy should hold a valid flight
crew licence and the associated ratings.
(d) Crew training. The nominated person or his/her deputy should be a current type rating instructor on a
type/class operated by the commercial specialised operator. The nominated person should have a thorough
knowledge of the operator’s crew training concept for flight crew and when relevant other crew.
(e) Ground operations. The nominated person should have a thorough knowledge of the commercial
specialised operator’s ground operations concept.
(f) Continuing airworthiness. The nominated person should have the relevant knowledge and appropriate
experience requirements related to aircraft continuing airworthiness as detailed in Part-M.
AMC1 ORO.SPO.100(c) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
LEASING OF THIRD COUNTRY OPERATOR OR AIRCRAFT — INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO
MCAA
The operator intending to lease-in an aircraft or operator should provide the competent authority with the
following information:
(a) the aircraft type, registration markings and serial number;
(b) the name and address of the registered owner;
(c) a copy of the valid certificate of airworthiness;
(d) a copy of the lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial arrangements;
(e) duration of the lease.
The information mentioned above should be accompanied by a statement signed by the lessee that the parties to
the lease agreement fully understand their respective responsibilities under the applicable regulations.
GM1 ORO.SPO.100(c) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
LEASE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OPERATORS REGISTERED IN AN EU MEMBER STATE
No approval is required for any lease agreements between operators having their principle place of business in
the Maldives.
AMC1 ORO.SPO.100(c)(1) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
WET LEASE-IN OF AN AIRCRAFT REGISTERED IN A THIRD COUNTRY
If the operator is not intending to apply Maldivian safety requirements for air operations and continuing
airworthiness when wet leasing-in an aircraft registered in a third country, it should demonstrate to MCAA that
the standards complied with are equivalent to the following requirements:
(a) Annex VIII (Part-SPO);
(b) Part-ORO:
(1) ORO.GEN.110 and Section 2 of Subpart GEN;
(2) ORO.MLR, excluding ORO.MLR.105;
(3) ORO.FC;
(c) Annex V (Part-SPA), if applicable;
(d) for continuing airworthiness management of the third country operator, Part-M Subpart-B, Subpart-C and
Subpart-G, excluding M.A.707, and M.A.710;
(e) for the maintenance organisation used by the third country operator during the lease period: Part-145; and
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(f) the operator should provide the competent authority with a full description of the operating procedures and
safety assessment demonstrating compliance with the requirements safety objectives set out in points (b)
(1)-(3).
AMC2 ORO.SPO.100(c)(1) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
WET LEASE-IN
The lessee should maintain a record of occasions when lessors are used, for inspection by MCAA.
GM1 ORO.SPO.100(c)(1) Common requirements for commercial specialised operators
SHORT-TERM WET LEASE-IN
In anticipation of an operational need the operator may enter into a framework agreement with more than one
third country operator provided that these operators comply with ORO.SPO.110(c). These third country
operators should be placed in a list maintained by the lessee.
GM1 ORO.SPO.110 (a) Authorisation of high-risk commercial specialised operations
DECLARATION/AUTHORISATION
Any commercial specialised operator should declare its activity to MCAA, as required by ORO.DEC.100.
GM2 ORO.SPO.110 (a) Authorisation of high-risk commercial specialised operations
VALIDITY OF THE AUTHORISATION
The operator may submit an application to MCAA for a single event, a defined series of flights or for an
unlimited duration, depending on the type of operations foreseen.
GM1 ORO.SPO.115 (a) Changes
GENERAL
Any change to information contained in the authorisation, but not leading to an amendment of the SOPs or the
operator’s risk assessment should be notified by the commercial specialised operator to MCAA to amend the
authorisation.
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SUBPART MLR – MANUALS, LOGS AND RECORDS
AMC1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
GENERAL
(a) The operations manual (OM) may vary in detail according to the complexity of the operation and of the
type and number of aircraft operated.
(b) The OM or parts thereof may be presented in any form, including electronic form. In all cases, the
accessibility, usability and reliability should be assured.
(c) The OM should be such that:
(1) all parts of the manual are consistent and compatible in form and content;
(2) the manual can be readily amended; and
(3) the content and amendment status of the manual is controlled and clearly indicated.
(d) The OM should include a description of its amendment and revision process specifying:
(1) the person(s) who may approve amendments or revisions;
(2) the conditions for temporary revisions and/or immediate amendments or revision required in the
interest of safety; and
(3) the methods by which operator personnel are advised of the changes.
(e) The OM content may be based on, or may refer to, industry codes of practice.
(f) When compiling an OM, the operator may take advantage of the contents of other relevant documents.
Material produced by the operator for the type-related part of the OM may be supplemented with, or
substituted by, applicable parts of the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or, where such a document exists, by an
aircraft operating manual produced by the manufacturer of the aircraft.
(g) In the case of commercial operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aircraft or non-commercial
operations, a ‘pilot operating handbook’ (POH), or equivalent document, may be used as the type-related
part of the OM, provided that the POH covers the normal and abnormal/emergency operating procedures.
(h) For the route and aerodrome part of the OM, material produced by the operator may be supplemented with
or substituted by applicable route guide material produced by a specialist company.
(i) If the operator chooses to use material from another source in the OM, either the applicable material should
be copied and included directly in the relevant part of the OM, or the OM should contain a reference to the
appropriate section of that applicable material.
(j) If the operator chooses to make use of material from another source (e.g. a route manual producer, an
aircraft manufacturer or a training organisation), this does not absolve the operator from the responsibility
of verifying the applicability and suitability of this material. Any material received from an external source
should be given its status by a statement in the OM.
AMC2 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — General
CONTENTS — NON-COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
AND COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT) OPERATIONS WITH SINGLE-ENGINED PROPELLERDRIVEN AEROPLANES WITH A MOPSC OF 5 OR SINGLE ENGINED NON-COMPLEX HELICOPTERS
WITH A MOPSC OF 5, TAKING OFF AND LANDING AT THE SAME AERODROME OR OPERATING
SITE, UNDER VFR BY DAY AND CAT OPERATIONS WITH SAILPLANES AND BALLOONS
The OM should contain at least the following information, where applicable:
(a) Table of contents;
(b) Amendment control status and list of effective pages or paragraphs, unless the entire manual is re-issued
and the manual has an effective date on it;
(c) Duties, responsibilities and succession of management and operating personnel;
(d) Description of the management system;
(e) Operational control system;
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(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
Flight time limitations;
Standard operating procedures (SOPs);
Weather limitations;
Emergency procedures;
Accidents/incidents considerations;
Security procedures;
Minimum equipment list (MEL);
Personnel qualifications and training;
Record-keeping;
Normal flight operations;
Performance operating limitations;
Use/protection of flight data recorder (FDR)/cockpit voice recorder (CVR) records, where applicable;
Handling of dangerous goods.
AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
CONTENTS — CAT OPERATIONS
(a) The OM should contain at least the following information, where applicable, as relevant for the area and
type of operation:
A
GENERAL/BASIC
0
ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONS MANUAL
0.1 Introduction:
(a) A statement that the manual complies with all applicable regulations and with the terms and conditions
of the applicable AOC.
(b) A statement that the manual contains operational instructions that are to be complied with by the
relevant personnel.
(c) A list and brief description of the various parts, their contents, applicability and use.
(d) Explanations and definitions of terms and words needed for the use of the manual.
0.2 System of amendment and revision:
(a) Details of the person(s) responsible for the issuance and insertion of amendments and revisions.
(b) A record of amendments and revisions with insertion dates and effective dates.
(c) A statement that handwritten amendments and revisions are not permitted, except in situations
requiring immediate amendment or revision in the interest of safety.
(d) A description of the system for the annotation of pages or paragraphs and their effective dates.
(e) A list of effective pages or paragraphs.
(f) Annotation of changes (in the text and, as far as practicable, on charts and diagrams).
(g) Temporary revisions.
(h) A description of the distribution system for the manuals, amendments and revisions.
1
ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1.1 Organisational structure. A description of the organisational structure, including the general organogram
and operations departments’ organograms. The organogram should depict the relationship between the
operations departments and the other departments of the operator. In particular, the subordination and
reporting lines of all divisions, departments, etc., which pertain to the safety of flight operations, should be
shown.
1.2 Nominated persons. The name of each nominated person responsible for flight operations, crew training and
ground operations, as prescribed in ORO.AOC.135. A description of their function and responsibilities
should be included.
1.3 Responsibilities and duties of operations management personnel. A description of the duties,
responsibilities and authority of operations management personnel pertaining to the safety of flight
operations and the compliance with the applicable regulations.
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1.4 Authority, duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command/commander. A statement defining the
authority, duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command/commander.
1.5 Duties and responsibilities of crew members other than the pilot-in-command/commander.
2
OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
2.1 Supervision of the operation by the operator. A description of the system for supervision of the operation by
the operator (see ORO.GEN.110(c)). This should show how the safety of flight operations and the
qualifications of personnel are supervised. In particular, the procedures related to the following items
should be described:
(a) licence and qualification validity,
(b) competence of operations personnel,
(c) control, analysis and storage of the required records.
2.2 System and responsibility for promulgation of additional operational instructions and information. A
description of any system for promulgating information which may be of an operational nature, but which is
supplementary to that in the OM. The applicability of this information and the responsibilities for its
promulgation should be included.
2.3 Operational control. A description of the procedures and responsibilities necessary to exercise operational
control with respect to flight safety.
2.4 Powers of the authority. A description of the powers of the competent authority and guidance to staff on
how to facilitate inspections by authority personnel.
3
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A description of the management system, including at least the following:
(a) safety policy;
(b) the process for identifying safety hazards and for evaluating and managing the associated risks;
(c) compliance monitoring system;
(d) allocation of duties and responsibilities;
(e) documentation of all key management system processes.
4
CREW COMPOSITION
4.1 Crew composition. An explanation of the method for determining crew compositions, taking account of the
following:
(a) the type of aircraft being used;
(b) the area and type of operation being undertaken;
(c) the phase of the flight;
(d) the minimum crew requirement and flight duty period planned;
(e) experience (total and on type), recency and qualification of the crew members;
(f) the designation of the pilot-in-command/commander and, if necessitated by the duration of the flight,
the procedures for the relief of the pilot-in-command/commander or other members of the flight crew
(see ORO.FC.105);
(g) the designation of the senior cabin crew member and, if necessitated by the duration of the flight, the
procedures for the relief of the senior cabin crew member and any other member of the cabin crew.
4.2 Designation of the pilot-in-command/commander. The rules applicable to the designation of the pilot-incommand/commander.
4.3 Flight crew incapacitation. Instructions on the succession of command in the event of flight crew
incapacitation.
4.4 Operation on more than one type. A statement indicating which aircraft are considered as one type for the
purpose of:
(a) flight crew scheduling; and
(b) cabin crew scheduling.
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5
QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
5.1 A description of the required licence, rating(s), qualification/competency (e.g. for routes and aerodromes),
experience, training, checking and recency for operations personnel to conduct their duties. Consideration
should be given to the aircraft type, kind of operation and composition of the crew.
5.2 Flight crew:
(a) pilot-in-command/commander,
(b) pilot relieving the pilot-in-command/commander,
(c) co-pilot,
(d) pilot relieving the co-pilot,
(e) pilot under supervision,
(f) system panel operator,
(g) operation on more than one type or variant.
5.3 Cabin crew:
(a) senior cabin crew member,
(b) cabin crew member:
(i) required cabin crew member,
(ii) additional cabin crew member and cabin crew member during familiarisation flights,
(c) operation on more than one type or variant.
5.4 Training, checking and supervision personnel:
(a) for flight crew; and
(b) for cabin crew.
5.5 Other operations personnel (including technical crew and crew members other than flight, cabin and
technical crew).
6
CREW HEALTH PRECAUTIONS
6.1 Crew health precautions. The relevant regulations and guidance to crew members concerning health,
including the following:
(a) alcohol and other intoxicating liquids,
(b) narcotics,
(c) drugs,
(d) sleeping tablets,
(e) anti-depressants,
(f) pharmaceutical preparations,
(g) immunisation,
(h) deep-sea diving,
(i) blood/bone marrow donation,
(j) meal precautions prior to and during flight,
(k) sleep and rest,
(l) surgical operations.
7
FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS
7.1 Flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements.
7.2 Exceedance of flight and duty time limitations and/or reductions of rest periods. Conditions under which
flight and duty time may be exceeded or rest periods may be reduced, and the procedures used to report
these modifications.
8
OPERATING PROCEDURES
8.1 Flight preparation instructions. As applicable to the operation:
8.1.1 Minimum flight altitudes. A description of the method of determination and application of minimum
altitudes including:
(a) a procedure to establish the minimum altitudes/flight levels for visual flight rules (VFR) flights; and
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(b) a procedure to establish the minimum altitudes/flight levels for instrument flight rules (IFR) flights.
8.1.2 Criteria and responsibilities for determining the adequacy of aerodromes to be used.
8.1.3 Methods and responsibilities for establishing aerodrome operating minima. Reference should be made to
procedures for the determination of the visibility and/or runway visual range (RVR) and for the
applicability of the actual visibility observed by the pilots, the reported visibility and the reported RVR.
8.1.4 En-route operating minima for VFR flights or VFR portions of a flight and, where single-engined aircraft
are used, instructions for route selection with respect to the availability of surfaces that permit a safe forced
landing.
8.1.5 Presentation and application of aerodrome and en-route operating minima.
8.1.6 Interpretation of meteorological information. Explanatory material on the decoding of meteorological
(MET) forecasts and MET reports relevant to the area of operations, including the interpretation of
conditional expressions.
8.1.7 Determination of the quantities of fuel, oil and water methanol carried. The methods by which the
quantities of fuel, oil and water methanol to be carried are determined and monitored in-flight. This section
should also include instructions on the measurement and distribution of the fluid carried on board. Such
instructions should take account of all circumstances likely to be encountered on the flight, including the
possibility of in-flight re-planning and of failure of one or more of the aircraft’s power plants. The system
for maintaining fuel and oil records should also be described.
8.1.8 Mass and centre of gravity. The general principles of mass and centre of gravity including the following:
(a) definitions;
(b) methods, procedures and responsibilities for preparation and acceptance of mass and centre of gravity
calculations;
(c) the policy for using standard and/or actual masses;
(d) the method for determining the applicable passenger, baggage and cargo mass;
(e) the applicable passenger and baggage masses for various types of operations and aircraft type;
(f) general instructions and information necessary for verification of the various types of mass and balance
documentation in use;
(g) last-minute changes procedures;
(h) specific gravity of fuel, oil and water methanol;
(i) seating policy/procedures;
(j) for helicopter operations, standard load plans.
8.1.9 Air traffic services (ATS) flight plan. Procedures and responsibilities for the preparation and submission of
the ATS flight plan. Factors to be considered include the means of submission for both individual and
repetitive flight plans.
8.1.10 Operational flight plan. Procedures and responsibilities for the preparation and acceptance of the
operational flight plan. The use of the operational flight plan should be described, including samples of the
operational flight plan formats in use.
8.1.11 Operator’s aircraft technical log. The responsibilities and the use of the operator’s aircraft technical log
should be described, including samples of the format used.
8.1.12 List of documents, forms and additional information to be carried.
8.2 Ground handling instructions. As applicable to the operation:
8.2.1 Fuelling procedures. A description of fuelling procedures, including:
(a) safety precautions during refuelling and defueling including when an auxiliary power unit is in
operation or when rotors are running or when an engine is or engines are running and the prop-brakes
are on;
(b) refuelling and defuelling when passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking; and
(c) precautions to be taken to avoid mixing fuels.
8.2.2 Aircraft, passengers and cargo handling procedures related to safety. A description of the handling
procedures to be used when allocating seats, embarking and disembarking passengers and when loading and
unloading the aircraft. Further procedures, aimed at achieving safety whilst the aircraft is on the ramp,
should also be given. Handling procedures should include:
(a) special categories of passengers, including children/infants, persons with reduced mobility,
inadmissible passengers, deportees and persons in custody;
(b) permissible size and weight of hand baggage;
(c) loading and securing of items in the aircraft;
(d) positioning of ground equipment;
(e) operation of aircraft doors;
(f) safety on the aerodrome/operating site, including fire prevention and safety in blast and suction areas;
(g) start-up, ramp departure and arrival procedures, including, for aeroplanes, push-back and towing
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operations;
(h) servicing of aircraft;
(i) documents and forms for aircraft handling;
(j) special loads and classification of load compartments; and
(k) multiple occupancy of aircraft seats.
8.2.3 Procedures for the refusal of embarkation. Procedures to ensure that persons who appear to be intoxicated,
or who demonstrate by manner or physical indications that they are under the influence of drugs, are
refused embarkation. This does not apply to medical patients under proper care.
8.2.4 De-icing and anti-icing on the ground. A description of the de-icing and anti-icing policy and procedures
for aircraft on the ground. These should include descriptions of the types and effects of icing and other
contaminants on aircraft whilst stationary, during ground movements and during take-off. In addition, a
description of the fluid types used should be given, including the following:
(a) proprietary or commercial names,
(b) characteristics,
(c) effects on aircraft performance,
(d) hold-over times,
(e) precautions during usage.
8.3 Flight Procedures:
8.3.1 VFR/IFR Policy. A description of the policy for allowing flights to be made under VFR, or for requiring
flights to be made under IFR, or for changing from one to the other.
8.3.2 Navigation Procedures. A description of all navigation procedures, relevant to the type(s) and area(s) of
operation. Special consideration should be given to:
(a) standard navigational procedures, including policy for carrying out independent cross-checks of
keyboard entries where these affect the flight path to be followed by the aircraft; and
(b) required navigation performance (RNP), minimum navigation performance specification (MNPS) and
polar navigation and navigation in other designated areas;
(c) in-flight re-planning;
(d) procedures in the event of system degradation; and
(e) reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM), for aeroplanes.
8.3.3 Altimeter setting procedures, including, where appropriate, use of:
(a) metric altimetry and conversion tables; and
(b) QFE operating procedures.
8.3.4 Altitude alerting system procedures for aeroplanes or audio voice alerting devices for helicopters.
8.3.5 Ground proximity warning system (GPWS)/terrain avoidance warning system (TAWS), for aeroplanes.
Procedures and instructions required for the avoidance of controlled flight into terrain, including limitations
on high rate of descent near the surface (the related training requirements are covered in OM-D 2.1).
8.3.6 Policy and procedures for the use of traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS)/airborne collision
avoidance system (ACAS) for aeroplanes and, when applicable, for helicopters.
8.3.7 Policy and procedures for in-flight fuel management.
8.3.8 Adverse and potentially hazardous atmospheric conditions. Procedures for operating in, and/or avoiding,
adverse and potentially hazardous atmospheric conditions, including the following:
(a) thunderstorms,
(b) icing conditions,
(c) turbulence,
(d) windshear,
(e) jet stream,
(f) volcanic ash clouds,
(g) heavy precipitation,
(h) sand storms,
(i) mountain waves,
(j) significant temperature inversions.
8.3.9 Wake turbulence. Wake turbulence separation criteria, taking into account aircraft types, wind conditions
and runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) location. For helicopters, consideration should also be
given to rotor downwash.
8.3.10 Crew members at their stations. The requirements for crew members to occupy their assigned stations or
seats during the different phases of flight or whenever deemed necessary in the interest of safety and, for
aeroplane operations, including procedures for controlled rest in the flight crew compartment.
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8.3.11 Use of restraint devices for crew and passengers. The requirements for crew members and passengers to
use safety belts and/or restraint systems during the different phases of flight or whenever deemed necessary
in the interest of safety.
8.3.12 Admission to flight crew compartment. The conditions for the admission to the flight crew compartment
of persons other than the flight crew. The policy regarding the admission of inspectors from an authority
should also be included.
8.3.13 Use of vacant crew seats. The conditions and procedures for the use of vacant crew seats.
8.3.14 Incapacitation of crew members. Procedures to be followed in the event of incapacitation of crew
members in-flight. Examples of the types of incapacitation and the means for recognising them should be
included.
8.3.15 Cabin safety requirements. Procedures:
(a) covering cabin preparation for flight, in-flight requirements and preparation for landing, including
procedures for securing the cabin and galleys;
(b) to ensure that passengers are seated where, in the event that an emergency evacuation is required, they
may best assist and not hinder evacuation from the aircraft;
(c) to be followed during passenger embarkation and disembarkation;
(d) when refuelling/defuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking;
(e) covering the carriage of special categories of passengers;
(f) covering smoking on board;
(g) covering the handling of suspected infectious diseases.
8.3.16 Passenger briefing procedures. The contents, means and timing of passenger briefing in accordance with
Annex IV (Part-CAT).
8.3.17 Procedures for aircraft operated whenever required cosmic or solar radiation detection equipment is
carried.
8.3.18 Policy on the use of autopilot and autothrottle for aircraft fitted with these systems.
8.4 Low visibility operations (LVO). A description of the operational procedures associated with LVO.
8.5 Extended-range operations with two-engined aeroplanes (ETOPS). A description of the ETOPS operational
procedures. (Refer to EASA AMC 20-6)
8.6 Use of the minimum equipment and configuration deviation list(s).
8.7 Non-revenue flights. Procedures and limitations, for example, for the following:
(a) non-commercial operations by AOC holders, a description of the differences to commercial operations,
(b) training flights,
(c) test flights,
(d) delivery flights,
(e) ferry flights,
(f) demonstration flights,
(g) positioning flights, including the kind of persons who may be carried on such flights.
8.8 Oxygen requirements:
8.8.1 An explanation of the conditions under which oxygen should be provided and used.
8.8.2 The oxygen requirements specified for the following persons:
(a) flight crew;
(b) cabin crew;
(c) passengers.
9
DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS
9.1 Information, instructions and general guidance on the transport of dangerous goods, in accordance with
Subpart G of Annex V (SPA.DG), including:
(a) operator’s policy on the transport of dangerous goods;
(b) guidance on the requirements for acceptance, labelling, handling, stowage and segregation of
dangerous goods;
(c) special notification requirements in the event of an accident or occurrence when dangerous goods are
being carried;
(d) procedures for responding to emergency situations involving dangerous goods;
(e) duties of all personnel involved; and
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(f) instructions on the carriage of the operator’s personnel on cargo aircraft when dangerous goods are
being carried.
9.2 The conditions under which weapons, munitions of war and sporting weapons may be carried.
10 SECURITY
Security instructions, guidance, procedures, training and responsibilities, taking into account CAR Part 19.
Some parts of the security instructions and guidance may be kept confidential.
11 HANDLING, NOTIFYING AND REPORTING ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES
Procedures for handling, notifying and reporting accidents, incidents and occurrences. This section should
include the following:
(a) definition of accident, incident and occurrence and of the relevant responsibilities of all persons
involved;
(b) illustrations of forms to be used for reporting all types of accident, incident and occurrence (or copies
of the forms themselves), instructions on how they are to be completed, the addresses to which they
should be sent and the time allowed for this to be done;
(c) in the event of an accident, descriptions of which departments, authorities and other organisations have
to be notified, how this will be done and in what sequence;
(d) procedures for verbal notification to air traffic service units of incidents involving ACAS resolution
advisories (RAs), bird hazards, dangerous goods and hazardous conditions;
(e) procedures for submitting written reports on air traffic incidents, ACAS RAs, bird strikes, dangerous
goods incidents or accidents, and unlawful interference;
(f) reporting procedures. These procedures should include internal safety-related reporting procedures to
be followed by crew members, designed to ensure that the pilot-in-command/commander is informed
immediately of any incident that has endangered, or may have endangered, safety during the flight, and
that the pilot-in-command/commander is provided with all relevant information.
(g) Procedures for the preservation of recordings following a reportable event.
12 RULES OF THE AIR
(a) Visual and instrument flight rules,
(b) Territorial application of the rules of the air,
(c) Communication procedures, including communication-failure procedures,
(d) Information and instructions relating to the interception of civil aircraft,
(e) The circumstances in which a radio listening watch is to be maintained,
(f) Signals,
(g) Time system used in operation,
(h) ATC clearances, adherence to flight plan and position reports,
(i) Visual signals used to warn an unauthorised aircraft flying in or about to enter a restricted, prohibited
or danger area,
(j) Procedures for flight crew observing an accident or receiving a distress transmission,
(k) The ground/air visual codes for use by survivors, and description and use of signal aids,
(l) Distress and urgency signals.
13 LEASING/CODE-SHARE
A description of the operational arrangements for leasing and code-share, associated procedures and
management responsibilities.
B
AIRCRAFT OPERATING MATTERS — TYPE RELATED
Taking account of the differences between types/classes, and variants of types, under the following
headings:
0
GENERAL INFORMATION AND UNITS OF MEASUREMENT
0.1 General information (e.g. aircraft dimensions), including a description of the units of measurement used for
the operation of the aircraft type concerned and conversion tables.
1
LIMITATIONS
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1.1 A description of the certified limitations and the applicable operational limitations should include the
following:
(a) certification status (e.g. EASA (supplemental) type certificate, environmental certification, etc.);
(b) passenger seating configuration for each aircraft type, including a pictorial presentation;
(c) types of operation that are approved (e.g. VFR/IFR, CAT II/III, RNP, flights in known icing
conditions, etc.);
(d) crew composition;
(e) mass and centre of gravity;
(f) speed limitations;
(g) flight envelope(s);
(h) wind limits, including operations on contaminated runways;
(i) performance limitations for applicable configurations;
(j) (runway) slope;
(k) for aeroplanes, limitations on wet or contaminated runways;
(l) airframe contamination;
(m) system limitations.
2
NORMAL PROCEDURES
The normal procedures and duties assigned to the crew, the appropriate checklists, the system for their use
and a statement covering the necessary coordination procedures between flight and cabin/other crew
members. The normal procedures and duties should include the following:
(a) pre-flight,
(b) pre-departure,
(c) altimeter setting and checking,
(d) taxi, take-off and climb,
(e) noise abatement,
(f) cruise and descent,
(g) approach, landing preparation and briefing,
(h) VFR approach,
(i) IFR approach,
(j) visual approach and circling,
(k) missed approach,
(l) normal landing,
(m) post-landing,
(n) for aeroplanes, operations on wet and contaminated runways.
3
ABNORMAL AND/OR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
The abnormal and/or emergency procedures and duties assigned to the crew, the appropriate checklists, the
system for their use and a statement covering the necessary coordination procedures between flight and
cabin/other crew members. The abnormal and/or emergency procedures and duties should include the
following:
(a) crew incapacitation,
(b) fire and smoke drills,
(c) for aeroplanes, un-pressurised and partially pressurised flight,
(d) for aeroplanes, exceeding structural limits such as overweight landing,
(e) lightning strikes,
(f) distress communications and alerting ATC to emergencies,
(g) engine/burner failure,
(h) system failures,
(i) guidance for diversion in case of serious technical failure,
(j) ground proximity warning, including for helicopters audio voice alerting device (AVAD) warning,
(k) ACAS/TCAS warning for aeroplanes/audio voice alerting device (AVAD) warning for helicopters,
(l) windshear,
(m) emergency landing/ditching,
(n) for aeroplanes, departure contingency procedures.
4
PERFORMANCE
4.0 Performance data should be provided in a form that can be used without difficulty.
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4.1 Performance data. Performance material that provides the necessary data for compliance with the
performance requirements prescribed in Annex IV (Part-CAT). For aeroplanes, this performance data
should be included to allow the determination of the following:
(a) take-off climb limits — mass, altitude, temperature;
(b) take-off field length (for dry, wet and contaminated runway conditions);
(c) net flight path data for obstacle clearance calculation or, where applicable, take-off flight path;
(d) the gradient losses for banked climb-outs;
(e) en-route climb limits;
(f) approach climb limits;
(g) landing climb limits;
(h) landing field length (for dry, wet and contaminated runway conditions) including the effects of an inflight failure of a system or device, if it affects the landing distance;
(i) brake energy limits;
(j) speeds applicable for the various flight stages (also considering dry, wet and contaminated runway
conditions).
4.1.1 Supplementary data covering flights in icing conditions. Any certified performance related to an allowable
configuration, or configuration deviation, such as anti-skid inoperative.
4.1.2 If performance data, as required for the appropriate performance class, are not available in the AFM, then
other data should be included. The OM may contain cross-reference to the data contained in the AFM
where such data are not likely to be used often or in an emergency.
4.2 Additional performance data for aeroplanes. Additional performance data, where applicable, including the
following:
(a) all engine climb gradients,
(b) drift-down data,
(c) effect of de-icing/anti-icing fluids,
(d) flight with landing gear down,
(e) for aircraft with 3 or more engines, one-engine-inoperative ferry flights,
(f) flights conducted under the provisions of the configuration deviation list (CDL).
5
FLIGHT PLANNING
5.1 Data and instructions necessary for pre-flight and in-flight planning including, for aeroplanes, factors such
as speed schedules and power settings. Where applicable, procedures for engine(s)-out operations, ETOPS
(particularly the one-engine-inoperative cruise speed and maximum distance to an adequate aerodrome
determined in accordance with Annex IV (Part-CAT)) and flights to isolated aerodromes should be
included.
5.2 The method for calculating fuel needed for the various stages of flight.
5.3 When applicable, for aeroplanes, performance data for ETOPS critical fuel reserve and area of operation,
including sufficient data to support the critical fuel reserve and area of operation calculation based on
approved aircraft performance data. The following data should be included:
(a) detailed engine(s)-inoperative performance data, including fuel flow for standard and non-standard
atmospheric conditions and as a function of airspeed and power setting, where appropriate, covering:
(i) drift down (includes net performance), where applicable;
(ii) cruise altitude coverage including 10 000 ft;
(iii) holding;
(iv) altitude capability (includes net performance); and
(v) missed approach;
(b) detailed all-engine-operating performance data, including nominal fuel flow data, for standard and
non-standard atmospheric conditions and as a function of airspeed and power setting, where
appropriate, covering:
(i) cruise (altitude coverage including 10 000 ft); and
(ii) holding;
(c) details of any other conditions relevant to ETOPS operations which can cause significant deterioration
of performance, such as ice accumulation on the unprotected surfaces of the aircraft, ram air turbine
(RAT) deployment, thrust-reverser deployment, etc.; and
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(d) the altitudes, airspeeds, thrust settings, and fuel flow used in establishing the ETOPS area of operations
for each airframe-engine combination should be used in showing the corresponding terrain and
obstruction clearances in accordance with Annex IV (Part-CAT).
6
MASS AND BALANCE
Instructions and data for the calculation of the mass and balance, including the following:
(a) calculation system (e.g. index system);
(b) information and instructions for completion of mass and balance documentation, including manual and
computer generated types;
(c) limiting masses and centre of gravity for the types, variants or individual aircraft used by the operator;
(d) dry operating mass and corresponding centre of gravity or index.
7
LOADING
Procedures and provisions for loading and unloading and securing the load in the aircraft.
8
CONFIGURATION DEVIATION LIST
The CDL(s), if provided by the manufacturer, taking account of the aircraft types and variants operated,
including procedures to be followed when an aircraft is being dispatched under the terms of its CDL.
9
MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL)
The MEL for each aircraft type or variant operated and the type(s)/area(s) of operation. The MEL should
also include the dispatch conditions associated with operations required for a specific approval (e.g. RNAV,
RNP, RVSM, ETOPS). Consideration should be given to using the ATA number system when allocating
chapters and numbers.
10 SURVIVAL AND EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT INCLUDING OXYGEN
10.1 A list of the survival equipment to be carried for the routes to be flown and the procedures for checking the
serviceability of this equipment prior to take-off. Instructions regarding the location, accessibility and use of
survival and emergency equipment and its associated checklist(s) should also be included.
10.2 The procedure for determining the amount of oxygen required and the quantity that is available. The flight
profile, number of occupants and possible cabin decompression should be considered.
11 EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES
11.1 Instructions for preparation for emergency evacuation, including crew coordination and emergency station
assignment.
11.2 Emergency evacuation procedures. A description of the duties of all members of the crew for the rapid
evacuation of an aircraft and the handling of the passengers in the event of a forced landing, ditching or
other emergency.
12 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
A description of the aircraft systems, related controls and indications and operating instructions.
Consideration should be given to use the ATA number system when allocating chapters and numbers.
C
ROUTE/ROLE/AREA
INFORMATION
1
Instructions and information relating to communications, navigation and aerodromes/operating sites,
including minimum flight levels and altitudes for each route to be flown and operating minima for each
aerodrome/operating site planned to be used, including the following:
(a) minimum flight level/altitude;
(b) operating minima for departure, destination and alternate aerodromes;
(c) communication facilities and navigation aids;
(d) runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) data and aerodrome/operating site facilities;
(e) approach, missed approach and departure procedures including noise abatement procedures;
(f) communication-failure procedures;
(g) search and rescue facilities in the area over which the aircraft is to be flown;
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(h) a description of the aeronautical charts that should be carried on board in relation to the type of flight
and the route to be flown, including the method to check their validity;
(i) availability of aeronautical information and MET services;
(j) en-route communication/navigation procedures;
(k) aerodrome/operating site categorisation for flight crew competence qualification;
(l) special aerodrome/operating site limitations (performance limitations and operating procedures, etc.).
D
TRAINING
1
Description of scope: Training syllabi and checking programmes for all operations personnel assigned to
operational duties in connection with the preparation and/or conduct of a flight.
2
Content: Training syllabi and checking programmes should include the following:
2.1 for flight crew, all relevant items prescribed in Annex IV (Part-CAT), Annex V (Part-SPA) and ORO.FC;
2.2 for cabin crew, all relevant items prescribed in Annex IV (Part-CAT), Annex V (Part-CC) of MCAR
AIRCREWand ORO.CC;
2.3 for technical crew, all relevant items prescribed in Annex IV (Part-CAT), Annex V (Part-SPA) and
ORO.TC;
2.4 for operations personnel concerned, including crew members:
(a) all relevant items prescribed in SPA.DG Subpart G of Annex IV (SPA.DG); and
(b) all relevant items prescribed in Annex IV (Part-CAT) and ORO.SEC; and
2.5 for operations personnel other than crew members (e.g. dispatcher, handling personnel, etc.), all other
relevant items prescribed in Annex IV (Part-CAT) and in this Annex pertaining to their duties.
3
Procedures:
3.1 Procedures for training and checking.
3.2 Procedures to be applied in the event that personnel do not achieve or maintain the required standards.
3.3 Procedures to ensure that abnormal or emergency situations requiring the application of part or all of the
abnormal or emergency procedures, and simulation of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) by
artificial means are not simulated during CAT operations.
4
Description of documentation to be stored and storage periods.
(b) Notwithstanding (a), an OM that is compiled in accordance with JAR-OPS 3 amendment 5 may be
considered to be compliant.
(c) If there are sections that, because of the nature of the operation, do not apply, it is recommended that
operators maintain the numbering system described in ORO.MLR.101 and above and insert ‘Not
applicable’ or ‘Intentionally blank’ where appropriate.
AMC4 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — General
CONTENTS – NON-COMMERCIAL SPECIALISED OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTORPOWERED AIRCRAFT AND COMMERCIAL SPECIALISED OPERATIONS
(a) The OM should contain at least the following information, where applicable, as relevant to the area and
type of operation:
A
GENERAL/BASIC
For chapters 0-7 refer to AMC3 ORO.MLR.100.
In addition:
6.2 The relevant regulations and guidance to crew members concerning dangerous goods used for specialised
tasks (pesticides and chemicals, etc.).
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8 OPERATING PROCEDURES
8.1 Flight preparation instructions. As applicable to the operation:
8.1.1 General procedures;
8.1.2 Minimum flight altitudes. A description of the method of determination and application of minimum
altitudes, including a procedure to establish the minimum altitudes/flight levels;
8.1.3 Criteria and responsibilities for determining the adequacy of aerodromes/operating sites to be used;
8.1.4 Interpretation of meteorological information. Explanatory material on the decoding of MET forecasts and
MET reports relevant to the area of operations, including the interpretation of conditional expressions;
8.1.5 Determination of the quantities of fuel, oil and water methanol carried. The methods by which the
quantities of fuel, oil and water methanol to be carried are determined and monitored in-flight. The system
for maintaining fuel and oil records should also be described;
8.1.6 Procedure for the determination of the mass of loads, the calculation of performance margins and the
centre of gravity;
8.1.7 Emergency procedures, e.g. load, fuel or chemical jettison (to include the actions of all personnel);
8.1.8 System for supply of NOTAMS, meteorological and other safety-critical information both at base and in
field locations;
8.1.9 Mandatory equipment for specific tasks (mirror, cargo sling, load cell, special radio equipment, radar
altimeters, etc.);
8.1.10 Guidance on the CDL and MEL;
8.1.11 Policy on completion and carriage of documents including operator’s aircraft technical log and journey
log, or equivalent;
8.1.12 Any task-specific standard operating procedures not covered above.
8.2 Ground handling instructions. As applicable to the operation:
8.2.1 Briefing requirements for in-flight and ground task specialists;
8.2.2 Decontamination procedures;
8.2.3 Fuelling procedures, including safety precautions during refuelling and defuelling including quality checks
required in the field location, precautions against spillage and environmental damage;
8.2.4. De-icing and anti-icing on the ground. A description of the de-icing and anti-icing policy and procedures
for aircraft on the ground.
8.3 Flight procedures. As applicable to the operation:
8.3.1 Procedures relevant to the aircraft type, specific task and area;
8.3.2 Altimeter setting procedures;
8.3.3 Actions following alerts from audio warning devices;
8.3.4 GPWS/TAWS for aeroplanes. Procedures and instructions required for the avoidance of controlled flight
into terrain, including limitations on high rate of descent near the surface (the related training requirements
are covered in OM-D 2.1);
8.3.5 Policy and procedures for the use of TCAS/ACAS for aeroplanes and, when applicable, for helicopters;
8.3.6 Policy and procedures for in-flight fuel management;
8.3.7 Procedures for operating in adverse and potentially hazardous atmospheric conditions;
8.3.8 Wake turbulence and rotor downwash for helicopters;
8.3.9 Use of restraint devices;
8.3.10 Policy on use of vacant seats;
8.3.11 Cabin safety requirements including smoking.
8.4 Task-specific weather limitations.
8.5 Use of the minimum equipment and configuration deviation list(s).
8.6 Oxygen requirements. An explanation of the conditions under which oxygen should be provided and used
(altitude, exposure times, night etc.).
9
DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS
9.1 Information, instruction and general guidance on the transport of dangerous goods as internal or external
loads, including:
9.1.1 The operator's policy on the transport of dangerous goods;
9.1.2 Guidance on the requirements for acceptance, labelling, handling, stowage, and segregation of dangerous
goods;
9.1.3 Procedures for responding to emergency situations involving dangerous goods;
9.1.4 Duties of all personnel involved; and
9.1.5 Instructions on carriage of the operator’s personnel on cargo aircraft when dangerous goods are being
carried.
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9.2 The conditions under which weapons, munitions of war and sporting weapons may be carried.
10 SECURITY
Security instructions, guidance, procedures, training and responsibilities, taking into account CAR Part 19.
Some parts of the security instructions and guidance may be kept confidential.
11 HANDLING, NOTIFYING AND REPORTING ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES
Procedures for the handling, notifying and reporting of accidents and occurrences. This section should
include:
11.1 Definitions of accidents and occurrences and responsibilities of all persons involved;
11.2 Reporting procedures (including any mandatory forms); and
11.3 Special notification when dangerous goods are carried.
12 RULES OF THE AIR
In addition to the items referred to in AMC3 ORO.MLR.100, territorial procedures for obtaining
permissions and exemptions, e.g. for underslung loads and lowflying clearances.
13 LEASING
Refer to AMC3 ORO.MLR.100.
B
AIRCRAFT OPERATING MATTERS — TYPE RELATED
For chapters 0-1 refer to AMC3 ORO.MLR.100.
2
NORMAL PROCEDURES
The normal procedures and duties assigned to the crew, the appropriate checklists and the system for their
use, including any task or specific role equipment procedures not contained in the AFM.
3
ABNORMAL AND/OR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
The abnormal and/or emergency procedures and duties assigned to the crew, the appropriate checklists and
the system for their use, including any task or specific role equipment emergency procedures not contained
in the AFM.
4
PERFORMANCE
4.1 Performance data should be provided in a form in which it can be used without difficulty.
4.2 Performance data. Performance material which provides the necessary data for compliance with the
performance requirements prescribed in Part-SPO.
5
FLIGHT PLANNING
5.1 Data and instructions necessary for pre-flight and in-flight planning.
5.2 Procedures for specialised tasks.
6
MASS AND BALANCE
Instructions and data for the calculation of the mass and balance, including:
6.1 Calculation system (e.g. index system);
6.2 Information and instructions for completion of mass and balance documentation; and
6.3 Limitations.
7
LOADING
Refer to AMC3 ORO.MLR.100.
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8
CONFIGURATION DEVIATION LIST (CDL)
Refer to AMC3 ORO.MLR.100.
9
MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL)
The MEL for each aircraft type or variant operated and the type(s)/area(s) of operation. It should also
contain procedures to be followed when an aircraft is being dispatched with one or more inoperative items,
in accordance with the MEL.
10 SURVIVAL AND EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT INCLUDING OXYGEN
10.1 A list of the survival equipment to be carried, taking into account the nature of the area of operation, such
as a hostile or a non-hostile environment.
10.2 A checklist for assessing the serviceability of the equipment and instructions for its use prior to take-off.
10.3 The procedure for determining the amount of oxygen required and the quantity that is available.
11 EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES
11.1 Emergency evacuation procedures, crew coordination and occupant handling in the event of a forced
landing, ditching or other emergency.
12 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
A description of the aircraft systems and all equipment specific to the tasks. Additional equipment, systems
or fitting, related special procedures including any supplements to the AFM.
C
TASKS AND OPERATING AREAS INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION
Specific instructions related to the specialised tasks and operating areas in accordance with AMC3
ORO.MLR.100.
D
TRAINING
1
Training syllabi and checking programmes for all operations personnel assigned to operational duties in
connection with the preparation and/or conduct of a flight.
2
Training syllabi and checking programmes should include:
2.1 For flight crew, all relevant items prescribed in Part-SPO, Part-SPA and this Part;
2.2 For other crew members, all relevant items prescribed in Part-SPO and this Part, as applicable;
2.3 For in-flight and ground task specialists concerned, including crew members:
a. All relevant items prescribed in SPA.DG; and
b. All relevant items prescribed in Part-SPO and ORO.SEC; and
2.4 For operations personnel other than crew members, all other relevant items pertaining to their duties
prescribed in Part-SPO and this Part.
3
Procedures:
3.1 Procedures for training and checking.
3.2 Procedures to be applied in the event that personnel do not achieve or maintain the required standards.
3.3 A system for tracking expiry dates for qualifications, checks, tests, recency and licences.
4
Description of documentation to be stored and storage periods.
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(b) If there are sections that, because of the nature of the operation, do not apply, it is recommended that
operators maintain the numbering system described in ORO.MLR.101 and above and insert ‘Not
applicable’ or ‘Intentionally blank’ where appropriate.
GM1 ORO.MLR.100 (k) Operations manual — general
HUMAN FACTORS PRINCIPLES
Guidance material on the application of human factors principles can be found in the ICAO Human Factors
Training Manual (Doc 9683).
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (a) Minimum equipment list
GENERAL
(a) The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is a document that lists the equipment that may be temporarily
inoperative, subject to certain conditions, at the commencement of flight. This document is prepared by the
operator for their own particular aircraft taking account of their aircraft configuration and all those
individual variables that cannot be addressed at MMEL level, such as operating environment, route
structure, geographic location, aerodromes where spare parts and maintenance capabilities are available,
etc., in accordance with a procedure approved by the competent authority.
(b) The MMEL, as defined in the mandatory part of the operational suitability data established in accordance
with this MCAR 21, is developed in compliance with EASA CS-MMEL or EASA CS-GEN-MMEL. These
Certification Specifications contain, among other, guidance intended to standardise the level of relief
granted in MMELs, in particular for items that are subject to operational requirements. If a MMEL
established as part of the operational suitability data is not available and items subject to operational
requirements are listed in the available MMEL without specific relief or dispatch conditions but only with a
reference to the operational requirements, the operator may refer to EASA CS-MMEL or EASA CS-GENMMEL guidance material, as applicable, to develop the relevant MEL content for such items.
NON-SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT
(a) Most aircraft are designed and certified with a significant amount of equipment redundancy, such that the
airworthiness requirements are satisfied by a substantial margin. In addition, aircraft are generally fitted
with equipment that is not required for safe operation under all operating conditions, e.g. instrument
lighting in day VMC.
(b) All items related to the airworthiness, or required for the safe operation, of the aircraft and not included in
the list are automatically required to be operative.
(c) Equipment, such as entertainment systems or galley equipment, may be installed for passenger
convenience. If this non-safety-related equipment does not affect the airworthiness or operation of the
aircraft when inoperative, it does not require a rectification interval, and need not be listed in the operator's
MEL, if it is not addressed in the MMEL. The exceptions to this are as follows:
(1) Where non-safety-related equipment serves a second function, such as movie equipment being used for
cabin safety briefings, operators should develop and include operational contingency procedures in the
MEL in case of an equipment malfunction.
(2) Where non-safety-related equipment is part of another aircraft system, for example the electrical
system, procedures should be developed and included in the MEL for deactivating and securing in case
of malfunction. In these cases, the item should be listed in the MEL, with compensating provisions and
deactivation instructions if applicable. The rectification interval will be dependent on the secondary
function of the item and the extent of its effect on other systems.
(d) If the operator chooses to list non-safety-related equipment in the MEL, not listed in the MMEL, they
should include a rectification interval category. These items may be given a ‘D’ category rectification
interval provided any applicable (M) procedure (in the case of electrically supplied items) is applied.
(e) Operators should establish an effective decision making process for failures that are not listed to determine
if they are related to airworthiness and required for safe operation. In order for inoperative installed
equipment to be considered non-safety-related, the following criteria should be considered:
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(1) the operation of the aircraft is not adversely affected such that standard operating procedures related to
ground personnel, and crew members are impeded;
(2) the condition of the aircraft is not adversely affected such that the safety of passengers and/or personnel
is jeopardised;
(3) the condition of the aircraft is configured to minimise the probability of a subsequent failure that may
cause injury to passengers/personnel and/or cause damage to the aircraft;
(4) the condition does not include the use of required emergency equipment and does not impact
emergency procedures such that personnel could not perform them.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105(c) Minimum equipment list
AMENDMENTS TO THE MEL FOLLOWING CHANGES TO THE MMEL — APPLICABLE CHANGES
AND ACCEPTABLE TIMESCALES
(a) The following are applicable changes to the MMEL that require amendment of the MEL:
(1) a reduction of the rectification interval;
(2) change of an item, only when the change is applicable to the aircraft or type of operations and is more
restrictive.
(b) An acceptable timescale for submitting the amended MEL to the competent authority is 90 days from the
effective date specified in the approved change to the MMEL.
(c) Reduced timescales for the implementation of safety-related amendments may be required if MCAA
consider it necessary.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (d) Minimum equipment list
MEL FORMAT
(a) The MEL format and the presentation of items and dispatch conditions should reflect those of the MMEL.
(b) The ATA 100/2200 Specification numbering system for MEL items is preferred.
(c) Other formats and item numbering systems may be used provided they are clear and unambiguous.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(1) Minimum equipment list
MEL PREAMBLE
The MEL preamble should:
(a) reflect the content of the MMEL preamble as applicable to the MEL scope and extent;
(b) contain terms and definitions used in the MEL;
(c) contain any other relevant specific information for the MEL scope and use that is not originally provided in
the MMEL;
(d) provide guidance on how to identify the origin of a failure or malfunction to the extent necessary for
appropriate application of the MEL;
(e) contain guidance on the management of multiple unserviceabilities, based on the guidance given in the
MMEL; and
(f) contain guidance on placarding of inoperative items to inform crew members of equipment condition, as
appropriate. In particular, when such items are accessible to the crew during flight, the control(s) and
indicator(s) related to inoperative unit(s) should be clearly placarded.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
SCOPE OF THE MEL
The MEL should include:
(a) The dispatch conditions associated with flights conducted in accordance with special approvals held by the
operator in accordance with Part-SPA.
(b) Specific provision for particular types of operations carried out by the operator in accordance with
ORO.AOC.125.
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AMC2 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
EXTENT OF THE MEL
The operator should include guidance in the MEL on how to deal with any failures that occur between the
commencement of the flight and the start of the take-off. If a failure occurs between the commencement of the
flight and the start of the take-off, any decision to continue the flight should be subject to pilot judgement and
good airmanship. The pilot-in-command/commander may refer to the MEL before any decision to continue the
flight is taken.
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
SCOPE OF THE MEL
(a) Examples of special approvals in accordance with Part-SPA may be:
(1) RVSM,
(2) ETOPS,
(3) LVO.
(b) Examples of operations carried out by the operator in accordance with ORO.AOC.125 may be:
(1) crew training,
(2) positioning flights,
(3) demonstration flights.
(c) When an aircraft has installed equipment which is not required for the operations conducted, the operator
may wish to delay rectification of such items for an indefinite period. Such cases are considered to be out of
the scope of the MEL, therefore modification of the aircraft is appropriate and deactivation, inhibition or
removal of the item should be accomplished by an appropriate approved modification procedure.
GM2 ORO.MLR.105 (d)(3) Minimum equipment list
PURPOSE OF THE MEL
The MEL is an alleviating document having the purpose to identify the minimum equipment and conditions to
operate safely an aircraft having inoperative equipment. Its purpose is not, however, to encourage the operation
of aircraft with inoperative equipment. It is undesirable for aircraft to be dispatched with inoperative equipment
and such operations are permitted only as a result of careful analysis of each item to ensure that the acceptable
level of safety, as intended in the applicable airworthiness and operational requirements is maintained. The
continued operation of an aircraft in this condition should be minimised.
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (e); (f) Minimum equipment list
RECTIFICATION INTERVAL (RI)
The definitions and categories of rectification intervals are provided in EASA CS-MMEL.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (f) Minimum equipment list
RECTIFICATION INTERVAL EXTENSION (RIE) - OPERATOR
APPROVAL BY MCAA AND NOTIFICATION TO MCAA
PROCEDURES
FOR
THE
(a) The operator’s procedures to address the extension of rectification intervals and ongoing surveillance
to ensure compliance should provide MCAA with details of the name and position of the nominated
personnel responsible for the control of the operator’s rectification interval extension (RIE) procedures
and details of the specific duties and responsibilities established to control the use of RIEs.
(b) Personnel authorising RIEs should be adequately trained in technical and/or operational disciplines to
accomplish their duties. They should have necessary operational knowledge in terms of operational use
of the MEL as alleviating documents by flight crew and maintenance personnel and engineering
competence. The authorising personnel should be listed by appointment and name.
(c) The operator should notify MCAA within 1 month of the extension of the applicable rectification interval or
within the appropriated timescales specified by the approved procedure for the RIE.
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(d) The notification should be made in a form determined by MCAA and should specify the original defect,
all such uses, the reason for the RIE and the reasons why rectification was not carried out within the
original rectification interval.
GM1 ORO. MLR.105 (f) Minimum equipment list
RECTIFICATION INTERVAL EXTENSION (RIE)
Procedures for the extension of rectification intervals should only be applied under certain conditions, such as a
shortage of parts from manufacturers or other unforeseen situations (e.g. inability to obtain equipment necessary
for proper troubleshooting and repair), in which case the operator may be unable to comply with the specified
rectification intervals.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (g) Minimum equipment list
OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
(a) The operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MEL should be based on the operational and
maintenance procedures referenced in the MMEL. Modified procedures may, however, be developed by the
operator when they provide the same level of safety, as required by the MMEL. Modified maintenance
procedures should be developed in accordance with MCARs.
(b) Providing appropriate operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MEL, regardless of who
developed them, is the responsibility of the operator.
(c) Any item in the MEL requiring an operational or maintenance procedure to ensure an acceptable level of
safety should be so identified in the ‘remarks’ or ’exceptions’ column/part/section of the MEL. This will
normally be ‘(O)’ for an operational procedure, or ‘(M)’ for a maintenance procedure. ‘(O)(M)’ means both
operational and maintenance procedures are required.
(d) The satisfactory accomplishment of all procedures, regardless of who performs them, is the responsibility of
the operator.
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (g) Minimum equipment list
OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
(a) Operational and maintenance procedures are an integral part of the compensating conditions needed to
maintain an acceptable level of safety, enabling the competent authority to approve the MEL. The
competent authority may request presentation of fully developed (O) and/or (M) procedures in the course of
the MEL approval process.
(b) Normally, operational procedures are accomplished by the flight crew; however, other personnel may be
qualified and authorised to perform certain functions.
(c) Normally, maintenance procedures are accomplished by the maintenance personnel; however, other
personnel may be qualified and authorised to perform certain functions in accordance with this Regulation.
(d) Operator's manuals may include the OM, the continued airworthiness management organisation manual
(CAME) or other documents. Operational and maintenance procedures, regardless of the document where
they are contained, should be readily available for use when needed for the application of the MEL.
(e) Unless specifically permitted by a maintenance procedure, an inoperative item may not be removed from
the aircraft.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (h) Minimum equipment list
OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES — APPLICABLE CHANGES
(a) Changes to the operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MMEL are considered applicable
and require the amendment of the maintenance and operating procedures referenced in the MEL when:
(1) the modified procedure is applicable to the operator’s MEL; and
(2) the purpose of this change is to improve compliance with the intent of the associated MMEL dispatch
condition.
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(b) An acceptable timescale for the amendments of maintenance and operating procedures, as defined in (a),
should be 90 days from the date when the amended procedures referenced in the MMEL are made
available. Reduced timescales for the implementation of safety related amendments may be required if
MCAA considers it necessary.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.105 (j) Minimum equipment list
OPERATION OF AN AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE MMEL - OPERATOR’S
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL BY MCAA
(a) The operator’s procedures to address the operation of an aircraft outside the constraints of the MEL
but within the constraints of the MMEL and ongoing surveillance to ensure compliance should provide
MCAA with details of the name and position of the nominated personnel responsible for the control of
the operations under such conditions and details of the specific duties and responsibilities established to
control the use of the approval.
(b) Personnel authorising operations under such approval should be adequately trained in technical and
operational disciplines to accomplish their duties. They should have the necessary operational knowledge
in terms of operational use of the MEL as alleviating documents by flight crew and maintenance
personnel and engineering competence. The authorising personnel should be listed by appointment and
name.
GM1 ORO.MLR.105 (j) Minimum equipment list
OPERATION OF AN AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE MMEL - OPERATOR’S
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL BY MCAA
Procedures for the operation of an aircraft outside the constraints of the MEL but within the constraints of the
MMEL should only be applied under certain conditions, such as a shortage of parts from manufacturers or other
unforeseen situations (e.g. inability to obtain equipment necessary for proper troubleshooting and repair),
in which case the operator may be unable to comply with the constraints specified in the MEL.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.110 Journey log
GENERAL
(a) The aircraft journey log, or equivalent, should include the following items, where applicable:
(1) aircraft nationality and registration,
(2) date,
(3) name(s) of crew member(s),
(4) duty assignments of crew member(s),
(5) place of departure,
(6) place of arrival,
(7) time of departure,
(8) time of arrival,
(9) hours of flight,
(10) nature of flight (scheduled or non-scheduled),
(11) incidents, observations, if any,
(12) signature of person in charge.
(b) The information, or parts thereof, may be recorded in a form other than on printed paper.
Accessibility, usability and reliability should be assured.
(c) ‘Journey log, or equivalent’, means that the required information may be recorded in documentation other
than a log book, such as the operational flight plan or the aircraft technical log.
(d) ‘Series of flights’, means consecutive flights, which begin and end:
(1) within a 24 hour period;
(2) at the same aerodrome or operating site or remain within a local area specified in the operations ma
nual; and
(3) with the same pilot-in-command/commander of the aircraft.
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GM1 ORO.MLR.110 Journey log
SERIES OF FLIGHTS
The term ‘series of flights’ is used to facilitate a single set of documentation.
AMC1 ORO.MLR.115 Record-keeping
TRAINING RECORDS
A summary of training should be maintained by the operator to show every crew member’s completion of each
stage of training and checking.
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SUBPART FC – FLIGHT CREW
Section I — Common requirements
AMC1 ORO.FC.100(c) Composition of flight crew
OPERATIONAL MULTI-PILOT LIMITATION (OML)
The operator should ensure that pilots with an OML on their medical certificate only operate aircraft in multipilot operations when the other pilot is fully qualified on the relevant type of aircraft, is not subject to an OML
and has not a ttained the age of 60 years.
AMC1 ORO.FC.105 (b)(2);(c) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
ROUTE/AREA AND AERODROME KNOWLEDGE FOR COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS
(a) Area and route knowledge
(1) Area and route training should include knowledge of:
(i) terrain and minimum safe altitudes;
(ii) seasonal meteorological conditions;
(iii) meteorological, communication and air traffic facilities, services and procedures;
(iv) search and rescue procedures where available; and
(v) navigational facilities associated with the area or route along which the flight is to take place.
(2) Depending on the complexity of the area or route, as assessed by the operator, the following methods
of familiarisation should be used:
(i) for the less complex areas or routes, familiarisation by self-briefing with route documentation, or
by means of programmed instruction; and
(ii) in addition, for the more complex areas or routes, in-flight familiarisation as a pilot-incommand/commander or co-pilot under supervision, observer, or familiarisation in a flight
simulation training device (FSTD) using a database appropriate to the route concerned.
(b) Aerodrome knowledge
(1) Aerodrome training should include knowledge of obstructions, physical layout, lighting, approach aids
and arrival, departure, holding and instrument approach procedures, applicable operating minima and
ground movement considerations.
(2) The operations manual should describe the method of categorisation of aerodromes and, in the case of
CAT operations, provide a list of those aerodrome categorised as B or C.
(3) All aerodromes to which an operator operates should be categorised in one of these three categories:
(i) category A — an aerodrome that meets all of the following requirements:
(A) an approved instrument approach procedure;
(B) at least one runway with no performance limited procedure for take-off and/or landing;
(C) published circling minima not higher than 1 000 ft above aerodrome level; and
(D) night operations capability.
(ii) category B — an aerodrome that does not meet the category A requirements or which requires
extra considerations such as:
(A) non-standard approach aids and/or approach patterns;
(B) unusual local weather conditions;
(C) unusual characteristics or performance limitations; or
(D) any other relevant considerations, including obstructions, physical layout, lighting, etc.
(iii) category C — an aerodrome that requires additional considerations to a category B aerodrome;
(iv) offshore installations may be categorised as category B or C aerodromes, taking into account the
limitations determined in accordance with AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.105 Use of aerodromes and
operating sites.
(c) Prior to operating to a:
(1) category B aerodrome, the pilot-in-command/commander should be briefed, or self-briefed by means
of programmed instruction, on the category B aerodrome(s) concerned. The completion of the briefing
should be recorded. This recording may be accomplished after completion or confirmed by the pilot-incommand/commander before departure on a flight involving category B aerodrome(s) as destination or
alternate aerodromes.
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(2) category C aerodrome, the pilot-in-command/commander should be briefed and visit the aerodrome as
an observer and/or undertake instruction in a suitable FSTD. The completion of the briefing, visit
and/or instruction should be recorded.
AMC1 ORO.FC.105(c) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
ROUTE/AREA AND AERODROME RECENCY
(a) The 12-month period should be counted from the last day of the month:
(1) when the familiarisation training was undertaken; or
(2) of the latest operation on the route or area to be flown and of the aerodromes, facilities and procedures
to be used.
(b) When the operation is undertaken within the last 3 calendar months of that period, the new 12-month period
should be counted from the original expiry date.
AMC2 ORO.FC.105(c) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
ROUTE/AREA AND AERODROME RECENCY - PERFORMANCE CLASS B AEROPLANES OPERATED
UNDER VFR BY NIGHT OR IFR IN CAT OPERATIONS
In the case of CAT operations with performance class B aeroplanes operating under visual flight rules (VFR)
by night or instrument flight rules (IFR), the knowledge should be maintained as follows:
(a) except for operations to the most demanding aerodromes, by completion of at least 10 flight sectors within
the area of operation during the preceding 12 months in addition to any required self-briefing;
(b) operations to the most demanding aerodromes may be performed only if: (1) the pilot-incommand/commander has been qualified at the aerodrome within the preceding 36 months by a visit
as an operating flight crew member or as an observer;
(2) the approach is performed in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) from the applicable
minimum sector altitude; and
(3) an adequate self-briefing has been made prior to the flight.
GM1 ORO.FC.105 (d) Designation as pilot-in-command/commander
PERFORMANCE CLASS B AEROPLANES OPERATED UNDER VFR BY DAY IN CAT OPERATIONS
For CAT operations under VFR by day with performance class B aeroplanes, the operator should take
account of any requirement that might be stipulated in specific cases by the State of the aerodrome.
AMC1 ORO.FC.125 Differences training and familiarisation training
GENERAL
(a) Differences training requires additional knowledge and training on the aircraft or an appropriate
training device. It should be carried out:
(1) when introducing a significant change of equipment and/or procedures on types or variants currently
operated; and
(2) in the case of aeroplanes, when operating another va riant of an aeroplane of the same type or another
type of the same class currently operated; or
(3) in the case of helicopters, when operating a variant of a helicopter currently operated.
(b) Familiarisation training requires only the acquisition of additional knowledge. It should be carried out when:
(1) operating another helicopter or aeroplane of the same type; or
(2) when introducing a significant change of equipment and/or procedures on types or variants currently
operated.
AMC1 ORO.FC.145 (b) Provision of training
NON-MANDATORY (RECOMMENDATION) ELEMENTS OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY DATA
When developing the training programmes and syllabi, the operator should consider the non-mandatory
(recommendation) elements for the relevant type that are provided in the operational suitability data established
in accordance with MCAR 21.
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AMC1 ORO.FC.145 (d) Provision of training
FULL FLIGHT SIMULATORS (FFS)
The operator should classify any differences between the aircraft and FFS in accordance with the Air
Transport Association (ATA) chapters as follows:
Compliance Levels
(a) Level A differences:
(1) no influence on flight characteristics;
(2) no influence on procedures (normal and/or abnormal);
(3) differences in presentation; and
(4) differences in operation.
Method: self-instruction via the operations manual or flight crew information.
(b) Level B differences:
(1) no influence on flight characteristics;
(2) influence on procedures (normal and/or abnormal); and
(3) possible differences in presentation and operation.
Method: flight crew information, computer-based training, system device training or special instruction by
instructor.
(c) Level C differences:
(1) influence on flight characteristics;
(2) influence on procedures (normal and/or abnormal); and
(3) eventually differences in presentation and operation.
Method: special instruction by instructor, a selected partial training on another FSTD or aircraft or a
waiver because of previous experience, special instruction or training programme.
(d) Level D differences:
(1) influence on flight characteristics; and/or
(2) influence on procedures (normal and/or abnormal); and/or
(3) differences in presentation and/or operation; and
(4) FSTD is level D qualified and is used for zero flight-time training (ZFTT).
Method: a specified partial training on another FSTD or aircraft or a waiver because of previous experience,
special instruction or training programme.
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Section II — Additional requirements for CAT operations
AMC1 ORO.FC.200 (a) Composition of flight crew
CREWING OF INEXPERIENCED FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS
The operator should establish procedures in the operations manual taking into account the following elements:
Aeroplanes
(a) The operator should consider that a flight crew member is inexperienced, following completion of a type
rating or command course, and the associated line flying under supervision, until he/she has achieved on the
type either:
(1) 100 flight hours and flown 10 sectors within a consolidation period of 120 consecutive days; or
(2) 150 flight hours and flown 20 sectors (no time limit).
(b) A lesser number of flight hours or sectors, subject to any other conditions that the competent authority may
impose, may be acceptable to the competent authority when one of the following applies:
(1) a new operator is commencing operations;
(2) an operator introduces a new aeroplane type;
(3) flight crew members have previously completed a type conversion course with the same operator;
(4) credits are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21; or
(5) the aeroplane has a maximum take-off mass of less than 10 tonnes or a maximum operational
passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of less than 20.
Helicopters
(c) The operator should consider that, when two flight crew members are required, a flight crew member,
following completion of a type rating or command course, and the associated line flying under supervision,
is inexperienced until either:
(1) he/she has achieved 50 flight hours on the type and/or in the role within a period of 60 days; or
(2) he/she has achieved 100 flight hours on the type and/or in the role (no time limit).
(d) A lesser number of flight hours, on the type and/or in the role, and subject to any other conditions which the
competent authority may impose, may be acceptable to the competent authority when one of the following
applies:
(1) a new operator is commencing operations;
(2) an operator introduces a new helicopter type;
(3) flight crew members have previously completed a type conversion course with the same operator
(reconversion); or
(4) credits are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21.
AMC1 ORO.FC.205 Command course
COMBINED UPGRADING AND CONVERSION COURSE – HELICOPTER
If a pilot is converting from one helicopter type or variant to another when upgrading to commander:
(a) the command course should also include a conversion course in accordance with ORO.FC.220; and
(b) additional flight sectors should be required for a pilot transitioning onto a new type of helicopter.
AMC1 ORO.FC.115 & 215 Crew resource management (CRM) training
CRM TRAINING – CAT OPERATIONS
(a) General
(1) CRM training should reflect the culture of the operator as well as type of operation and be conducted by
means of both classroom training and practical exercises including group discussions and accident and
serious incident reviews to analyse communication problems and instances or examples of a lack of
information or crew management.
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(2) Whenever it is practicable to do so, consideration should be given to conducting relevant parts of CRM
training in FSTDs that reproduce, in an acceptable way, a realistic operational environment and permit
interaction. This includes, but is not limited to, appropriate line-oriented flight training (LOFT)
scenarios conducted in FSTDs.
(3) It is recommended that, whenever possible, initial CRM training be conducted in a group session away
from the pressures of the usual working environment so that the opportunity is provided for flight crew
members to interact and communicate in an environment conducive to learning.
(b) Initial CRM Training
(1) Initial CRM training programmes are designed to provide knowledge of, and familiarity with, human
factors relevant to flight operations. The course duration should be a minimum of 1 day for single-pilot
operations and 2 days for all other types of operations. It should cover all the elements indicated in (f).
(2) The CRM trainer should:
(i) possess group facilitation skills;
(ii) have and maintain adequate knowledge of the operation and the aircraft type, preferably through
current CAT experience as a flight crew member;
(iii) have successfully passed the human performance and limitations (HPL) examination whilst
recently obtaining the airline transport pilot licence (ATPL) in accordance with this Regulation; or
followed a theoretical HPL course covering the whole syllabus of the HPL examination;
(iv) have completed initial CRM training;
(v) have received additional education in the fields of group management, group dynamics and
personal awareness; and
(vi) be supervised by suitably qualified CRM training personnel when conducting his/her first initial
CRM training session.
(3) The operator should ensure that initial CRM training addresses the nature of the operations of the
operator concerned, as well as the associated procedures and the culture of the operator. This will
include areas of operations that produce particular difficulties or involve adverse climatic conditions
and any unusual hazards.
(4) If the operator does not have sufficient means to establish initial CRM training, use may be made of a
course provided by another operator, or a third party or training organisation. In this event the operator
should ensure that the content of the course meets his/her operational requirements. When crew
members from several companies follow the same course, CRM core elements should be specific to the
nature of operations of the companies and the trainees concerned.
(5) The flight crew member’s CRM skills should not be assessed during initial CRM training.
(c) Operator conversion course – CRM training
(1) If the flight crew member undergoes a conversion course with a change of aircraft type, elements of
CRM should be integrated into all appropriate phases of the operator’s conversion course, in
accordance with (f).
(2) If the flight crew member undergoes a conversion course with a change of operator, elements of CRM
should be integrated into all appropriate phases of the operator’s conversion course, in accordance with
(f).
(3) The flight crew member should not be assessed when completing elements of CRM training that are
included in the operator conversion course.
(d) Command course – CRM training
(1) The operator should ensure that elements of CRM are integrated into the command course in accordance
with (f).
(2) The flight crew member should not be assessed when completing elements of CRM training that are
included in the command course, although feedback should be given.
(e) Recurrent CRM training
(1) The operator should ensure that:
(i) elements of CRM are integrated into all appropriate phases of recurrent training every year, in
accordance with (f), and that modular CRM training covers the same areas over a maximum period
of 3 years; and
(ii) relevant modular CRM training is conducted by CRM trainers qualified according to (b)(2).
(2) The flight crew member should not be assessed when completing elements of CRM training that are
included in the recurrent training.
(f) Implementation of CRM
(1) Table 1 indicates which elements of CRM should be included in each type of training.
(g) Coordination between flight crew and cabin/technical crew training
(1) Operators should, as far as practicable, provide combined training for flight crew and cabin/technical
crew including briefing and debriefing.
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(2) There should be an effective liaison between flight crew and cabin/technical crew training departments.
Provision should be made for transfer of relevant knowledge and skills between flight and
cabin/technical crew instructors.
(h) Assessment of CRM skills
(1) Assessment of CRM skills is the process of observing, recording, interpreting and debriefing crews and
crew member’s performance and knowledge using an acceptable methodology in the context of overall
performance. It includes the concept of self-critique, and feedback which can be given continuously
during training or in summary following a check. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the
programme this methodology should, where possible, be agreed with flight crew representatives.
(2) NOTECHS (non-technical skills evaluation) or other acceptable methods of assessment should be used.
