Business ethics and moral skepticism
ALAIN ANQUETIL1
Abstract
The phrase ‘business ethics’ frequently evokes an incompatibility between business and ethics. Such
an incompatibility reflects a negative skeptical attitude regarding the possibility of an ethics in
business. This attitude raises in turn the following epistemological question: what was the influence
of skepticism on normative theories that have been built in business ethics? In this paper, it is argued
that skepticism have played a central and structuring role in normative theorization within this field.
For this purpose, and using examples taken from the business ethics literature, we will try to show
how business ethicists answer to this skepticism before exposing their theories and showing how they
can address it.
The argument will be presented in two steps. First, four species of skepticism will be considered. The
first one is ideological: it is based on a radical criticism of the foundations of the market economy.
The second kind of skepticism has an anti-theoretical dimension: it questions the practical relevance
of ethical theory. The third, which pertains to meta-ethics, is concerned with the view that moral
statements have no truth value and therefore lack any power of conviction. The fourth kind of
skepticism refers to an egoistic account of moral human motivations, which reduces significantly
the practical authority of morality.
The second step of the argument will deal with the answers that have been proposed in the business
ethics literature, especially within its normative branch, to these forms of skepticism. The metaethical and egoistic kinds will be more specifically considered. The former kind is often summarized
by the phrase “separation thesis,” that is, the idea that business morality is less demanding than
common morality. One answer to the separation thesis has been advanced by Freeman. It consists
in changing the language with which business facts and practices are described. Another answer,
proposed by Solomon, is that economic and non-economic activities are part of a single community
governed by the same moral rules, and that each economic actor should consider himself as a member
of this unique community. Two answers are also proposed with respect to the form of skepticism
which lies in an egoistic account of moral human motivations. The first one has been emphasized
in the “ethical philosophy for marketing” defended by Robin and Reidenbach. In their view, the
proper function of business morality is to counterbalance the “limited sympathies” that characterize
human relationships. The second answer, put forward by Sen, aims at showing that the belief that
economic actors would be exclusively self-interested is not justified. This belief often relates to a
famous passage of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, but Sen explains why it is misinterpreted.
Our epistemological argument has two main consequences. First, it stresses the fact that skepticism
about ethics in business should be taken seriously. In other words, its effects on practices and
on theoretical constructions should be considered. Second, theories in business ethics should be
detached from skepticism and based on criteria that define a good human life and good human
relations in general.
Key words : Business ethics, skepticism, normative theories, separation thesis, egoism.
1 - Professor of Business Ethics, ESSCA Ecole de Management, LUNAM, Associate Researcher,
CERSES (UMR 8137) - alain.anquetil@essca
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Résumé
L’expression « éthique des affaires » évoque souvent une incompatibilité entre l’éthique et la vie
économique marchande. Cette incompatibilité reflète une attitude sceptique sur la possibilité d’une
éthique dans les affaires. Il en résulte une problématique épistémologique : celle de l’influence du
scepticisme sur les théories qui ont été élaborées dans le champ de l’éthique des affaires. Dans
cet article, nous défendons l’hypothèse selon laquelle une telle attitude sceptique a pu contribuer
à structurer les approches normatives proposées dans l’éthique des affaires. À cette fin, nous
montrerons à partir d’exemples issus de la littérature la manière dont les théoriciens répondent à ce
scepticisme avant de proposer des positions normatives.
Notre méthodologie se développera en deux temps. D’abord, nous distinguerons quatre formes de
scepticisme sur l’éthique dans les affaires : la première, idéologique, est fondée sur une critique des
fondements du système économique ; la seconde, anti-théorique, affirme que les théories morales
ont peu d’utilité car elles sont déconnectées des pratiques des acteurs ; la troisième, méta-éthique,
énonce que les principes moraux censés gouverner la vie des affaires sont dépourvus de valeur de
vérité, ce qui implique qu’ils n’ont pas un pouvoir de conviction suffisant ; la quatrième repose sur
une conception égoïste des motivations humaines qui compromet l’efficacité de l’éthique dans les
affaires.
