-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐INTRODUCTION TO DUE PROCESS-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Sources of Authority a. Constitution (floor) i. 14th Amendment DPC (states) ii. 5th Amendment DPC (federal) b. Precedent & Common Law i. Binding and persuasive c. Statutes (USC 28 = judiciary) d. Federal/State Rules of Civil Procedure 2. Values a. FRCP 1 = just, speedy, and inexpensive determination i. Fairness ii. Equality iii. Efficiency iv. Finality v. Transparency b. Tension between speed/cost and justice vi.
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Consistency Meaningful Participation Dignity Accuracy Impartiality -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Hearings a. Citizens must have opportunity to contest factual basis of their detention before neural arbiter i. Hamdi military operations do NOT trump citizen’s core rights to be heard 1. Essential: counsel, know/notice of charges ⊕ evidence, opportunity to respond, neutral decision 2. NOT Essential: full criminal trial, quantum of evidence 2. Fairness a. Mathews Balancing Test i. Private Interest ii. Government [public] interest iii. Risk: erroneous deprivation b. Pros/Cons i. + Realistic appraisal off significance of procedural costs, flexible for many scenarios ii. – Results-­‐oriented/favors government judicial guessing game, doesn’t take dignity, equality or tradition into account 3. Right to Counsel a. Nature of Deprivation at non-­‐criminal trial (apply Mathews) i. Counsel access diminishes w/ threat to personal liberty (Lassiter = parental termination: counsel wouldn’t have changed outcome) ii. If liberty NOT at stake Ü don’t need counsel (Lassiter) b. Re: Indigents, consider (Turner = civil contempt balancing) i. Ability to pay ii. Asymmetry: other party is indigent too iii. Substitute set: procedural safeguards -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐NOTICE-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Statutory Requirements: FRCP Rule 4 a. Rule 4 must always be followed i. Actual notice (or even most likely to notify) is not necessary or sufficient (Mid Continent = technicalities FRCP 4 always need be met) ii. Actual knowledge of suit NOT enough to cure deficiencies of service iii. Good faith efforts DO NOT change fact that service failed iv. Clear and Convincing evidence required to prove elusive ∆ b. Service of Process i. Complaint and summons 4(c)(1) c. Method of Service i. Personal delivery 4(e)(2)(A) OR ii. AT dwelling/usual place of abode WITH one of reasonable age ⊕ discretion 4(e)(2)(B) 1. Kashoggi = person may have 1+ dwelling/place of abode: sufficient indicia of permanency required Ü money for remodel, actually in the city @ service a. Where personal belongs are even if you travel b. Not where you only stay for business c. Temporary stay elsewhere does NOT change usual abode iii. Delivery to appointed agent 4(e)(2)(C) iv. Any method that applies in forum state’s courts or state where service is made 4(e)(1) d. When 4(m) i. Within 120 days of filing complaint e. By Whom 4(c)(2) i. Anyone over 18 who is NOT 1. Party to complaint 2. Incompetent 2. Constitutional Requirements a. Mullane—notice, reasonably calculated under all circumstances to appraise interested parties of pendency of action can afford them an opportunity to present objections (NOT Actual Notice) i. Publications OK if whereabouts unknown b. Reasonably Calculated: when government knows method has failed, use alternative i. Greene—circumstances show: positing insufficient and where feasible customary alternatives exist, they should be used 1. US Mail 2. Certified Mail 3. 1st Class 4. Return Receipt ii. Jones—where you know mailing doesn’t work Ü post -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐PERSONAL JURISDICTION-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Overview a. In Personam—PJX over your person b. In rem—PJX over a thing c. Quasi in Rem—PJX over you through a thing (Pennoyer = state has power over people ⊕ things inside it) i. NO LONGER VALID (Shaffer = need minimum contact for all PJX) 2. Standards a. Permission: Statutory when ∆ i. Present in forum and personally served ii. Domiciled in forum iii. Citizen iv. Consent v. Long Arm—committed acts brining within forum state 1. Federal FRCP 4(k)—anyone who is subject to PJX of the state 2. State a. CA = one-­‐step (to limits of DPC) b. Others restrain their reach b. Power: Constitutional Requirements Part 1: International Shoe Test