Peirce and the Scientific Conception of Truth1
Albert Atkin.
Sheffield University, United Kingdom
Introduction
C.S. Peirce's concepts of truth and reality are inextricably bound up in his
concept of science. What I intend to do in this article is give an account of three
complex, important and elusive ideas in Peirce's theories - ‘science’, ‘truth’ and
‘reality’. The notion of science is integral to the whole of Peirce's concept of
truth. However, central to Peirce's concept of science is his notion of inquiry,
which in turn is integral to his concepts of belief and doubt. To simply place
science within this system is inadequate however, since outlining Peirce's
concept of what science is, is itself a feat of explanatory gymnastics. His
concept of science uses ideas of what is tantamount to ‘guess work’, he
acknowledges that the Baconian assumption of presupositionalist science
cannot hold, and, in liberal interpretations, can be seen as pre-empting
Popperian principles of falsification and the Kuhn/Feyerbend insistence that
science be seen as existing in a socio-historical setting.
What I am attempting in this article is offer an introduction and briefest of
explorations of a truly original and ingenious system: to do more would require a
book, not a paper. I shall begin by outlining Peirce's system of belief, doubt and
how inquiry arises from these concepts. I shall then go on to discuss inquiry in
more depth before showing how science arises from this. Before discussing the
nature and status of the concepts of truth and reality that in turn arise from
science I shall discuss in more detail the logical structure of Peirce's concept of
science and why he takes it to be the means by which we get to truth. I shall also
draw attention to areas of dispute, both of interpretation and content as and
when they arise in the expository detail.
Belief, Doubt and Inquiry
It is well acknowledged that the ground spring for Peirce's notion of belief is the
work of the Scottish psychologist Alexander Bain (Bain 1859).2 Bain endorsed
a dispositionalist theory of belief, the idea being that a belief is roughly whatever
inspires us to act. Peirce takes the idea and through it defines his own theory of
belief and doubt. For Peirce belief is a state that is stable to such an extent that
the actions we perform in accordance with it are habitual. So set are our beliefs
in this dispositional mode that we accept them unreflectively and are prepared
to act upon them.
This, of course, is not to say that they could not cause us concerns;
Peirce was a fallibilist and thought that no belief was immune to recalcitrance.
Doubt, in Peirce's theory, is the direct consequence of such recalcitrance. The
habitual belief states of Peirce's theory have to run the gambit of everyday
experience and a contradictory experiential episode to such states throws their
habitual nature into disarray. Doubt then is characterised as the state where
stable belief is broken and habitual action disrupted as a result. Peirce
characterises doubt as a state of irritation, a state where our actions are no
longer ordained by habit, where we are unsure about how to proceed where, we
have experienced something that appears to undermine the basis for our habit.
Doubt however does lead to actions of its own in Peirce's account.
Whenever we are in a state of doubt, we are inclined to find an end to the
accompanying irritation, the feelings of disruption. In short, we are driven to
inquiry in an attempt to eradicate doubt and settle belief into a state of habit
once more. Inquiry is the means by which we settle belief and is the mode we
are driven to whenever belief is unsettled. So, what is the importance of this
structure of habitual belief, doubt and inquiry for our over-riding concerns of truth
and reality?
2
The answer is simple. For Peirce, truth just is the state of permanently
settled belief; reality is defined in terms of the state represented by these
permanently settled beliefs. Inquiry is the means by which we get to this final
settled state through a repeated process of belief habits, recalcitrance and
doubt and inquiry until inquiry is at an end. This answer does however lead to
certain further questions. For example, what is the relationship between truth
and reality an sich and truth and reality at some staging post on the way to
inquiries end? What kind of truth will this be? These questions I will address
later. For now our concerns lie with the possibility of any method of permanently
fixing belief providing truth. If truth is just a state of belief that is permanently
fixed won't a state fixed even by the most inappropriate means still count as
truth? This would initially appear to be so, but Peirce pre-empts this and shows
why inappropriate and specious methods of inquiry cannot provide permanently
fixed belief.
The Methods of Inquiry
In his paper The Fixation of Belief (1877) Peirce outlines methods of inquiry
that have been used in the past, are used today (though less prominently) and
assesses their effectiveness in fixing belief. These methods are taken by Peirce
to be specious. He then outlines a further method of inquiry, science, which he
takes to be the current chosen means of belief settlement and further more the
only effective method to end inquiry.
The three specious methods Peirce lists are: tenacity (a blinkered
retention of ones view in the face of recalcitrance); authority (this is where
beliefs are settled by adherence to institutional dogma, the catholic church
appearing to be Peirce’s paradigm example); and what could be best
described as apriorism (a rationalistic approach working from assumed
principles rather than experiential fact). All three are seen as capable of fixing
beliefs to an extent. All, however, will fail in permanently fixing belief.
The failure of tenacity will come about, Peirce argues, from its reliance
on insularity in the face of our inclusion in a wider social community. Interaction
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with the community of which we are a part will expose us to views different from
our own. We can of course insist that our views are right and all others wrong
(which is rather the whole point of the method) but a constant barrage of
contradictory views will at some point lead us to question the status of our own
belief habits.
A further point against the method of tenacity would seem to be that to
retain ones own views at the expense of all others would require realising that
that is what one is doing. For example, taking the approach of an ostrich, which
is how Peirce characterises the method of tenacity (CE 3, 249, 1877), and
hiding your head in the face of recalcitrance implies that one knows what one is
hiding from and why. In order to know either of these things the ultimate stability
of ones own beliefs are brought into doubt.
The failure of authority as a method of permanently fixing belief comes
about through reasons similar to the flaws in the method of tenacity. Although
the method of authority decides belief habits for whole communities it cannot
possibly dictate the content of all beliefs; beliefs which each individual must then
decide for themselves leading inevitably to difference and doubt. Further more,
the method can do very little about the views of other communities which, just as
conflicting views must lead to doubt on an individual level, will raise questions
about the stability of these communally dictated beliefs.
