Complaint arising from a premises
search - MPS
Independent Investigation
Final Report
IPCC Reference: 2014/033206
IPCC Final Report
Contents
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3
Terms of reference ............................................................................................................ 3
Subjects to the investigation .............................................................................................. 4
Chronological summary of events ..................................................................................... 4
Legislation and case law ................................................................................................... 8
Conclusions....................................................................................................................... 9
Organisational learning ............................................................................................... 13
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Introduction
1.
On 23 July 2014, officers from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
executed a search warrant under Section 8 of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 at Ms A’s home address. Their aim was to
arrest her son, Mr B, on suspicion of supply of a Class A drug, and to
search for evidence linked to that offence.
2.
Ms A made a complaint about the search on 21 August 2014. She alleged
that if officers had made enquiries with other agencies when applying for
the warrant, they would have realised that Mr B had not lived at the
address for some years. She also alleged that officers continued forcing
entry via the front door after their colleagues had been let in through the
back door.
3.
Ms A’s complaint was locally investigated by the MPS. On 23 December
2014, the IPCC received an appeal against the investigation findings and
outcome. On 5 February 2015, the IPCC upheld the appeal on the
grounds that further enquiries needed to be carried out. The IPCC decided
to conduct an independent reinvestigation into parts of Ms A’s complaint.
4.
On 8 April 2015, Ms A made a further complaint about the covert footage
that formed the basis for the search warrant application. She stated that
the suspect in the footage looked nothing like Mr B, as he was taller and
had darker skin. This complaint was also incorporated into the IPCC
investigation.
Terms of reference
5.
The terms of reference for the investigation were:
1. To investigate
a) Whether any checks were made regarding Mr B’s address with
the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), the local
authority, or utility companies when applying for the warrant; and
if so, whether the results of these checks were disclosed to the
magistrate.
b) Whether any checks were not made which should reasonably
have been made, and whether there are any local policies or
guidance dealing with the issue of what steps should routinely
be taken to verify a suspect’s address when applying for a
search warrant.
c) Whether the decision to continue forcing entry through the front
door was reasonable, proportionate and justified, given that it is
alleged that officers continued forcing entry after some of their
colleagues had been let in through the back door.
d) The allegation that the suspect in the covert camera footage
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bore little resemblance to Mr B, and that he was only targeted
because he had a police record.
2. To identify whether any subject of the investigation may have
committed a criminal offence and, if appropriate, send a copy of the
investigation report to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for
him to decide whether criminal proceedings are to be brought.
3. To identify whether any subject of the investigation may have
breached their standards of professional behaviour. If such a
breach may have occurred, to determine whether that breach
amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct and whether there is a
case to answer.
4. To consider and report on whether there is organisational learning,
including:

whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a
recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated;

whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be
disseminated.
Subjects to the investigation
6.
A number of officers were involved in this incident. They have been treated
as witnesses rather than subjects because, while it is not in dispute that
police forced entry to the wrong address, the facts that could be
established throughout the investigation did not give an indication that any
officer may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner
that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. This decision
was kept under review throughout the investigation.
Chronological summary of events
7.
In a witness statement dated 11 June 2014, the officer who applied for the
search warrant stated: “This statement details my enquiries into the
identification of a suspect who sold class A drugs to [an undercover officer
on three occasions]... I compared [Mr B’s] arrest photographs to the still
images of the drug dealer and believe them to be the same person. On
close inspection the still images of the drug dealer show him to have a
small scar/mark just above his upper lip right of centre. [Mr B’s] arrest
photographs show him to have the same scar/mark.”
8.
I have been provided with the four still images from the footage of the
suspect who supplied drugs to an undercover MPS officer on three
occasions in early 2014. The suspect is a black male whom I estimate to
be in his late teens or early twenties. He has dark eyes and a small
amount of hair on his upper lip. In all of the images, the suspect is wearing
a hooded top with the hood pulled down low over his face.
9.
I have also been provided with the photographs of Mr B that were taken
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following a previous arrest, for comparison purposes.
10.