The selection criteria and training requirements of the assessors and their relevant qualifications,
knowledge and skills should be established.
(3) Assessment of CRM skills should:
(i) provide feedback to the crew and the individual and serve to identify retraining where needed; and
(ii) be used to improve the CRM training system.
(4) Prior to the introduction of CRM skills assessment, a detailed description of the CRM methodology
including terminology used should be published in the operations manual.
(5) Methodology of CRM skills assessment
(i) The operator should establish the CRM training programme including an agreed terminology. This
should be evaluated with regard to methods, length of training, depth of subjects and effectiveness.
(ii) A training and standardisation programme for training personnel should then be established.
(iii) The assessment should be based on the following principles:
(A) only observable, repetitive behaviours are assessed;
(B) the assessment should positively reflect any CRM skills that result in enhanced safety;
(C) assessments should include behaviour that contributes to a technical failure, such technical
failure being errors leading to an event that requires debriefing by the person conducting the
line check; and
(D) the crew and, where needed, the individual are verbally debriefed.
(6) De-identified summaries of all CRM assessments by the operator should be used to provide feedback
and such feedback should be used to update and improve the operator’s CRM training.
(7) Operators should establish procedures, including retraining, to be applied in the event that personnel do
not achieve or maintain the required standards.
(8) If the operator proficiency check is combined with the type rating revalidation/renewal check, the
assessment of CRM skills should satisfy themulti-crew cooperation requirements of the type rating
revalidation/renewal. This assessment should not affect the validity of the type rating.
(i) Levels of training
(1) Overview. When overview training is required it should normally be instructional in style. Such training
should refresh knowledge gained in earlier training.
(2) In-depth. When in-depth training is required it should normally be interactive in style and should
include, as appropriate, case studies, group discussions, role play and consolidation of knowledge and
skills. Core elements should be tailored to the specific needs of the training phase being undertaken.
(j) Use of automation
(1) The operator conversion course should include training in the use and knowledge of automation and in
the recognition of systems and human limitations associated with the use of automation. The operator
should therefore ensure that the flight crew member receives training on:
(i) the application of the operations policy concerning the use of automation as stated in the operations
manual; and
(ii) system and human limitations associated with the use of automation.
(2) The objective of this training should be to provide appropriate knowledge, skills and behavioural
patterns for managing and operating automated systems. Special attention should be given to how
automation increases the need for crews to have a common understanding of the way in which the
system performs, and any features of automation that make this understanding difficult.
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Table 1: Elements of CRM to be included in training
Core Elements
Human error and reliability, error
chain, error prevention and
detection
Operator safety culture, standard
operating
procedures
(SOPs),
organisational factors
Stress, stress management, fatigue
& vigilance
Information
acquisition
and
processing situation awareness,
workload management
Decision making
Communication and coordination
inside and outside the flight crew
compartment
Leadership and team behaviour
synergy
Automation, philosophy of the use
of automation (if relevant to the
type)
Specific type-related differences
Case studies
Initial
CRM
Training
Operator
conversion
course when
changing
type
Operator
conversion
course when
changing
operator
Command
course
In-depth
Overview
Overview
Recurrent
training
In-depth
Not required
Not required
In-depth
Overview
In-depth
Overview
Overview
As required
In-depth
In-depth
As required
As
required
Not required
In-depth
In-depth
In-depth
In-depth
In-depth
AMC1.1 ORO.FC.115 & 215; Crew resource management (CRM) training
CRM TRAINER
The acceptable means of compliance are as set out in AMC1 ORO.FC.115&.215, except for (b) (2) of that
AMC, for which the following qualifications and experience are also acceptable for a CRM trainer:
(a) a flight crew member holding a recent qualification as a CRM trainer may continue to be a CRM trainer
even after the cessation of active flying duties;
(b) an experienced non-flight crew CRM trainer having a knowledge of HPL; and
(c) a former flight crew member having knowledge of HPL may become a CRM trainer if he/she
maintains adequate knowledge of the operation and aircraft type and meets the provisions of AMC1
ORO.FC.115&.215, (b)(2)(i), (iv), (v) and (vi).
GM1 ORO.FC.115&.215 Crew resource management (CRM) training
GENERAL
(a) Crew resource management (CRM) is the effective utilisation of all available resources (e.g. crew
members, aircraft systems, supporting facilities and persons) to achieve safe and efficient operation.
(b) The objective of CRM is to enhance the communication and management skills of the flight crew member
concerned. The emphasis is placed on the non-technical aspects of flight crew performance.
AMC1 ORO.FC.220 Operator conversion training and checking
OPERATOR CONVERSION TRAINING SYLLABUS
(a) General
(1) The operator conversion training should include, in the following order:
(i) ground training and checking, including aircraft systems, and normal, abnormal and
emergency procedures;
(ii) emergency and safety equipment training and checking, (completed before any flight training
in an aircraft commences);
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(iii) flight training and checking (aircraft and/or FSTD); and
(iv) line flying under supervision and line check.
When the flight crew member has not previously completed an operator’s conversion course,
he/she should undergo general first-aid training and, if applicable, ditching procedures training
using the equipment in water.
Where the emergency drills require action by the non-handling pilot, the check should additionally
cover knowledge of these drills.
The operator’s conversion may be combined with a new type/class rating training as required by this
Regulation.
The operator should ensure that the personnel integrating elements of CRM into conversion training are
suitably qualified.
(b) Ground training
(1) Ground training should comprise a properly organised programme of ground instruction
supervised by training staff with adequate facilities, including any necessary audio, mechanical
and visual aids. Self-study using appropriate electronic learning aids, computer-based training (CBT)
etc. may be used with adequate supervision of the standards achieved. However, if the aircraft
concerned is relatively simple, unsupervised private study may be adequate if the operator
provides suitable manuals and/or study notes.
(2) The course of ground instruction should incorporate formal tests on such matters as aircraft systems,
performance and flight planning, where applicable.
(c) Emergency and safety equipment training and checking
(1) Emergency and safety equipment training should take place in conjunction with cabin/technical
crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way
communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin.
(2) On the initial conversion course and on subsequent conversion courses as applicable, the
following should be addressed:
(i) Instruction on first-aid in general (initial conversion course only); instruction on first-aid as
relevant to the aircraft type of operation and crew complement including those situations
where no cabin crew is required to be carried (initial and subsequent).
(ii) Aero-medical topics including:
(A) hypoxia;
(B) hyperventilation;
(C) contamination of the skin/eyes by aviation fuel or hydraulic or other fluids;
(D) hygiene and food poisoning; and
(E) malaria.
(iii) The effect of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a
simulated smoke-filled environment.
(iv) Actual fire fighting, using equipment representative of that carried in the aircraft on an actual or
simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used.
(v) The operational procedures of security, rescue and emergency services.
(vi) Survival information appropriate to their areas of operation (e.g. polar, desert, jungle or
sea) and training in the use of any survival equipment required to be carried.
(vii) A comprehensive drill to cover all ditching procedures where flotation equipment is
carried. This should include practice of the actual donning and inflation of a life-jacket,
together with a demonstration or audio-visual presentation of the inflation of life-rafts
and/or slide-rafts and associated equipment. This practice should, on an initial conversion
course, be conducted using the equipment in water, although previous certified training with
another operator or the use of similar equipment will be accepted in lieu of further wet-drill
training.
(viii) Instruction on the location of emergency and safety equipment, correct use of all
appropriate drills, and procedures that could be required of flight crew in different emergency
situations. Evacuation of the aircraft (or a representative training device) by use of a slide where
fitted should be included when the operations manual procedure requires the early evacuation of
flight crew to assist on the ground.
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(d) Flight training
(1) Flight training should be conducted to familiarise the flight crew member thoroughly with all
aspects of limitations and normal, abnormal and emergency procedures associated with the aircraft
and should be carried out by suitably qualified class and type rating instructors and/or
examiners. For specific operations such as steep approaches, ETOPS, or operations based on
QFE, additional training should be carried out, based on any additional elements of training
defined for the aircraft type in the data in accordance with this MCAR 21, where they exist.
(2) In planning flight training on aircraft with a flight crew of two or more, particular emphasis should be
placed on the practice of LOFT with emphasis on CRM, and the use of crew coordination procedures,
including coping with incapacitation.
(3) Normally, the same training and practice in the flying of the aircraft should be given to copilots as well as commanders. The ‘flight handling’ sections of the syllabus for commanders and
co-pilots alike should include all the requirements of the operat or proficiency check required by
ORO.FC .230.
(4) Unless the type rating training programme has been carried out in a n FSTD usable for ZFTT,
the training should include at least three take-offs and landings in the aircraft.
(e) Line flying under supervision (LIFUS)
(1) Following completion of flight training and checking as part of the operator’s conversion
course, each flight crew member should operate a minimum number of sectors and/or flight hours
under the supervision of a flight crew member nominated by the operator.
(2) The minimum flight sectors/hours should be specified in the operations manual and should be
determined by the following:
(i) previous experience of the flight crew member;
(ii) complexity of the aircraft; and
(iii) the type and area of operation.
(3) For performance class B aeroplanes, the amount of LIFUS required is dependent on the complexity of
the operations to be performed.
(f) Passenger handling for operations where no cabin crew is required
Other than general training on dealing with people, emphasis should be placed on the following:
(1) advice on the recognition and management of passengers who appear or are intoxicated with
alcohol, under the influence of drugs or aggressive;
(2) methods used to motivate passengers and the crowd control necessary to expedite an aircraft
evacuation; and
(3) the importance of correct seat allocation with reference to aircraft mass and balance. Particular
emphasis should also be given on the seating of special categories of passengers.
(g) Discipline and responsibilities, for operations where no cabin crew is required
Emphasis should be placed on discipline and an individual's responsibilities in relation to:
(1) his/her ongoing competence and fitness to operate as a crew member with special regard to flight
and duty time limitation (FTL) requirements; and
(2) security procedures.
(h) Passenger briefing/safety demonstrations, for operations where no cabin crew is required
Training should be given in the preparation of passengers for normal and emergency situations.
AMC2 ORO.FC.220 Operator conversion training and checking
OPERATOR CONVERSION TRAINING SYLLABUS – FLIGHT ENGINEERS
(a) Operator conversion training for flight engineers should approximate to that of pilots.
(b) If the flight crew includes a pilot with the duties of a flight engineer, he/she should, after training and
the initial check in these duties, operate a minimum number of flight sectors under the supervision of a
nominated additional flight crew member. The minimum figures should be specified in the operations
manual and should be selected after due note has been taken of the complexity of the aircraft and the
experience of the flight crew member.
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GM1 ORO.FC.220 (b) Operator conversion training and checking
COMPLETION OF AN OPERATOR’S C ONVERSION COURSE
(a) The operator conversion course is deemed to have started when the flight training has begun.
theoretical element of the course ma y be undertaken ahead of the practical element.
The
(b) Under certain circumstances the course may have started and reached a stage where, for unforeseen
reasons, it is not possible to complete it without a delay. In these circumstances the operator may
allow the pilot to revert to the original type.
(c) Before the resumption of the operator conversion course, the operator should evaluate how much of the
course needs to be repeated before continuing with the remainder of the course.
GM1 ORO.FC.220 (d) Operator conversion training and checking
LINE FLYING UNDER SUPERVISION
(a) Line flying under supervision provides the opportunity for a flight crew member to carry into
practice the procedures and techniques he/she has been made familiar with during the ground and flight
training of an operator conversion course. This is accomplished under the supervision of a flight
crew member specifically nominated and trained for the task. At the end of line flying under supervision
the respective crew member should be able to perform a safe a nd efficient flight conducted within
the tasks of his/her crew member station.
(b) A variety of reasonable combinations may exist with respect to:
(1) a flight crew member's previous experience;
(2) the complexity of the aircraft concerned; and
(3) the type of route/role/area operations.
(c) Aeroplanes.
The following minimum figures for details to be flown under supervision are guidelines for operators to use
when establishing their individual requirements:
(1) turbo-jet aircraft
(i) co-pilot undertaking first operator conversion course:
(A) total accumulated 100 hours or minimum 40 flight sectors;
(ii) co-pilot upgrading to commander:
(A) minimum 20 flight sectors when converting to a new type;
(B) minimum 10 flight sectors when already qualified on the aeroplane type.
AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking
RECURRENT TRAINING SYLLABUS
(a) Recurrent training
Recurrent training should comprise the following:
(1) Ground training
(i) The ground training programme should include:
(A) aircraft systems;
(B) operational procedures and requirements, including ground de-icing/anti-icing and pilot
incapacitation; and
(C) accident/incident and occurrence review.
(ii) Knowledge of the ground training should be verified by a questionnaire or other suitable methods.
(iii) When the ground training is conducted within 3 calendar months prior to the expiry of the 12
calendar months period, the next ground and refresher training should be completed within 12
calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training.
(2) Emergency and safety equipment training
(i) Emergency and safety equipment training may be combined with emergency and safety equipment
checking and should be conducted in an aircraft or a suitable alternative training device.
(ii) Every year the emergency and safety equipment training programme should include the following:
(A) actual donning of a life-jacket, where fitted;
(B) actual donning of protective breathing equipment, where fitted;
(C) actual handling of fire extinguishers of the type used;
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(D) instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the
aircraft;
(E) instruction on the location and use of all types of exits;
(F) security procedures.
(iii) Every 3 years the programme of training should include the following:
(A) actual operation of all types of exits;
(B) demonstration of the method used to operate a slide where fitted;
(C) actual fire-fighting using equipment representative of that carried in the aircraft on an actual or
simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used;
(D) the effects of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a
simulated smoke-filled environment;
(E) actual handling of pyrotechnics, real or simulated, where applicable;
(F) demonstration in the use of the life-rafts where fitted. In the case of helicopters involved in
extended over water operations, demonstration and use of the life-rafts.
Helicopter water survival training
Where life-rafts are fitted for helicopter extended overwater operations (such as sea pilot
transfer, offshore operations, regular, or scheduled, coast-to-coast overwater operations), a
comprehensive wet drill to cover all ditching procedures should be practised by aircraft crew.
This wet drill should include, as appropriate, practice of the actual donning and inflation of a
life-jacket, together with a demonstration or audio-visual presentation of the inflation of liferafts. Crews should board the same (or similar) life-rafts from the water whilst wearing a lifejacket. Training should include the use of all survival equipment carried on board life-rafts
and any additional survival equipment carried separately on board the aircraft;
— consideration should be given to the provision of further specialist training such as
underwater escape training. Where operations are predominately conducted offshore,
operators should conduct 3-yearly helicopter underwater escape training at an appropriate
facility;
— wet practice drill should always be given in initial training unless the crew member
concerned has received similar training provided by another operator;
(G) particularly in the case where no cabin crew is required, first-aid, appropriate to the aircraft
type, the kind of operation and crew complement.
(iv) The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and
cabin/technical crew and emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination
and two-way communication between all crew members in various emergency situations.
(v) Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in aircraft evacuations so
that all who are involved are aware of the duties other crew members should perform. When such
practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin/technical crew training should include
joint discussion of emergency scenarios.
(vi) Emergency and safety equipment training should, as far as practicable, take place in conjunction
with cabin/technical crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures
and two-way communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin.
(3) CRM
(i) Elements of CRM should be integrated into all appropriate phases of recurrent training.
(ii) A specific modular CRM training programme should be established such that all major topics of
CRM training are covered over a period not exceeding 3 years, as follows:
(A) human error and reliability, error chain, error prevention and detection;
(B) operator safety culture, standard operating procedures (SOPs), organisational factors;
(C) stress, stress management, fatigue and vigilance;
(D) information acquisition and processing, situation awareness, workload management;
(E) decision making;
(F) communication and coordination inside and outside the flight crew compartment;
(G) leadership and team behaviour, synergy;
(H) automation and philosophy of the use of automation (if relevant to the type);
(I) specific type-related differences;
(J) case studies;
(K) additional areas which warrant extra attention, as identified by the safety management system.
(iii) Operators should establish procedures to update their CRM recurrent training programme.
Revision of the programme should be conducted over a period not exceeding 3 years. The revision
of the programme should take into account the de-identified results of the CRM assessments of
crews, and information identified by the safety management system.
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(4) Aircraft/FSTD training
(i) General
(A) The aircraft/FSTD training programme should be established in a way that all major failures
of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been covered in the preceding 3 year
period.
(B) When engine-out manoeuvres are carried out in an aircraft, the engine failure should be
simulated.
(C) Aircraft/FSTD training may be combined with the operator proficiency check.
(D) When the aircraft/FSTD training is conducted within 3 calendar months prior to the expiry of
the 12 calendar months period, the next aircraft/FSTD training should be completed within 12
calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training.
(ii) Helicopters
(A) Where a suitable FSTD is available, it should be used for the aircraft/FSTD training
programme. If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk
assessment, that using an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of training
with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used for this
training to the extent necessary.
(B) The recurrent training should include the following additional items, which should be
completed in an FSTD:
- settling with power and vortex ring;
- loss of tail rotor effectiveness.
(5) For operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aeroplanes, all training and checking should be
relevant to the type of operation and class of aeroplane on which the flight crew member operates with
due account taken of any specialised equipment used.
(b) Recurrent checking
Recurrent checking should comprise the following:
(1) Operator proficiency checks
(i) Aeroplanes
Where applicable, operator proficiency checks should include the following manoeuvres as pilot
flying:
(A) rejected take-off when an FSTD is available to represent that specific aeroplane, otherwise
touch drills only;
(B) take-off with engine failure between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed) or, if carried out in an
aeroplane, at a safe speed above V2;
(C) precision instrument approach to minima with, in the case of multi-engine aeroplanes, oneengine-inoperative;
(D) non-precision approach to minima;
(E) missed approach on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi-engined aeroplanes,
one-engine-inoperative;
(F) landing with one-engine-inoperative. For single-engine aeroplanes a practice forced landing is
required.
(ii) Helicopters
(A) Where applicable, operator proficiency checks should include the following
abnormal/emergency procedures:
- engine fire;
- fuselage fire;
- emergency operation of under carriage;
- fuel dumping;
- engine failure and relight;
- hydraulic failure;
- electrical failure;
- engine failure during take-off before decision point;
- engine failure during take-off after decision point;
- engine failure during landing before decision point;
- engine failure during landing after decision point;
- flight and engine control system malfunctions;
- recovery from unusual attitudes;
- landing with one or more engine(s) inoperative;
- instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) autorotation techniques;
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
- autorotation to a designated area;
- pilot incapacitation;
- directional control failures and malfunctions.
(B) For pilots required to engage in IFR operations, proficiency checks include the following
additional abnormal/emergency procedures:
- precision instrument approach to minima;
- go-around on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a
simulated failure of one engine;
- non-precision approach to minima;
- in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine to be included
in either the precision or non-precision approach to minima;
- landing with a simulated failure of one or more engines;
- where appropriate to the helicopter type, approach with flight control system/flight
director system malfunctions, flight instrument and navigation equipment failures.
(C) Before a flight crew member without a valid instrument rating is allowed to operate in VMC at
night, he/she should be required to undergo a proficiency check at night. Thereafter, each second
proficiency check should be conducted at night.
(iii) Once every 12 months the checks prescribed in (b)(1)(ii)(A) may be combined with the
proficiency check for revalidation or renewal of the aircraft type rating.
(iv) Operator proficiency checks should be conducted by a type rating examiner (TRE) or a synthetic
flight examiner (SFE), as applicable.
Emergency and safety equipment checks. The items to be checked should be those for which training
has been carried out in accordance with (a)(2).
Line checks
(i) Line checks should establish the ability to perform satisfactorily a complete line operation,
including pre-flight and post-flight procedures and use of the equipment provided, as specified in
the operations manual. The route chosen should be such as to give adequate representation of the
scope of a pilot’s normal operations. When weather conditions preclude a manual landing, an
automatic landing is acceptable. The commander, or any pilot who may be required to relieve the
commander, should also demonstrate his/her ability to ‘manage’ the operation and take appropriate
command decisions.
(ii) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with a methodology
described in the operations manual. The purpose of such assessment is to:
(A) provide feedback to the crew collectively and individually and serve to identify retraining; and
(B) be used to improve the CRM training system.
(iii) CRM assessment alone should not be used as a reason for a failure of the line check.
(iv) When pilots are assigned duties as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked in
both functions.
(v) Line checks should be conducted by a commander nominated by the operator. The operator should
inform the competent authority about the persons nominated. The person conducting the line check
should occupy an observer’s seat where installed. His/her CRM assessments should solely be
based on observations made during the initial briefing, cabin briefing, flight crew compartment
briefing and those phases where he/she occupies the observer’s seat.
(A) For aeroplanes, in the case of long haul operations where additional operating flight crew are
carried, the person may fulfil the function of a cruise relief pilot and should not occupy either
pilot’s seat during take-off, departure, initial cruise, descent, approach and landing.
(vi) Where a pilot is required to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, he/she should be checked
on one flight sector as pilot flying and on another flight sector as pilot monitoring. However,
where the operator’s procedures require integrated flight preparation, integrated cockpit
initialisation and that each pilot performs both flying and monitoring duties on the same sector,
then the line check may be performed on a single flight sector.
When the operator proficiency check, line check or emergency and safety equipment check are
undertaken within the final 3 calendar months of validity of a previous check, the period of validity of
the subsequent check should be counted from the expiry date of the previous check.
In the case of single-pilot operations with helicopters, the recurrent checks referred to in (b)(1), (2) and
(3) should be performed in the single-pilot role on a particular helicopter type in an environment
representative of the operation.
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(c) Flight crew incapacitation training, except single-pilot operations
(1) Procedures should be established to train flight crew to recognise and handle flight crew incapacitation.
This training should be conducted every year and can form part of other recurrent training. It should
take the form of classroom instruction, discussion, audio-visual presentation or other similar means.
(2) If an FSTD is available for the type of aircraft operated, practical training on flight crew incapacitation
should be carried out at intervals not exceeding 3 years.
(d) Personnel providing training and checking
Training and checking should be provided by the following personnel:
(1) ground and refresher training by suitably qualified personnel;
(2) flight training by a flight instructor (FI), type rating instructor (TRI) or class rating instructor (CRI) or,
in the case of the FSTD content, a synthetic flight instructor (SFI), providing that the FI, TRI, CRI or
SFI satisfies the operator's experience and knowledge requirements sufficient to instruct on the items
specified in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A) and (B);
(3) emergency and safety equipment training by suitably qualified personnel;
(4) CRM:
(i) integration of CRM elements into all the phases of the recurrent training by all the personnel
conducting recurrent training. The operator should ensure that all personnel conducting recurrent
training are suitably qualified to integrate elements of CRM into this training;
(ii) modular CRM training by at least one CRM trainer, who may be assisted by experts in order to
address specific areas.
(5) recurrent checking by the following personnel:
(i) operator proficiency check by a type rating examiner (TRE), class rating examiner (CRE) or, if the
check is conducted in an FSTD, a TRE, CRE or a synthetic flight examiner (SFE), trained in CRM
concepts and the assessment of CRM skills.
(ii) emergency and safety equipment checking by suitably qualified personnel.
(e) Use of FSTD
(1) Training and checking provide an opportunity to practice abnormal/emergency procedures that rarely
arise in normal operations and should be part of a structured programme of recurrent training. This
should be carried out in an FSTD whenever possible.
(2) The line check should be performed in the aircraft. All other training and checking should be
performed in an FSTD, or, if it is not reasonably practicable to gain access to such devices, in an
aircraft of the same type or in the case of emergency and safety equipment training, in a representative
training device. The type of equipment used for training and checking should be representative of the
instrumentation, equipment and layout of the aircraft type operated by the flight crew member.
(3) Because of the unacceptable risk when simulating emergencies such as engine failure, icing problems,
certain types of engine(s) (e.g. during continued take-off or go-around, total hydraulic failure), or
because of environmental considerations associated with some emergencies (e.g. fuel dumping) these
emergencies should preferably be covered in an FSTD. If no FSTD is available, these emergencies may
be covered in the aircraft using a safe airborne simulation, bearing in mind the effect of any subsequent
failure, and the exercise must be preceded by a comprehensive briefing.
AMC2 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
(a) The recurrent training and checking for flight engineers should meet the requirements for pilots and any
additional specific duties, omitting those items that do not apply to flight engineers.
(b) Recurrent training and checking for flight engineers should, whenever possible, take place concurrently with
a pilot undergoing recurrent training and checking.
(c) The line check should be conducted by a commander or by a flight engineer nominated by the
operator, in accordance with national rules, if applicable.
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GM1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking
LINE CHECK AND PROFICIENCY TRAINING AND CHECKING
(a) Line checks, route and aerodrome knowledge and recent experience requirements are intended to ensure
the crew member’s ability to operate efficiently under normal conditions, whereas ot her checks and
emergency and safety equipment training are primarily intended to prepare the crew member for
abnormal/emergency procedures.
(b) The line check is considered a particularly important factor in the development, maintenance and
refinement of high operating standards, and can provide the operator with a valuable indication of
the usefulness of his/her training policy and methods. Line checks are a test of a flight crew
member’s ability to perform a complete line operation, including pre-flight and post-flight procedures
and use of the equipment provided, and an opportunity for an overall assessment of his/her ability to
perform the duties required as specified in the operations manual. The line check is not intended to
determine knowledge on any particular route.
(c) Proficiency training and checking
When an FSTD is used, the opportunity should be taken, where possible, to use LOFT.
AMC1 ORO.FC.235 (d) Pilot qualification to operate in either pilot’s seat
SINGLE-ENGINE HELICOPTERS – AUTOROTATIVE LANDING
In the case of single-engined helicopters, the autorotative landing should be carried out from left- and right-hand
seats on alternate proficiency checks.
GM1 ORO.FC.235 (f) ;( g) Pilot qualification to operate in either pilot’s seat
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT-HAND SEATS
The differences between left- and right-hand seats may not be significant in cases where, for example, the
autopilot is used.
AMC1 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant
GENERAL
(a) Aeroplanes
(1) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane class, type or variant, as determined by
the operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for class-single pilot or typesingle pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, the operator should ensure that the flight crew
member does not operate more than:
(i) three reciprocating engine aeroplane types or variants;
(ii) three turbo-propeller aeroplane types or variants;
(iii) one turbo-propeller aeroplane type or variant and one reciprocating engine aeroplane type or
variant; or
(iv) one turbo-propeller aeroplane type or variant and any aeroplane within a particular class.
(2) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant within one or more
licence endorsement, as determined by the operational suitability data established in accordance with
MCAR 21, the operator should ensure that:
(i) the minimum flight crew complement specified in the operations manual is the same for each type
or variant to be operated;
(ii) the flight crew member does not operate more than two aeroplane types or variants for which a
separate licence endorsement is required, unless credits related to the training, checking, and recent
experience requirements are defined in operational suitability data established in accordance with
MCAR 21 for the relevant types or variants; and
(iii) only aeroplanes within one licence endorsement are flown in any one flight duty period, unless the
operator has established procedures to ensure adequate time for preparation.
(3) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant as determined by the
operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for type-single pilot and typemulti pilot, but not within a single licence endorsement, the operator should comply with points (a)(2)
and (4).
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(4) When a flight crew member operates more than one aeroplane type or variant as determined by the
operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for type multi-pilot, but not
within a single licence endorsement, or combinations of aeroplane types or variants as determined by
the operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for class single-pilot and type
multi-pilot, the operator should comply with the following:
(i) point (a)(2);
(ii) before exercising the privileges of more than one licence endorsement:
(A) flight crew members should have completed two consecutive operator proficiency checks and
should have:
— 500 hours in the relevant crew position in CAT operations with the same operator; or
— for IFR and VFR night operations with performance class B aeroplanes, 100 hours or
flight sectors in the relevant crew position in CAT operations with the same operator, if at
least one licence endorsement is related to a class. A check flight should be completed
before the pilot is released for duties as commander;
(B) in the case of a pilot having experience with an operator and exercising the privileges of more
than one licence endorsement, and then being promoted to command with the same operator
on one of those types, the required minimum experience as commander is 6 months and 300
hours, and the pilot should have completed two consecutive operator proficiency checks
before again being eligible to exercise more than one licence endorsement;
(iii) before commencing training for and operation of another type or variant, flight crew members
should have completed 3 months and 150 hours flying on the base aeroplane, which should include
at least one proficiency check, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience
requirements are defined in operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21
for the relevant types or variants;
(iv) after completion of the initial line check on the new type, 50 hours flying or 20 sectors should be
achieved solely on aeroplanes of the new type rating, unless credits related to the training,
checking and recent experience requirements are defined in operational suitability data established
in accordance with MCAR 21 for the relevant types or variants;
(v) recent experience requirements established in MCAR AIRCREW for each type operated;
(vi) the period within which line flying experience is required on each type should be specified in the
operations manual;
(vii) when credits are defined in operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21
for the relevant type or variant, this should be reflected in the training required in ORO.FC.230
and:
(A) ORO.FC.230 (b) requires two operator proficiency checks every year. When credits are
defined in operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for operator
proficiency checks to alternate between the types, each operator proficiency check should
revalidate the operator proficiency check for the other type(s). The operator proficiency check
may be combined with the proficiency checks for revalidation or renewal of the aeroplane
type rating or the instrument rating in accordance with MCAR AIRCREW.
(B) ORO.FC.230 (c) requires one line check every year. When credits are defined in operational
suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for line checks to alternate between
types or variants, each line check should revalidate the line check for the other type or variant.
(C) Annual emergency and safety equipment training and checking should cover all requirements
for each type.
(b) Helicopters
(1) If a flight crew member operates more than one type or variant, the following provisions should be
met:
(i) The recency requirements and the requirements for recurrent training and checking should be met
and confirmed prior to CAT operations on any type, and the minimum number of flights on each
type within a 3-month period specified in the operations manual.
(ii) ORO.FC.230 requirements with regard to recurrent training.
(iii) When credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in
operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for the relevant types or
variants, the requirements of ORO.FC.230 with regard to proficiency checks may be met by a 6
monthly check on any one type or variant operated. However, a proficiency check on each type or
variant operated should be completed every 12 months.
(iv) For helicopters with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of more than 5 700 kg, or with
a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of more than 19:
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(A) the flight crew member should not fly more than two helicopter types, unless credits related to
the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined in operational suitability
data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for the relevant types or variants;
(B) a minimum of 3 months and 150 hours experience on the type or variant should be achieved
before the flight crew member should commence the conversion course onto the new type or
variant, unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are
defined in operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for the
relevant types or variants;
(C) 28 days and/or 50 hours flying should then be achieved exclusively on the new type or variant,
unless credits related to the training, checking and recent experience requirements are defined
in operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for the relevant types
or variants; and
(D) a flight crew member should not be rostered to fly more than one type or significantly
different variant of a type during a single duty period.
(v) In the case of all other helicopters, the flight crew member should not operate more than three
helicopter types or significantly different variants, unless credits related to the training, checking
and recent experience requirements are defined in operational suitability data established in
accordance with MCAR 21 for the relevant types or variants.
(c) Combination of helicopter and aeroplane
(1) The flight crew member may fly one helicopter type or variant and one aeroplane type irrespective of
their MCTOM or MOPSC.
(2) If the helicopter type is covered by paragraph (b)(1)(iv) then (b)(1)(iv)(B), (C) and (D) should also
apply in this case.
AMC2 ORO.FC.240 Operation on more than one type or variant
GENERAL
(a) Terminology
The terms used in the context of the operation of more than one type or variant have the following meaning:
(1) Base aircraft means an aircraft used as a reference to compare differences with another aircraft.
(2) Variant means an aircraft or a group of aircraft within the same pilot type rating that has differences to
the base aircraft requiring difference training or familiarisation training.
(3) Credit means the recognition of training, checking or recent experience based on commonalities
between aircraft. For substantiation of the credits ODR tables or other appropriate documentation for
comparison of the relevant aircraft characteristics may be provided.
(4) Operator difference requirements (ODRs) mean a formal description of differences between types or
variants flown by a particular operator.
(b) Philosophy
The concept of operating more than one type or variant depends upon the experience, knowledge and ability
of the operator and the flight crew concerned.
The first consideration is whether or not aircraft types or variants are sufficiently similar to allow the safe
operation of both.
The second consideration is whether or not the types or variants are sufficiently similar for the training,
checking and recent experience. Unless credits have been established by the operational suitability data in
accordance with MCAR 21, all training, checking and recent experience requirements should be completed
independently for each type or variant.
(c) Methodology – Use of Operator Difference Requirement (ODR) Tables
(1) Before assigning flight crew members to operate more than one type or variant of aircraft, the operator
should conduct a detailed evaluation of the differences or similarities of the aircraft concerned in order
to establish appropriate procedures or operational restrictions. This evaluation should be based on the
data established in accordance with MCAR 21 for the relevant types or variants, and should be adapted
to the operator’s specific aircraft configurations. This evaluation should take into account of the
following:
(i) the level of technology;
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(ii) operational procedures; and
(iii) handling characteristics.
The methodology described below should be used as a means of evaluating aeroplane differences
and similarities to justify the operation of more than one type or variant, and when credit is sought.
(2) ODR tables
Before requiring flight crew members to operate more than one type or variant, operators should first
nominate one aircraft as the base aircraft from which to show differences with the second aircraft type
or variant, the ‘difference aircraft’, in terms of technology (systems), procedures, pilot handling and
aircraft management. These differences, known as operator difference requirements (ODR), preferably
presented in tabular format, constitute part of the justification for operating more than one type or
variant and also the basis for the associated differences/familiarisation or reduced type rating training
for the flight crew.
(3) The ODR tables should be presented as follows:
GENERAL OPERATOR DIFFERENCES REQUIREMENTS TABLE
DIFFERENCE AIRCRAFT:
COMPLIANCE METHOD
BASE AIRCRAFT:
TRAINING
CHKG/CURR
General
Differences
Flt
char
Proc
chg
A
B
C
D
E
FLT
CHK
REC
EXP
Range
No
Yes
CBT
ETOPS Certified
Configuration
DIMENSIONS
Yes No
CBT
per AFM, FCOM
SYSTEM OPERATOR DIFFERENCES REQUIREMENTS TABLE
21 – AIR
CONTROLS
No
Yes
HO
CONDITIONING
AND
INDICATORS:
- Panel layout
21 - AIR
PACKS:
No
Yes
CBT
CONDITIONING
- Switch type
- Automatically
controlled
- Reset switch for
both packs
MANOEUVRE OPERATOR DIFFERENCES REQUIREMENTS TABLE
Differences due
Preflight
NO
YES
CBT FTD
to systems, ECL
FBW handling vs
Conventional;
AFDS
Normal takeoff
TAKEOFF:
NO
YES
CBT
FFS
- Autothrottle
engagement
FMA indications
GENERAL
(4) Compilation of ODR Tables
(i) ODR 1: General
The general characteristics of the candidate aircraft are compared with the base aircraft with regard
to:
(A) general dimensions and aircraft design (number and type of rotors, wing span or category);
(B) flight deck general design;
(C) cabin layout;
(D) engines (number, type and position);
(E) limitations (flight envelope).
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(ii) ODR 2: Systems
Consideration is given to differences in design between the candidate aircraft and the base aircraft.
For this comparison the Air Transport Association (ATA) 100 index is used. This index establishes
a system and subsystem classification and then an analysis performed for each index item with
respect to the main architectural, functional and operations elements, including controls and
indications on the systems control panel.
(iii) ODR 3: Manoeuvres
Operational differences encompass normal, abnormal and emergency situations and include any
change in aircraft handling and flight management. It is necessary to establish a list of operational
items for consideration on which an analysis of differences can be made.
The operational analysis should take the following into account:
(A) flight deck dimensions (size, cut-off angle and pilot eye height);
(B) differences in controls (design, shape, location and function);
(C) additional or altered function (flight controls) in normal or abnormal conditions;
(D) handling qualities (including inertia) in normal and in abnormal configurations;
(E) aircraft performance in specific manoeuvres;
(F) aircraft status following failure;
(G) management (e.g. ECAM, EICAS, navaid selection, automatic checklists).
(iv) Once the differences for ODR 1, ODR 2 and ODR 3 have been established, the consequences of
differences evaluated in terms of flight characteristics (FLT CHAR) and change of procedures
(PROC CHNG) should be entered into the appropriate columns.
(v) Difference Levels - crew training, checking and currency
(A) The final stage of an operator’s proposal to operate more than one type or variant is to
establish crew training, checking and currency requirements. This may be established by
applying the coded difference levels from Table 4 to the compliance method column of the
ODR Tables.
(B) Differences items identified in the ODR tables as impacting flight characteristics, or
procedures, should be analysed in the corresponding ATA section of the ODR manoeuvres.
Normal, abnormal and emergency situations should be addressed accordingly.
(d) Difference Levels
(1) Difference levels — General
Difference levels are used to identify the extent of difference between a base and a candidate aircraft
with reference to the elements described in the ODR tables. These levels are proportionate to the
differences between a base and a candidate aircraft. A range of five difference levels in order of
increasing requirements, identified as A through E, are each specified for training, checking, and
currency.
Difference levels apply when a difference with the potential to affect flight safety exists between a base
and a candidate aircraft. Differences may also affect the knowledge, skills, or abilities required from a
pilot. If no differences exist, or if differences exist but do not affect flight safety, or if differences exist
but do not affect knowledge, skills, or abilities, then difference levels are neither assigned nor
applicable to pilot qualification. When difference levels apply, each level is based on a scale of
differences related to design features, systems, or manoeuvres. In assessing the effects of differences,
both flight characteristics and procedures are considered since flight characteristics address handling
qualities and performance, while procedures include normal, non-normal and emergency items.
Levels for training, checking, and currency are assigned independently, but are linked depending on the
differences between a base and candidate aircraft. Training at level E usually identifies that the
candidate aircraft is a different type to the base aircraft.
(2) Difference levels are summarised in the table below regarding training, checking, and currency.
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DIFFERENCE
LEVEL
TRAINING
CHECKING
CURRENCY
Not applicable or
integrated with next
proficiency check
Not applicable
B
Task or system check
Self-review
C
Partial proficiency check
using qualified device
Designated system
D
Manoeuvre Training
Devices1 or aircraft to
accomplish specific
manoeuvres
Partial proficiency check
using qualified device1
Designated
manoeuvre(s)1
E
FSTDs2 or aircraft
Proficiency check using
FSTDs2 or aircraft
As per regulation, using
FSTDs2 or aircraft
A
-instruction
Footnote (1):
Aeroplane: FTD Level 2, or FFS, or aeroplane
Helicopter: FTD Level 2 and 3, or FFS, or helicopter
Footnote (2):
Aeroplane: FFS Level C or D, or aeroplane
Helicopter: FSTD’S having dual qualification: FFS Level B and FTD Level 3, or FFS Level C or D,
or helicopter
Training Levels A and B require familiarisation training, levels C and D require differences training.
Training Level E means that differences are such that type rating training is required.
(3) Difference level — Training
The training differences levels specified represent the minimum requirements. Devices associated with
a higher difference level may be used to satisfy a training differences requirement.
(i) Level A training
Level A differences training is applicable to aircraft with differences that can adequately be
addressed through self-instruction. Level A training represents a knowledge requirement such that
once appropriate information is provided, understanding and compliance can be assumed to be
demonstrated.
Training needs not covered by level A training may require level B training, or higher, depending
on the outcome of the evaluations described in the aircraft evaluation process (EASA CS
FCD.420).
(ii) Level B training
Level B differences training is applicable to aircraft with system or procedure differences that can
adequately be addressed through aided instruction.
At level B aided instruction it is appropriate to ensure pilot understanding, emphasise issues,
provide a standardised method of presentation of material, or to aid retention of material following
training.
(iii) Level C training
Level C differences training can only be accomplished through the use of devices capable of
systems training.
Level C differences training is applicable to variants having ‘part task’ differences that affect skills
or abilities as well as knowledge. Training objectives focus on mastering individual systems,
procedures, or tasks, as opposed to performing highly integrated flight operations and manoeuvres
in ‘real time’. Level C may also require self-instruction or aided instruction of a pilot, but cannot
be adequately addressed by a knowledge requirement alone. Training devices are required to
supplement instruction to ensure attainment or retention of pilot skills and abilities to accomplish
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the more complex tasks, usually related to operation of particular aircraft systems.
The minimum acceptable training media for level C is interactive computer-based training, cockpit
systems simulators, cockpit procedure trainers, part task trainers [such as Inertial Navigation
System (INS), Flight Management System (FMS), or Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
trainers], or similar devices.
(iv) Level D training
Level D differences training can only be accomplished with devices capable of performing flight
manoeuvres and addressing full task differences affecting knowledge, skills, or abilities.
Devices capable of flight manoeuvres address full task performance in a dynamic ‘real time’
environment and enable integration of knowledge, skills and abilities in a simulated flight
environment, involving combinations of operationally oriented tasks and realistic task loading for
each relevant phase of flight. At level D, knowledge and skills to complete necessary normal, nonnormal and emergency procedures are fully addressed for each variant.
Level D differences training requires mastery of interrelated skills that cannot be adequately
addressed by separate acquisition of a series of knowledge areas or skills that are interrelated.
However, the differences are not so significant, that a full type rating training course is required. If
demonstration of interrelationships between the systems was important, the use of a series of
separate devices for systems training would not suffice. Training for level D differences requires a
training device that has accurate, high fidelity integration of systems and controls and realistic
instrument indications. Level D training may also require manoeuvre visual cues, motion cues,
dynamics, control loading or specific environmental conditions. Weather phenomena such as low
visibility operations or wind shear may or may not be incorporated. Where simplified or generic
characteristics of an aircraft type are used in devices to satisfy level D difference training,
significant negative training cannot occur as a result of the simplification.
Appropriate devices as described in EASA CS FCD.420 (a), satisfying level D differences training
range from those where relevant elements of aircraft flight manoeuvring, performance, and
handling qualities are incorporated. The use of a Manoeuvre Training Device or aircraft is limited
for the conduct of specific manoeuvres or handling differences, or for specific equipment or
procedures.
(v) Level E training
Level E differences training is applicable to candidate aircraft having such a significant ‘full task’
differences that a full type rating training course or a type rating training course with credit for
previous experience on similar aircraft types is required to meet the training objectives.
The training requires a ‘high fidelity’ environment to attain or maintain knowledge, skills, or
abilities that can only be satisfied by the use of FSTDs or the aircraft itself as mentioned in EASA
CS FCD.415 (a). Level E training, if done in an aircraft, should be modified for safety reasons
where manoeuvres can result in a high degree of risk.
When level E differences training is assigned, suitable credit or constraints may be applied for
knowledge, skills or abilities related to other pertinent aircraft types and specifies the relevant
subjects, procedures or manoeuvres.
(4) Difference level — Checking
Differences checking addresses any pertinent pilot testing or checking. Initial and recurrent checking
levels are the same unless otherwise specified.
It may be possible to satisfactorily accomplish recurrent checking objectives in devices not meeting
initial checking requirements. In such instances the applicant may propose for revalidation checks the
use of certain devices not meeting the initial check requirements.
(i) Level A checking
Level A differences checking indicates that no check related to differences is required at the time
of differences training. However, a pilot is responsible for knowledge of each variant flown.
(ii) Level B checking
Level B differences checking indicates that a ‘task’ or ‘systems’ check is required following initial
and recurring training.
(iii) Level C checking
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Level C differences checking requires a partial check using a suitable qualified device. A partial
check is conducted relative to particular manoeuvres or systems.
(iv) Level D checking
Level D differences checking indicates that a partial proficiency check is required following both
initial and recurrent training. In conducting the partial proficiency check, manoeuvres common to
each variant may be credited and need not be repeated. The partial proficiency check covers the
specified particular manoeuvres, systems, or devices. Level D checking is performed using
scenarios representing a ‘real time’ flight environment and uses qualified devices permitted for
level D training or higher.
(v) Level E checking
Level E differences checking requires that a full proficiency check be conducted in FSTDs or in an
aircraft as mentioned in EASA CS FCD.415(a), following both initial and recurrent training. If
appropriate, alternating Level E checking between relevant aircraft is possible and credit may be
defined for procedures or manoeuvres based on commonality.
Assignment of level E checking requirements alone, or in conjunction with level E currency, does
not necessarily result in assignment of a separate type rating.
(5) Difference level — Currency
Differences currency addresses any currency and re-currency levels. Initial and recurrent currency
levels are the same unless otherwise specified.
(i) Level A currency
Level A currency is common to each aircraft and does not require separate tracking. Maintenance
of currency in any aircraft suffices for any other variant within the same type rating.
(ii) Level B currency
Level B currency is ‘knowledge-related’ currency, typically achieved through self-review by
individual pilots.
(iii) Level C currency
(A) Level C currency is applicable to one or more designated systems or procedures, and relates to
both skill and knowledge requirements. When level C currency applies, any pertinent lower
level currency is also to be addressed.
(B) Re-establishing level C currency
When currency is lost, it may be re-established by completing required items using a device
equal to or higher than that specified for level C training and checking.
(iv) Level D currency
(A) Level D currency is related to designated manoeuvres and addresses knowledge and skills
required for performing aircraft control tasks in real time with integrated use of associated
systems and procedures. Level D currency may also address certain differences in flight
characteristics including performance of any required manoeuvres and related normal, nonnormal and emergency procedures. When level D is necessary, any pertinent lower level
currency is also to be addressed.
(B) Re-establishing level D currency
When currency is lost, currency may be re-established by completing pertinent manoeuvres
using a device equal to or higher than that specified for level D differences training and
checking.
(v) Level E currency
(A) Level E currency requires that recent experience requirements of Part-FCL and operational
requirements be complied with in each aircraft separately. Level E currency may also specify
other system, procedure, or manoeuvre currency item(s) necessary for safe operations, and
requires procedures or manoeuvres to be accomplished in FSTDs or in an aircraft as
mentioned in EASA CS FCD.415(a). Provisions are applied in a way which addresses the
required system or manoeuvre experience.
When level E is assigned between aircraft of common characteristics, credit may be permitted.
Assignment of level E currency requirements does not automatically lead to a determination
on same or separate type rating. Level E currency is tracked by a means that is acceptable to
the competent authority.
When CTLC is permitted, any credit or constraints applicable to using FSTDs, as mentioned
in EASA CS FCD.415 (a), are also to be determined.
(B) Re-establishing level E currency
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When currency is lost, currency may be re-established by completing pertinent manoeuvres
using a device specified for level E differences training and checking.
(6) Competency regarding non-normal and emergency procedures — Currency
Competency for non-normal and emergency manoeuvres or procedures is generally addressed by
checking requirements. Particular non-normal and emergency manoeuvres or procedures may not be
considered mandatory for checking or training. In this situation it may be necessary to periodically
practice or demonstrate those manoeuvres or procedures specifying currency requirements for those
manoeuvres or procedures.
AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative training and qualification programme
COMPONENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION
(a) Alternative training and qualification programme (ATQP) components
The ATQP should comprise the following:
(1) Documentation that details the scope and requirements of the programme, including the following:
(i) The programme should demonstrate that the operator is able to improve the training and
qualification standards of flight crew to a level that exceeds the standards prescribed in ORO.FC
and Subpart E of Annex V (SPA.LVO).
(ii) The operator’s training needs and established operational and training objectives.
(iii) A description of the process for designing and gaining approval for the operator’s flight crew
qualification programmes. This should include quantified operational and training objectives
identified by the operator’s internal monitoring programmes. External sources may also be used.
(iv) A description of how the programme will:
(A) enhance safety;
(B) improve training and qualification standards of flight crew;
(C) establish attainable training objectives;
(D) integrate CRM in all aspects of training;
(E) develop a support and feedback process to form a self-correcting training system;
(F) institute a system of progressive evaluations of all training to enable consistent and uniform
monitoring of the training undertaken by flight crew;
(G) enable the operator to be able to respond to new aeroplane technologies and changes in the
operational environment;
(H) foster the use of innovative training methods and technology for flight crew instruction and
the evaluation of training systems; and
(I) make efficient use of training resources, specifically to match the use of training media to the
training needs.
(2) A task analysis to determine:
(i) knowledge;
(ii) required skills;
(iii) associated skill-based training; and
(iv) validated behavioural markers, where appropriate.
For each aeroplane type/class to be included within the ATQP the operator should establish a
systematic review that determines and defines the various tasks to be undertaken by the flight crew
when operating that type/class. Data from other types/classes may also be used. The analysis
should determine and describe the knowledge and skills required to complete the various tasks
specific to the aeroplane type/class and/or type of operation. In addition, the analysis should
identify the appropriate behavioural markers that should be exhibited. The task analysis should be
suitably validated in accordance with (b)(3). The task analysis, in conjunction with the data
gathering programme(s), permits the operator to establish a programme of targeted training
together with the associated training objectives.
(3) Curricula. The curriculum structure and content should be determined by task analysis, and should
include proficiency objectives, including when and how these objectives should be met.
(i) The training programme should have the following structure:
(A) Curriculum, specifying the following elements:
(a) Entry requirements: a list of topics and content, describing what training level will be
required before start or continuation of training.
(b) Topics: a description of what will be trained during the lesson.
(c) Targets/Objectives
(1) Specific target or set of targets that have to be reached and fulfilled before the training
course can be continued.
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(2) Each specified target should have an associated objective that is identifiable both by the
flight crew and the trainers.
(3) Each qualification event that is required by the programme should specify the training
that is required to be undertaken and the required standard to be achieved.
(B) Daily lesson plan
(a) Each lesson/course/training or qualification event should have the same basic structure.
The topics related to the lesson should be listed and the lesson targets should be
unambiguous.
(b) Each lesson/course or training event whether classroom, CBT or simulator should specify
the required topics with the relevant targets to be achieved.
(4) A specific training programme for:
(i) each aeroplane type/class within the ATQP;
(ii) instructors (class rating instructor rating/synthetic flight instructor authorisation/type rating
instructor rating — CRI/SFI/TRI), and other personnel undertaking flight crew instruction; and
(iii) examiners (class rating examiner/synthetic flight examiner/type rating examiner —
CRE/SFE/TRE).
This should include a method for the standardisation of instructors and examiners. Personnel who
perform training and checking of flight crew in an operator’s ATQP should receive the following
additional training on:
(A) ATQP principles and goals;
(B) knowledge/skills/behaviour as learnt from task analysis;
(C) line-oriented evaluation (LOE)/ LOFT scenarios to include triggers/markers/event
sets/observable behaviour;
(D) qualification standards;
(E) harmonisation of assessment standards;
(F) behavioural markers and the systemic assessment of CRM;
(G) event sets and the corresponding desired knowledge/skills and behaviour of the flight crew;
(H) the processes that the operator has implemented to validate the training and qualification
standards and the instructors part in the ATQP quality control; and
(I) line-oriented quality evaluation (LOQE).
(5) A feedback loop for the purpose of curriculum validation and refinement, and to ascertain that the
programme meets its proficiency objectives.
(i) The feedback should be used as a tool to validate that the curricula are implemented as specified
by the ATQP; this enables substantiation of the curriculum, and that proficiency and training
objectives have been met. The feedback loop should include data from operations flight data
monitoring, the advanced flight data monitoring (FDM) programme and LOE/LOQE programmes.
In addition, the evaluation process should describe whether the overall targets/objectives of
training are being achieved and should prescribe any corrective action that needs to be undertaken.
(ii) The programme’s established quality control mechanisms should at least review the following:
(A) procedures for approval of recurrent training;
(B) ATQP instructor training approvals;
(C) approval of event set(s) for LOE/LOFT;
(D) procedures for conducting LOE and LOQE.
(6) A method for the assessment of flight crew during conversion and recurrent training and checking. The
assessment process should include event-based assessment as part of the LOE. The assessment method
should comply with ORO.FC.230.
(i) The qualification and checking programmes should include at least the following elements:
(A) a specified structure;
(B) elements to be tested/examined;
(C) targets and/or standards to be attained;
(D) the specified technical and procedural knowledge and skills, and behavioural markers to be
exhibited.
(ii) An LOE event should comprise tasks and sub-tasks performed by the crew under a specified set of
conditions. Each event has one or more specific training targets/objectives, which require the
performance of a specific manoeuvre, the application of procedures, or the opportunity to practise
cognitive, communication or other complex skills. For each event the proficiency that is required
to be achieved should be established. Each event should include a range of circumstances under
which the crews’ performance is to be measured and evaluated. The conditions pertaining to each
event should also be established and they may include the prevailing meteorological conditions
(ceiling, visibility, wind, turbulence, etc.), the operational environment (navigation aid inoperable,
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etc.), and the operational contingencies (non-normal operation, etc.).
(iii) The markers specified under the operator’s ATQP should form one of the core elements in
determining the required qualification standard. A typical set of markers is shown in the table
below:
EVENT
Awareness of aeroplane systems:
MARKER
1. Monitors and reports changes in automation status
2. Applies closed loop principle in all relevant situations
3. Uses all channels for updates
4. Is aware of remaining technical resources
(iv) The topics/targets integrated into the curriculum should be measurable and progression on any
training/course is only allowed if the targets are fulfilled.
(7) A data monitoring/analysis programme consisting of the following:
(i) A flight data monitoring (FDM) programme, as described in AMC1 ORO.AOC.130. Data
collection should reach a minimum of 60 % of all relevant flights conducted by the operator before
ATQP approval is granted. This proportion may be increased as determined by the competent
authority.
(ii) An advanced FDM when an extension to the ATQP is requested: an advanced FDM programme is
determined by the level of integration with other safety initiatives implemented by the operator,
such as the operator’s safety management system. The programme should include both systematic
evaluations of data from an FDM programme and flight crew training events for the relevant
crews. Data collection should reach a minimum of 80 % of all relevant flights and training
conducted by the operator. This proportion may be varied as determined by the competent
authority.
The purpose of an FDM or advanced FDM programme for ATQP is to enable the operator to:
(A) provide data to support the programme’s implementation and justify any changes to the
ATQP;
(B) establish operational and training objectives based upon an analysis of the operational
environment; and
(C) monitor the effectiveness of flight crew training and qualification.
(iii) Data gathering: the data analysis should be made available to the person responsible for ATQP
within the organisation. The data gathered should:
(A) include all fleets that are planned to be operated under the ATQP;
(B) include all crews trained and qualified under the ATQP;
(C) be established during the implementation phase of ATQP; and
(D) continue throughout the life of the ATQP.
(iv) Data handling: the operator should establish a procedure to ensure the confidentiality of individual
flight crew members, as described by AMC1 ORO.AOC.130.
(v) The operator that has a flight data monitoring programme prior to the proposed introduction of
ATQP may use relevant data from other fleets not part of the proposed ATQP.
(b) Implementation. The operator should develop an evaluation and implementation process, including the
following stages:
(1) A safety case that demonstrates equivalency of:
(i) the revised training and qualification standards compared to the standards of ORO.FC and/or
Subpart E of Annex V (SPA.LVO) prior to the introduction of ATQP; and
(ii) any new training methods implemented as part of ATQP.
The safety case should encompass each phase of implementation of the programme and be
applicable over the lifetime of the programme that is to be overseen. The safety case should:
— demonstrate the required level of safety;
— ensure the required safety is maintained throughout the lifetime of the programme; and
— minimise risk during all phases of the programme’s implementation and operation.
The elements of a safety case include:
— planning: integrated and planned with the operation (ATQP) that is to be justified;
— criteria;
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— safety-related documentation, including a safety checklist;
— programme of implementation to include controls and validity checks; and
— oversight, including review and audits.
Criteria for the establishment of a safety case. The safety case should:
— be able to demonstrate that the required or equivalent level of safety is maintained throughout
all phases of the programme;
— be valid to the application and the proposed operation;
— be adequately safe and ensure the required regulatory safety standards or approved equivalent
safety standards are achieved;
— be applicable over the entire lifetime of the programme;
— demonstrate completeness and credibility of the programme;
— be fully documented;
— ensure integrity of the operation and the maintenance of the operations and training
infrastructure;
— ensure robustness to system change;
— address the impact of technological advance, obsolescence and change; and
— address the impact of regulatory change.
(2) A task analysis, as required by (a)(2), to establish the operator’s programme of targeted training and the
associated training objectives.
(3) A period of operation whilst data is collected and analysed to validate the safety case and task analysis.
During this period the operator should continue to operate in accordance with ORO.FC and/or Subpart
E of Annex V (SPA.LVO), as applicable. The length of this period should be determined by the
competent authority.
GM1 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative training and qualification programme
TERMINOLOGY
(a) ‘ Line oriented evaluation (LOE)’ is an evaluation methodology used in the ATQP to evaluate
trainee performance, and to validate trainee proficiency. LOEs consist of flight simulator scenarios
that are developed by the operator in accordance with a methodology approved as part of the ATQP.
The LOE should be realistic and include appropriate weather scenarios and in addition should fall within an
acceptable range of difficulty. The LOE should include the use of validated event sets to provide the basis
for event-based assessment.
(b) ‘Line oriented quality evaluation (LOQE)’ is one of the tools used to help evaluate the overall performance
of an operation. LOQEs consist of line flights that are observed by appropriately qualified operator
personnel to provide feedback to validate the ATQP. The LOQE should be designed to look at those
elements of the operation that are unable to be monitored by FDM or Advanced FDM programmes.
(c) ‘Skill-based training’ requires the identification of specific knowledge and skills. The required knowledge
and skills are identified within an ATQP as part of a task analysis and are used to provide targeted training.
(d) ‘ Event-based assessment’ is the assessment of flight crew to provide assurance that the required
knowledge and skills have been acquired. This is achieved within an LOE. Feedback to the flight crew is an
integral part of event-based assessment.
(e) Safety case means a documented body of evidence that provides a demonstrable and valid justification that
the ATQP is adequately safe for the given type of operation.
AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 (a) Alternative training and qualification programme
OPERATOR EXPERIENCE
The appropriate experience should be at least 2 years’ continuous operation.
AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 (d)(e)(2) Alternative training and qualification programme
COMBINATION OF CHECK S
(a) The line orientated evaluation (LOE) may be undertaken with other ATQP training.
(b) The line check may be combined with a line oriented quality evaluation (LOQE).
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SUBPART CC – CABIN CREW
Section I — Common requirements
AMC1 ORO.CC.100 Number and composition of cabin crew
DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF CABIN CREW
(a) When determining the minimum number of cabin crew required to operate aircraft engaged in CAT
operations, factors to be taken into account should include:
(1) the number of doors/exits;
(2) the type(s) of doors/exits and the associated assisting evacuation means;
(3) the location of doors/exits in relation to cabin crew stations and the cabin layout;
(4) the location of cabin crew stations taking into account direct view requirements and cabin crew duties
in an emergency evacuation including:
(i) opening floor level doors/exits and initiating stair or slide deployment;
(ii) assisting passengers to pass through doors/exits; and
(iii) directing passengers away from inoperative doors/exits, crowd control and passenger flow
management;
(5) actions required to be performed by cabin crew in ditching, including the deployment of slide-rafts and
the launching of life-rafts;
(6) additional actions required to be performed by cabin crew members when responsible for a pair of
doors/exits; and
(7) the type and duration of the flight to be operated.
(b) When scheduling cabin crew for a flight, the operator should establish procedures that take account of the
experience of each cabin crew member. The procedures should specify that the required cabin crew
includes some cabin crew members who have at least 3 months experience as an operating cabin crew
member.
GM1 ORO.CC.100 Number and composition of cabin crew
MINIMUM NUMBER OF CABIN CREW
(a) When determining the minimum required cabin crew for its specific aircraft cabin configuration, the
operator should:
(1) request information regarding the minimum number of cabin crew established by the aircraft type
certificate (TC) holder or other design organisation responsible for showing compliance with the
evacuation requirements of the applicable Certification Specifications; and
(2) take into account the factors specified in AMC1 ORO.CC.100, as applicable.
(b) The number of cabin crew referred to in ORO.CC.100 (b)(1) means either:
(1) the number of cabin crew who actively participated in the aircraft cabin during the relevant emergency
evacuation demonstration, or who were assumed to have taken part in the relevant analysis, carried out
by the aircraft TC holder when demonstrating the maximum passenger seating capacity (MPSC) of the
aircraft type at the time of initial type certification; or
(2) a lower number of cabin crew who actively participated in a subsequent emergency evacuation
demonstration, or who were assumed to have taken part in the relevant analysis, and for which
approval has been obtained for a cabin configuration other than the MPSC, either by the TC holder or
by another design organisation. The operator should obtain a clear indication of that number which is
specified in the related documentation. If a lower number is not specified, the number of cabin crew
established at the time of initial type certification applies.
GM1 ORO.CC.115 Conduct of training courses and associated checking
EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
The following definitions apply for the purpose of training programmes, syllabi and the conduct of training and
checking on equipment and procedures:
(a) ‘Safety equipment’ means equipment installed/carried to be used during day-to-day normal operations for
the safe conduct of the flight and protection of occupants (e.g. seat belts, child restraint devices, safety card,
safety demonstration kit).
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(b) ‘Emergency equipment’ means equipment installed/carried to be used in case of abnormal and emergency
situations that demand immediate action for the safe conduct of the flight and protection of occupants,
including life preservation (e.g. drop-out oxygen, crash axe, fire extinguisher, protective breathing
equipment, manual release tool, slide-raft).
(c) ‘Normal procedures’ means all procedures established by the operator in the operations manual for day-today normal operations (e.g. pre-flight briefing of cabin crew, pre-flight checks, passenger briefing, securing
of galleys and cabin, cabin surveillance during flight).
(d) ‘Emergency procedures’ means all procedures established by the operator in the operations manual for
abnormal and emergency situations. For this purpose, ‘abnormal’ refers to a situation that is not typical or
usual, deviates from normal operation and may result in an emergency.
AMC1 ORO.CC.115(c) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
TRAINING METHODS AND TRAINING DEVICES
(a) The operator should establish training methods that take into account the following:
(1) training should include the use of cabin training devices, audio-visual presentations, computer-based
training and other types of training, as most appropriate to the training element; and
(2) a reasonable balance between the different training methods should be ensured so that the cabin crew
member achieves the level of proficiency necessary for a safe performance of all related cabin crew
duties and responsibilities.
(b) When assessing the representative training devices to be used, the operator should:
(1) take into account that a representative training device may be used to train cabin crew as an alternative
to the use of the actual aircraft or required equipment;
(2) ensure that those items relevant to the training and checking intended to be given accurately represent
the aircraft or equipment in the following particulars:
(i) layout of the cabin in relation to doors/exits, galley areas and safety and emergency equipment
stowage as relevant;
(ii) type and location of passenger seats and cabin crew stations;
(iii) doors/exits in all modes of operation, particularly in relation to the method of operation, mass and
balance and operating forces, including failure of power-assist systems where fitted; and
(iv) safety and emergency equipment of the type provided in the aircraft (such equipment may be
‘training use only’ items and, for oxygen and protective breathing equipment, units charged with
or without oxygen may be used); and
(3) assess the following factors when determining whether a door/exit can be considered to be a variant of
another type:
(i) door/exit arming/disarming;
(ii) direction of movement of the operating handle;
(iii) direction of door/exit opening;
(iv) power-assist mechanisms; and
(v) assisting evacuation means such as slides and ropes.
AMC1 ORO.CC.115 (d) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
CHECKING
(a) Checking required for each training course should be accomplished by the method appropriate to the
training element to be checked. These methods include:
(1) practical demonstration;
(2) computer-based assessment;
(3) in-flight checks;
(4) oral or written tests.
(b) Training elements that require individual practical participation may be combined with practical checks.
AMC1 ORO.CC.115 (e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT–TRAINING PROGRAMMES AND CRM INSTRUCTORS
(a) Implementation of CRM training
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Table 1 below indicates which CRM training elements should be covered in each type of training.
Table 1 – Cabin crew CRM training
CRM TRAINING ELEMENTS
to be covered
Operator’s
CRM
Training
Operator
Aircraft Type
Conversion
Training
General Principles
Human factors in aviation General instructions on
Not
CRM principles and objectives Human performance
required1
Not required
and limitations
Relevant to the individual cabin crew member
Personality awareness, human error and reliability,
attitudes and behaviours, self-assessment Stress and
Not required
stress
management
Fatigue
and
vigilance
Not required
Assertiveness, situation awareness, information
acquisition and processing
Relevant to the entire aircraft crew
Error prevention and detection
Shared situation awareness, information acquisition
and processing
Workload management
Effective communication and coordination between
all crew members including the flight crew as well as
inexperienced cabin crew members, cultural
Relevant
differences
In-depth
to the type(s)
Leadership, cooperation, synergy, decision-making,
delegation
Individual and team responsibilities, decision making,
and actions
Identification and management of the passenger
human factors: crowd control, passenger stress,
conflict management, medical factors
Specifics related to aircraft types (narrow/wide
bodied, single/multi deck), flight crew and cabin crew Not required
In-depth
composition and number of passengers
Relevant to the operator and the organisation
Company safety culture, SOPs, organisational factors,
factors linked to the type of operations
Effective communication and coordination with other
In- depth
Relevant to the
operational personnel and ground services
type(s)
Participation in cabin safety incident and accident
reporting
Case- studies
Required
Annual
Recurrent
Training
Senior Cabin
Crew (SCC)
Course
Not required
Overview
Overview
(3 year
cycle)
Not required
Overview
(3 year
cycle)
Reinforcement
(relevant to
the SCC
duties)
Overview
(3 year
cycle)
Reinforcement
(relevant to
the SCC
duties)
Required
(b) CRM training programmes
(1) There should be an effective liaison between flight crew and cabin crew training departments. Provision
should be made to allow, whenever practicable, flight and cabin crew instructors to observe and
comment on each other’s training. Consideration should be given to creating films of flight
crew compartment scenarios for playback to all cabin crew during recurrent training, and to
providing the opportunity for cabin crew members, particularly senior cabin crew members, to
participate in flight crew line oriented flying training (LOFT) exercises.
(2) The programme of each CRM training course, its content and the level to be achieved should
comply with the relevant elements specified in table 1 below as applicable to the appropriate training
course to be completed.
(3) CRM training for senior cabin crew members
(i) CRM training for senior cabin crew members should be the application of knowledge gained in
previous CRM training and operational experience relevant to the specific duties and
responsibilities of a senior cabin crew member.
(ii) The senior cabin crew member should demonstrate the ability to manage the operation and take
appropriate leadership/management decisions.
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(c) CRM instructor qualifications
(1) All personnel conducting training should be appropriately qualified to integrate elements of CRM into
all appropriate training programmes.
(2) A training and standardisation programme for CRM instructors should be established.
(3) The cabin crew CRM instructor should:
(i) have suitable experience of commercial air transport operations as a cabin crew member;
(ii) have received instruction on human factors performance limitations (HPL);
(iii) have completed an introductory CRM course as required by Part-CC and all cabin crew CRM
training required by Part-ORO;
(iv) have received instruction in training skills in order to conduct CRM courses; and
(v) be supervised by an appropriately qualified CRM instructor when conducting their first CRM
training course.
(4) An experienced non-cabin crew CRM instructor may continue to be a cabin crew CRM instructor,
provided that the provisions specified in (3)(ii) to (3)(v) are satisfied and that the instructor
demonstrates a satisfactory knowledge of the nature of the operation, the relevant specific
aircraft types and the cabin crew working environment.
(5) Instructors integrating elements of CRM into aircraft type training, recurrent training, or senior cabin
crew training should have acquired relevant knowledge of human factors and have completed
appropriate CRM training.
GM1 ORO.CC.115 (e) Conduct of training courses and associated checking
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM)
(a) CRM — General
(1) CRM should be the effective utilisation of all available resources (e.g. crew members, aircraft systems,
and supporting facilities) to achieve safe and efficient operation.
(2) The objective of CRM should be to enhance the communication and management skills of the crew
member, as well as the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all
crew members.
(3) Operator’s CRM training should reflect the culture of the operator, the scale and scope of the operation
together with associated operating procedures and areas of operation that produce particular
difficulties.
(4) Accordingly, where required during CRM training, if relevant aircraft type-specific case studies are not
available, then other case studies relevant to the scale and scope of the operation should be considered.
(b) General principles for CRM training for cabin crew
(1) Whenever practicable, combined training should be provided to flight crew and cabin crew, particularly
senior cabin crew members. This should include feedback.
(2) Where appropriate, CRM principles should be integrated into relevant parts of cabin crew training.
(3) CRM training should include group discussions and the review of accidents and incidents (case
studies).
(4) Whenever it is practicable to do so, relevant parts of CRM training should form part of the training
conducted in cabin training devices or in the aircraft.
(5) CRM training courses should be conducted in a structured and realistic manner.
(6) There should be no assessment of CRM skills. Feedback from instructors or members of the group on
individual performance should be given during training to the individuals concerned.
(7) For CAT operations, cabin crew CRM training should focus on issues related to cabin crew duties and,
therefore, should be different from flight crew CRM training. However, the coordination of the tasks
and functions of flight crew and cabin crew should be addressed.
AMC1 ORO.CC.120 (a)(1) Initial training course
NEW ENTRANTS IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN CAT OPERATIONS
(a) When a new entrant to an operator conducting operations other than CAT is a cabin crew member, not
holding a valid cabin crew licence, who has already acquired experience as cabin crew in operations other
than CAT, credit may be granted to the elements of the initial training programme he/she has previously
completed if such training elements are documented in his/her training records.
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(b) In such a case, the operator should ensure that:
(1) the full training programme, as specified in Appendix 1 to Part-CC, has been covered, and
(2) the new entrant successfully undergoes the examination required by ORO.CC.120(a)(2).