The failure of apriorism is due, according to Peirce, to it taking principles
and building rational systems upon them without recourse to experience.
Although this often leads to impressive systems of beliefs they are divorced
from the world and are merely a matter of taste. By being a matter of taste,
belief habits become a part of the intellectual age and fashion changing with the
ages and fashions thereby offering no permanent settlement. With every change
of age, comes a change of belief system and another upheaval, which will in turn
lead to new tastes and new systems with further upheavals.
None of these methods of inquiry can fix belief and we would feel
unhappy if they were the methods by which we were supposed to arrive at truth.
Peirce suggests that the only method left open to us is science. Scientific
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inquiry is supposed to fix our beliefs by subjecting our hypotheses to experience
and observation. Our beliefs are plotted against a reality independent of us
giving us objective evidence for the validity and stability of our beliefs. It is reality
where recalcitrance and belief de-stabilisation will most likely come from and
reality the evidential body which will offer stability. This way, evidence
contradictory to our beliefs is out there for us to observe, no longer is it a matter
of our opinion (tenacity and apriorism) or someone else's (authority): our beliefs
either have evidential support or not. This however, still says very little about
what Peirce takes science to be.
The Structure of Science
So far, we have seen that Peirce takes his theory of inquiry to lead us to accept
scientific method as the only viable means to get at truth and reality. How
effective or stable Peirce's arguments are for this is hotly debated. We will look
at these arguments for accepting science in more detail latter but first we will
look at and assess the method Peirce thinks that as lovers of truth we are duty
bound to accept.
Peirce's concept of science has a clear taxonomy3 and divides the
scientific method into three stages: abduction, deduction and induction. I shall
outline what Peirce takes these stages to involve before going on to address
questions and concerns raised with them.4
Abduction
To best detail what abduction is it seems worthwhile saying a little about what
abduction isn't. Ian Hacking (1983) suggests that Peirce's notion of abduction is
something like inference to the best explanation.
The idea is that if, confronted by some phenomenon, you find one explanation
(perhaps with some initial plausibility) that makes sense of what is otherwise
inexplicable, then you should conclude that the explanation is probably right.
(Hacking 1983: 52)
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It occurs to me that, although fundamentally correct, there is something amiss in
Hacking's interpretation of Peircian abduction here. My own reading of Peirce
would suggest that abduction has very little to do with judging whether or not
some plausible hypotheses or explanation is right. Abduction is not about
concluding that some hypotheses is right or wrong, merely that it could be a
viable candidate for fit with observed states. Consider:
Abduction commits us to nothing. It merely causes a hypotheses to be set down
[...] to be tried. (CP 5. 602, 1903.)
This is not to say that Hacking doesn't grasp the whole point of Peircian
abduction5 but to characterise it as inference to the best explanation is, in my
opinion, misleading in as much as it fails to highlight the truly conjectural nature
of the abductive stage of science. Indeed we are trying to find an explanation of
the facts presented to us through experience but we are not in any position to
judge the correctness of these conjectures at the abductive stage. As a matter
of fact, us faced with any body of observations, the range of possible
conjectures open to would seem to be vast with nothing suggesting the
correctness of one above all others.
Having said this it should be a little clearer as to what the abductive
stage is about: hypotheses creation. We face experience and offer conjectural
explanation or hypotheses that must then be selected for testing.
HYPOTHESES SELECTION
As we have seen, the possible number of conjectural hypotheses for any body
of observations is potentially vast. How then are we to choose which of the
conjectures should be forwarded for testing? What is the process of selection?
We cannot after all use a criterion of truth or correctness since this is where the
overall method is supposed to be taking us. Furthermore, accordance with
observation is why the conjectural hypotheses have been put forward in the first
place so this will not offer a criterion of choice either. Peirce's answer is to
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choose an entirely different criterion of selection to any that might immediately
be taken as conducive to finding correct hypotheses: economy.
The concept of economy in Peirce's theory of science is taken by some
to be one of his most important contributions (see Rescher 1978) and it is
indeed a truly ingenious tool. It plays its part in what ought to be described as
the second mode of the abductive process. The creative phase of the abductive
process outlined above should be seen as the narrow construal of abduction,
whereas the second mode suggests an economy governed process of
hypothesis selection. The idea is that we follow the creative first phase,
hypothesis creation, with a regulated process of selection for testing from the
body of conjectures that we have created. The regulation of this process is to be
through economic considerations. So how is this to work?
The whole notion of economy of research works on something closely
akin to a cost-benefit analysis. Cost, at base level, is to be taken as the
expenditure of time and money. The benefit, or return on this cost, is to be seen
in terms of addition to knowledge and the effect range of the hypotheses in
question being shown as true (or false). For example, simplicity and accuracy
are to be seen as benefits. Other benefits such as having the equipment to test
would also count in favour of a hypothesis' selection. This notion of benefit is
wide ranging and would just as likely rule out candidates that would seem
intuitively to be correct (because the cost of testing would be far to much) as it
would suggest the selection of hypotheses that seem on the surface to be wrong
headed. Such "wrong headed" hypotheses might be cheap, quick, easy or rule
out a whole lot of other possibilities by being proved (or not). Our picking a
hypothesis for testing need not have anything to do with our beliefs about its
correctness; instead, we must consider how settling the truthfulness, one way or
another, through testing can contribute to our knowledge. Consider:
[The] main problem is, how, with a given expenditure of money, time, and energy,
to obtain the most valuable addition to our knowledge. (CP. 7.140, c1879).