In his written account to the IPCC dated 3 March 2015, the officer who
applied for the search warrant stated that he obtained a data subject report
from the force Financial Investigation Unit which gave Ms A’s address as
Mr B’s most recent address. This, combined with the fact that Mr B had
given that address when arrested on 24 May 2011, led the officer to
believe that he was still living at the address.
11.
The officer confirmed that no other enquiries were carried out in order to
verify that this was Mr B’s current address. He explained that data subject
reports are internal documents and as such there is no risk of
confidentiality being compromised, whereas once outside agencies are
involved, that risk becomes significant. This in turn increases the risk of
the suspect receiving a tip-off and vacating the premises, or disposing of
evidence, or making preparations to harm officers when they enter the
premises.
12.
The officer stated that the data subject report itself was not provided to the
magistrate because it contained confidential data.
13.
In a further written response dated 23 June 2015, the officer confirmed
that he was not aware of any local policy or guidance dealing with the
issue of what checks should be conducted in order to verify the link
between a suspect and a premises when applying for a warrant. PS Nick
Griffith of the Newham Gangs and Firearms Unit has also confirmed
separately in an email dated 31 March 2015 that there is no guidance in
relation to this area.
14.
I have been provided with a copy of the data subject report. These reports
are obtained from Experian and are similar in content and format to
Experian credit reports, though less detailed. The report gives the results
that were returned when Experian carried out a search against Mr B’s
name and Ms A’s address on 10 April 2014.
15.
The report shows that Mr B used Ms A’s address when opening bank
accounts in 2012 and 2013, and when applying for insurance and
mortgage quotes in 2013. In the sections headed “Residential Phone
Numbers” and “Employment Phone Numbers”, searches carried out in
October 2013 also linked Mr B to Ms A’s address.
16.
In addition to the above evidence linking Mr B to Ms A’s address, in the
section headed “Previous and forward addresses”, Mr B’s actual address
in N_ Road was listed as a forwarding address in April 2012 and again in
March 2013. The report also shows that voters’ registration checks were
carried out, which found that Ms A was registered at her address on the
electoral roll, as was Mr B’s brother, Mr C, but Mr B was not. The report
does not state what address Mr B was registered at, but the Electoral
Services Officer for Haringey Council has since informed me that he has
been registered on the electoral roll as living at his current address in N_
Road since 1 February 2013.
17.
I have been provided with a copy of the Search Warrant Application Form.
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This gives a summary of the evidence that forms the basis for the warrant
application, and states: “Financial and Police intelligence shows [B’s]
current home address to be [Ms A’s address].”
18.
I have asked the magistrates’ court to supply any evidence of any
additional information provided by the officer who applied for the search
warrant, in response to any questions asked by the magistrate about the
strength or reliability of the intelligence linking Mr B to Ms A’s address.
19.
The Deputy Justices Clerk has confirmed that on the list of search
warrants applied for that day, next to Mr B’s surname, there is a note in the
magistrate’s handwriting which reads "bought 3 times. [Dates] – [Ms A’s
address]. Voters check - shows brother [Mr C] and Mum".
20.
I have also been provided with page 6 of the warrant application, which
was completed by the magistrate. This includes the following entry:
“Voters’ registration checks carried out: mum and brother registered but
not Mr B. This is address he has previously given to police. Also this
address on Experian checks.”
21.
The warrant application does not include any references to the address in
N_ Road.
22.
Mr C was present during the search and provided an account to the IPCC
on 2 March 2015. Mr C stated that on the morning of the search, he was
asleep in his bedroom on the third floor when he was woken by a loud
bang on the front door. When he looked out of his window he saw police
officers outside. He went downstairs and said to them through the door
“Hello, how can I help you?”
23.
The officers replied “I need you to open the door right now.” Mr C replied
“OK, I’m just going to get my key”, then ran back upstairs. He could not
find his key so went back downstairs and explained this to the officers,
then went upstairs again and woke his mother’s partner, Mr D, to see if he
had a key.
24.
They both went downstairs and Mr D told the officers he did not have his
key, then went back upstairs. The officers then started forcing the door.
25.
Mr D came downstairs with a key and went to open the back door. Mr C
stated that by this point he had stopped trying to communicate with the
officers at the front door, because he could not believe what they were
doing. He stated that it took them a long time to force entry, probably 1015 minutes in total.