Dans un second temps, nous traiterons des réponses apportées à ces formes de scepticisme. Nous
présenterons ainsi plusieurs éléments permettant de vérifier l’influence du scepticisme sur les
approches normatives de l’éthique des affaires. Nous traiterons en particulier des formes « métaéthique » et « liée à l’égoïsme de la nature humaine ». La forme méta-éthique peut être résumée
par la thèse de la séparation, qui affirme que la morale de la vie économique est séparée de la
morale ordinaire. Une réponse à la thèse de la séparation, due à Freeman, consiste à proposer
un nouveau langage pour décrire la vie économique. Une autre réponse, due à Solomon, est de
défendre l’idée que les activités économiques marchandes et les autres domaines de la vie humaine
font partie intégrante d’un même ensemble régi par les mêmes règles morales, et que chaque acteur
doit se penser lui-même comme membre d’une unique communauté morale. En ce qui concerne
le scepticisme lié à l’égoïsme de la nature humaine, deux réponses sont présentées. La première se
situe dans le champ du marketing. Proposée par Robin et Reichenbach, elle revient à concevoir la
morale des affaires comme un instrument de compensation des « sympathies limitées » dont font
preuve les êtres humains. La seconde réponse, formulée par Sen, revient à dénoncer les fondements
de la croyance selon laquelle les acteurs économiques sont par nature égoïstes, une croyance qui
s’enracine souvent dans une mauvaise interprétation d’un célèbre passage de La richesse des nations
d’Adam Smith.
Les apports de notre argument épistémologique sont de deux types. Le premier est qu’il convient
de prendre au sérieux le scepticisme relatif à la place de l’éthique dans les affaires, c’est-à-dire de
considérer ses effets non seulement sur les pratiques, mais aussi sur les constructions théoriques. Le
second apport est que les théories de l’éthique des affaires devraient s’affranchir de toute attitude
sceptique et partir de critères relatifs à ce que sont une bonne vie et de bonnes relations humaines.
Mots clés : Éthique des affaires, scepticisme, théories normatives, thèse de la séparation, égoïsme.
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Resumen
La expresión « ética de los negocios » evoca muchas veces una incompatibilidad entre la ética y
la vida económica mercantil. Esta incompatibilidad refleja una actitud escéptica a propósito de la
posibilidad de una ética en los negocios. De ello procede una problemática epistemológica : la de la
influencia del escepticismo a propósito de las teorías que se han elaborado en el ámbito de la ética
de los negocios. En este artículo, defendemos la hipótesis según la cual semejante actitud escéptica
ha podido contribuir a estructurar los enfoques normativos propuestos en la ética de los negocios.
Con este fin, demostraremos, a partir de ejemplos procedentes de la literatura, cómo reaccionan los
teóricos frente a este escepticismo antes de proponer orientaciones normativas.
Nuestra metodología se desarrollará en dos fases. En un principio, distinguiremos cuatro formas de
escepticismo sobre la ética de los negocios : la primera, ideológica, que se fundó en una crítica de los
fundamentos del sistema económica ; la segunda, antiteórica, afirma que las teorías morales tienen
poca utilidad porque se han desconectado de las prácticas de los actores; la tercera, metaética,
enuncia que los principios morales que supuestamente gobernan la vida de los negocios están
desprovistos de valor de verdad, lo que implica que no tienen un poder de convicción suficiente
; la cuarta se funda en una concepción egoísta de las motivaciones humanas que comprometen
la eficacia de la ética en los negocios. En un segundo tiempo, trataremos de las respuestas que se
dan a estas formas de escepticismo. Presentaremos así varios elementos que permiten comprobar
la influencia del escepticismo a propósito de los enfoques normativos de la ética de los negocios.
Trataremos en particular de las formas « metaética » y « vinculada al egoísmo de la naturaleza
humana ». La forma metaética puede resumirse por la tesis de la separación, que afirma que la moral
de la vida económica está alejada de la moral ordinaria. Una respuesta a la tesis de la separación,
que se debe a Freeman, consiste en proponer un nuevo lenguaje para describir la vida económica.