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So we have a second abductive phase: hypothesis selection. Having at first
created a series of conjectural hypotheses we can then go on to select which of
these we will be best served by testing. The next stage after abductive creation
and selection is deduction and although it is not the testing stage that our
selected hypotheses must eventually undergo, it is where we begin to look at the
effects of the theories we are left with after the abductive phases are complete.
Deduction
When we have hypotheses that are deemed fit for testing our next stage will be
to deduce logical consequences from them. Peirce sees deduction as two
staged (see CP 6.471, 1908). Firstly, we must construct our hypothesis in
logical terms making it clear and consistent. After this constructive stage we
must enter a stage of derivation where we attempt to derive predictions about
what we may have to experience in testing to determine our hypothesis' truthvalue. Furthermore, Peirce identifies two kinds of deduction, performing
different roles at the two stages of deductive inference. These Peirce refers to
as corollarial and theorematic deduction (see CP. 7.204, 1901) and again, like
the abductive process, one is more regulated and one is more creative.
Corollarial represents the regulated (and, when employed at the constructive
stage, regulative) type of deduction, and can be seen as a strictly mechanical
method where propositions are established by purely logical and analytical
process on internal terms. Corollarial deductions are made without assuming
any propositions outside of what can taken from the hypothesis whose truth is to
be established. It should be obvious why corollarial deduction is closely akin to
the first, constructive, stage of Peirce's abductive process since both are
concerned with clear and consistent logical explication of consequents.
The second kind of deduction, theorematic, attempts to draw predictions
from placing what we may deduce into experiential settings. This will show what
effects we might expect our hypotheses to have. This is more creative and
offers conjectural truths for our hypotheses. This second stage is more closely
akin to the derivative stage of induction (see below) and is involved quite
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centrally in it; however, the corollarial deduction is also at use in the derivative
stage. Before we can make conjectures or predictions on our hypotheses (or
theorematic deductions), we first must make clear and consistent deductions
from our internal terms (or corollarial deductions). Before we make our creative
theorematic predictions we must have performed corollarial deductions to make
the propositions we are working from for our predictions internally logical and
secure.
So, we have created and selected hypotheses for testing, we have
deduced predictions for their effects and think we know what to expect from
them we must now subject the hypotheses to empirical testing and see if all our
abductions and deductions will fit with the world. How, is this to proceed?
Induction
The process of induction in Peirce's method of science is, on the surface, quite
simple. Its role is to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses we have put forward
from our two earlier stages of the inquiry. This is done by taking our deductively
processed abductive conjectures and by holding them up to the world, as it
were, see if they fit or not. This simplicity however can be misleading and it is
still worth drawing out what induction is supposed to do.
Induction is about confirming or falsifying the hypotheses we have put
forward. That is to say, that it will not, or at least should not be seen as offering
us alternatives to falsified theories: that is the role of the abductive and
deductive stages. To take this point further, induction is also not there to offer us
any indication as to where our new abductive and deductive conjectures should
go in order to create inductively confirmable theories. Its job is, purely and
simply, the empirical testing of hypotheses where testing means confirming or
falsifying. The inductive stage of the scientific mode should not offer, or be the
ground for, any of the qualitative features of inquiry. That said, how is this
empirical confirmation/falsification supposed to work?
PROBABILITY
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Induction is supposed to work through quantitative means only. This, for Peirce,
means validating the inductive method with a statistical approach through the
use of probability. What Peirce has in mind is frequentialist probability theory, or
at least an adaptation of it.6 The frequentialist method is perhaps best
characterised in terms of a simple equation quantifying over the probable
occurrence of some specified event, a coin toss is the usual example given. To
get a statistic for probability we need to work out the relative frequency of the
favoured case to the total number of possible cases. In a coin toss, for example,
we favour heads which is one of two possible cases so has a probability of 0.5
or one in two. This however isn't functional in inductive testing unless it is
performed over long sequences.
Consider that to prove we have a one in two chance of coming up heads
we toss a coin twice. It comes up heads once out of the two.7 Are we proved
right? What if it were to come up heads both times, would that mean that with
that coin we had a fool proof chance of coming up heads every time? The point
is that to test the conjecture we have made about the probability of the coin
coming up heads fifty percent of the time we need to make a long sequence of
trials, this way any particular anomaly about our coin will show itself or the
validity of our coin tossing conjecture will reveal itself. We are looking for long
run relative frequency and this is central to Peirce's notion of frequentialist
probability.
This seems straightforward enough but what Peirce has here is a
method for imposing probability values for the long run relative frequency of
events. His concern at this inductive stage of science, however, is to find
probability values for arguments, propositions or hypotheses. Events either
happen or they don't: arguments, propositions, hypotheses, etc. aren't the same
in that they are either true or false. Peirce, however, finds a way of using this to
create probability ratios for arguments etc.
Peirce uses the same calculative process by taking the relative
frequencies of arguments of a certain type with true premises leading to true
conclusions over the total number of that argument type with true premises
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alone. This gives him an idea of the probability of finding an inference from true
premises to true conclusions from the argument type in question. It also offers
Peirce the means for justifying the inductive method he uses at this stage of the
scientific mode.8 What Peirce wants to show is how we can have the
assurances that long run relative frequency gives us for the probability of events
in our inductive testing on hypotheses and he does this by recourse to what is
taken to be the tendency of samples to exhibit similar patterns to the body from
which they are drawn. This is generally referred to as the weak law of large
numbers.
The idea behind the weak law of large numbers is that if, for example,
seventy five percent of a sufficiently large population exhibit some characteristic
then a significant number of good-sized samples drawn from that population will
exhibit the same characteristic in approximately the same ratio. The result of
this would be that our hypotheses that, say, three quarters of my vast numbers of
battery hens have fowl pest could be borne out (or not) by a sufficiently high
sample of inductive testing.9 We would be looking for the long run relative
frequency of my hens with fowl pest over my hens. Any inductive sampling taking
place in an attempt to test the hypothesis about my hens would be conforming to
the assurances of long run relative frequency through the weak law of large
numbers. If our hypothesis is wrong, the weak law of large numbers means that
a sufficient number of large samples will show this. If we are right, the tendency
of the samples to mirror the population from which they are drawn will bear this
out. Either way our inductive testing of hypotheses can be given the same
statistical assurances of probability ratios and long run relative frequency as
events through Peirce's use of argument type and the weak law of large
numbers.