AMC1 ORO.CC.125(c) Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion training
TRAINING PROGRAMME — AIRCRAFT TYPE SPECIFIC TRAINING
The following aircraft type specific training elements should be covered as relevant to the aircraft type:
(a) Aircraft description
(1) type of aircraft, principal dimensions, narrow or wide bodied, single or double deck;
(2) speed, altitude, range;
(3) passenger seating capacity;
(4) flight crew number and minimum number of required cabin crew;
(5) cabin doors/exits location and sill height;
(6) cargo and unpressurised areas as relevant;
(7) aircraft systems relevant to cabin crew duties;
(8) flight crew compartment — general presentation, pilot seats and their mechanism, emergency exits,
storage;
(9) required cabin crew stations;
(10) flight crew compartment security — general: door components and use;
(11) access to avionics bay where relevant;
(12) lavatories — general: doors, systems, calls and signs; and
(13) least risk bomb location.
(b) Safety and emergency equipment and aircraft systems installed
Each cabin crew member should receive realistic training on, and demonstration of, the location and use of
all aircraft type specific safety and emergency equipment and aircraft systems installed, with emphasis on
the following:
(1) slides, and where non-self-supporting slides are carried, the use of any associated assisting evacuation
means;
(2) life-rafts and slide-rafts, including the equipment attached to, and/or carried in, the raft;
(3) drop-out oxygen system; and
(4) communication equipment.
(c) Operation of doors and exits
This training should be conducted in a representative training device or in the actual aircraft and should
include failure of power assist systems where fitted and the action and forces required to operate and deploy
evacuation slides. Training should also include operation and actual opening of the flight crew compartment
security door when installed.
(d) Fire and smoke protection equipment
Each cabin crew member should be trained in using fire and/or smoke protection equipment where fitted.
(e) Evacuation slide training
(1) Each cabin crew member should descend an evacuation slide from a height representative of the
aircraft main deck sill height.
(2) The slide should be fitted to a representative training device or to the actual aircraft.
(3) A further descent should be made when the cabin crew member qualifies on an aircraft type in which
the main deck exit sill height differs significantly from any aircraft type previously operated.
(f) Operation of equipment related to pilot incapacitation
The training should cover any type specific elements or conditions relevant to cabin crew actions to be
taken in case of pilot incapacitation. Each cabin crew member should be trained to operate all equipment
that must be used in case of pilot incapacitation.
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AMC1 ORO.CC.125 (d) Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion training
TRAINING PROGRAMME — OPERATOR CONVERSION TRAINING
The following training elements should be covered as relevant to the aircraft type and the related operator’s
specifics:
(a) Description of the cabin configuration
The description should cover all elements specific to the operator’s cabin configuration and any differences
with those previously covered in accordance with AMC1 ORO.CC.125(c), including:
(1) required and additional cabin crew stations — location (including direct view), restraint systems,
control panels;
(2) passenger seats — general presentation and associated operator’s specific features and equipment;
(3) designated stowage areas;
(4) lavatories — operator’s specific features, equipment and systems additional to the aircraft type specific
elements;
(5) galley — location, appliances, water and waste system, including shut-off, sinks, drains, stowage,
control panels, calls and signs; and where applicable
(6) crew rest areas — location, systems, controls, safety and emergency equipment;
(7) cabin dividers, curtains, partitions;
(8) lift location, use, controls;
(9) stowage for the containment of waste; and
(10) passenger hand rail system or alternative means.
(b) Safety and emergency equipment
Each cabin crew member should receive realistic training on and demonstration of the location and use of
all safety and emergency equipment carried, including:
(1) life jackets, infant life jackets and flotation devices;
(2) first-aid and drop-out oxygen, including supplementary systems;
(3) fire extinguishers and protective breathing equipment (PBE);
(4) crash axe or crowbar;
(5) emergency lights including torches;
(6) communication equipment, including megaphones;
(7) slide rafts and life rafts’ survival packs and their contents;
(8) pyrotechnics (actual or representative devices);
(9) first-aid kits, emergency medical kits and their contents; and
(10) other portable safety and emergency equipment, where applicable.
(c) Normal and emergency procedures
Each cabin crew member should be trained on the operator’s normal and emergency procedures as
applicable, with emphasis on the following:
(1) passenger briefing, safety demonstration and cabin surveillance;
(2) severe air turbulence;
(3) non–pressurisation, slow and sudden decompression, including the donning of portable oxygen
equipment by each cabin crew member; and
(4) other in-flight emergencies.
(d) Passenger handling and crowd control
Training should be provided on the practical aspects of passenger preparation and handling, as well as
crowd control, in various emergency situations as applicable to the operator’s specific aircraft cabin
configuration, and should cover the following:
(1) communications between flight crew and cabin crew and use of all communications equipment,
including the difficulties of coordination in a smoke-filled environment;
(2) verbal commands;
(3) the physical contact that may be needed to encourage people out of a door/exit and onto a slide;
(4) redirection of passengers away from unusable doors/exits;
(5) marshalling of passengers away from the aircraft;
(6) evacuation of special categories of passengers with emphasis on passengers with disabilities or reduced
mobility; and
(7) authority and leadership.
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(e) Fire and smoke training
(1) Each cabin crew member should receive realistic and practical training in the use of all fire-fighting
equipment, including protective clothing representative of that carried in the aircraft.
(2) Each cabin crew member should:
(i) extinguish an actual fire characteristic of an aircraft interior fire except that, in the case of halon
extinguishers, an alternative extinguishing agent may be used; and
(ii) exercise the donning and use of PBE in an enclosed simulated smoke-filled environment with
particular emphasis on identifying the actual source of fire and smoke.
(f) Evacuation procedures
Training should include all the operator’s procedures that are applicable to planned or unplanned
evacuations on land and water. It should also include, where relevant, the additional actions required from
cabin crew members responsible for a pair of doors/exits and the recognition of when doors/exits are
unusable or when evacuation equipment is unserviceable.
(g) Pilot incapacitation procedures
Unless the minimum flight crew is more than two, each cabin crew member should be trained in the
procedure for pilot incapacitation. Training in the use of flight crew checklists, where required by the
operator's standard operating procedures (SOPs), should be conducted by a practical demonstration.
(h) Crew resource management
(1) Each cabin crew member should complete the operator's CRM training covering the applicable training
elements to the level specified in the relevant column of Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.CC.115 (e).
(2) When a cabin crew member undertakes the operator’s conversion training on an aircraft type, the
applicable training elements specified in Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.CC.115(e) should be covered to the
level specified in column ‘Operator’s aircraft type conversion training’.
(3) The operator's CRM training and CRM training covered during operator aircraft type conversion
training should be conducted by at least one cabin crew CRM instructor.
AMC1 ORO.CC.125 & ORO.CC.130 Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion training &
differences training
TRAINING PROGRAMMES
The programmes and syllabi of aircraft type specific training, operator conversion training and differences
training should take into account the cabin crew member's previous training as documented in his/her training
records.
AMC1 ORO.CC.125 (b) & ORO.CC.130(c) Aircraft type specific training and operator conversion
training & differences training
NON-MANDATORY (RECOMMENDATIONS) ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY DATA
When developing the training programmes and syllabi for aircraft-type specific training and for differences
training, the operator should consider the non-mandatory (recommendations) elements for the relevant type that
are provided in the operational suitability data established in accordance with MCAR 21.
AMC1 ORO.CC.135 Familiarisation
FAMILIARISATION FLIGHTS AND AIRCRAFT FAMILIARISATION VISITS
(a) For CAT operations, familiarisation of cabin crew to a new aircraft type or variant should be completed in
accordance with the following, as relevant:
(1) New entrant cabin crew
Each new entrant cabin crew member having no previous comparable operating experience should
participate in:
(i) a familiarisation visit, as described in (c), to the aircraft to be operated; and
(ii) familiarisation flights, as described in (b).
(2) Cabin crew operating on a subsequent aircraft type
A cabin crew member assigned to operate on a subsequent aircraft type with the same operator should
participate either in:
(i) a familiarisation flight, as described in (b); or
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(ii) a familiarisation visit, as described in (c), to the aircraft type to be operated.
(b) Familiarisation flights
(1) During familiarisation flights, the cabin crew member should be assigned in addition to the minimum
number of cabin crew required in accordance with ORO.CC.100 and if applicable ORO.CC.200.
(2) Familiarisation flights should be:
(i) conducted under the supervision of the senior cabin crew member;
(ii) structured and conducted with the cabin crew member participating in pre-flight, in-flight and
post-flight safety duties;
(iii) operated with the cabin crew member wearing the operator’s cabin crew uniform; and
(iv) recorded in the training record of the cabin crew member.
(c) Aircraft familiarisation visits
(1) Aircraft visits should enable the cabin crew member to become familiar with the aircraft environment
and its equipment. Accordingly, aircraft visits should be conducted by appropriately qualified persons.
The aircraft visit should provide an overview of the aircraft’s exterior, interior and aircraft systems
with emphasis on the following:
(i) interphone and public address systems;
(ii) evacuation alarm systems;
(iii) emergency lighting;
(iv) smoke detection systems;
(v) safety and emergency equipment;
(vi) flight crew compartment;
(vii) cabin crew stations;
(viii) lavatories;
(ix) galleys, galley security and water shut-off;
(x) cargo areas if accessible from the passenger compartment during flight;
(xi) circuit breaker panels located in the passenger compartment;
(xii) crew rest areas; and
(xiii) doors/exits location and environment.
(2) An aircraft familiarisation visit may be combined with the aircraft type specific training or operator
conversion training required by ORO.CC.125.
(d) For cabin crew members assigned to operations other than CAT, familiarisation should be completed by
means of an aircraft familiarisation visit, or a familiarisation flight, as appropriate taking into account the
aircraft type to be operated by the cabin crew member.
AMC1 ORO.CC.140 Recurrent training
TRAINING PROGRAMMES
(a) Elements of the annual recurrent training programme
(1) Training on the location and handling of safety and emergency equipment should include all relevant
oxygen systems, and any equipment such as defibrillators if carried on board.
(2) Training on emergency procedures should cover pilot incapacitation procedures and crowd control
techniques.
(3) CRM training should satisfy the following:
(i) the applicable training elements specified in Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.CC.115(e) should be covered
within a 3-year cycle to the level required by Column ‘Annual Recurrent Training’;
(ii) the definition and implementation of the programme should be managed by a cabin crew CRM
instructor; and
(iii) when CRM training is provided by stand-alone modules, it should be conducted by at least one
cabin crew CRM instructor.
(b) Additional triennial elements of recurrent training programme
(1) Training on the operation of normal and emergency doors/exits should cover failure of power assist
systems where fitted. This should include the actions and forces required to operate and deploy
evacuation slides, and additional training when relevant for cabin crew members responsible for a pair
of doors/exits.
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(2) Training in the use of all firefighting equipment, including protective clothing, representative of that
carried in the aircraft should include individual practice by each cabin crew member to extinguish a fire
characteristic of an aircraft interior fire except that, in the case of halon extinguishers, an alternative
extinguishing agent may be used. Training should place particular emphasis on identifying the actual
source of fire or smoke.
AMC1 ORO.CC.145 Refresher training
TRAINING PROGRAMME
(a) Training on emergency procedures should include pilot incapacitation procedures and crowd control
techniques as applicable to the aircraft type; and
(b) Operation of doors and exits by each cabin crew member should include failure of power assist systems
where fitted as well as the action and forces required to operate and deploy evacuation slides.
GM1 ORO.CC.145 Refresher training
FREQUENCY OF REFRESHER TRAINING
For aircraft with complex equipment or procedures, the operator should consider the need for refresher training
to be completed by cabin crew members who have been absent from flying duties for less than 6 months.
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Section II — Additional requirements for CAT operations
AMC1 ORO.CC.200(c) Senior cabin crew member
TRAINING PROGRAMME
The senior cabin crew member training course should at least cover the following elements:
(a) Pre-flight briefing:
(1) operating as a crew;
(2) allocation of cabin crew stations and responsibilities; and
(3) consideration of the particular flight, aircraft type, equipment, area and type of operation, including
extended range operations with two-engine aeroplanes (ETOPS) and special categories of passengers
with emphasis on passengers with disabilities or reduced mobility, infants and stretcher cases.
(b) Cooperation within the crew:
(1) discipline, responsibilities and chain of command;
(2) importance of coordination and communication; and
(3) pilot incapacitation.
(c) Review of operator requirements and legal requirements:
(1) passenger briefing, safety briefing cards;
(2) securing of galleys;
(3) stowage of cabin baggage;
(4) electronic equipment;
(5) procedures when fuelling with passengers on board;
(6) turbulence; and
(7) documentation.
(d) Accident and incident reporting.
(e) Human factors and CRM:
The operator should ensure that all applicable elements specified in Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.CC.115 (e) are
integrated into the training and covered to the level required by Column ‘Senior Cabin Crew Course’.
(f) Flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements (FTL).
AMC1 ORO.CC.200 (d) Senior cabin crew member
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE COMMANDER
When the level of turbulence so requires, and in the absence of any instructions from the flight crew, the senior
cabin crew member should be entitled to discontinue non-safety-related duties and advise the flight crew of the
level of turbulence being experienced and the need for the fasten seat belt signs to be switched on. This should
be followed by the cabin crew securing the passenger cabin and other relevant areas.
AMC1 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
UNABLE TO OPERATE
(a) Replacement of senior cabin crew member at a base of the operator
A senior cabin crew member who did not report for or cannot commence the assigned flight or series of
flights originating from a base of the operator should be replaced without undue delay. The flight should not
depart unless another senior cabin crew member has been assigned.
(b) Replacement of incapacitated or unavailable senior cabin crew member
(1) A senior cabin crew member, who becomes incapacitated during a flight or series of flights, or
unavailable at a stopover (layover) point, should be replaced without undue delay by another senior
cabin crew member qualified on the concerned aircraft type/variant. If there is no other senior cabin
crew member, the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member should be assigned to act as senior
cabin crew member in order to reach a base of the operator.
(2) If during the series of flights the aircraft transits via a base of the operator, the assigned cabin crew
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member acting as senior cabin crew member should be replaced by another senior cabin crew member.
AMC2 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
MOST APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CABIN CREW MEMBER
Selection of the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member should take into account if the individual’s
experience as operating cabin crew member is adequate for the conduct of duties required of a senior cabin crew
member. The selected cabin crew member should have operational experience on the concerned aircraft
type/variant.
GM1 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
REPLACEMENT OF INCAPACITATED OR UNAVAILABLE SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER BY
ANOTHER SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER
To ensure that another senior cabin crew member is assigned without undue delay, the operator should take
appropriate measures. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) to ensure that a flight or series of flights do not depart from an aerodrome where a senior cabin crew
member is available or can be made available, the operator may:
(1) appoint a senior cabin crew member originally assigned to another flight and who is available at the
concerned base or stopover (layover) point if the reporting time for that flight provides sufficient time
to find a replacement; or
(2) assign a senior cabin crew member who is on standby to operate the flight or to position to the
destination where the nominated senior cabin crew member has become incapacitated or unavailable
to operate;
(b) the operator should utilise another senior cabin crew member if she/he is among the operating crew on the
same flight;
(c) in case of unavailable senior cabin crew member, the operator should use the available time and resources
to replace him/her at the stopover (layover) point with another senior cabin crew member;
(d) the operator should consider including the identification of the most appropriately qualified cabin crew
member in pre-flight briefings.
GM2 ORO.CC.200 (e) Senior cabin crew member
FLIGHT OR SERIES OF FLIGHTS
Flight or series of flights refers to a period that commences when a cabin crew member is required to report for
duty, which includes a sector or a series of sectors, and finishes when the aircraft finally comes to rest and the
engines are shut down, at the end of the last sector on which the cabin crew member acts as an operating crew
member.
GM1 ORO.CC.205 (b)(2) Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground operations and in
unforeseen circumstances
UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES
Unforeseen circumstances in this context refer to incapacitation and unavailability of a senior cabin crew
member or a cabin crew member as follows:
(a) ‘Incapacitation’ means a sudden degradation of medical fitness that occurs during flight duty period either
in-flight or during a flight transit of the same flight duty period away from operator’s base and that
precludes the senior cabin crew member or cabin crew member from performing his/her duties.
Incapacitation prior to dispatch of the aircraft from a base of the operator does not substantiate a reduction
of the cabin crew complement below the minimum required.
(b) ‘Unavailability’ means circumstances at a stopover (layover) destination that preclude the senior cabin crew
member or cabin crew member from reporting for the flight duty period, such as traffic jams that prevent
the senior cabin crew member or cabin crew member from presenting himself/herself at the crew pick-up
point in time, difficulties with local authorities, health problems, death, etc. Unavailability does not refer to
insufficient number or absence of cabin crew members on standby, or absence from work due to pregnancy,
maternity/paternity leave, parental leave, medical leave, sick leave, or any other absence from work.
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AMC1 ORO.CC.205(c)(1) Reduction of the number of cabin crew during ground operations and in
unforeseen circumstances
PROCEDURES WITH REDUCED NUMBER OF CABIN CREW
(a) During ground operations, if reducing the applicable minimum required number of cabin crew, the operator
should ensure that the procedures required by ORO.CC.205 (c)(1) specify that:
(1) electrical power is available on the aircraft;
(2) a means of initiating an evacuation is available to the senior cabin crew member or at least one member
of the flight crew is in the flight crew compartment;
(3) cabin crew stations and associated duties are specified in the operations manual; and
(4) cabin crew remain aware of the position of servicing and loading vehicles at and near the exits.
Additionally, in the case of passengers’ embarkation:
(5) the senior cabin crew member should have performed the pre-boarding safety briefing to the cabin
crew; and
(6) the pre-boarding cabin checks should have been completed.
(b) If, in unforeseen circumstances, the number of cabin crew members is reduced below the applicable
minimum required number, for example in the event of incapacitation or unavailability of cabin crew, the
procedures established for this purpose in the operations manual should take into consideration at least the
following:
(1) reduction of passenger numbers;
(2) reseating of passengers with due regard to doors/exits and other applicable limitations; and
(3) relocation of cabin crew taking into account the factors specified in AMC1 ORO.CC.100 and any
change of procedures.
GM1 ORO.CC.210 (d) Additional conditions for assignment to duties
OPERATOR’S CABIN CREW UNIFORM
The uniform to be worn by operating cabin crew should be such as not to impede the performance of their
duties, as required for the safety of passengers and flight during operations, and should allow passengers to
identify the operating cabin crew including in an emergency situation.
GM1 ORO.CC.215 (b)(2) Training and checking programmes and related documentation
LIST OF AIRCRAFT TYPE/VARIANT QUALIFICATION(S)
When providing the updated validity list of aircraft type/variant qualifications to cabin crew members having
successfully completed a training course and the associated checking, the operator may use the following
format. If using another format, at least the elements in (a) to (d) and in columns (1) and (2) should be indicated
to show validity of qualification(s).
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CABIN CREW AIRCRAFT TYPE/VARIANT QUALIFICATION(S)
Reference number of the cabin crew licence:
Cabin crew licence holder’s full name:
The above-mentioned person may act as an operating cabin crew member during flight operations only if
(b)
his/her aircraft type and/or variant qualification(s) listed below, and dated DD/MM/YYYY, comply with
the applicable validity period(s) specified in Part-ORO.
Issuing organisation:
(c)
(name, postal address, AOC and/or approval reference number and stamp or logo)
(d) Date of issue: (DD/MM/YYYY)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Qualification
Aircraft
Operator
Differences FamiliariLast
Refresher
valid until
type
conversion
training
sation
recurrent
training
specific
training
If relevant
training
If relevant
training
A/C type 1
Variant …
A/C type 2
Variant …
A/C type 3
Variant …
If approved
A/C type 4
(a)
AMC1 ORO.CC.250 (b) Operation on more than one aircraft type or variant
DETERMINATION OF AIRCRAFT TYPES AND VARIANTS
(a) When determining similarity of location and type of portable safety and emergency equipment, the
following factors should be assessed:
(1) all portable safety and emergency equipment is stowed in the same, or in exceptional circumstances, in
substantially the same location;
(2) all portable safety and emergency equipment requires the same method of operation;
(3) portable safety and emergency equipment includes:
(i) fire-fighting equipment;
(ii) protective breathing equipment (PBE);
(iii) oxygen equipment;
(iv) crew life-jackets;
(v) torches;
(vi) megaphones;
(vii) first-aid equipment;
(viii) survival and signalling equipment; and
(ix) other safety and emergency equipment, where applicable.
(b) The type-specific emergency procedures to be considered should include at least the following:
(1) land and water evacuation;
(2) in-flight fire;
(3) non-pressurisation, slow and sudden decompression; and
(4) pilot incapacitation.
(c) When determining similarity of doors/exits in the absence of operational suitability data established in
accordance with MCAR 21 for the relevant aircraft type(s) or variant(s), the following factors should be
assessed, except for self-help exits, such as type III and type IV exits, that need not be included in the
assessment:
(1) door/exit arming and disarming;
(2) direction of movement of the operating handle;
(3) direction of door/exit opening;
(4) power assist mechanisms; and
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(5) assisting evacuation means.
GM1 ORO.CC.250 Operation on more than one aircraft type or variant
SAFETY BRIEFING FOR CABIN CREW
When changing aircraft type or variant during a series of flight sectors, the cabin crew safety briefing should
include a representative sample of type-specific normal and emergency procedures and safety and emergency
equipment applicable to the actual aircraft to be operated for the immediately subsequent flight sector.
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SUBPART TC – TECHNICAL CREW MEMBER IN HEMS, HHO OR NVIS OPERATIONS
GM1 ORO.TC.105 Conditions for assignment to duties
GENERAL
(a) The technical crew member in HEMS, HHO or NVIS operations should undergo an initial medical
examination or assessment and, if applicable, a re-assessment before undertaking duties.
(b) Any medical assessment or re-assessment should be carried out according to best aero-medical
practice by a medical practitioner who has sufficient detailed knowledge of the applicant’s medical
history.
(c) The operator should maintain a record of medical fitness for each technical crew member.
(d) Technical crew members should:
(1) be in good health;
(2) be free from any physical or mental illness that might lead to incapacitation or inability to
perform crew duties;
(3) have normal cardio-respiratory function;
(4) have normal central nervous system;
(5) have adequate visual acuity 6/9 with or without glasses;
(6) have adequate hearing; and
(7) have normal function of ear, nose and throat.
AMC1 ORO.TC.110 Training and checking
GENERAL
(a) Elements of training that require individual practice may be combined with practical checks.
(b) The checks should be accomplished by the method appropriate to the type of training including:
(1) practical demonstration;
(2) computer-based assessment;
(3) in-flight checks; and/or
(4) oral or written tests.
AMC1 ORO.TC.115 Initial training
ELEMENTS
(a) The elements of initial training mentioned in ORO.TC.115 should include in particular:
(1) General theoretical knowledge on aviation and aviation regulations relevant to duties and
responsibilities:
(i) the importance of crew members performing their duties in accordance with the operations
manual;
(ii) continuing competence and fitness to operate as a crew member with special regard to flight
and duty time limitations and rest requirements;
(iii) an awareness of the aviation regulations relating to crew members and the role of the
competent and inspecting authority;
(iv) general knowledge of relevant aviation terminology, theory of flight, passenger distribution,
meteorology and areas of operation;
(v) pre-flight briefing of the crew members and the provision of necessary safety information
with regard to their specific duties;
(vi) the importance of ensuring that relevant documents and manuals are kept up-to-date with
amendments provided by the operator;
(vii) the importance of identifying when crew members have the authority and responsibility to
initiate an evacuation and other emergency procedures; and
(viii) the importance of safety duties and responsibilities and the need to respond promptly and
effectively to emergency situations.
(2) Fire and smoke training:
(i) reactions to emergencies involving fire and smoke and identification of the fire sources;
(ii) the classification of fires and the appropriate type and techniques of application of
extinguishing agents, the consequences of misapplication, and of use in a confined space; and
(iii) the general procedures of ground-based emergency services at aerodromes.
(3) When conducting extended overwater operations, water survival training, including the use of personal
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flotation equipment.
(4) Before first operating on an aircraft fitted with life-rafts or other similar equipment, training on
the use of this equipment, including practice in water.
(5) Survival training appropriate to the areas of operation, (e.g. polar, desert, jungle, sea or mountain).
(6) Aero-medical aspects and first aid, including:
(i) instruction on first aid and the use of first-aid kits; and
(ii) the physiological effects of flying.
(7) Effective communication between technical crew members and flight crew members including
common language and terminology.
(8) Relevant CRM elements of AMC1 and AMC1.1 ORO.FC.115&.215.
AMC1 ORO.TC.120&.125 Operator conversion training and differences training
ELEMENTS
(a) Operator conversion training mentioned in ORO.TC.120 (b) and differences training mentioned in
ORO.TC.125 (a) should include the following:
(1) Fire and smoke training, including practical training in the use of all fire fighting equipment as well
as protective clothing representative of that carried in the aircraft. Each technical crew member
should:
(i) extinguish a fire characteristic of an aircraft interior fire except that, in the case of Halon
extinguishers, an alternative extinguishing agent may be used; and
(ii) practise the donning and use of protective breathing equipment (when fitted) in an enclosed,
simulated smoke-filled environment.
(2) Practical training on operating and opening all normal and emergency exits for passenger
evacuation in an aircraft or representative training device and demonstration of the operation of all
other exits.
(3) Evacuation procedures and other emergency situations, including:
(i) recognition of planned or unplanned evacuations on land or water - this training should
include recognition of unusable exits or unserviceable evacuation equipment;
(ii) in-flight fire and identification of fire source; and
(iii) other in-flight emergencies.
(4) When the flight crew is more than one, training on assisting if a pilot becomes incapacitated, including
a demonstration of:
(i) the pilot's seat mechanism;
(ii) fastening and unfastening the pilot's seat restraint system;
(iii) use of the pilot's oxygen equipment, when applicable; and
(iv) use of pilots' checklists.
(5) Training on, and demonstration of, the location and use of safety equipment including the
following:
(i) life-rafts, including the equipment attached to, and/or carried in, the raft, where applicable;
(ii) life-jackets, infant life-jacket s and flotation devices, where applicable;
(iii) fire extinguishers;
(iv) crash axe or crow bar;
(v) emergency lights including portable lights;
(vi) communication equipment, including megaphones;
(vii) survival packs, including their contents;
(viii) pyrotechnics (actual or representative devices);
(ix) first-aid kits, their contents and emergency medical equipment; and
(x) other safety equipment or systems, where applicable.
(6) Training on passenger briefing/safety demonstrations and preparation of passengers for normal and
emergency situations.
(7) Training on the use of dangerous goods, if applicable.
(8) Task-specific training.
AMC2 ORO.TC.120&.125 Operator conversion training and differences training
GENERAL
(a) The operator should determine the content of the conversion or differences training taking account of
the technical crew member's previous training as documented in the technical crew member's training
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records.
(b) Aircraft conversion or differences training should be conducted according to a syllabus and include the use
of relevant equipment and emergency procedures and practice on a representative training device or on the
actual aircraft.
(c) The operator should specify in the operations manual the maximum number of types or variants that can be
operated by a technical crew member.
AMC1 ORO.TC.135 Recurrent training
ELEMENTS
(a) The 12-month period mentioned in ORO.TC.135 (a) should be counted from the last day of the
month when the first checking was made. Further training and checking should be undertaken within
the last 3 calendar months of that period. The new 12-month period should be counted from the original
expiry date.
(b) The recurrent practical training should include every year:
(1) emergency procedures including pilot incapacitation;
(2) evacuation procedures;
(3) touch-drills by each technical crew member for opening normal and emergency exits for (passenger)
evacuation;
(4) the location and handling of emergency equipment and the donning by each technical crew
member of life-jackets and protective breathing equipment (PBE), when applicable;
(5) first aid and the content s of the first-aid kit(s);
(6) stowage of articles in the cabin;
(7) use of dangerous goods, if applicable;
(8) incident and accident review; and
(9) crew resource management: all major topics of the initial CRM training should be covered over a
period not exceeding 3 years.
(c) Recurrent training should include every 3 years:
(1) practical training on operating and opening all normal and emergency exits for passenger
evacuation in an aircraft or representative training device and demonstration of the operation of all
other exits;
(2) practical training in the use of all firefighting equipment as well as protective clothing
representative of that carried in the aircraft. Each technical crew member should:
(i) extinguish a fire characteristic of an aircraft interior fire except that, in the case of Halon
extinguishers, an alternative extinguishing agent may be used; and
(ii) practise the donning and use of protective breathing equipment (when fitted) in an enclosed,
simulated smoke-filled environment;
(3) use of pyrotechnics (actual or representative devices); and
(4) demonstration of the use of the life-raft, where fitted.
AMC1 ORO.TC.140 Refresher training
ELEMENTS
(a) Refresher training may include familiarisation flights.
(b) Refresher training should include at least the following:
(1) emergency procedures, including pilot incapacitation;
(2) evacuation procedures;
(3) practical training on operating and opening all normal and emergency exits for passenger
evacuation in an aircraft or representative training device and demonstration of the operation of all
other exits; and
(4) the location and handling of emergency equipment, and the donning of life-jackets and
protective breathing equipment, when applicable.
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SUBPART FTL — FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (1) Definitions
ACCLIMATISED
(a) A crew member remains acclimatised to the local time of his/her reference time during 47 hours 59 minutes
after reporting no matter how many time zones he/she has crossed.
(b) The maximum daily FDP for acclimatised crew members is determined by using table 1 of ORO.FTL.205
(b)(1) with the reference time of the point of departure. As soon as 48 hours have elapsed, the state of
acclimatisation is derived from the time elapsed since reporting at reference time and the number of time
zones crossed.
GM2 ORO.FTL.105 (1) Definitions
ACCLIMATISED ‘POINT OF DEPARTURE’
The point of departure refers to the reporting point for a flight duty period or positioning duty after a rest period.
GM3 ORO.FTL.105 (1) Definitions
ACCLIMATISED ‘TIME ELAPSED SINCE REPORTING AT REFERENCE TIME’
The time elapsed since reporting at reference time for operations applying MCAR AIRCREW at home base
refers to the time elapsed since reporting for the first time at home base for a rotation.
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (2) Definitions
REFERENCE TIME
(a) Reference time refers to reporting points in a 2-hour wide time zone band around the local time where a
crew member is acclimatised.
(b) Example: A crew member is acclimatised to the local time in Helsinki and reports for duty in London. The
reference time is the local time in London.
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (3) Definitions
ADEQUATE FURNITURE FOR ‘ACCOMMODATION’
Adequate furniture for crew member accommodation should include a seat that reclines at least 45° back angle
to the vertical, has a seat width of at least 20 inches (50cm) and provides leg and foot support.
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (8) Definitions
DETERMINATION OF DISRUPTIVE SCHEDULES
If a crew member is acclimatised to the local time at his/her home base, the local time at the home base should
be used to consider an FDP as ‘disruptive schedule’. This applies to operations within the 2-hour wide time zone
surrounding the local time at the home base, if a crew member is acclimatised to the local time at his/her home
base.
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (10) Definitions
ELEMENTS OF STANDBY FOR DUTY
ORO.FTL.225(c) and (d) and EASA CS FTL.1.225 (b)(2) determine which elements of standby count as duty.
GM1 ORO.FTL.105 (17) Definitions
OPERATING CREW MEMBER
A person on board an aircraft is either a crew member or a passenger. If a crew member is not a passenger on
board an aircraft he/she should be considered as ‘carrying out duties’. The crew member remains an operating
crew member during in-flight rest. In-flight rest counts in full as FDP, and for the purpose of ORO.FTL.210.
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AMC1 ORO.FTL.110 Operator responsibilities
SCHEDULING
(a) Scheduling has an important impact on a crew member’s ability to sleep and to maintain a proper level of
alertness. When developing a workable roster, the operator should strike a fair balance between the
commercial needs and the capacity of individual crew members to work effectively. Rosters should be
developed in such a way that they distribute the amount of work evenly among those that are involved.
(b) Schedules should allow for flights to be completed within the maximum permitted flight duty period and
flight rosters should take into account the time needed for pre-flight duties, taxiing, the flight- and
turnaround times. Other factors to be considered when planning duty periods should include:
(1) the allocation of work patterns which avoid undesirable practices such as alternating day/night duties,
alternating eastward-westward or westward-eastward time zone transitions, positioning of crew
members so that a serious disruption of established sleep/work patterns occurs;
(2) scheduling sufficient rest periods especially after long flights crossing many time zones; and
(3) preparation of duty rosters sufficiently in advance with planning of recurrent extended recovery rest
periods and notification of the crew members well in advance to plan adequate pre-duty rest.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.110 (a) Operator responsibilities
PUBLICATION OF ROSTERS
Rosters should be published 14 days in advance.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.110 (j) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROSTERS
The operator should establish and monitor performance indicators for operational robustness of rosters.
GM1 ORO.FTL.110 (j) Operator responsibilities
OPERATIONAL ROBUSTNESS OF ROSTERS
Performance indicators for operational robustness of rosters should support the operator in the assessment of the
stability of its rostering system. Performance indicators for operational robustness of rosters should at least
measure how often a rostered crew pairing for a duty period is achieved within the planned duration of that duty
period. Crew pairing means rostered positioning and flights for crew members in one duty period.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(1) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM POLICY
(a) The operator’s FRM policy should identify all the elements of FRM.
(b) The FRM policy should define to which operations FRM applies.
(c) The FRM policy should:
(1) reflect the shared responsibility of management, flight and cabin crew, and other involved personnel;
(2) state the safety objectives of FRM;
(3) be signed by the accountable manager;
(4) be communicated, with visible endorsement, to all the relevant areas and levels of the organisation;
(5) declare management commitment to effective safety reporting;
(6) declare management commitment to the provision of adequate resources for FRM;
(7) declare management commitment to continuous improvement of FRM;
(8) require that clear lines of accountability for management, flight and cabin crew, and all other involved
personnel are identified; and
(9) require periodic reviews to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate.
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AMC2 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(2) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM DOCUMENTATION
The operator should develop and keep current FRM documentation that describes and records:
(a) FRM policy and objectives;
(b) FRM processes and procedures;
(c) accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities for these processes and procedures;
(d) mechanisms for on-going involvement of management, flight and cabin crew members, and all other
involved personnel;
(e) FRM training programmes, training requirements and attendance records;
(f) scheduled and actual flight times, duty periods and rest periods with deviations and reasons for deviations;
and
(g) FRM outputs including findings from collected data, recommendations, and actions taken.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(4) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
The operator should develop and maintain three documented processes for fatigue hazard identification:
(a) Predictive
The predictive process should identify fatigue hazards by examining crew scheduling and taking into
account factors known to affect sleep and fatigue and their effects on performance. Methods of examination
may include, but are not limited to:
(1) operator or industry operational experience and data collected on similar types of operations;
(2) evidence-based scheduling practices; and
(3) bio-mathematical models.
(b) Proactive
The proactive process should identify fatigue hazards within current flight operations. Methods of
examination may include, but are not limited to:
(1) self-reporting of fatigue risks;
(2) crew fatigue surveys;
(3) relevant flight and cabin crew performance data;
(4) available safety databases and scientific studies; and
(5) analysis of planned versus actual time worked.
(c) Reactive
The reactive process should identify the contribution of fatigue hazards to reports and events associated
with potential negative safety consequences in order to determine how the impact of fatigue could have
been minimised. At a minimum, the process may be triggered by any of the following:
(1) fatigue reports;
(2) confidential reports;
(3) audit reports;
(4) incidents; or
(5) flight data monitoring (FDM) events.
AMC2 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(4) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS RISK ASSESSMENT
An operator should develop and implement risk assessment procedures that determine the probability
and potential severity of fatigue-related events and identify when the associated risks require
mitigation. The risk assessment procedures should review identified hazards and link them to:
(a) operational processes;
(b) their probability;
(c) possible consequences; and
(d) the effectiveness of existing safety barriers and controls.
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AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(5) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS RISK MITIGATION
An operator should develop and implement risk mitigation procedures that:
(a) select the appropriate mitigation strategies;
(b) implement the mitigation strategies; and
(c) monitor the strategies’ implementation and effectiveness.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(6) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM SAFETY ASSURANCE PROCESSES
The operator should develop and maintain FRM safety assurance processes to:
(a) provide for continuous FRM performance monitoring, analysis of trends, and measurement to validate the
effectiveness of the fatigue safety risk controls. The sources of data may include, but are not limited to:
(1) hazard reporting and investigations;
(2) audits and surveys; and
(3) reviews and fatigue studies;
(b) provide a formal process for the management of change which should include, but is not limited to:
(1) identification of changes in the operational environment that may affect FRM;
(2) identification of changes within the organisation that may affect FRM; and
(3) consideration of available tools which could be used to maintain or improve FRM performance prior to
implementing changes; and
(c) provide for the continuous improvement of FRM. This should include, but is not limited to:
(1) the elimination and/or modification of risk controls have had unintended consequences or that are no
longer needed due to changes in the operational or organisational environment;
(2) routine evaluations of facilities, equipment, documentation and procedures; and
(3) the determination of the need to introduce new processes and procedures to mitigate emerging fatiguerelated risks.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.120 (b)(7) Fatigue risk management (FRM)
CAT OPERATORS FRM PROMOTION PROCESS
FRM promotion processes should support the on-going development of FRM, the continuous
improvement of its overall performance, and attainment of optimum safety levels.
The following should be established and implemented by the operator as part of its FRM:
(a) training programmes to ensure competency commensurate with the roles and responsibilities of
management, flight and cabin crew , and all other involved personnel under the planned FRM; and
(b) an effective FRM communication plan that:
(1) explains FRM policies, procedures and responsibilities to all relevant stakeholders; and
(2) describes communication channels used to gather and disseminate FRM-related information.
GM1 ORO.FTL.205 (a)(1) Flight Duty Period (FDP)
REPORTING TIMES
The operator should specify reporting times taking into account the type of operation, the size and type of
aircraft and the reporting airport conditions.
GM1 ORO.FTL.205 (b)(1) Flight duty period (FDP)
REFERENCE TIME
The start time of the FDP in the table refers to the ‘reference time’. That means, to the local time of the point of
departure, if this point of departure is within a 2-hour wide time zone band around the local time where a crew
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member is acclimatised.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.205 (f) Flight Duty Period (FDP)
UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES IN ACTUAL FLIGHT
DISCRETION
OPERATIONS — COMMANDER’S
(a) As general guidance when developing a commander’s discretion policy, the operator should take into
consideration the shared responsibility of management, flight and cabin crew in the case of unforeseen
circumstances. The exercise of commander’s discretion should be considered exceptional and should be
avoided at home base and/or company hubs where standby or reserve crew members should be available.
Operators should asses on a regular basis the series of pairings where commander’s discretion has been
exercised in order to be aware of possible inconsistencies in their rostering.
(b) The operator’s policy on commander’s discretion should state the safety objectives, especially in the case of
an extended FDP or reduced rest and should take due consideration of additional factors that might decrease
a crew member’s alertness levels, such as:
(1) WOCL encroachment;
(2) weather conditions;
(3) complexity of the operation and/or airport environment;
(4) aeroplane malfunctions or specifications;
(5) flight with training or supervisory duties;
(6) increased number of sectors;
(7) circadian disruption; and
(8) individual conditions of affected crew members (time since awake, sleep-related factor, workload,
etc.).
GM1 ORO.FTL.205 (f)(1)(i) Flight Duty Period (FDP)
COMMANDER’S DISCRETION
The maximum basic daily FDP that results after applying ORO.FTL.205 (b) should be used to calculate the
limits of commander’s discretion, if commander’s discretion is applied to an FDP which has been extended
under the provisions of ORO.FTL.205 (d).
AMC1 ORO.FTL.210(c) Flight times and duty periods
POST-FLIGHT DUTIES
The operator should specify post-flight duty times taking into account the type of operation, the size and type of
aircraft and the airport conditions.
GM1 ORO.FTL.230 (a) Reserve
ROSTERING OF RESERVE
Including reserve in a roster, also referred to as ‘rostering’, implies that a reserve period that does not result in a
duty period may not retrospectively be considered as part of a recurrent extended recovery rest period.
GM1 ORO.FTL.235 (a)(2) Rest periods
MINIMUM REST PERIOD AT HOME BASE IF SUITABLE ACCOMMODATION IS PROVIDED
An operator may apply the minimum rest period away from home base during a rotation which includes a rest
period at a crew member’s home base. This applies only if the crew member does not rest at his/her residence,
or temporary accommodation, because the operator provides suitable accommodation. This type of roster is
known as "back-to-back operation".
AMC1 ORO.FTL.235 (b) Rest periods
MINIMUM REST PERIOD AWAY FROM HOME BASE
The time allowed for physiological needs should be 1 hour. Consequently, if the travelling time to the suitable
accommodation is more than 30 minutes, the operator should increase the rest period by twice the amount of
difference of travelling time above 30 minutes.
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AMC1 ORO.FTL.240 Nutrition
MEAL OPPORTUNITY
(a) The operations manual should specify the minimum duration of the meal opportunity, when a meal
opportunity is provided, in particular when the FDP encompasses the regular meal windows (e.g. if the FDP
starts at 11:00 hours and ends at 22:00 hours meal opportunities for two meals should be given).
(b) It should define the time frames in which a regular meal should be consumed in order not to alter the human
needs for nutrition without affecting the crew member’s body rhythms.
AMC1 ORO.FTL.250 Fatigue management training
TRAINING SYLLABUS FATIGUE MANAGEMENT TRAINING
The training syllabus should contain the following:
(a) applicable regulatory requirements for flight, duty and rest;
(b) the basics of fatigue including sleep fundamentals and the effects of disturbing the circadian rhythms;
(c) the causes of fatigue, including medical conditions that may lead to fatigue;
(d) the effect of fatigue on performance;
(e) fatigue countermeasures;
(f) the influence of lifestyle, including nutrition, exercise, and family life, on fatigue;
(g) familiarity with sleep disorders and their possible treatments;
(h) where applicable, the effects of long range operations and heavy short range schedules on individuals;
(i) the effect of operating through and within multiple time zones; and
(j) the crew member responsibility for ensuring adequate rest and fitness for flight duty.
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ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE (AMC) AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL
(GM) TO ANNEX IV - PART-CAT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subpart A – General requirements
Section 1 – Motor-powered aircraft
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.100 (b) Crew responsibilities
COPIES OF REPORTS
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.100(c)(1) Crew responsibilities
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.100(c)(2) Crew responsibilities
ELAPSED TIME BEFORE RETURNING TO FLYING DUTY
PART-MED
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.115 (a) Personnel or crew members other than cabin crew in the passenger
compartment
MEASURES TO PREVENT CONFUSION BY PASSENGERS
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.115 Personnel or crew members other than cabin crew in the passenger compartment
POSITIONING CABIN CREW MEMBERS
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.124 Taxiing of aircraft
PROCEDURES FOR TAXIING
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.125 Taxiing of aeroplanes
SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.125 Taxiing of aeroplanes
SAFETY-CRITICAL ACTIVITY
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.130 Rotor engagement - helicopters
INTENT OF THE RULE
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.135 (a) (3) Admission to the flight crew compartment
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SINGLE-PILOT OPERATIONS UNDER VFR BY DAY
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE USE OF PEDS
AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF PEDS
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
DEFINITIONS
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
CREW REST COMPARTMENT, NAVIGATION, TEST ENTITIES AND FIRE CAUSED BY PEDS
GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
CARGO TRACKING DEVICES EVALUATION
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.145 Information on emergency and survival equipment carried
ITEMS FOR COMMUNIC ATION TO THE RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRE
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.155 Carriage of weapons of war and munitions of war
WEAPONS OF WAR AND MUNITIONS OF WAR
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.160 Carriage of sporting weapons and ammunition
SPORTING WEAPONS
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.161 Carriage of sporting weapons and ammunition - alleviations
SPORTING WEAPONS - HELICOPTERS
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 Documents, manuals and information to be carried
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(1) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT(S)
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(5) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
THE AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(5)(6) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(9) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
JOURNEY LOG OR EQUIVALENT
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-1
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(13) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
PROCEDURES AND VISUAL SIGNALS FOR USE BY INTERCEPTING AND INTERCEPTED
AIRCRAFT
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(14) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a) (23) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE PERTINENT TO THE FLIGHT
STATES CONCERNED WITH THE FLIGHT
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (a) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings
REMOVAL OF RECORDERS AFTER A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings
OPERATIONAL CHECKS
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings
INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT R ECORDERS RECORDING
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.200 (e) Transport of dangerous goods
DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT REPORTING
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.200 Transport of dangerous goods
GENERAL
Section 2 – Non- Motor-powered aircraft
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.100 (b)(1) Responsibilities of the commander
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.100 (b)(2) Responsibilities of the commander
ELAPSED TIME BEFORE RETURNING TO FLYING DUTY
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.100 (d)(3) Responsibilities of the commander
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING — BALLOON OPERATIONS
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.105 (a) Additional balloon crew member
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBER
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.105 (b)(1) Additional balloon crew member
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.105 (b)(2) Additional balloon crew member
ELAPSED TIME BEFORE RETURNING TO FLYING DUTY
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.120 Portable electronic devices
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.125 Information on emergency and survival equipment carried
ITEMS FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRE
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 Documents, manuals and information to be carried
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(1) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT(S)
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a) (5)(6) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(9) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
JOURNEY LOG, OR EQUIVALENT
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(13) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
CURRENT AND SUITABLE AERONAUTICAL CHARTS
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(14) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
PROCEDURES AND VISUAL SIGNALS FOR USE BY INTERCEPTING AND INTERCEPTED
AIRCRAFT
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(15) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(21) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE PERTINENT TO THE FLIGHT
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.150 (a)(1) Transport of dangerous goods
EXCEPTIONS, APPROVALS, EXEMPTIONS
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.150 (a)(2) Transport of dangerous goods
DANGEROUS GOODS CARRIED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PART 8 OF THE T.I.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.150 (b)(c) Transport of dangerous goods
PROCEDURES AND INFORMATION TO PERSONNEL AND PASSENGERS
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-2
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
Subpart B – Operating procedures
Section 1 – Motor-powered aircraft
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.100 (a)(2) Use of air traffic services
IN-FLIGHT OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.105 Use of aerodromes and operating sites
DEFINING OPERATING SITES - HELICOPTERS
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.105 Use of aerodromes and operating sites
HELIDECK
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS - AEROPLANES
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS - HELICOPTERS
AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
NPA, APV, CAT I OPERATIONS
AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING RVR/CMV
AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, APV, CAT I - AEROPLANES
AMC6 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, CAT I — HELICOPTERS
AMC7 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
CIRCLING OPERATIONS - AEROPLANES
AMC8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
ONSHORE CIRCLING OPERATIONS - HELICOPTERS
AMC9 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
VISUAL APPROACH OPERATIONS
AMC10 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
CONVERSION OF REPORTED METEOROLOGICAL VISIBILITY TO RVR65
AMC11 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND
EQUIPMENT
AMC12 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
VFR OPERATIONS WITH OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
ONSHORE AERODROME DEPARTURE PROCEDURES – HELICOPTERS68
GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
APPROACH LIGHTING SYSTEMS – ICAO, FAA
GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
SBAS OPERATIONS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 (a) Aerodrome operating minima
INCREMENTS SPECIFIED BY MCAA
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROAC H (CDFA)
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
NPA OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPLYING THE CDFA TECHNIQUE
AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS AND TRAINING
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROAC H (CDFA)
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.120 Airborne radar approaches (ARAs) for overwater operations - helicopters
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.120 Airborne radar approaches (ARAs) for overwater operations - helicopters
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.130 Noise abatement procedures - aeroplanes
NADP DESIGN
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.130 Noise abatement procedures - aeroplanes
TERMINOLOGY; GENERAL; EXAMPLE
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-3
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.137 (b) Routes and areas of operation - helicopters
COASTAL TRANSIT
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140 (d) Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes
without an ETOPS approval
OPERATION OF NON-ETOPS COMPLIANT TWIN TURBO-JET AEROPLANES WITH MOPSC OF
19 OR LESS AND MCTOM LESS THAN 45 360 KG BETWEEN 120 AND 180 MINUTES FROM AN
ADEQUATE AERODROME
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(c) Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes
without an ETOPS approval
ONE-ENGINE-INOPERATIVE (OEI) CRUISING SPEED
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.145 (a) Establishment of minimum flight altitudes
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
AMC1.1 CAT.OP.MPA.145 (a) Establishment of minimum flight altitudes
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.145 (a) Establishment of minimum flight altitudes
MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
PLANNING CRITERIA - AEROPLANES
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
LOCATION OF THE FUEL EN-ROUTE ALTERNATE (FUEL ERA) AERODROME
AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
PLANNING CRITERIA - HELCIOPTERS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
CONTINGENCY FUEL STATISTICAL METHOD - AEROPLANES
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.150(c)(3)(i) Fuel policy
CONTINGENCY FUEL
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.150(c)(3)(ii) Fuel policy
DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROME
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.155 (b) Carriage of special categories of passengers (SCPs)
PROCEDURES
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.160 Stowage of baggage and cargo
STOWAGE PROCEDURES
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.160 Stowage of baggage and cargo
CARRIAGE OF CARGO IN THE PASSENGER COMPARTEMENT
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 Passenger seating
PROCEDURES
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.165 Passenger seating
ACCESS TO EMERGENCY EXITS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 Passenger seating
DIRECT ACCESS
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing
PASSENGER BRIEFING
AMC1.1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing
PASSENGER BRIEFING
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing
SINGLE-PILOT OPERATIONS WITHOUT CABIN CREW
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.175 (a) Flight preparation
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN – COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN - OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
OPERATIONS AND LOCAL OPERATIONS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.175 (b)(5) Flight preparation
CONVERSION TABLES
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.181 (b)(1) Selection of aerodromes and operating sites - helicopters
COASTAL AERODR OME
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.181 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites - helicopters
OFFSHORE ALTERNATES
LANDING FORECAST
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.181 (d) Selection of aerodromes and operating sites - helicopters
OFFSHORE ALTERNATES
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-4
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.185 Planning minima for IFR flights - aeroplanes
PLANNING MINIMA FOR ALTERNATE AERODROMES
GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.185 Planning minima for IFR flights – aeroplanes
AERODROME WEATHER FORECASTS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.186 Planning minima for IFR flights - helicopters
PLANNING MINIMA FOR ALTERNATE AERODROMES
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.190 Submission of the ATS flight plan
FLIGHTS WITHOUT ATS FLIGHT PLAN
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.195 Refuelling/defuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - GENERAL
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - AEROPLANES
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - HELICOPTERS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.200 Refuelling/defuelling with wide-cut fuel
PROCEDURES
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.205 Push back and towing - aeroplanes
BARLESS TOWING
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.210 (b) Crew members at stations
CABIN CREW SEATING POSITIONS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.210 Crew members at stations
MITIGATING MEASURES – CONTROLLED REST
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants – ground procedures
TERMINOLOGY
ANTI-ICING CODES
GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants – ground procedures
DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING - PROCEDURES
GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants – ground procedures
DE-ICING/ANTI-IC ING BACKGROUND INFORMATION
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.255 Ice and other contaminants – flight procedures
FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL ICING CONDITIONS - AEROPLANES
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.255 Ice and other contaminants – flight procedures
FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL ICING CONDITIONS - HELICOPTERS
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.281 In-flight fuel management - helicopters
COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED HELICOPTERS, OTHER THAN LOCAL OPERATIONS
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.290 Ground proximity detection
TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.295 Use of airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)
GENERAL
ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions
IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE LANDING DISTANCE
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 (e) Commencement and continuation of approach
VISUAL REFERENC ES FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS151
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 (f) Commencement and continuation of approach
EXPLANATION OF THE TERM ‘RELEVANT’
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.315 Flight hours reporting - helicopters
FLIGHT HOURS REPORTING
Section 2 — Non-motor-powered aircraft
GM1 CAT.OP.NMPA.100 Use of aerodromes and operating sites
BALLOONS
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.115 Carriage of special categories of passengers (SCPs)
CARRIAGE OF CHILDREN AND PERSONS WITH REDUCED MOBILITY — BALLOONS
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.120 Passenger briefing
SAILPLANES
AMC2 CAT.OP.NMPA.120 Passenger briefing
BALLOONS
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.125 (a) Flight preparation
GROUND FACILITIES
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-5
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.130 Submission of the ATS flight plan
FLIGHTS WITHOUT ATS FLIGHT PLAN
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.155 Take-off conditions
FACILITIES AT THE TAKE-OFF SITE — BALLOONS
GM1 CAT.OP.NMPA.180 Operational limitations — hot-air balloons
AVOIDANCE OF NIGHT LANDING
Subpart C – Aircraft performance and operating limitations – AMC/GM
Section 1 – Aeroplanes
Chapter 2 - Performance class A
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 General
WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.205 Take-off
LOSS OF RUNWAY LENGTH DUE TO ALIGNMENT
GM1 CAT.POL.A.205 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
TAKE-OFF OBSTACLE CLEARANCE
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
EFFECT OF BANK ANGLES
AMC3 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
REQUIRED NAVIGATIONAL ACCURACY
GM1 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES FOR OBSTACLES CLEARANCES
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.215 En-route – one-engine-inoperative (OEI)
ROUTE ANALYSIS
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.225 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
ALTITUDE MEASURING
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.225 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
MISSED APPROACH
GM1 CAT.POL.A.225 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
MISSED APPROACH GRADIENT
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing – dry runways
FACTORING OF AUTOMATIC LANDING DISTANCE PERFORMANCE DATA
GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing – dry runways
LANDING MASS
Chapter 3 - Performance class B
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.305 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.305 Take-off
RUNWAY SLOPE
GM1 CAT.POL.A.305 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
TAKE-OFF FLIGHT PATH – VISUAL C OURSE GUIDANCE NAVIGATION164
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
TAKE-OFF FLIGHT PATH CONSTRUCTION
GM1 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
OBSTACLE CLEARANCE IN LIMITED VISIBILITY
GM2 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
TAKE-OFF FLIGHT PATH CONSTRUCTION
GM1 CAT.POL.A.315 En-route – multi-engined aeroplanes
CRUISING ALTITUDE
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.320 En-route - single-engined aeroplanes
ENGINE FAILURE
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-6
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
GM1 CAT.POL.A.320 En-route – single-engined aeroplanes
ENGINE FAILURE
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.325 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
ALTITUDE MEASURING
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing – dry runways
LANDING DISTANCE CORRECTION FACTORS
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing – dry runways
RUNWAY SLOPE
GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing – dry runways
LANDING MASS
GM1 CAT.POL.A.335 Landing - wet and contaminated runways
LANDING ON WET GRASS RUNWAYS
Chapter 4 – Performance class C
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.400 Take-off
LOSS OF RUNWAY LENGTH DUE TO ALIGNMENT
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.400 Take-off
RUNWAY SLOPE
GM1 CAT.POL.A.400 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFACE CONDITION
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.405 Take-off obstacle clearance
EFFECT OF BANK ANGLES
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.405 Take-off obstacle clearance
REQUIRED NAVIGATIONAL ACCURACY
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.415 En-route – OEI
ROUTE ANALYSIS
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.425 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
ALTITUDE MEASURING
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.430 Landing – dry runways
LANDING DISTANCE CORRECTION FACTORS
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.430 Landing – dry runways
RUNWAY SLOPE
GM1 CAT.POL.A.430 Landing - dry runways
LANDING MASS
Section 2 - Helicopters
Chapter 1 - General requirements
GM1 CAT.POL.H.105(c)(3)(ii)(A) General
REPORTED HEADWIND COMPONENT
GM1 CAT.POL.H.110 (a)(2)(i) Obstacle accountability
COURSE GUIDANCE
Chapter 2 – Performance class 1
GM1 CAT.POL.H.200&CAT.POL.H.300&CAT.POL.H.400 General
CATEGORY A AND CATEGORY B
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b)(4) Take -off
THE APPLICATION OF TODRH
GM1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b)(4) Take-off
THE APPLICATION OF TODRH
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (e) Take-off
OBSTACLE CLEARANCE IN THE BACKUP AREA
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205&CAT.POL.H.220 Take-off and landing
APPLICATION FOR ALTERNATIVE TAKE-OFF AND LANDING PROCEDURES
GM1 CAT.POL.H.205&CAT.POL.H.220 Take-off and landing
APPLICATION FOR ALTERNATIVE TAKE-OFF AND LANDING PROCEDURES
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-7
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
GM1 CAT.POL.H.215 (b)(3) En-route - critical engine inoperative
FUEL JETTISON
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.225 (a)(5) Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site
HELICOPTER MASS LIMITATION
GM1 CAT.POL.H.225 Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
GM1 CAT.POL.H.225 (a)(6) Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site
ENDORSEMENT FROM ANOTHER STATE
Chapter 3 – Performance class 2
GM to Section 2, Chapter 3 performance class 2
OPERATIONS IN PERFOR MANCE CLASS 2
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.305 (b) Helicopter operations without an assured safe forced landing capability
ENGINE RELIABILITY STATISTICS
AMC2 CAT.POL.H.305 (b) Helicopter operations without an assured safe forced landing capability
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SET OF CONDITIONS
GM1 CAT.POL.H.305 (b) Helicopter operations without an assured safe forced landing capability
USE OF FULL AUTHORITY DIGITAL ENGINE CONTROL (FADEC)
GM1 CAT.POL.H.310(c) &CAT.POL.H.325(c) Take-off and landing
PROCEDURE FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS TO HELIDECKS
GM1 CAT.POL.H.310&CAT.POL.H.325 Take-off and landing
TAKE-OFF AND LANDING TECHNIQUES
Chapter 4 –Performance class 3
GM1 CAT.POL.H.400(c) General
THE TAKE-OFF AND LANDING PHASES (PERFORMANCE CLASS 3)
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.420 Helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area
SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
GM1 CAT.POL.H.420 Helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area
EXAMPLE OF A SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
GM2 CAT.POL.H.420 (a) Helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area
ENDORSEMENT FROM ANOTHER STATE
Section 3 - Mass and balance
Chapter 1 – Motor-powered aircraft
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (b) Mass and balance, loading
WEIGHING OF AN AIRCRAFT
AMC2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (b) Mass and balance, loading
FLEET MASS AND CG POSITION – AEROPLANES
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (a) Mass and balance, loading
CENTRE OF GRAVITY LIMITS – OPERATIONAL CG ENVELOPE AND IN-FLIGHT CG
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (d) Mass and balance, loading
DRY OPERATING MASS
AMC2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (d) Mass and balance, loading
MASS VALUES FOR CREW MEMBERS
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and balance, loading
MASS VALUES FOR PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE
AMC2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and balance, loading
PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING REVISED STANDARD MASS VALUES FOR PASSENGERS
AND BAGGAGE
GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and balance, loading
ADJUSTMENT OF STANDARD MASSES
GM2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and Balance, Loading
STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE DATA
GM3 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and balance, loading
GUIDANC E ON PASSENGER WEIGHING SURVEYS
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-8
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (g) Mass and balance, loading
FUEL DENSITY
GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (i) Mass and balance, loading
IN-FLIGHT CHANGES IN LOADING - HELICOPTERS
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.105 (a) Mass and balance data and documentation
CONTENTS
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.105 (b) Mass and balance data and documentation
INTEGRITY
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.105(c) Mass and balance data and documentation
SIGNATURE OR EQUIVALENT
AMC2 CAT.POL.MAB.105(c) Mass and balance data and documentation
MASS AND BALANCE DOCUMENTATION SENT VIA DATA LINK
GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.105 (e) Mass and balance data and documentation
ON-BOARD INTEGRATED MASS AND BALANCE COMPUTER SYSTEM.
GM2 CAT.POL.MAB.105 (e) Mass and balance data and documentation
STAND-ALONE COMPUTERISED MASS AND BALANCE SYSTEM
Section 4 — Sailplanes
Reserved
Section 5 — Balloons
GM1 CAT.POL.B.105 Weighing
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.POL.B.110 (a)(2) System for determining the mass
TRAFFIC LOAD
AMC2 CAT.POL.B.110 (a)(2) System for determining the mass
MASS VALUES FOR PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE
AMC1 CAT.POL.B.110 (a)(6) System for determining the mass
DOCUMENTATION
GM1 CAT.POL.B.110 (a)(6) System for determining the mass
LIMITING MASS VALUES
Subpart D – Instrument, data, and equipment
Section 1 – Aeroplanes
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.100 (a) Instruments and equipment — general
REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.100 (b) Instruments and equipment – general
NOT REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS REGULATION, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.100 (d) Instruments and equipment - general
POSITIONING OF INSTRUMENTS
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.110 Spare electrical fuses
FUSES
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.120 Equipment to clear windshield
MEANS TO MAINTAIN A CLEAR PORTION OF THE WINDSHIELD DURING PRECIPITATION
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125&CAT.IDE.A.130 Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at night –
flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
INTEGRATED INSTRUMENTS
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.125 Operations under VFR by day – flight and navigational instruments and associated
equipment
LOCAL FLIGHTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125 (a)(1)(i)&CAT.IDE.A.130(a)(1) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MEANS OF MEASUR ING AND DISPLAYING MAGNETIC HEADING
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125 (a)(1)(ii)&CAT.IDE.A.130(a)(2) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MEANS OF MEASUR ING AND DISPLAYING THE TIME
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-9
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125 (a)(1)(iii)&CAT.IDE.A.130(b) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR
or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
CALIBRATION OF THE MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING PRESSURE ALTITUDE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125 (a)(1)(iv)&CAT.IDE.A.130(a)(3) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
CALIBRATION OF THE INSTRUMENT INDICATING AIRSPEED
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.130 (a)(5) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
SLIP INDICATOR
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.130 (b) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
ALTIMETERS – IFR OR NIGHT OPERATIONS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125 (a)(1)(ix)&CAT.IDE.A.130(a)(8) Operations under VFR by day & operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MEANS OF DISPLAYING OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125 (b)&CAT.IDE.A.130(h) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at
night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MULTI-PILOT OPERATIONS - DUPLICATE INSTRUMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.125(c)&CAT.IDE.A.130(d) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at
night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MEANS OF PREVENTING MALFUNCTION DUE TO CONDENSATION OR ICING
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.130 (e) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
MEANS OF INDICATING FAILURE OF THE AIRSPEED INDICATING SYSTEM’S MEANS OF PR
EVENTING MALFUNCTION DUE TO EITHER CONDENSATION OR ICING
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.130 (i)(5) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
ILLUMINATION OF STANDBY MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING ATTITUDE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.130 (j) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
CHART HOLDER
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.125&CAT.IDE.A.130 Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at night –
flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
SUMMARY TABLE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.150 Terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)
EXCESSIVE DOWNWARDS GLIDE SLOPE DEVIATION WARNING FOR CLASS A TAWS
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.150 Terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)
ACCEPTABLE STANDARD FOR TAWS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.160 Airborne weather detecting equipment
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.170 Flight crew interphone system
TYPE OF FLIGHT CREW INTERPHONE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.175 Crew member interphone system
SPECIFICATIONS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.180 Public address system
SPECIFICATIONS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.185 Cockpit voice recorder
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN
INDIVIDUAL COFA ON OR AFTER 1 JANUARY 2016
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN
INDIVIDUAL COFA ON OR AFTER 1 APRIL 1998 AND BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2016
AMC3 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR
AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL COFA ON OR AFTER 1 APRIL 1998 AND
BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2016
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-10
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC4 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
LIST OF PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN
INDIVIDUAL C OF A ON OR AFTER 1 JUNE 1990 UP TO AND INCLUDING 31 MARCH 1998
AMC5 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR
AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL C OF A UP TO AND INCLUDING 31
MARCH 1998
AMC6 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
LIST OF PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN
INDIVIDUAL C OF A BEFORE 1 JUNE 1990
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.195 Data link recording
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.195 Data link recording
DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.200 Combination recorder
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.200 Combination recorder
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices
CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICES (CRDS)
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices
UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM
SAFETY BELT
AMC3 CAT.IDE.A.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices
SEATS FOR MINIMUM REQUIR ED CABIN CREW
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.220 First-aid kit
CONTENT OF FIRST-AID KITS
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.220 First-aid kit
MAINTENANCE OF FIRST-AID KITS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.225 Emergency medical kit
CONTENT OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL KIT
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.225 Emergency medical kit
CARRIAGE UNDER SECURITY CONDITIONS
AMC3 CAT.IDE.A.225 Emergency medical kit
ACCESS TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL KIT
AMC4 CAT.IDE.A.225 Emergency medical kit
MAINTENANCE OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL KIT
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.230 First-aid oxygen
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.235 Supplemental oxygen – pressurised aeroplanes
DETERMINATION OF OXYGEN
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.235 Supplemental oxygen – pressurised aeroplanes
OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS FOR FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT SEAT OCCUPANTS AND
CABIN CREW IN ADDITION TO THE REQUIRED MINIMUM NUMBER OF CABIN CREW
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.235 (e) Supplemental oxygen – pressurised aeroplanes
AEROPLANES NOT CERTIFIED TO FLY ABOVE 25 000 FT
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.235 (b)(1) Supplemental oxygen – pressurised aeroplanes
QUICK DONNING MASKS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.240 Supplemental oxygen - non-pressurised aeroplanes
AMOUNT OF SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.245 Crew protective breathing equipment
PROTECTIVE BREATHING EQUIPMENT (PBE)
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.250 Hand fire extinguishers
NUMBER, LOCATION AND TYPE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.255 Crash axe and crowbar
STORAGE OF CRASH AXES AND CROWBARS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.260 Marking of break-in points
MARKINGS – COLOUR AND CORNERS
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-11
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.270 Megaphones
LOCATION OF MEGAPHONES
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.280 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
BATTERIES
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.280 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
TYPES OF ELT AND GENERAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.280 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
TERMINOLOGY
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.285 Flight over water
LIFE–RAFTS AND EQUIPMENT FOR MAKING DISTRESS SIGNALS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.285 (e)(4)&CAT.IDE.A.305(a)(2) Flight over water & Survival equipment
SURVIVAL ELT
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.285 (a) Flight over water
ACCESSIBILITY OF LIFE-JACKETS
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.285 (a) Flight over water
ELECTRIC ILLUMINATION OF LIFE-JACKETS
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.285 (a) Flight over water
SEAT CUSHIONS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.305 Survival equipment
ADDITIONAL SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.305 (b)(2) Survival equipment
APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS STANDARD
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.305 Survival equipment
SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
GM2 CAT.IDE.A.305 Survival equipment
AREAS IN WHICH SEARCH AND RESCUE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.325 Headset
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.325 Headset
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
TWO INDEPENDENT MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
ACCEPTABLE NUMBER AND TYPE OF COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT
AMC3 CAT.IDE.A.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
FAILURE OF A SINGLE UNIT
AMC4 CAT.IDE.A.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
LONG RANGE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.345(c) Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
SHORT HAUL OPERATIONS
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR over
routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
APPLICABLE AIRSPACE REQUIREMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.350 Transponder
SSR TRANSPONDER
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.355 Electronic navigation data management
ELECTRONIC NAVIGATION DATA PRODUCTS
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.355 Electronic navigation data management
LETTERS OF ACCEPTANCE AND STANDARDS FOR ELECTR ONIC NAVIGATION DATA
PRODUCTS
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-12
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
Section 2 - Helicopters
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.100 (a) Instruments and equipment — general
REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH MCAR 21
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.100 (b) Instruments and equipment – general
NOT REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS REGULATION, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.100 (d) Instruments and equipment - general
POSITIONING OF INSTRUMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125&CAT.IDE.H.130 Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at night flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment and
INTEGRATED INSTRUMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125 (a)(1)(i)&CAT.IDE.H.130(a)(1) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MEANS OF MEASUR ING AND DISPLAYING MAGNETIC HEADING
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125 (a)(1)(ii)&CAT.IDE.H.130(a)(2) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MEANS OF MEASUR ING AND DISPLAYING THE TIME
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125 (a)(1)(iii)&CAT.IDE.H.130(b) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR
or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
CALIBRATION OF THE MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING PRESSURE ALTITUDE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125 (a)(1)(iv)&CAT.IDE.H.130(a)(43) Operations under VFR by day& Operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
CALIBRATION OF THE INSTRUMENT INDICATING AIRSPEED
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125 (a)(1)(vii)&CAT.IDE.H.130(a)(8) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under
IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125 (b)&CAT.IDE.H.130(h) Operations under VFR by day &Operations under IFR or at
night - flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment and
MULTI-PILOT OPERATIONS - DUPLICATE INSTRUMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125(c)(2)&CAT.IDE.H.130(a)(7) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR
or at night – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
STABILISED HEADING
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.125 (d) &CAT.IDE.H.130 (d) Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at
night operations – flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
MEANS OF PREVENTING MALFUNCTION DUE TO CONDENSATION OR ICING
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.130 (e) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
MEANS OF INDICATING FAILURE OF THE AIRSPEED INDICATING SYSTEM’S MEANS OF PR
EVENTING MALFUNCTION DUE TO EITHER CONDENSATION OR IC ING
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.130 (f) (6) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
ILLUMINATION OF STANDBY MEANS OF MEASURING AND DISPLAYING ATTITUDE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.130 (i) Operations under IFR or at night – flight and navigational instruments and
associated equipment
CHART HOLDER
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.125&CAT.IDE.H.130 Operations under VFR by day & Operations under IFR or at night –
flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
SUMMARY TABLE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.145 Radio altimeters
AUDIO WARNING DEVICE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.160 Airborne weather detecting equipment
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.170 Flight crew interphone system
TYPE OF FLIGHT CREW INTERPHONE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.175 Crew member interphone system
SPECIFICATIONS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.180 Public address system
SPECIFICATIONS
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-13
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.185 Cockpit voice recorder
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.190 Flight data recorder
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR HELICOPTERS HAVING AN MCTOM OF
MORE THAN 3 175 KG AND FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL C OF A ON OR AFTER 1
JANUARY 2016
AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.190 Flight data recorder
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN
INDIVIDUAL COFA ON OR AFTER 1 APRIL 1998 AND BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2016
AMC3 CAT.IDE.H.190 Flight data recorder
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR
AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL COFA ON OR AFTER 1 APRIL 1998 AND
BEFORE 1 JANUARY 2016
AMC4 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
LIST OF PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN
INDIVIDUAL COFA ON OR AFTER 1 JUNE 1990 UP TO AND INCLUDING 31 MARCH 1998
AMC5 CAT.IDE.A.190 Flight data recorder
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PARAMETERS TO BE RECORDED FOR
AEROPLANES FIRST ISSUED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL COFA UP TO AND INCLUDING 31
MARCH 1998
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.190 Flight data recorder
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.195 Data link recording
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.195 Data link recording
DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.200 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices
CHILD RESTRAINT DEVICES (CRDS)
AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices
UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT SYSTEM
SAFETY BELT
AMC3 CAT.IDE.H.205 Seats, seat safety belts, restraint systems and child restraint devices
SEATS FOR MINIMUM REQUIR ED CABIN CREW
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.220 First-aid kits
CONTENT OF FIRST-AID KITS
AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.220 First -aid kits
MAINTENANCE OF FIRST-AID KITS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.240 Supplemental oxygen - non-pressurised helicopters
DETERMINATION OF OXYGEN
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.250 Hand fire extinguishers
NUMBER, LOCATION AND TYPE
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.260 Marking of break-in points
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.270 Megaphones
LOCATION OF MEGAPHONES
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.280 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
BATTERIES
AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.280 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
TYPES OF ELT AND GENERAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.280 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)
TERMINOLOGY
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.290 (a) Life-jackets
ACCESSIBILITY
AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.290(c) Life-jackets
ELECTRIC ILLUMINATION
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.290 Life-jackets
SEAT CUSHIONS
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.295 Crew survival suits
ESTIMATING SURVIVAL TIME
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-14
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.300 Life-rafts, survival ELTs and survival equipment on extended overwater flights
LIFE–RAFTS AND EQUIPMENT FOR MAKING DISTRESS SIGNALS - HELICOPTERS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.300 (b) (3) & CAT.IDE.H.305 (b) Flight over water & Survival equipment
SURVIVAL ELT
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.305 Survival equipment
ADDITIONAL SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.305 Survival equipment
SIGNALLING EQUIPMENT
GM2 CAT.IDE.H.305 Survival equipment
AREAS IN WHICH SEARCH AND RESCUE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.310 Additional requirements for helicopters operating to or from helidecks located in a
hostile sea area
INSTALLATION OF THE LIFE-RAFT
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.315 Helicopters certificated for operating on water - Miscellaneous equipment
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.320 (b) All helicopters on flight over water - ditching
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.325 Headset
GENERAL
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.325 Headset
GENERAL
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
TWO INDEPENDENT MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
ACCEPTABLE NUMBER AND TYPE OF COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT
AMC3 CAT.IDE.H.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR
over routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
FAILURE OF A SINGLE UNIT
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.345 Communication and navigation equipment for operations under IFR or under VFR over
routes not navigated by reference to visual landmarks
APPLICABLE AIRSPACE REQUIREMENTS
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.350 Transponder
SSR TRANSPONDER
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-15
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC & GM to ANNEX IV
COMMERCIAL AIRTRANSPORT OPERATIONS
(Part-CAT)
Subpart A – General requirements
Section 1 – Motor-powered aircraft
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.100 (b) Crew responsibilities
COPIES OF REPORTS
Where a written report is required, a copy of the report should be communicated to the commander concerned,
unless the terms of the operator’s reporting schemes prevent this.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.100(c)(1) Crew responsibilities
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
The operator should issue instructions concerning the consumption of alcohol by crew members. The
instructions should be not less restrictive than the following:
(a) no alcohol should be consumed less than 8 hours prior to the specified reporting time for a flight
duty period or the commencement of standby;
(b) the blood alcohol level should not exceed the lower of the national requirements or 0.2 per thousand at the
start of a flight duty period;
(c) no alcohol should be consumed during the flight duty period or whilst on standby.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.100(c)(2) Crew responsibilities
ELAPSED TIME BEFORE RETURNING TO FLYING DUTY
24 hours is a suitable minimum length of time to allow after normal blood donation or normal
recreational (sport) diving before returning to flying duties. This should be considered by operators when
determining a reasonable time period for the guidance of crew members.