Otra respuesta, que se debe a Solomon, es defender la idea según la que las actividades económicas
mercantiles y los otros sectores de la vida humana forman parte íntegra de un mismo conjunto
regido por las mismas reglas morales, y cada actor tiene que pensarse a sí mismo como miembro
de una única comunidad moral. En lo que atañe al escepticismo relacionado con el egoísmo de
la naturaleza humana, se ofrecen dos respuestas. La primera se sitúa en el sector del marketing.
Propuesto por Robin y Reichenbach, consiste en considerar la moral de los negocios como un
instrumento de compensación de las « simpatías limitadas » que manifiestan los seres humanos. La
segunda respuesta, formulada por Sen, consiste en denunciar los fundamentos de la creencia según
la que los actores económicos son por naturaleza egoístas, una creencia que se arraiga a menudo
en una interpretación errada de un famoso extracto de La riqueza de las naciones de Adam Smith.
Los aportes de nuestro argumento epistemológico son de dos tipos. El primero es que es preciso
tomar en serio el escepticismo relativo al lugar de la ética en los negocios, o sea considerar sus efectos
no solo sobre las prácticas, sino también sobre las construcciones teóricas. El segundo aporte es que
las teorías de la ética de los negocios deberían liberarse de cualquier actitud escéptica y empezar
desde criterios relativos a lo que son una buena vida y buenas relaciones humanas.
Palabras clave :
egoísmo.
Ética de los negocios, escepticismo, teorías normativas, tesis de la separación,
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Introduction
Moral skepticism has an important place in the academic field of business ethics.
It is not a radical skepticism such as the attitude which gave rise to skeptical
doubt in ancient philosophy, but rather an uncertainty about the possibility
of behaving morally and leading an ethical life in the context of business. The
skeptical attitude has of course a positive dimension. It corresponds to the
etymological meaning of the word “skeptical,” from the Greek skeptikos, which
means “examining, observing, reflective” (Godin, 2004, p. 1177). It refers also
to an essential aim of skepticism, that is, fighting dogmatic thought, especially
religious dogmatism. But the skeptical attitude has also a negative dimension.
It is particularly present in the normative edge of the business ethics literature,
which aims at building theories that describe the organizational conditions
allowing economic agents to act rightly and lead a good life. As it often appears,
such theorists begin by mentioning some sort of skepticism about the possibility
of establishing ethics in business – or at least their own interpretation of
skepticism – before exposing their theories and showing how they can address
it. Understanding the influence of the negative skeptical attitude on business
ethics is a complex task that we will not undertake here. Rather, we will try to
stress the way the skeptical attitude has been connected with some significant
normative conceptions in business ethics. In particular, we will try to underpin
the epistemological argument that the negative skeptical attitude regarding the
possibility of an ethics in business may have structured, of course partially, the
academic field of business ethics. This argument is rather hypothetical. There
is no guarantee that it can be empirically verified. Naturally, other factors have
shaped the field, such as the advent of a globalized economy, the diversity of
social pressures exerted on firms, or the dramatic effects of financial scandals.
But the negative skeptical attitude is presumably one of them. Moreover, it
is an important component of the “separation thesis,” a famous claim of
Edward Freeman (1994, 2000), one of the proponents of the stakeholder
theory, a dominant paradigm in business ethics. The separation thesis asserts
that ordinary morality and business morality are deeply separated. A negative
skeptical attitude can also be found in Robert Solomon (1992), who defends a
moral philosophy for business inspired from an Aristotelian ethics of virtue.
It also appears through the huge efforts that have been devoted to correct the
false interpretation of Adam Smith’s assertion that the individual pursuit of
self-interest is the sole source of collective prosperity – the “invisible hand
paradigm.”
To begin with, we will propose some general considerations with regard to the
roots of skepticism about ethics in business. Four forms of skepticism will be
considered. The first is ideological; the second has an anti-theoretical dimension;
the third, which pertains to meta-ethics, is concerned with the truth value of
moral statements (for simplicity’s sake, it will be termed “meta-ethical”); the
fourth rests on an egoistic account of moral human motivations. In the second
part, we will present some of the most significant answers to the last two forms,
referring to a number of works in business ethics which have contributed to the
normative wing of business ethics literature.