Summary
So, we have the means of testing our deductively processed abductive
conjectures through this statistically assured inductive stage. We face
recalcitrance by offering conjectural answers that are processed for
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confirmation/falsification testing. When our conjectures are confirmed by the
inductive interaction with experience we find our doubt removed and our belief
settled once more. Where we find our abductions falsified or unconfirmed by the
inductive stage we remain in doubt and must start again at the abductive stage,
attempting to remove the irritation that has unsettled our belief habits. However,
questions need to be addressed about these various stages of the scientific
mode of inquiry.
The Structure of Science: Questions and Clarification
Of the three stages of inquiry in Peirce's model of science, deduction is
perhaps the only one free from criticism. This is mainly because its assumptions
are self-contained. Abduction and induction are seen in a different light and are
criticised by many commentators, mainly because they contain evidential gaps.
Induction, only taking samples, leaves room for error. Abduction is purely
conjectural and creative also leaving room for error. This isn't seen as a
significant problem for abduction since its offerings are conjectural and Peirce
takes a fallibilist stance. Further more, and perhaps more importantly, Peirce
opposes any Cartesian foundationalist paradigms. For Peirce we do not need
to have firm undoubtable truths to build our theories upon: we can make the
required corrections as we go along rather like Otto Neurath's metaphor of
rebuilding the ship plank by plank as we sail it (Neurath 1959). As such, it is
quite all right to begin with abductive conjectures. There are other difficulties
though, both for abduction and induction.
Hypotheses Creation
The central concern raised against abduction is how, given the short time span
that we have been engaged in scientific inquiry, is it possible for us to have hit
upon so many correct ideas. This concern was particularly relevant for Peirce's
own era since science was seen to have already resolved most of the essential
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puzzles of the universe. Although we recognise the possibility of scientific
relativism more strongly (since Kuhn at least), the question is still a valid one.
How are we to account for the rate at which Peirce's theory of abduction
produces confirmable conjectures and the extent of their success given the
sheer number of possible hypotheses, propositions, conjectures etc. that are
open to us? Although it often gets things completely wrong, our abductive
hypotheses are often very close to the mark: why do we always seem to guess
just about right?
The answer that Peirce offers is evolution. Guessing right in new and
novel situations would be a character trait that quite easily lends itself to
selection since it offers an advantage over those without it. Assuming
evolutionary theory to be correct, and ‘best guessing’ to offer an advantage in
this process, humans ought to possess something of such adaptive value.
Further more, Peirce suggests (CP. 5.604, 1898) that as working parts of a
universe that obeys certain laws and generalities, we would be privy to (although
instinctively) such laws and be imbued with the natural proclivity to guess them
correctly. In later papers (CP. 6.469, 1908 for example) Peirce defines this
evolved instinct as a natural ability to fall upon the plausible. This gives a
stronger definition to the evolutionary instinct in as much as puts a more
immediate and cognisable name on the instinct of guessing right. This,
however, does little to eleviate certain concerns.
Rescher (1978) finds himself troubled by this appeal to evolution and
instinct and offers a kind of Peircian-Popperian assimilation. His proposal is to
substitute Peirce's appeal to an instinctive ability with what he calls "the
methodology of inquiry and substantiation" (Rescher 1978: 61; italics in
original). This is supposed to be the formulation of hypotheses through the use
of heuristic principles that have been developed and adopted after emerging as
the most functional methods of a Popperian system of trial and error testing.
Rescher takes this to be superior to Peirce's system because it avoids an
appeal to evolution.10
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It occurs to me however that an appeal to instinct might still be required
since the building up of heuristic principles might also be argued as taking too
long to account for rate and success. The finding of heuristic principles that work
depends on what kind of success we have at finding correct theories through
trial and error. How then have we discovered so many heuristic principles
(displayed through the amount of correct science that we have) given the sheer
amount of trial and error that we would have to go through to find a correct
theory leading to a heuristic principle? I'm sure that we might have found more
theories that are correct by hitting upon methods to find them than if we had
pure trial and error with no appeal to evolution. However, I am unconvinced that
Rescher's reconstruction of Peircian abduction would adequately answer
concerns about the rate and degree of success of the scientific method.
That is not to say that I find Peirce's appeal to evolutionary instinct
satisfying either. I cannot see how Peirce's appeal is any more grounded than
Descartes' own appeal to the goodness of God not to deceive him (Descartes
1988 p99) and it occurs to me that by his own standards Peirce has made an
abductive conjecture to defend abductive conjectures. An appeal to evolutionary
instinct that manifests itself in an ability to be good at guessing is highly
conjectural and although good guessing would seem to have some adaptive
value, one ought to worry about the stability of this natural instincts metaphysical
base.
Hypotheses Testing
The most important thing to note about the inductive stage of Peirce's scientific
method of inquiry is that it is often misunderstood. Induction is by its nature selfcorrecting, particularly the frequentialist method that we are attributing to Peirce.
That is to say that any errors or incorrect hypotheses would show themselves
with the continuation of inductive testing and sampling. Such is the nature of
induction's self correcting tendency that if we were in a universe where induction
were not self correcting inductive steps and random sampling etc. would reveal
this. The problem is that this is easily conflated to suggest that science as a
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whole is self-correcting or that induction alone is what gives the truth: this is not
how Peirce's theory works.11 Consider for example:
[Peirce] says [...] that all forms of induction are self corrective.... And I think it
would be less than candid not to say that Peirce offers no cogent reasons, [...]