26.
Mr C estimated that Mr D let the officers in through the back door between
1 and 5 minutes before the officers at the front broke in. He stated that the
officers at the front must have seen their colleagues coming in, as the front
door had a flat glass pane and it is possible to see the whole of the back
door when standing at the front door.
27.
He could not remember what the officers said when they came in through
the back door, as he was in shock and angry. They told him to sit down in
the front room with Mr D and his younger brother. While the other officers
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were spread out planning how to carry out the search, the Sergeant
explained that they were there to search for Mr B and Class A drugs. Mr C
told him that Mr B did not even live there.
28.
He stated that he remembered clearly one officer coming downstairs and
saying “It’s a complete waste of time.” He did not remember whether the
other officers said anything, but they looked disappointed. After this, they
brought in the dogs to search the house.
29.
Mr C stated that they were all polite to the officers and tried their best to
cooperate. When they smashed the door he was a bit angry, but still
compliant. After the officers realised Mr B did not live there, they were
really apologetic. However, this did not help as they had already broken
the front door. He stated that he has no respect for what the officers did on
that day, and their house is not safe any more because the front door is
not secure.
30.
Mr D provided an account on 10 April 2015. He stated that on the morning
of the search, Ms A was at work and he was asleep when Mr C knocked
on his bedroom door and told him that the police were trying to get into the
house.
31.
When he went downstairs, he could hear them trying to force the door. By
the time he got there, it was too late to open the door as his key would not
turn in the lock. He told the officers that he would let them in through the
back door, but they just kept shouting at him to open the door. He then
went upstairs and got the back door key.
32.
When he went to the back door, there were already three or four police
officers in the garden. He let them in and they radioed the officers at the
front and said “He’s let us in through the back door.” When Mr D turned
around from opening the back door, officers were coming in through the
front door.
33.
The officers said they were there for Mr B, and Mr D told them that he did
not live there. They showed him a search warrant and then brought the
dog in to search the house.
34.
In his written account to the IPCC dated 18 May 2015, PS Chris Scammell
stated that he was the supervising officer in charge of executing the
warrant. He stated that officers used a Rabbit tool1 to “spread” the door,
and a Hooligan2 bar to pull it outwards. He could not say how long it took
to gain access, but it took some minutes. Officers at the rear informed him
that they had gained access, but due to the unknown risks inside the
address and the fact that only a small number of officers had gained entry,
he decided to continue forcing entry and seconds later entry was gained.
PS Scammell stated that the damage to the front door occurred before the
back door was opened. He stated that only once the search had been
1
A Rabbit tool is a hand-held, manual hydraulic pump with a set of jaws that exert pressure outwards in
order to force a door open.
2
A Hooligan bar is a multi-purpose tool that can be used as a crow bar, adze or pick.
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completed were they able to establish definitively that Mr B did not live
there.
35.
In his written account to the IPCC dated 18 May 2015, PC Chris Martin
stated that he and PC Allen forced entry through the front door. He
inserted the Rabbit tool into the door gap, which did not have any effect
other than causing a small section of plastic to snap off. PC Allen then
began using the Rabbit at each locking point on the door, and PC Martin
inserted the Hooligan bar into each gap created by PC Allen and broke
each lock individually. He was unsure of how long it took them to open the
front door. He was aware that at some point other officers had made their
way to the rear of the address, but was not sure when. He did not recall
any communication between the two teams; nor any conversation between
officers and the occupants once entry had been gained.
36.
In her written account to the IPCC dated 1 June 2015, PC Bridie Middleton
stated that she was responsible for covering the rear of the property. She
could hear banging at the front, but could not see the officers. After a short
while she went back round to the front to see what was happening, which
took her around 30-45 seconds. By the time she arrived, entry had been
gained and she followed the officers in through the front door. She did not
know that officers had been let in through the back door until after she had
gone in through the front door. She did not witness any communication
between the two teams, and does not recall any conversation between the
officers and the occupants once inside the address. At the time of the
search, she did not know that Mr B did not live there.
37.
Seven other officers also provided written accounts, but their accounts did
not include any additional information of value to the investigation.