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1. Some species of skepticism about ethics in business
One may wonder why the negative skeptical attitude on morality in business is
of first importance within business ethics literature. Admittedly, the skeptical
attitude is central to such scientific disciplines as physics or biology, but what
is in question is the positive version of the skeptical attitude. It is part of the
scientific approach. As Anne Fagot-Largeault (2002, p. 164) says with regard
to the European scientific spirit, such an attitude relates to a “spirit of inquiry
which is made up of an active curiosity, an ability to identify and formulate
a research statement, a critical mind which questions the common view, and
fidelity to the real world, giving at the same time an ethical dimension to the
scientific method.” For any scientist, no theory is irrefutable, because doubt and
criticism are intrinsic to the scientific method. However, the skeptical attitude
we are concerned with here is not virtuous and positive doubt, rather a lack of
confidence in the possibility of behaving morally and leading an ethical life in
the context of business. We should specify that we do not distinguish here the
concepts of doubt and skepticism, though they differ. In particular, the strong
meaning of skepticism supposes a radical doubt, that is, the possibility of
doubting everything. This form of skepticism was forcefully argued by Pyrrho,
a Greek philosopher from Elis. He denied the possibility that any knowledge,
or even any belief, may be justified. This view stands in contrast with scientific
doubt, which demands that no judgment be made on a fact if no evidence is
available. In this paper, we use the term “skepticism” in a sense akin to the word
“doubt.” It refers to an a priori attitude of systematic incredulity and criticism
over the authority of morality in business. We also suppose that this skepticism
leads to a defensive attitude on the part of both business practitioners and
business ethics theorists; in other words, they have to prove that business is
indeed an ethical activity.
Indeed, this negative side of skepticism is not only shared by many of those who
are involved in the market economy, but also by many observers, including of
course specialists in business ethics. In this respect, we should remark that the
observers’ skepticism has often been regarded as one major cause of the difficulty
in building a constructive dialogue between practitioners and theorists. Yet one
of the requests made by practitioners to theorists was that the latter help them
to set up moral criteria in order to make their practices legitimate – or, to put it
another way, that theorists help them to prove that mistrust regarding the role
of ethics in business is inappropriate. For theorists as well as practitioners, the
task is difficult because skepticism about ethics in business takes different forms.
Moreover, some of them particularly resist criticism. In what follows, we will be
concerned with four sorts of skepticism – ideological, anti-theoretical, “metaethical,” and grounded on an egoistic account of moral human motivations.
The first one is ideological. It rests on a harsh criticism of the foundations of
the market economy and is related to a wider political, social and economic
denunciation of the harmful effects of liberalism and capitalism. According to
this view, the economic system based on free market hinders moral progress.
The only way to resolve this state of affairs is to provoke a radical change of the
economic system. However, ideological skepticism remains marginal within the
field of business ethics, even though some arguments have been developed from
it, for instance the one based on the Marxist concept of alienation (Corlett, 1988;
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Sweet, 1993) or the place of democracy within the firm (McMahon, 2010). The
second form of skepticism about the implementation of ethics in business may
be called “anti-theoretical.” Bertrand Russell (1925), who did not believe that
ethical knowledge can exist, proposed a striking example. In his view, desire is the
source or every human behavior. Moral injunctions, if regarded as independent
of desire, cannot produce any practical effect. We cannot appeal to and count
on any ethical theory in order to make a right decision, regardless of our desire.
“The superfluity of theoretical ethics is obvious in simple cases,” Russell writes
(1925, p. 129). “Suppose, for instance, your child is ill. Love makes you wish to
cure it, and science tells you how to do so. There is not an intermediate stage of
ethical theory, where it is demonstrated that your child had better be cured. Your
act springs directly from desire for an end, together with knowledge of means.”