PART-MED
Information on the effects of medication, drugs, other treatments and alcohol can be found in Annex IV
(Part-MED) to Regulation MCAR-Aircrew.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.115 (a) Personnel or crew members other than cabin crew in the passenger
compartment
MEASURES TO PREVENT CONFUSION BY PASSENGERS
If personnel or crew members other than operating cabin crew members carry out duties in a passenger
compartment , the operator should ensure that they do not perform tasks or wear a uniform in such a way
that might lead passengers to identify them as members of the operating cabin crew.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.115 Personnel or crew members other than cabin crew in the passenger
compartment
POSITIONING CABIN CREW MEMBERS
To prevent confusion by passengers and undue expectations in case of emergency, positioning cabin crew
members should not wear, or should at least make invisible to passengers, parts of the operator’s cabin crew
uniform, such as main jacket or crew signs or badges, that might identify them as members of the operating
cabin crew.
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-16
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.124 Taxiing of aircraft
PROCEDURES FOR TAXIING
Procedures for taxiing should include at least the following:
(a) application of the sterile flight crew compartment procedures;
(b) use of standard radio-telephony (RTF) phraseology;
(c) use of lights;
(d) measures to enhance the situational awareness of the minimum required flight crew members. The
following list of typical items should be adapted by the operator to take into account its operational
environment:
(1) each flight crew member should have the necessary aerodrome layout charts available;
(2) the pilot taxiing the aircraft should announce in advance his/her intentions to the pilot monitoring;
(3) all taxi clearances should be heard and should be understood by each flight crew member;
(4) all taxi clearances should be cross-checked against the aerodrome chart and aerodrome surface
markings, signs, and lights;
(5) an aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area should stop and hold at all lighted stop bars, and may
proceed further when an explicit clearance to enter or cross the runway has been issued by the
aerodrome control tower, and when the stop bar lights are switched off;
(6) if the pilot taxiing the aircraft is unsure of his/her position, he/she should stop the aircraft and contact
air traffic control;
(7) the pilot monitoring should monitor the taxi progress and adherence to the clearances, and should assist
the pilot taxiing;
(8) any action which may disturb the flight crew from the taxi activity should be avoided or done with the
parking brake set (e.g. announcements by public address);
(e) subparagraphs (d)(2) and (d)(7) are not applicable to single-pilot operations.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.125 Taxiing of aeroplanes
SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE
The following skills and knowledge may be assessed to check if a person can be authorised by the
opera tor to taxi an aeroplane:
(a) positioning of the aeroplane to ensure safety when starting engine;
(b) obtaining automatic terminal information service (ATIS) reports and ta xi clearance, where applicable;
(c) interpretation of airfield markings/lights/signals/indicators;
(d) interpretation of marshalling signals, where applicable;
(e) identification of suitable parking area;
(f) maintaining lookout and right-of-way rules and complying with air traffic control (ATC) or
marshalling instructions when applicable;
(g) avoidance of adverse effect of propeller slipstream or jet wash on other aeroplanes, aerodrome fa cilities and
personnel;
(h) inspection of taxi path when surface conditions are obscured;
(i) communication with others when controlling an aeroplane on the ground;
(j) interpretation of operational instructions;
(k) reporting of any problem that may occur while taxiing an aeroplane; and
(l) adapting the taxi speed in accordance with prevailing aerodrome, traffic, surface and weather
conditions.
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.125 Taxiing of aeroplanes
SAFETY-CRITICAL ACTIVITY
(a) Taxiing should be treated as a safety-critical activity due to the risks related to the movement of the
aeroplane and the potential for a catastrophic event on the ground.
(b) Taxiing is a high-workload phase of flight that requires the full attention of the flight crew.
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-17
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.130 Rotor engagement - helicopters
INTENT OF THE RULE
(a) The following two situations where it is allowed to turn the rotor under power should be
distinguished:
(1) for the purpose of flight, this is described in the Implementing Rule;
(2) for maintenance purposes.
(b) Rotor engagement for the purpose of flight: the pilot should not leave the control when the rotors are
turning. For example, the pilot is not allowed to get out of the aircraft in order to welcome passengers and
adjust their seat belts with the rotors turning.
(c) Rotor engagement for the purpose of maintenance: the Implementing Rule, however, does not
prevent ground runs being conducted by qualified personnel other than pilots for maintenance
purposes.
The following conditions should be applied:
(1) the operator should ensure that the qualification of personnel, other than pilots, who are
authorised to conduct maintenance runs is described in the appropriate manual;
(2) ground runs should not include taxiing the helicopter;
(3) there should be no passengers on board; and
(4) maintenance runs should not include collective increase or autopilot engagement (due to the risk
of ground resonance).
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.135 (a) (3) Admission to the flight crew compartment
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SINGLE-PILOT OPERATIONS UNDER VFR BY DAY
Where an aircraft is used in a single-pilot operation under visual flight rules (VFR) by day but has more than
one pilot station, the instructions of the operator may permit passengers to be carried in the unoccupied
pilot seat(s), provided that the commander is satisfied that:
(a) it will not cause distraction or interference with the operation of the flight; and
(b) the passenger occupying a pilot seat is familiar with the relevant restrictions and safety procedures.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE USE OF PEDS
(a) Scope
This AMC describes the technical prerequisites under which any kind of portable electronic device
(PED) may be used on board the aircraft without adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft’s
systems and equipment.
(b) Prerequisites concerning the aircraft configuration
(1) Before an operator may permit the use of any kind of PED on-board, it should ensure that PEDs have
no impact on the safe operation of the aircraft. The operator should demonstrate that PEDs do not
interfere with on-board electronic systems and equipment, especially with the aircraft’s navigation and
communication systems.
(2) The assessment of PED tolerance may be tailored to the different aircraft zones for which the use of
PEDs is considered, i.e. may address separately:
(i) the passenger compartment;
(ii) the flight crew compartment; and
(iii) areas not accessible during the flight.
(c) Scenarios for permitting the use of PEDs
(1) Possible scenarios, under which the operator may permit the use of PEDs, should be as documented in
Table 1. The scenarios in Table 1 are listed in a descending order with the least permitting scenario at
the bottom.
(2) Restrictions arising from the corresponding aircraft certification, as documented in the aircraft flight
manual (AFM) or equivalent document(s), should stay in force. They may be linked to different aircraft
zones, or to particular transmitting technologies covered.
(3) For Scenarios Nos. 3 to 8 in Table 1 the use of C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices may be further
expanded, when the EMI assessment has demonstrated that there is no impact on safety as follows:
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(i) for C-PEDs by using the method described in (d)(2); and
(ii) for cargo tracking devices by using the method described in (d)(3).
Table 1 – Scenarios for permitting the use of PEDs by the operator
No.
Technical condition
1
The aircraft is certified as T-PED tolerant, i.e. it
has been demonstrated during the aircraft
certification process that front door and back door
coupling have no impact on the safe operation of
the aircraft
A complete electromagnetic interference (EMI)
assessment for all technologies, using the method
described in (d)(1), has been performed and has
demonstrated the T-PED tolerance
The aircraft is certified for the use of T-PEDs
using particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or
mobile phone)
2
3
7
The EMI assessment, using the method described
in (d)(1), has demonstrated that:
(a) the front door coupling has no impact on
safety; and
(b) the back door coupling has no impact on
safety when using particular technologies (e.g.
WLAN or mobile phone)
The EMI assessment, using the method described
in (d)(1)(i), has demonstrated that the front door
coupling has no impact on safety caused by
nonintentional
transmitters
The EMI assessment, using the method described
in (d)(1)(ii), has demonstrated that the back door
coupling has no impact on safety when using
particular technologies (e.g. WLAN or mobile
phone)
An EMI assessment has not been performed
8
Notwithstanding Scenarios Nos. 3 to 7
4
5
6
Non-intentional
transmitters
All phases of flight
All phases of flight
All phases of flight
All phases of flight
All phases of flight
All phases of flight,
restricted to those
particular
technologies
All phases of flight,
restricted to those
particular
technologies
All phases of flight
T-PEDs
All phases of flight
Not permitted
All phases of flight except low visibility
approach operation
All phases of flight except low visibility
approach operation,
restricted to those
All phases of flight - Not permitted
except low visibility
approach operation
(a) before taxi-out;
(b) during taxi-in after the end of landing roll; and
(c) the commander may permit the use during
prolonged departure delays, provided that
sufficient time is available to check the
passenger compartment before the flight
proceeds
(d) Demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility
(1) EMI assessment at aircraft level
The means to demonstrate that the radio frequency (RF) emissions (intentional or nonintentional) are
tolerated by aircraft systems should be as follows:
(i) to address front door coupling susceptibility for any kind of PEDs:
(A) RTCA, ‘Guidance on allowing transmitting portable, electronic devices (T-PEDs) on aircraft’,
DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 5C; or
(B) RTCA, ‘Aircraft design and certification for portable electronic device (PED) tolerance’, DO307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 4; and
(ii) to address back door coupling susceptibility for T-PEDs:
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(A) EUROCAE, ‘Guidance for the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs) on board aircraft’,
ED-130 (or later revisions), Annex 6;
(B) RTCA DO-294C (or later revisions), Appendix 6D; or
(C) RTCA DO-307 (including Change 1 or later revisions), Section 3.
(2) Alternative EMI assessment of C-PEDs
(i) For front door coupling:
(A) C-PEDs should comply with the levels as defined by:
(a) EUROCAE/RTCA, ‘Environmental conditions and test procedures for airborne equipment’,
ED-14D/DO-160D (or later revisions), Section 21, Category M, for operation in the passenger
compartment and the flight crew compartment; and
(b) EUROCAE ED-14E/RTCA DO-160E (or later revisions), Section 21,
Category H, for operation in areas not accessible during the flight.
(B) If the C-PEDs are electronic flight bags used in the flight crew compartment, an alternative
compliance method described in EASA, ‘General acceptable means of compliance for
airworthiness of products, part and appliances’, AMC-20, AMC 20-25 (‘Airworthiness and
operational considerations for electronic flight bags’), may be used.
(ii) For back door coupling the EMI assessment described in (1)(ii) should be performed.
(3) Alternative EMI assessment of cargo tracking devices
In case a transmitting function is automatically deactivated in a cargo tracking device (being a T-PED),
the unit should be qualified for safe operation on board the aircraft. One of the following methods
should be considered acceptable as evidence for safe operation:
(i) A type-specific safety assessment, including failure mode and effects analysis, has been performed
at aircraft level. The main purpose of the assessment should be to determine the worst hazards and
to demonstrate an adequate design assurance level of the relevant hardware and software
components of the cargo tracking device.
(ii) The high intensity radiated field (HIRF) certification of the aircraft has been performed, i.e. the
aircraft type has been certified after 1987 and meets the appropriate special condition. In such a
case, the operator should observe the following:
(A) The tracking device:
(a) features an automated and prolonged radio suspension in flight using multiple modes of
redundancy; and
(b) has been verified in the aircraft environment to ensure deactivation of the transmitting
function in flight.
(B) The transmissions of the tracking device are limited per design to short periods of time (less
than 1 second per 1 000 seconds) and cannot be continuous.
(C) The tracking device emissions should comply with the levels as defined by EUROCAE ED14E/RTCA DO-160E (or later revisions), Section 21, Category H.
(D) In order to provide assurance on the tracking device design and production, the following
documents are retained as part of the evaluation package:
(a) operational description, technical specifications, product label and images of the tracking
device and any peripheral attachments;
(b) failure mode and effects analysis report of the tracking device and any peripheral attachments;
(c) declaration of stringent design and production controls in place during the tracking device
manufacturing;
(d) declaration of conformity and technical documentation showing compliance to the European
Norms (EN), regulating the transmitter characteristic of the tracking device or its transmission
module; and
(e) an EMI assessment report documenting the emission levels.
(iii) The tracking device interference levels during transmission are below those considered acceptable
for the specific aircraft environment.
(e) Operational conditions of C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices
The operator should ensure that C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices are maintained in good
and safe condition, having in mind that:
(1) damage may modify their emissions characteristics; and
(2) damage to the battery may create a fire hazard.
(f) Batteries in C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices
Lithium-type batteries in C-PEDs and cargo tracking devices should meet:
(1) United Nations (UN) Transportation Regulations, ‘Recommendations on the transport of
dangerous goods - manual of tests and criteria’, UN ST/SG/AC.10/11; and
(2) one of the following standards:
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Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Lithium batteries’, UL 1642;
Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Household and commercial batteries’, UL 2054;
Underwriters Laboratory, ‘Information technology equipment – safety’, UL 60950-1;
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), ‘Secondary cells and batteries
containing alkaline or other non-acid electrolytes - safety requirements for portable
sealed secondary cells, and for batteries made from them, for use in portable
applications’, IEC 62133;
(v) RTCA, ‘Minimum operational performance standards for rechargeable lithium
battery systems’, DO-311. RTCA DO-311 may be used to address concerns
regarding over-charging, over-discharging, and the flammability of cell components.
The standard is intended to test permanently installed equipment; however, these
tests are applicable and sufficient to test electronic flight bags rechargeable lithiumtype batteries; or
(vi) European Technical Standard Order (ETSO), ‘Non-rechargeable lithium cells and
batteries’, ETSO C142a.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF PEDS
(a) Scope
This AMC describes the procedures under which any kind of portable electronic device (PED) may be used
on board the aircraft without adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft’s systems and equipment.
This AMC addresses the operation of PEDs in the different aircraft zones — passenger compartment, flight
compartment, and areas inaccessible during the flight.
(b) Prerequisites
Before permitting the use of any kind of PEDs the operator should ensure compliance with (c) of AMC1
CAT.GEN.MPA.140.
(c) Hazard identification and risk assessment
The operator should identify the safety hazards and manage the associated risks following the management
system implemented in accordance with ORO.GEN.200. The risk assessment should include hazards
associated with:
(1) PEDs in different aircraft zones;
(2) PED use during various phases of flight;
(3) PED use during turbulence;
(4) improperly stowed PEDs;
(5) impeded or slowed evacuations;
(6) passenger non-compliance, e.g. not deactivating transmitting functions, not switching off PEDs or not
stowing PEDs properly;
(7) disruptive passengers; and
(8) battery fire.
(d) Use of PEDs in the passenger compartment
(1) Procedures and training
If an operator permits passengers to use PEDs on board its aircraft, procedures should be in place to
control their use. These procedures should include provisions for passenger briefing, passenger
handling and for the stowage of PEDs. The operator should ensure that all crew members and ground
personnel are trained to enforce possible restrictions concerning the use of PEDs, in line with these
procedures.
(2) Provisions for use
(i) The use of PEDs in the passenger compartment may be granted under the responsibility of the
operator, i.e. the operator decides which PED may be used during which phases of the flight.
(ii) Notwithstanding (b), medical equipment necessary to support physiological functions may be used
at all times and does not need to be switched-off.
(3) Stowage, passenger information and passenger briefing of PEDs
(i) In accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.160 the operator should establish procedures concerning the
stowage of PEDs. The operator should:
(A) identify the phases of flight in which PEDs are to be stowed; and
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(B) determine suitable stowage locations, taking into account the PEDs’ size and weight.
(ii) The operator should provide general information on the use of PEDs to the passengers before the
flight. This information should specify at least:
(A) which PEDs can be used during which phases of the flight;
(B) when and where PEDs are to be stowed; and
(C) that the instructions of the crew are to be followed at all times.
(iii) In accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.170, the use of PEDs should be part of the passenger briefings.
The operator should remind passengers to pay attention and to avoid distraction during such
briefings.
(4) In-seat electrical power supplies
Where in-seat electrical power supplies are available for passenger use, the following should apply:
(i) information giving safety instructions should be provided to the passengers;
(ii) PEDs should be disconnected from any in-seat electrical power supply during taxiing, take-off,
approach, landing, and during abnormal or emergency conditions; and
(iii) flight crew, cabin crew and technical crew should be aware of the proper means to switch-off inseat power supplies used for PEDs.
(5) Operator’s safety measures during boarding and any phase of flight
(i) Appropriate coordination between flight crew, cabin crew and technical crew should be established
to deal with interference or other safety problems associated with PEDs.
(ii) Suspect equipment should be switched off.
(iii) Particular attention should be given to passenger misuse of equipment.
(iv) Thermal runaways of batteries, in particular lithium batteries, and potential resulting fire, should
be handled properly.
(v) The commander may, for any reason and during any phase of flight, require deactivation and
stowage of PEDs.
(vi) When the operator restricts the use of PEDs, consideration should be given to handle special
requests to operate a T-PED during any phase of the flight for specific reasons (e.g. for security
measures).
(6) Reporting
Occurrences of suspected or confirmed interference should be reported to the competent authority.
Where possible, to assist follow-up and technical investigation, reports should describe the suspected
device, identify the brand name and model number, its location in the aircraft at the time of the
occurrence, interference symptoms, the device user’s contact details and the results of actions taken by
the crew.
(e) Use of PEDs in the flight crew compartment
In the flight crew compartment the operator may permit the use of PEDs, e.g. to assist the flight crew in
their duties, when procedures are in place to ensure the following:
(1) The conditions for the use of PEDs in-flight are specified in the operations manual.
(2) The PEDs do not pose a loose item risk or other hazard.
(3) These provisions should not preclude use of a T-PED (specifically a mobile phone) by the flight crew
to deal with an emergency. However, reliance should not be predicated on a T-PED for this purpose.
(f) PEDs not accessible during the flight
PEDs should be switched off, when not accessible for deactivation during flight. This should apply
especially to PEDs contained in baggage or transported as part of the cargo. The operator may permit
deviation for PEDs for which safe operation has been demonstrated in accordance with AMC1
CAT.GEN.MPA.140. Other precautions, such as transporting in shielded metal boxes, may also be used to
mitigate associated risks.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
DEFINITIONS
(a) Definition and categories of PEDs
PEDs are any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer electronics, brought
on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of the cargo and that are not included in
the approved aircraft configuration. All equipment that is able to consume electrical energy falls under
this definition. The electrical energy can be provided from internal sources as batteries (chargeable or nonrechargeable) or the devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power sources. PEDs include the
following two categories:
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(1) Non-intentional transmitters can non-intentionally radiate RF transmissions, sometimes referred to as
spurious emissions. This category includes, but is not limited to, calculators, cameras, radio receivers,
audio and video players, electronic games and toys; when these devices are not equipped with a
transmitting function.
(2) Intentional transmitters radiate RF transmissions on specific frequencies as part of their intended
function. In addition they may radiate non-intentional transmissions like any PED. The term
‘transmitting PED’ (T-PED) is used to identify the transmitting capability of the PED.
Intentional transmitters are transmitting devices such as RF based remote control equipment,
which may include some toys, two-way radios (sometimes referred to as private mobile radio),
mobile phones of any type, satellite phones, computer with mobile phone data connection,
wireless local area network (WLAN) or Bluetooth capability. After deactivation of the transmitting
capability; e.g., by activating the so-called ‘flight mode’ or ‘flight safety mode’, the T-PED
remains a PED having non-intentional emissions.
(b) Controlled PEDs (C-PEDs)
A controlled PED (C-PED) is PED subject to administrative control by the operator using it. This will
include, inter alia, tracking the location of the devices to specific aircraft or persons and ensuring
that no unauthorised changes are made to the hardware, software or databases. C-PEDs can be assigned
to the category of non-intentional transmitters or T-PEDs.
(c) Cargo tracking device
A cargo tracking device is a PED attached to or included in airfreight (e.g. in or on containers, pallets,
parcels or baggage). Cargo tracking devices can be assigned to the category of non-intentional transmitters
or T-PEDs. If the device is a T-PED, it complies with the European Norms (EN) for transmissions.
(d) Definition of the switched-off status
Many PEDs are not completely disconnected from the internal power source when switched off. The
switching function may leave some remaining functionality e.g. data storage, timer, clock, etc. These
devices can be considered switched off when in the deactivated status. The same applies for devices
having no transmiting capability and are operated by coin cells without further deactivation
capability, e.g. wrist watches.
(e) Electromagnetic interference (EMI)
The two classes of EMI to be addressed can be described as follows:
(1) Front door coupling is the possible disturbance to an aircraft system as received by the antenna of the
system and mainly in the frequency band used by the system. Any PED internal oscillation has the
potential to radiate low level signals in the aviation frequency bands. Through this disturbance
especially the instrument landing system (ILS) and the VHF omni range (VOR) navigation system may
indicate erroneous information.
(2) Back door coupling is the possible disturbance of aircraft systems by electromagnetic fields generated
by transmitters at a level which could exceed on short distance (i.e. within the aircraft) the
electromagnetic field level used for the aircraft system certification. This disturbance may then lead to
system malfunction.
GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
CREW REST COMPARTMENT, NAVIGATION, TEST ENTITIES AND FIRE CAUSED BY PEDS
(a) When the aircraft is equipped with a crew rest compartment, it is considered being part of the passenger
compartment. Annex to ED Decision 2014/029/R Page 10 of 12
(b) Front door coupling may influence the VOR navigation system. Therefore, the flight crew monitors other
navigation sensors to detect potential disturbances by PEDs, especially during low visibility departure
operation based on VOR guidance.
(c) Specific equipment, knowledge and experience are required, when the industry standards for evaluating
technical prerequisites for the use of PEDs are applied. In order to ensure conformity with the industry
standards, the operator is encouraged to cooperate with an appropriately qualified and experienced entity, as
necessary. For this entity an aviation background is not required, but is considered to be beneficial.
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(d) Guidance to follow in case of fire caused by PEDs is provided by the International Civil Aviation
Organisation, ‘Emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods’, ICAO Doc
9481-AN/928.
GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable electronic devices
CARGO TRACKING DEVICES EVALUATION
(a) Safety assessment
Further guidance on performing a safety assessment can be found in:
(1) EASA, ‘Certification specifications and acceptable means of compliance for large aeroplanes’, CS-25,
Book 2, AMC-Subpart F, AMC 25.1309;
(2) EUROCAE/SAE, ‘Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems’, ED-79/ARP 4754 (or
later revisions); and
(3) SAE, ‘Guidelines and methods for conducting the safety assessment process on civil airborne systems
and equipment’, ARP 4761 (or later revisions).
(b) HIRF certification
The type certificate data sheet (TCDS), available on the EASA website for each aircraft model having
EASA certification, lists whether the HIRF certification has been performed through a special condition.
The operator may contact the type certification holder to gain the necessary information.
(c) Failure mode and effects analysis
Further guidance on performing a failure mode and effects analysis can be found in:
(1) SAE ARP 4761 (or later revisions); and
(2) U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Procedures for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis’, Military Standard MIL-STD-1629A (or later revisions).
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.145 Information on emergency and survival equipment carried
ITEMS FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRE
The information, compiled in a list, should include, as applicable, the number, colour and type of life-rafts and
pyrotechnics, details of emergency medical supplies, e.g. first-aid kits, emergency medical kits, water supplies
and the type and frequencies of emergency portable radio equipment.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.155 Carriage of weapons of war and munitions of war
WEAPONS OF WAR AND MUNITIONS OF WAR
(a) In accordance with MCARs, weapons of war may be carried on board an aircraft, in a place that is not
inaccessible, if the required security conditions in accordance with national laws have been fulfilled and
authorisation has been given by the States involved.
(b) There is no internationally agreed definition of weapons of war and munitions of war. Some States
may have defined them for their particular purposes or for national need.
(c) It is the responsibility of the operator to check, with the State(s) concerned, whether or not a
particular weapon or munition is regarded as a weapon of war or munitions of war. In this context,
States that may be concerned with granting approvals for the carriage of weapons of war or
munitions of war are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the consignment and the
State of the operator.
(d) Where weapons of war or munitions of war are also dangerous goods by definition (e.g. Torpedoes, bombs,
etc.), CAT.GEN.MPA.200 Transport of dangerous goods also applies.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.160 Carriage of sporting weapons and ammunition
SPORTING WEAPONS
(a) In accordance with MCARs, sporting weapons may be carried on board an aircraft, in a place that is not
inaccessible, if the required security conditions in accordance with national laws have been fulfilled and
authorisation has been given by the States involved.
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(b) There is no internationally agreed definition of sporting weapons. In general it may be any weapon that is
not a weapon of war or munitions of war. Sporting weapons include hunting knives, bows and other similar
articles. An antique weapon, which at one time may have been a weapon of war or munitions of
war, such as a musket, may now be regarded as a sporting weapon.
(c) A firearm is any gun, rifle or pistol that fires a projectile.
(d) The following firearms are generally regarded as being sporting weapons:
(1) those designed for shooting game, birds and other animals;
(2) those used for target shooting, clay-pigeon shooting and competition shooting, providing the
weapons are not those on standard issue to military forces; and
(3) airguns, dart guns, starting pistols, etc.
(e) A firearm, which is not a weapon of war or munitions of war, should be treated as a sporting weapon for the
purposes of its carriage on an aircraft.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.161 Carriage of sporting weapons and ammunition - alleviations
SPORTING WEAPONS - HELICOPTERS
Procedures for the carriage of sporting weapons may need to be considered if the helicopter does not
have a separate compartment in which the weapons can be stowed. These procedures should take into
account the nature of the flight, its origin and destination, and the possibility of unlawful interference. As
far as possible, the weapons
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 Documents, manuals and information to be carried
GENERAL
The documents, manuals and information may be available in a form other than on printed paper. An
electronic storage medium is acceptable if accessibility, usability and reliability can be assured.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(1) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT(S)
‘Aircraft flight manual, or equivalent document(s)’ means in the context of this rule the flight manual for
the aircraft, or other documents containing information required for the operation of the aircraft within the
terms of its certificate of airworthiness, unless these data are available in the parts of the operations manual
carried on board.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(5)(6)
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES
Documents, manuals and information to be carried
Certified true copies may be provided:
(a) directly by MCAA; or
(b) by persons holding privileges for certification of official documents in accordance with applicable
legislation, e.g., public notaries, authorised officials in public services.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(9) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
JOURNEY LOG OR EQUIVALENT
‘Journey log, or equivalent’ means in this context that the required information may be recorded in
documentation other than a log book, such as the operational flight plan or the aircraft technical log.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a)(13) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
PROCEDURES AND VISUAL SIGNALS FOR USE BY INTERCEPTING AND INTERCEPTED
AIRCRAFT
The procedures and the visual signals for use by intercepting and intercepted aircraft should reflect
those contained in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 2. This may be part of the
operations manual.
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GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a) (14) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION
This information is usually found in the State’s aeronautical information publication.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.180 (a) (23) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE PERTINENT TO THE FLIGHT
Any other documents that may be pertinent to the flight or required by the States concerned with the
flight may include, for example, forms to comply with reporting requirements.
STATES CONCERNED WITH THE FLIGHT
The States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the flight.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (a), Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings
REMOVAL OF RECORDERS AFTER A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
The need for removal of the recorders from the aircraft is determined by the investigating authority
with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the
operation.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings
OPERATIONAL CHECKS
Whenever a recorder is required to be carried, the operator should:
(a) perform an annual inspection of FDR recording and CVR recording , unless one or more of the
following applies:
(1) Where two solid-state FDRs both fitted with internal built -in-test equipment sufficient to monitor
reception and recording of data share the same acquisition unit, a comprehensive recording
inspection need only be performed for one FDR. For the second FDR, checking its internal built-intest equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each FDR is
inspected once every other year.
(2) Where the following conditions are met, the FDR recording inspection is not needed:
(i) the aircraft flight data are collected in the frame of a flight data monitoring (FDM)
programme;
(ii) the data acquisition of mandatory flight parameters is the same for the FDR and for the recorder
used for the FDM programme;
(iii) the integrity of all mandatory flight parameters is verified by the FDM programme; and
(iv) the FDR is solid-state and is fitted with an internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to
monitor reception and recording of data.
(3) Where two solid-state CVRs are both fitted with internal built -in-test equipment sufficient to
monitor reception and recording of data, a comprehensive recording inspection need only to be
performed for one CVR. For the second CVR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is
sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each CVR is inspected once
every other year.
(b) perform every 5 years an inspection of the data link recording.
(c) check every 5 years, or in accordance with the recommendations of the sensor manufacturer, that
the parameters dedicated to the FDR and not monitored by other means a re being recorded within
the calibration tolerances and that there is no discrepancy in the engineering conversion routines for these
parameters..
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195 (b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings
INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS R ECORDING
(a) The inspection of the FDR recording usually consists of the following:
(1) Making a copy of the complete recording file.
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(2) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory
parameters - this could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and
indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered:
(i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for
different values of its operational range - for this purpose, some parameters may need to be
inspected at different flight phases; and
(ii) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the
operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation
check may need to be performed;
(A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative
evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and
(B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded
by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight
instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight
profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose.
(3) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording
inspection report.
(b) The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of:
(1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording;
(2) examining, where practicable and subject to prior approval by the flight crew, a sample of in-flight
recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and
(3) preparing and retaining an inspection report.
(c) The inspection of the DLR recording usually consists of:
(1) Checking the consistency of the data link recording with other recordings for example, during a
designated flight, the flight crew speaks out a few data link messages sent and received. After the
flight, the data link recording and the CVR recording are compared for consistency.
(2) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording and the corresponding inspection
report.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.200 (e) Transport of dangerous goods
DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT REPORTING
(a) Any type of dangerous goods accident or incident, or the finding of undeclared or misdeclared
dangerous goods should be reported, irrespective of whether the dangerous goods are contained in
cargo, mail, passengers’ baggage or crew baggage. For the purposes of the reporting of undeclared and
misdeclared dangerous goods found in cargo, the Technical Instructions considers this to include items of
operators’ stores that are classified as dangerous goods.
(b) The first report should be dispatched within 72 (seventy two) hours of the event. It may be sent by any
means, including e-mail, telephone or fax. This report should include the details that are known at that
time, under the headings identified in
(c). If necessary, a subsequent report should be made as soon as possible giving all the details that were
not known at the time the first report was sent. If a report has been made verbally, written
confirmation should be sent as soon as possible. The first and any subsequent report should be as
precise as possible and should contain the following data, where relevant:
(1) date of the incident or accident or the finding of undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods;
(2) location, the flight number and flight date;
(3) description of the goods and the reference number of the air waybill, pouch, baggage tag, ticket,
etc.;
(4) proper shipping name (including the technical name, if appropriate) and UN/ID number, when
known;
(5) class or division and any subsidiary risk;
(6) type of packaging, and the packaging specification marking on it;
(7) quantity;
(8) name and address of the shipper, passenger, etc.;
(9) any other relevant details;
(10) suspected cause of the incident or accident;
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(11) action taken;
(12) any other reporting action taken; and
(13) name, title, address and telephone number of t he person making the report.
(d) Copies of relevant documents and any photographs taken should be attached to the report.
(e) A dangerous goods accident or incident ma y also constitute an aircraft accident, serious incident or
incident. Reports should be made for both types of occurrences when the criteria for each are met.
(f) The following dangerous goods reporting form should be used, but other forms, including electronic
transfer of data, may be used provided that at least the minimum information of this AMC is
supplied:
DANGEROUS GOODS OCCURRENCE REPORT
1. Operator:
2. Date of Occurrence:
DGOR No:
3. Local time of occurrence:
4. Flight date:
5. Flight No:
6. Departure aerodrome:
7. Destination aerodrome:
8. Aircraft type:
9. Aircraft registration:
10. Location of occurrence:
11. Origin of the goods:
12. Description of the occurrence, including details of injury, damage, etc. (if necessary continue on the
reverse of this form):
13. Proper shipping name (including the technical name):
15. Class/Division
known):
(when
19. Type of packaging:
14. UN/ID No (when
known):
16. Subsidiary risk(s):
17. Packing group:
18 Category (Class 7
only):
20. Packaging
specification
marking:
21. No of packages:
22.
Quantity
(or
transport index, if
applicable):
23. Reference No of Airway Bill:
24. Reference No of courier pouch, baggage tag, or passenger ticket:
25. Name and address of shipper, agent, passenger, etc.:
26. Other relevant information (including suspected cause, any action taken):
27. Name and title of person making report:
28. Telephone No:
29. Company:
31. Address:
30. Reporters ref:
32. Signature:
33. Date:
Description of the occurrence (continuation)
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Notes for completion of the form:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
A dangerous goods accident is as defined in Annex I. For this purpose serious injury is as defined in
MCAR 1.
This form should also be used to report any occasion when undeclared or misdeclared dangerous
goods are discovered in cargo, mail or unaccompanied baggage or when accompanied baggage contains
dangerous goods which passengers or crew are not permitted to take on aircraft.
The initial report should be dispatched unless exceptional circumstances prevent this. This occurrence
report form, duly completed, should be sent as soon as possible, even if all the information is not
available.
Copies of all relevant documents and any photographs should be attached to this report.
Any further information, or any information not included in the initial report, should be sent as soon
as possible to authorities identified in CAT.GEN.MPA.200 (e).
Providing it is safe to do so, all dangerous goods, packaging, documents, etc., relating to the
occurrence should be retained until after the initial report has been sent to the authorities identified in
CAT.GEN.MPA.200 (e) and they have indicated whether or not these should continue to be retained.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.200 Transport of dangerous goods
GENERAL
(a) The requirement to transport dangerous goods by air in accordance with the
Technical Instructions is irrespective of whether:
(1) the flight is wholly or partly within or wholly outside the territory of a state; or
(2) an approval to carry dangerous goods in accordance with Annex V (Part SPA), Subpart G is held.
(b) The Technical Instructions provide that in certain circumstances dangerous goods, which are normally
forbidden on an aircraft, may be carried. These circumstances include cases of extreme urgency or
when other forms of transport are inappropriate or when full compliance with the prescribed
requirements is contrary to the public interest. In these circumstances all the States concerned may grant
exemptions from the provisions of the Technical Instructions provided that an overall level of safety
which is at least equivalent to that provided by the Technical Instructions is achieved. Although exemptions
are most likely to be granted for the carriage of dangerous goods that are not permitted in normal
circumstances, they may also be granted in other circumstances, such as when the packaging to be
used is not provided for by the appropriate packing method or the quantity in the packaging is greater
than that permitted. The Technical Instructions also make provision for some dangerous goods to be
carried when an approval has been granted only by the State of Origin and the State of the Operator.
(c) When an exemption is required, the States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination
of the consignment and that of the operator. For the State of overflight, if none of the criteria for
granting an exemption are relevant, an exemption may be granted based solely on whether it is believed that
an equivalent level of safety in air transport has been achieved.
(d) The Technical Instructions provide that exemptions and approvals are granted by the ‘appropriate
national authority’, which is intended to be the authority responsible for the particular aspect
against which the exemption or approval is being sought. The Instructions do not specify who
should seek exemptions and, depending on the legislation of the particular State, this may mean the
operator, the shipper or an agent. If an exemption or approval has been granted to other than the
operator, the operator should ensure a copy has been obtained before the relevant flight. The operator
should ensure all relevant conditions on an exemption or approval are met.
(e) The exemption or approval referred to in (b) to (d) is in addition to the approval required by Annex
V (Part SPA), Subpart G.
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Section 2 – Non- Motor-powered aircraft
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.100 (b)(1) Responsibilities of the commander
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
The operator should issue instructions concerning the consumption of alcohol by commanders. The instructions
should not be less restrictive than the following:
(a) no alcohol should be consumed less than 8 hours prior to the specified reporting time for a flight duty
period or the commencement of standby;
(b) the blood alcohol level should not exceed the lower of the national requirements or 0.2 per thousand at the
start of a flight duty period; and
(c) no alcohol should be consumed during the flight duty period or whilst on standby.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.100 (b)(2) Responsibilities of the commander
ELAPSED TIME BEFORE RETURNING TO FLYING DUTY
24 hours is a suitable minimum length of time to allow after normal blood donation or normal recreational
(sport) diving before returning to flying duties. This should be considered by operators when determining a
reasonable time period for the guidance of crew members.
PART-MED
Information on the effects of medication, drugs, other treatments and alcohol can be found in Annex IV (PartMED) to MCAR AIRCREW.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.100 (d)(3) Responsibilities of the commander
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING — BALLOON OPERATIONS
Protective clothing includes:
(a) long sleeves and trousers preferably made out of natural fibres;
(b) stout footwear; and
(c) gloves.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.105 (a) Additional balloon crew member
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBER
The additional crew member should have taken part in:
(a) the following practical training inflations with subsequent flights, as applicable:
(1) three on any balloon;
(2) two on balloons with baskets of a capacity of at least seven passengers; and
(3) one on a balloon with a basket of a capacity of more than 19 passengers;
(b) at least two landings under (a) with a ground speed of at least 5 kt; and
(c) training in first-aid and in the use of the fire extinguisher at intervals of maximum 24 months.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.105 (b)(1) Additional balloon crew member
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
The operator should issue instructions concerning the consumption of alcohol by crew members. The
instructions should not be less restrictive than the following:
(a) no alcohol should be consumed less than 8 hours prior to the specified reporting time for a flight duty
period or the commencement of standby;
(b) the blood alcohol level should not exceed the lower of the national requirements or 0.2 per thousand at the
start of a flight duty period;
(c) no alcohol should be consumed during the flight duty period or whilst on standby.
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GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.105 (b) (2) Additional balloon crew member
ELAPSED TIME BEFORE RETURNING TO FLYING DUTY
24 hours is a suitable minimum length of time to allow after normal blood donation or normal recreational
(sport) diving before returning to flying duties. This should be considered by operators when determining a
reasonable time period for the guidance of crew members.
PART-MED
Information on the effects of medication, drugs, other treatments and alcohol can be found in Annex IV (PartMED).
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.120 Portable electronic devices
GENERAL
(a) A portable electronic device (PED) is any kind of electronic device not being part of the certified aircraft
configuration, but brought on-board the aircraft either by crew members or passengers, or being inside the
personal luggage or cargo.
(b) The associated risk relates to interference of the PED with electronic operated aircraft systems, mainly
instruments or communication equipment. The interference can result in malfunctioning or misleading
information of on-board systems and communication disturbance which may subsequently increase flight
crew workload.
(c) Interference may be caused by transmitters being part of the PED functionality or by unintentional
transmissions of the PED. Due to the short distance and the lack of shielding from a metal aircraft structure,
the risk of interference is to be considered higher in small aircraft compared to aircraft made of big metal
structures. It has been found that compliance to the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) Directive
2004/108/EC2 and related European standards as indicated by the CE marking are not sufficient to exclude
the existence of interference. A well-known interference is the demodulation of the transmitted signal from
GSM mobile phones leading to audio disturbances in other systems. Similar to this case, interferences can
hardly be predicted during the PED design and protecting aircraft electronic against all kind of potential
interferences is similar impossible. Therefore, not operating PEDs on-board aircraft is the safe option,
especially as effects may not be identified immediately but under the most inconvenient circumstances.
(d) Guidance to follow in case of fire caused by PEDs is provided by the International Civil Aviation
Organisation, ‘Emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods’, ICAO Doc
9481-AN/928.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.125 Information on emergency and survival equipment carried
ITEMS FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRE
The information, compiled in a list, should include, as applicable:
(a) the number, colour and type of life-rafts and pyrotechnics;
(b) details of emergency medical supplies and water supplies; and
(c) the type and frequencies of the emergency portable radio equipment.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 Documents, manuals and information to be carried
GENERAL
The documents, manuals and information may be available in a form other than on printed paper. Accessibility,
usability and reliability should be assured.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(1) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT(S)
At least the operating limitations, normal and emergency procedures should be available to the commander
during operation by providing the relevant data of the AFM or by other means (e.g. placards, quick reference
cards) that effectively accomplish the purpose.
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GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a) (5)(6) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES
(a) Certified true copies may be provided:
(1) directly by the competent authority; or
(2) by persons holding privileges for certification of official documents in accordance with applicable
legislation, e.g. public notaries, authorised officials in public services.
(b) Translations of the air operator certificate (AOC) including operations specifications do not need to be
certified.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a) (9) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
JOURNEY LOG, OR EQUIVALENT
‘Journey log, or equivalent’ means that the required information may be recorded in documentation other than a
log book, such as the operational flight plan or the aircraft technical log.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a) (13) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
CURRENT AND SUITABLE AERONAUTICAL CHARTS
(a) The aeronautical charts carried should contain data appropriate to the applicable air traffic regulations, rules
of the air, flight altitudes, area/route and nature of the operation. Due consideration should be given to
carriage of textual and graphic representations of:
(1) aeronautical data including, as appropriate for the nature of the operation:
(i) airspace structure;
(ii) significant points, navigation aids (nav aids) and air traffic services (ATS) routes;
(iii) navigation and communication frequencies;
(iv) prohibited, restricted and danger areas; and
(v) sites of other relevant activities that may hazard the flight; and
(2) topographical data, including terrain and obstacle data.
(b) A combination of different charts and textual data may be used to provide adequate and current data.
(c) The aeronautical data should be appropriate for the current aeronautical information regulation and control
(AIRAC) cycle.
(d) The topographical data should be reasonably recent, having regard to the nature of the planned operation.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(14) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
PROCEDURES AND VISUAL SIGNALS FOR USE BY INTERCEPTING AND INTERCEPTED
AIRCRAFT
The procedures and the visual signals information for use by intercepting and intercepted aircraft should reflect
those contained in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 2. This may be part of the
operations manual.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(15) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION
This information is usually found in the State’s aeronautical information publication.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.140 (a)(21) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE PERTINENT TO THE FLIGHT
Any other documents that may be pertinent to the flight or required by the States concerned with the flight may
include, for example, forms to comply with reporting requirements.
STATES CONCERNED WITH THE FLIGHT
The States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the flight.
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GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.150 (a)(1) Transport of dangerous goods
EXCEPTIONS, APPROVALS, EXEMPTIONS
(a) The Technical Instructions (T.I.) provide for exceptions to the provisions for the transport of dangerous
goods for those goods that are required on board in accordance with airworthiness rules and/or are used for
operational purposes, e.g. portable electronic devices.
(b) Furthermore, the T.I. allow to deviate from provisions on how to transport dangerous goods through
approvals. However, such approvals are likely to be used only for operators holding a specific approval to
dangerous goods as in Annex V (Part-SPA), Subpart G. Approvals under Part 1 of the T.I. may, therefore,
not be relevant for commercial air transport operations with sailplanes and balloons.
(c) The T.I. also provide for exemptions. An exemption would allow the transport of dangerous goods which
would normally be forbidden. Exemptions may be granted by the State of the operator, the States of origin,
transit, overflight and destination. Exemptions, as stated in the T.I., can be granted under the following
conditions:
(1) the overall level of safety is at least equivalent to the level of safety provided for in the T.I.; and
(2) at least one of the following three criteria is fulfilled:
(i) in cases of extreme urgency; or
(ii) when other forms of transport are inappropriate; or
(iii) when full compliance with the T.I. is contrary to the public interest.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.150 (a)(2) Transport of dangerous goods
DANGEROUS GOODS CARRIED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PART 8 OF THE T.I.
Passengers and crew may carry certain dangerous goods under the provisions of Part 8 of the T.I. either in their
baggage or on the person. The T.I. specify for which goods an approval from the operator or a notification to the
commander is compulsory. The T.I., furthermore, specify restrictions to the carriage of some of these goods.
GM1 CAT.GEN.NMPA.150 (b)(c) Transport of dangerous goods
PROCEDURES AND INFORMATION TO PERSONNEL AND PASSENGERS
(a) Personnel should be trained to get familiarised with the items that are allowed or forbidden on board to an
extent that they can inform the passengers accordingly. An updated list of permitted items under Part 8 of
the T. I. should be available to the personnel. This can be a poster, a leaflet or anything that can be easily
understood and shown to the passengers when needed. This list should also specify the items that are
forbidden under all circumstances as established in Part 8 of the T.I.
(b) Information should be given to the passengers as regards goods that are forbidden to take on board before
the flight takes place. This can be done in the website where the ticket is bought or in a summary written on
the physical ticket that is given to the passenger. In case this is not possible, the crew can provide this
information in a briefing before the flight.
(c) An operator should provide information in the operations manual to enable the commander and other
personnel to carry out their responsibilities and identify which dangerous goods can be allowed on board.
(d) Procedures should also be established and described in the operations manual to respond to accidents or
incidents involving dangerous goods. The relevant personnel should be familiar with them.
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Subpart B – Operating procedures
Section 1 – Motor-powered aircraft
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.100 (a)(2) Use of air traffic services
IN-FLIGHT OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
When coordination with an appropriate air traffic service (ATS) unit has not been possible, in-flight
operational instructions do not relieve a commander of responsibility for obtaining an appropriate
clearance from an ATS unit, if applicable, before making a change in flight plan.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.105 Use of aerodromes and operating sites
DEFINING OPERATING SITES - HELICOPTERS
When defining operating sites (including infrequent or temporary sites) for the type(s) of helicopter(s) and
operation(s) concerned, the operator should take account of the following:
(a) An adequate site is a site that the operator considers to be satisfactory, taking account of the
applicable performance requirements and site characteristics (guidance on standards and criteria are
contained in ICAO Annex 14 Volume 2 and in the ICAO Heliport Manual (Doc 9261-AN/903)).
(b) The operator should have in place a procedure for the survey of sites by a competent person. Such
a procedure should take account for possible changes to the site characteristics which may have taken
place since last surveyed.
(c) Sites that are pre-surveyed should be specifically specified in the operations manual. The operations
manual should contain diagrams or/and ground and aerial photographs, and depiction (pictorial) and
description of:
(1) the overall dimensions of the site;
(2) location and height of relevant obstacles to approach and take-off profiles, and in the
manoeuvring area;
(3) approach and take-off flight paths;
(4) surface condition (blowing dust/snow/sand);
(5) helicopter types authorised with reference to performance requirements;
(6) provision of control of third parties on the ground (if applicable);
(7) procedure for activating site with land owner or controlling authority;
(8) other useful information, for example appropriate ATS agency and frequency; and
(9) lighting (if applicable), that enables the pilot to make, from the air, a judgment on the suitability of a
site. (c)(1) to (c)(6) should be considered.
(e) Operations to non-pre-surveyed sites by night (except in accordance with SPA.HEMS.125 (b)(4))
should not be permitted.
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.105 Use of aerodromes and operating sites
HELIDECK
(a) The content of Part C of the operations manual relating to the specific usage of helidecks should
contain both the listing of helideck limitations in a helideck limitations list (HLL) and a pictorial
representation (template) of each helideck showing all necessary information of a permanent nature.
The HLL should show, and be amended as necessary to indicate, the most recent status of each helideck
concerning non-compliance with ICAO Annex 14 Volume 2, limitations, warnings, cautions or other
comments of operational importance. An example of a typical template is shown in Figure 1 below.
(b) In order to ensure that the safety of flights is not compromised, the operator should obtain relevant
information and details for compilation of the HLL, and the pictorial representation, from the
owner/operator of the helideck.
(c) When listing helidecks, if more than one name of the helideck exists, the most common name
should be used and other names should also be included. After renaming a helideck, t he old name
should be included in the HLL for the ensuing 6 months.
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(d) All helideck limitations should be included in the HLL. Helidecks without limitations should also be listed.
With complex installations and combinations of installations (e.g. co-locations), a separate listing in
the HLL, accompanied by diagrams where necessary, may be required.
(e) Each helideck should be assessed based on limitations, warnings, cautions or comments to determine
its acceptability with respect to the following that, as a minimum, should cover the factors listed
below:
(1) The physical characteristics of the helideck.
(2) The preservation of obstacle-protected surfaces is the most basic safeguard for all flights.
These surfaces are:
(i) the minimum 210° obstacle-free surface (OFS);
(ii) the 150° limited obstacle surface (LOS); and
(iii) the minimum 180° falling ‘5:1’ - gradient with respect to significant obstacles. If this is
infringed or if an adjacent installation or vessel infringes the obstacle clearance surfaces or
criteria related to a helideck, an assessment should be made to determine any possible
negative effect that may lead to operating restrictions.
(3) Marking and lighting:
(i) adequate perimeter lighting;
(ii) adequate floodlighting;
(iii) status lights (for night and day operations e.g. signalling lamp);
(iv) dominant obstacle paint schemes and lighting;
(v) helideck markings; and
(vi) general installation lighting levels. Any limitations in this respect should be annotated ‘daylight
only operations’ on the HLL.
(4) Deck surface:
(i) surface friction;
(ii) helideck net;
(iii) drainage system;
(iv) deck edge netting;
(v) tie down system; and
(vi) cleaning of all contaminants.
(5) Environment:
(i) foreign object damage;
(ii) physical turbulence generators;
(iii) bird control;
(iv) air quality degradation due to exhaust emissions, hot gas vents or cold gas vents; and
(v) adjacent helideck may need to be included in air quality assessment.
(6) Rescue and fire fighting:
(i) primary and complementary media types, quantities, capacity and systems personal protective
equipment and clothing, breathing apparatus; and
(ii) crash box.
(7) Communications & navigation:
(i) aeronautical radio(s);
(ii) radio/telephone (R/T) call sign to match helideck name and side identification which should
be simple and unique;
(iii) Non-directional beacon (NDB) or equivalent (as appropriate);
(iv) radio log; and
(v) light signal (e.g. signalling lamp).
(8) Fuelling facilities:
(i) in accordance with the relevant national guidance and regulations.
(9) Additional operational and handling equipment:
(i) windsock;
(ii) wind recording;
(iii) deck motion recording and reporting where applicable;
(iv) passenger briefing system;
(v) chocks;
(vi) tie downs; and
(vii) weighing scales.
(10) Personnel:
(i) trained helideck staff (e.g. helicopter landing officer, deck assistant and fire fighters etc.).
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(11) Other:
(i) as appropriate.
(f) For helidecks about which there is incomplete information, ‘limited’ usage based on the information
available may be specified by the operator prior to the first helicopter visit. During subsequent
operations and before any limit on usage is lifted, information should be gathered and the following should
apply:
(1) Pictorial (static) representation:
(i) template (see figure 1) blanks should be available, to be filled out during flight preparation
on the basis of the information given by the helideck owner/operator and flight crew observations;
(ii) where possible, suitably annotated photographs may be used until the HLL and template have been
completed;
(iii) until the HLL and template have been completed, operational restrictions (e.g. performance,
routing etc.) may be applied;
(iv) any previous inspection reports should be obtained by the operator; and
(v) an inspection of the helideck should be carried out to verify the content of the completed
HLL and template, following which the helideck may be considered as fully adequate for
operations.
(2) With reference to the above, the HLL should contain at least the following:
(i) HLL revision date and number;
(ii) generic list of helideck motion limitations;
(iii) name of helideck;
(iv) ‘D’ value; and
(v) limitations, warnings, cautions and comments.
(3) The template should contain at least the following (see example below):
(i) installation/vessel name;
(ii) R/T call sign;
(iii) helideck identification marking;
(iv) side panel identification marking;
(v) helideck elevation;
(vi) maximum installation/vessel height;
(vii) 'D' value;
(viii) type of installation/vessel:
- fixed manned
- fixed unmanned
- ship type (e.g. diving support vessel)
- semi-submersible
- jack-up
(ix) name of owner/operator;
(x) geographical position;
(xi) communication and navigation (Com/Nav) frequencies and ident;
(xii) general drawing preferably looking into the helideck with annotations showing location of
derrick, masts, cranes, flare stack, turbine and gas exhausts, side identification panels, windsock
etc.;
(xiii) plan view drawing, chart orientation from the genera l drawing, to show the above. The
plan view will also show the 210 orientation in degrees true;
(xiv) type of fuelling:
- pressure and gravity
- pressure only
- gravity only
- none
(xv) type and nature of fire fighting equipment;
(xvi) availability of ground power unit (GPU);
(xvii) deck heading;
(xviii) maximum allowable mass;
(xix) status light (Yes/No); and
(xx) revision date of publication.
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Figure 1 Helideck template
Installation/vessel
name
…
Helideck elevation :
200 ft
Type of installation :
…1
Position : 2
N…
COM
R/T callsign :
…
Maximum height :
350 ft
W…
LOG : VHF 123.45
Traffic : VHF
123.45
Deck
:
VHF
123.45
NAV
Helideck identification :
…
Side identification :
…
D value :
22 m
Operator 3
ATIS :
VHF 123.45
NBD : 123 (ident)
DME : 123
VOR/DME : 123
VOR : 123
Fuelling :
…4
MTOM :
…T
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
GPU :
…5
Status light :
…6
IV-37
Deck heading :
…
Fire fighting equipment :
…7
Revision date:
…
1st March 2015
CAAP – Air Operations
AMC GM to Annex IV - Part-CAT
Civil Aviation Advisory Publications
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Fixed manned, fixed unmanned; ship type (e.g. diving support vessel); semi-submersible; jack-up.
WGS84 grid.
NAM, AMOCO, etc.
Pressure/gravity; pressure; gravity; no.
Yes; no; 28V DC.
Yes; no.
Type (e.g. aqueous film forming foams (AFFF)) and nature (e.g. deck integrated fire fighting system
(DIFFS).
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS - AEROPLANES
(a) General
(1) Take-off minima should be expressed as visibility or runway visual range (RVR) limits, taking
into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome planned to be used and aircraft characteristics.
Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing,
additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, should be specified.
(2) The commander should not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of
departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome unless a weatherpermissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available.
(3) When the reported meteorological visibility (VIS) is below that required for take-off and RVR is
not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the commander can determine that the
visibility along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum.
(4) When no reported meteorological visibility or RVR is available, a take -off should only be
commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway is equal to or
better than the required minimum.
(b) Visual reference
(1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in
the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure
of the critical engine.
(2) For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the runway and any
obstacles.
(c) Required RVR/VIS – aeroplanes
(1) For multi-engined aeroplanes, with performance such that in the event of a critical engine
failure at any point during take-off the aeroplane can either stop or continue the take-off to a
height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins, the
take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR/CMV (converted
meteorological visibility) values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A.
(2) For multi-engined aeroplanes without the performance to comply with the conditions in (c)(1) in
the event of a critical engine failure, there may be a need to re-land immediately and to see
and avoid obstacles in the take -off area. Such aeroplanes may be operated to the following takeoff minima provided they are able to comply with the applicable obstacle clearance criteria,
assuming engine failure at the height specified. The take-off minima specified by the operator
should be based upon the height from which the one-engine-inoperative (OEI) net take-off flight
path can be constructed. The RVR minima used should not be lower than either of the values
specified in Table 1.A or Table 2.A.
(3) When RVR or meteorological visibility is not available, the commander should not commence take-off
unless he/she can determine that the actual conditions satisfy the applicable take-off minima.
Revision No: Original
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Table 1.A: Take-off – aeroplanes (without an approval for low visibility take-off (LVTO))
Facilities
Day only: Nil**
Day: at least runway edge lights or runway centreline markings
Night: at least runway edge lights and runway end lights or runway centreline lights and
runway end lights
RVR/VIS (m) *
500
400
*: The reported RVR/VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot
assessment.
**: The pilot is able to continuously identify the take-off surface and maintain directional control.
Table 2.A: Take-off - aeroplanes
Assumed engine failure height above the runway versus RVR/VIS
Assumed engine failure height above the take-off runway (ft)
<50
51 – 100
101 – 150
151 – 200
201 – 300
>300 *
RVR/VIS (m) **
400 (200 with LVTO approval)
400 (300 with LVTO approval)
400
500
1 000
1 500
*: 1 500 m is also applicable if no positive take-off flight path can be constructed.
**: The reported RVR/VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot
assessment.
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS - HELICOPTERS
(a) General
(1) Take-off minima should be expressed as visibility or runway visual range (RVR) limits, taking
into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome planned to be used and aircraft characteristics.
Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing,
additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, should be specified.
(2) The commander should not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of
departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome unless a weatherpermissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available.
(3) When the reported meteorological visibility (VIS) is below that required for take-off and RVR is
not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility
along the take -off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum.
(4) When no reported meteorological visibility or RVR is available, a take -off should only be
commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway/area is
equal to or better than the required minimum.
(b) Visual reference
(1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in
the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure
of the critical engine.
(2) For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the runway/final approach
and take-off area (FATO) and any obstacles.
(c) Required RVR/VIS – helicopters:
(1) For performance class 1 operations, the operator should specify an RVR/VIS as take-off minima in
accordance with Table 1.H.
(2) For performance class 2 operations onshore, the commander should operate to take-off minima
of 800 m RVR/VIS and remain clear of cloud during the take-off manoeuvre until reaching
performance class 1 capabilities.
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
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(3) For performance class 2 operations offshore, the commander should operate to minima not less
than that for performance class 1 and remain clear of cloud during the take-off manoeuvre until
reaching performance class 1 capabilities.
(4) Table 8 for converting reported meteorological visibility to RVR should not be used for calculating
take-off minima.
Table 1.H: Take-off – helicopters (without LVTO approval) RVR/VIS
Onshore aerodromes with instrument flight rules (IFR)
departure procedures
No light and no markings (day only)
No markings (night)
Runway edge/FATO light and centreline marking
Runway edge/FATO light, centreline marking and relevant RVR
information
Offshore helideck *
Two-pilot operations
Single-pilot operations
RVR/VIS (m)
400 or the rejected take-off
distance, whichever is the greater
800
400
400
-400
500
*: The take-off flight path to be free of obstacles.
AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
NPA, APV, CAT I OPERATIONS
(a) The decision height (DH) to be used for a non-precision approach (NPA) flown with the continuous descent
final approach (CDFA) technique, approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) or CAT I operation
should not be lower than the highest of:
(1) the minimum height to which the approach aid can be used without the required visual
reference;
(2) the obstacle clearance height (OCH) for the category of aircraft;
(3) the published approach procedure DH where applicable;
(4) the system minimum specified in Table 3; or
(5) the minimum DH specified in the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or equivalent document, if stated.
(b) The minimum descent height (MDH) for an NPA operation flown without the CDFA technique should not
be lower than the highest of:
(1) the OCH for the category of aircraft;
(2) the system minimum specified in Table 3; or
(3) the minimum MDH specified in the AFM, if stated.
Table 3: System minima
Facility
ILS/MLS/GLS
GNSS/SBAS (LPV)
GNSS (LNAV)
GNSS/Baro-VNAV (LNAV/ VNAV)
LOC with or without DME
SRA (terminating at ½ NM)
SRA (terminating at 1 NM)
SRA (terminating at 2 NM or more)
VOR
VOR/DME
NDB
NDB/DME
VDF
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
Lowest DH/MDH (ft)
200
200
250
250
250
250
300
350
300
250
350
300
350
IV-40
1st March 2015
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DME:
GNSS:
ILS:
LNAV:
LOC:
LPV:
SBAS:
SRA:
VDF:
VNAV:
VOR:
distance measuring equipment;
global navigation satellite system;
instrument landing system;
lateral navigation;
localiser;
localiser performance with vertical guidance
satellite-based augmentation system;
surveillance radar approach;
VHF direction finder;
vertical navigation;
VHF omnidirectional radio range.
AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING RVR/CMV
(a) Aeroplanes
The following criteria for establishing RVR/CMV should apply:
(1) In order to qualify for the lowest allowable values of RVR/CMV specified in Table 6.A the
instrument approach should meet at least the following facility specifications and associated
conditions:
(i) Instrument approaches with designated vertical profile up to and including 4.5° for category
A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for category C and D aeroplanes where the facilities are:
(A) ILS / microwave landing system (MLS) / GBAS landing system (GLS) / precision approach
radar (PAR); or
(B) APV; and where the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for category
A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for category C and D aeroplanes.
(ii) Instrument approach operations flown using the CDFA technique with a nominal vertical
profile, up t o and including 4.5° for category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for category C
and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC,
LOC/DME, VDF, SRA or GNSS/LNAV, with a final approach segment of at least 3 NM,
which also fulfil the following criteria:
(A) the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for category A and B aeroplanes
or by not more than 5° for category C and D aeroplanes;
(B) the final approach fix (FAF) or another appropriate fix where descent is initiated is
available, or distance to threshold (THR) is available by flight management system /
GNSS (FMS/GNSS) or DME; and
(C) if the missed approach point (MAPt) is determined by timing, the distance from FAF or
another appropriate fix to THR is = 8 NM.
(iii) Instrument approaches where the facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC,
LOC/DME, VDF, SRA or GNSS/LNAV, not fulfilling the criteria in (a)(1)(ii), or with an
MDH = 1 200 ft.
(2) The missed approach operation, after an approach operation has been flown using the CDFA technique,
should be executed when reaching the DA/H or the MAPt, whichever occurs first. The lateral part of
the missed approach procedure should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the
approach chart.
AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, APV, CAT I - AEROPLANES
(a) Aeroplanes
The RVR/CMV/VIS minima for NPA, APV and CAT I operations should be determined as follows:
(1) The minimum RVR/CMV/VIS should be the highest of the values specified in Table 5 or Table
6.A but not greater than the maximum values specified in Table 6.A, where applicable.
(2) The values in Table 5 should be derived from the formula below,
Required RVR/VIS (m) = [(DH/MDH (ft) x 0.3048) / tana] - length of approach lights (m) where a
is the calculation angle, being a default value of 3.00° increasing in steps of 0.10° for ea ch line in
Table 5 up to 3.77° and then remaining constant.
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-41
1st March 2015
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(3) If the approach is flown with a level flight segment at or above MDA/H, 200 m should be added for
category A and B aeroplanes and 400 m for category C and D aeroplanes to the minimum
RVR/CMV/VIS value resulting from the application of Tables 5 and 6.A.
(4) An RVR of less than 750 m as indicated in Table 5 may be used:
(i) for CAT I operations to runways with full approach lighting system (FALS), runway
touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway centreline lights (RCLL);
(ii) for CAT I operations to runways without RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up
guidance landing system (HUDLS), or equivalent approved system, or when conducting a
coupled approach or flight-director-flown approach to a DH. The ILS should not be published as
a restricted facility; and
(iii) for APV operations t o runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up
display (HUD).
(5) Lower values than those specified in Table 5, for HUDLS and auto-land operations may be used
if approved in accordance with Annex V (Pa rt-SPA), Subpart E (SPA.LVO).
(6) The visual aids should comprise standard runway day markings and approach and runway lights as
specified in Table 4. MCAA may approve that RVR values relevant to a basic approach lighting
system (BALS) are used on runways where the approach lights are restricted in length below 210 m
due to terrain or water, but where at least one cross-bar is available.
(7) For night operations or for any operation where credit for runway and approach lights is
required, the lights should be on and serviceable except as provided for in Table 9.
(8) For single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR/VIS should be calculated in accordance with the
following additional criteria:
(i) an RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 5 may be used for CAT I approaches
provided any of the following is used at least down to the applicable DH:
(A) a suitable autopilot, coupled to an ILS, MLS or GLS that is not published as restricted;
or
(B) an approved HUDLS, including, where appropriate, enhanced vision system (EVS), or
equivalent approved system;
(ii) where RTZL and/or RCLL are not available, the minimum RVR/CMV should not be less
than 600 m; and
(iii) an RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 5 may be used for APV operations to
runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved HUDLS, or equivalent
approved system, or when conducting a coupled approach to a DH equal to or greater than 250
ft.
Table 4: Approach lighting systems
Class of lighting facility
FALS
IALS
BALS
NALS
Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights
CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥720 m) distance coded centreline, Barrette
centreline
Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420 – 719 m) single source, Barrette
Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS 210 - 419 m)
Any other approach light system (HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no
approach lights
Note: HIALS: high intensity approach lighting system;
MALS: medium intensity approach lighting system.