i. Minimum Contacts: quality, quantity, nature 1. Purposefully avail to privileges of forum OR foreseeable hailed to forum? Stream of Commerce⊕ a. YES i. McGee v. International Life—specifically targeted CA from TX even though only 1 customer ii. Keeton v. Hustler—regular monthly sales iii. Calder v. Jones—defamatory article from FL-­‐CA b. NO i. WW VW—must make ∆ reasonably anticipate hailing ii. Asahi Metal—awareness goods enter SOC iii. Kulko—father let kids move to CA w/ mom: harmony iv. Hanson v. Denckla—insurance holder unilateral act of 3rd party 2. Relatedness of Claims to contracts of ∆ w/ Forum: Claim arise ∆’s contact? a. Yes i. Burger King—K; went down to FL for negotiations ii. McGee v. International Life b. No: mere act of selling goods outside forum w/ slim likelihood i. Asahi Metal c. Constitutional Requirements Part 2: World Wide Volkswagen Test i. Fairness Trump & Reasonableness Ü Asahi was the only TRUMP Contacts 1. Burden/Convince: ∆ (⊕ witnesses) a. Reasonable/Fair i. Burger King—weak contacts bolstered lots fairness: assume JX ii. Burnham—tradition sometimes fair: volition ⊕ personal service b. Unreasonable/Unfair (Asahi) i. Shaffer—more than tradition (~ Pennoyer) 2. Convenient Effective Relief: π 3. Interest in adjudicating: Forum State 4. Shared Interests of All states: Efficiency 5. Shared Substantive Policies 3. Limits on Personal JX a. Forum Clauses i. Carnival Cruise Lines = corporations have legitimate interest in restricting forum given range of π /customers 1. Gets rid of early motions trying to establish proper forum 2. Customers benefit from limited venue: lower fare b. Consent i. Szuknehnt = designated agent legit Ü consent to agent valid so consented to JX via agent/lease No contacts Related COA No PJx Unrelated COA No PJx Isolated (depending on their nature) Regular but not substantial Systematic and substantial Specific PJx No PJx Specific PJx ·∙ Gray = OH sold ·∙ VW = NY sold car to NY ·∙ Shoe = 12 salesmen who valves to Penn resident who crashed in OK show samples and solicit water heater who (unilateral act of 3rd party) orders, so it’s fair sold to Ill. Resident ·∙ Asahi = Not fair to sue in ·∙ BK = Long term contract ·∙ McGee = CA for Japanese parts sold with Fl choice of law btwn Insurance to Taiwanese manufacturer Michigan resident and FL company solicited for sale in CA motorcycles corp. shows personal 1 CA resident for ·∙ Kulko = not foreseeable for availment business by mail NY father to be sued by ·∙ Keeton = regular monthly ·∙ Calder = FL writer wife who moved to CA sales of magazine in NH should have ·∙ Pavlovich = passive means NY resident can be foreseen being positing online by TX sue OH corp. there for libel sued for libel by CA resident that harms CA target in CA business through unilateral acts of 3rd parties (measure site interactivity and commercial nature) No PJx No PJx General PJx General PJx -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Sources of Authority a. US Constitution Article III § 2 AND b. 28 USC i. § 1331 (Federal Question) OR ii. § 1332 (Diversity) c. Case Law Expansions 2. Diversity SMJX a. US Constitution Art. III § 2 (boundaries of power) AND i. All cases where parties include citizens of different states b. 28 USC § 1332 (authorization by Congress defining original JX under Art. III § 1) i. Diversity of citizenship = where domicile (residence NOT enough) 1. Must be diverse at filing (Groupo Dataflux) a. Does NOT have to be at COA 2. Complete diversity: All π from all ∆ Ü Strawbridge 3. Individuals (Mas) a. Resides AND b. Intends to remain indefinitely i. Marriage does NOT necessarily chance citizenship 4. Corporation (2) a. Incorporation ⊕ AND b. PPB (Hertz = nerve center/where decision makers are) 5. Partnerships, LLPs, Unincorporated Assoc., Business trusts ⊕ LLCs (Bellville) a. Every state where partner resides b. Party invoking diversity has burden of proof BUT c. Courts can also bring up sua sponte ii. Amount in Controversy must exceed $75,000 1. Aggregation multiple claims to get over $75L (§ 1367) a. YES i. If 1 π v. 1 ∆ Ü add them up 1. Claims need NOT be related at all ii. Joint Claims (# parties does NOT matter) b. NO i. If multiple parties on either side (separate claims) 1. 