It is important to see that Russell does not exclude normative analysis, as he
recommends that, in any choice, the expected consequences of the options be
assessed. But he denies the usefulness of ethical knowledge if it is independent
of desire. Such a rejection of ethical theory may foster a quite ordinary form of
skepticism with regard to the practical authority of morality. It has also been
observed within applied ethics, perhaps especially in business ethics. Arguments
against the practical relevance of ethical theory have often focused on the too
general character of normative conceptions stemming from moral philosophy,
such as utilitarianism and deontologism (Cavanagh, Moberg and Velasquez,
1995). Even if moral advice given by these conceptions often reflect ordinary
moral intuitions, such advice would in practice be ineffective in complex moral
decision-making.
Solomon (1992, p. 317) argues more generally that “a large part of the problem
is that it is by no means clear what a theory in business ethics is supposed to look
like or whether there is, as such, any such theoretical enterprise.” But he himself
has laid the foundations of such a theory (see the second part). Besides, and quite
naturally, a lot of normative work in business ethics has striven to build workable
theories. For example, the ethical conceptualization proposed by Cavanagh,
Moberg and Velasquez (1995) explicitly aims at helping practitioners to identify
and make clear their moral reasoning and justify their decisions. Another typical
case is the approach that Gene Laczniak and Patrick Murphy (1991) designed for
marketers. It is based on a series of eight critical tests (“A sequence of questions
to improve ethical reasoning”) with which any moral decision should comply.
Rejection of ethical theory also results from the place of moral relativism in
the normative landscape of business ethics. Relativism “denies that there is any
universal moral code,” it is “the doctrine that there is no single true or most
justified morality” (Wong, 1996, p. 1290). The sort of skepticism which is
considered here – which means doubting the effective role allotted to ethics in
business – is fueled by relativism. Indeed, some theoretical endeavors in business
ethics have attempted to limit the extent of moral relativism. This is the case of
the moral theory proposed by Robin and Reidenbach (1993), which rests upon
a “bounded relativism,” and of the famous contractarian framework, named
“Integrative Social Contracts Theory,” devised by Thomas Donaldson and
Thomas Dunfee (1994), which leaves room for a certain degree of relativism.
The third form of skepticism on ethics in business has been termed “metaethical,” with reference to the branch of moral philosophy which is concerned, in
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particular, with the meaning of moral terms, the truth value of moral statements
and the motivational power of ethical judgments. We will briefly deal with the
question of the truth value of moral statements.
Examining whether moral statements may be true or false is intuitively important
to explain skepticism about ethics in business. Scientific statements such as “Two
plus two equals four” and “Water boils at one hundred degrees Celsius (under
some initial conditions, i.e. at sea level)” are true. But is it the same for such
statements as “Corruption is morally wrong” or “Profits should be shared out
fairly among the stakeholders”? With regard to moral statements, emotivists
(as well as expressivists and prescriptivists) contend that such statements simply
express the speaker’s preferences. The agent who argues that “Corruption is
morally wrong” is not referring to a moral truth. She is only asserting her own
preference with respect to the problem of corruption. Moreover, by publicly
expressing her judgment, she is seeking to convince her hearers that her judgment
is right. Now, according to emotivism, moral statements articulated in a public
context, e.g. a public debate, lack the power to convince. They would certainly
be far more persuasive if they could be proven true as is the case for scientific
statements. Doubt about the truth value of moral statements assuredly plays a
role in the “moral muteness of managers,” a phrase devised by Frederick Bird
and James Waters (1989). They stress how difficult it is for managers to express
moral concerns in business contexts. Managers may even be led to remain silent
on some moral questions they are confronted with. Such a moral muteness may
be linked to the explicit or implicit belief that moral statements are less persuasive
than scientific statements because they only express subjective preferences. Added
to this is the belief that the public confrontation of moral statements expressing
the participants’ subjective preferences results in sterile and insoluble debates. If
moral muteness becomes the rule, it quite simply excludes moral considerations
from debates regarding business and supports the belief that business morality
is less demanding than common morality – which amounts to excluding ethics
from business. Such devaluation refers to what has been called the “separation
thesis,” which will be presented in the next part.