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
IV-42
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Table 5: RVR/CMV vs. DH/MDH
DH or MDH
200
211
221
231
241
251
261
281
301
321
341
361
381
401
421
441
461
481
501
521
541
561
581
601
621
641
461
481
501
521
541
661
681
701
721
741
761
801
851
901
951
1 001
1 101
ft
1 201 and above
Revision No: Original
Issue No: 1
FALS
210
230
240
250
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
420
440
460
480
500
520
540
560
580
600
620
640
660
480
500
520
540
560
680
700
720
740
760
800
850
900
950
1 000
1 100
1 200
550
220
550
550
550
600
600
650
700
800
900
1 000
1 100
1 200
1 300
1 400
1 500
1 500
1 600
1 700
1 800
1 900
2 000
2 100
2 200
2 300
1 500
1 500
1 600
1 700
1 800
2 400
2 500
2 600
2 700
2 700
2 900
3 100
3 300
3 600
3 800
4 100
4 600
5 000
IV-43
Class of lighting facility
IALS
BALS
See (a)(4),(5),(8) above for RVR <750/800 m
RVR/CMV (m)
750
1 000
550
800
800
1 000
800
1 000
800
1 000
800
1 100
900
1 100
900
1 200
1 000
1 200
1 100
1 300
1 200
1 400
1 300
1 500
1 400
1 600
1 500
1 700
1 600
1 800
1 700
1 900
1 800
2 000
1 800
2 100
1 900
2 100
2 000
2 200
2 100
2 300
2 200
2 400
2 300
2 500
2 400
2 600
2 500
2 700
2 600
2 800
1 800
2 000
1 800
2 100
1 900
2 100
2 000
2 200
2 100
2 300
2 700
2 900
2 800
3 000
2 900
3 100
3 000
3 200
3 000
3 300
3 200
3 400
3 400
3 600
3 600
3 800
3 900
4 100
4 100
4 300
4 400
4 600
4 900
5 000
5 000
5 000
NALS
1 200
1 000
1 200
1 200
1 300
1 300
1 300
1 400
1 400
1 500
1 600
1 700
1 800
1 900
2 000
2 100
2 200
2 300
2 400
2 400
2 500
2 600
2 700
2 800
2 900
3 000
2 200
2 300
2 400
2 400
2 500
3 100
3 200
3 300
3 400
3 500
3 600
3 800
4 000
4 300
4 500
4 900
5 000
5 000
1st March 2015
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Table 6.A: CAT I, APV, NPA - aeroplanes
Minimum and maximum applicable RVR/CMV (lower and upper cut-off limits)
Facility/conditions
RVR/CMV (m)
ILS, MLS, GLS, PAR, NSS/SBAS,
GNSS/VNAV
NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC,
LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV with a
procedure that fulfils the criteria in AMC4
CAT.OP.MPA.110, (a)(1)(ii)
Min
Max
Min
Aeroplane category
B
C
D
According to Table 5
1 500
1 500
2 400
2 400
750
750
750
750
Max
1 500
Min
For NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME,
LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV:
- not fulfilling the criteria in in AMC4
CAT.OP.MPA.110, (a)(1)(ii), or
- with a DH or MDH ≥1 200 ft
Max
A
1 500
2 400
2 400
1 000
1 000
1 200
1 200
According to Table 5 if flown using
the CDFA technique, otherwise an
add-on of 200 m for Category A and
B aeroplanes and 400 m for Category
C and D aeroplanes applies to the
values in Table 5 but not to result in a
value exceeding 5 000 m.
AMC6 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
DETERMINATION OF RVR/CMV/VIS MINIMA FOR NPA, CAT I — HELICOPTERS
(a) Helicopters
The RVR/CMV/VIS minima for NPA, APV and CAT I operations should be determined as follows:
(1) For NPA operations operated in performance class 1 (PC1) or performance class 2 (PC2), the
minima specified in Table 6.1.H should apply:
(i) where the missed approach point is within ½ NM of the landing threshold, the approach
minima specified for FALS may be used regardless of the length of approach lights
available. However, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, end lights and FATO/runway
markings are still required;
(ii) for night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the FATO/runway and any
obstacles; and
(iii) for single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR is 800 m or the minima in Table 6.1.H,
whichever is higher.
(2) For CAT I operations operated in PC1 or PC2, the minima specified in Table 6.2.H should
apply:
(i) for night operations, ground light should be available to illuminate the FATO/runway and any
obstacles;
(ii) for single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR/VIS should be calculated in accordance with the
following additional criteria:
(A) an RVR of less than 800 m should not be used except when using a suitable autopilot coupled
to an ILS, MLS or GLS, in which case normal minima apply; and
(B) the DH applied should not be less than 1.25 times the minimum use height for the autopilot.
Table 6.1.H: Onshore NPA minima
MDH (ft) *
250 – 299
300 – 449
450 and above
FALS
600
800
1 000
Facilities vs. RVR/CMV (m) **, ***
IALS
BALS
800
1 000
1 000
1 000
1 000
1 000
NALS
1 000
1 000
1 000
*: The MDH refers to the initial calculation of MDH. When selecting the associated RVR, there is no need to
take account of a rounding up to the nearest 10 ft, which may be done for operational purposes, e.g.
conversion to MDA.
**: The tables are only applicable to conventional approaches with a nominal descent slope of not greater
than 4°. Greater descent slopes will usually require that visual glide slope guidance (e.g. precision approach
path indicator (PAPI)) is also visible at the MDH.
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***: FALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 720 m or more of high intensity/medium intensity
(HI/MI) approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights.
Lights to be on.
IALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 420 - 719 m of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge
lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.
BALS comprise FATO/runway markings, <420 m of HI/MI approach lights, any length of low intensity
(LI) approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to
be on.
NALS comprise FATO/runway markings, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, FATO/runway end
lights or no lights at all.
Table 6.2.H: Onshore CAT I minima
DH (ft) *
200
201 – 250
251 – 300
301 and above
FALS
500
550
600
750
Facilities vs. RVR/CMV (m) **, ***
IALS
BALS
600
700
650
750
700
800
800
900
NALS
1 000
1 000
1 000
1 000
*:
The DH refers to the initial calculation of DH. When selecting the associated RVR, there is no need to
take account of a rounding up to the nearest 10 ft, which may be done for operational purposes, e.g.
conversion to DA.
**: The table is applicable to conventional approaches with a glide slope up to and including 4°.
***: FALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 720 m or more of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway
edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.
IALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 420 - 719 m of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge
lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.
BALS comprise FATO/runway markings, <420 m of HI/MI approach lights, any length of LI
approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to
be on.
NALS comprise FATO/runway markings, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, FATO/runway end
lights or no lights at all.
AMC7 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
CIRCLING OPERATIONS - AEROPLANES
(a) Circling minima
The following standards should apply for establishing circling minima for operations with aeroplanes:
(1) the MDH for circling operation should not be lower than the highest of:
(i) the published circling OCH for the aeroplane category;
(ii) the minimum circling height derived from Table 7; or
(iii) the DH/MDH of the preceding instrument approach procedure;
(2) the MDA for circling should be calculated by adding the published aerodrome elevation to the
MDH, as determined by (a)(1); and
(3) the minimum visibility for circling should be the highest of:
(i) the circling visibility for the aeroplane cat egory, if published;
(ii) the minimum visibility derived from Table 7; or
(iii) the RVR/CMV derived from Tables 5 and 6.A for the preceding instrument approach
procedure.
Table 7: Circling - aeroplanes
MDH and minimum visib ility vs. aeroplane category
MDH (ft)
Minimum meteorological visibility (m)
Revision No: Original
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A
400
1 500
Aeroplane category
B
C
500
600
1 600
2 400
D
700
3 600
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(b) Conduct of flight – general:
(1) the MDH and OCH included in the procedure are referenced to aerodrome elevation;
(2) the MDA is referenced to mean sea level;
(3) for these procedures, the applicable visibility is the meteorological visibility; and
(4) operators should provide tabular guidance of the relationship between height above threshold and
the in-flight visibility required to obtain and sustain visual contact during the circling manoeuvre.
(c) Instrument approach followed by visual manoeuvring (circling) without prescribed tracks
(1) When the aeroplane is on the initial instrument approach, before visual reference is stabilised,
but not below MDA/H, the aeroplane should follow the corresponding instrument approach
procedure until the appropriate instrument MAPt is reached.
(2) At the beginning of the level flight phase at or above the MDA/H, the instrument approach
track determined by radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS should be maintained
until the pilot:
(i) estimates that, in all probability, visual contact with the runway of intended landing or the
runway environment will be maintained during the entire circling procedure;
(ii) estimates that the aeroplane is within the circling area before commencing circling; and
(iii) is able to determine the aeroplane’s position in relation to the runway of intended landing with
the aid of the appropriate external references.
(3) When reaching the published instrument MAPt and the conditions stipulated in (c)(2) are unable to be
established by the pilot, a missed approach should be carried out in accordance with that instrument
approach procedure.
(4) After the aeroplane has left the track of the initial instrument approach, the flight phase
outbound from the runway should be limited to an appropriate distance, which is required to
align the aeroplane onto the final approach. Such manoeuvres should be conducted to enable the
aeroplane:
(i) to attain a controlled and stable descent path to the intended landing runway; and
(ii) to remain within the circling area and in such way that visual contact with the runway of
intended landing or runway environment is maintained at all times.
(5) Flight manoeuvres should be carried out at an altitude/height that is not less than the circling MDA/H.
(6) Descent below MDA/H should not be initiated until the threshold of the runway to be used has been
appropriately identified. The aeroplane should be in a position to continue with a normal rate of
descent and land within the touchdown zone.
(d) Instrument approach followed by a visual manoeuvring (circling) with prescribed track
(1) The aeroplane should remain on the initial instrument approach procedure until one of the following is
reached:
(i) the prescribed divergence point to commence circling on the prescribed track; or
(ii) the MAPt.
(2) The aeroplane should be established on the instrument approach track determined by the radio
navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS in level flight at or above the MDA/H at or by the
circling manoeuvre divergence point.
(3) If the divergence point is reached before the required visual reference is acquired, a missed
approach should be initiated not later than the MAPt and completed in accordance with the
instrument approach procedure.
(4) When commencing the prescribed circling manoeuvre at the published divergence point, the subsequent
manoeuvres should be conducted to comply with the published routing and published heights/altitudes.
(5) Unless otherwise specified, once the aeroplane is established on the prescribed track(s), the
published visual reference does not need to be maintained unless:
(i) required by the State of the aerodrome; or
(ii) the circling MAPt (if published) is reached.
(6) If the prescribed circling manoeuvre has a published MAPt and the required visual reference
has not been obtained by that point, a missed approach should be executed in accordance with
(e)(2) and (e)(3).
(7) Subsequent further descent below MDA/H should only commence when the required visual reference
has been obtained.
(8) Unless otherwise specified in the procedure, final descent should not be commenced from
MDA/H until the threshold of the intended landing runway has been identified and the
aeroplane is in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent to land within the touchdown
zone.
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(e) Missed approach
(1) Missed approach during the instrument procedure prior to circling:
(i) if the missed approach procedure is required to be flown when the aeroplane is positioned
on the instrument approach track defined by radio-navigation aids RNAV, RNP, or ILS, MLS,
and before commencing the circling manoeuvre, the published missed approach for the
instrument approach should be followed; or
(ii) if the instrument approach procedure is carried out with the aid of an ILS, MLS or an stabilised
approach (SAp), the MAPt associated with an ILS, MLS procedure without glide path (GP-out
procedure) or the SAp, where applicable, should be used.
(2) If a prescribed missed approach is published for the circling manoeuvre, this overrides the manoeuvres
prescribed below.
(3) If visual reference is lost while circling to land after the aeroplane has departed from the initial
instrument approach track, the missed approach specified for that particular instrument approach
should be followed. It is expected that the pilot will make an initial climbing turn toward the
intended landing runway to a position overhead the aerodrome where the pilot will establish the
aeroplane in a climb on the instrument missed approach segment.
(4) The aeroplane should not leave the visual manoeuvring (circling) area, which is obstacle protected,
unless:
(i) established on the appropriate missed approach procedure; or
(ii) at minimum sector altitude (MSA).
(5) All turns should be made in the same direction and the aeroplane should remain within the
circling protected area while climbing either:
(i) to the altitude assigned to any published circling missed approach manoeuvre if applicable;
(ii) to the altitude assigned to the missed approach of the initial instrument approach;
(iii) to the MSA;
(iv) to the minimum holding altitude (MHA) applicable for transition to a holding facility or fix,
or continue to climb to an MSA; or
(v) as directed by ATS.
When the missed approach procedure is commenced on the ‘downwind’ leg of the circling manoeuvre,
an ‘S’ turn ma y be undertaken to align the aeroplane on the initial instrument approach missed
approach path, provided the aeroplane remains within the protected circling area . The commander
should be responsible for ensuring adequate terrain clearance during the above-stipulated manoeuvres,
particularly during the execution of a missed approach initiated by ATS.
(6) Because the circling manoeuvre may be accomplished in more than one direction, different
patterns will be required to establish the aeroplane on the prescribed missed approach course
depending on its position at the time visual reference is lost. In particular, all turns are to be in
the prescribed direction if this is restricted, e.g. to the west/east (left or right hand) to remain
within the protected circling area.
(7) If a missed approach procedure is published for a particular runway onto which the aeroplane is
conducting a circling approach and the aeroplane has commenced a manoeuvre to align with the
runway, the missed approach for this direction may be accomplished. The ATS unit should be
informed of the intention to fly the published missed approach procedure for that particular
runway.
(8) The commander should advise ATS when any missed approach procedure has been commenced, the
height/altitude the aeroplane is climbing to and the position the aeroplane is proceeding towards
and / or heading the aeroplane is established on.
AMC8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
ONSHOR E CIRCLING OPERATIONS - HELICOPTERS
For circling the specified MDH should not be less than 250 ft, and the meteorological visibility not less
than 800 m.
AMC9 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
VISUAL APPROACH OPERATIONS
The operator should not use an RVR of less than 800 m for a visual approach operation.
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AMC10 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
CONVERSION OF REPORTED METEOROLOGICAL VISIBILITY TO RVR
(a) A conversion from meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV should not be used:
(1) when reported RVR is available;
(2) for calculating take-off minima; and
(3) for any RVR minima less than 800 m.
(b) If the RVR is reported as being above the maximum value assessed by the aerodrome operator, e.g.
‘RVR more than 1 500 m’, it should not be considered as a reported value for (a)(1).
(c) When converting meteorological visibility to RVR in circumstances other than those in (a) , the conversion
factors specified in Table 8 should be used.
Table 8: Conversion of reported meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV
RVR/CMV = reported meteorological visibility x
Day
Night
1.5
2.0
1.0
1.5
1.0
not applicable
Light elements in operation
HI approach and runway lights
Any type of light installation other than above
No lights
AMC11 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED GROUND
EQUIPMENT
(a) General
These instructions are intended for use both pre-flight and in-flight. It is however not expected that the
commander would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of
ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the commander’s
discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach
should be considered as described in Table 9, and the approach may have to be abandoned.
(b) Conditions applicable to Tables 9:
(1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than indicated in Table 9 should not be acceptable;
(2) deficiencies of approach and runway/FATO lights are treated separately; and
(3) failures other than ILS, MLS affect RVR only and not DH.
Table 9: Failed or downgraded equipment – effect on landing minima Operations without a low visibility
op erations (LVO) approval
Failed or downgraded equipment
ILS/MLS stand-by transmitter
CAT I
No effect
Effect on landing minima
APV, NPA
Outer Marker
Not allowed except
if replaced by
height check at 1
000 ft
Middle marker
RVR Assessment Systems
Approach lights
Approach lights except the last 210 m
Approach lights except the last 420 m
No effect
No effect
Minima as for NALS
Minima as for BALS
Minima as for IALS
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APV – not applicable
NPA with FAF: no effect unless used
as FAF
If the FAF cannot be identified (e.g.
no method available for timing of
descent), non-precision operations
cannot be conducted
No effect unless used as MAPt
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Standby power for approach lights
Edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights
Centreline lights
Centreline lights spacing increased to 30 m
Touchdown zone lights
Taxiway lighting system
No effect
Day: no effect; Night: not allowed
No effect if F/D,
HUDLS or autoNo effect
land otherwise
RVR 750 m
No effect
No effect if F/D,
HUDLS or autoNo effect
land; otherwise
RVR 750 m
No effect
AMC12 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
VFR OPERATIONS WITH OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
For the establishment of VFR operation minima, the operator may apply the VFR operating minima specified in
Part-SERA. Where necessary, the operator may specify in the OM additional conditions for the applicability of
such minima taking into account such factors as radio coverage, terrain, nature of sites for take-off and landing,
flight conditions and ATS capacity.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
ONSHOR E AERODROME DEPARTURE PROCEDURES – HELICOPTERS
The cloud base and visibility should be such as to allow the helicopter to be clear of cloud at take-off decision
point (TDP), and for the pilot flying to remain in sight of the surface until reaching the minimum speed for
flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) given in the AFM.
GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
APPROAC H LIGHTING SYSTEMS – ICAO, FAA
The following table provides a comparison of ICAO and FAA specifications.
Table 1: Approach lighting systems
Class of lighting
facility
ICAO: CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥ 900 m) distance coded centreline, Barrette
centreline
FAA: ALSF1, ALSF2, SSALR, MALSR, high or medium intensity and/or flashing lights,
720 m or more
ICAO: simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420 – 719 m) single source, Barrette
FAA: MALSF, MALS, SALS/SALSF, SSALF, SSALS, high or medium intensity and/or
flashing lights, 420 – 719 m
Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS 210-419 m)
FAA: ODALS, high or medium intensity or flashing lights 210 - 419 m
Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS <210 m) or no approach lights
FALS
IALS
BALS
NALS
Note:
Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights
ALSF:
MALS:
MALSF:
MALSR:
ODALS:
SALS:
SALSF:
SSALF:
SSALR:
SSALS:
approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights;
medium intensity approach lighting system;
medium intensity approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights;
medium intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights;
omnidirectional approach lighting system;
simple approach lighting system;
short approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights;
simplified short approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights;
simplified short approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights;
simplified short approach lighting system.
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GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.110 Aerodrome operating minima
SBAS OPERATIONS
(a) SBAS CAT I operations with a DH of 200 ft depend on an SBAS system approved for operations
down to a DH of 200 ft.
(b) The following systems are in operational use or in a planning phase:
(1) European geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS) operational in Europe;
(2) wide area augmentation system (WAAS) operational in the USA;
(3) multi-functional satellite augmentation system (MSAS) operational in Japan;
(4) system of differential correction and monitoring (SDCM) planned by Russia;
(5) GPS aided geo augmented navigation (GAGAN) system, planned by India; and
(6) satellite navigation augmentation system (SNAS), planned by China.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.110 (a) Aerodrome operating minima
INCREMENTS SPECIFIED BY MCAA
Additional increments to the published minima may be specified by MCAA to take into account
certain operations, such as downwind approaches and single-pilot operations.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA)
(a) Flight techniques:
(1) The CDFA technique should ensure that an approach can be flown on the desired vertical path
and track in a stabilised manner, without significant vertical path changes during the final
segment descent to the runway. This technique applies to an approach with no vertical guidance
and controls the descent path until the DA/DH. This descent path can be either:
(i) a recommended descent rate, based on estimated ground speed;
(ii) a descent path depicted on the approach chart; or
(iii) a descent path coded in the flight management system in accordance with the approach chart
descent path.
(2) The operator should either provide charts which depict the appropriate cross check
altitudes/heights with the corresponding appropriate range information, or such information should be
calculated and provided to the flight crew in an appropriate and usable format. Generally, the MAPt is
published on the cha rt.
(3) The approach should be flown as an SAp.
(4) The required descent path should be flown to the DA/H, observing any step-down crossing altitudes if
applicable.
(5) This DA/H should take into account any add-on to the published minima as identified by the
opera tor’s management system and should be specified in the OM (aerodrome operating minima).
(6) During the descent the pilot monitoring should announce crossing altitudes as published fixes and
other designated points are crossed, giving the appropriate altitude or height for the appropriate
range as depicted on the chart. The pilot flying should promptly adjust the rate of descent as
appropriate.
(7) The operator should establish a procedure to ensure that an appropriate callout is made when
the aeroplane is approaching DA/H. If the required visual references are not established at DA/H,
the missed approach procedure is to be executed promptly.
(8) The descent path should ensure that little or no adjustment of attitude or thrust/power is needed
after the DA/H to continue the landing in the visual segment.
(9) The missed approach should be initiated no later than reaching the MAPt or at the DA/H, whichever
comes first. The lateral part of the missed approach should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise
stated on the approach chart.
(b) Flight techniques conditions:
(1) The approach should be considered to be fully stabilised when the aeroplane is:
(i) tracking on the required approach path and profile;
(ii) in the required configuration and attitude;
(iii) flying with the required rate of descent and speed; and
(iv) flying with the appropriate thrust/power and trim.
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(2) The aeroplane is considered established on the required approach path at the appropriate energy for
stable flight using the CDFA technique when:
(i) it is tracking on the required approach path with the correct track set, approach aids tuned and
identified as appropriate to the approach type flown and on the required vertical profile; and
(ii) it is at the appropriate attitude and speed for the required target rate of descent (ROD) with the
appropriate thrust/power and trim.
(3) Stabilisation during any straight-in approach without visual reference to the ground should be
achieved at the latest when passing 1 000 ft above runway threshold elevation. For approaches with a
designated vertical profile applying the CDFA technique, a later stabilisation in speed may be
acceptable if higher than normal approach speeds are required by ATC procedures or allowed by the
OM. Stabilisation should, however, be achieved not later than 500 ft above runway threshold
elevation.
(4) For approaches where the pilot has visual reference with the ground, stabilisation should be
achieved not later than 500 ft above aerodrome elevation. However, the aeroplane should be
stabilised when passing 1 000 ft above runway threshold elevation; in the case of circling
approaches flown after a CDFA, the aircraft should be stabilised in the circling configuration not later
than passing 1 000 ft above the runway elevation.
(5) To ensure that the approach can be flown in a stabilised manner, the bank angle, rate of
descent and thrust/power management should meet the following performances:
(i) The bank angle should be less than 30 degrees.
(ii) The target rate of descent (ROD) should not exceed 1 000 fpm and the ROD deviations should not
exceed ± 300 fpm, except under exceptional circumstances which have been anticipated and
briefed prior to commencing the approach; for example, a strong tailwind. Zero ROD may be
used when the descent path needs to be regained from below the profile. The target ROD may
need to be initiated prior to reaching the required descent point, typically 0.3 NM before the
descent point, dependent upon ground speed, which may vary for each type/class of
aeroplane.
(iii) The limits of thrust/power and the appropriate range should be specified in the OM Part B or
equivalent document.
(iv) The optimum angle for the approach slope is 3 and should not exceed 4.5.
(v) The CDFA technique should be applied only to approach procedures based on NDB,
NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV and fulfil the
following criteria:
(A) the final approach track off-set = 5 except for Category A and B aeroplanes, where the
approach-track off-set is = 15 ; and
(B) a FAF, or another appropriate fix, e.g., final approach point, where descent initiated is
available; and
(C) the distance from the FAF or another appropriate fix to the threshold (THR) is less
than or equal to 8 NM in the case of timing; or
(D) the distance to the THR is available by FMS/GNSS or DME; or
(E) the minimum final-segment of the designated constant angle approach path should not be
less than 3 NM from the THR unless approved by the authority.
(7) The CDFA techniques support a common method for the implementation of flight-directorguided or auto-coupled RNAV approaches.
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
NPA OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPLYING THE CDFA TECHNIQUE
(a) In case the CDFA technique is not used the approach should be flown to an altitude/height at or
above the MDA/H where a level flight segment at or above MDA/H may be flown to the MAPt.
(b) Even when the approach procedure is flown without the CDFA technique the relevant procedures
for ensuring a controlled and stable path to MDA/H should be followed.
(c) In case the CDFA technique is not used when flying an approach, the operator should implement
procedures to ensure that early descent to the MDA/H will not result in a subsequent flight below
MDA/H without adequate visual reference. These procedures could include:
(1) awareness of radio altimeter information with reference to the approach profile;
(2) terrain awareness warning system (TAWS);
(3) limitation of rate of descent;
(4) limitation of the number of repeated approaches;
(5) safeguards against too early descents with prolonged flight at MDA/H; and
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(6) specification of visual requirements for the descent from the MDA/H.
(d) In case the CDFA technique is not used and when the MDA/H is high, it may be appropriate to
make an early descent to MDA/H with appropriate safeguards such as the application of a significantly
higher RVR/VIS.
(e) The procedures that are flown with level flight at/or above MDA/H should be listed in the OM.
(f) Operators should categorise aerodromes where there are approaches that require level flight at/or
above MDA/H as B and C. Such aerodrome categorisation will depend upon the operator’s
experience, operational exposure, training programme(s) and flight crew qualification(s).
AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS AND TRAINING
(a) The operator should establish procedures and instructions for flying approaches using the CDFA technique
and not using it. These procedures should be included in the OM and should include the duties of the flight
crew during the conduct of such operations.
(b) The operator should at least specify in the OM the maximum ROD for each aeroplane type/class
operated and the required visual reference to continue the approach below:
(1) the DA/H, when applying the CDFA technique; and
(2) the MDA/H, when not applying the CDFA technique.
(c) The operator should establish procedures which prohibit level flight at MDA/H without the flight
crew having obtained the required visual references. It is not the intention to prohibit level flight at
MDA/H when conducting a circling approach, which does not come within the definition of the CDFA
technique.
(d) The operator should provide the flight crew with unambiguous details of the technique used (CDFA
or not). The corresponding relevant minima should include:
(1) type of decision, whether DA/H or MDA/H;
(2) MAPt as applicable; and
(3) appropriate RVR/VIS for the approach operation and aeroplane category.
(e) Training
(1) Prior to using the CDFA technique, each flight crew member should undertake appropriate training
and checking as required by Subpart FC of Annex III (ORO.FC). The operator’s proficiency
check should include at least one approach to a landing or missed approach as appropriate
using the CDFA technique or not. The approach should be operated to the lowest appropriate DA/H
or MDA/H, a s appropriate; and, if conducted in a FSTD, the approach should be operated to
the lowest approved RVR. The approach is not in addition to any manoeuvre currently required by
either Part-FCL or Part-CAT. The provision may be fulfilled by undertaking any currently required
approach, engine out or otherwise, other than a precision approach (PA), whilst using the CDFA
technique.
(2) The policy for the esta blishment of constant predetermined vertical path and approach stability is
to be enforced both during initial and recurrent pilot training and checking. The relevant training
procedures and instructions should be documented in the operations manual.
(3) The training should emphasise the need to establish and facilitate joint crew procedures and crew
resource management (CRM) to enable accurate descent path control and the provision to establish the
aeroplane in a stable condition as required by the operator’s operational procedures.
(4) During training, emphasis should be placed on the flight crew’s need to:
(i) maintain situational awareness at all times, in particular with reference to the required vertical and
horizontal profile;
(ii) ensure good communication channels throughout the approach;
(iii) ensure accurate descent-path control particularly during any manually-flown descent phase. The
monitoring pilot should facilitate good flight path control by:
(A) communicating any altitude/height crosschecks prior to the actual passing of the
range/altitude or height crosscheck;
(B) prompting, as appropriate, changes to the target ROD; and
(C) monitoring flight path control below DA/MDA;
(iv) understand the actions to be taken if the MAPt is reached prior to the MDA/H;
(v) ensure that the decision for a missed approach is taken no later than when reaching the DA/H or
MDA/H;
(vi) ensure that prompt action for a missed approach is taken immediately when reaching DA/H if
the required visual reference has not been obtained as there may be no obstacle protection
if the missed approach procedure manoeuvre is delayed;
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(vii) understand the significance of using the CDFA technique to a DA/H with an associated
MAPt and the implications of early missed approach manoeuvres; and
(viii) understand the possible loss of the required visual reference due to pitch-change/climb
when not using the CDFA technique for aeroplane types or classes that require a late change
of configuration and/or speed to ensure the aeroplane is in the appropriate landing
configuration.
(5) Additional specific training when not using the CDFA technique with level flight at or above MDA/H
(i) The training should detail:
(A) the need to facilitate CRM with appropriate flight crew communication in particular;
(B) the additional known safety risks associated with the ‘dive -and-drive’ approach
philosophy which may be associated with non-CDFA;
(C) the use of DA/H during approaches flown using the CDFA technique;
(D) the significance of the MDA/H and the MAPt where appropriate;
(E) the actions to be taken at the MAPt and the need to ensure that the aeroplane remains in a
stable condition and on the nominal and appropriate vertical profile until the landing;
(F) the reasons for increased RVR/Visibility minima when compared to the application of
CDFA;
(G) the possible increased obstacle infringement risk when undertaking level flight at
MDA/H without the required visual references;
(H) the need to accomplish a prompt missed approach manoeuvre if the required visual
reference is lost;
(I) the increased risk of an unstable final approach and an associated unsafe landing if a
rushed approach is attempted either from:
(a) inappropriate and close-in acquisition of the required visual reference; or
(b) unstable aeroplane energy and or flight path control; and
(J) the increased risk of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.115 Approach flight technique - aeroplanes
CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA)
(a) Introduction
(1) Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is a major hazard in aviation. Most CFIT accidents occur in the
final approach segment of non-precision approaches; the use of stabilised-approach criteria on a
continuous descent with a constant, predetermined vertical path is seen as a major improvement
in safety during the conduct of such approaches. Operators should ensure that the following
techniques are adopted as widely as possible, for all approaches.
(2) The elimination of level flight segments at MDA close to the ground during approaches, and the
avoidance of major changes i n attitude and power/thrust close to the runway that can destabilise
approaches, are seen as ways to reduce operational risks significantly.
(3) The term CDFA has been selected to cover a flight technique for any type of NPA operation.
(4) The advantages of CDFA are as follows:
(i) the technique enhances safe approach operations by the utilisation of standard operating
practices;
(ii) the technique is similar to that used when flying an ILS approach, including when
executing the missed approach and the associated missed approach procedure manoeuvre;
(iii) the aeroplane attitude may enable better acquisition of visual cues;
(iv) the technique may reduce pilot workload;
(v) the approach profile is fuel-efficient;
(vi) the approach profile affords reduced noise levels;
(vii) the technique affords procedural integration with APV operations; and
(viii) when used and the approach is flown in a stabilised manner, CDFA is the safest approach
technique for all NPA operations.
(b) CDFA
(1) Continuous descent final approach is defined in Annex I to this Regulation.
(2) An approach is only suitable for application of a CDFA technique when it is flown along a
nominal vertical profile: a nominal vertical profile is not forming part of the approach procedure
design, but can be flown as a continuous descent. The nominal vertical profile information may be
published or displayed on the approach chart to the pilot by depicting the nominal slope or
range/distance vs. height. Approaches with a nominal vertical profile are considered to be:
(i) NDB, NDB/DME;
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(ii) VOR, VOR/DME;
(iii) LOC, LOC/DME;
(iv) VDF, SRA; or
(v) GNSS/LNAV.
(3) Stabilised approach (SAp) is defined in Annex I to this Regulation.
(i) The control of the descent path is not the only consideration when using the CDFA
technique. Control of the aeroplane’s configuration and energy is also vital to the safe conduct of
an approach.
(ii) The control of the flight path, described above as one of the specifications for conducting
an SAp, should not be confused with the path specifications for using the CDFA technique.
The predetermined path specification for conducting an SAp are established by the operator
and published in the operations manual part B.
(iii) The predetermined approach slope specifications for applying the CDFA technique are established
by the following:
(A) the published ‘nominal’ slope information when the approach has a nominal vertical profile;
and
(B) the designated final-approach segment minimum of 3 NM, and maximum, when using
timing techniques, of 8 NM.
(iv) An SAp will never have any level segment of flight at DA/H or MDA/H as applicable. This
enhances safety by mandating a prompt missed approach procedure manoeuvre at DA/H or
MDA/H.
(v) An approach using the CDFA technique will always be flown as an SAp, since this is a
specification for applying CDFA. However, an SAp does not have to be flown using the
CDFA technique, for example a visual approach.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.120
GENERAL
Airborne radar approaches (ARAs) for overwater operations - helicopters
(a) Before commencing the final approach the commander should ensure that a clear path exists on the radar
screen for the final and missed approach segments. If lateral clearance from any obstacle will be less
than 1 NM, the commander should:
(1) approach to a nearby target structure and thereafter proceed visually to the destination structure;
or
(2) make the approach from another direction leading to a circling manoeuvre..
(b) The cloud ceiling should be sufficiently clear above the helideck to permit a safe landing.
(c) MDH should not be less than 50 ft above the elevation of the helideck.
(1) The MDH for an airborne radar approach should not be lower than:
(i) 200 ft by day; or
(ii) 300 ft by night.
(2) The MDH for an approach leading to a circling manoeuvre should not be lower than:
(i) 300 ft by day; or
(ii) 500 ft by night.
(d) MDA may only be used if the radio altimeter is unserviceable. The MDA should be a minimum of MDH
+200 ft and should be based on a calibrated barometer at the destination or on the lowest forecast
QNH for the region.
(e) The decision range should not be less than ¾ NM.
(f) The MDA/H for a single-pilot ARA should be 100 ft higher than that calculated using (c) and (d) above. The
decision range should not be less than 1 NM.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.120 Airborne radar approaches (ARAs) for overwater operations - helicopters
GENERAL
(a) General
(1) The helicopter ARA procedure may have as many as five separate segments.
These are the arrival, initial, intermediate, final and missed approach segments. In addition, the
specifications of the circling manoeuvre to a landing under visual conditions should be considered. The
individual approach segments can begin and end at designated fixes. However, the segments of an
ARA may often begin at specified points where no fixes are available.
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(2) The fixes, or points, are named to coincide with the associated segment. For example, the intermediate
segment begins at the intermediate fix (IF) and ends at the final approach fix (FAF). Where no
fix is available or appropriate, the segments begin and end at specified points; for example,
intermediate point (IP) and final approach point (FAP). The order in which this GM discusses
the segments is the order in which the pilot would fly them in a complete procedure: that is,
from the arrival through initial and intermediate to a final approach and, if necessary, the missed
approach.
(3) Only those segments that are required by local conditions applying at the time of the approach need be
included in a procedure. In constructing the procedure, the final approach track, which should be
orientated so a s to be substantially into wind should be identified first as it is the least flexible
and most critical of all the segments. When the origin and the orientation of the final approach
have been determined, the other necessary segments should be integrated with it to produce an
orderly manoeuvring pattern that does not generate an unacceptably high work-load for the flight crew.
(4) Examples of ARA procedures, vertical profile and missed approach procedures are contained in Figures
1 to 5.
(b) Obstacle environment
(1) Each segment of the ARA is located in an overwater area that has a flat surface at sea level.
However, due to the passage of large vessels which are not required to notify their presence, the
exact obstacle environment cannot be determined. As the largest vessels and structures are
known to reach elevations exceeding 500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL), the uncontrolled
offshore obstacle environment applying to the arrival, initial and intermediate approach segments can
reasonably be assumed to be capable of reaching to at least 500 ft AMSL. But, in the case of the
final approach and missed approach segments, specific areas are involved within which no radar
returns are allowed. In these areas the height of wave crests and the possibility that small obstacles
may be present that are not visible on radar results in an uncontrolled surface environment that
extends to an elevation of 50 ft AMSL.
(2) Under normal circumstances, the relationship between the approach procedure and the obstacle
environment is governed according to the concept that vertical separation is very easy to apply
during the arrival, initial and intermediate segments, while horizontal separation, which is much
more difficult to guarantee in an uncontrolled environment, is applied only in the final and
missed approach segments.
(c) Arrival segment
The arrival segment commences at the last en-route navigation fix, where the aircraft leaves the
helicopter route, and it ends either at the initial approach fix (IAF) or, if no course reversal, or similar
manoeuvre is required, it ends at the IF. Standard en-route obstacle clearance criteria should be applied
to the arrival segment.
(d) Initial approach segment
The initial approach segment is only required if a course reversal, race track, or arc procedure is necessary
to join the intermediate approach track. The segment commences at the IAF and on completion of the
manoeuvre ends at the IP. The minimum obstacle clearance (MOC) assigned to the initial approach
segment is 1 000 ft.
(e) Intermediate approach segment
The intermediate approach segment commences at the IP, or in the case of straight-in approaches,
where there is no initial approach segment, it commences at the IF. The segment ends at the FAP and
should not be less than 2 NM in length. The purpose of the intermediate segment is to align and prepare the
helicopter for the final approach. During the intermediate segment the helicopter should be lined up with
the final approach track, the speed should be stabilised, the destination should be identified on the
radar, and the final approach and missed approach areas should be identified and verified to be
clear of rada r returns. The MOC assigned to the intermediate segment is 500 ft.
(f) Final approach segment
(1) The final approach segment commences at the FAP and ends at the missed approach point
(MAPt). The final approach area, which should be identified on radar, takes the form of a corridor
between the FAP and the radar return of the destination. This corridor should not be less than 2 NM
wide in order that the projected track of the helicopter does not pass closer than 1 NM to the
obstacles lying outside the area.
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(2) On passing the FAP, the helicopter will descend below the intermediate approach altitude, and
follow a descent gradient which should not be steeper than 6.5 %. At this stage vertical separation
from the offshore obstacle environment will be lost. However, within the final approach area the
MDA/H will provide separation from the surface environment. Descent from 1 000 ft AMSL to 200
ft AMSL at a constant 6.5 % gradient will involve a horizontal distance of 2 NM. In order to
follow the guideline that the procedure should not generate an unacceptably high work-load for the
flight crew, the required actions of levelling at MDH, changing heading at the offset initiation
point (OIP), and turning away at MAPt should not be planned to occur at the same NM time
from the destination.
(3) During the final approach, compensation for drift should be applied and the heading which, if
maintained, would take the helicopter directly to the destination, should be identified. It follows
that, at an OIP located at a range of 1.5 NM, a heading change of 10° is likely to result in a track offset
of 15° at 1 NM, and the extended centreline of the new track can be expected to have a mean position
lying some 300 - 400 m to one side of the destination structure. The safety margin built in to
the 0.75 NM decision range (DR) is dependent upon the rate of closure with the destination.
Although the airspeed should be in the range 60 - 90 kt during the final approach, the ground
speed, after due allowance for wind velocity, should be no greater than 70 kt.
(g) Missed approach segment
(1) The missed approach segment commences at the MAPt and ends when the helicopter reaches
minimum en-route altitude. The missed approach manoeuvre is a ‘ turning missed approach’
which should be of not less than 30° and should not, normally, be greater than 45°. A turn away of
more than 45° does not reduce the collision risk factor any further, nor will it permit a closer
DR. However, turns of more than 45° may increase the risk of pilot disorientation and, by
inhibiting the rate of climb (especially in the case of an OEI missed approach procedure), may keep
the helicopter at an extremely low level for longer than is desirable.
(2) The missed approach area to be used should be identified and verified as a clear area on the
radar screen during the intermediate approach segment. The base of the missed approach area is a
sloping surface at 2.5 % gradient starting from MDH at the MAPt. The concept is that a helicopter
executing a turning missed approach will be protected by the horizontal boundaries of the missed
approach area until vertical separation of more than 130 ft is achieved between the base of the area, and
the offshore obstacle environment of 500 ft AMSL which prevails outside the area.
(3) A missed approach area, taking the form of a 45° sector orientated left or right of the final
approach track, originating from a point 5 NM short of the destination, and terminating on an
arc 3 NM beyond the destination, will normally satisfy the specifications of a 30° turning missed
approach.
(h) The required visual reference
The visual reference required is that the destination should be in view in order that a safe landing may be
carried out.
(i) Radar equipment
During the ARA procedure, colour mapping radar equipment with a 120° sector scan and 2.5 NM
range scale selected, may result in dynamic errors of the following order:
(1) bearing/tracking error ±4.5° with 95 % accuracy;
(2) mean ranging error -250 m; or
(3) random ranging error ±250 m with 95 % accuracy.
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Figure 1: Arc procedure
Figure 2: Base turn procedure – direct approach
Figure 3: Holding pattern & race track procedure
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Figure 4: Vertical profile
Figure 5: Missed approach area left & right
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.130 Noise abatement procedures - aeroplanes
NADP DESIGN
(a) For each aeroplane type two departure procedures should be defined, in accordance with ICAO Doc. 8168
(Procedures for Air Navigation Services, ‘PANS-OPS’), Volume I:
(1) noise abatement departure procedure one (NADP 1), designed to meet the close-in noise
abatement objective; and
(2) noise abatement departure procedure two (NADP 2), designed to meet the distant noise
abatement objective.
(b) For each type of NADP (1 and 2), a single climb profile should be specified for use at all aerodromes,
which is associated with a single sequence of actions. The NADP 1 and NADP 2 profiles may be
identical.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.130 Noise abatement procedures - aeroplanes
TERMINOLOGY
(a) ‘Climb profile’ means in this context the vertical path of the NADP as it results from the pilot’s actions
(engine power reduction, acceleration, slats/flaps retraction).
(b) ‘Sequence of actions’ means the order in which these pilot’s actions are done and their timing.
GENERAL
(c) The rule addresses only the vertical profile of the departure procedure. Lateral track has to comply
with the standard instrument departure (SID).
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EXAMPLE
(d) For a given aeroplane type, when establishing the distant NADP, the operator should choose either to
reduce power first and then accelerate, or to accelerate first and then wait until slats/flaps are retracted
before reducing power. The two methods constitute two different sequences of actions.
(e) For an aeroplane type, each of the two departure climb profiles may be defined by one sequence of
actions (one for close-in, one for distant) and two above aerodrome level (AAL) altitudes/heights.
These are:
(1) the altitude of the first pilot’s action (generally power reduction with or without acceleration).
This altitude should not be less than 800 ft AAL; or
(2) the altitude of the end of the noise abatement procedure. This altitude should usually not be more than 3
000 ft AAL.
These two altitudes may be runway specific when the aeroplane flight management system (FMS) has the
relevant function which permits the crew to change thrust reduction and/or acceleration altitude/height.
If the aeroplane is not FMS equipped or the FMS is not fitted with the relevant function, two fixed
heights should be defined and used for each of the two NADPs.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.137 (b) Routes and areas of operation - helicopters
COASTAL TRANSIT
(a) General
(1) Helicopters operating overwater in performance class 3 have to have certain equipment fitted. This
equipment varies with the distance from land that the helicopter is expected to operate. The aim of
this GM is to discuss that distance, bring into focus what fit is required and to clarify the
operator's responsibility, when a decision is made to conduct coastal transit operations.
(2) In the case of operations north of 45N or south of 45S, the coastal corridor facility may or may
not be available in a particular state, as it is related to the State definition of open sea area as
described in the definition of hostile environment.
(3) Where the term ‘coastal transit’ is used, it means the conduct of operations overwater within the
coastal corridor in conditions where there is reasonable expectation that:
(i) the flight can be conducted safely in the conditions prevailing;
(ii) following an engine failure, a safe forced landing and successful evacuation can be achieved;
and
(iii) survival of the crew and passengers can be assured until rescue is effected.
(4) Coastal corridor is a variable distance from the coastline to a maximum distance corresponding
to three minutes’ flying at normal cruising speed.
(b) Establishing the width of the coastal corridor
(1) The maximum distance from land of coastal transit, is defined as the boundary of a corridor that
extends from the land, to a maximum distance of up to 3 minutes at normal cruising speed
(approximately 5 - 6 NM). Land in this context includes sustainable ice (see (i) to (iii) below)
and, where the coastal region includes islands, the surrounding waters may be included in the corridor
and aggregated with the coast and each other. Coastal transit need not be applied to inland
waterways, estuary crossing or river transit.
(i) In some areas, the formation of ice is such that it can be possible to land, or force land,
without hazard to the helicopter or occupants. Unless MCAA considers that operating to, or
over, such ice fields is unacceptable, the operator may regard the definition of the ‘land’ extends to
these areas.
(ii) The interpretation of the following rules may be conditional on (i) above:
- CAT.OP.MPA.137 (a) (2)
- CAT.IDE.H.290
- CAT.IDE.H.295
- CAT.IDE.H.300
- CAT.IDE.H.320.
(iii) In view of the fact that such featureless and flat white surfaces could present a hazard and could
lead to white-out conditions, the definition of land does not extend to flights over ice fields in the
following rules:
- CAT.IDE.H.125 (d)
- CAT.IDE.H.145.
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(2) The width of the corridor is variable from not safe to conduct operations in the conditions prevailing, to
the maximum of 3 minutes wide. A number of factors will, on the day, indicate if it can be used and how wide it can be. These factors will include but not be restricted to the following:
(i) meteorological conditions prevailing in the corridor;
(ii) instrument fit of the aircraft;
(iii) certification of the aircraft - particularly with regard to floats;
(iv) sea state;
(v) temperature of the water;
(vi) time to rescue; and
(vii) survival equipment carried.
(3) These can be broadly divided into three functional groups:
(i) those that meet the provisions for safe flying;
(ii) those that meet the provisions for a safe forced landing and evacuation; and
(iii) those that meet the provisions for survival following a forced landing and successful
evacuation.
(c) Provision for safe flying
(1) It is generally recognised that when flying out of sight of land in certain meteorological
conditions, such as occur in high pressure weather patterns (goldfish bowl - no horizon, light
winds and low visibility), the absence of a basic panel (and training) can lead to disorientation. In
addition, lack of depth perception in these conditions demands the use of a radio altimeter with
an audio voice warning as an added safety benefit - particularly when autorotation to the surface
of the water may be required.
(2) In these conditions the helicopter, without the required instruments and radio altimeter, should be
confined to a corridor in which the pilot can maintain reference using the visual cues on the land.
(d) Provision for a safe forced landing and evacuation
(1) Weather and sea state both affect the outcome of an autorotation following an engine failure. It is
recognised that the measurement of sea state is problematical and when assessing such conditions,
good judgement has to be exercised by the operator and the commander.
(2) Where floats have been certificated only for emergency use (and not for ditching), operations
should be limited to those sea states that meet the provisions for such use - where a safe
evacuation is possible.
Ditching certification requires compliance with a comprehensive number of requirements relating
to rotorcraft water entry, flotation and trim, occupant egress and occupant survival. Emergency
flotation systems, generally fitted to smaller CS-27 rotorcraft, are approved against a broad
specification that the equipment should perform its intended function and not hazard the rotorcraft or
its occupants. In practice, the most significant difference between ditching and emergency flotation
systems is substantiation of the water entry phase. Ditching rules call for water entry procedures and
techniques to be established and promulgated in the AFM. The fuselage/flotation equipment should
thereafter be shown to be able to withstand loads under defined water entry conditions which
relate to these procedures. For emergency flotation equipment, there is no specification to define
the water entry technique and no specific conditions defined for the structural substantiation.
(e) Provisions for survival
(1) Survival of crew members and passengers, following a successful autorotation and evacuation, is
dependent on the clothing worn, the equipment carried and worn, the temperature of the sea and the sea
state. Search and rescue (SAR) response/capability consistent with the anticipated exposure should be
available before the conditions in the corridor can be considered non-hostile.
(2) Coastal transit can be conducted (including north of 45N and south of 45S - when the definition of
open sea areas allows) providing the provisions of (c) and (d) are met, and the conditions for a
non-hostile coastal corridor are satisfied.
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AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.140 (d)
Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined
aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval
OPERATION OF NON-ETOPS COMPLIANT TWIN TURBO-JET AEROPLANES WITH MOPSC OF 19
OR LESS AND MCTOM LESS THAN 45 360 KG BETWEEN 120 AND 180 MINUTES FROM AN
ADEQUATE AERODROME
(a) For operations between 120 and 180 minutes, due account should be taken of the aeroplane’s design and
capabilities as outlined below and the operator’s experience related to such operations. Relevant
information should be included in the operations manual and the operator’s maintenance procedures.
The term ‘the aeroplane’s design’ in this AMC does not imply any additional type design approval
specifications beyond the applicable original type certificate (TC) specifications.
(b) Systems capability
Aeroplanes should be certified to CS-25 as appropriate or equivalent (e.g. FAR-25). With respect to the
capability of the aeroplane systems, the objective is that the aeroplane is capable of a safe diversion
from the maximum diversion distance with particular emphasis on operations with OEI or with degraded
system capability. To this end, the operator should give consideration to the capability of the
following systems to support such a diversion:
(1) Propulsion systems: the aeroplane engine should meet the applicable specifications prescribed in CS25 and CS-E or equivalent (e.g. FAR-25, FAR-E), concerning engine TC, installation and system
operation. In addition to the performance standards established by a competent authority at the time of
engine certification, the engines should comply with all subsequent mandatory safety standards
specified by a competent authority, including those necessary to maintain an acceptable level of
reliability. In addition, consideration should be given to the effects of extended duration singleengine operation (e.g. the effects of higher power demands such as bleed and electrical).
(2) Airframe systems: with respect to electrical power, three or more reliable as defined by CS-25 or
equivalent (e.g. FAR-25) and independent electrical power sources should be available, each of
which should be capable of providing power for all essential services which should at least
include the following:
(i) sufficient instruments for the flight crew providing, as a minimum, attitude, heading,
airspeed and altitude information;
(ii) appropriate pitot heating;
(iii) adequate navigation capability;
(iv) adequate radio communication and intercommunication capability;
(v) adequate flight deck and instrument lighting and emergency lighting;
(vi) adequate flight controls;
(vii) adequate engine controls and restart capability with critical type fuel (from the stand-point of
flame-out and restart capability) and with the aeroplane initially at the maximum relight altitude;
(viii) adequate engine instrumentation;
(ix) adequate fuel supply system capability including such fuel boost and fuel transfer functions
that may be necessary for extended duration single or dual-engine operation;
(x) such warnings, cautions and indications as are required for continued safe flight and landing;
(xi) fire protection (engines and auxiliary power unit (APU));
(xii) adequate ice protection including windshield de-icing; and
(xiii) adequate control of the flight crew compartment and cabin environment including heating
and pressurisation.
The equipment including avionics necessary for extended diversion times should have the ability
to operate acceptably following failures in the cooling system or electrical power systems.
For single-engine operations, the remaining power electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic should
continue to be available at levels necessary to permit continued safe flight and landing, and to
provide those services necessary for the overall safety of the passengers and crew. As a
minimum, following the failure of any two of the three electrical power sources, the remaining source
should be capable of providing power for all of the items necessary for the duration of any
diversion. If one or more of the required electrical power sources are provided by an APU, hydraulic
system or air driven generator/ram air turbine (ADG/RAT), the following criteria should apply as
appropriate:
(A) to ensure hydraulic power (hydraulic motor generator) reliability, it may be necessary to
provide two or more independent energy sources;
(B) the ADG/RAT, if fitted, should not require engine dependent power for deployment; and
(C) the APU should meet the criteria in (b)(3).
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(3) APU: the APU, if required for extended range operations, should be certified as an essential
APU and should meet the applicable CS-25 and CS-APU provisions or equivalent (e.g. FAR-25).
(4) Fuel supply system: consideration should include the capability of the fuel supply system to provide
sufficient fuel for the entire diversion taking account of aspects such as fuel boost and fuel transfer.
(c) Engine events and corrective action
(1) All engine events and operating hours should be reported by the operator to the airframe and engine
supplemental type certificate (STC) holders as well as to MCAA.
(2) These events should be evaluated by the operator in consultation with MCAA and with the
engine and airframe (S)TC holders. MCAA may consult the EASA to ensure that world wide data
are evaluated.
(3) Where statistical assessment alone is not applicable, e.g. where the fleet size or accumulated flight
hours are small, individual engine events should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
(4) The evaluation or statistical assessment, when available, may result in corrective action or the
application of operational restrictions.
(5) Engine events could include engine shutdowns, both on ground and in-flight, excluding normal training
events, including flameout, occurrences where the intended thrust level was not achieved or
where crew action was taken to reduce thrust below the normal level for whatever reason, and
unscheduled removals.
(6) Arrangements to ensure that all corrective actions required by MCAA are implemented.
(d) Maintenance
The maintenance programme in accordance with Regulation (MCAR-M) should be based upon
reliability programmes including, but not limited to, the following elements:
(1) engine oil consumption programmes: such programmes are intended to support engine condition
trend monitoring; and
(2) engine condition monitoring programme: a programme for each engine that monitors engine
performance parameters and trends of degradation that provides for maintenance actions to be
undertaken prior to significant performance loss or mechanical failure.
(e) Flight crew training
Flight crew training for this type of operation should include, in addition to the requirements of
Subpart FC of Annex III (ORO.FC), particular emphasis on the following:
(1) Fuel management: verifying required fuel on board prior to departure and monitoring fuel on
board en-route including calculation of fuel remaining. Procedures should provide for an
independent cross-check of fuel quantity indicators, e.g. fuel flow used to calculate fuel burned
compared to indicate fuel remaining. Confirmation that the fuel remaining is sufficient to satisfy the
critical fuel reserves.
(2) Procedures for single and multiple failures in-flight that may give rise to go/no-go and diversion
decisions - policy and guidelines to aid the flight crew in the diversion decision making process and the
need for constant awareness of the closest weather-permissible alternate aerodrome in terms of time.
(3) OEI performance data: drift down procedures and OEI service ceiling data.
(4) Weather reports and flight requirements: meteorological aerodrome reports (METARs) and
aerodrome forecast (TAF) reports and obtaining in-flight weather updates on the en-route
alternate (ERA), destination and destination alternate aerodromes. Consideration should also be
given to forecast winds including the accuracy of the forecast compared to actual wind
experienced during flight and meteorological conditions along the expected flight path at the OEI
cruising altitude and throughout the approach and landing.
(f) Pre-departure check
A pre-departure check, additional to the pre-flight inspection required by Part-M should be reflected
in the operations manual. Flight crew members who are responsible for the pre-departure check of an
aeroplane should be fully trained and competent to do it. The training programme required should cover all
relevant tasks with particular emphasis on checking required fluid levels.
(g) MEL
The MEL should take into account all items specified by the manufacturer relevant to operations in
accordance with this AMC.
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(h) Dispatch/flight planning rules
The operator’s dispatch rules should address the following:
(1) Fuel and oil supply: an aeroplane should not be dispatched on an extended range flight unless
it carries sufficient fuel and oil to comply with the applicable operational requirements and any
additional reserves determined in accordance with the following:
(i) Critical fuel scenario - the critical point is the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome
assuming a simultaneous failure of an engine and the pressurisation system. For those
aeroplanes that are type certificated to operate above flight level 450, the critical point is
the furthest point from an alternate aerodrome assuming an engine failure. The operator
should carry additional fuel for the worst case fuel burn condition (one engine vs. two
engines operating), if this is great er than the additional fuel calculated in accordance with the
fuel requirements in CAT.OP.MPA, as follows:
(A) fly from the critical point to an alternate aerodrome:
(a) at 10 000 ft;
(b) at 25 000 ft or the single-engine ceiling, whichever is lower, provided that all
occupants can be supplied with and use oxygen for the time required to fly from the
critical point to an alternate aerodrome; or
(c) at the single-engine ceiling, provided that the aeroplane is type certified to operate
above flight level 450;
(B) descend and hold at 1 500 ft for 15 minutes in international standard atmosphere (ISA)
conditions;
(C) descend to the applicable MDA/DH followed by a missed approach (taking into
account the complete missed approach procedure); followed by
(D) a normal approach and landing.
(ii) Ice protection: additional fuel used when operating in icing conditions (e.g. operation of ice
protection systems (engine/airframe as applicable)) and, when manufacturer’s data are
available, take account of ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces if icing conditions are likely
to be encountered during a diversion.
(iii) APU operation: if an APU has to be used to provide additional electrical power, consideration
should be given to the additional fuel required.
(2) Communication facilities: the availability of communications facilities in order to allow reliable
two-way voice communications between the aeroplane and the appropriate ATC unit at OEI cruise
altitudes.
(3) Aircraft technical log review to ensure proper MEL procedures, deferred items, and required
maintenance checks completed.
(4) ERA aerodrome(s): ensuring that ERA aerodromes are available for the intended route, within the
distance flown in 180 minutes based upon the OEI cruising speed which is a speed within the
certificated limits of the aeroplane, selected by the operator and approved by MCAA, confirming that,
based on the available meteorological information, the weather conditions at ERA aerodromes
are at or above the applicable minima for the period of time during which the aerodrome(s) may be
used.
Table 1: Planning minima
Approach facility
PA
NPA
Circling approach
Alternate aerodrome ceiling
DA/H +200 ft
Weather minima RVR/VIS
RVR/VIS +800 m
MDA/H +400 ft
RVR/VIS +1 500 m
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.140(c)
Maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined
aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval
ONE-ENGINE-INOPERATIVE (OEI) CRUISING SPEED
The OEI cruising speed is intended to be used solely for establishing the maximum distance from an
adequate aerodrome.
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AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.145 (a) Establishment of minimum flight altitudes
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
(a) The operator should take into account the following factors when establishing minimum flight
altitudes:
(1) the accuracy with which the position of the aircraft can be determined;
(2) the probable inaccuracies in the indications of the altimeters used;
(3) the characteristics of the terrain, such as sudden changes in the elevation, along the routes or in
the areas where operations are to be conducted;
(4) the probability of encountering unfavourable meteorological conditions, such as severe turbulence
and descending air currents; and
(5) possible inaccuracies in aeronautical charts.
(b) The operator should also consider:
(1) corrections for temperature and pressure variations from standard values;
(2) ATC requirements; and
(3) any foreseeable contingencies along the planned route.
AMC1.1 CAT.OP.MPA.145 (a) Establishment of minimum flight altitudes
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
This AMC provides another means of complying with the rule for VFR operations of other-than-complex
motor-powered aircraft by day, compared to that presented in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.145(a). The safety
objective should be satisfied if the operator ensures that operations are only conducted along such routes or
within such areas for which a safe terrain clearance can be maintained and take account of such factors as
temperature, terrain and unfavourable meteorological conditions.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.145 (a) Establishment of minimum flight altitudes
MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
(a) The following are examples of some of the methods available for calculating minimum flight
altitudes.
(b) KSS formula:
(1) Minimum obstacle clearance altitude (MOCA)
(i) MOCA is the sum of:
(A) the maximum terrain or obstacle elevation, whichever is higher; plus
(B) 1 000 ft for elevation up to and including 6 000 ft; or
(C) 2 000 ft for elevation exceeding 6 000 ft rounded up to the next 100 ft.
(ii) The lowest MOCA to be indicated is 2 000 ft.
(iii) From a VOR station, the corridor width is defined as a borderline starting 5 NM either side
of the VOR, diverging 4 from centreline until a width of 20 NM is reached at 70 NM out,
thence paralleling the centreline until 140 NM out, thence again diverging 4 until a
maximum width of 40 NM is reached at 280 NM out. Thereafter the width remains constant
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Corridor width from a VOR station
(iv) From a non-directional beacon (NDB), similarly, the corridor width is defined as a borderline
starting 5 NM either side of the NDB diverging 7 until a width of 20 NM is reached 40 NM out ,
thence paralleling the centreline until 80 NM out, thence again diverging 7 until a maximum
width of 60 NM is reached 245 NM out. Thereafter the width remains constant (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Corridor width from an NDB
(v) MOCA does not cover a ny overlapping of the corridor.
(2) Minimum off-route altitude (MORA). MORA is calculated for an area bounded by each or every
second LAT/LONG square on the route facility chart (RFC) / terminal approach chart (TAC) and is
based on a terrain clearance as follows:
(i) terrain with elevation up to 6 000 ft (2 000 m) – 1 000 ft above the highest terrain and
obstructions;
(ii) terrain with elevation above 6 000 ft (2 000 m) – 2 000 ft above the highest terrain and
obstructions.
(c) Jeppesen formula (see Figure 3)
(1) MORA is a minimum flight altitude computed by Jeppesen from current operational navigation
charts (ONCs) or world aeronautical charts (WACs). Two types of MORAs are charted which are:
(i) route MORAs e.g. 9800a; and
(ii) grid MORAs e.g. 98.
(2) Route MORA values are computed on the basis of an area extending 10 NM to either side of route
centreline and including a 10 NM radius beyond t he radio fix/reporting point or mileage break
defining the route segment.
(3) MORA values clear all terrain and man-made obstacles by 1 000 ft in areas where the highest
terrain elevation or obstacles are up to 5 000 ft. A clearance of 2 000 ft is provided above all
terrain or obstacles that are 5 001 ft and above.
(4) A grid MORA is an altitude computed by Jeppesen and the values are shown within each grid formed
by charted lines of latitude and longitude. Figures are shown in thousands and hundreds of feet
(omitting the last two digits so as to avoid chart congestion). Values followed by ± are believed not to
exceed the altitudes shown. The same clearance criteria as explained in (c)(3) apply.
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Figure 3: Jeppesen formula
(d) ATLAS formula
(1) Minimum en-route altitude (MEA). Calculation of the MEA is based on the elevation of the highest
point along the route segment concerned (extending from navigational aid to navigational aid)
within a distance on either side of track as specified in Table 1 below:
Table 1: Minimum safe en-route altitude
Segment length
Up to 100 NM
More than 100 NM
*:
**:
Distance either side of track
10 NM *
10 % of segment length up to a maximum of 60 NM
**
This distance may be reduced to 5 NM within terminal control areas (TMAs) where, due to the
number and type of available navigational aids, a high degree of navigational accuracy is warranted.
In exceptional cases, where this calculation results in an operationally impracticable value, an
additional special MEA may be calculated based on a distance of not less than 10 NM either side of
track. Such special MEA will be shown together with an indication of the actual width of protected
airspace.
(2) The MEA is calculated by adding an increment to the elevation specified above as appropriate,
following Table 2 below. The resulting value is adjusted to the nearest 100 ft.
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Table 2: Increment added to the elevation *
Elevation of highest point
Not above 5 000 ft
Above 5 000 ft but not above 10 000 ft
Above 10 000 ft
*:
Increment
1 500 ft
2 000 ft
10 % of elevation plus 1 000 ft
For the last route segment ending over the initial approach fix, a reduction to 1 000 ft is permissible within
TMAs where, due to the number and type of available navigation aids, a high degree of navigational
accuracy is warranted.
(3) Minimum safe grid altitude (MGA). Calculation of the MGA is based on the elevation of the highest
point within the respective grid area.
The MGA is calculated by adding an increment to the elevation specified above as appropriate,
following Table 3 below. The resulting value is adjusted to the nearest 100 ft.
Table 3: Minimum safe grid altitude
Elevation of highest point
Not above 5 000 ft
Above 5 000 ft but not above 10 000 ft
Above 10 000 ft
Increment
1 500 ft
2 000 ft
10 % of elevation plus 1 000 ft
(e) Lido formula
(1) Minimum terrain clearance altitude (MTCA)
The MTCA represents an altitude providing terrain and obstacle clearance for all airways/ATS routes,
all standard terminal arrival route (STAR) segments up to IAF or equivalent end point and for
selected standard instrument departures (SIDs). The MTCA is calculated by Lido and covers
terrain and obstacle clearance relevant for air navigation with the following buffers:
(i) Horizontal:
(A) for SID and STAR procedures 5 NM either side of centre line; and
(B) for airways/ATS routes 10 NM either side of centre line.
(ii) Vertical:
(A) 1 000 ft up to 6 000 ft; and
(B) 2 000 ft above 6 000 ft.
MTCAs are always shown in feet. The lowest indicated MTCA is 3 100 ft.
(2) Minimum grid altitude (MGA)
MGA represents the lowest safe altitude which can be flown off-track. The MGA is calculated
by rounding up the elevation of the highest obstruction within the respective grid area to the next
100 ft and adding an increment of
(i) 1 000 ft for terrain or obstructions up to 6 000 ft; and
(ii) 2 000 ft for terrain or obstructions above 6 000 ft.
MGA is shown in hundreds of feet. The lowest indicated MGA is 2 000 ft. This value is also
provided for terrain and obstacles that would result in an MGA below 2 000 ft. An exception
is over water areas where the MGA can be omitted.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
PLANNING CRITERIA - AEROPLANES
The operator should base the defined fuel policy, including calculation of the amount of fuel to be on board for
departure, on the following planning criteria:
(a) Basic procedure
The usable fuel to be on board for departure should be the sum of the following:
(1) Taxi fuel, which should not be less than the amount, expected to be used prior to take-off. Local
conditions at the departure aerodrome and auxiliary power unit (APU) consumption should be taken
into account.
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(2) Trip fuel, which should include:
(i) fuel for take-off and climb from aerodrome elevation to initial cruising level/altitude, taking into
account the expected departure routing;
(ii) fuel from top of climb to top of descent, including any step climb/descent;
(iii) fuel from top of descent to the point where the approach is initiated, taking into account the
expected arrival procedure; and
(iv) fuel for approach and landing at the destination aerodrome.
(3) Contingency fuel, except as provided for in (b), which should be the higher of:
(i) Either:
(A) 5 % of the planned trip fuel or, in the event of in-flight replanning, 5 % of the trip fuel
for the remainder of the flight;
(B) not less than 3 % of the planned trip fuel or, in the event of in-flight replanning, 3 % of
the trip fuel for the remainder of the flight, provided that an en-route alternate (ERA)
aerodrome is available;
(C) an amount of fuel sufficient for 20 minutes flying time based upon the planned trip
fuel consumption, provided that the operator has established a fuel consumption
monitoring programme for individual aeroplanes and uses valid data determined by
means of such a programme for fuel calculation; or
(D) an amount of fuel based on a statistical method that ensures an appropriate statistical
coverage of the deviation from the planned to the actual trip fuel. This method is used to
monitor the fuel consumption on each city pair/aeroplane combination and the operator
uses this data for a statistical analysis to calculate contingency fuel for that city
pair/aeroplane combination;
(ii) or an amount to fly for 5 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 ft (450 m), above the
destination aerodrome in standard conditions.
(4) Alternate fuel, which should:
(i) include:
(A) fuel for a missed approach from the applicable DA/H or MDA/H at the destination
aerodrome to missed approach altitude, taking into account the complete missed approach
procedure;
(B) fuel for climb from missed approach altitude to cruising level/altitude, taking into
account the expected departure routing;
(C) fuel for cruise from top of climb to top of descent, taking into account the expected
routing;
(D) fuel for descent from top of descent to the point where the approach is initiated,
taking into account the expected arrival procedure; and
(E) fuel for executing an approach and landing at the destination alternate aerodrome;
(ii) where two destination alternate aerodromes are required, be sufficient to proceed to the alternate
aerodrome that requires the greater amount of alternate fuel.
(5) Final reserve fuel, which should be:
(i) for aeroplanes with reciprocating engines, fuel to fly for 45 minutes; or
(ii) for aeroplanes with turbine engines, fuel to fly for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 ft
(450 m) above aerodrome elevation in standard conditions, calculated with the estimated mass
on arrival at the destination alternate aerodrome or the destination aerodrome, when no
destination alternate aerodrome is required.
(6) The minimum additional fuel, which should permit:
(i) the aeroplane to descend as necessary and proceed to an adequate alternate aerodrome in
the event of engine failure or loss of pressurisation, whichever requires the greater amount of
fuel based on the assumption that such a failure occurs at the most critical point along the
route, and
(A) hold there for 15 minutes at 1 500 ft (450 m) above aerodrome elevation in standard
conditions; and
(B) make an approach and landing, except that additional fuel is only required if the minimum
amount of fuel calculated in accordance with (a)(2) to (a)(5) is not sufficient for such an
event; and
(ii) holding for 15 minutes at 1 500 ft (450 m) above destination aerodrome elevation in
standard conditions, when a flight is operated without a destination alternate aerodrome.
(7) Extra fuel, which should be at the discretion of the commander.
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(b) Reduced contingency fuel (RCF) procedure
If the operator’s fuel policy includes pre -flight planning to a destination 1 aerodrome (commercial
destination) with an RCF procedure using a decision point along the route and a destination 2
aerodrome (optional refuel destination), the amount of usable fuel, on board for departure, should be
the greater of (b)(1) or (b)(2):
(1) The sum of:
(i) taxi fuel;
(ii) trip fuel to the destination 1 aerodrome, via the decision point;
(iii) contingency fuel equal to not less than 5 % of the estimated fuel consumption from the
decision point to the destination 1 aerodrome;
(iv) alternate fuel or no alternate fuel if the decision point is at less than six hours from the
destination 1 aerodrome and the requirements of CAT.OP.MPA.180(b)(2), are fulfilled;
(v) final reserve fuel;
(vi) additional fuel; and
(vii) extra fuel if required by the commander.
(2) The sum of:
(i) taxi fuel;
(ii) trip fuel to the destination 2 aerodrome, via the decision point;
(iii) contingency fuel equal to not less than the amount calculated in accordance with (a)(3)
above from departure aerodrome to the destination 2 aerodrome;
(iv) alternate fuel, if a destination 2 alternate aerodrome is required;
(v) final reserve fuel;
(vi) additional fuel; and
(vii) extra fuel if required by the commander.
(c) Predetermined point (PDP) procedure
If the operator’s fuel policy includes planning to a destination alternate aerodrome where the distance
between the destination aerodrome and the destination alternate aerodrome is such that a flight can
only be routed via a predetermined point to one of these aerodromes, the amount of usable fuel, on
board for departure, should be the great er of (c)(1) or (c)(2):
(1) The sum of:
(i) taxi fuel;
(ii) trip fuel from the departure aerodrome to the destination aerodrome, via the predetermined
point;
(iii) contingency fuel calculated in accordance with (a)(3);
(iv) additional fuel if required, but not less than:
(A) for aeroplanes with reciprocating engines, fuel to fly for 45 minutes plus 15 % of the
flight time planned to be spent at cruising level or 2 hours, whichever is less; or
(B) for aeroplanes with turbine engines, fuel to fly for 2 hours at normal cruise consumption
above the destination aerodrome, this should not be less than final reserve fuel; and
(v) extra fuel if required by the commander.
(2) The sum of:
(i) taxi fuel;
(ii) trip fuel from the departure aerodrome to t he destination alternate aerodrome, via the
predetermined point;
(iii) contingency fuel calculated in accordance with (a)(3);
(iv) additional fuel if required, but not less than:
(A) for aeroplanes with reciprocating engines: fuel to fly for 45 minutes; or
(B) for aeroplanes with turbine engines: fuel to fly for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 ft
(450 m) above the destination alternate aerodrome elevation in standard conditions, this
should not be less t han final reserve fuel; and
(v) extra fuel if required by the commander.