Peirce acts as if his argument about quantitative induction shows all other
species of induction to be self-corrective as well. (Laudan. 1974: 293)
Here Laudan falls foul of a misunderstanding that I think Rescher, amongst
others, also commits. As far as I can tell, Peirce never commits himself to any
form of induction other than statistical or quantitative. Rescher as well as
Laudan seem to take the whole of Peirce's system to consist of, or depend
upon, inductive process. Rescher (1978) for example imposes a taxonomic
specification on Peirce's system that consists entirely of induction: what I would
take to be abduction and deduction Rescher defines as qualitative induction;
what I take to be induction Rescher defines as quantitative induction. He also
sets about reconstructing Peirce's position to enable him to retain this multiinductive view of science and still use the self-correcting nature of quantitative
induction. I cannot see how Peirce is supposed to have taken this view which
unfortunately gives the impression of creating a straw man of Peirce's system.
From the taxonomy that Rescher gives it would be easy to misinterpret
Peirce’s claims about science and truth. If one has the view that the whole of
Peirce's scientific method of inquiry is based around induction then it is easy to
see why one would think that Peirce is committed to treating science as a whole
as self-correcting. Furthermore, it is also easy to see why, given the belief that
what is maintained at the end of science is the truth, one would think that Peirce
is committed to the belief that induction is what will furnish us with the truth. As
was said before, Peirce's system does not work like this. Induction may be selfmonitoring or self-corrective but it is only one stage in Peirce's overall system of
scientific inquiry. Abduction and deduction have no self-monitoring or selfcorrecting features, and as such, Peirce's scientific method cannot be selfcorrective as a whole. Neither, given that all three methods must work together
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to produce, select, deduce and test hypotheses, could induction alone be
responsible for getting us to the truth at the end of inquiry.
Summary
We have seen then that Peirce sees the scientific method of inquiry as being
made up of three stages: abduction, deduction and induction. We have also
seen the detail of these three stages and some of the controversies and
questions they throw up. However, there are wider questions to ask and far
more encompassing issues to deal with. What we have done so far is to look at
the detail of the method of inquiry that Peirce thinks will ultimately succeed in
fixing belief, ending inquiry and providing us with truth. What we now have to do
is ask if the scientific method really is the only means we have of reaching truth
an sich. Or more to the point, why it is that the other methods cannot do this.
Furthermore we need to detail exactly what kind of truth and reality Peirce thinks
he is giving us through this method, and see how plausible we think this is.
Why Science?
The issues at play here consist of the way in which Peirce outlines the failure of
the specious methods, the success of science and therefore the reasons he
suggests for the adoption of scientific method. The question in the title above
has as much to do with asking ‘why not adopt other methods’ as it is to do with
‘why science’. In a sense, we are looking for a prescriptive constraint on our
method for getting at the truth. It is clear that we could choose science for fixing
belief, but has Peirce shown that we should choose it rather than any other
method?
The areas I want to highlight for discussion here concern Peirce's notion
of community in the fixing of beliefs, the importance of an appeal to an
independent reality and also a method invoked by Cheryl Misak (1991) whereby
definitional stops are employed. The claim that each of these areas support, or
are significant in, the success of science and provide a reason why we should
follow it rather than the specious methods will be addressed.
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Communalism
The notion behind communalism is that the break down of the specious
methods is due to their inability to accommodate the plurality of views that must
arise from a community of inquirers. Science on the other hand is able to
accommodate this to such an extent that a notion of community is central to its
success as provider of truth through the ending of inquiry.
The method of tenacity, as was pointed out, falls foul of contradiction
from the views expressed by others, the same applies to apriorism, which is
contradicted by the changing tastes of others. The method of authority also falls
foul of this in as much as not all beliefs can be fixed so communities must
provide answers themselves, which will of course lead to contradictions and
doubt. Furthermore, other ideologies will exist that also contradict the beliefs
dictated by authority. The point is that beliefs must necessarily exist across
communities of believers, since we are communal animals, and the only way the
specious methods can accommodate this fact is by requiring a uniformity of
belief. This is a rare if not impossible occurrence.
Science on the other hand requires no uniformity of beliefs to succeed.
Indeed the method of science requires that a community of inquirers be less
defined by their immediate social context. We should see ourselves as part of a
socio-historical community of inquirers each contributing to the final state of
belief where recalcitrance and doubt are no longer present.
The scientific world is like is like a colony of insects in that the individual strives to
produce that which he himself cannot hope to enjoy. One generation collects
premises in order that a distant generation may discover what they mean. (CP.
7.87, c1902)
Without a community, and all the diversity of belief that this brings, Peirce
believes science cannot even progress. Science takes the very thing that
undermines the other methods, diversity of opinion and belief, and makes a
virtue of it.12 Or does it?
17
The problem is that Peirce's description of what unnerves the followers of
the specious methods is the presence of contradictory belief. This is not ruled
out in the scientific method, in fact diversity is encouraged, so why does this no
longer make people feel unsettled? There would appear to be no reason why it
wouldn't unsettle people. In whatever way we come by a belief, contradictory
beliefs make us question the stability of our own. Misak (1991) raises this point
(she calls it the ‘psychological hypothesis’) and although I am in broad
agreement with it, there is something deeper involved in the notion of scientific
socio-historical communalism that I think rebukes this objection.
Firstly, though I want to look at Misak's own suggestions as to why the
specious methods fail, I also intend to suggest why this proposal should not be
taken up and to point out an important feature common to both it and the
communalist method.