The fourth form of skepticism about ethics in business is grounded on an egoistic
account of human nature. If every reason for acting is self-interested – and,
in addition, based on the quest for power and wealth – it is difficult, perhaps
impossible, not to be pessimistic about the practicability of ethics in business.
This skepticism stems for instance from Machiavelli’s Discourses, in which he
insists on the importance of rulers’ willingness to dominate others and the
desire for wealth that governs individual conduct. It also draws upon writers
like Robert Michels (1911), who studied how the ruling class rise to power and
secure their power. Such a framework is compatible with the model of homo
economicus – the imaginary creature whose motives exclusively depend on his
own interests – even though this model has been widely challenged within the
social sciences, including economics. This form of skepticism is almost common
in business ethics. It can be found in works regarding amorality and immorality
in business – see, for example, Archie Carroll (1991). It also lies in the background
of normative assumptions behind theoretical constructions such as the “ethical
philosophy for marketing” defended by Donald Robin and Eric Reidenbach
(1993).
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2. Responses of business ethics to skepticism about morality in business
In this second part we expound some of the theoretical answers that have been
proposed within the business ethics literature, especially within its normative
side. We will only be concerned with the two last forms of skepticism. Indeed,
we will not deal with the ideological form, as even basic answers to it and the
objections it faces would entail an amount of political, economic and moral
argumentation moving us beyond the field of business ethics. Objecting to
the anti-theoretical form also goes beyond our present scope, as it is found
in much recent debate within normative moral philosophy. Moreover, some
considerations about the way some theoretical perspectives in business ethics
incorporate moral relativism (in the form of a “bounded relativism”) have been
alluded to in the previous part. Rather, we will be concerned most centrally
here with the two other species of skepticism: first, “meta-ethical skepticism,”
on which we will present the answers of Freeman (1994) and Wicks, Gilbert and
Freeman (1994) to the “separation thesis,” and the refutation put forward by
Solomon (1992); and secondly, the skepticism grounded on an egoistic account
of human nature, referring to Robin and Reidenbach (1993), whose “ethical
philosophy for marketing” relies upon egoism, and to Amartya Sen’s (1993)
refutation of a famous and frequently misinterpreted passage in Adam Smith’s
Wealth of Nations.
Before proceeding, one thing should be said about the reason why these
particular works have been selected here. It does not stem from their reputation
within business ethics, even though this would possibly be a legitimate reason,
but from the fact that their writers address the very issue of skepticism about
ethics in business, before arguing for normative positions. A good way to deal
with meta-ethical skepticism is to take the separation thesis as a starting point.
This thesis holds that business morality is separated from common morality.
Language lies at the root of this view. The idea appears clearly in Freeman (1994,
p. 412): “The discourse of business and the discourse of ethics can be separated
so that sentences like, ‘x is a business decision’ have no moral content, and ‘x is
a moral decision’ have no business content”2. According to Freeman (1994), the
separation thesis pervades not only the practices of business professionals, but
also the views and theoretical constructions of some, if not a majority of, business
ethics theorists. Thus, even without being aware of its influence, they presuppose
a separation between two orders of language and morality. This is why Freeman
proposes to change the language in order to rule out the detrimental effects of
the separation thesis. The change in question should not exclusively apply to
morality – another way to speak of such rules as “Reject corruption” or “Do not
conclude agreements subject to antitrust laws.” It would also require a change in
the way business facts and practices are described. The task consists in inventing
a proper and refreshed vocabulary.
Freeman and his colleagues Andrew Wicks and Daniel Gilbert (1994) thus
undertake to renew some key aspects of the business vocabulary. In particular,
they strive to partially replace five “masculinist metaphors” (without abolishing
them), commonly used to describe business, with five “feminist metaphors.”
2 - For an account of the separation thesis, see (in French) Anquetil (2008, p. 19-28). This thesis has given rise
to an abundant literature. For instance, Andrew Abela (2001) and Joakim Sandberg (2008) have identified
respectively four degrees and nine sorts of “separation.”