(d) Isolated aerodrome procedure
If the operator’s fuel policy includes planning to an isolated aerodrome, the last possible point of
diversion to any available en-route alternate (ERA) aerodrome should be used as the predetermined
point.
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AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
LOCATION OF THE FUEL EN-ROUTE ALTERNATE (FUEL ERA) AERODROME
(a) The fuel ERA aerodrome should be located within a circle having a radius equal to 20 % of the total
flight plan distance, the centre of which lies on the planned route at a distance from the destination
aerodrome of 25 % of the total flight plan distance, or at least 20 % of the total flight plan distance plus
50 NM, whichever is greater. All distances should be calculated in still air conditions (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Location of the fuel ERA aerodrome for the purposes of reducing contingency fuel to 3 %
AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
PLANNING CRITERIA - HELCIOPTERS
The operator should base the company fuel policy, including calculation of the amount of fuel to be carried, on
the following planning criteria:
(a) The amount of:
(1) taxi fuel, which should not be less than the amount expected to be used prior to take-off. Local
conditions at the departure site and APU consumption should be taken into account;
(2) trip fuel, which should include fuel:
(i) for take-off and climb from aerodrome elevation to initial cruising level/altitude, taking into
account the expected departure routing;
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(ii) from top of climb to top of descent, including any step climb/descent;
(iii) from top of descent to the point where the approach procedure is initiated, taking into
account the expected arrival procedure; and
(iv) for approach and landing at the destination site;
contingency fuel, which should be:
(i) for IFR flights, or for VFR flights in a hostile environment, 10 % of the planned trip fuel; or
(ii) for VFR flights in a non-hostile environment, 5 % of the planned trip fuel;
alternate fuel, which should be:
(i) fuel for a missed approa ch from the applicable MDA/DH at the destination aerodrome to
missed approach altitude, taking into account the complete missed approach procedure;
(ii) fuel for a climb from missed approach altitude to cruising level/altitude;
(iii) fuel for the cruise from top of climb to top of descent;
(iv) fuel for descent from top of descent to the point where the approach is initiated, taking into
account the expected arrival procedure;
(v) fuel for executing an approach and landing at the destination alternate selected in accordance with
CAT.OP.MPA.181; and
(vi) or for helicopters operating to or from helidecks located in a hostile environment, 10 % of
(a)(4)(i) to (v);
final reserve fuel, which should be:
(i) for VFR flights navigating by day with reference to visual landmarks, 20 minutes’ fuel at best
range speed; or
(ii) for IFR flights or when flying VFR and navigating by means other than by reference to visual
landmarks or at night, fuel to fly for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 ft (450 m) above the
destination aerodrome in standard conditions calculated with the estimated mass on arrival
above the alternate, or the destination, when no alternate is required; and
extra fuel, which should be at the discretion of the commander.
(b) Isolated aerodrome IFR procedure
If the operator's fuel policy includes planning to an isolated aerodrome flying IFR, or when flying
VFR and navigating by means other than by reference to visual landmarks, for which a destination
alternate does not exist, the amount of fuel at departure should include:
(1) taxi fuel;
(2) trip fuel;
(3) contingency fuel calculated in accordance with (a)(3);
(4) additional fuel to fly for 2 hours at holding speed, including final reserve fuel; and
(5) extra fuel at the discretion of the commander.
(c) Sufficient fuel should be carried at all times to ensure that following the failure of an engine occurring at the
most critical point along the route, the helicopter is able to:
(1) descend as necessary and proceed to an adequate aerodrome;
(2) hold there for 15 minutes at 1 500 ft (450 m) above aerodrome elevation in standard conditions;
and
(3) make an approach and landing.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) Fuel policy
CONTINGENCY FUEL STATISTICAL METHOD - AEROPLANES
(a) As an example, the following values of statistical coverage of the deviation from the planned to the actual
trip fuel provide appropriate statistical coverage.
(1) 99 % coverage plus 3 % of the trip fuel, if the calculated flight time is less than 2 hours, or
more than 2 hours and no weather-permissible ERA aerodrome is available.
(2) 99 % coverage if the calculated flight time is more than 2 hours and a weather-permissible ERA
aerodrome is available.
(3) 90 % coverage if:
(i) the calculated flight time is more than 2 hours;
(ii) a weather-permissible ERA aerodrome is available; and
(iii) at the destination aerodrome two separate runways are available and usable, one of which is
equipped with an ILS/MLS, and the weather conditions are in compliance with
CAT.OP.MPA.180(b)(2), or the ILS/MLS is operational to CAT II/III operating minima and the
weather conditions are at or above 500 ft.
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(b) The fuel consumption database used in conjunction with these values should be based on fuel
consumption monitoring for each route/aeroplane combination over a rolling 2 year period.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.150(c)(3)(i) Fuel policy
CONTINGENCY FUEL
Factors that ma y influence fuel required on a particular flight in an unpredictable way include
deviations of an individual aeroplane from the expected fuel consumption data, deviations from forecast
meteorological conditions and deviations from planned routings and/or cruising levels/altitudes.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.150(c)(3)(ii) Fuel policy
DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROME
The departure aerodrome may be selected as the destination alternate aerodrome.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.155 (b) Carriage of special categories of passengers (SCPs)
PROCEDURES
When establishing the procedures for the carriage of special categories of passengers, the operator should
take into account the following factors:
(a) the aircraft type and cabin configuration;
(b) the total number of passengers carried on board;
(c) the number and categories of SCPs, which should not exceed the number of passengers capable of
assisting them in case of an emergency evacuation; and
(d) any other factor(s) or circumstances possibly impacting on the application of emergency procedures
by the operating crew members.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.160 Stowage of baggage and cargo
STOWAGE PROCEDURES
Procedures established by the operator to ensure that hand baggage and cargo are adequately and
securely stowed should take account of the following:
(a) each item carried in a cabin should be stowed only in a location that is capable of restraining it;
(b) weight limitations placarded on or adjacent to stowages should not be exceeded;
bar and the baggage is of such size that it may adequately be restrained by this equipment;
(c) items should not be stowed in lavatories or against bulkheads that are incapable of restraining articles
against movement forwards, sideways or upwards and unless the bulkheads carry a placard
specifying the greatest mass that may be placed there;
(d) baggage and cargo placed in lockers should not be of such size that they prevent latched doors from
being closed securely;
(e) baggage and cargo should not be placed where it can impede access to emergency equipment; and
(f) checks should be made before take-off, before landing and whenever the fasten seat belts signs are
illuminated or it is otherwise so ordered to ensure that baggage is stowed where it cannot impede
evacuation from the aircraft or cause injury by falling (or other movement) as may be appropriate to the
phase of flight.
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AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.160 Stowage of baggage and cargo
CARRIAGE OF CARGO IN THE PASSENGER COMPARTEMENT
The following should be observed before carrying cargo in the passenger compartment:
(a) for aeroplanes:
(1) dangerous goods should not be allowed; and
(2) a mix of passengers and live animals should only be allowed for pets weighing not more than 8 kg and
guide dogs;
(b) for aeroplanes and helicopters:
(1) the mass of cargo should not exceed the structural loading limits of the floor or seats;
(2) the number/type of restraint devices and their attachment points should be capable of restraining
the cargo in accordance with applicable certification specifications; and
(3) the location of the cargo should be such that, in the event of an emergency evacuation, it will not
hinder egress nor impair the crew’s view.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 Passenger seating
PROCEDURES
The operator should make provision so that:
(a) those passengers who are allocated seats that permit direct access to emergency exits appear to be
reasonably fit, strong and able to assist the rapid evacuation of the aircraft in an emergency after an
appropriate briefing by the crew;
(b) in all cases, passengers who, because of their condition, might hinder other passengers during an
evacuation or who might impede the crew in carrying out their duties, should not be allocated seats
that permit direct access to emergency exits. If procedures cannot be reasonably implemented at the
time of passenger ‘check-in’, the operator should establish an alternative procedure which ensures
that the correct seat allocations will, in due course, be made.
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.165 Passenger seating
ACCESS TO EMERGENCY EXITS
The following categories of passengers are among those who should not be allocated to, or directed to, seats that
permit direct access to emergency exits:
(a) passengers suffering from obvious physical or mental disability to the extent that they would have
difficulty in moving quickly if asked to do so;
(b) passengers who are either substantially blind or substantially deaf to the extent that they might not
readily assimilate printed or verbal instructions given;
(c) passengers who because of age or sickness are so frail that they have difficulty in moving quickly;
(d) passengers who are so obese that they would have difficulty in moving quickly or reaching and passing
through the adjacent emergency exit;
(e) children (whether accompanied or not) and infants;
(f) deportees, inadmissible passengers or persons in custody; and
(g) passengers with animals.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 Passenger seating
DIRECT ACCESS
‘Direct access’ means a seat from which a passenger can proceed directly to the exit without entering
an aisle or passing around an obstruction.
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AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing
PASSENGER BRIEFING
Passenger briefings should contain the following:
(a) Before take-off
(1) passengers should be briefed on the following items if applicable:
(i) smoking regulations;
(ii) back of the seat to be in the upright position and tray table stowed;
(iii) location of emergency exits;
(iv) location and use of floor proximity escape path markings;
(v) stowage of hand baggage;
(vi) the use and stowage of portable electronic devices; and
(vii) the location and the contents of the safety briefing card; and
(2) passengers should receive a demonstration of the following:
(i) the use of safety belts or restraint systems, including how to fasten and unfasten the safety
belts or restraint systems;
(ii) the location and use of oxygen equipment, if required. Passengers should also be briefed to
extinguish all smoking materials when oxygen is being used; and
(iii) the location and use of life-jackets, if required.
(b) After take-off
(1) passengers should be reminded of the following, if applicable:
(i) smoking regulations; and
(ii) use of safety belts or restraint systems including the safety benefits of having safety belts fastened
when seated irrespective of seat belt sign illumination.
(c) Before landing
(1) passengers should be reminded of the following, if applicable:
(i) smoking regulations;
(ii) use of safety belts or restraint systems;
(iii) back of the seat to be in the upright position and tray table stowed;
(iv) re-stowage of hand baggage; and
(v) the use and stowage of portable electronic devices.
(d) After landing
(1) passengers should be reminded of the following:
(i) smoking regulations; and
(ii) use of safety belts and/or restraint systems.
(e) Emergency during flight
(1) passengers should be instructed as appropriate to the circumstances.
AMC1.1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing
PASSENGER BRIEFING
(a) The operator may replace the briefing/demonstration as set out in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 with a
passenger training programme covering all safety and emergency procedures for a given type of
aircraft.
(b) Only passengers who have been trained according to this programme and have flown on the aircraft type
within the last 90 days may be carried on board without receiving a briefing/demonstration.
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.170 Passenger briefing
SINGLE-PILOT OPERATIONS WITHOUT CABIN CREW
For single-pilot operations without cabin crew, the commander should provide safety briefings to passengers
except during critical phases of flight and taxiing.
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AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.175 (a) Flight preparation
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN – COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
(a) The operational flight plan used and the entries made during flight should contain the following items:
(1) aircraft registration;
(2) aircraft type and variant;
(3) date of flight;
(4) flight identification;
(5) names of flight crew members;
(6) duty assignment of flight crew members;
(7) place of departure;
(8) time of departure (actual off-block time, take-off time);
(9) place of arrival (planned and actual);
(10) time of arrival (actual landing and on-block time);
(11) type of operation (ETOPS, VFR, ferry flight, etc.);
(12) route and route segments with checkpoints/waypoints, distances, time and tracks;
(13) planned cruising speed and flying times between check-points/waypoints (estimated and actual
times overhead);
(14) safe altitudes and minimum levels;
(15) planned altitudes and flight levels;
(16) fuel calculations (records of in-flight fuel checks);
(17) fuel on board when starting engines;
(18) alternate(s) for destination and, where applicable, take-off and en-route, including information
required in (a)(12) to (15);
(19) initial ATS flight plan clearance and subsequent reclearance;
(20) in-flight replanning calculations; and
(21) relevant meteorological information.
(b) Items that are readily available in other documentation or from another acceptable source or are irrelevant
to the type of operation may be omitted from the operational flight plan.
(c) The operational flight plan and its use should be described in the operations manual.
(d) All entries on the operational flight plan should be made concurrently and be permanent in nature.
OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN - OTHER-THAN-COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT
OPERATIONS AND LOCAL OPERATIONS
An operational flight plan may be established in a simplified form relevant to the kind of operation for
operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aircraft as well as local operations with any aircraft.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.175 (b)(5) Flight preparation
CONVERSION TABLES
The documentation should include any conversion tables necessary to support operations where metric heights,
altitudes and flight levels are used.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.181 (b)(1)
COASTAL AERODROME
Selection of aerodromes and operating sites - helicopters
(a) Any alleviation from the requirement to select an alternate aerodrome for a flight to a coastal aerodrome
under IFR routing from offshore should be based on an individual safety case assessment.
(b) The following should be taken into account:
(1) suitability of the weather based on the landing forecast for the destination;
(2) the fuel required to meet the IFR requirements of CAT.OP.MPA.150 less alternate fuel;
(3) where the destination coastal aerodrome is not directly on the coast it should be:
(i) within a distance that, with the fuel specified in (b)(2), the helicopter can, at any time after
crossing the coastline, return to the coast, descend safely and carry out a visual approach
and landing with VFR fuel reserves intact; and
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(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(ii) geographically sited so that the helicopter can, within the rules of the air, and within the landing
forecast:
(A) proceed inbound from the coast at 500 ft AGL and carry out a visual approach and
landing; or
(B) proceed inbound from the coast on an agreed route and carry out a visual approach and
landing;
procedures for coastal aerodromes should be based on a landing forecast no worse than:
(i) by day, a cloud base of DH/MDH +400 ft, and a visibility of 4 km, or, if descent over the sea is
intended, a cloud base of 600 ft and a visibility of 4 km; or
(ii) by night, a cloud base of 1 000 ft and a visibility of 5 km;
the descent to establish visual contact with the surface should take place over the sea or as part of the
instrument approach;
routings and procedures for coastal aerodromes nominated as such should be included in the operations
manual, Part C;
the MEL should reflect the requirement for airborne radar and radio altimeter for this type of
operation; and
operational limitations for each coastal aerodrome should be specified in the operations manual.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.181 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites - helicopters
OFFSHORE ALTERNATES
When operating offshore, any spare payload capacity should be used to carry additional fuel if it would facilitate
the use of an onshore alternate aerodrome.
LANDING FORECAST
(a) Meteorological data have been specified that conform to the standards contained in the Regional Air
Navigation Plan and ICAO Annex 3. As the following meteorological data is point-specific, caution should
be exercised when associating it with nearby aerodromes (or helidecks).
(b) Meteorological reports (METARs)
(1) Routine and special meteorological observations at offshore installations should be made during
periods and at a frequency agreed between the meteorological authority and the operator
concerned. They should comply with the provisions contained in the meteorological section of
the ICAO Regional Air Navigation Plan, and should conform to the standards and recommended
practices, including the desirable accuracy of observations, promulgated in ICAO Annex 3.
(2) Routine and selected special reports are exchanged between meteorological offices in the
METAR or SPECI (aviation selected special weather report ) code forms prescribed by the World
Meteorological Organisation.
(c) Aerodrome forecasts (TAFs)
(1) The aerodrome forecast consists of a concise statement of the mean or average meteorological
conditions expected at an aerodrome or aerodrome during a specified period of validity, which is
normally not less than 9 hours, or more than 24 hours in duration. The forecast includes surface
wind, visibility, weather and cloud, and expected changes of one or more of these elements
during the period. Additional elements may be included as agreed between the meteorological
authority and the operators concerned. Where these forecasts relate to offshore installations,
barometric pressure and temperature should be included to facilitate the planning of helicopter landing
and take-off performance.
(2) Aerodrome forecasts are most commonly exchanged in the TAF code form, and the detailed
description of an aerodrome forecast is promulgated in the ICAO Regional Air Navigation Plan
and also in ICAO Annex 3, together with the operationally desirable accuracy elements. In
particular, the observed cloud height should remain within ±30 % of the forecast value in 70 %
of cases, and the observed visibility should remain within ±30 % of the forecast value in 80 % of cases.
(d) Landing forecasts (TRENDS)
(1) The landing forecast consists of a concise statement of the mean or average meteorological
conditions expected at an aerodrome or aerodrome during the two-hour period immediately following
the time of issue. It contains surface wind, visibility, significant weather and cloud elements
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and other significant information, such as barometric pressure and temperature, as may be agreed
between the meteorological authority and the operators concerned.
(2) The detailed description of the landing forecast is promulgated in the ICAO Regional Air
Navigation Plan and also in ICAO Annex 3, together with the operationally desirable accuracy
of the forecast elements. In particular, the value of the observed cloud height and visibility
elements should remain within ±30 % of the forecast values in 90 % of the cases.
(3) Landing forecasts most commonly take the form of routine or special selected meteorological reports
in the METAR code, to which either the code words ‘NOSIG’, i.e. no significant change
expected; ‘BECMG’ (becoming), or ‘TEMPO’ (temporarily), followed by the expected change, are
added. The 2-hour period of validity commences at the time of the meteorological report.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.181 (d)
OFFSHORE ALTERNATES
Selection of aerodromes and operating sites - helicopters
(a) Offshore alternate helideck landing environment
The landing environment of a helideck that is proposed for use as an offshore alternate should be
pre-surveyed and, as well as the physical characteristics, the effect of wind direction and strength, and
turbulence established. This information, which should be available to the commander at the planning
stage and in flight, should be published in an appropriate form in the operations manual Part C
(including the orientation of the helideck) such that the suitability of the helideck for use as an offshore
alternate aerodrome can be assessed. The alternate helideck should meet the criteria for size and
obstacle clearance appropriate to the performance requirements of the type of helicopter concerned.
(b) Performance considerations
The use of an offshore alternate is restricted to helicopters which can achieve OEI in ground effect (IGE)
hover at an appropriate power rating at the offshore alternate aerodrome . Where the surface of the
offshore alternate helideck, or prevailing conditions (especially wind velocity), precludes an OEI
IGE, OEI out of ground effect (OGE) hover performance at an appropriate power rating should be
used to compute the landing mass. The landing mass should be calculated from graphs provided in
the relevant Part B of the operations manual. When arriving at this landing mass, due account should
be taken of helicopter configuration, environmental conditions and the operation of systems that have an
adverse effect on performance. The planned landing mass of the helicopter including crew,
passengers, baggage, cargo plus 30 minutes final reserve fuel, should not exceed the OEI landing mass
at the time of approach to the offshore alternate aerodrome.
(c) Weather considerations
(1) Meteorological observations
When the use of an offshore alternate helideck is planned, the meteorological observations at the
destination and alternate aerodrome should be taken by an observer acceptable to the authority
responsible for the provision of meteorological services. Automatic meteorological observations
stations may be used.
(2) Weather minima
When the use of an offshore alternate helideck is planned, the operator should not select a helideck as
a destination or offshore alternate helideck unless the aerodrome forecast indicates that, during a period
commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the expected time of arrival at the destination
and offshore alternate aerodrome, the weather conditions will be at or above the planning minima
shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Planning minima
Cloud Base
Visibility
Day
600 ft
4 km
Night
800 ft
5 km
(d) Actions at point of no return
Before passing the point of no return - which should not be more that 30 minutes from the destination - the
following actions should have been completed:
(1) confirmation that navigation to the destination and offshore alternate helideck can be assured;
(2) radio contact with the destination and offshore alternate helideck (or master station) has been
established;
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(3) the landing forecast at the destination and offshore alternate helideck have been obtained and
confirmed to be at or above the required minima;
(4) the requirements for OEI landing (see (b)) have been checked in the light of the latest reported
weather conditions to ensure that they can be met; and
(5) to the extent possible, having regard to information on current and forecast use of the offshore
alternate helideck and on conditions prevailing, the availability of the offshore alternate helideck
should be guaranteed by the duty holder (the rig operator in the case of fixed installations and the
owner in the case of mobiles) until the landing at the destination, or the offshore alternate
aerodrome, has been achieved or until offshore shuttling has been completed.
(e) Offshore shuttling
Provided that the actions in (d) have been completed, offshore shuttling, using an offshore alternate
aerodrome, may be carried out.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.185 Planning minima for IFR flights - aeroplanes
PLANNING MINIMA FOR ALTERNATE AERODROMES
Non-precision minima (NPA) in Table 1 of CAT.OP.MPA.185 mean the next highest minima that apply
in the prevailing wind and serviceability conditions. Localiser only approaches, if published, are
considered to be non-precision in this context. It is recommended that operators wishing to publish tables of
planning minima choose values that are likely to be appropriate on the majority of occasions (e.g.
regardless of wind direction). Unserviceabilities should, however, be fully taken into account.
As Table 1 does not include planning minima requirements for APV, LTS CAT I and OTS CAT II operations,
the operat or may use the following minima:
(a) for APV operations – NPA or CAT I minima, depending on the DH/MDH;
(b) for LTS CAT I operations – CAT I minima; and
(c) for OTS CAT II operations – CAT II minima.
GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.185 Planning minima for IFR flights – aeroplanes
AERODROME WEATHER FORECASTS
APPLICATION OF AERODROME FORECASTS (TAF & TREND) TO PRE-FLIGHT PLANNING (ICAO Annex 3 refers)
1. APPLICATION OF INITIAL PART OF TAF
a) Application time period: From the start of the TAF validity period up to the time of applicability of the first subsequent ‘FM…*’ or
‘BECMG’, or if no ‘FM’ or ‘BECMG’ is given, up to the end of the validity period of the TAF.
b) Application of forecast: The prevailing weather conditions forecast in the initial part of the TAF should be fully applied with the
exception of the mean wind and gusts (and crosswind) which should be applied in accordance with the policy in the column ‘BECMG AT
and FM’ in the table below. This may however be overdue temporarily by a ‘TEMPO’ or ‘PROB**’ if applicable according to the table
below.
2. APPLICATION OF FORECAST FOLLOWING CHANGE INDICATION IN TAF AND TREND
FM (alone)
BECMG (alone), BECMG FM,
TEMPO (alone), TEMPO FM, TEMPO
PROB
and BECMG
BECMG TL, BECMG
FM…TL, PROB30/40(alone)
TEMPO
AT:
FM…*TL, in case of :
Deterioration
Improvement
Transient
TAF or TREND
Deterioration
/Shower
Persistent
for
Deterioration
and
Conditions
Conditions
AERODROME
and
Improvement
in connection
in connection
PLANNED AS:
Deterioration
Improvement
Improvement
with short –
with e.g. haze,
lived weather
mist, fog,
phenomena,
dust/sandstorm,
e.g.
continuous
thunderstorms,
precipitations
showers
DESTINATION
Applicable
Applicable
Applicable
Not applicable Applicable
at ETA ± 1 HR
from the start
from the time
from the time
Deterioration
TAKE –OFF
of the change;
of the start of
of the end of
Mean wind:
may be
ALTERNATE
Mean wind:
the change;
the change;
Should be
disregarded;
Should be
at ETA ± 1 HR
Should be
Mean wind:
Mean wind:
within required
Improvement
disDEST.
within
Should be
Should be
Mean wind
limits;
should be
regarded
ALTERNATE
required
within
within required and gusts
disregarded
at ETA ± 1 HR
limits;
required
limits;
exceeding
Gusts: May be
including
ENROUTE
Gusts: May be limits;
Gusts: May be
required limits disregarded
mean wind
ALTERNATE
disregarded
Gusts:May be
disregarded
may be
and gusts.
at ETA ± 1 HR
disregarded
disregarded
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ETOPS ENRT
ALTN
at earliest/latest
ETA ± 1 HR
Applicable
from the
time of start
of change;
Mean wind:
should be
within
required
limits;
Gusts
exceeding
crosswind
limits should
be fully
applied
Applicable
from the
time of start
of change;
Mean wind:
should be
within
required
limits;
Gusts
exceeding
crosswind
limits should
be fully
applied.
Applicable
from the
time of end of
change;
Mean wind:
should be
within required
limits;
Gusts
exceeding
crosswind
limits should
be fully
applied
Applicable if
below
applicable
landing
minima;
Mean wind:
Should be
within
required
limits;
Gusts
exceeding
crosswind
limits should
be fully
applied.
Applicable if
below
applicable
landing
minima;
Mean wind:
Should be
within required
limits;
Gusts
exceeding
crosswind
limits should
be fully
applied.
Note 1: ‘Required limits’ are those contained in the Operations Manual.
Note 2: If promulgated aerodrome forecasts do not comply with the requirements of ICAO Annex 3, operators should ensure that guidance
in the application of these reports is provided.
* The space following ‘FM’ should always include a time group e.g. ‘FM1030’.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.186 Planning minima for IFR flights - helicopters
PLANNING MINIMA FOR ALTERNATE AERODROMES
Non-precision minima (NPA) in Table 1 of CAT.OP.MPA.186 mean the next highest minima that apply
in the prevailing wind and serviceability conditions. Localiser only approa ches, if published, are
considered to be non-precision in this context. It is recommended that operators wishing to publish tables of
planning minima choose values that are likely to be appropriate on the majority of occasions (e.g.
regardless of wind direction). Unserviceabilities should, however, be fully taken into account. As Table 1 does
not include planning minima requirements for APV, LTS CAT I and OTS CAT II operations, the operator may
use the following minima:
(a) for APV operations – NPA or CAT I minima, depending on the DH/MDH;
(b) for LTS CAT I operations – CAT I minima; and
(c) for OTS CAT II operations – CAT II minima.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.190 Submission of the ATS flight plan
FLIGHTS WITHOUT ATS FLIGHT PLAN
(a) When unable to submit or to close the ATS flight plan due to lack of ATS facilities or any other means of
communications to ATS, the operator should establish procedures, instructions and a list of
nominated persons to be responsible for alerting search and rescue services.
(b) To ensure that each flight is located at all times, these instructions should:
(1) provide the nominated person with at least the information required to be included in a VFR
flight plan, and the location, date and estimated time for re-establishing communications;
(2) if an aircraft is overdue or missing, provide for notification to the appropriate ATS or search and
rescue facility; and
(3) provide that the information will be retained at a designated place until the completion of the
flight.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.195 Refuelling/defuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - GENERAL
(a) When refuelling/defuelling with passengers on board, ground servicing activities and work inside the
aircraft, such as catering and cleaning, should be conducted in such a manner that they do not create a
hazard and allow emergency evacuation to take place through those aisles and exits intended for emergency
evacuation.
(b) The deployment of integral aircraft stairs or the opening of emergency exits as a prerequisite to
refuelling is not necessarily required.
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OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - AEROPLANES
(c) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:
(1) one qualified person should remain at a specified location during fuelling operations with
passengers on board. This qualified person should be capable of handling emergency procedures
concerning fire protection and fire-fighting, handling communications and initiating and directing an
evacuation;
(2) two-way communication should be established and should remain available by the aeroplane's intercommunication system or other suitable means between the ground crew supervising the refuelling
and the qualified personnel on board the a eroplane; the involved personnel should remain within
easy reach of the system of communication;
(3) crew, personnel and passengers should be warned that re/defuelling will take place;
(4) ‘Fasten Seat Belts’ signs should be off;
(5) ‘NO SMOKING’ signs should be on, together with interior lighting to enable emergency exits to
be identified;
(6) passengers should be instructed to unfasten t heir seat belts and refrain from smoking;
(7) the minimum required number of cabin crew should be on board and be prepared for an
immediate emergency evacuation;
(8) if the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the aeroplane, or any other hazard arises during
re/defuelling, fuelling should be stopped immediately;
(9) the ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation and slide deployment areas
should be kept clear at doors where stairs are not in position for use in the event of evacuation; and
(10) provision is made for a safe and rapid evacuation.
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES - HELICOPTERS
(d) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:
(1) door(s) on the refuelling side of the helicopter remain closed;
(2) door(s) on the non-refuelling side of the helicopter remain open, weather permitting;
(3) fire-fighting facilities of the appropriate scale be positioned so as to be immediately available in
the event of a fire;
(4) sufficient personnel be immediately available to move passengers clear of the helicopter in the event
of a fire;
(5) sufficient qualified personnel be on board and be prepared for an immediate emergency
evacuation;
(6) if the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the helicopter, or any other hazard arises during
refuelling/defuelling, fuelling be stopped immediately;
(7) the ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation be kept clear; and
(8) provision is made for a safe and rapid evacuation.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.200 Refuelling/defuelling with wide-cut fuel
PROCEDURES
(a) ‘Wide cut fuel’ (designated JET B, JP-4 or AVTAG) is an aviation turbine fuel that falls between
gasoline and kerosene in the distillation range and consequently, compared to kerosene (JET A or
JET A1), it has the properties of higher volatility (vapour pressure), lower flash point and lower
freezing point.
(b) Wherever possible, the operator should avoid the use of wide-cut fuel types. If a situation arises
such that only wide-cut fuels are a vailable for refuelling/defuelling, operators should be aware that
mixtures of wide-cut fuels and kerosene turbine fuels can result in the air/fuel mixture in the tank being
in the combustible range at ambient temperatures. The extra precautions set out below are advisable to
avoid arcing in the tank due to electrostatic discharge. The risk of this type of arcing can be minimised by
the use of a static dissipation additive in the fuel. When this additive is present in the proportions
stated in the fuel specification, the normal fuelling precautions set out below are considered adequate.
(c) Wide-cut fuel is considered to be ‘involved’ when it is being supplied or when it is already present in
aircraft fuel tanks.
(d) When wide-cut fuel has been used, this should be recorded in the technical log. The next two uplifts of
fuel should be treated as though they too involved the use of wide-cut fuel.
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(e) When refuelling/defuelling with turbine fuels not containing a static dissipator, and where wide-cut
fuels are involved, a substantial reduction on fuelling flow rate is advisable. Reduced flow rate, as
recommended by fuel suppliers and/or aeroplane manufacturers, has the following benefits:
(1) it allows more time for any static charge build-up in the fuelling equipment to dissipate before the
fuel enters the tank;
(2) it reduces any charge which may build up due to splashing; and
(3) until the fuel inlet point is immersed, it reduces misting in the tank and consequently the
extension of the flammable range of the fuel.
(f) The flow rate reduction necessary is dependent upon the fuelling equipment in use and the type of filtration
employed on the aeroplane fuelling distribution system. It is difficult, therefore, to quote precise flow rates.
Reduction in flow rate is advisable whether pressure fuelling or over-wing fuelling is employed.
(g) With over-wing fuelling, splashing should be avoided by making sure that the delivery nozzle
extends as far as practicable into the tank. Caution should be exercised to avoid damaging bag tanks
with the nozzle.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.205 Push back and towing - aeroplanes
BARLESS TOWING
(a) Barless towing should be based on the applicable SAE ARP (Aerospace Recommended Practices), i.e.
4852B/4853B/5283/5284/5285 (as amended).
(b) Pre- or post-taxi positioning of the aeroplanes should only be executed by barless towing if one of the
following conditions are met:
(1) an aeroplane is protected by its own design from damage to the nose wheel steering system;
(2) a system/procedure is provided to alert the flight crew that damage referred to in (b)(1) may have
or has occurred;
(3) the towing vehicle is designed to prevent damage to the aeroplane type; or
(4) the aeroplane manufacturer has published procedures and these are included in the operations
manual.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.210 (b) Crew members at stations
CABIN CREW SEATING POSITIONS
(a) When determining cabin crew seating positions, the operator should ensure that they are:
(1) close to a floor level door/exit;
(2) provided with a good view of the area(s) of the passenger cabin for which the cabin crew member is
responsible; and
(3) evenly distributed throughout the cabin, in the above order of priority.
(b) Item (a) should not be taken as implying that, in the event of there being more cabin crew stations
than required cabin crew, the number of cabin crew members should be increased.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.210 Crew members at stations
MITIGATING MEASURES – CONTROLLED REST
(a) This GM addresses controlled rest taken by the minimum certified flight crew. It is not related to planned
in-flight rest by members of an augmented crew.
(b) Although flight crew members should stay alert at all times during flight, unexpected fatigue can occur as a
result of sleep disturbance and circadian disruption. To cover for this unexpected fatigue, and to regain a high
level of alertness, a controlled rest procedure in the flight crew compartment, organised by the commander may be
used, if workload permits and a controlled rest procedure is described in the operations manual. ‘Controlled rest’
means a period of time ‘off task’ that ma y include actual sleep. The use of controlled rest has been shown to
significantly increase the levels of alertness during the later phases of flight, particularly after the top of
descent, and is considered to be good use of crew resource management (CRM) principles. Controlled rest
should be used in conjunction with other on-board fatigue management countermeasures such as physical exercise,
bright cockpit illumination at appropriate times, balanced eating and drinking, and intellectual activity.
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(c) Controlled rest taken in this way should not be considered to be part of a rest period for the
purposes of calculating flight time limitations, nor used to justify any duty period. Controlled rest may
be used to manage both sudden unexpected fatigue and fatigue that is expected to become more severe
during higher workload periods later in the flight. Controlled rest is not related to fatigue management,
which is planned before flight.
(d) Controlled rest periods should be agreed according to individual needs and the accepted principles
of CRM; where the involvement of the cabin crew is required, consideration should be given to their
workload.
(e) When applying controlled rest procedures, the commander should ensure that:
(1) the other flight crew member(s) is/are adequately briefed to carry out the duties of the resting
flight crew member;
(2) one flight crew member is fully able to exercise control of the aircraft at all times; and
(3) any system intervention that would normally require a cross-check according to multi-crew
principles is avoided until the resting flight crew member resumes his/her duties.
(f) Controlled rest procedures should satisfy all of the following criteria:
(1) Only one flight crew member at a time should take rest at his/her station; the restraint device should
be used and the seat positioned to minimise unintentional interference with the controls.
(2) The rest period should be no longer than 45 minutes (in order to limit any actual sleep to
approximately 30 minutes) to limit deep sleep and associated long recovery time (sleep inertia).
(3) After this 45-minute period, there should be a recovery period of 20 minutes to overcome sleep
inertia during which control of the aircraft should not be entrusted to the flight crew member.
At the end of this recovery period an appropriate briefing should be given.
(4) In the case of two-crew operations, means should be established to ensure that the non-resting
flight crew member remains alert. This may include:
(i) appropriate alarm systems;
(ii) on-board systems to monitor flight crew activity; and
(iii) frequent cabin crew checks. In this case, the commander should inform the senior cabin crew
member of the intention of the flight crew member to take controlled rest, and of the time of
the end of that rest; frequent contact should be established between the non-resting flight crew
member and the cabin crew by communication means, and the cabin crew should check that
the resting flight crew member is awake at the end of the period.
(5) There should be a minimum of 20 minutes between two subsequent controlled rest periods in order to
overcome the effects of sleep inertia and allow for adequate briefing.
(6) If necessary, a flight crew member may take more than one rest period, if time permits, on
longer sectors, subject to the restrictions above .
(7) Controlled rest periods should terminate at least 30 minutes before the top of descent.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants – ground procedures
TERMINOLOGY
Terms used in the context of de-icing/anti-icing have the meaning defined in the following
subparagraphs.
(a) ‘Anti -icing fluid’ includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) Type I fluid if heated to min 60 °C at the nozzle;
(2) mixture of water and Type I fluid if heated to min 60 °C at the nozzle;
(3) Type II fluid;
(4) mixture of water and Type II fluid;
(5) Type III fluid;
(6) mixture of water and Type III fluid;
(7) Type IV fluid;
(8) mixture of water and Type IV fluid.
On uncontaminated aircraft surfaces Type II, III and IV anti-icing fluids are normally applied
unheated.
(b) ‘Clear ice’: a coating of ice, generally clear and smooth, but with some air pockets.
It forms on exposed objects, the temperatures of which are at, below or slightly above the freezing
temperature, by the freezing of super-cooled drizzle, droplets or raindrops.
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(c) Conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground (e.g. freezing fog, freezing precipitation, frost, rain
or high humidity (on cold soaked wings), snow or mixed rain and snow).
(d) ‘Contamination’, in this context, is understood as being all forms of frozen or semi-frozen moisture, such as
frost, snow, slush or ice.
(e) ‘Contamination check’: a check of aircraft for contamination to establish the need for de-icing.
(f) ‘De-icing fluid’: such fluid includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) heated water;
(2) Type I fluid;
(3) mixture of water and Type I fluid;
(4) Type II fluid;
(5) mixture of water and Type II fluid;
(6) Type III fluid;
(7) mixture of water and Type III fluid;
(8) Type IV fluid;
(9) mixture of water and Type IV fluid.
De-icing fluid is normally applied heated to ensure maximum efficiency.
(g) ‘De-icing/anti-icing’: this is the combination of de -icing and anti-icing performed in either one or two
steps.
(h) ‘Ground ice detection system (GIDS)’: system used during aircraft ground operations to inform the
personnel involved in the operation and/or the flight crew about the presence of frost, ice, snow or slush on
the aircraft surfaces.
(i) ‘Lowest operational use temperature (LOUT)’: the lowest temperature at which a fluid has been tested
and certified as acceptable in accordance with the appropriate aerodynamic acceptance test whilst still
maintaining a freezing point buffer of not less than:
(1) 10°C for a Type I de-icing/anti-icing fluid; or
(2) 7°C for Type II, III or IV de-icing/anti-icing fluids.
(j)
‘Post -treatment check’: an external check of the aircraft after de -icing and/or anti-icing treatment
accomplished from suitably elevated observation points (e.g. from the de-icing/anti-icing equipment itself
or other elevated equipment) to ensure that the aircraft is free from any frost, ice, snow, or slush.
(k) ‘Pre take-off check’: an assessment normally performed by the flight crew, t o validate the applied
HoT.
(l) ‘Pre take-off contamination check’: a check of the treated surfaces for contamination, performed
when the HoT has been exceeded or if any doubt exists regarding the continued effectiveness of the
applied anti-icing treatment. It is normally accomplished externally, just before commencement of the
take -off run.
ANTI-ICING CODES
(m) The following are examples of anti-icing codes:
(1) ‘Type I’ at (start time) – to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a Type I fluid;
(2) ‘Type II/100’ at (start time) – to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with
undiluted Type II fluid;
(3) ‘Type II/75’ at (start time) – to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a
mixture of 75 % Type II fluid and 25 % water;
(4) ‘Type IV/50’ at (start time) – to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a
mixture of 50 % Type IV fluid and 50 % water.
(n) When a two-step de-icing/anti-icing operation has been carried out, the anti-icing code should be
determined by the second step fluid. Fluid brand names may be included, if desired.
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GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants – ground procedures
DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING - PROCEDURES
(a) De-icing and/or anti-icing procedures should take into account manufacturer’s recommendations, including
those that are type -specific and cover:
(1) contamination checks, including detection of clear ice and under-wing frost; limits on the
thickness/area of contamination published in the AFM or other manufacturers’ documentation
should be followed;
(2) procedures to be followed if de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures are interrupted or unsuccessful;
(3) post-treatment checks;
(4) pre-take-off checks;
(5) pre-take-off contamination checks;
(6) the recording of any incidents relating to de-icing and/or anti-icing; and
(7) the responsibilities of all personnel involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing.
(b) Operator’s procedures should ensure the following:
(1) When aircraft surfaces are contaminated by ice, frost, slush or snow, they are de-iced prior to take-off,
according to the prevailing conditions. Removal of contaminants may be performed with
mechanical tools, fluids (including hot water), infra-red heat or forced air, taking account of
aircraft type-specific provisions.
(2) Account is taken of the wing skin temperature versus outside air temperature (OAT), as this may affect:
(i) the need to carry out aircraft de-icing and/or anti-icing; and/or
(ii) the performance of the de-icing/anti-icing fluids.
(3) When freezing precipitation occurs or there is a risk of freezing precipitation occurring that
would contaminate the surfaces at the time of take-off, aircraft surfaces should be anti-iced. If both
de-icing and anti-icing are required, the procedure ma y be performed in a one- or two-step
process, depending upon weather conditions, available equipment, available fluids and the desired
hold-over time (HoT). One-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried
out at the same time, using a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. Two-step deicing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out in two separate steps. The
aircraft is first de-iced using heated water only or a heated mixture of de -icing/anti-icing fluid
and water. After completion of the de-icing operation a layer of a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid
and water, or of de-icing/anti-icing fluid only, is sprayed over the aircraft surfaces. The second
step will be applied before the first step fluid freezes, typically within three minutes and, if
necessary, area by area.
(4) When an aircraft is anti-iced and a longer HoT is needed/desired, the use of a less diluted Type II or
Type IV fluid should be considered.
(5) All restrictions relative to OAT and fluid application (including, but not necessarily limited to,
temperature and pressure) published by t he fluid manufacturer and/or aircraft manufacturer, are
followed and procedures, limitations and recommendations to prevent the formation of fluid residues
are followed.
(6) During conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground or after de -icing and/or anti-icing,
an aircraft is not dispatched for departure unless it has been given a contamination check or a posttreatment check by a trained and qualified person. This check should cover all treated surfaces of
the aircraft and be performed from points offering sufficient accessibility to these parts. To ensure that
there is no clear ice on suspect areas, it may be necessary to make a physical check (e.g. tactile).
(7) The required entry is made in the technical log.
(8) The commander continually monitors the environmental situation after the performed treatment. Prior
to take-off he/she performs a pre-take-off check, which is an assessment of whether the applied
HoT is still appropriate. This pre-take-off check includes, but is not limited to, factors such as
precipitation, wind and OAT.
(9) If any doubt exists as to whether a deposit may adversely affect the aircraft’s performance and/or
controllability characteristics, the commander should arrange for a pre take-off contamination
check to be performed in order to verify that the aircraft’s surfaces are free of contamination.
Special methods and/or equipment may be necessary to perform this check, especially at night time or
in extremely adverse weather conditions. If this check cannot be performed just before take-off, retreatment should be applied.
(10) When retreatment is necessary, any residue of the previous treatment should be removed and a
completely new de-icing/anti-icing treatment should be applied.
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(11) When a ground ice detection system (GIDS) is used to perform an aircraft surfaces check prior
to and/or after a treatment, the use of GIDS by suitably trained personnel should be pa rt of the
procedure.
(c) Special operational considerations
(1) When using thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids, the operator should consider a two-step de-icing/antiicing procedure, the first step preferably with hot water and/or un-thickened fluids.
(2) The use of de-icing/anti-icing fluids should be in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer’s
documentation. This is particularly important for thickened fluids to assure sufficient flow-off during
take-off.
(3) The operator should comply with any type -specific operational provision(s), such as an aircraft mass
decrease and/or a take-off speed increase associated with a fluid application.
(4) The operator should take into account any flight handling procedures (stick force, rotation speed
and rate, take -off speed, aircraft attitude etc.) laid down by the aircraft manufacturer when associated
with a fluid application.
(5) The limitations or handling procedures resulting from (c)(3) and/or (c)(4) above should be part of
the flight crew pre take-off briefing.
(d) Communications
(1) Before aircraft treatment. When the aircraft is to be treated with the flight crew on board, the
flight and personnel involved in the operation should confirm the fluid to be used, the extent of
treatment required and any aircraft type-specific procedure(s) to be used. Any other information
needed t o apply the HoT tables should be exchanged.
(2) Anti-icing code. The operator’s procedures should include an anti-icing code, which indicates the
treatment the aircraft has received. This code provides the flight crew with the minimum details
necessary to estimate a HoT and confirms that the aircraft is free of contamination.
(3) After treatment. Before reconfiguring or moving the aircraft, the flight crew should receive a
confirmation from the personnel involved in the operation that all de-icing and/or anti-icing
operations are complete and that all personnel and equipment are clear of the aircraft.
(e) Hold-over protection
The operator should publish in the operations manual, when required, the HoTs in the form of a
table or a diagram, to account for the various types of ground icing conditions and the different
types and concentrations of fluids used. However, the times of protection shown in these tables are to be
used as guidelines only and are normally used in conjunction with the pre take-off check.
(f) Training
The operator’s initial and recurrent de-icing and/or anti-icing training programmes (including
communication training) for flight crew and those of its personnel involved in the operation who
are involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing should include additional training if any of the following is
introduced:
(1) a new method, procedure and/or technique;
(2) a new type of fluid and/or equipment; or
(3) a new type of aircraft.
(g) Contracting
When the operator contracts training on de -icing/anti-icing, the operator should ensure that the
contractor complies with the operator’s training/qualification procedures, together with any specific
procedures in respect of:
(1) de-icing and/or anti-icing methods and procedures;
(2) fluids to be used, including precautions for storage and preparation for use;
(3) specific aircraft provisions (e.g. no-spray areas, propeller/engine de-icing, APU operation etc.); and
(4) checking and communications procedures.
(h) Special maintenance considerations
(1) General
The operator should take proper account of the possible side-effects of fluid use. Such effects
may include, but are not necessarily limited to, dried and/or re-hydrated residues, corrosion and the
removal of lubricants.
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(2) Special considerations regarding residues of dried fluids
The operator should establish procedures to prevent or detect and remove residues of dried fluid.
If necessary the operator should establish appropriate inspection intervals based on the
recommendations of the airframe manufacturers and/or the operator’s own experience:
(i) Dried fluid residues
Dried fluid residues could occur when surfaces have been treated and the aircraft has not
subsequently been flown and has not been subject to precipitation. The fluid may then have dried
on the surfaces.
(ii) Re-hydrated fluid residues
Repetitive application of thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids may lead to the subsequent
formation/build-up of a dried residue in aerodynamically quiet areas, such as cavities and
gaps. This residue may re-hydrate if exposed to high humidity conditions, precipitation,
washing, etc., and increase to many times its original size/volume. This residue will freeze if
exposed to conditions at or below 0 °C. This may cause moving parts, such as elevators,
ailerons, and flap actuating mechanisms to stiffen or jam in-flight. Re-hydrated residues may
also form on exterior surfaces, which can reduce lift, increase drag and stall speed. Rehydrated residues may also collect inside control surface structures and cause clogging of
drain holes or imbalances to flight controls. Residues may also collect in hidden areas, such
as around flight control hinges, pulleys, grommets, on cables and in gaps.
(iii) Operators are strongly recommended to obtain information about the fluid dry-out and rehydration characteristics from the fluid manufacturers and t o select products with optimised
characteristics.
(iv) Additional information should be obtained from fluid manufacturers for handling, storage,
application and testing of their products.
GM3 CAT.OP.MPA.250 Ice and other contaminants – ground procedures
DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Further guidance material on this issue is given in the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Antiicing Operations (Doc 9640) (hereinafter referred to as the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Antiicing Operations).
(a) General
(1) Any deposit of frost, ice, snow or slush on the external surfaces of an aircraft may drastically affect
its flying qualities because of reduced aerodynamic lift, increased drag, modified stability and
control characteristics. Furthermore, freezing deposits may cause moving parts, such as
elevators, ailerons, flap actuating mechanism etc., to jam and create a potentially hazardous
condition. Propeller/engine/auxiliary power unit (APU)/systems performance may deteriorate due to
the presence of frozen contaminants on blades, intakes and components. Also, engine operation may
be seriously affected by the ingestion of snow or ice, thereby causing engine stall or compressor
damage. In addition, ice/frost may form on certain external surfaces (e.g. wing upper and lower
surfaces, etc.) due to the effects of cold fuel/structures, even in ambient temperatures well above
0 °C.
(2) Procedures established by the operator for de-icing and/or anti-icing are intended to ensure that
the aircraft is clear of contamination so that degradation of aerodynamic characteristics or
mechanical interference will not occur and, following anti-icing, to maintain the airframe in that
condition during the appropriate HoT.
(3) Under certain meteorological conditions, de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures may be ineffective in
providing sufficient protection for continued operations. Examples of these conditions are freezing
rain, ice pellets and hail, heavy snow, high wind velocity, fast dropping OAT or any time
when freezing precipitation with high water content is present. No HoT guidelines exist for these
conditions.
(4) Material for establishing operational procedures can be found, for example, in:
(i) ICAO Annex 3, Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation;
(ii) ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations;
(iii) ISO 11075 Aircraft - De-icing/anti-icing fluids - ISO type I;
(iv) ISO 11076 Aircraft - De-icing/anti-icing methods with fluids;
(v) ISO 11077 Aerospace - Self propelled de-icing/anti-icing vehicles - Functional requirements;
(vi) ISO 11078 Aircraft - De-icing/anti-icing fluids -- ISO types II, III and IV;
(vii) AEA ‘Recommendations for de-icing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground’;
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(viii) AEA ‘Training recommendations and background information for de-icing/anti-icing of aircraft
on the ground’;
(ix) EUROCAE ED-104A Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Ground Ice Detection
Systems;
(x) SAE AS5681 Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Remote On-Ground Ice
Detection Systems;
(xi) SAE ARP4737 Aircraft - De-icing/anti-icing methods;
(xii) SAE AMS1424 De-icing/anti-Icing Fluid, Aircraft, SAE Type I;
(xiii) SAE AMS1428 Fluid, Aircraft De-icing/anti-Icing, Non-Newtonian, (Pseudoplastic), SAE Types
II, III, and IV;
(xiv) SAE ARP1971 Aircraft De-icing Vehicle - Self-Propelled, Large and Small Capacity;
(xv) SAE ARP5149 Training Programme Guidelines for De -icing/anti-icing of Aircraft on Ground;
and
(xvi) SAE ARP5646 Quality Program Guidelines for De-icing/anti-icing of Aircraft on the Ground.
(b) Fluids
(1) Type I fluid: Due to its properties, Type I fluid forms a thin, liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which
it is applied which, under certain weather conditions, gives a very limited HoT. With this type of
fluid, increasing the concentration of fluid in the fluid/water mix does not provide any extension in
HoT.
(2) Type II and Type IV fluids contain thickeners which enable the fluid to form a thicker liquid-wetting
film on surfaces to which it is applied. Generally, this fluid provides a longer HoT than Type I
fluids in similar conditions. With this type of fluid, the HoT can be extended by increasing the
ratio of fluid in the fluid/water mix.
(3) Type III fluid is a thickened fluid especially intended for use on aircraft with low rotation
speeds.
(4) Fluids used for de-icing and/or anti-icing should be acceptable to the operator and the aircraft
manufacturer. These fluids normally conform to specifications such as SAE AMS1424, SAE
AMS1428 or equivalent. Use of non-conforming fluids is not recommended due to their characteristics
being unknown. The anti-icing and aerodynamic properties of thickened fluids may be seriously
degraded by, for example, inappropriate storage, treatment, application, application equipment and age.
(c) Hold-over protection
(1) Hold-over protection is achieved by a layer of a nti-icing fluid remaining on and protecting aircraft
surfaces for a period of time. With a one-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the HoT begins at the
commencement of de-icing/anti-icing. With a two-step procedure, the HoT begins at the
commencement of the second (anti-icing) step. The hold-over protection runs out:
(i) at the commencement of the take-off roll (due to aerodynamic shedding of fluid); or
(ii) when frozen deposits start to form or accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces, thereby
indicating the loss of effectiveness of the fluid.
(2) The duration of hold-over protection may vary depending on the influence of factors other than
those specified in the HoT tables. Guidance should be provided by the operator to take account of
such factors, which may include:
(i) atmospheric conditions, e.g. exact type and rate of precipitation, wind direction and velocity,
relative humidity and solar radiation; and
(ii) the aircraft and its surroundings, such as aircraft component inclination angle, contour and surface
roughness, surface temperature, operation in close proximity to other aircraft (jet or
propeller blast) and ground equipment and structures.
(3) HoTs are not meant to imply that flight is safe in the prevailing conditions if the specified HoT has
not been exceeded. Certain meteorological conditions, such as freezing drizzle or freezing rain,
may be beyond the certification envelope of the aircraft.
(4) References to usable HoT tables may be found in the AEA ‘Recommendations for de-icing/anti-icing of
aircraft on the ground’.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.255 Ice and other contaminants – flight procedures
FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL IC ING CONDITIONS - AEROPLANES
(a) In accordance with Article 2(a)5. of Annex IV to this Regulation (Essential requirements for air
operations), in case of flight into known or expected icing conditions, the aircraft must be certified,
equipped and/or treated to operate safely in such conditions. The procedures to be established by the
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operator should take account of the design, the equipment, the configuration of the aircraft and the
necessary training. For these reasons, different aircraft types operated by the same company may require the
development of different procedures. In every case the relevant limitations are those which are defined
in the AFM and other documents produced by the manufacturer.
(b) The operator should ensure that the procedures take account of the following:
(1) the equipment and instruments which must be serviceable for flight in icing conditions;
(2) the limitations on flight in icing conditions for each phase of flight. These limitations may be
imposed by the aircraft’s de-icing or anti-icing equipment or the necessary performance corrections
that have to be made;
(3) the criteria the flight crew should use to assess the effect of icing on the performance and/or
controllability of the aircraft ;
(4) the means by which the flight crew detects, by visual cues or the use of the aircraft’s ice
detection system, that the flight is entering icing conditions; and
(5) the action to be taken by the flight crew in a deteriorating situation (which may develop
rapidly) resulting in an adverse affect on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft, due to:
(i) the failure of the aircraft’s anti -icing or de-icing equipment to control a build-up of ice; and/or
(ii) ice build-up on unprotected areas.
(c) Training for dispatch and flight in expected or actual icing conditions. The content of the operations
manual should reflect the training, both conversion and recurrent, which flight crew, cabin crew and all
other relevant operational personnel require in order to comply with the procedures for dispatch and flight
in icing conditions:
(1) For the flight crew, the training should include:
(i) instruction on how to recognise, from weather reports or forecasts which are available before
flight commences or during flight, the risks of encountering icing conditions along the planned
route and on how to modify, as necessary, the departure and in-flight routes or profiles;
(ii) instruction on the operational and performance limitations or margins;
(iii) the use of in-flight ice detection, anti-icing and de-icing systems in both normal and
abnormal operation; and
(iv) instruction on the differing intensities and forms of ice accretion and the consequent action
which should be taken.
(2) For the cabin crew, the training should include;
(i) awareness of the conditions likely to produce surface contamination; and
(ii) the need to inform the flight crew of significant ice accretion.
AMC2 CAT.OP.MPA.255 Ice and other contaminants – flight procedures
FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL ICING CONDITIONS - HELICOPTERS
(a) The procedures to be established by the operator should take account of the design, the equipment or the
configuration of the helicopter and also of the training which is needed. For these reasons, different
helicopter types operated by the same company ma y require the development of different
procedures. In every case, the relevant limitations are those that are defined in the AFM and other
documents produced by the manufacturer.
(b) For the required entries in the operations manual, the procedural principles that apply to flight in
icing conditions are referred to under Subpart MLR of Annex III (ORO.MLR) and should be crossreferenced, where necessary, to supplementary, type-specific data.
(c) Technical content of the procedures
The operator should ensure that the procedures take account of the following:
(1) CAT.IDE.H.165;
(2) the equipment and instruments that should be serviceable for flight in icing conditions;
(3) the limitations on flight in icing conditions for each phase of flight. These limitations may be
specified by the helicopter’s de -icing or anti-icing equipment or the necessary performance
corrections which have to be made;
(4) the criteria the flight crew should use to assess the effect of icing on the performance and/or
controllability of the helicopter;
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(5) the means by which the flight crew detects, by visual cues or the use of the helicopter’s ice
detection system, that the flight is entering icing conditions; and
(6) the action to be taken by the flight crew in a deteriorating situation (which may develop
rapidly) resulting in an adverse effect on the performance and/or controllability of the helicopter, due to
either:
(i) the failure of the helicopter’s anti -icing or de-icing equipment to control a build-up of ice; and/or
(ii) ice build-up on unprotected areas.
(d) Training for dispatch and flight in expected or actual icing conditions
The content of the operations manual, Part D, should reflect the training, both conversion and
recurrent, which flight crew, and all other relevant operational personnel will require in order to
comply with the procedures for dispatch and flight in icing conditions.
(1) For the flight crew, the training should include:
(i) instruction on how to recognise, from weather reports or forecasts that are available before flight
commences or during flight, the risks of encountering icing conditions along the planned
route and on how to modify, as necessary, the departure and in-flight routes or profiles;
(ii) instruction on the operational and performance limitations or margins;
(iii) the use of in-flight ice detection, anti-icing and de-icing systems in both normal and
abnormal operation; and
(iv) instruction on the differing intensities and forms of ice accretion and the consequent action
which should be taken.
(2) For crew members other than flight crew, the t raining should include;
(i) awareness of the conditions likely to produce surface contamination; and
(ii) the need to inform the flight crew of significant ice accretion.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.281 In-flight fuel management - helicopters
COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED HELICOPTERS, OTHER THAN LOCAL OPERATIONS
The operator should base in-flight fuel management procedures on the following criteria:
(a) In-flight fuel checks
(1) The commander should ensure that fuel checks are carried out in-flight at regular intervals. The
remaining fuel should be recorded and evaluated to:
(i) compare actual consumption with planned consumption;
(ii) check that the remaining fuel is sufficient to complete the flight; and
(iii) determine the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination.
(2) The relevant fuel data should be recorded.
(b) In-flight fuel management
(1) If, as a result of an in-flight fuel check, the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination is
less than the required alternate fuel plus final reserve fuel, the commander should:
(i) divert; or
(ii) re-plan the flight in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.181 (d)(1) unless he/she considers it safer
to continue to the destination.
(2) At an onshore destination, when two suitable, separate touchdown and lift-off areas are available and
the weather conditions at the destination comply with those specified for planning in
CAT.OP.MPA.245 (a)(2), the commander may permit alternate fuel to be used before landing at the
destination.
(c) If, as a result of an in-flight fuel check on a flight to an isolated destination, planned in accordance with
(b), the expected fuel remaining at the point of last possible diversion is less than the sum of:
(1) fuel to divert to an operating site selected in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.181 (a);
(2) contingency fuel; and
(3) final reserve fuel,
the commander should:
(i) divert; or
(ii) proceed to the destination provided that at onshore destinations, two suitable, separate
touchdown and lift-off areas are available at the destination and the expected weather
conditions at the destination comply with those specified for planning in CAT.OP.MPA.245
(a)(2).
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GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.290 Ground proximity detection
TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES
(a) Introduction
(1) This GM contains performance-based training objectives for TAWS flight crew training.
(2) The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general inflight operations; response to TAWS cautions; and response to TAWS warnings.
(3) The term ‘TAWS’ in this GM means a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) enhanced by
a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. Alerts include both cautions and warnings.
(4) The content of this GM is intended to assist operators who are producing training programmes.
The information it contains has not been tailored to any specific aircraft or TAWS equipment, but
highlights features which are typically available where such systems are installed. It is the
responsibility of the individual operator to determine the applicability of the content of this
guidance material to each aircraft and TAWS equipment installed and their operation. Operators
should refer to the AFM and/or aircraft/flight crew operating manual (A/FCOM), or similar
documents, for information applicable to specific configurations. If there should be any conflict
between the content of this guidance material and that published in the other documents described
above, then information contained in the AFM or A/FCOM will take precedence.
(b) Scope
(1) The scope of this GM is designed to identify training objectives in the areas of: academic training;
manoeuvre training; initial evaluation; and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas,
the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training
items and those that are considered to be desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable
performance criteria are defined.
(2) No attempt is made to define how the training programme should be implemented. Instead,
objectives are established to define the knowledge that a pilot operating TAWS is expected to possess
and the performance expected from a pilot who has completed TAWS training. However, the
guidelines do indicate those areas in which the pilot receiving the training should demonstrate
his/her understanding, or performance, using a real-time, interactive training device, i.e. a flight
simulator. Where appropriate, notes are included within the performance criteria which amplify or
clarify the material addressed by the training objective.
(c) Performance-based training objectives
(1) TAWS academic training
(i) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations
specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests
or by providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.
(ii) Theory of operation. The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of TAWS operation and the
criteria used for issuing cautions and warnings. This training should address system operation.
Objective: To demonstrate knowledge of how a TAWS functions. Criteria: The pilot should
demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:
(A) Surveillance
(a) The GPWS computer processes data supplied from an air data computer, a radio
altimeter, an instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system
(MLS)/multi-mode (MM) receiver, a roll attitude sensor, and actual position of the
surfaces and of the landing gear.
(b) The forward looking terrain avoidance function utilises an accurate source of
known aircraft position, such as that which may be provided by a flight
management system (FMS) or GPS, or an electronic terrain database. The source and
scope of the terrain, obstacle and airport data, and features such as the terrain
clearance floor, the runway picker, and geometric altitude (where provided) should
all be described.
(c) Displays required to deliver TAWS outputs
announcements, visual alerts (typically amber
awareness display (that may be combined with
should be provided for indicating the status of the
failures that may occur.
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include a loudspeaker for voice
and red lights), and a terrain
other displays). In addition, means
TAWS and any partial or total
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(B) Terrain avoidance. Outputs from the TAWS computer provide visual and audio
synthetic voice cautions and warnings to alert the flight crew about potential conflicts
with terrain and obstacles.
(C) Alert thresholds. Objective: To demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing
cautions and warnings. Criteria: The pilot should be able to demonstrate an
understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and alerts and
the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including:
(a) basic GPWS alerting modes specified in the ICAO Standard:
- Mode 1: excessive sink rate;
- Mode 2: excessive terrain closure rate;
- Mode 3: descent after take-off or go-around;
- Mode 4: unsafe proximity to terrain;
- Mode 5: descent below ILS glide slope (caution only); and
(b) an additional, optional alert mode- Mode 6: radio altitude call-out (information
only); TAWS cautions and warnings which alert the flight crew to obstacles and terrain
ahead of the aircraft in line with or adjacent to its projected flight path (forwardlooking terrain avoidance (FLTA) and premature descent alert (PDA) functions).
(D) TAWS limitations. Objective: To verify that the pilot is aware of the limitations of TAWS.
Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of TAWS
limitations identified by the manufacturer for the equipment model installed, such as:
(a) navigation should not be predicated on the use of the terrain display;
(b) unless geometric altitude data is provided, use of predictive TAWS functions is
prohibited when altimeter subscale settings display ‘QFE’;
(c) nuisance alerts can be issued if the aerodrome of intended landing is not included in the
TAWS airport databa se;
(d) in cold weather operations, corrective procedures should be implemented by the pilot
unless the TAWS has in-built compensation, such as geometric altitude data;
(e) loss of input data to the TAWS computer could result in partial or total loss of
functionality. Where means exist to inform the flight crew t hat functionality has been
degraded, this should be known and the consequences understood;
(f) radio signals not associated with the intended flight profile (e.g. ILS glide path
transmissions from an adjacent runway) may cause false alerts;
(g) inaccurate or low accuracy aircraft position data could lead to false or non-annunciation
of terrain or obstacles ahead of the aircraft; and
(h) minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions should be applied in the event of the
TAWS becoming partially or completely unserviceable. (It should be noted that basic
GPWS has no forward-looking capability.)
(E) TAWS inhibits. Objective: To verify that the pilot is aware of the conditions under which
certain functions of a TAWS are inhibited. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate
knowledge and an understanding of the various TAWS inhibits, including the following
means of:
(a) silencing voice alerts;
(b) inhibiting ILS glide path signals (as may be required when executing an ILS back
beam approach);
(c) inhibiting flap position sensors (as may be required when executing an approach
with the flaps not in a normal position for landing);
(d) inhibiting the FLTA and PDA functions; and
(e) selecting or deselecting the display of terrain information, together with appropriate
annunciation of the status of each selection.
(2) Operating procedures. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate TAWS avionics
and to interpret the information presented by a TAWS. This training should address the following
topics:
(i) Use of controls. Objective: To verify that the pilot can properly operate all TAWS controls and
inhibits. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following
means by which:
(A) before flight, any equipment self-test functions can be initiated;
(B) TAWS information can be selected for display; and
(C) all TAWS inhibits can be operated and what the consequent annunciations mean with
regard to loss of functionality.
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(ii)
Display interpretation. Objective: To verify that the pilot understands the meaning of all
information that can be annunciated or displayed by a TAWS. Criteria: The pilot should
demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information annunciated or displayed by a
TAWS, including the following:
(A) knowledge of all visual and aural indications that may be seen or heard;
(B) response required on receipt of a caution;
(C) response required on receipt of a warning; and
(D) response required on receipt of a notification that partial or total failure of the TAWS has
occurred (including annunciation that the present aircraft position is of low accuracy).
(iii) Use of basic GPWS or use of the FLTA function only. Objective: To verify that the pilot
understands what functionality will remain following loss of the GPWS or of the FLTA
function. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate knowledge of how to recognise the following:
(A) un-commanded loss of the GPWS function, or how to isolate this function and how to
recognise the level of the remaining controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) protection
(essentially, this is the FLTA function); and
(B) un-commanded loss of the FLTA function, or how to isolate this function and how to
recognise the level of the remaining CFIT protection (essentially, this is the basic GPWS).
(iv) Crew coordination. Objective: To verify that the pilot adequately briefs other flight crew
members on how TAWS alerts will be handled. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate that
the pre -flight briefing addresses procedures that will be used in preparation for responding to
TAWS cautions and warnings, including the following:
(A) the action to be taken, and by whom, in the event that a TAWS caution and/or warning is
issued; and
(B) how multi-function displays will be used to depict TAWS information at take-off, in
the cruise and for the descent, approach, landing (and any go-a round). This will be in
accordance with procedures specified by the operator, who will recognise that it may
be more desirable that other data is displayed at certain phases of flight and that the
terrain display has an automatic 'pop-up' mode in the event that an alert is issued.
(v) Reporting rules. Objective: To verify that the pilot is aware of the rules for reporting alerts to the
controller and other authorities. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate knowledge of the
following:
(A) when, following recovery from a TAWS alert or caution, a transmission of information
should be made to the appropriate ATC unit; and
(B) the type of written report that is required, how it is to be compiled, and whether any
cross reference should be made in the aircraft technical log and/or voyage report (in
accordance with procedures specified by the operator), following a flight in which the
aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert, or if any part of the
equipment appears not to have functioned correctly.
(vi) Alert thresholds. Objective: To demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and
warnings. Criteria: The pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology
used by a TAWS to issue cautions and warnings and the general criteria for the issuance of these
alerts, including awareness of the following:
(A) modes associated with basic GPWS, including the input data associated with each; and
(B) visual and aural annunciations that can be issued by TAWS and how to identify which
are cautions and which are warnings.
(3) TAWS manoeuvre training. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to respond
correctly to TAWS cautions and warnings. This training should address the following topics:
(i) Response to cautions:
(A) Objective: To verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to cautions. Criteria:
The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the need, without delay:
(a) to initiate action required to correct the condition which has caused the TAWS to issue the
caution and to be prepared to respond to a warning, if this should follow; and
(b) if a warning does not follow the caution, to notify the controller of the new
position, heading and/or altitude/flight level of the aircraft, and what the commander
intends to do next.
(B) The correct response to a caution might require the pilot to:
(a) reduce a rate of descent and/or to initiate a climb;
(b) regain an ILS glide path from below, or to inhibit a glide path signal if an ILS is
not being flown;
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(c) select more flap, or to inhibit a flap sensor if the landing is being conducted with the
intent that the normal flap setting will not be used;
(d) select gear down; and/or
(e) initiate a turn away from the terrain or obstacle ahead and towards an area free of
such obstructions if a forward-looking terrain display indicates that this would be
a good solution and the entire manoeuvre can be carried out in clear visual
conditions.
(ii) Response to warnings. Objective: To verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to
warnings. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following:
(A) The need, without delay, to initiate a climb in the manner specified by the operator.
(B) The need, without delay, to maintain the climb until visual verification can be made that
the aircraft will clear the terrain or obstacle ahead or until above the appropriate sector safe
altitude (if certain about the location of the aircraft with respect to terrain) even if the
TAWS warning stops. If, subsequently, the aircraft climbs up through the sector safe
altitude, but the visibility does not allow the flight crew to confirm that the terrain hazard
has ended, checks should be made to verify the location of the aircraft and to confirm that
the altimeter subscale settings are correct.
(C) When the workload permits, that the flight crew should notify the air traffic controller of
the new position and altitude/flight level, and what the commander intends to do next.
(D) That the manner in which the climb is made should reflect the type of aircraft and
the method specified by the aircraft manufacturer (which should be reflected in the
operations manual) for performing the escape manoeuvre. Essential aspects will include the
need for an increase in pitch attitude, selection of maximum thrust, confirmation that external
sources of drag (e.g. spoilers/speed brakes) are retracted, and respect of the stick shaker or
other indication of eroded stall margin.
(E) That TAWS warnings should never be ignored. However, the pilot’s response may be limited
to that which is appropriate for a caution, only if:
(a) the aircraft is being operated by day in clear, visual conditions; and
(b) it is immediately clear to the pilot that the aircraft is in no danger in respect of its
configuration, proximity to terrain or current flight path.
(4) TAWS initial evaluation:
(i) The flight crew member understands of the academic training items should be assessed by means of
a written test.
(ii) The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be
assessed in a FSTD equipped with TAWS visual and aural displays and inhibit selectors
similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft which the pilot will fly. The
results should be assessed by a synthetic flight instructor, synthetic flight examiner, type rating
instructor or type rating examiner.