Misak's Definitional Stop
Misak (1991) offers a very simple argument against the specious methods and
in favour of the scientific method. She suggests that the specious methods
breach a definitional parameter of what a belief is whereas the scientific
method gives rise to no such breach. Her suggestion is that Peirce views
beliefs as crumbling in the face of contradiction or recalcitrance, experienced
when a person acknowledges that the method used to fix their beliefs did not
consider experience in the process. As such, she claims that any mental state
that does 'not resign in these circumstances' cannot be considered a genuine
belief. By this definitional stop, the mental states produced by the specious
methods have no immediate right to be called beliefs and, considering that
Misak thinks the arguments for communalism are defunct, these mental states
will make no resignation to recalcitrance. However, apart from the fact that I
think it isn't all that apparent that the arguments of communalism are misplaced,
Misak points out that most of what she takes Peirce to say about a definitional
criterion for beliefs are only hints. As such, I would say that she is right to put a
definitional criterion on beliefs and to question the validity of specious beliefs in
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the face of this criterion, but ultimately I would question whether we could use
such an argument against the specious methods.
As Misak says, Peirce only really hints at these definitional criteria and I
think that we may be assuming more about Peirce than we really ought to if we
accept Misak's reading. What is more, taking into account Peirce's widely
acknowledge Bainian inheritance (see CP. 5.12, c1906), I would suggest that
the only criterion for belief that we can safely impose upon Peirce is the Bainian
notion of that by which an individual is prepared to act. The result is that the
specious methods do give rise to beliefs albeit through a safe Bainian definition
rather than Misak's more intuitive but less secure reading of belief. However, I
do believe that Misak points to the most important aspect of the scientific
method in offering her definitional stop argument against the specious methods.
The definitional points that she makes come from her commitment to the
thought that beliefs should be 'sensitive to evidence or experience': it is this
notion of accordance with experiential reality that I would suggest is the key to
understanding the failure of the specious methods and the prescriptive pull of
the scientific method.
Experience and Reality
As I said, although I don't accept Misak's point about providing definitions for
beliefs, I think the seeds from which her proposals spring are important
because they rely on the idea of an independent body of experiences. A similar
notion is implicit in the communalist arguments for the failure of the specious
methods, which is why I think the psychological hypothesis objection can be
argued against.
What I am suggesting is that the method of science carries with it
broader notions of fixing beliefs than those carried by the specious methods.
The specious methods take the beliefs they have fixed to be the truth an sich.
The method of science on the other hand works along side Peirce's fallibilist
commitments so we should be aware that as a scientific community we may not
have truth an sich only some working approximation of it. Facing a contradiction
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to something we are not taking as truth-in-itself should not fill us with fear or
anxiety in the same sense as it should if the contradiction we are facing
undermines what we take to be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth. Furthermore, if we were taking the scientific method, a recalcitrant
experience or contradiction would actually be an indication that we are moving
in the right direction rather than a loathsome erosion of all that we hold sacred
and true. So, is communalism the way to justify the scientific method over the
specious methods?
In and of itself, no. It shows what we would get if we adopted the scientific
method not that it should be adopted. However, what the rebuttal of the
psychological hypothesis objection does show is where the prescriptive pull of
the scientific method lies. Consider why communalism could be seen as
capable of rebuking the psychological hypothesis objection. The rebuttal works
on the premise that the scientific method doesn't lead to doubt in the same way
as the specious methods. The point is that we are trying to eradicate doubt and
fix beliefs. The way in which we come into a state of doubt is by meeting
recalcitrant evidence to the beliefs that we hold true. The way to avoid doubt is
to fix beliefs in such a way as they do not meet recalcitrance.13 Any method that
can do this is the one that we ought to follow.
The communalist rebuttal of the psychological hypothesis objection
highlights this much and Misak's definitional criterion highlights the best way to
avoid doubt through recalcitrant proof beliefs. The source of recalcitrance and
contradiction to our beliefs, however they are fixed is experience of reality. If we
fix a belief through tenacity, authority, apriorism or science, any recalcitrant
evidence will be found in our experience of reality. It would seem then that the
best way to avoid contradiction from reality is not to contradict it. What this
means is that our beliefs must be fixed in a way that is sensitive to experience
and tries to accord with it.
One method that does fix beliefs (rather than define them) in a way that is
sensitive to experience is science. Science is the only method that creates
beliefs that are ‘designed to be resigned’ in the face of recalcitrant experiences
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in the hope that we can find others that will accord with those experiences. If we
never change our beliefs to accord with reality the recalcitrance and doubt
experienced by the specious believer will never be avoided. In science we have
a method that can, eventually, provide us with reality accordant, doubt resistant
beliefs. That is why we ought to adopt it, not because it is the only one that
creates or works with a certain conception of belief, or because it doesn't
require communal uniformity of belief.
Truth and Reality
We would appear to have a method of inquiry that compels those of us who fear
error and doubt to adopt it. This method also appears to be able to ‘get us to
truth’. However, it is not immediately apparent what kind of truth we are
supposed to be getting or what the detail of our getting to the truth is. It is clear
from what has already been said that Peirce holds the truth to be the end of
inquiry but this does not tell us what kind of truth this is meant to be or the
relation between truth at the end of inquiry and the truth we have at some interval
along the way. This relation between truth and reality here and now and truth and
reality an sich is an important point and the answer we give here can either give
rise to or allay some potentially serious and damaging problems.
Consensus or Convergence?