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For instance, they suggest that the masculinist metaphor of hierarchy, which is
commonly and often unconsciously applied to organizational structures, should
be replaced by a metaphor, supposedly stemming from a feminist outlook,
emphasizing a “radical decentralization and worker empowerment” (Wicks,
Gilbert and Freeman, 1994, p. 491). Their perspective, also influenced by
pragmatism and postmodernism, is typical of an attempt to answer the deeply
rooted skepticism stemming from the separation thesis. In the first section of his
paper, Robert Solomon (1992) tackles various theoretical frameworks that have
been quite frequently invoked in order to set the foundations of business ethics.
After highlighting their imperfections, Solomon contends that business ethics
should be grounded on an Aristotelian moral philosophy. Such a framework
attaches much importance to the development of virtues within the firm
understood as a human community. But Solomon (1992) also offers a critique
of skepticism about the place of morality in business. In his view, this skepticism
is based on two prejudices. The first one stems from Aristotle’s distinction
between household management (oikonomia) and commerce with a view to
profit (chrematistike). The second type is oriented toward a purely mercantile
aim, viz. maximizing profit (Aristotle, Politics, 1257b4). Consequently, it is not
virtuous. As Solomon (1992, p. 321) reminds us, “Aristotle declared the latter
activity wholly devoid of virtue and called those who engaged in such purely
selfish practices ‘parasites’.” As for the second prejudice, which has a Christian
origin, it is expressed in a “contempt for finance.”
Such prejudices have helped to buttress the belief that business (understood
here as “profit as an end in itself ”) is governed by very specific moral rules, that
is, rules separate from those that govern the community. This is why Solomon
(1992) puts forward a holistic theory which views the market economy and other
domains of life as integral to a single community governed by the same rules.
One need not consider that there are two different human communities, one
devoted to economy and the other to non-economic activities. Indeed, there is
only one community, and the theory of business ethics advocated by Solomon
(1992) depends on the idea that every member of this single and widest possible
community has to see himself as a member of this community. The way Solomon
connects his theory with the skepticism grounded on the Aristotelian prejudice
is eloquently expressed in the following passage: “Even defenders of business
often end up presupposing Aristotelian prejudices in such Pyrrhonian arguments
as ‘business is akin to poker and apart from the ethics of everyday life’ (Albert
Carr) and ‘the [only] social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’
(Milton Friedman). But if it is just this schism between business and the rest of
life that so infuriated Aristotle, for whom life was supposed to fit together in a
coherent whole, it is the same holistic idea – that businesspeople and corporations
are first of all part of a larger community, that drives business ethics today”
(Solomon, 1992, p. 322). Let us now deal with some meaningful answers to the
sort of skepticism about ethics in business which is based on an egoistic account
of human nature. Importantly, in their attempt to define a “workable ethical
philosophy for marketing,” Donald Robin and Eric Reidenbach (1993) rely on
such an egoistic conception, which owes much of its inspiration to Thomas
Hobbes. They refer in particular to Geoffrey Warnock (1971), who considers that
morality should counterbalance the “limited sympathies” between people and
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their “potentially most damaging effects” (Robin and Reidenbach, 1993, p. 100).
According to Robin and Reidenbach, the language of “limited sympathies” fits
well into marketing because marketers target particular segments of the market
while ignoring those segments, i.e. people, who are outside the target. Moreover,
they strive to satisfy exclusively the egoistic desires of those who are included
in market targets. Robin and Reidenbach present a definition of the object
of ethics that is worth quoting here because it refers to skepticism about the
supposedly egoistic nature of man: “Ethics is an attempt by human beings to use
their intelligence and capacity for reasoning to improve on the ‘law of the jungle’
conditions from which they evolved. Lower order animals lack this capacity and
must face conditions in which power, in the form of force, speed, and instinct, as
well as pure chance, dictates the length and quality of life. Power and chance are
obviously part of the human condition as well, and with the addition of increased
intelligence, the human capacity to use power is extended far beyond that found
in any jungle. The moral dictates of societies and organizations represent an
attempt to temper the use of power and perhaps at least reduce the grossest
impacts of chance” (1993, p. 100). We may recall the reference Solomon (1992)
makes to Milton Friedman (1970) in the passage quoted above.3 This famous
economist is often associated with Adam Smith, although for certain reasons
only, e.g. with regard to invisible hand arguments. And it is true that Smith has
(unwittingly) fed a form of skepticism based on the “virtuous” effects resulting
from supposedly self-interested economic agents.