(iii) The range of scenarios should be designed to give confidence that proper and timely
responses to TAWS cautions and warnings will result in the aircraft avoiding a CFIT accident.
To achieve this objective, the pilot should demonstrate taking the correct action to prevent a
caution developing into a warning and, separately, the escape manoeuvre needed in response
to a warning. These demonstrations should take place when the external visibility is zero,
though there is much to be learnt if, initially, the training is given in 'mountainous' or 'hilly'
terrain with clear visibility. This training should comprise a sequence of scenarios, rather than
be included in line oriented flight training (LOFT).
(iv) A record should be made, after the pilot has demonstrated competence, of the scenarios that
were practised.
(5) TAWS recurrent training:
(i) TAWS recurrent training ensures that pilots maintain the appropriate TAWS knowledge and skills.
In particular, it reminds pilots of the need to act promptly in response to cautions and
warnings, and of the unusual attitude associated with flying the escape manoeuvre.
(ii) An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and
operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also
address changes to TAWS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique TAWS
characteristics of which pilots should be aware.
(6) Reporting procedures:
(i) Verbal reports. Verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate air traffic control unit:
(A) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance;
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(B) when, following a manoeuvre which has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic
clearance, the aircraft has returned to a flight path which complies with the clearance; and/or
(C) when an air traffic control unit issues instructions which, if followed, would cause the
pilot to manoeuvre the aircraft towards terrain or obstacle or it would appear from the
display that a potential CFIT occurrence is likely to result.
(ii) Written reports. Written reports should be submitted in accordance with the operator's
occurrence reporting scheme and they also should be recorded in the aircraft technical log:
(A) whenever the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert (false,
nuisance or genuine);
(B) whenever a TAWS alert has been issued and is believed to have been false; and/or
(C) if it is believed that a TAWS alert should have been issued, but was not.
(iii) Within this GM and with regard to reports:
(A) the term 'false' means that the TAWS issued an alert which could not possibly be justified by
the position of the aircraft in respect to terrain and it is probable that a fault or failure in
the system (equipment and/or input data) was the cause;
(B) the term 'nuisance' means that the TAWS issued an alert which was appropriate, but was
not needed because the flight crew could determine by independent means that the flight
path was, at that time, safe;
(C) the term 'genuine' means that the TAWS issued an alert which was both appropriate and
necessary; and
(D) the report terms described in (c)(6)(iii) are only meant to be assessed after the
occurrence is over, to facilitate subsequent analysis, the adequacy of the equipment and
the programmes it contains. The intention is not for the flight crew to attempt to
classify an alert into any of these three categories when visual and/or aural cautions or
warnings are annunciated.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.295 Use of airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)
GENERAL
(a) The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into
account this GM. It incorporates advice contained in:
(1) ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV;
(2) ICAO PANS-OPS, Volume 1;
(3) ICAO PANS-ATM; and
(4) ICAO guidance material ‘ACAS Performance-Based Training Objectives’ (published under
Attachment E of State Letter AN 7/1.3.7.2-97/77).
(b) Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such
sources as EUROCONTROL.
ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES
(c) During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified which had been
attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training
has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when
designing training programmes.
(d) This GM contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training.
Information contained in this paper related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I
and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight
operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs).
(e) The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are
identified.
(f)
The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training;
manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the
training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those
which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.
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(g) ACAS academic training
(1) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations
specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or
through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.
(2) Essential items
(i) Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS
II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the
following topics:
(A) System operation
Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following
functions:
(a) Surveillance
(1) ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14
NM.
(2) ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large
number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft.
(3) If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S
extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the
nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance
purposes.
(b) Collision avoidance
(1) TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft which responds to the
ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude
reporting capability.
(2) RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical
plane only.
(3) RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are co-ordinated to ensure
complementary RAs are issued.
(4) Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided
by own ACAS.
(5) Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts
the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other
aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS equipped.
(B) Advisory thresholds
Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the
methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the
issuance of these advisories, including the following:
(a) ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than
distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or
projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards
provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts.
(b) Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at
higher altitudes.
(c) A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected
CPA.
(d) RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can
instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude.
(C) ACAS limitations
Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS
limitations, including the following:
(a) ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponder-equipped aircraft, nor aircraft not
responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations.
(b) ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft’s barometric altimeter, radio
altimeter or transponder is lost.
(1) In some installations, the loss of information from other on board systems such as an
inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS)
may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their
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flight crews are aware of the types of failure that will result in an ACAS
failure.
(2) ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is
provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators
should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions that
can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their
own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude
reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off.
(c) Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are
deemed t o be ‘on ground’ and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an
aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed.
(d) ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high
density traffic.
(e) The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation
of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display.
(f) ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10 000
ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the
tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the
intruder.
(g) Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems
(GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS
advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural
annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only'
mode of operation.
(D) ACAS inhibits
Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which
certain functions of ACAS are inhibited.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of
the various ACAS inhibits, including the following:
(a) ‘Increase Descent’ RAs are inhibited below 1 450 ft AGL;
(b) ‘Descend’ RAs are inhibited below 1 100 ft AGL;
(c) all RAs are inhibited below 1 000 ft AGL;
(d) all TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL; and
(e) altitude and configuration under which ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are inhibited.
ACAS can still issue ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs when operating at t he
aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are
never inhibited.)
(ii) Operating procedures
The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics
and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following:
(A) Use of controls
Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls.
Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls including:
(a) aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test;
(b) steps required to initiate a self-test;
(c) recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When
the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible,
correcting the problem;
(d) recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and
the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition
between the terminal and en-route environment;
(e) recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS
surveillance volume;
(f) selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution;
(g)
proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without
eliminating the display of other needed information;
(h) if available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode
should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent; and
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(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(i) if available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the
limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS.
Display interpretation
Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information
that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the
tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should
be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret
information displayed by ACAS, including the following:
(a) other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate
traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued;
(b) proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ±1 200 ft;
(c) non-altitude reporting traffic;
(d) no bearing TAs and RAs;
(e) off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all
available information on the intruder is displayed;
(f) TAs: the minimum available display range which allows the traffic to be displayed
should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution;
(g) RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display
which allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum
display resolution;
(h) RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning
of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed
on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of
the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the
tape is less than 2 500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed; and
(i) if appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on ‘Track-Up’ may require
a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the
bearing of proximate traffic.
Use of the TA only mode
Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to
select the TA only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:
(a) Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only.
(b) Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting
simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1 200 ft, and to
some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If for any reason TA only is not
selected and an RA is received in these situations, the response should comply
with the operator's approved procedures.
(c) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below
500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine
instrument scan.
Crew coordination
Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be
handled.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures
that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following:
(a) task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring;
(b) expected call-outs; and
(c) communications with ATC.
Phraseology rules
Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the
controller.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:
(a) the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS;
(b) an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex
2; and
(c) the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate
ATC unit:
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(1) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic
clearance;
(2) when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate
from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned t o a flight path that
complies with the clearance; and/or
(3) when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to
manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying.
(F) Reporting rules
Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to
the operator.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where
information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to
various states when an RA is issued.
Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight
crew member should be tailored to the operator’s operating environment. For
operators involved in commercial operations, this responsibility is satisfied by the flight
crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules.
(3) Non-essential items: advisory thresholds
Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by
ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including
the following:
(i) the minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued;
(ii) when the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired
separation, a corrective RA which requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be
issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude;
(iii) when the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation,
a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be
issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft; and
(iv) RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM.
(h) ACAS manoeuvre training
(1) Demonstration of the flight crew member’s ability to use ACAS displayed information to
properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an
ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full
flight simulator is utilised, CRM should be practised during this training.
(2) Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an
ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive
CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member
should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or
inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be.
(3) The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial
preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals;
weakening RAs; and multi -aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly
should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL
ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROC ONTROL website).
(i) TA responses
Objective: t o verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAS
Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:
(A) Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot
flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared t o
respond to any RA that might follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot
flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot
monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using
this information to help visually acquire the intruder.
(B) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm
that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued.
Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the
bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data
tag) and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow).
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(C) Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including
ATC ‘party-line’ information, traffic flow in use, etc.
(D) Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft
based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to
adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if
own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present,
vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1 500 ft/min.
(E) When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of
way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres
should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual
acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should
be demonstrated as being understood.
(ii) RA responses
Objective: t o verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs.
Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:
(A) Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even
if the pilot believes that there is no threat present.
(B) Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying
should respond to a corrective RA with appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring
should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic
location by checking the traffic display. Proper crew resource management (CRM) should
be used.
(C) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder
causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond
appropriately.
(D) For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within five
seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished
with an acceleration of approximately ¼ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²).
(E) Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA
should be properly accomplished, as follows:
(a) For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within two and a
half seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be
accomplished with an acceleration of approximately g.
(b) For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within two and a
half seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be
accomplished with an acceleration of approximately g.
(c) For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the
original clearance.
(d) An acceleration of approximately ¼ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude
corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1 500 ft/min is accomplished in
approximately 5 seconds, and of g if the change is accomplished in approximately
three seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or
descent of 1 500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6 when the true
airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4 at 250 kt, and 2 at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from
the formula: 1 000 divided by TAS.).
(F) Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs.
(G) For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain
outside the red area on the RA display.
(H) For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that
a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude.
(I) When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot
should initiate a return towards the original clearance and when ‘clear of conflict’ is
annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance.
(J) The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the
standard phraseology.
(K) When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For
example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an
‘adjust vertical speed’ RA (version 7) or ‘level off’ (version 7.1)) it should be done;
the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed.
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(L) Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can
optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For
example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting
an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder those results in a
manoeuvre towards another intruder which is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder
becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder.
(i) ACAS initial evaluation
(1) The flight crew member understands of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a
written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions.
(2) The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a
full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation
to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified
instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs;
initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals;
weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations
of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring
opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA.
(3) Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with
an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot
will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be
made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct.
(j) ACAS recurrent training
(1) ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS
knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in
conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent
training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been
identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters
or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made
aware of.
(2) It is recommended that the operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators
include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The
full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2-year period. If a full flight simulator, as described
above, is not available, use should be made of interactive CBT that is capable of presenting
scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real-time.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions
IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE LANDING DISTANCE
The in-flight determination of the landing distance should be based on the latest available meteorological or
runway state report, preferably not more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 (e) Commencement and continuation of approach
VISUAL REFERENCES FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS
(a) NPA, APV and CAT I operations
At DH or MDH, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly
visible and identifiable to the pilot:
(1) elements of the approach lighting system;
(2) the threshold;
(3) the threshold markings;
(4) the threshold lights;
(5) the threshold identification lights;
(6) the visual glide slope indicator;
(7) the touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings;
(8) the touchdown zone lights;
(9) FATO/runway edge lights; or
(10) other visual references specified in the operations manual.
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(b) Lower than standard category I (LTS CAT I) operations
At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
(1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or
touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of
these;
(2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach
light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation
is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS usable to at least 150 ft.
(c) CAT II or OTS CAT II operations
At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
(1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights being the centreline of the approach lights, or
touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of
these;
(2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach
light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation
is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS to touchdown.
(d) CAT III operations
(1) For CAT IIIA operations and for CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control
systems or with the use of an approved HUDLS: at DH, a segment of at least three consecutive
lights being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway
centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these is attained and can be
maintained by the pilot.
(2) For CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail -operational flight control systems or with a
fail-operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at DH, at least one centreline light is attained and
can be maintained by the pilot.
(3) For CAT IIIB operations with no DH there is no specification for visual reference with the
runway prior t o touchdown.
(e) Approach operations utilising EVS – CAT I operations
(1) At DH, the following visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS
image:
(i) elements of the approach light; or
(ii) the runway threshold, identified by at least one of the following:
(A) the beginning of the runway landing surface,
(B) the threshold lights, the threshold identification lights; or
(C) the touchdown zone, identified by at least one of the following: the runway touchdown
zone landing surface, the touchdown zone lights, the touchdown zone markings or the runway
lights.
(2) At 100 ft above runway threshold elevation at least one of the visual references specified below
should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS:
(i) the lights or markings of the threshold; or
(ii) the lights or markings of the touchdown zone.
(f) Approach operations utilising EVS – APV and NPA operations flown with the CDFA technique
(1) At DH/MDH, visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS image as
specified under (a).
(2) At 200 ft above runway threshold elevation, at least one of the visual references specified
under (a) should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.305 (f) Commencement and continuation of approach
EXPLANATION OF THE TERM ‘RELEVANT’
‘Relevant’ in this context means that part of the runway used during the high-speed phase of the landing
down to a speed of approximately 60 kt.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.315 Flight hours reporting - helicopters
FLIGHT HOURS REPORTING
(a) The requirement in CAT.OP.MPA.315 may be achieved by making available either:
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(1) the flight hours flown by each helicopter – identified by its serial number and registration mark during the previous calendar year; or
(2) the total flight hours of each helicopter – identified by its serial number and registration mark –
on the 31st of December of the previous calendar year.
(b) Where possible, the operator should have available, for each helicopter, the breakdown of hours for
commercial air transport operations. If the exact hours for the functional activity cannot be
established, the estimated proportion will be sufficient.
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Section 2 — Non-motor-powered aircraft
GM1 CAT.OP.NMPA.100 Use of aerodromes and operating sites
BALLOONS
An adequate operating site is a site that the commander considers to be satisfactory, taking account of the
applicable performance requirements and site characteristics.
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.115 Carriage of special categories of passengers (SCPs)
CARRIAGE OF CHILDREN AND PERSONS WITH REDUCED MOBILITY — BALLOONS
The operator may exclude children and/or persons with reduced mobility (PRM)s from transportation in a
balloon, when:
(a) their presence may impede:
(1) the crew in their duties;
(2) access to emergency equipment; or
(3) the emergency evacuation of the balloon; and/or
(b) those persons are:
(1) unable to take a proper brace position; or
(2) shorter than the inner height of the basket wall.
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.120 Passenger briefing
SAILPLANES
The briefing should include the locations and use of seat belts and if applicable:
(a) emergency canopy opening;
(b) use of the parachute;
(c) oxygen dispensing equipment;
(d) passenger emergency briefing cards; and
(e) other emergency equipment, where provided for individual passenger use.
AMC2 CAT.OP.NMPA.120 Passenger briefing
BALLOONS
(a) Passengers should be given a verbal briefing and demonstration about safety matters in such a way that the
information is easily retained and reproduced during the landing and in the case of an emergency situation.
(b) The briefing/demonstration should contain the following items:
(1) use of landing hand-holds;
(2) use of oxygen dispensing equipment, if applicable;
(3) other emergency equipment, where provided for individual passenger use;
(4) wearing of suitable clothing;
(5) smoking regulations and the use of portable electronic devices;
(6) stowage of baggage;
(7) importance to remain inside the basket at all times, particularly after landing;
(8) landing positions to be assumed to minimise the effect of the impact upon an emergency landing; and
(9) safe transport of the balloon on the ground after landing.
(c) Part or all of the verbal briefing may be provided additionally by a safety briefing card on which pictorial
instructions indicate the correct landing position.
(d) Before take-off, the correct landing position should be demonstrated.
(e) Before commencing the landing phase, passengers should be required to practise the correct landing
position.
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AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.125 (a) Flight preparation
GROUND FACILITIES
NOTAMS should be considered as an appropriate means to gather the required information.
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.130 Submission of the ATS flight plan
FLIGHTS WITHOUT ATS FLIGHT PLAN
(a) The operator should nominate a person to be responsible for alerting search and rescue services for flights
without submitted ATS flight plans.
(b) The operator should establish procedures to ensure that each flight is located at all times and provide:
(1) the nominated person with at least the information required to be included in a VFR flight plan, and the
location, date and estimated time for re-establishing communications;
(2) for notification to the appropriate ATS or search and rescue facility, if an aircraft is overdue or missing;
and
(3) that the information is retained at a designated place until the completion of the flight.
AMC1 CAT.OP.NMPA.155 Take-off conditions
FACILITIES AT THE TAKE-OFF SITE — BALLOONS
At the balloon take-off site, a means of assessing the wind direction and wind speed should be provided by the
operator.
GM1 CAT.OP.NMPA.180 Operational limitations — hot-air balloons
AVOIDANCE OF NIGHT LANDING
The intent of the rule is to ensure that when the balloon takes off during night, sufficient fuel is on board for
landing under VFR by day.
The risk of collision with overhead lines is considerable and cannot be overstated. The risk is considerably
increased during night flights in conditions of failing light and visibility when there is increasing pressure to
land. A number of incidents have occurred in the late evening in just such conditions and may have been
avoided had an earlier landing been planned. Night landings should, therefore, be avoided by taking appropriate
measures including a larger quantity of fuel and/or additional safety equipment.
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Subpart C – Aircraft performance and operating limitations – AMC/GM
Section 1 – Aeroplanes
Chapter 2 - Performance class A
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 General
WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA
If the performance data have been determined on the basis of a measured runway friction coefficient,
the operator should use a procedure correlating the measured runway friction coefficient and the effective
braking coefficient of friction of the aeroplane type over the required speed range for the existing runway
conditions.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.205 Take-off
LOSS OF RUNWAY LENGTH DUE TO ALIGNMENT
(a) The length of the runway that is declared for the calculation of take-off distance available (TODA),
accelerate-stop distance available (ASDA) and take-off run available (TORA) does not account for
line-up of the aeroplane in the direction of take-off on the runway in use. This alignment distance
depends on the aeroplane geometry and access possibility to the runway in use. Accountability is
usually required for a 90° taxiway entry to the runwa y and 180° turnaround on the runway. There are two
distances to be considered:
(1) the minimum distance of the main wheels from the start of the runway for determining TODA
and TORA,’L’; and
(2) the minimum distance of the most forward wheel(s) from the start of the runway for
determining ASDA,’N’.
Figure 1: Line-up of the aeroplane in the direction of take-off - L and N
Where the aeroplane manufacturer does not provide the appropriate data, the calculation method given
in (b) should be used to determine the alignment distance.
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(b) Alignment distance calculation
The distances mentioned in (a)(1) and (a)(2) are:
L=
N=
90° entry
RM + X
RM + X + WB
180° turnaround
RN + Y
RN + Y + WB
where:
RN = A + WN = WB/cos (90°-a) + WN
RM = B + WM = WB tan (90°-a) + WM
X = safety distance of outer main wheel during turn to the edge of the runway
Y = safety distance of outer nose wheel during turn to the edge of the runway
Note: Minimum edge safety distances for X and Y are specified in FAA AC 150/5300-13 and ICAO Annex 14,
3.8.3
RN = radius of turn of outer nose wheel
RM = radius of turn of outer main wheel
WN = distance from aeroplane centre-line to outer nose wheel
WM = distance from aeroplane centre-line to outer main wheel
WB = wheel base
α = steering angle.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.205 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFAC E CONDITION
(a) Operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow or ice implies uncertainties with regard
to runway friction and contaminant drag and therefore to the achievable performance and control of the
aeroplane during take-off, since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on
which the performance information is based. In the case of a contaminated runway, the first option for
the commander is to wait until the runway is cleared. If this is impracticable, he/she may consider a
take-off, provided that he/she has applied the applicable performance adjustments, and any further
safety measures he/she considers justified under the prevailing conditions.
(b) An adequate overall level of safety will only be maintained if operations in accordance with AMC
25.1591 or equivalent are limited to rare occasions. Where the frequency of such operations on
contaminated runways is not limited to rare occasions, the operator should provide additional
measures ensuring an equivalent level of safety. Such measures could include special crew training,
additional distance factoring and more restrictive wind limitations.
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AMC1 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
TAKE-OFF OBSTACLE CLEARANCE
(a) In accordance with the definitions used in preparing the take-off distance and take-off flight path data
provided in the AFM:
(1) The net take-off flight path is considered to begin at a height of 35 ft above the runway or
clearway at the end of the take -off distance determined for the aeroplane in accordance with (b) below.
(2) The take-off distance is the longest of the following distances:
(i) 115 % of the distance with all engines operating from the start of the take-off to the point at
which the aeroplane is 35 ft above the runway or clearway;
(ii) the distance from the start of the take -off to the point at which the aeroplane is 35 ft
above the runway or clearway assuming failure of the critical engine occurs at the point
corresponding to the decision speed (V1) for a dry runway; or
(iii) if the runway is wet or contaminated, the distance from the start of the take-off to the point at
which the aeroplane is 15 ft above the runway or clearway assuming failure of the critical
engine occurs at the point corresponding to the decision speed (V 1) for a wet or
contaminated runway.
(b) The net take-off flight path, determined from the data provided in the AFM in accordance with
(a)(1) and (a)(2), should clear all relevant obstacles by a vertical distance of 35 ft. When taking off on
a wet or contaminated runway and an engine failure occurs at the point corresponding to the decision
speed (V1) for a wet or contaminated runway, this implies that the aeroplane can initially be as
much as 20 ft below the net take-off flight path in accordance with (a) and, therefore, ma y clear closein obstacles by only 15 ft. When taking off on wet or contaminated runways, the operator should
exercise special care with respect to obstacle assessment, especially if a take-off is obstacle-limited
and the obstacle density is high.
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
EFFECT OF BANK ANGLES
(a) The AFM generally provides a climb gradient decrement for a 15° bank turn. For bank angles of
less than 15°, a proportionate amount should be applied, unless the manufacturer or AFM has provided
other data.
(b) Unless otherwise specified in the AFM or other performance or operating manuals from the
manufacturer, acceptable adjustments to assure adequate stall margins and gradient corrections are
provided by the following table:
Table 1: Effect of bank angles
Bank
15°
20°
25°
Speed
V2
V2 + 5 kt
V2 + 10 kt
Gradient correction
1 x AFM 15° gradient loss
2 x AFM 15° gradient loss
3 x AFM 15° gradient loss
AMC3 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
REQUIRED NAVIGATIONAL ACCURACY
(a) Navigation systems
The obstacle accountability semi-widths of 300 m and 600 m may be used if the navigation system
under OEI conditions provides a two standard deviation accuracy of 150 m and 300 m respectively.
(b) Visual course guidance
(1) The obstacle accountability semi-widths of 300 m and 600 m may be used where navigational
accuracy is ensured at all relevant points on the flight path by use of external references. These
references may be considered visible from the flight crew compartment if they are situated
more than 45° either side of the intended track and with a depression of not greater than 20° from
the horizontal.
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(2) For visual course guidance navigation, the operator should ensure that the weather conditions
prevailing at the time of operation, including ceiling and visibility, are such that the obstacle
and/or ground reference points can be seen and identified. The operations manual should
specify, for the aerodrome(s) concerned, the minimum weather conditions which enable the
flight crew to continuously determine and maintain the correct flight path with respect to ground
reference points, so as to provide a safe clearance with respect to obstructions and terrain as
follows:
(i) the procedure should be well defined with respect to ground reference points so that the track to
be flown can be analysed for obstacle clearance requirements;
(ii) the procedure should be within the capabilities of the aeroplane with respect to forward
speed, bank angle and wind effects;
(iii) a written and/or pictorial description of the procedure should be provided for crew use; and
(iv) the limiting environmental conditions (such as wind, the lowest cloud base, ceiling,
visibility, day/night, ambient lighting, obstruction lighting) should be specified.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.210 Take-off obstacle clearance
CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES FOR OBSTACLES CLEARANCES
If compliance with CAT.POL.A.210 is based on an engine failure route that differs from the all engine
departure route or SID normal departure, a ‘deviation point’ can be identified where the engine failure
route deviates from the normal departure route. Adequate obstacle clearance along the normal departure
route with failure of the critical engine at the deviation point will normally be available. However, in certain
situations the obstacle clearance along the normal departure route may be marginal and should be
checked to ensure that, in case of an engine failure after the deviation point, a flight can safely proceed along the
normal departure rout e.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.215 En-route – one-engine-inoperative (OEI)
ROUTE ANALYSIS
(a) The high terrain or obstacle analysis required should be carried out by a detailed analysis of the
route.
(b) A detailed analysis of the route should be made using contour maps of the high terrain and plotting
the highest points within the prescribed corridor’s width along the route. The next step is to
determine whether it is possible to maintain level flight with OEI 1 000 ft above the highest point
of the crossing. If this is not possible, or if the associated weight penalties are unacceptable, a
driftdown procedure should be worked out, based on engine failure at the most critical point and clearing
critical obstacles during the driftdown by at least 2 000 ft. The minimum cruise altitude is
determined by the intersection of the two driftdown paths, taking into account allowances for
decision making (see Figure 1). This method is time-consuming and requires the availability of detailed
terrain maps.
(c) Alternatively, the published minimum flight altitudes (MEA or minimum off-route altitude (MORA))
should be used for determining whether OEI level flight is feasible at the minimum flight altitude, or if it
is necessary to use the published minimum flight altitudes as the basis for the driftdown construction
(see Figure 1). This procedure a voids a detailed high terrain contour analysis, but could be more
penalising than taking the actual terrain profile into account as in (b).
(d) In order to comply with CAT.POL.A.215 (c), one means of compliance is the use of MORA and, with
CAT.POL.A.215 (d), MEA provided that the aeroplane meets the navigational equipment standard
assumed in the definition of MEA.
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Figure 1: Intersection of the two driftdown paths
Note: MEA or MORA normally provide the required 2 000 ft obstacle clearance for driftdown.
However, at and below 6 000 ft altitude, MEA and MORA cannot be used directly as only 1 000 ft
clearance is ensured.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.225 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
ALTITUDE MEASURING
The operator should use either pressure altitude or geometric altitude for its operation and this should be
reflected in the operations manual.
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.225 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
MISSED APPROACH
(a) For instrument approaches with a missed approach climb gradient greater than 2.5 %, the operator
should verify that the expected landing mass of the aeroplane allows for a missed approach with a
climb gradient equal to or greater than the applicable missed approach gradient in the OEI missed
approach configuration and at the associated speed.
(b) For instrument approaches with DH below 200 ft, the operator should verify that the expected landing mass
of the aeroplane allows a missed approach gradient of climb, with the critical engine failed and with the
speed and configuration used for a missed approach of at least 2.5 %, or the published gradient,
whichever is greater.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.225 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
MISSED APPROACH GRADIENT
(a)
Where an aeroplane cannot achieve the missed approach gradient specified in AMC2
CAT.POL.A.225, when operating at or near maximum certificated landing mass and in engine-out
conditions, the operator has the opportunity to propose an alternative means of compliance to MCAA
demonstrating that a missed approach can be executed safely taking into account appropriate mitigating
measures.
(b) The proposal for an alternative means of compliance may involve the following:
(1) considerations to mass, altitude and temperature limitations and wind for the missed approach;
(2) a proposal to increase the DA/H or MDA/H; and
(3) a contingency procedure ensuring a safe route and avoiding obstacles.
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AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing – dry runways
FACTORING OF AUTOMATIC LANDING DISTANCE PERFORMANCE DATA
In those cases where the landing requires the use of an automatic landing system, and the distance published
in the AFM includes safety margins equivalent to those contained in CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1) and
CAT.POL.A.235, the landing mass of the aeroplane should be the lesser of:
(a) the landing mass determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.235 as
appropriate; or
(b) the landing mass determined for the automatic landing distance for the appropriate surface condition, as
given in the AFM or equivalent document. Increments due to system features such as beam location or
elevations, or procedures such as use of overspeed, should also be included.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing – dry runways
LANDING MASS
CAT.POL.A.230 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass at the
destination and alternate aerodromes:
(a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 60 % or 70 % (as
applicable) of the landing distance available (LDA) on the most favourable (normally the longest)
runway in still air. Regardless of the wind conditions, the maximum landing mass for an
aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular aerodrome cannot be exceeded.
(b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The expected wind,
or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different runway. These factors
may result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which case dispatch should be based on
this lesser mass.
(c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival.
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Chapter 3 - Performance class B
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.305 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFAC E CONDITION
(a) Unless otherwise specified in the AFM or other performance or operating manuals from the
manufacturer, the variables affecting the take -off performance and the associated factors that should
be applied to the AFM data are shown in Table 1 below. They should be applied in addition to the
operational factors as prescribed in CAT.POL.A.305.
Table 1: Runway surface condition – Variables
Surface type
Grass (on firm soil)
up to 20 cm long
Paved
Condition
Dry
Wet
Wet
Factor
1.2
1.3
1.0
(b) The soil should be considered firm when there are wheel impressions but no rutting.
(c) When taking off on grass with a single -engined aeroplane, care should be taken to assess the rate of
acceleration and consequent distance increase.
(d) When making a rejected take-off on very short grass that is wet and with a firm subsoil, the
surface may be slippery, in which case the distances may increase significantly.
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.305 Take-off
RUNWAY SLOPE
Unless otherwise specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the manufacturer,
the take-off distance should be increased by 5 % for each 1 % of upslope except that correction factors
for runways with slopes in excess of 2 % should only be applied when the operator has demonstrated to
MCAA that the necessary data in the AFM or the operations manual contain the appropriated procedures and the
crew is trained to take-off in runway with slopes in excess of 2 %.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.305 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFAC E CONDITION
(a) Due to the inherent risks, operations from contaminated runways are inadvisable, and should be
avoided whenever possible. Therefore, it is advisable to delay the take-off until the runway is cleared.
(b) Where this is impracticable, the commander should also consider the excess runway length available
including the criticality of the overrun area.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
TAKE-OFF FLIGHT PATH – VISUAL COURSE GUIDANCE NAVIGATION
(a) In order to allow visual course guidance navigation, the weather conditions prevailing at the time of
operation, including ceiling and visibility, should be such that the obstacle and/or ground reference
points can be seen and identified.
(b) The operations manual should specify, for the aerodrome(s) concerned, the minimum weather
conditions that enable the flight crew to continuously determine and maintain the correct flight path
with respect to ground reference points, so as to provide a safe clearance with respect to obstructions and
terrain as follows:
(1) the procedure should be well defined with respect to ground reference points so that the track to
be flown can be analysed for obstacle clearance requirements;
(2) the procedure should be within the capabilities of the aeroplane with respect to forward speed, bank
angle and wind effects;
(3) a written and/or pictorial description of the procedure should be provided for crew use; and
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(4) the limiting environmental conditions should be specified (e.g. wind, cloud, visibility, day/night,
ambient lighting, obstruction lighting).
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
TAKE-OFF FLIGHT PATH CONSTRUCTION
(a) For demonstrating that the aeroplane clears all obstacles vertically, a flight path should be
constructed consisting of an all -engines segment to the assumed engine failure height, followed by an
engine -out segment. Where the AFM does not contain the appropriate data, the approximation given in
(b) may be used for the all-engines segment for an assumed engine failure height of 200 ft, 300 ft, or
higher.
(b) Flight path construction
(1) All-engines segment (50 ft to 300 ft)
The average all-engines gradient for the all-engines flight path segment starting at an altitude of
50 ft at the end of the take-off distance ending at or passing through the 300 ft point is given by the
following formula:
Y300 =
0.57(YERC)
1+ (VERC2-V22)/5647
The factor of 0.77 as required by CAT.POL.A.310 is already included
Where:
Y300 = average all-engines gradient from 50 ft to 300 ft;
YER C = scheduled all engines en-route gross climb gradient;
VERC = en-route climb speed, all engines knots true airspeed (TAS);
V2
= take-off speed at 50 ft, knots TAS;
(2) All-engines segment (50 ft to 200 ft)
This may be used as an alternative to (b)(1) where weather minima permit. The average allengines gradient for the all-engines flight path segment starting at an altitude of 50 ft at the end
of the take-off distance ending at or passing through the 200 ft point is given by the following formula:
Y200 =
0.51(YERC)
1+ (VERC2-V22)/3388
The factor of 0.77 as required by CAT.POL.A.310 is already included
Where:
Y200
= average all-engines gradient from 50 ft to 200 ft;
YER C = scheduled all engines en-route gross climb gradient;
VERC
= en-route climb speed, all engines, knots TAS;
V2
= take-off speed at 50 ft, knots TAS.
(3) All-engines segment (above 300 ft)
The all-engines flight path segment continuing from an altitude of 300 ft is given by the AFM
en-route gross climb gradient, multiplied by a factor of 0.77.
(4) The OEI flight path
The OEI flight path is given by the OEI gradient chart contained in the AFM.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
OBSTACLE CLEARANCE IN LIMITED VISIBILITY
(a) Unlike the airworthiness codes applicable for performance class A aeroplanes, those for performance class
B aeroplanes do not necessarily provide for engine failure in all phases of flight. It is accepted that
performance accountability for engine failure need not be considered until a height of 300 ft is reached.
(b) The weather minima given up to and including 300 ft imply that if a take-off is undertaken with
minima below 300 ft an OEI flight path should be plotted starting on the all-engines take-off flight
path at the assumed engine failure height. This path should meet the vertical and lateral obstacle
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clearance specified in CAT.POL.A.310. Should engine failure occur below this height, the associated
visibility is taken as being the minimum that would enable the pilot to make, if necessary, a
forced landing broadly in the direction of the take-off. At or below 300 ft, a circle and land
procedure is extremely inadvisable. The weather minima provisions specify that, if the assumed engine
failure height is more than 300 ft, the visibility should be at least 1 500 m and, to allow for
manoeuvring, the same minimum visibility should apply whenever the obstacle clearance criteria for
a continued take-off cannot be met.
GM2 CAT.POL.A.310 Take-off obstacle clearance – multi-engined aeroplanes
TAKE-OFF FLIGHT PATH CONSTRUC TION
(a) This GM provides examples to illustrate the method of take-off flight path construction given in
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.310. The examples are based on an aeroplane for which the AFM shows, at a
given mass, altitude, temperature and wind component the following performance data:
- factored take-off distance – 1 000 m;
- take-off speed, V2 – 90 kt;
- en-route climb speed, VER C – 120 kt;
- en-route all-engines climb gradient, YER C – 0.2;
- en-route OEI climb gradient, YERC - 1 – 0.032.
(1) Assumed engine failure height 300 ft
The average all-engines gradient from 50 ft to 300 ft may be read from Figure 1 or calculated with the
following formula:
Y300 =
0.51 ( YERC )
1+ (VERC2-V22)/5647
The factor of 0.77 as required by CAT.POL.A.310 is already included
Where:
Y300
YER C
VERC
V2
= average all-engines gradient from 50 ft to 300 ft;
= scheduled all engines en-route gross climb gradient;
= en-route climb speed, all engines knots TAS; and
= take-off speed at 50 ft, knots TAS.
Figure 1: Assumed engine failure height 300 ft
(2) Assumed engine failure height 200 ft
The average all-engines gradient from 50 ft to 200 ft may be read from Figure 2 or calculated with the
following formula:
Y200 =
0.51(YERC)
1+ (VERC2-V22)/3388
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The factor of 0.77 as required by CAT.POL.A.310 is already included where:
Y200
= average all-engines gradient from 50 ft to 200 ft;
YER C = scheduled all engines en-route gross gradient;
VERC
= en-route climb speed, all engines, knots TAS; and
V2 =
take-off speed at 50 ft, knots TAS.
Figure 2: Assumed engine failure height 200 ft
(3) Assumed engine failure height less than 200 ft
Construction of a take-off flight path is only possible if the AFM contains the required flight
path data.
(4) Assumed engine failure height more than 300 ft.
The construction of a take-off flight path for an assumed engine failure height of 400 ft is illustrated
below.
Figure 3: Assumed engine failure height less than 200 ft
GM1 CAT.POL.A.315 En-route – multi-engined aeroplanes
CRUISING ALTITUDE
(a) The altitude at which the rate of climb equals 300 ft per minute is not a restriction on the maximum
cruising altitude at which the aeroplane can fly in practice, it is merely the maximum altitude from
which the driftdown procedure ca n be planned to start.
(b) Aeroplanes may be planned to clear en-route obstacles assuming a driftdown procedure, having first
increased the scheduled en-rout e OEI descent data by 0.5 % gradient.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.320 En-route - single-engined aerop lanes
ENGINE FAILURE
CAT.POL.A.320 (a) requires the operator to ensure that in the event of an engine failure, the aeroplane should
be capable of reaching a point from which a safe forced landing can be made. Unless otherwise specified by
MCAA, this point should be 1 000 ft above the intended landing area.
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GM1 CAT.POL.A.320 En-route – single-engined aeroplanes
ENGINE FAILURE
(a) In the event of an engine failure, single-engined aeroplanes have to rely on gliding to a point suitable for a
safe forced landing. Such a procedure is clearly incompatible with flight above a cloud layer that
extends below the relevant minimum safe altitude.
(b) The operator should first increase the scheduled engine-inoperative gliding performance data by 0.5 %
gradient when verifying the en-route clearance of obstacles and the ability to reach a suitable place for a
forced landing.
(c) The altitude at which the rate of climb equals 300 ft per minute is not a restriction on the maximum
cruising altitude at which the aeroplane can fly in practice, it is merely the maximum altitude from
which the engine-inoperative procedure can be planned to start.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.325 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
ALTITUDE MEASURING
The operator should use either pressure altitude or geometric altitude for its operation and this should be
reflected in the operations manual.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing – dry runways
LANDING DISTANCE CORRECTION FACTORS
(a)
Unless otherwise
manufacturers, the
be applied to the
operational factors
specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the
variable affecting the landing performance and the associated factor that should
AFM data is shown in the table below. It should be applied in addition to the
a s prescribed in CAT.POL.A.330 (a).
Table 1: Landing distance correction factors
Surface type
Grass (on firm soil up
to 20 cm long)
Factor
1.15
(b) The soil should be considered firm when there are wheel impressions but no rutting.
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing – dry runways
RUNWAY SLOPE
Unless otherwise specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the manufacturer,
the landing distances required should be increased by 5 % for each 1 % of downslope.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing – dry runways
LANDING MASS
CAT.POL.A.330 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass at the
destination and alternate aerodromes.
(a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 70 % of the
LDA on the most favourable (normally the longest) runway in still air. Regardless of the wind
conditions, the maximum landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular
aerodrome cannot be exceeded.
(b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The expected wind,
or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different runway. These factors may
result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which case dispatch should be based on this
lesser mass.
(c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival.
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GM1 CAT.POL.A.335 Landing - wet and contaminated runways
LANDING ON WET GRASS RUNWAYS
(a) When landing on very short grass that is wet and with a firm subsoil, the surface may be slippery,
in which case the distances may increase by as much as 60 % (1.60 factor).
(b) As it may not be possible for a pilot to determine accurately the degree of wetness of the grass, particularly
when airborne, in cases of doubt, the use of the wet factor (1.15) is recommended.
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Chapter 4 – Performance class C
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.400 Take-off
LOSS OF RUNWAY LENGTH DUE TO ALIGNMENT
(a) The length of the runway that is declared for the calculation of TODA, ASDA and TORA does not
account for line-up of the aeroplane in the direction of take-off on the runway in use. This alignment
distance depends on the aeroplane geometry and access possibility to the runway in use. Accountability is
usually required for a 90° taxiway entry to the runway and 180° turnaround on the runway. There
are two distances to be considered:
(1) the minimum distance of the main wheels from the start of the runway for determining TODA
and TORA, ‘ L’; and
(2) the minimum distance of the most forward wheel(s) from the start of the runway for
determining ASDA, ‘ N’.
Figure 1: Line-up of the aeroplane in the direction of take-off – L and N
Where the aeroplane manufacturer does not provide the appropriate data, the calculation method
given in (b) may be used to determine the alignment distance.
(b) Alignment distance calculation
The distances mentioned in (a)(1) and (a)(2) above are:
L=
N=
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Where:
WB
RN = A + WN = cos (90-α)
RM = B + WM = WB tan (90°-α) + WM
X = safety distance of outer main wheel during turn to the edge of the runway
Y = safety distance of outer nose wheel during turn to the edge of the runway
Note: Minimum edge safety distances for X and Y are specified in FAA AC 150/5300-13 and ICAO
Annex 14, 3.8.3
RN = radius of turn of outer nose wheel
RM = radius of turn of outer main wheel
WN = distance from aeroplane centre-line to outer nose wheel
WM = distance from aeroplane centre-line to outer main wheel
WM = wheel base
α
= steering angle.
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.400 Take-off
RUNWAY SLOPE
Unless otherwise specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the
manufacturers, the take-off distance should be increased by 5 % for each 1 % of upslope. However,
correction factors for runways with slopes in excess of 2 % should only be applied when:
(a) the operator has demonstrated to MCAA that the necessary data in the AFM or the operations manual
contain the appropriated procedures; and
(b) the crew is trained to take-off on runways with slopes in excess of 2 %.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.400 Take-off
RUNWAY SURFAC E CONDITION
Operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow or ice implies uncertainties with regard to
runway friction and contaminant drag and therefore to the achievable performance and control of the
aeroplane during take-off, since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on
which the performance information is based. An adequate overall level of safety can, therefore, only be
maintained if such operations are limited to rare occasions. In case of a contaminated runway the first
option for the commander is to wait until the runway is cleared. If this is impracticable, he/she may
consider a take-off, provided that he/she has applied the applicable performance adjustments, and any
further safety measures he /she considers justified under the prevailing conditions.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.405 Take-off obstacle clearance
EFFECT OF BANK ANGLES
(a) The AFM generally provides a climb gradient decrement for a 15° bank turn. Unless otherwise specified in
the AFM or other performance or operating manuals from the manufacturer, acceptable adjustments to
assure adequate stall margins and gradient corrections are provided by the following:
Table 1: Effect of bank angles
Bank
15°
20°
25°
Speed
V2
V2 + 5 kt
V2 + 10 kt
Gradient correction
1 x AFM 15° gradient loss
2 x AFM 15° gradient loss
3 x AFM 15° gradient loss
(b) For bank angles of less than 15°, a proportionate amount may be applied, unless the manufacturer or
AFM has provided other data.
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AMC2 CAT.POL.A.405 Take-off obstacle clearance
REQUIRED NAVIGATIONAL ACCURACY
(a) Navigation systems
The obstacle accountability semi-widths of 300 m and 600 m may be used if the navigation system
under OEI conditions provides a two standard deviation accuracy of 150 m and 300 m respectively.
(b) Visual course guidance
(1) The obstacle accountability semi-widths of 300 m and 600 m may be used where navigational
accuracy is ensured at all relevant points on the flight path by use of external references. These
references may be considered visible from the flight crew compartment if they are situated
more than 45° either side of the intended track and with a depression of not greater than 20° from the
horizontal.
(2) For visual course guidance navigation, the operator should ensure that the weather conditions
prevailing at the time of operation, including ceiling and visibility, are such that the obstacle
and/or ground reference points can be seen and identified. The operations manual should
specify, for the aerodrome(s) concerned, the minimum weather conditions that enable the flight
crew to continuously determine and maintain the correct flight path with respect to ground reference
points, so as to provide a safe clearance with respect to obstructions and terrain as follows:
(i) the procedure should be well defined with respect to ground reference points so that the track to
be flown can be analysed for obstacle clearance requirements;
(ii) the procedure should be within the capabilities of the aeroplane with respect to forward
speed, bank angle and wind effects;
(iii) a written and/or pictorial description of the procedure should be provided for crew use; and
(iv) the limiting environmental conditions (such as wind, the lowest cloud base, ceiling,
visibility, day/night, ambient lighting, obstruction lighting) should be specified.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.415 En-route – OEI
ROUTE ANALYSIS
The high terrain or obstacle analysis should be carried out by making a detailed analysis of the route using
contour maps of the high terrain, and plotting the highest points within the prescribed corridor width along the
route. The next step is to determine whether it is possible to maintain level flight with OEI 1 000 ft above the
highest point of the crossing. If this is not possible, or if the associated weight penalties are unacceptable, a
driftdown procedure must be evaluated, based on engine failure at the most critical point, and must
show obstacle clearance during the driftdown by at least 2 000 ft. The minimum cruise altitude is
determined from the driftdown path, taking into account allowances for decision making, and the reduction in
the scheduled rate of climb (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: Intersection of the driftdown paths
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AMC1 CAT.POL.A.425 Landing – destination and alternate aerodromes
ALTITUDE MEASURING
The operator should use either pressure altitude or geometric altitude for its operation and this should be
reflected in the operations manual.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.430 Landing – dry runways
LANDING DISTANCE CORRECTION FACTORS
(a) Unless otherwise specified in the AFM or other performance or operating manuals from the
manufacturers, the variables affecting the landing performance and the associated factors to be
applied to the AFM data are shown in the table below. It should be applied in addition to the factor
specified in CAT.POL.A.430.
Table 1: Landing distance correction factor
Surface type
Grass (on firm soil up to 20 cm long)
factor
1.2
(b) The soil should be considered firm when there are wheel impressions but no rutting.
AMC2 CAT.POL.A.430 Landing – dry runways
RUNWAY SLOPE
Unless otherwise specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the manufacturer,
the landing distances required should be increased by 5 % for each 1 % of downslope.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.430 Landing - dry runways
LANDING MASS
CAT.POL.A.430 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass at the
destination and alternate aerodromes.
(a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 70 % of the
LDA on the most favourable (normally the longest) runway in still air. Regardless of the wind
conditions, the maximum landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular
aerodrome cannot be exceeded.
(b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The expected wind,
or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different runway. These factors
may result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which case dispatch should be based on
this lesser mass.
(c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival.
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Section 2 - Helicopters
Chapter 1 - General requirements
GM1 CAT.POL.H.105(c)(3)(ii)(A) General
REPORTED HEADWIND COMPONENT
The reported headwind component should be interpreted as being that reported at the time of flight
planning and may be used, provided there is no significant change of unfactored wind prior to take-off.
GM1 CAT.POL.H.110 (a)(2)(i) Obstacle accountability
COURSE GUIDANCE
Standard course guidance includes automatic direction finder (ADF) and VHF omni-directional radio range
(VOR) guidance. Accurate course guidance includes ILS, MLS or other course guidance providing an
equivalent navigational accuracy.
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Chapter 2 – Performance class 1
GM1 CAT.POL.H.200&CAT.POL.H.300&CAT.POL.H.400 General
CATEGORY A AND CATEGORY B
(a) Helicopters that have been certified according to any of the following standards are considered to satisfy the
Category A criteria. Provided that they have the necessary performance information scheduled in the
AFM, such helicopters are therefore eligible for performance class 1 or 2 operations:
(1) certification as Category A under CS-27 or CS-29;
(2) certification as Category A under JAR-27 or JAR-29;
(3) certification as Category A under FAR Part 29;
(4) certification as group A under BCAR Section G; and
(5) certification as group A under BCAR-29.
(b) In addition to the above, certain helicopters have been certified under FAR Part 27 and with compliance
with FAR Part 29 engine isolation requirements a s specified in FAA Advisory Circular AC 27-1.
Provided that compliance is established with the following additional requirements of CS-29:
(1) CS 29.1027(a) Independence of engine and rotor drive system lubrication;
(2) CS 29.1187(e);
(3) CS 29.1195(a) & (b) Provision of a one-shot fire extinguishing system for each engine;
(i) The requirement to fit a fire extinguishing system may be waived if the helicopter manufacturer can
demonstrate equivalent safety, based on service experience for the entire fleet showing that the
actual incidence of fires in the engine fire zones has been negligible.
(4) CS 29.1197;
(5) CS 29.1199;
(6) CS 29.1201; and
(7) CS 29.1323(c)(1) Ability of the airspeed indicator to consistently identify the take-off decision
point,
these helicopters are considered to satisfy the requirement to be certified as equivalent to Category
A.
(c) The performance operating rules of JAR-OPS 3, which were transposed into this Part, were drafted
in conjunction with the performance requirements of JAR-29 Issue 1 and FAR Part 29 at
amendment 29-39. For helicopters certificated under FAR Part 29 at an earlier amendment, or
under BCAR section G or BCAR -29, performance data will have been scheduled in the AFM
according to these earlier requirements. This earlier scheduled data may not be fully compatible
with this Part.
(d) Before any AOC is issued under which performance class 1 or 2 operations are conducted, it
should be established that scheduled performance data are available that are compatible with the
requirements of performance class 1 and 2 respectively.
(e) Any properly certified helicopter is considered to satisfy the Category B criteria.
If appropriately equipped (in accordance with CAT.IDE.H), such helicopters are therefore eligible for
performance class 3 operations.
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b)(4) Take-off
THE APPLICATION OF TODRH
The selected height should be determined with the use of AFM data, and be at least 10.7 m (35 ft)
above:
(a) the take-off surface; or
(b) as an alternative, a level height defined by the highest obstacle in the take -off distance required.
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GM1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b)(4) Take-off
THE APPLICATION OF TODRH
(a) Introduction
Original definitions for helicopter performance were derived from aeroplanes; hence the definition of
take-off distance owes much to operations from runways. Helicopters on the other hand can operate
from runways, confined and restricted areas and rooftop FATOs - all bounded by obstacles. As an
analogy this is equivalent to a take-off from a runway with obstacles on and surrounding it.
It can therefore be seen that unless the original definitions from aeroplanes are tailored for
helicopters, the flexibility of the helicopter might be const rained by the language of operational
performance.
This GM concentrates on the critical term - take-off distance required (TODRH) - and describes
the methods to achieve compliance with it and, in particular, the alternative procedure described in
ICAO Annex 6 Attachment A 4.1.1.3:
(1) the take-off distance required does not exceed the take-off distance available; or
(2) as an alternative, the take-off distance required may be disregarded provided that the helicopter with
the critical engine failure recognised at TDP can, when continuing the take-off, clear all obstacles
between the end of the take-off distance available and the point at which it becomes established in
a climb at VTO SS by a vertical margin of 10.7 m (35 ft) or more. An obstacle is considered to be in
the path of the helicopter if its distance from the nearest point on the surface below the intended line of
flight does not exceed 30 m or 1.5 times the maximum dimension of the helicopter, whichever is
greater.
(b) Definition of TODRH
The definition of TODRH from Annex I is as follows:
‘Take-off distance required (TODRH)’ in the case of helicopters means the horizontal distance required
from the start of the take-off to the point at which take-off safety speed (VT O SS), a selected height and
a positive climb gradient are achieved, following failure of the critical engine being recognised at
the TDP, the remaining engines operating within approved operating limits.
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b)(4) states how the specified height should be determined.
The original definition of TODRH was based only on the first part of this definition.
(c) The clear area procedure (runway)
In the past, helicopters certified in Category A would have had, at the least, a ‘clear area’ procedure. This
procedure is analogous to an aeroplane Category A procedure and assumes a runway (either metaled or
grass) with a smooth surface suitable for an aeroplane take-off (see Figure 1).
The helicopter is assumed to accelerate down the FATO (runway) outside of the height velocity
(HV) diagram. If the helicopter has an engine failure before TDP, it must be able to land back on the
FATO (runway) without damage to helicopter or passengers; if there is a failure at or after TDP the
aircraft is permitted to lose height - providing it does not descend below a specified height above
the surface (usually 15 ft if the TDP is above 15 ft). Errors by the pilot are taken into consideration
but the smooth surface of the FATO limits serious damage if the error margin is eroded (e.g. by a change of
wind conditions).
Figure 1: Clear Area take – off
The operator only has to establish that the distances required are within the distance available
(take-off distance and reject distance). The original definition of TODRH meets this case exactly.
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From the end of the TODRH obstacle clearance is given by the climb gradient of the first or second climb
segment meeting the requirement of CAT.POL.H.210 (or for performance class 2 (PC2):
CAT.POL.H.315). The clearance margin from obstacles in the take-off flight path takes account of
the distance travelled from the end of the take-off distance required and operational conditions (IMC or
VMC).
(d) Category A procedures other than clear area
Procedures other than the clear area are treated somewhat differently. However, the short field procedure
is somewhat of a hybrid as either (a) or (b) of AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b) (4) can be utilised (the
term ‘helipad’ is used in the following section to illustrate the principle only, it is not intended as
a replacement for ‘aerodrome’ or ‘FATO’).
(1) Limited area, restricted area and helipad procedures (other than elevated)
The exact names of the procedure used for other than clear area are as many as there are manufacturers.
However, principles for obstacle clearance are generic and the name is unimportant.
These procedures (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) are usually associated with an obstacle in the
continued take-off area - usually shown as a line of trees or some other natural obstacle. As
clearance above such obstacles is not readily associated with an accelerative procedure, as
described in (c), a procedure using a vertical climb (or a steep climb in the forward, sideways or
rearward direction) is utilised.
Figure 2: Short Field take-off
With the added complication of a TDP principally defined by height together with obstacles in
the continued take off area, a drop down to within 15 ft of the take-off surface is not deemed
appropriate and the required obstacle clearance is set to 35 ft (usually called min-dip). The distance
to the obstacle does not need to be calculated (provided it is outside the rejected distance
required), as clearance above all obstacles is provided by ensuring that helicopter does not
descend below the min-dip associated with a level defined by the highest obstacle in the continued
take-off area.
Figure 3: Helipad take–off
These procedures depend upon (b) of AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b) (4).
As shown in Figure 3, t he point at which VT OS S and a positive rate of climb are met defines the
TODRH.
Obstacle clearance from that point is assured by meeting the requirement of
CAT.POL.H.210 (or for PC2 - CAT.POL.H.315). Also shown in Figure 3 is the distance behind
the helipad which is the backup distance (B/U distance).
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(2) Elevated helipad procedures
The elevated helipad procedure (see Figure 4) is a special case of the ground level helipad procedure
discussed above.
Figure 4: Elevate Helipad take – off
The main difference is that drop down below the level of the take-off surface is permitted. In the drop
down phase, the Category A procedure ensures deck-edge clearance but, once clear of the deckedge, the 35 ft clearance from obstacles relies upon the calculation of drop down. Item (b) of
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (b) (4) is applied.
Although 35 ft is used throughout the requirements, it may be inadequate at particular elevated
FATOs that are subject to adverse airflow effects, turbulence, etc.
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205 (e) Take-off
OBSTACLE CLEARANCE IN THE BACKUP AREA
(a) The requirement in CAT.POL.H.205(e) has been established in order to take into account the
following factors:
(1) in the backup: the pilot has few visual cues and has to rely upon the altimeter and sight picture
through the front window (if flight path guidance is not provided) to achieve an accurate rearward
flight path;
(2) in the rejected take-off: the pilot has to be able to manage the descent against a varying
forward speed whilst still ensuring an adequate clearance from obstacles until the helicopter
gets in close proximity for landing on the FATO; and
(3) in the continued take-off; the pilot has to be able to accelerate to VT O SS (take-off safety speed for
Category A helicopters) whilst ensuring an adequate clearance from obstacles.
(b) The requirements of CAT.POL.H.205 (e) may be achieved by establishing that:
(1) in the backup area no obstacles are located within the safety zone below the rearward flight path
when described in the AFM (see Figure 1 - in the absence of such data in the AFM, the operator should
contact the manufacturer in order to define a safety zone);or
(2) during the backup, the rejected take-off and the continued take-off manoeuvres, obstacle
clearance is demonstrated to MCAA.
Figure 1: Rearward flight path
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(c) An obstacle, in the backup area, is considered if its lateral distance from the nearest point on the surface
below the intended flight path is not further than:
(1) half of the minimum FATO (or the equivalent term used in the AFM) width defined in the
AFM (or, when no width is defined 0.75 D, where D is the largest dimension of the helicopter
when the rotors are turning); plus
(2) 0.25 times D (or 3 m, whichever is greater); plus
(3) 0.10 for VFR day, or 0.15 for VFR night, of the distance travelled from the back of the FATO
(see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Obstacle accountability
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.205&CAT.POL.H.220 Take-off and landing
APPLICATION FOR ALTERNATIVE TAKE-OFF AND LANDING PR OCEDURES
(a) A reduction in the size of the take-off surface may be applied when the operator has demonstrated to MCAA
that compliance with the requirements of CAT.POL.H.205, 210 and 220 can be assured with:
(1) a procedure based upon an appropriate Category A take-off and landing profile scheduled in the AFM;
(2) a take-off or landing mass not exceeding the mass scheduled in the AFM for a hover-out-of-groundeffect one-engine-inoperative (HOGE OEI) ensuring that:
(i) following an engine failure at or before TDP, there are adequate external references to
ensure that the helicopter can be landed in a controlled manner; and
(ii) following an engine failure at or after the landing decision point (LDP) there are adequate
external references to ensure that the helicopter can be landed in a controlled manner.
(b) An upwards shift of the TDP and LDP may be applied when the operator has demonstrated to
MCAA that compliance with the requirements of CAT.POL.H.205, 210 and 220 can be assured with:
(1) a procedure based upon an appropriate Category A take-off and landing profile scheduled in the AFM;
(2) a take-off or landing mass not exceeding the mass scheduled in the AFM for a HOGE OEI ensuring
that:
(i) following an engine failure at or after TDP compliance with the obstacle clearance requirements
of CAT.POL.H.205 (b)(4) and CAT.POL.H.210 can be met; and
(ii) following an engine failure at or before the LDP the balked landing obstacle clearance
requirements of CAT.POL.H.220 (b) and CAT.POL.H.210 can be met.
(c) The Category A ground level surface area requirement may be applied at a specific elevated FATO when
the operator can demonstrate to MCAA that the usable cue environment at that aerodrome/operating site
would permit such a reduction in size.
GM1 CAT.POL.H.205&CAT.POL.H.220 Take-off and landing
APPLICATION FOR ALTERNATIVE TAKE-OFF AND LANDING PR OCEDURES
The manufacturer’s Category A procedure defines profiles and scheduled data for take -off, climb,
performance at minimum operating speed and landing, under specific environmental conditions and
masses.
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Associated with these profiles and conditions are minimum operating surfaces, take -off distances, climb
performance and landing distances; these are provided (usually in graphic form) with the take-off and
landing masses and the take-off decision point (TDP) and landing decision point (LDP).
The landing surface and the height of the TDP are directly related to the ability of the helicopter following an engine failure before or at TDP - to reject onto the surface under forced landing conditions. The
main considerations in establishing the minimum size of the landing surface are the scatter during flight
testing of the reject manoeuvre, with the remaining engine operating within approved limits, and the
required usable cue environment.
Hence, an elevated site with few visual cues - apart from the surface itself - would require a greater
surface area in order that the helicopter can be accurately positioned during the reject manoeuvre within
the specified area. This usually results in the stipulation of a larger surface for an elevated site than
for a ground level site (where lateral cues may be present).
This could have the unfortunate side-effect that a FATO that is built 3 m above the surface (and
therefore elevated by definition) might be out of operational scope for some helicopters - even though there
might be a rich visual cue environment where rejects are not problematical. The presence of elevated sites
where ground level surface requirements might be more appropriate could be brought to the attention of
MCAA.
It can be seen that the size of the surface is directly related to the requirement of the helicopter to
complete a rejected take-off following an engine failure. If the helicopter has sufficient power such that a
failure before or at TDP will not lead to a requirement for rejected take-off, the need for large surfaces is
removed; sufficient power for the purpose of this GM is considered to be the power required for hover-out-ofground-effect one-engine-inoperative (HOGE OEI).
Following an engine failure at or after the TDP, the continued take-off path provides OEI clearance from the
take-off surface and the distance to reach a point from where climb performance in the first, and
subsequent segments, is assured.
If HOGE OEI performance exists at the height of the TDP, it follows that the continued take-off profile,
which has been defined for a helicopter with a mass such that a rejected take-off would be required following an
engine failure at or before TDP, would provide the same, or better, obstacle clearance and the same, or
less, distance to reach a point where climb performance in the first, and subsequent segments, is assured.
If the TDP is shifted upwards, provided that the HOGE OEI performance is established at the revised TDP, it
will not affect the shape of the continued take-off profile but should shift the min-dip upwards by the same
amount that the revised TDP has been increased - with respect to the basic TDP.
Such assertions are concerned only with the vertical or the backup procedures and can be regarded as achievable
under the following circumstances:
(a) when the procedure is flown, it is based upon a profile contained in the AFM - with the exception of the
necessity to perform a rejected take-off;
(b) the TDP, if shifted upwards (or upwards and backward in the backup procedure) will be the height at which
the HOGE OEI performance is established; and
(c) if obstacles are permitted in the backup area they should continue to be permitted with a revised TDP.
GM1 CAT.POL.H.215 (b)(3) En-route - critical engine inoperative
FUEL JETTISON
The presence of obstacles along the en-route flight path may preclude compliance with CAT.POL.H.215
(a)(1) at the planned mass at the critical point along the route. In this case fuel jettison at the most critical
point may be planned, provided that the procedures of (c) in AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.150 (b) are complied with.
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.225 (a) (5) Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site
HELICOPTER MASS LIMITATION
(a)
The helicopter mass limitation at take-off or landing specified in CAT.POL.H.225 (a)(5) should be
determined using the climb performance data from 35 ft to 200 ft at VT OSS (first segment of the
take-off flight path) contained in the Category A supplement of the AFM (or equivalent manufacturer
data acceptable in accordance with GM1-CAT.POL.H.200 & CAT.POL.H.300 & CAT.POL.H.400).
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(b) The first segment climb data to be considered is established for a climb at the take-off safety speed
VTOSS, with the landing gear extended (when the landing gear is retractable), with the critical
engine inoperative and the remaining engines operating at an appropriate power rating (the 2 min
30 sec or 2 min OEI power rating, depending on the helicopter type certification). The appropriate VT
OS S, is the value specified in the Category A performance section of the AFM for vertical take-off and
landing procedures (VTOL, helipad or equivalent manufacturer terminology).
(c) The ambient conditions at the site (pressure-altitude and temperature) should be taken into account.
(d) The data is usually provided in charts in one of the following ways:
(1) Height gain in ft over a horizontal distance of 100 ft in the first segment configuration (35 ft to
200 ft, VT OS S, 2 min 30 sec / 2 min OEI power rating).
This chart should be entered with a height gain of 8 ft per 100 ft horizontally travelled, resulting
in a mass value for every pressure-altitude/temperature combination considered.
(2) Horizontal distance to climb from 35 ft to 200 ft in the first segment configuration (VT OSS , 2
min 30 sec / 2 min OEI power rating). This chart should be entered with a horizontally distance of
628 m (2 062 ft), resulting in a mass value for every pressure-altitude/temperature combination
considered.
(3) Rate of climb in the first segment configuration (35 ft to 200 ft, VT OS S, 2 min 30 sec / 2 min
OEI power rating). This chart can be entered with a rate of climb equal to the climb speed
(VT OSS ) value in knots (converted to true airspeed) multiplied by 8.1, resulting in a mass
value for every pressure-altitude/temperature combination considered.
GM1 CAT.POL.H.225 Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
(a) General
The original Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(i) was introduced in
January 2002 to address problems that had been encountered by States at hospital sites due to the
applicable performance requirements of JAR-OPS 3 Subparts G and H. These problems were enumerated
in ACJ to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) paragraph 8, part of which is reproduced below. “8 Problems
with hospital sites
During implementation of JAR-OPS 3, it was established that a number of States had encountered
problems with the impact of performance rules where helicopters were operated for HEMS. Although
States accept that progress should be made towards operations where risks associated with a critical
power unit failure are eliminated, or limited by the exposure time concept, a number of landing sites exist
which do not (or never can) allow operations to performance class 1 or 2 requirements.
These sites are generally found in a congested hostile environment:
- in the grounds of hospitals; or
- on hospital buildings;
The problem of hospital sites is mainly historical and, whilst the Authority could insist that such
sites not be used - or used at such a low weight that critical power unit failure performance is assured, it
would seriously curtail a number of existing operations.
Even though the rule for the use of such sites in hospital grounds for HEMS operations (Appendix
1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) sub-paragraph (c)(2)(i)(A)) attracts alleviation until 2005, it is only partial and
will still impact upon present operations.
Because such operations are performed in the public interest, it was felt that the Authority should
be able t o exercise its discretion so as to allow continued use of such sites provided that it is
satisfied that an adequate level of safety can be maintained - notwithstanding that the site does not
allow operations to performance class 1 or 2 standards. However, it is in the interest of continuing
improvements in safety that the alleviation of such operations be constrained to existing sites, and for
a limited period.”
As stated in this ACJ and embodied in the text of the appendix, the solution was short-term (until
31 December 2004). During the comment period of JAA NPA 18, representations were made to the
JAA that the alleviation should be extended to 2009. The review committee, in not accepting this
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request, had in mind that this was a short-term solution to address an immediate problem, and a
permanent solution should be sought.
(b) After 1 January 2005
Although elimination of such sites would remove the problem, it is recognised that phasing out, or
rebuilding existing hospital sites, is a long-term goal which ma y not be cost-effective, or even possible, in
some States.
It should be noted however that CAT.POL.H.225 (a) limits the problem by confining approvals to hospital
sites established before 1 July 2002 (established in this context means either: built before that date,
or brought into service before that date – this precise wording was used to avoid problems
associated with a ground level aerodrome/operating site where no building would be required). Thus
the problem of these sites is contained and reducing in severity. This date was set approximately 6
months after the intended implementation of the original JAR-OPS 3 appendix.
EASA adopted the JAA philosophy that, from 1st January 2005 approval would be confined to those
sites where a CAT A procedure alone cannot solve the problem. The determination of whether the
helicopter can or cannot be operated in accordance with performance class 1 should be established with
the helicopter at a realistic payload and fuel to complete the mission. However, in order to reduce the risk
at those sites, the application of the requirements contained in CAT.POL.H.225 (a) should be applied.
Additionally and in order to promote understanding of the problem, the text contained in
CAT.POL.H.225 (b) had been amended to refer to the performance class and not to Annex 14 as in
the original appendix. Thus Part C of the operations manual should reflect the non-conformance with
performance class 1, as well as the site specific procedures (approach and departure paths) to minimise the
danger to third parties in the event of an incident.
The following paragraphs explain the problem and solutions.
(c) The problem associated with such sites
There are a number of problems: some of which can be solved with the use of appropriate
helicopters and procedures; and others which, because of the size of the site or the obstacle
environment, cannot. They consist of:
(1) the size of the surface of the site (smaller than that required by the manufacturer’s procedure);
(2) an obstacle environment that prevents the use of the manufacturer’s procedure (obstacles in the
backup area); and
(3) an obstacle environment that does not allow recovery following an engine failure in the critical
phase of take-off (a line of buildings requiring a demanding gradient of climb) at a realistic
payload and fuel to complete the mission.
- Problems associated with (c)(1): the inability to climb and conduct a rejected landing back to
the site following an engine failure before the Decision Point (DP).
- Problems associated with (c)(2): as in (c)(1)).
- Problems associated with (c)(3): climb into an obstacle following an engine failure after DP.
Problems cannot be solved in the immediate future but can, when mitigated with the use of the
latest generation of helicopters (operated at a weight that can allow useful payloads and endurance),
minimise exposure to risk.
(d) Long term solution
Although not offering a complete solution, it was felt that a significant increase in safety could be
achieved by applying an additional performance margin to such operations. This solution allowed the
time restriction of 2004 to be removed.
The required performance level of 8 % climb gradient in the first segment reflects ICAO Annex 14
Volume II in ‘Table 4-3 'Dimensions and slopes of obstacle limitations surfaces’ for performance
class 2.
The performance delta is achieved without the provision of further manufacturer’s data by using
existing graphs to provide the reduced take-off mass (RTOM).
If the solution in relation to the original problem is examined, the effects can be seen.
(1) Solution with relation to (c)(1): although the problem still exists, the safest procedure is a
dynamic take-off reducing the time taken to achieve Vst a y up and thus allowing VFR recovery – if
the failure occurs at or after Vy and 200 ft, an IFR recovery is possible.
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(2) Solution with relation to (c)(2): as in (c)(1) above.
(3) Solution with relation to (c)(3): once again this does not give a complete solution, however the
performance delta minimises the time during which a climb over the obstacle cannot be achieved.
GM1 CAT.POL.H.225 (a)(6) Helicopter operations to/from a public interest site
ENDORSEMENT FROM ANOTHER STATE
(a) Application to another State
To obtain an endorsement from another State the operator should submit to that State:
(1) the reasons that preclude compliance with the requirements for operations in performance class 1;
(2) the site-specific procedures to minimise the period during which there would be danger to
helicopter occupants and person on the surface in the event of an engine failure during take-off and
landing; and
(3) the extract from the operations manual to comply with CAT.POL.H.225 (c).
(b) Endorsement from another State
Upon receiving the endorsement from another State the operator should submit it together with the
site specific procedures and the reasons and justification that preclude the use of performance class 1
criteria, to MCAA to obtain the approval or extend the approval to a new public interest site.
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Chapter 3 – Performance class 2
GM to Section 2, Chapter 3 performance class 2
OPERATIONS IN PERFORMANCE CLASS 2
(a) Introduction
This GM describes performance class 2 as established in Part-CAT. It has been produced for the purpose
of:
(1) explaining the underlying philosophy of operations in performance class 2;
(2) showing simple means of compliance; and
(3) explaining how to determine - with examples and diagrams:
(i) the take-off and landing masses;
(ii) the length of the safe forced landing area;
(iii) distances to establish obstacle clearance; and
(iv) entry point(s) into performance class 1.
It explains the derivation of performance class 2 from ICAO Annex 6 Part III and describes an
alleviation that may be approved in accordance with CAT.POL.H.305 following a risk assessment.
It examines the basic requirements, discusses the limits of operation, and considers the benefits of the use of
performance class 2.
It contains examples of performance class 2 in specific circumstances, and explains how these examples
may be generalised to provide operators with methods of calculating landing distances and obstacle
clearance.