Legislation and case law
38.
Paragraphs 1.3 and 1.3A of PACE Code B state that powers of entry,
search and seizure should be fully and clearly justified before use,
because they may significantly interfere with the occupier’s right to privacy
and respect for personal property under the Human Rights Act 1998.
Powers to search and seize must be used fairly, responsibly, and with
respect for those who may be affected.
39.
Paragraph 3.1 of PACE Code B states that, when information appears to
justify an application for a search warrant, it is the officer’s responsibility to
take reasonable steps to check that the information is accurate, recent and
not provided maliciously or irresponsibly.
40.
The case of R (Energy Financing Team) v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court
[2006] found that the officer must also draw the magistrate’s attention to
anything “that militates against the issue of a warrant” While this case
involved an application for a warrant under the Criminal Justice Act 1987,
this part of the judgement was worded in general terms and accordingly I
consider it reasonable to apply the principles of that judgement to Ms A’s
case.
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41.
Finally, paragraphs 6.4 and 6.6 of PACE Code B state that officers can, if
necessary, use reasonable and proportionate force to enter an address if:




it is impossible to communicate with the occupier or any other
person entitled to grant access, or
the occupier has refused entry, or
the occupier and any other person entitled to grant access are
absent, or
there are reasonable grounds for believing that alerting the occupier
or any other person entitled to grant access would frustrate the
object of the search or endanger officers or other people.
Conclusions
42.
Below, I have set out my conclusions for the appropriate authority and
commission delegate to consider. These conclusions are based on the
evidence obtained during the investigation and summarised above.
43.
I have made factual findings, where appropriate, by applying the balance
of probabilities test to the evidence. In other words, I have decided
whether it is more likely than not that the alleged facts occurred.
44.
After reviewing my report and considering my recommendations, the
commission delegate will decide whether any organisational learning has
been identified that should be shared with the organisation in question.
They may also recommend or direct, unsatisfactory performance
procedures.
45.
For each complaint dealt with in the report, I will reach a conclusion about
whether the complaint should be upheld or not upheld.
46.
First, I have considered the complaint that the officer who applied for the
search warrant failed to undertake sufficient checks for the purpose of
verifying Mr B’s current address when applying for the warrant. In
particular, I have considered whether any checks were made with the
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), the local authority, or utility
companies when applying for the warrant; if so, whether the results of
these checks were disclosed to the magistrate; and whether any checks
were not made which should reasonably have been made.
47.
The investigation has established that the officer did not carry out any
checks with the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), the local
authority, utility companies or other agencies in order to supplement the
address information in the data subject report.
48.
PACE Code B states that an officer should take “reasonable” steps to
check that the information giving rise to the warrant application is accurate,
recent and not provided maliciously or irresponsibly.
49.
Whether a step is “reasonable” for the purposes of PACE Code B is likely
to depend on the circumstances of that particular case. If an offence is
serious and/or there is an urgent need to carry out a search, then it may
not be proportionate to carry out extensive research if doing so would
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delay the warrant application. In other cases, certain steps might not be
reasonable because the cost or resources entailed are not proportionate to
the seriousness of the alleged offence.
50.
The officer who applied for the search warrant has also made the valid
point that it may not be reasonable to take the step of contacting outside
agencies, due to the risk that information might be leaked to the suspect
which alerts them to the fact that a search is due to take place. While this
risk is small, it carries potentially serious consequences including harm to
officers when the warrant is executed, or the loss of evidence of an
offence.
51.
In this case, the offences (supply of controlled drugs) were recent and
accordingly prompt action was required in order to minimise the risk of
evidence being lost. However, there was evidently not considered to be a
need for immediate action as the data subject report was obtained two
months later and a further three months elapsed before the warrant was
granted. This timescale gives me no cause to think that further address
checks would not have been reasonably practicable on grounds of
urgency.
52.
Conducting checks with organisations such as the DWP, local authority or
utilities companies would also not have required significant resources or
generated significant costs.
53.
As discussed previously, there is a risk that such checks might alert the
suspect to the search. This risk is likely to be higher when the offence
potentially involves a network of individuals, and this is more likely to be
the case where the offence relates to the illegal drug trade. The police
would not be able to guarantee that the person with whom they were
speaking did not have any links with the suspect or any of their associates.