In a famous section of The Wealth of Nations, Smith asserted that “It is not from
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their
humanity but to their self-love…” (Smith, 1776, p. 23-24). In Sen’s view (1993),
this passage has been misinterpreted. That is, the view that collective prosperity
only depends on individual self-interest has been wrongly ascribed to Smith. Sen
reminds us that Smith speaks of self-interest in the narrow context of exchange,
even a special category of exchange. In this much-quoted passage, Smith does
not speak of the virtues of self-interest regarding production and distribution
of commodities or distribution of wealth. As for production, for instance, the
agents’ motivations are often “non-profit” or “non-self-seeking” motivations,
as Sen says. The same is true for issues of distribution. In the end, “for Smith,
commerce is a morally decent activity” and “people engaged in commerce
have the capacity to be morally virtuous while engaged in economic activities”
(Calkins and Werhane, 1998, p. 43). The important point here is that Sen relates
his argument to skepticism about ethics in business, since that skepticism depends
to a significant degree on the misinterpretation of Smith’s statement about the
butcher, the brewer, and the baker. Sen’s paper typically begins with the idea
that “that there is no need for such ethics” and concludes that “business ethics
can be crucially important in economic organization in general and in exchange
operations in particular” (Sen, 1993, p. 45 and p. 53). Even though he does not
argue for a normative theory of business ethics as Wicks, Gilbert and Freeman
(1994), Solomon (1992), and Robin and Reidenbach (1993) do, his argument, like
theirs, is dependent on skepticism about the place of ethics in a market economy.
3 - Solomon omits the fact that for Friedman the context of business must be “without deception or fraud”
(Anquetil, 2008, p.82).
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Conclusion
What we have tried to show in this paper is that different forms of skepticism
about ethics in business have played a central and structuring role in normative
theorization within the field of business ethics. Of course, the skepticism in
question is not a radical skepticism in a philosophical sense, rather an attitude
of doubt and suspicion toward the possibility of acting well and leading a good
life in the context of business. In the first part, we laid out some the forms that
skepticism may take. Then we proposed four examples from the normative side
of business ethics that illustrate the role played by the skeptical attitude – we
should say rather different forms of such attitudes – in the construction and
content of theories. At a minimum, as the previous examples show, skepticism,
or one of its forms, has been used as a heuristic device. The epistemological
hypothesis presented here has three limits which should be emphasized. The
first is that the presumed influence of skepticism is restricted here to the
normative branch of business ethics. Now, the discipline also includes a quite
well developed empirical branch. But it was deemed more relevant to attend to
the effects of the skeptical assumption specifically in the normative branch, as
theoretical contributions are more elaborate than in the empirical – a point that
will be not be expanded on here due to space limitations. The second limit comes
from the fact that we have not offered a systematic analysis of the influence
of skepticism on normative constructions in business ethics. However, we may
observe that the four examples mentioned in the previous part correspond to
significant and often-cited normative work in the discipline. In our opinion,
they are sufficiently developed to support the epistemological hypothesis we
argue for. The third limit relates to the absence of a well-established definition
of the nature of the skepticism about ethics in business. We intentionally did not
attempt to provide such a definition, although the same word, “skepticism,” has
been used to denote the suspicious attitudes generated by four types of ordinary
beliefs– ideological, anti-theoretical, “meta-ethical,” and related to an egoistic
account of human motivations. Skepticism about the place of ethics in business
should be taken very seriously. The robustness (and intuitive plausibility) of the
four varieties presented argue in favor of it. An additional and crucial point
is the fact that the role of ethics in business is best assessed in the light of the
criteria that define a good human life and good human relations in general, e.g.
with such fundamental capacities as sincerity, loyalty, and trust, which mean
more than the simple absence of “deception or fraud,” as Friedman said.
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