The issue at play here is how to get to the end of inquiry where our conception
of ultimate truth is. In Peirce’s account we obviously follow the scientific method
but does the knowledge that we gather from this method build and build and, as
is commonly perceived, converge upon truth. The problem is that if it does, we
have to account for the relation we have to truth here and now since what we
have now isn't the truth as it will be, but some incomplete subset of it. We could,
of course, suggest that we reach the ultimate truth through ever increasing
degrees of truth but this is fraught with difficulty. 14 Quine highlights the problem
facing Peirce
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[...] to define truth outright in terms of scientific method, as the ideal theory which
is approached as a limit when the (supposed) canons of scientific method are
used [...] is [a] faulty use of numerical analogy in speaking of a limit of theories,
since the notion of limit depends on that of 'nearer than' [.] (Quine, 1960: 23)
The problem is that it doesn't seem to make sense to say that one theory is
nearer to the truth than another in the linear sense - e.g. ‘eleven is nearer to
fifteen than ten’. Providing linear gradients for numbers is clear enough but how
we are to go about this for truth is not at all clear. However, if we are taking truth
to be making linear steps from one set of theories to another, getting closer to
the end of inquiry and ultimate truth each time, then there would seem to be
sense in which we are committed to this. Quine's objections are well placed,
defining verisimilitude is a problematic task and one that we would do best to
avoid, and as such, we should not conform to the interpretation he makes. We
would to better to avoid treating the process of science as convergence
towards a final theory.
The alternative view is suggested by Misak (1991) in direct opposition to
Quine's points and works with the notion of consensus. Misak's interpretation
comes from various comments made by Peirce that seem to suggest that
knowledge need not accumulate in a linear fashion or that any interim state of
belief is imbued with degrees of truthfulness.
The object of [...] individual opinion is whatever is thought at that time. [...] The
perversity or ignorance of mankind may make this thing or that to be held true, for
any number of generations, but it cannot affect what would be the result of
sufficient experience and reasoning (CE. 3, 79. 1873, my emphasis).
The point is that interim states are working theories, and although they may
have some beliefs in common with the theory at the end of inquiry this does not
make them subject to states of truthlikeness: they are merely held true.
22
Misak suggests that Peirce has something like consensus in mind
whereby everyone will eventually agree upon a belief. This is not to say that a
belief with some consent, but not universal, is more or less truthful than others.
Rather, if we follow the scientific method everyone must agree on their beliefs if
they aren't contradicted by experience with reality: uncontradicted beliefs are
stable, not the truth; uncontradictable beliefs are the truth and at the end of
inquiry everyone adopting scientific method will come to agree on these.
However, this notion of consensus seems to imply subjective truth and this is
where we have to question what kind of truth we get when we reach the end of
inquiry.
Objectivity
Peirce is Kantian by nature, however, he finds himself opposed to the Kantian
hope that truth can be given objectivity through correspondence. This is not say,
however, that Peirce does not hold hopes for objective truth and he believes he
gets there. As I suggested earlier, defining the move towards truth in terms of
communal consensus would seem to imply that we are getting something like
subjective truth where the community decides what is to count for the truth. What
is more it is our beliefs and doubts that go towards this reaching the truth so the
truth must surely depend on us. This, however, is not so. The community is fated
to believe the truth and even if we never reach the end of inquiry, the truth is still
constituted by what would be found there. An objection from Russell should
bring this point out more clearly.
Russell (1939) says that defining truth as the end of inquiry makes the
beliefs of the last man on earth the truth. For an ardent C.N.D campaigner like
Russell the threat of nuclear Armageddon was all too real and the point that a
premature end to human life means a premature end to inquiry and immature
account of truth is obvious, but mistaken. Russell's scenario would only damage
Peirce's claims for truth if he took it to be subjective: he doesn't. We only need
to define the notion of fated opinion and end of inquiry in terms of ceteris
paribus clauses or, as Peirce does (CP.5.403, 1878), subjunctive conditionals
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to show that the actual obtaining of inquiry’s end is of little consequence to the
truth. This is because the status of truth does not depend on us. Truth depends
on what the scientific method would lead us to agree upon if we were to follow it
to its end.
The scientific method depends upon experiential reality which is clearly
independent (in Peirce's view) of what anyone thinks about it. Scientific method
develops reality accordant beliefs that create a truth, which (like our beliefs) can
only hold if it falls in line with reality: an objective reality independent of us. That
reaching the end of inquiry would mean that certain beliefs would be held does
not entail that we have to reach inquiries end for those beliefs to be true. Those
final beliefs are the truth in virtue of their accordance with an objective reality,
not our being there to believe in them; not our believing in them at all. Truth then
is objective in Peirce's system, it does not depend upon us. If it is to be realised
then we must follow scientific method and fix beliefs into a final state where they
cannot meet recalcitrance, but our achieving this or not does not alter what
those final beliefs must be. We might never take up the scientific method but
that scientifically settled, unimprovable beliefs, are what the truth is will not
change.
Peirce takes truth to be constituted by belief in a final settled state but, as
we have seen this, does not mean that truth is subjective. Truth (as a final state
of settled belief) is hemmed in on all sides by reality, which is independent of us,
and the content of those final settled beliefs is fixed by it. Is this what we require
of truth though?
Concerns
Consider how we have truth defined here in Peirce's system. If a belief is fixed
in a state where it cannot meet contradiction, it is the truth. It has faced the test
of experience and passed and cannot be improved upon; inquiry has been
pushed to its limit. However, what if we have two beliefs that accord with all the
experiential evidence and when inquiry is pushed as far as it will go, neither will
show as fallacious, what do we do?
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This scenario is actually at play (to an extent) in much of quantum
physics. Einstein and Nils Bohr both offered competing explanations about the
same body of evidence. In fact, interpretations of quantum physics are far more
plentiful than just these two with standard wave-particle duality expressed in
terms of wave-packets, pilot-waves and many others. The point is that all seem
to provide equally good explanations of the same observations, they are all
equally borne out by the evidence. A further example would be that of cladistic
re-classification of species. Willi Hennig, the founder of this approach, grouped,
for example, crocodiles with birds (rather than other reptiles) since their hearts
and ankle joints bear a closer similarity to those of birds than reptiles.
Traditionally this would not be the case.
Of course, Peirce would say that inquiry has not been taken to its limit
and if it were, such cases as these would be settled. This however is conjectural
and quantum physics particularly does not need a settled answer to proceed.