54.
However, this risk must be balanced against the very real and significant
risks associated with searching the wrong address. A premises search is
an extremely intrusive policing tactic, and the merits of this approach must
always be balanced against the occupier’s right to privacy and respect for
property. If the occupier is innocent of any offence, then the experience
can be particularly traumatic. For the police, there may be financial costs if
a civil claim is successful; there may also be complaints, negative press,
loss of public confidence in the police, and the potential for evidence to be
lost once the suspect is made aware of the error.
55.
With this in mind, in cases where the available evidence does not
demonstrate an unambiguous and recent link to a single address and
there is no particular urgency associated with the warrant application, I
consider that it would be reasonable for the officer to conduct further
checks.
56.
While the information in the data subject report gave a reasonably strong
indication that Mr B was living at Ms A’s address, there was still a degree
of uncertainty due to the fact that the most recent address information was
dated October 2013 (six months before the data subject report was
obtained); and also due to the fact that Mr B was not listed at Ms A’s
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address on the electoral roll. The fact that N_ Road was listed as his
forwarding address in March 2013 also undermined the warrant
application; albeit to a lesser degree as searches carried out in October
2013 indicated that Mr B was once again living at Ms A’s address.
57.
Taking this into account, it is my view that at the very least, the officer who
applied for the search warrant should have checked the electoral roll. This
can be done easily and quickly, without involving outside agencies. Had he
conducted this check, he would have found that Mr B was registered at the
N_ Road address. It was also open to him to request a further Experian
search against Mr B’s name and the N_ Road address. Given that Mr B
was living at this address, it is probable that further research would have
uncovered more recent and stronger links to this address.
58.
I therefore consider that this complaint by Ms A should be upheld on the
grounds that the service provided to her has fallen below a standard that
could reasonably be expected.
59.
However in my opinion, it is more appropriate to regard this as an
organisational learning opportunity than an individual misconduct or
performance issue, as there are no local policies or guidance dealing with
the issue of what steps should routinely be taken to verify a suspect’s
address when applying for a search warrant. As a result, officers may not
always be aware of all of the means of researching a suspect’s current
address, or they may have differing perceptions of what steps are
reasonable in order to verify that the information in the warrant application
is accurate and recent.
60.
I have made a recommendation for organisational learning with a view to
addressing this lack of guidance, which is set out in the next section.
61.
With regard to Ms A’s complaint about the forced entry: the original
decision by police to force entry was addressed in the course of the appeal
review by the IPCC, and was found to be reasonable and proportionate.
62.
This investigation has focused on the allegation that officers at the front
door continued forcing entry after their colleagues had already been let in
through the back door. The evidence as a whole indicates that this did
occur. While a number of officers have said that they did not realise that
their colleagues had been let in through the back door, supervisor PS
Scammell has confirmed that he was aware but decided to continue
forcing entry.
63.
PS Scammell stated that he decided to continue forcing entry due to the
fact that only a small number of officers had gained access, and he did not
know what the risks were inside the address.
64.
I have been provided with a copy of the briefing that was given to all
officers prior to the search, and this briefing does discuss the potential
risks associated with the search. Due to the information available to the
officers and the nature of the offence under investigation, I consider that
PS Scammell had reasonable grounds to believe that officers entering the
address may be at risk of harm, and that this risk would be likely to reduce
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as the number of officers increased.
65.
If there had been evidence to suggest that officers at the front might have
gained access more quickly by halting their efforts to force the door and
instead taking the same access route as their colleagues, then there may
be grounds to query the justification for PS Scammell’s decision to
continue forcing entry.
66.
However, the evidence does not support such a finding. While Mr C has
estimated that officers entered through the back door between one and
five minutes before officers at the front door broke in, PS Scammell stated
that entry was gained through the front door seconds after officers at the
rear door informed him that they had been let in. PC Middleton has
indicated that officers gained entry through the front door between 30 and
45 seconds after their colleagues entered through the back door. Mr D
stated that when he turned around from opening the back door, officers
were already coming in through the front door. On balance, it is my view
that the evidence suggests that the total time elapsed between the two
events is closer to one minute than five minutes, and perhaps even less
than that.