(b) Definitions used in this GM
The definitions for the following terms, used in this GM, are contained in Annex I and its AMC:
(1) distance DR
(2) defined point after take-off (DPATO)
(3) defined point before landing (DPBL)
(4) landing distance available (LDAH)
(5) landing distance required (LDRH)
(6) performance class 2
(7) safe forced landing (SFL)
(8) take-off distance available (TODAH).
The following terms, which are not defined Annex I, are used in this GM:
- VT: a target speed at which to aim at the point of minimum ground clearance (min-dip) during
acceleration from TDP to VT OS S
- V50. : a target speed and height utilised to establish an AFM distance (in compliance with the
requirement of CS/JAR 29.63) from which climb out is possible; and
- Vstay up: a colloquial term used to indicate a speed at which a descent would not result following an
engine failure. This speed is several knots lower than V TOSS at the equivalent take-off mass.
(c) What defines performance class 2
Performance class 2 can be considered as performance class 3 take-off or landing, and performance
class 1 climb, cruise and descent. It comprises an all-engines-operating (AEO) obstacle clearance
regime for the take-off or landing phases, and a OEI obstacle clearance regime for the climb, cruise,
descent, approach and missed approach phases.
For the purpose of performance calculations in Part -CAT, the CS/JAR 29.67 Category A climb
performance criteria is used:
- 150 ft/min at 1 000 ft (at Vy);
and depending on the choice of DPATO:
- 100 ft/min up to 200 ft (at VT OSS) at the appropriate power settings.
(1) Comparison of obstacle clearance in all performance classes
Figure 1 shows the profiles of the three performance classes - superimposed on one diagram.
- Performance class 1 (PC1): from TDP, requires OEI obstacle clearance in all phases of
flight; the construction of Category A procedures, provides for a flight path to the first
climb segment, a level acceleration segment to V y (which may be shown concurrent with
the first segment), followed by the second climb segment from Vy at 200 ft (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: All Performance Classes (a comparison)
-
-
Performance class 2 (PC2): requires AEO obstacle clearance to DPATO and OEI from then on.
The take-off mass has the PC1 second segment climb performance at its basis therefore, at the
point where Vy at 200 ft is reached, Performance Class 1 is achieved (see also Figure 3).
Performance class 3 (PC3): requires AEO obstacle clearance in all phases.
Figure 2: Performance Class 1 distances
(2) Comparison of the discontinued take-off in all performance classes
(i) PC1 - requires a prepared surface on which a rejected landing can be undertaken (no damage); and
(ii) PC2 and 3 - require a safe forced landing surface (some damage can be tolerated but there
must be a reasonable expectancy of no injuries to persons in the aircraft or third parties on the
surface).
(d) The derivation of performance class 2
PC2 is primarily based on the text of ICAO Annex 6 Part III Section II and its attachments which provide for the following:
(1) obstacle clearance before DPATO: the helicopter shall be able, with all engines operating, to clear all
obstacles by an adequate margin until it is in a position to comply with (2);
(2) obstacle clearance after DPATO: the helicopter shall be able, in the event of the critical engine
becoming inoperative at any time after reaching DPATO, to continue the take-off clearing all
obstacles along the flight path by an adequate margin until it is able to comply with en-route
clearances; and
(3) engine failure before DPATO: before the DPATO, failure of the critical engine may cause the
helicopter to force land; therefore a safe forced landing should be possible (this is analogous to the
requirement for a reject in performance class 1 but where some damage to the helicopter can be
tolerated.)
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(e) Benefits of performance class 2
Operations in performance class 2 permit advantage to be taken of an AEO procedure for a short
period during take-off and landing - whilst retaining engine failure accountability in the climb,
descent and cruise. The benefits include the ability to:
(1) use (the reduced) distances scheduled for the AEO - thus permitting operations to take place at
smaller aerodromes and allowing airspace requirements to be reduced;
(2) operate when the safe forced landing distance available is located outside the boundary of the
aerodrome;
(3) operate when the take-off distance required is located outside the boundary of the aerodrome; and
(4) use existing Category A profiles and distances when the surface conditions are not adequate for a
reject but are suitable for a safe forced landing (for example when the ground is waterlogged).
Additionally, following a risk assessment when the use of exposure is approved by MCAA the ability
to:
(i) operate when a safe forced landing is not assured in the take-off phase; and
(ii) penetrate the HV curve for short periods during take-off or landing.
(f) Implementation of performance class 2 in Part-CAT
The following sections explain the principles of the implementation of performance class 2.
(1) Does ICAO spell it all out?
ICAO Annex 6 does not give guidance on how DPATO should be calculated nor does it require that
distances be established for the take-off. However, it does require that, up to DPATO AEO, and
from DPATO OEI, obstacle clearance is established (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 which are
simplified versions of the diagrams contained in Annex 6 Part III, Attachment A).
(ICAO Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft (IVA 2.2.3.1.4’ and ‘IVB 2.2.7 d) requires that
an AEO distance be scheduled for all helicopters operating in performance classes 2 & 3. ICAO
Annex 6 is dependent upon the scheduling of the AEO distances, required in Annex 8, to provide
data for the location of DPATO.)
When showing obstacle clearance, the divergent obstacle clearance height required for IFR is - as
in performance class 1 - achieved by the application of the additional obstacle clearance of 0.01
distance DR (the distance from the end of ‘take-off-distance-available’ - see the pictorial
representation in Figure 4 and the definition in Annex I).
As can also be seen from Figure 4, flight must be conducted in VFR until DPATO has been
achieved (and deduced that if an engine failure occurs before DPATO, entry into IFR is not permitted
(as the OEI climb gradient will not have been established)).
Figure 3: Performance Class 2 Obstacle Clearance
Figure 4: Performance Class 2 Obstacle Clearance (plan view)
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(2) Function of DPATO
From the preceding paragraphs it can be seen that DPATO is germane to PC2. It can also be seen
that, in view of the many aspects of DPATO, it has, potentially, to satisfy a number of
requirements that are not necessarily synchronised (nor need to be). It is clear that it is only
possible to establish a single point for DPATO, satisfying the requirement of (d)(2) & (d)(3),
when:
- accepting the TDP of a Category A procedure; or
- extending the safe forced landing requirement beyond required distances (if data are available to
permit the calculation of the distance for a safe forced landing from the DPATO).
It could be argued that the essential requirement for DPATO is contained in section (d)(2) - OEI
obstacle clearance. From careful examination of the flight path reproduced in Figure 3 above, it may be
reasonably deduced that DPATO is the point at which adequate climb performance is established
(examination of Category A procedures would indicate that this could be (in terms of mass, speed and
height above the take-off surface) the conditions at the start of the first or second segment s - or any
point between.)
(The diagrams in Attachment A of ICAO Annex 6 do not appear to take account of drop down
- permitted under Category A procedures; similarly with helideck departures, the potential for
acceleration in drop down below deck level (once the deck edge has been cleared) is also not
shown. These omissions could be regarded as a simplification of the diagram, as drop down is
discussed and accepted in the accompanying ICAO text.)
It may reasonably be argued that, during the take-off and before reaching an appropriate climb speed
(VT O SS or Vy ), Vs ta y up will already have been achieved (where Vst a y up is the ability to
continue the flight and accelerate without descent - shown in some Category A procedures as
VT or target speed) and where, in the event of a n engine failure, no landing would be required.
It is postulated that, to practically satisfy all the requirements of (d)(1), (2)and (3), DPATO
does not need to be defined at one synchronised point; provisions can be met separately - i.e.
defining the distance for a safe forced landing, and then establishing the OEI obstacle clearance flight
path.
As the point at which the helicopter’s ability to continue the flight safely, with the critical engine
inoperative is the critical element, it is that for which DPATO is used in this text.
Figure 5: The three elements in a PC 2 take – off
(i) The three elements from the pilot’s perspective
When seen from the pilot’s perspective (see Figure 5), there are three elements of the PC 2
take-off - each with associated related actions which need to be considered in the case of an
engine failure:
(A) action in the event of an engine failure - up to the point where a forced-landing will be
required;
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(B) action in the event of an engine failure - from the point where OEI obstacle clearance
is established (DPATO); and
(C) pre-considered action in the event of an engine failure - in the period between (A) and
(B)
The action of the pilot in (A) and (Bb) is deterministic, i.e. it remains the same for every
occasion. For pre-consideration of the action at point (C), as is likely that the planned
flight path will have to be abandoned (the point at which obstacle clearance using the OEI
climb gradients not yet being reached), the pilot must (before take-off) have considered his/her
options and the associated risks, and have in mind the course of action that will be pursued
in the event of an engine failure during that short period. (As it is likely that any action will
involve turning manoeuvres, the effect of turns on performance must be considered.)
(3) Take-off mass for performance class 2
As previously stated, performance class 2 is an AEO take-off that, from DPATO, has to meet
the requirement for OEI obstacle clearance in the climb and en-route phases. Take-off mass is
therefore the mass that gives at least the minimum climb performance of 150 ft/min at Vy , at 1
000 ft above the take-off point, and obstacle clearance.
As can be seen in Figure 6 below, the take -off mass may have to be modified when it does not
provide the required OEI clearance from obstacles in the take-off-flight path (exactly as in
performance class 1). This could occur when taking off from an aerodrome/operating site where the
flight path has to clear an obstacle such a ridge line (or line of buildings) that can neither be:
(i) flown around using VFR and see and avoid; nor
(ii) cleared using the minimum climb gradient given by the take-off mass (150 ft/min at 1 000 ft).
In this case, the take-off mass has to be modified (using data contained in the AFM) to give an
appropriate climb gradient.
Figure 6: Performance Class 2 (enhanced climb gradient)
(4) Do distances have to be calculated?
Distances do not have to be calculated if, by using pilot judgement or standard practice, it can be
established that:
(i) a safe forced landing is possible following an engine failure (notwithstanding that there
might be obstacles in the take-off path); and
(ii) obstacles can be cleared (or avoided) - AEO in the take-off phase and OEI in the climb.
If early entry (in the sense of cloud base) into IMC is expected, an IFR departure should be
planned. However, standard masses and departures can be used when described in the operations
manual.
(5) The use of Category A data
In Category A procedures, TDP is the point at which either a rejected landing or a safe continuation
of the flight, with OEI obstacle clearance, can be performed.
For PC2 (when using Category A data), only the safe forced landing (reject) distance depends
on the equivalent of the TDP; if an engine fails between TDP and DPATO the pilot has to decide what
action is required - it is not necessary for a safe forced landing distance to be established from beyond
the equivalent of TDP (see Figure 5 and discussion in (f)(2)(ii)(A)).
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Category A procedures based on a fixed VT OSS are usually optimised either for the reduction of the
rejected ta ke-off distance, or the take-off distance. Category A procedures based on a variable
VT OSS allow either a reduction in required distances (low VT O SS ) or an improvement in OEI
climb capability (high VTO SS ). These optimisations may be beneficial in PC2 to satisfy the
dimensions of the take-off site.
In view of the different requirements for PC2 (from PC1), it is perfectly acceptable for the
two calculations (one to establish the safe forced landing distance and the other to establish
DPATO) to be based upon different Category A procedures. However, if this method is used, the
mass resulting from the calculation cannot be more than the mass from the more limiting of the
procedures.
(6) DPATO and obstacle clearance
If it is necessary for OEI obstacle clearance to be established in the climb, the starting point (DPATO)
for the (obstacle clearance) gradient has to be established. Once DPATO is defined, the OEI
obstacle clearance is relatively easy to calculate with data from the AFM.
(i) DPATO based on AEO distance
In the simplest case; if provided, the scheduled AEO to 200 ft at Vy can be used (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Suggested AEO locations for DPATO
Otherwise, and if scheduled in the AFM, the AEO distance to 50 ft (V50)
– determined in accordance with CS/JAR 29.63 - can be used (see Figure 7). Where this
distance is used, it will be necessary to ensure that the V50 climb out speed is associated with a
speed and mass for which OEI climb data is available so that, from V50, the OEI flight path can be
constructed.
(ii) DPATO based on Category A distances
It is not necessary for specific AEO distances t o be used (although for obvious reasons it is
preferable); if they are not available, a flight path (with OEI obstacle clearance) can be
established using Category A distances (see Figure 8 and Figure 9) - which will then be
conservative.
Figure 8: Using Cat A data; actual and apparent position of DPATO (Vtoss and start of first segment)
The apparent DPATO is for planning purposes only in the case where AEO data are not
available to construct the take-off flight path. The actual OEI flight path will provide better
obstacle clearance than the apparent one (used to demonstrate the minimum requirement) as seen from the firm and dashed lines in the above figure.
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Figure 9: Using Cat A data; actual and apparent position of DPATO (Vy and start of second segment)
(iii) Use of most favourable Category A data
The use of AEO data is recommended for calculating DPATO. However, where an AEO distance
is not provided in the flight manual, distance to Vy at 200 ft, from the most favourable of the
Category A procedures, can be used to construct a flight path (provided it can be demonstrated
that AEO distance to 200 ft at Vy is always closer to the take-off point than the CAT A OEI
flight path).
In order to satisfy the requirement of CAT.POL.H.315, the last point from where the start
of OEI obstacle clearance can be shown is at 200 ft.
(7) The calculation of DPATO - a summary
DPATO should be defined in terms of speed and height above the take-off surface and should
be selected such that AFM data (or equivalent data) are available to establish the distance from
the start of the take-off up to the DPATO (conservatively if necessary).
(i) First method
DPATO is selected as the AFM Category B take-off distance (V5 0 speed or any other take-off
distance scheduled in accordance with CS/JAR 29.63) provided that within the distance the
helicopter can achieve:
(A) one of the VT OS S values (or the unique VTO SS value if it is not variable)
provided in the AFM, selected so as to assure a climb capability according to Category
A criteria; or
(B) Vy.
Compliance with CAT.POL.H.315 would be shown from V5 0 (or the scheduled Category B takeoff distance).
(ii) Second method
DPATO is selected as equivalent to the TDP of a Category A ‘clear area’ take-off procedure
conducted in the same conditions.
Compliance with CAT.POL.H.315 would be shown from the point at which VT OSS , a height of
at least 35 ft above the take-off surface and a positive climb gradient are achieved (which is
the Category A ‘clear area’ take-off distance).
Safe forced landing areas should be available from the start of the take-off, to a distance
equal to the Category A ‘clear area’ rejected take-off distance.
(iii) Third method
As an alternative, DPATO could be selected such that AFM OEI data are available to establish a
flight path initiated with a climb at that speed. This speed should then be:
(A) one of the VT OS S values (or the unique VTO SS value if it is not variable)
provided in the AFM, selected so as to assure a climb capability according to Category
A criteria; or
(B) Vy
The height of the DPATO should be at least 35 ft and can be selected up to 200 ft.
Compliance with CAT.POL.H.315 would be shown from the selected height.
(8) Safe forced landing distance
Except as provided in (f)(7)(ii), the establishment of the safe forced landing distance could be
problematical as it is not likely that PC2 specific data will be available in the AFM.
By definition, the Category A reject distance may be used when the surface is not suitable for a reject,
but may be satisfactory for a safe forced landing (for example where the surface is flooded or is
covered with vegetation).
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Any Category A (or other accepted) data may be used to establish the distance. However, once
established it remains valid only if the Category A mass (or the mass from the accepted data)
is used and the Category A (or accepted) AEO profile to the TDP is flown. In view of these
constraints, the likeliest Category A procedures are the clear area or the short field (restricted area/site)
procedures.
From Figure 10, it can be seen that if the Category B V50 procedure is used to establish DPATO, the
combination of the distance to 50 ft and the Category A ‘clear area’ landing distance, required by
CS/JAR 29.81 (the horizontal distance required to land and come to a complete stop from a
point 50 ft above the landing surface), will give a good indication of the maximum safe forced
landing distance required (see also the explanation on Vs ta y up above).
Figure 10: Category B (V50) safe – forced – landing distance
(9) Performance class 2 landing
For other than PC2 operations to elevated FATOs or helidecks (see section (g)(4)(i)), the principles
for the landing case are much simpler. As the performance requirements for PC1 and PC2 landings are
virtually identical, the condition of the landing surface is the main issue.
If the engine fails at any time during the approach, the helicopter must be able either: to perform
a go-around meeting the requirements of CAT.POL.H.315; or perform a safe forced landing on the
surface. In view of this, and if using PC1 data, the LDP should not be lower that the corresponding TDP
(particularly in the case of a variable TDP).
The landing mass will be identical to the take-off mass for the same site (with consideration for any
reduction due to obstacle clearance - as shown in Figure 6 above).
In the case of a balked landing (i.e. the landing site becomes blocked or unavailable during the
approach), the full requirement for take-off obstacle clearance must be met.
(g) Operations in performance class 2 with exposure
The Implementing Rules offer an opportunity to discount the requirement for an assured safe forced
landing area in the take-off or landing phase - subject to an approval from MCAA. The following
sections deals with this option:
(1) Limit of exposure
As stated above, performance class 2 has to ensure AEO obstacle clearance to DPATO and OEI
obstacle clearance from that point. This does not change with the application of exposure.
It can therefore be stated that operations with exposure are concerned only with alleviation from
the requirement for the provision of a safe forced landing.
The absolute limit of exposure is 200 ft - from which point OEI obstacle clearance must be
shown.
(2) The principle of risk assessment
ICAO Annex 6 Part III Chapter 3.1.2 states that:
“3.1.2 In conditions where the safe continuation of flight is not ensured in the event of a critical
engine failure, helicopter operations shall be conducted in a manner that gives appropriate
consideration for achieving a safe forced landing.”
Although a safe forced landing may no longer be the (absolute) Standard, it is considered that risk
assessment is obligatory to satisfy the amended requirement for ‘appropriate consideration’.
Risk assessment used for fulfilment of this proposed Standard is consistent with principles
described in ‘AS/NZS 4360:1999’. Terms used in this text and defined in the AS/NZS Standard are
shown in Sentence Case e.g. risk assessment or risk reduction.
(3) The application of risk assessment to performance class 2
Under circumstances where no risk attributable to engine failure (beyond that inherent in the safe
forced landing) is present, operations in performance class 2 may be conducted in accordance with the
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non-alleviated requirements contained above - and a safe forced landing will be possible.
Under circumstances where such risk would be present, i.e. operations to an elevated FATO (deck
edge strike); or, when permitted, operations from a site where a safe forced landing cannot be
accomplished because the surface is inadequate; or where there is penetration into the HV curve for
a short period during take-off or landing (a limitation in CS/JAR 29 AFMs), operations have to be
conducted under a specific approval.
Provided such operations are risk assessed and can be conducted to an established safety target
- they ma y be approved in accordance with CAT.POL.H.305.
(i) The elements of the risk management
The approval process consists of an operational risk assessment and the application of four
principles:
(A) a safety target;
(B) a helicopter reliability assessment;
(C) continuing airworthiness; and
(D) mitigating procedures.
(ii) The safety target
The main element of the risk assessment when exposure was initially introduced by the
JAA into JAR -OPS 3 (NPA OPS-8), was the assumption that turbine engines in helicopters
would have failure rates of about 1:100 000 per flying hour, which would permit (against
the agreed safety target of 5 x 10- 8 per event) an exposure of about 9 seconds for twins
during the take-off or landing event. (When choosing this target it was assumed that the
majority of current well maintained turbine powered helicopters would be capable of
meeting the event target - it therefore represents the residual risk).
(Residual risk is considered to be the risk that remains when all mitigating procedures airworthiness and operational - are applied (see sections (g)(3)(iv) and (g)(3)(v))).
(iii) The reliability assessment
The reliability assessment was initiated to test the hypothesis (stated in (g)(3)(ii) ) that the
majority of turbine powered types would be able to meet the safety target. This hypothesis could
only be confirmed by an examination of the manufacturers’ power-loss data.
(iv) Mitigating procedures (airworthiness)
Mitigating procedures consist of a number of elements:
(A) the fulfilment of all manufacturers’ safety modifications;
(B) a comprehensive reporting system (both failures and usage data); and
(C) the implementation of a usage monitoring system (UMS).
Each of these elements is to ensure that engines, once shown to be sufficiently reliable to
meet the safety target, will sustain such reliability (or improve upon it).
The monitoring system is felt to be particularly important as it had already been
demonstrated that when such systems are in place it inculcates a more considered approach
to operations. In addition the elimination of ‘hot starts’, prevented by the UMS, itself minimises
the incidents of turbine burst failures.
(v) Mitigating procedures (operations)
Operational and training procedures, to mitigate the risk - or minimise the consequences - are
required of the operator. Such procedures are intended to minimise risk by ensuring that:
(A) the helicopter is operated within the exposed region for the minimum time; and
(B) simple but effective procedures are followed to minimise the consequence should an
engine failure occur.
(4) Operation with exposure
When operating with exposure, there is alleviation from the requirement to establish a safe
forced landing area (which extends to landing as well as take-off). However, the requirement for
obstacle clearance - AEO in the take-off and from DPATO OEI in the climb and en-route
phases - remains (both for take-off and landing).
The take-off mass is obtained from the more limiting of the following:
- the climb performance of 150 ft/min at 1 000 ft above the take-off point; or
- obstacle clearance (in accordance with (f)(3) above); or
- AEO hover out of ground effect (HOGE) performance at the appropriate power setting. (AEO
HOGE is required to ensure acceleration when (near) vertical dynamic take-off techniques
are being used. Additionally for elevated FATO or helidecks, it ensures a power reserve to offset
ground cushion dissipation; and ensures that, during the landing manoeuvre, a stabilised
HOGE is available - should it be required.)
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(i) Operations to elevated FATOs or helidecks
PC2 operations to elevated FATOs and helidecks are a specific case of operations with exposure.
In these operations, the alleviation covers the possibility of:
(A) a deck-edge strike if the engine fails early in the take-off or late in the landing;
(B) penetration into the HV Curve during take-off and landing; and
(C) forced landing with obstacles on the surface (hostile water conditions) below the elevated
FATO (helideck). The take-of mass is as stated above and relevant techniques are as
described in GM1 CAT.POL.H.310(c)&CAT.POL.H.325(c).
It is unlikely that the DPATO will have to be calculated with operations to helidecks (due to the
absence of obstacles in the take-off path).
(ii) Additional requirements for operations to helidecks in a hostile environment
For a number of reasons (e.g. the deck size, and the helideck environment – including
obstacles and wind vectors), it was not anticipated that operations in PC1 would be
technically feasible or economically justifiable by the projected JAA deadline of 2010 (OEI
HOGE could have provided a method of compliance but this would have resulted in a severe and
unwarranted restriction on payload/range).
However, due to the severe consequences of an engine failure to helicopters involved in
take-off and landings to helidecks located in hostile sea areas (such as the North Sea or the
North Atlantic), a policy of risk reduction is called for. As a result, enhanced class 2 takeoff and landing masses together with techniques that provide a high confidence of safety due
to:
(A) deck-edge avoidance; and
(B) drop-down that provides continued flight clear of the sea,
are seen as practical measures.
For helicopters which have a Category A elevated helideck procedure, certification is
satisfied by demonstrating a procedure and adjusted masses (adjusted for wind as well as
temperature and pressure) that assure a 15 ft deck edge clearance on take-off and landing. It
is therefore recommended that manufacturers, when providing enhanced PC2 procedures, use the
provision of this deck-edge clearance as their benchmark.
As the height of the helideck above the sea is a variable, drop down has to be calculated;
once clear of the helideck, a helicopter operating in PC1 would be expected to meet the 35 ft
obstacle clearance. Under circumstances other than open sea areas and with less complex
environmental conditions, this would not present difficulties. As the provision of drop down
takes no account of operational circumstances, standard drop down graphs for enhanced PC2 similar to those in existence for Category A procedures - are anticipated.
Under conditions of offshore operations, calculation of drop down is not a trivial matter - the
following examples indicate some of the problems which might be encountered in hostile
environments:
(A) Occasions when tide is not taken into account and the sea is running irregularly - the
level of the obstacle (i.e. the sea) is indefinable making a true calculation of drop down
impossible.
(B) Occasions when it would not be possible - for operational reasons - for the approach and
departure paths to be clear of obstacles - the ‘standard’ calculation of drop-down could not be
applied.
Under these circumstances, practicality indicates that drop-down should be based upon the
height of the deck AMSL a nd the 35 ft clearance should be applied.
There are however, other and more complex issues which will also affect the deck-edge
clearance and drop down calculations:
(C) When operating to moving decks on vessels, a recommended landing or take-off profile
might not be possible because the helicopter might have to hover alongside in order
that the rise and fall of the ship is mentally mapped; or, on take-off re-landing in the case of
an engine failure might not be an option.
Under these circumstances, the commander might adjust the profiles to address a hazard more
serious or more likely than that presented by an engine failure.
It is because of these and other (unforeseen) circumstances that a prescriptive requirement
is not used. However, the target remains a 15 ft deck-edge clearance and a 35 ft obstacle
clearance and data should be provided such that, where practically possible, these clearances
can be planned.
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As accident/incident history indicates that the main hazard is collision with obstacles on the
helideck due to human error, simple and reproducible take-off and landing procedures are
recommended.
In view of the reasons stated above, the future requirement for PC1 was replaced by the new
requirement that the take-off mass takes into account:
- the procedure;
- deck-edge miss; and
- drop down appropriate to the height of the helideck.
This will require calculation of take-off mass from information produced by manufacturers
reflecting these elements. It is expected that such information will be produced by performance
modelling/simulation using a model validated through limited flight testing.
(iii) Operations to helidecks for helicopters with a maximum operational passenger seating
configuration (MOPSC) of more than 19
The original requirement for operations of helicopters with an MOPSC of more than 19 was PC1
(as set out in CAT.POL.H.100 (b)(2)).
However, when operating to helidecks, the problems enumerated in (g)(4)(ii) above are
equally applicable to these helicopters. In view of this, but taking into account that increased
numbers are (potentially) being carried, such operations are permitted in PC2
(CAT.POL.H.100 (b)(2)) but, in all helideck environments (both hostile and non-hostile), have to
satisfy, the additional requirements, set out in (g)(4)(ii) above.
AMC1 CAT.POL.H.305 (b) Helicopter operations without an assured safe forced landing capability
ENGINE RELIABILITY STATISTICS
(a) As part of the risk assessment prior to granting an approval under CAT.POL.H.305, the operator should
provide appropriate engine reliability statistics available for the helicopter type and the engine type.
(b) Except in the case of new engines, such data should show sudden power loss from the set of in-flight
shutdown (IFSD) events not exceeding 1 per 100 000 engine hours in a 5 year moving window.
However, a rate in excess of this value, but not exceeding 3 per 100 000 engine hours, may be
accepted by MCAA after an assessment showing an improving trend.
(c) New engines should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
(d) After the initial assessment, updated statistics should be periodically reassessed; any adverse
sustained trend will require an immediate evaluation to be accomplished by the operator in
consultation with MCAA and the manufacturers concerned. The evaluation may result in corrective action
or operational restrictions being applied.
(e) The purpose of this paragraph is to provide guidance on how the in-service power plant sudden power loss
rate is determined.
(1) Share of roles between the helicopter and engine type certificate holders (TCH)
(i) The provision of documents establishing the in-service sudden power loss rate for the
helicopter/engine installation; the interface with the operational authority of the State of the
operator should be the engine TCH or the helicopter TCH depending on the way they share
the corresponding analysis work.
(ii) The engine TCH should provide the helicopter TCH with a document including: the list of
in-service power loss events, the applicability factor for each event (if used), and the
assumptions made on the efficiency of any corrective actions implemented (if used).
(iii) The engine or helicopter TCH should provide the operational authority of the State of the
operator, with a document that details the calculation results - taking into account the
following:
(A) events caused by the engine and the events caused by the engine installation;
(B) applicability factor for each event (if used), the assumptions made on the efficiency of
any corrective actions implemented on the engine and on the helicopter (if used); and
(C) calculation of the power plant power loss rate.
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(2) Documentation
The following documentation should be updated every year:
(i) the document with detailed methodology and calculation as distributed to the authority of the
State of design;
(ii) a summary document with results of computation as made available on request to any operational
authority; and
(iii) a service letter establishing the eligibility for such operation and defining the corresponding
required configuration as provided to the operators.
(3) Definition of ‘sudden in-service power loss’
Sudden in-service power loss is an engine power loss:
(i) larger than 30 % of the take-off power;
(ii) occurring during operation; and
(iii) without the occurrence of an early intelligible warning to inform and give sufficient time for
t he pilot to take any appropriate action.
(4) Database documentation
Each power loss event should be documented, by the engine and/or helicopter TCHs, as follows:
(i) incident report number;
(ii) engine type;
(iii) engine serial number;
(iv) helicopter serial number;
(v) date;
(vi) event type (demanded IFSD, un-demanded IFSD);
(vii) presumed cause;
(viii) applicability factor when used; and
(ix) reference and assumed efficiency of the corrective actions that will have to be applied (if
any).
(5) Counting methodology
Various methodologies for counting engine power loss rate have been accepted by authorities.
The following is an example of one of these methodologies.
(i) The events resulting from:
(A) unknown causes (wreckage not found or totally destroyed, undocumented or unproven
statements);
(B) where the engine or the elements of the engine installation have not been investigated (for
example when the engine has not been returned by the customer); or
(C) an unsuitable or non-representative use (operation or maintenance) of the helicopter or the
engine,
are not counted as engine in-service sudden power loss and the applicability factor is 0 %.
(ii) The events caused by:
(A) the engine or the engine installation; or
(B) the engine or helicopter maintenance, when the applied maintenance was compliant with
the maintenance manuals,
are counted as engine in-service sudden power loss and the applicability factor is 100 %.
(iii) For the events where the engine or an element of the engine installation has been
submitted for investigation but where this investigation subsequently failed to define a
presumed cause, the applicability factor is 50 %.
(6) Efficiency of corrective actions.
The corrective actions made by the engine and helicopter manufacturers on the definition or
maintenance of the engine or its installation may be defined as mandatory for specific operations.
In this case the associated reliability improvement may be considered as a mitigating factor for the
event.
A factor defining the efficiency of the corrective action may be applied to the applicability factor of the
concerned event.
(7) Method of calculation of the powerplant power loss rate
The detailed method of calculation of the powerplant power loss rate should be documented by engine
or helicopter TCH and accepted by the relevant authority.
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AMC2 CAT.POL.H.305 (b) Helicopter operations without an assured safe forced landing capability
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SET OF CONDITIONS
To obtain an approval under CAT.POL.H.305 (a), the operator conducting operations without an assured
safe forced landing capability should implement the following:
(a) Attain and then maintain the helicopter/engine modification standard defined by the manufacturer that has
been designated to enhance reliability during the take -off and landing phases.
(b) Conduct the preventive maintenance actions recommended by the helicopter or engine manufacturer as
follows:
(1) engine oil spectrometric and debris analysis - as appropriate;
(2) engine trend monitoring, based on available power assurance checks;
(3) engine vibration analysis (plus any other vibration monitoring systems where fitted); and
(4) oil consumption monitoring.
(c) The usage monitoring system should fulfil at least the following:
(1) Recording of the following data:
(i) date and time of recording, or a reliable means of establishing these parameters;
(ii) amount of flight hours recorded during the day plus total flight time;
(iii) N1 (gas producer RPM) cycle count;
(iv) N2 (power turbine RPM) cycle count (if the engine features a free turbine);
(v) turbine temperature exceedance: value, duration;
(vi) Power-shaft torque exceedance: value, duration (if a torque sensor is fitted);
(vii) engine shafts speed exceedance: value, duration.
(2) Data storage of the above parameters, if applicable, covering the maximum flight time in a
day, and not less than 5 flight hours, with an appropriate sampling interval for each parameter.
(3) The system should include a comprehensive self-test function with a malfunction indicator and
a detection of power-off or sensor input disconnection.
(4) A means should be available for downloading and analysis of the recorded parameters.
Frequency of downloading should be sufficient to ensure data is not lost through over-writing.
(5) The analysis of parameters gathered by the usage monitoring system, the frequency of such
analysis and subsequent maintenance actions should be described in the maintenance
documentation.
(6) The data should be stored in an acceptable form and accessible to MCAA for at least 24 months.
(d) The training for flight crew should include the discussion, demonstration, use and practice of the techniques
necessary to minimise the risks.
(e) Report to the manufacturer any loss of power control, engine shutdown (precautionary or otherwise)
or engine failure for any cause (excluding simulation of engine failure during training). The content of each
report should provide:
(1) date and time;
(2) operator (and maintenance organisations where relevant);
(3) type of helicopter and description of operations;
(4) registration and serial number of airframe;
(5) engine type and serial number;
(6) power unit modification standard where relevant to failure;
(7) engine position;
(8) symptoms leading up to the event;
(9) circumstances of engine failure including phase of flight or ground operation;
(10) consequences of the event;
(11) weather/environmental conditions;
(12) reason for engine failure – if known;
(13) in case of an in-flight shutdown (IFSD), nature of the IFSD (demanded/un-demanded);
(14) procedure applied and any comment regarding engine restart potential;
(15) engine hours and cycles (from new and last overhaul);
(16) airframe flight hours;
(17) rectification actions applied including, if any, component changes with part number and serial
number of the removed equipment; and
(18) any other relevant information.
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GM1 CAT.POL.H.305 (b) Helicopter operations without an assured safe forced landing capability
USE OF FULL AUTHORITY DIGITAL ENGINE CONTROL (FADEC)
Current technology increasingly allows for the recording function required in (c)(1) of AMC2
CAT.POL.H.305(b) to be incorporated in the full authority digital engine control (FADEC).
Where a FADEC is capable of recording some of the parameters required by (c)(1) of AMC2
CAT.POL.H.305(b) it is not intended that the recording of the parameters is to be duplicated.
Providing that the functions as set out in (c) of AMC2 CAT.POL.H.305(b)are satisfied, the FADEC may
partially, or in whole, fulfil the requirement for recording and storing parameters in a usage monitoring
system.
GM1 CAT.POL.H.310 (c) & CAT.POL.H.325 (c) Take-off and landing
PROCEDURE FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS TO HELIDECKS
(a) Factors to be considered when taking off from or landing on a helideck
(1) In order to take account of the considerable number of variables associated with the helideck
environment, each take-off and landing may require a slightly different profile. Factors such as
helicopter mass and centre of gravity, wind velocity, turbulence, deck size, deck elevation and
orientation, obstructions, power margins, platform gas turbine exhaust plumes etc., will influence
both the take-off and landing. In particular, for the landing, additional considerations such as
the need for a clear go-around flight path, visibility and cloud base etc., will affect the
commander’s decision on the choice of landing profile. Profiles may be modified, taking
account of the relevant factors noted above and the characteristics of individual helicopter types.
(b) Performance
(1) To perform the following take-off and landing profiles, adequate all engines operating (AEO)
hover performance at the helideck is required. In order to provide a minimum level of
performance, data (derived from the AFM AEO out of ground effect (OGE)) should be used to
provide the maximum take -off or landing mass. Where a helideck is affected by downdrafts or
turbulence or hot gases, or where the take-off or landing profile is obstructed, or the approach or
take-off cannot be made into wind, it may be necessary to decrease this take-off or landing
mass by using a suitable calculation method. The helicopter mass should not exceed that required by
CAT.POL.H.310 (a) or CAT.POL.H.325 (a).
(For helicopter types no longer supported by the manufacturer, data may be established by the
operator, provided they are acceptable to MCAA.)
(c) Take-off profile
(1) The take-off should be performed in a dynamic manner ensuring that the helicopter
continuously moves vertically from the hover to the rotation point (RP) and thence into
forward flight. If the manoeuvre is too dynamic then there is an increased risk of losing
spatial awareness (through loss of visual cues) in the event of a rejected take-off, particularly at
night.
(2) If the transition to forward flight is too slow, the helicopter is exposed to an increased risk of
contacting the deck edge in the event of an engine failure at or just after the point of cyclic input (RP).
(3) It has been found that the climb to RP is best made between 110 % and 120 % of the power
required in the hover. This power offers a rate of climb that assists with deck-edge clearance
following engine failure at RP, whilst minimising ballooning following a failure before RP.
Individual types will require selection of different values within this range.
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Figure 1: Take-off profile
(d) Selection of a lateral visual cue
(1) In order to obtain the maximum performance in the event of an engine failure being recognised at or
just after RP, the RP should be at its optimum value, consistent with maintaining the necessary
visual cues. If an engine failure is recognised just before RP, the helicopter, if operating at a
low mass, may ‘balloon’ a significant height before the reject action has any effect. It is,
therefore, important that the pilot flying selects a lateral visual marker and maintains it until
the RP is achieved, particularly on decks with few visual cues. In the event of a rejected take
-off, the lateral marker will be a vital visual cue in assisting the pilot to carry out a successful
landing.
(e) Selection of the rotation point
(1) The optimum RP should be selected to ensure that the take-off path will continue upwards and
away from the deck with AEO, but minimising the possibility of hitting the deck edge due to
the height loss in the event of an engine failure at or just after RP.
(2) The optimum RP may vary from type to type. Lowering the RP will result in a reduced deck edge
clearance in the event of an engine failure being recognised at or just after RP. Raising the RP
will result in possible loss of visual cues, or a hard landing in the event of an engine failure just prior to
RP.
(f) Pilot reaction times
(1) Pilot reaction time is an important factor affecting deck edge clearance in the event of an engine failure
prior to or at RP. Simulation has shown that a delay of 1 second can result in a loss of up to 15 ft in
deck edge clearance.
(g) Variation of wind speed
(1) Relative wind is an important parameter in the achieved take-off path following an engine failure;
wherever practicable, take-off should be made into wind. Simulation has shown that a 10 kt wind can
give an extra 5 ft deck edge clearance compared to a zero wind condition.
(h) Position of the helicopter relative to the deck edge
(1) It is important to position the helicopter as close to the deck edge (including safety nets) as possible
whilst maintaining sufficient visual cues, particularly a lateral marker.
(2) The ideal position is normally achieved when the rot or tips are positioned at the forward deck
edge. This position minimises the risk of striking the deck edge following recognition of an engine
failure at or just after RP. Any take-off heading which causes the helicopter to fly over obstructions
below and beyond the deck edge should be avoided if possible. Therefore, the final take-off heading
and position will be a compromise between the take -off path for least obstructions, relative wind,
turbulence and lateral marker cue considerations.
(i) Actions in the event of an engine failure at or just after RP
(1) Once committed to the continued take-off, it is important, in the event of an engine failure, to
rotate the aircraft to the optimum attitude in order to give the best chance of missing the deck
edge. The optimum pitch rates and absolute pitch attitudes should be detailed in the profile for the
specific type.
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(j) Take-off from helidecks that have significant movement
(1) This technique should be used when the helideck movement and any other factors, e.g.
insufficient visual cues, makes a successful rejected take-off unlikely. Weight should be reduced to
permit an improved one -engine-inoperative capability, as necessary.
(2) The optimum take-off moment is when the helideck is level and at its highest point, e.g. horizontal on
top of the swell. Collective pitch should be applied positively and sufficiently to make an immediate
transition to climbing forward flight. Because of the lack of a hover, the take-off profile should
be planned and briefed prior to lift off from the deck.
(k) Standard landing profile
(1) The approach should be commenced into wind to a point outboard of the helideck. Rotor tip
clearance from the helideck edge should be maintained until the aircraft approaches this
position at the requisite height (type dependent) with approximately 10kt of ground-speed and a
minimal rate of descent. The aircraft is then flown on a flight path to pass over the deck edge and into
a hover over the safe landing area.
Figure 2: Standard landing profile
(l) Offset landing profile
(1) If the normal landing profile is impracticable due to obstructions and the prevailing wind
velocity, the offset procedure may be used. This should involve flying to a hover position,
approximately 90° offset from the landing point, at the appropriate height and maintaining rotor tip
clearance from the deck edge. The helicopter should then be flown slowly but positively sideways
and down to position in a low hover over the landing point. Normally, the committal point
(CP) will be the point at which helicopter begins to transition over the helideck edge.
(m) Training
(1) These t echniques should be covered in the training required by Annex III (Part-ORO).
GM1 CAT.POL.H.310&CAT.POL.H.325 Take-off and landing
TAKE-OFF AND LANDING TECHNIQUES
(a) This GM describes three types of operation to/from helidecks and elevated FATOs by helicopters operating
in performance class 2.
(b) In two cases of take-off and landing, exposure time is used. During the exposure time (which is only
approved for use when complying with CAT.POL.H.305) the probability of an engine failure is
regarded as extremely remote. If an engine failure occurs during the exposure time a safe forced landing
may not be possible.
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(c) Take-off - non-hostile environment (without an approval to operate with an exposure time)
CAT.POL.H.310 (b).
(1) Figure 1 shows a typical take-off profile for performance class 2 operations from a helideck or
an elevated FATO in a non-hostile environment.
(2) If an engine failure occurs during the climb to the rotation point, compliance with CAT.POL.H.310
(b) will enable a safe landing or a safe forced landing on the deck.
(3) If an engine failure occurs between the rotation point and the DPATO, compliance with
CAT.POL.H.310 (b) will enable a safe forced landing on the surface, clearing the deck edge.
(4) At or after the DPATO, the OEI flight path should clear all obstacles by the margins specified
in CAT.POL.H.315.
Figure 1: Typical take-off profile PC2 from a helideck/elevated FATO, non-hostile environment
(d) Take-off - non-hostile environment (with exposure time) CAT.POL.H.310(c)
(1) Figure 2 shows a typical take-off profile for performance class 2 operations from a helideck or
an elevated FATO in a non-hostile environment (with exposure time).
(2) If an engine failure occurs after the exposure time and before DPATO, compliance with
CAT.POL.H.310 (c) will enable a safe forced landing on the surface.
(3) At or after the DPATO, the OEI flight path should clear all obstacles by the margins specified
in CAT.POL.H.315.
Figure 2: Typical take-off profile PC2 from a helideck/elevated FATO with exposure time, non-hostile
environment
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(e) Take-off - non-congested hostile environment (with exposure time) CAT.POL.H.310 (c)
(1) Figure 3 shows a typical take off profile for performance class 2 operations from a helideck or
an elevated FATO in a non-congested hostile environment (with exposure time).
(2) If an engine failure occurs after the exposure time the helicopter is capable of a safe forced landing or
safe continuation of the flight.
(3) At or after the DPATO, the OEI flight path should clear all obstacles by the margins specified
in CAT.POL.H.315.
Figure 3: Typical take-off profile PC2 from a helideck/elevated FATO, non-congested hostile
environment
(f) Landing - non-hostile environment (without an approval to operate with an exposure time)
CAT.POL.H.325 (b)
(1) Figure 4 shows a typical landing profile for performance class 2 operations to a helideck or an elevated
FATO in a non-hostile environment.
(2) The DPBL is defined as a ‘window’ in terms of airspeed, rate of descent, and height above the landing
surface. If an engine failure occurs before the DPBL, the pilot may elect to land or to execute a balked
landing.
(3) In the event of an engine failure being recognised after the DPBL and before the committal point,
compliance with CAT.POL.H.325 (b) will enable a safe forced landing on the surface.
(4) In the event of an engine failure at or after the committal point, compliance with
CAT.POL.H.325 (b) will enable a safe forced landing on the deck.
Figure 4: Typical landing profile PC2 to a helideck/elevated FATO, non-hostile environment
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(g) Landing - non-hostile environment (with exposure time) CAT.POL.H.325 (c)
(1) Figure 5 shows a typical landing profile for performance class 2 operations to a helideck or an
elevated FATO in a non-hostile environment (with exposure time).
(2) The DPBL is defined as a ‘window’ in terms of airspeed, rate of descent, and height above the
landing surface. If an engine failure occurs before the DPBL, the pilot may elect to land or to execute a
balked landing.
(3) In the event of an engine failure being recognised before the exposure time compliance with
CAT.POL.H.325 (c) will enable a safe forced landing on the surface.
(4) In the event of an engine failure after the exposure time, compliance with CAT.POL.H.325 (c)
will enable a safe forced landing on the deck.
Figure 5: Typical landing profile PC2 to a helideck/elevated FATO with exposure time, non-hostile
environment
(h) Landing - non-congested hostile environment (with exposure time) CAT.POL.H.325 (c)
(1) Figure 6 shows a typical landing profile for performance class 2 operations to a helideck or an
elevated FATO in a non-congested hostile environment (with exposure time).
(2) In the event of an engine failure at any point during the approach and landing phase up to the start of
exposure time, compliance with CAT.POL.H.325 (b) will enable the helicopter, after clearing all
obstacles under the flight path, to continue the flight.
(3) In the event of an engine failure after the exposure time (i.e. at or after the committal point), a
safe forced landing should be possible on the deck.
Figure 6: Typical landing profile PC2 to a helideck/elevated FATO with exposure time, non-congested
hostile environment
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Chapter 4 –Performance class 3
GM1 CAT.POL.H.400(c) General
THE TAKE-OFF AND LANDING PHASES (PERFORMANCE CLASS 3)
(a) To understand the use of ground level exposure in performance class 3, it is important first to be
aware of the logic behind the use of ‘take -off and landing phases’. Once this is clear, it is easier
to appreciate the aspects and limits of the use of ground level exposure. This GM shows the
derivation of the term from the ICAO definition of the ‘en-route phase’ and t hen gives practical
examples of the use, and limitations on the use, of ground level exposure in CAT.POL.400 (c).
(b) The take-off phase in performance class 1 and performance class 2 may be considered to be
bounded by ‘the specified point in the take-off’ from which the take-off flight path begins.
(1) In performance class 1 this specified point is defined as ‘the end of the take-off distance required’.
(2) In performance class 2 this specified point is defined as DPATO or, as an alternative, no later
than 200 ft above the take-off surface.
(3) There is no simple equivalent point for bounding of the landing in performance classes 1 & 2.
(c) Take-off flight path is not used in performance class 3 and, consequently, the term ‘take-off and landing
phases’ is used to bound the limit of exposure. For the purpose of performance class 3, the take off and landing phases are as set out in CAT.POL.H.400 (c) and are considered to be bounded by:
(1) during take-off before reaching Vy (speed for best rate of climb) or 200 ft above the take-off
surface; and
(2) during landing, below 200 ft above the landing surface.
(ICAO Annex 6 Part III, defines en-route phase as being “That part of the flight from the end
of the take-off and initial climb phase to the commencement of the approach and landing
phase.” The use of take -off and landing phase in this text is used to distinguish the take-off
from the initial climb, and the landing from the approach: they are considered to be
complimentary and not contradictory.)
(d) Ground level exposure – and exposure for elevated FATOs or helidecks in a non-hostile
environment – is permitted for operations under an approval in accordance with CAT.POL.H.305.
Exposure in this case is limited to the ‘take -off and landing phases’.
The practical effect of bounding of exposure can be illustrated with the following examples:
(1) A clearing: the operator may consider a take-off/landing in a clearing when there is sufficient
power, with all engines operating, to clear all obstacles in the take-off path by an adequate
margin (this, in ICAO, is meant to indicate 35 ft). Thus, the clearing may be bounded by bushes,
fences, wires and, in the extreme, by power lines, high trees etc. Once the obstacle has been cleared –
by using a steep or a vertical climb (which itself ma y infringe the height velocity (HV)
diagram) - the helicopter reaches Vy or 200 ft, and from that point a safe forced landing must be
possible. The effect is that whilst operation to a clearing is possible, operation to a clearing in the
middle of a forest is not (except when operated in accordance with CAT.POL.H.420).
(2) An aerodrome/operating site surrounded by rocks: the same applies when operating to a landing
site that is surrounded by rocky ground. Once Vy or 200 ft has been reached, a safe forced
landing must be possible.
(3) An elevated FATO or helideck: when operating to an elevated FATO or helideck in performance class
3, exposure is considered to be twofold: firstly, to a deck-edge strike if the engine fails after
the decision to transition has been taken; and secondly, to operations in the HV diagram due to the
height of the FATO or helideck. Once the take-off surface has been cleared and the helicopter
has reached the knee of the HV diagram, the helicopter should be capable of making a safe
forced landing.
(e) Operation in accordance with CAT.POL.400 (b) does not permit excursions into a hostile
environment as such and is specifically concerned with the absence of space to abort the take-off or landing
when the take-off and landing space are limited; or when operating in the HV diagram.
(f) Specifically, the use of this exception to the requirement for a safe forced landing (during take-off or
landing) does not permit semi-continuous operations over a hostile environment such as a forest or
hostile sea area.
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AMC1 CAT.POL.H.420 Helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested
area
SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
(a) Introduction
Two cases that are deemed to be acceptable for the alleviation under the conditions of CAT.POL.H.420
for the en-route phase of the flight (operations without an assured safe forced landing capability
during take-off and landing phases are subject to a separate approval under CAT.POL.H.400 (c))
are flights over mountainous areas and remote areas, both already having been considered by the JAA in
comparison to ground transport in the case of remote areas and respectively to multi-engined helicopters in
the case of mountain areas.
(1) Remote areas
Remote area operation is acceptable when alternative surface transportation does not provide the
same level of safety as helicopter transportation. In this case, the operator should demonstrate why
the economic circumstances do not justify replacement of single-engined helicopters by multiengined helicopters.
(2) Mountainous areas
Current generation twin-engined helicopters may not be able to meet the performance class 1
or 2 requirements at the operational altitude; consequently, the outcome of an engine failure is
the same a s a single-engined helicopter. In this case, the operator should justify the use of exposure
in the en-route phase.
(b) Other areas of operation
For other areas of operations to be considered for the operational approval, a risk assessment should
be conducted by the operator that should, at least, consider the following factors:
(1) type of operations and the circumstances of the flight;
(2) area/terrain over which the flight is being conducted;
(3) probability of an engine failure and the consequence of such an event;
(4) safety target;
(5) procedures to maintain the reliability of the engine(s);
(6) installation and utilisation of a usage monitoring system; and
(7) when considered relevant, any available publications on (analysis of) accident or other safety data.
GM1 CAT.POL.H.420 Helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area
EXAMPLE OF A SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT
(a) Introduction
Where it can be substantiated that helicopter limitations, or other justifiable considerations, preclude
the use of appropriate performance, the approval effectively alleviates from compliance with the
requirement in C AT.OP.MPA.137, that requires the availability of surfaces that permit a safe forced
landing to be executed.
Circumstances where an engine failure will result in a catastrophic event are those defined for a hostile
environment:
(1) a lack of adequate surfaces to perform a safe landing;
(2) the inability to protect the occupants of the helicopter from the elements; or
(3) a lack of search and rescue services to provide rescue consistent with the expected survival time
in such environment.
(b) The elements of the risk assessment
The risk assessment process consists of the application of three principles:
- a safety target;
- a helicopter reliability assessment; and
- continuing airworthiness.
(1) The safety target
The main element of the risk assessment when exposure was initially introduced by the JAA
into JAR-OPS 3 (NPA OPS-8), was the assumption that turbine engines in helicopters would have
failure rates of about 1:100 000 per flying hour - which would permit (against the agreed safety
target of 5 x 10- 8 per event) an exposure of about 9 seconds for twin-engined helicopters and 18
seconds for single-engined helicopters during the take-off or landing event.
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An engine failure in the en-route phase over a hostile environment will inevitably result in a
higher risk (in the order of magnitude of 1 x 10- 5 per flying hour) to a catastrophic event.
The approval to operate with this high risk of endangering the helicopter occupants should
therefore only be granted against a comparative risk assessment (i.e. compared to other means
of transport the risk is demonstrated to be lower), or where there is no economic justification
to replace single-engined helicopters by multi-engined helicopters.
(2) The reliability assessment
The purpose of the reliability assessment is to ensure that the engine reliability remains at or better than
1 x 10- 5.
(3) Continuing airworthiness
Mitigating procedures consist of a number of elements:
(i) the fulfilment of all manufacturers’ safety modifications;
(ii) a comprehensive reporting system (both failures and usage data); and
(iii) the implementation of a usage monitoring system (UMS).
Each of these elements is to ensure that engines, once shown to be sufficiently reliable to meet the
safety target, will sustain such reliability (or improve upon it).
The monitoring system is felt to be particularly important as it had already been demonstrated
that when such systems are in place it inculcates a more considered approach to operations. In
addition the elimination of ‘hot starts’, prevented by the UMS, itself minimises the incidents of turbine
burst failures.
GM2 CAT.POL.H.420 (a) Helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested
area
ENDORSEMENT FROM ANOTHER STATE
(a) Application to another State
To obtain an endorsement from another State the operator should submit to that State the safety risk
assessment and the reasons and justification that preclude the use of appropriate performance criteria,
over those hostile areas outside a congested area over which the operator is planning to conduct
operations.
(b) Endorsement from another State
Upon receiving the endorsement from another State the operator should submit it together with the
safety risk assessment and the reasons and justification that preclude the use of appropriate
performance criteria, to MCAA to obtain the approval or extend the existing approval to a new
area.
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Section 3 - Mass and balance
Chapter 1 – Motor-powered aircraft
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (b) Mass and balance, loading
WEIGHING OF AN AIRCRAFT
(a) New aircraft that have been weighed at the factory may be placed into operation without reweighing
if the mass and balance records have been adjusted for alterations or modifications to the aircraft.
Aircraft transferred from one operator to another operator do not have to be weighed prior to use by
the receiving operator, unless more than 4 years have elapsed since the last weighing.
(b) The mass and centre of gravity (CG) position of an aircraft should be revised whenever the
cumulative changes to the dry operating mass exceed ±0.5 % of the maximum landing mass or for
aeroplanes the cumulative change in CG position exceeds 0.5 % of the mean aerodynamic chord. This
may be done by weighing the aircraft or by calculation.
(c) When weighing an aircraft, normal precautions should be taken consistent with good practices such
as:
(1) checking for completeness of the aircraft and equipment;
(2) determining that fluids are properly accounted for;
(3) ensuring that the aircraft is clean; and
(4) ensuring that weighing is accomplished in an enclosed building.
(d) Any equipment used for weighing should be properly calibrated, zeroed, and used in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions. Each scale should be calibrated either by the manufacturer, by a civil
department of weights and measures or by an appropriately authorized organisation within two years or
within a time period defined by the manufacturer of the weighing equipment, whichever is less.
The equipment should enable the mass of the aircraft to be established accurately. One single accuracy
criterion for weighing equipment cannot be given. However, the weighing accuracy is considered
satisfactory if the accuracy criteria in Table1 are met by the individual scales/cells of the weighing
equipment used:
Table 1: Accuracy criteria for weighing equipment
For a scale/cell load
below 2 000 kg
from 2 000 kg to 20 000 kg
from 2 000 kg to 20 000 kg
An accuracy of
±1 %
±20 kg
±0·1 %
AMC2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (b) Mass and balance, loading
FLEET MASS AND CG POSITION – AEROPLANES
(a) For a group of aeroplanes of the same model and configuration, an average dry operating mass and
CG position may be used as the fleet mass and CG position, provided that:
(1) the dry operating mass of an individual aeroplane does not differ by more than ±0.5 % of the
maximum structural landing mass from the established dry operating fleet mass; or
(2) the CG position of an individual aeroplane does not differ by more than ±0.5 % of the mean
aerodynamic chord from the established fleet CG.
(b) The operator should verify that, after an equipment or configuration change or after weighing, the aeroplane
falls within the tolerances above.
(c) To add an aeroplane to a fleet operated with fleet values, the operator should verify by weighing or
calculation that its actual values fall within the tolerances specified in (a)(1) and (2).
(d) To obtain fleet values, the operator should weigh, in the period between two fleet mass evaluations, a
certain number of aeroplanes as specified in Table 1, where ‘n’ is the number of aeroplanes in the fleet
using fleet values. Those aeroplanes in the fleet that have not been weighed for the longest time should be
selected first.
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Table 1: Minimum number of weighings to obtain fleet values Number of aeroplanes in the fleet
Minimum number of weighings
Number of aeroplanes in the fleet
2 or 3
4 to 9
10 or more
Minimum number of weighings
n
(n + 3)/2
(n + 51)/10
(e) The interval between two fleet mass evaluations should not exceed 48 months.
(f) The fleet values should be updated at least at the end of each fleet mass evaluation.
(g) Aeroplanes that have not been weighed since the last fleet mass evaluation may be kept in a fleet operated
with fleet values, provided that the individual values are revised by calculation and stay within the
tolerances above. If these individual values no longer fall within the tolerances, the operator should
determine new fleet values or operate aeroplanes not falling within the limits with their individual values.
(h) If an individual aeroplane mass is within the dry operating fleet mass tolerance but its CG position
exceeds the tolerance, the aeroplane may be operated under the applicable dry operating fleet mass but
with an individual CG position.
(i) Aeroplanes for which no mean aerodynamic chord has been published should be operated with their
individual mass and CG position values. They may be operated under the dry operating fleet mass and CG
position, provided that a risk assessment has been completed.
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (a) Mass and balance, loading
CENTRE OF GRAVITY LIMITS – OPERATIONAL C G ENVELOPE AND IN-FLIGHT CG
In the Certificate Limitations section of the AFM, forward and aft CG limits are specified. These limits ensure
that the certification stability and control criteria are met throughout the whole flight and allow the proper
trim setting for take-off. The operator should ensure that these limits are respected by:
(a) Defining and applying operational margins to the certified CG envelope in order to compensate for the
following deviations and errors:
(1) Deviations of actual CG at empty or operating mass from published values due, for example,
to weighing errors, unaccounted modifications and/or equipment variations.
(2) Deviations in fuel distribution in tanks from the applicable schedule.
(3) Deviations in the distribution of baggage and cargo in the various compartments as compared
with the assumed load distribution as well as inaccuracies in the actual mass of baggage and cargo.
(4) Deviations in actual passenger seating from the seating distribution assumed when preparing the mass
and balance documentation. Large CG errors may occur when ‘free seating’, i.e. freedom of
passengers to select any seat when entering the aircraft, is permitted. Although in most cases
reasonably even longitudinal passenger seating can be expected, there is a risk of an extreme forward
or aft seat selection causing very large and unacceptable CG errors, assuming that the balance
calculation is done on the basis of an assumed even distribution. The largest errors may occur at a
load factor of approximately 50% if all passengers are seated in either the forward or aft half of the
cabin. Statistical analysis indicates that the risk of such extreme seating adversely affecting the
CG is greatest on small aircraft.
(5) Deviations of the actual CG of cargo and passenger load within individual cargo compartments
or cabin sections from the normally assumed mid position.
(6) Deviations of the CG caused by gear and flap positions and by application of the prescribed fuel
usage procedure, unless already covered by the certified limits.
(7) Deviations caused by in-flight movement of cabin crew, galley equipment and passengers.
(8) On small aeroplanes, deviations caused by the difference between actual passenger masses and
standard passenger masses when such masses are used.
(b) Defining and applying operational procedures in order to:
(1) ensure an even distribution of passengers in the cabin;
(2) take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by passenger/crew movement;
and
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(3) take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by fuel consumption/transfer.
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (d) Mass and balance, loading
DRY OPERATING MASS
The dry operating mass includes:
(a) crew and crew baggage;
(b) catering and removable passenger service equipment; and
(c) tank water and lavatory chemicals.
AMC2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (d) Mass and balance, loading
MASS VALUES FOR CREW MEMBERS
(a) The operator should use the following mass values for crew to determine the dry operating mass:
(1) actual masses including any crew baggage; or
(2) standard masses, including hand baggage, of 85 kg for flight crew/technical crew members and
75 kg for cabin crew members.
(b) The operator should correct the dry operating mass to account for any additional baggage. The
position of this additional baggage should be accounted for when establishing the centre of gravity of
the aeroplane.
AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and balance, loading
MASS VALUES FOR PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE
(a) When the number of passenger seats available is:
(1) less than 10 for aeroplanes; or
(2) less than 6 for helicopters,
passenger mass may be calculated on the basis of a statement by, or on behalf of, each passenger, adding
to it a predetermined mass to account for hand baggage and clothing.
The predetermined mass for hand baggage and clothing should be established by the operator on the
basis of studies relevant to his particular operation. In any case, it should not be less than:
(1) 4 kg for clothing; and
(2) 6 kg for hand baggage.
The passengers’ stated mass and the mass of passengers’ clothing and hand baggage should be
checked prior to boarding and adjusted, if necessary. The operator should establish a procedure in
the operations manual when to select actual or standard masses and the procedure to be followed
when using verbal statements.
(b) When determining the actual mass by weighing, passengers’ personal belongings and hand baggage
should be included. Such weighing should be conducted immediately prior to boarding the aircraft.
(c) When determining the mass of passengers by using standard mass values, the standard mass values
in Tables 1 and 2 below should be used. The standard masses include hand baggage and the mass of
any infant carried by an adult on one passenger seat. Infants occupying separate passenger seats
should be considered as children for the purpose of this AMC. When the total number of passenger seats
available on an aircraft is 20 or more, the standard masses for males and females in Table 1 should be used.
As an alternative, in cases where the total number of passenger seats available is 30 or more, the ‘All Adult’
mass values in Table 1 may be used.
Table 1: Standard masses for passengers – aircraft with a total number of passenger seats of 20 or more
20 and more
Male
Female
88 kg
70 kg
83 kg
69 kg
35 kg
35 kg
Passenger seats:
All flights except holiday charters
Holiday charters*
Children
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84 kg
76 kg
35 kg
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*
Holiday charter means a charter flight that is part of a holiday travel package. On such flights the entire
passenger capacity is hired by one or more charterer(s) for the carriage of passengers who are
travelling, all or in part by air, on a round- or circle-trip basis for holiday purposes. The holiday charter
mass values apply provided that not more than 5 % of passenger seats installed in the aircraft are
used for the non-revenue carriage of certain categories of passengers. Categories of passengers such a
s company personnel, tour operators’ staff, representatives of the press, authority officials etc. can be
included within the 5% without negating the use of holiday charter mass values.
Table 2: Standard masses for passengers – aircraft with a total number of passenger seats of 19 or less
1-5
104 kg
86 kg
35 kg
Passenger seats:
Male
Female
Children
6-9
96 kg
78 kg
35 kg
10 - 19
92 kg
74 kg
35 kg
(1) On aeroplane flights with 19 passenger seats or less and all helicopter flights where no hand
baggage is carried in the cabin or where hand baggage is accounted for separately, 6 kg may be
deducted from male and female masses in Table 2. Articles such as an overcoat, an umbrella, a
small handbag or purse, reading material or a small camera are not considered as hand
baggage.
(2) For helicopter operations in which a survival suit is provided to passengers, 3 kg should be
added to the passenger mass value.
(d) Mass values for baggage
(1) Aeroplanes. When the total number of passenger seats available on the aeroplane is 20 or
more, the standard mass values for checked baggage of Table 3 should be used.
(2) Helicopters. When the total number of passenger seats available on the helicopters is 20 or
more, the standard mass value for checked baggage should be 13 kg.
(3) For aircraft with 19 passenger seats or less, the actual mass of checked baggage should be
determined by weighing.
Table 3: Standard masses for baggage – aeroplanes with a total number of passenger seats of 20 or more
Type of flight
Domestic
Within the European region
Intercontinental
All other
Baggage standard mass
11 kg
13 kg
15 kg
13 kg
(4) For the purpose of Table 3:
(i) domestic flight means a flight with origin and destination within the borders of one State;
(ii) flights within the European region mean flights, other than domestic flights, whose origin
and destination are within the area specified in (d)(5); and
(iii) intercontinental flight means flights beyond the European region with origin and destination
in different continents.
(5) Flights within the European region are flights conducted within the following area:
– N7200 E04500
– N4000 E04500
– N3500 E03700
– N3000 E03700
– N3000 W00600
– N2700 W00900
– N2700 W03000
– N6700 W03000
– N7200 W01000
– N7200 E04500
as depicted in Figure 1.
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(f) Other standard masses may be used provided they are calculated on the basis of a detailed weighing survey
plan and a reliable statistical analysis method is applied. The operator should advise MCAA about
the intent of the passenger weighing survey and explain the survey plan in general terms. The
revised standard mass values should only be used in circumstances comparable with those under
which the survey was conducted. Where the revised standard masses exceed those in Tables 1, 2
and 3 of, then such higher values should be used.
(g) On any flight identified as carrying a significant number of passengers whose masses, including
hand baggage, a re expected to significantly deviate from the standard passenger mass, the operator
should determine the actual mass of such passengers by weighing or by adding an adequate mass
increment.
(h) If standard mass values for checked baggage are used and a significant number of passengers checked
baggage is expected to significantly deviate from the standard baggage mass, the operator should determine
the actual mass of such baggage by weighing or by adding an adequate mass increment.
Figure 1: The European region
AMC2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and balance, loading
PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING REVISED STANDARD MASS VALUES FOR PASSENGERS AND
BAGGAGE
(a) Passengers
(1) Weight sampling method. The average mass of passengers and their hand baggage should be
determined by weighing, taking random samples. The selection of random samples should by
nature and extent be representative of the passenger volume, considering the type of operation, the
frequency of flights on various routes, in/outbound flights, applicable season and seat capacity of
the aircraft.
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(2) Sample size. The survey plan should cover the weighing of at least the greatest of:
(i) a number of passengers calculated from a pilot sample, using normal statistical procedures and
based on a relative confidence range (accura cy) of 1 % for all adult and 2 % for separate
male and female average masses; and
(ii) for aircraft:
(A) with a passenger seating capacity of 40 or more, a total of 2 000 passengers; or
(B) with a passenger seating capacity of less than 40, a total number of 50 multiplied by the
passenger seating capacity.
(3) Passenger masses. Passenger masses should include the mass of the passengers' belongings that
are carried when entering the aircraft. When taking random samples of passenger masses, infants
should be weighted together with the accompanying adult.
(4) Weighing location. The location for the weighing of passengers should be selected as close as
possible to the aircraft, at a point where a change in the passenger mass by disposing of or by
acquiring more personal belongings is unlikely to occur before the passengers board the aircraft.
(5) Weighing machine. The weighing machine used for passenger weighing should have a capacity of at
least 150 kg. The mass should be displayed at minimum graduations of 500 g. The weighing machine
should have an accuracy of at least 0.5 % or 200 g, whichever is greater.
(6) Recording of mass values. For each flight included in the survey the mass of the passengers, the
corresponding passenger category (i.e. male / female / children) and the flight number should be
recorded.
(b) Checked baggage. The statistical procedure for determining revised standard baggage mass values
based on average baggage masses of the minimum required sample size should comply with (a)(1)
and (a)(2). For baggage, the relative confidence range (accuracy) should amount to 1 %. A minimum of 2
000 pieces of checked baggage should be weighed.
(c) Determination of revised standard mass values for passengers and checked baggage.
(1) To ensure that, in preference to the use of actual masses determined by weighing, the use of
revised standard mass values for passengers and checked baggage does not adversely affect
operational safety, a statistical analysis should be carried out. Such an analysis should generate
average mass values for passengers and baggage as well as other data.
(2) On aircraft with 20 or more passenger seats, these averages apply as revised standard male and female
mass values.
(3) On aircraft with 19 passenger seats or less, the increments in Table 1 should be added to the average
passenger mass to obtain the revised standard mass values:
Table 1: Increments for revised standard masses values
Number of passenger seats
1 – 5 incl.
6 – 9 incl.
10 – 19 incl.
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Required mass increment
16 kg
8 kg
4 kg
Alternatively, all adult revised standard (average) mass values may be applied on aircraft with 30 or
more passenger seats. Revised standard (average) checked baggage mass values are applicable to
aircraft with 20 or more passenger seats.
The revised standard masses should be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 5 years.
All adult revised standard mass values should be based on a male/female ratio of 80/20 in respect of
all flights except holiday charters that are 50/50. A different ratio on specific routes or flights
may be used, provided supporting data shows that the alternative male/female ratio is conservative
and covers at least 84 % of the actual male/female ratios on a sample of at least 100
representative flights.
The resulting average mass values should be rounded to the nearest whole number in kg.
Checked baggage mass values should be rounded to the nearest 0.5 kg figure, as appropriate.
When operating on similar routes or networks, operators may pool their weighing surveys
provided that in addition to the joint weighing survey results, results from individual operators
participating in the joint survey are separately indicated in order to validate the joint survey results.
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GM1 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and balance, loading
ADJUSTMENT OF STANDARD MASSES
When standard mass values are used, AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.100(d) item (g) states that the operator
should identify and adjust the passenger and checked baggage masses in cases where significant numbers
of passengers or quantities of baggage are suspected of significantly deviating from the standard values.
Therefore the operations manual should contain instructions to ensure that:
(a) check-in, operations and cabin staff and loading personnel report or take appropriate action when a
flight is identified as carrying a significant number of passengers whose masses, including hand
baggage, are expected to significantly deviate from the standard passenger mass, and/or groups of
passengers carrying exceptionally heavy baggage (e.g. military personnel or sports teams); and
(b) on small aircraft, where the risks of overload and/or CG errors are the greatest, pilots pay special
attention to the load and its distribution and make proper adjustments.
GM2 CAT.POL.MAB.100 (e) Mass and Balance, Loading
STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE DATA
(a) Sample size.
(1) For calculating the required sample size it is necessary to make an estimate of the standard deviation
on the basis of standard deviations calculated for similar populations or for preliminary surveys.
The precision of a sample estimate is calculated for 95 % reliability or ‘significance’, i.e. there is a
95 % probability that the true value falls within the specified confidence interval around the
estimated value. This standard deviation value is also used for calculating the standard passenger
mass.
(2) As a consequence, for the parameters of mass distribution, i.e. mean and standard deviation, three cases