The implication in cases like these is that inquiry need not result in the truth. It is
quite conceivable that we could push inquiry in quantum physics to its limits and
still find no way of settling on one quantum theory. This, as far as I could tell,
would not mean that quantum theories were offering us no truth, just that the truth
would appear to lie beyond inquiry. Peirce would probably be unconcerned with
points such as these, since they too are just conjecture or "paper doubts" which
he has no time for. Of course Peirce’s idea that sufficient pursuit of inquiry
would exhaust truth might be conceived as a ‘paper proof’, since we have no
way of knowing that inquiry’s end lays the whole of truth open for us to see.
Concluding Remarks
This article has illustrated how Peirce takes the notion of belief and doubt and,
through it, scientific inquiry, to be central to the concept of truth. For Peirce,
when our beliefs reach a state where they cannot face recalcitrance they are so
stable as to produce an unalterable habit in us. This state deserves to be called
the truth. The question really becomes whether we are satisfied to accept this
as our view of truth. Ultimately, if we believe that there are areas of knowledge
25
and truth that scientific inquiry cannot open up for us then we are going to have
some doubts about the system for truth that Peirce offers us.
Furthermore, if we feel uncomfortable with the notion that inquiry has
anything to do with truth at all, we will doubt Peirce's theory of truth. What Peirce
would take himself to have done is to show us how inquiry and truth are
intimately linked and why we would adopt scientific inquiry in order to reach
truth. Our wanting to do this depends on how seriously we take his claim that
scientific inquiry will end doubt and settle on truth. We have no idea if science is
a completable task (even theoretically) and much depends on this. Peirce has
created an impressive system and theory of scientific structure but our
commitment to science as the provider of all and only true knowledge is what
will decide how seriously we take him. If we believe that scientific inquiry does
not or might not exhaust the truth, or that it may not settle on a true belief, we will
doubt whether Peirce's system can provide us with a satisfactory account of
truth.
Notes
1
References from the works of Peirce are referred throughout as:
CP. n, m: Collected Papers with n as volume number and m as paragraph number.
CE. n, m: Chronological Edition with n as volumn number and m as page number.
2
There is, however, no mention of Bain's work in the early papers.
3
say "clear" and I would suggest that it is clear but this has not stopped certain
misconstruals and misunderstandings of Peirce's system taking place. I shall point
these out at appropriate junctures.
4
I rely heavily on the interpretations of C.F. Delaney (1993) C.J Misak (1991) and N.
Rescher (1978) to detail Peirce's system in the following sections.
5
Although he doesn't grasp the entirety of its role in the scientific method.
6
Misak (1991 p101) points out that Peirce often appears to endorse a propensity
theory of probability rather than a frequentialist. Given that both are objective about
26
probability I am happy to leave the question of Peirce's real view of probability to
others and take him to be frequentialist.
7
It should be noted that Peirce's view of probability does not range over single cases
or events.
8
Peirce takes induction and inductive reasoning to be one form of inference from
probability.
9
The difference between an event and hypotheses here is that the event would be
the having of fowl pest whereas our hypothesis is a conjecture about the likelihood or
range of this event. The difference is subtle and often unimportant but worth making,
particularly here.
10
Rescher also takes this to be a viable alternative to Popper's system of trial and
error since he holds that Popper cannot account for the rate and success of science
with that system.
11
Misak (1991, Ch 3, section 6) gives a particularly good account of the
misinterpretation of Peirce's self correcting thesis and its relation to that of Hans
Reichenbach.
12
This actually requires other virtues like the love of truth and an over riding
confidence in the ultimate success of the scientific method (see again CP. 7.87 and
CP. 2. 655) which Peirce thinks are central not just to science but also to logic, I omit
any detail of this here.
13
Not meeting recalcitrance is not the same as ignoring and persisting in the face of
it. The later could be seen as the approach of the specious methods.
14
See Popper's (1963) Conjectures and Refutations for his attempt at providing a
definition of verisimilitude and the objections that it gives rise to.
References
Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge Mass.:
Belknap Press), I-VI C.Hartshorne and P.Weiss (Ed.) (1931-35); VII & VIII,
A.Burks (Ed.) (1958).
Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Vol. 3.
C. Kloesel (Ed.) (1986) Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press
27
Bain, A. (1859) Emotion and the Will. New York: Longmans Green.
Delaney, C.F. (1993) Science Knowledge and Mind: A Study in the
Philosophy of C. S. Peirce. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Descartes, R. (1988) Fourth Meditation, in Selected Philosophical Writings
trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (1988) Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the
Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laudan, L. (1974) Peirce and the Trivialisation of the Self-Correcting Thesis, in
R. Griere and R. Westfall (Eds.) Foundations of Scientific Method: The
Nineteenth Century. Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Misak, C.J. (1991) Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircian Account of Truth.
Oxford: Clarandon Press.
Neurath, O. (1959) Protocol Sentences, in A.J Ayer (Ed.) Logical Positivism.
New York: The Free Press.
Popper, K. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific
Knowledge. New York: Harper and Row.
Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object. Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
Rescher, N. (1978) Peirce's Philosophy of Science: Critical Studies in his
Theory of Induction and Scientific Method. Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press.
Russell, B. (1939) Dewey's New Logic, in P.A. Schlipp (Ed.) The Philosophy of
John Dewey. New York: Tudor.
Albert Atkin is a PhD Research Student in the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Sheffield. He completed his first degree and Masters at the
University of Nottingham where he researched Wittgenstinian Meaning
28
Irrealism. His current research involves attempting to address key problems in
the theory of reference by adopting and adapting the sign theory of C.S. Peirce.
He also has peripheral research interests in, Epistemology, The Philosophy of
Law, Aesthetics, and Game Theoretic Semantics.
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