67.
In summary, it is my view that the evidence does not support a finding that
this use of force was unjustified or disproportionate. I therefore consider
that this part of the complaint cannot be upheld.
68.
With regard to the allegation that the suspect in the covert camera footage
bore little resemblance to Mr B, and that he was only targeted because he
had a police record: I have compared the photographs of the suspect with
the images of Mr B taken after his arrest in 2011.
69.
The covert images of the suspect were taken in close-up. The image
quality is reasonable, but still considerably lower than the quality of the
custody photographs. The suspect’s forehead, chin, eyebrows, ears and
the sides of his face are obscured or overshadowed by his hood. Because
only the suspect’s head and shoulders are shown, the footage does not
give an indication of his height. The location is brightly lit by artificial
lighting, and parts of the image are overexposed. Because a large
proportion of the suspect’s face is either in shadow or reflecting the
artificial light, it is not possible to say whether the suspect’s skin tone is
lighter or darker than Mr B’s skin tone. In my view, the image definition is
not clear enough to be able to see whether the suspect has a scar to the
right of his upper lip as stated by the officer who applied for the search
warrant, but in two of the four images, light is reflected off the suspect’s
upper lip in a way that could plausibly give the impression that it is
reflecting off scar tissue. It could also simply be a flaw in the image, but I
do not consider that the officer was unreasonable or obviously wrong to
conclude that it was a scar.
70.
Another factor that makes it harder to compare the two sets of images is
the fact that there are no images in which the suspect is completely in
profile or facing straight ahead, as Mr B is in his custody photographs. In
two of the images the suspect is looking slightly to the right; in one image
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he is looking down; and in one image he is looking towards the camera
with his head tilted slightly up.
71.
In my view, the suspect appears to have a similar face shape and facial
features to Mr B. He also has similar eye colour and facial hair. Due to the
fact that the suspect’s face is partially concealed and also due to the other
factors discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is genuinely hard to give
a view on the degree of resemblance or the degree of difference.
However, having given careful consideration to this matter, it is my view
that any differences between the images are not pronounced enough that
the misidentification should be regarded as anything more than an honest
and reasonable mistake.
72.
I therefore consider that this part of Ms A’s complaint should not be
upheld.
73.
In closing, Ms A has queried whether records of Mr B’s arrest will be
retained. The Criminal Records Office website includes guidance on
applying for the deletion of records from national police systems, including
PNC, the fingerprint database and the DNA database, at
https://www.acro.police.uk/acro_std.aspx?id=699.
Organisational learning
74.
After reviewing this report, the commission delegate will consider whether
learning has been identified for any organisation involved in the
investigation. If any learning is identified, the commission delegate can
make organisational learning recommendations and send these to the
organisations in question under separate cover.
75.
Recommendations can include improving practice, updating policy or
changes to training.
76.
Often these recommendations and any responses to them are published
on the recommendations section of the IPCC Website.
77.
The IPCC also works with a variety of stakeholders, including the
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the College of Policing
to disseminate learning coming from investigations undertaken by the
IPCC, and by the police service locally. We produce a regular Learning
the Lessons Bulletin which is disseminated to senior officers, policy
makers, managers and frontline officers and staff working across the
police service. These bulletins are also available on the IPCC website.
78.
The commission delegate may wish to consider making the following
recommendations:
A local policy or guidance should be drawn up to include the following:

What steps should always be taken to verify a suspect’s
address when applying for a warrant (for example, checking
the voters’ register, and researching internal police records
such as the Police National Computer (PNC), the NSPIS
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custody record database and the Crimint intelligence
database).

What additional steps may be taken (for example, with
outside agencies such as Experian, the DWP, local
authority, utilities companies).

Factors that the officer should consider when deciding
whether it is “reasonable” to undertake further checks (for
example, the seriousness of the offence and level of
urgency of the warrant application, the degree of
uncertainty regarding the suspect’s current address, and
whether the risk associated with undertaking further checks
outweighs the risk associated with not performing those
checks).
Liz Pollard
Lead Investigator, IPCC
3 July 2015
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