1π v. 2∆ a. If 1 π’s claim >$75K BUT others do NOT Ü OK 3. Federal Question SMJX a. US Constitution Article III § 2 (power) AND i. Arising under US Constitution OR ii. US Law or Treaty iii. Right to relief depends on resolution of substantial federal law question b. 28 USC § 1331 (authorization under US Const. Art. III § 1) i. Arising under ii. Well Pleaded Complaint 1. Constitutional violation 2. Violation of federal law OR 3. Substantial question of federal law a. π’s relief necessarily depends on resolution of substantial federal law question b. CANNOT claim FQ in anticipation of counterclaim (Mottley = really dealt with state K-­‐Law claim, ~ federal question) 4. Removal JX a. Who: ∆ i. +1: All ∆ must join petition unless § 1441(c) separate/independent met [narrow] b. What: actions originally permissible in Federal Court § 1441(a) i. Exception: CANNOT remove to federal if ∆ citizen of forum state § 1441(b)(2) c. When: § 1446(b) Within 30 days: i. Service upon ∆ OR ii. Becoming removable re: § 1332 diversity (1yr to establish SMJX) 1. BUT NO limit on § 1331 federal question iii. NOT removable 1 year after initial filing d. Where: federal court in same district at state level § 1441(a) e. How: ∆ files notice of removal § 1446(a) i. State court NOT required to have JX § 1441(f) f. After Removal (change of court ⊥ law doesn’t change) i. If NO SMJX Ü court remand § 1447(c) 1. Only remand where removed ii. π can file motion to remand within 30 days of removal for any other defect § 1447(c) iii. Remand NOT reviewable BUT failure to remand is § 1447(c) 1. π should also file interlocutory appeal or extraordinary writ of mandamus 2. Caterpillar = consideration s of finality and efficiency trump as long as federal JX requirements are met when judgment is entered iv. If π seeks to join ∆s to destroy diversity court can deny or remand § 1447(e) -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐VENUE-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Venue Generally § 1391 a. Re: proper geographic district b. Yes OR No question c. At discretion of courts Ü Consider: convenience, interest of justice, π’s interest d. Venue is proper where i. Any ∆ resides if all ∆s are residents of state in which district is located ii. Judicial district which substantial part of the events/omissions giving rise to claim occurred or, substantial part of property that is subject of the action is situated, OR iii. If no district anywhere in US which satisfies (i) or (ii) Ü judicial district in which any ∆ is subject to court’s PJX with respect to action 2. Venue Transfer a. Change of Venue § 1404(a) i. Limited to places where case could have initially been brought AND ii. All consent OR iii. Petitioner motion Ü courts consider 1. Convenience of parties/witnesses 2. Interest of justice b. Waiver or Cure of Defense § 1406 i. Assume district is improper venue (PJX or SMJX) ii. Dismiss/allow π to re-­‐file (FRCP 12(b)(3)) OR iii. Transfer elsewhere § 1406(a) c. Forum Non-­‐Conveniens—choice of forum is SO inconvenient that court dismisses claim to completely foreign court system i. Balance while recognizing π’s choice of forum rarely disturbed 1. Private interests—Relative ease of access to sources of proof (availability of witnesses 2. Public Interests—Localized controversies heard at home -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐LIFECYCLE: INITIAL PLEADING-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. History a. FRCP in 1938 merged law and equity 2. Generally a. 7(a)(1)-­‐7 i. Complaint/3rd Party complaint ii. Answer to complaint/counterclaim iii. If court orders one, a reply to an answer b. Form 10(a)-­‐(c) c. Can plead the alternative 8)(d)(2)-­‐(3) d. Construed so as to do justice 8(e) 3. Complaint a. Requirements FRCP 8 i. Short plain statement of JX 8(a)(1) ii. Short plain statement showing entitlement to relief 8(a)(2) 1. Conley—possible—complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that π can prove NO set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle him to relief (elaboration of R8) Ü shifts burden to ∆ 2. Twiqbal—plausible BUT less than probable a. Nickel—ignore legal conclusions ⊥ takes facts as true b. Swierkiewicz—do NOT need to meet all elements of PF case (plausible) c. EXAMPLE: Form 11 d. NOTE: Iqbal 2 Prong Approach: Sufficiency of complaint i. Are there any factual allegations? ii. Do complaints give rise to entitlement to relief iii. Demand for relief sought 8(a)(3) b. FRCP 9 Heightened Pleading Standards i. Fraud [Securities] or Mistake, must plead complaint with particularity ii. Letherman = cannot extend standard where NOT enumerated a. Crawford-­‐El v. Britton = trial courts have other power: i. FRCP 7(a)(7): power to order reply to answer ii. FRCP 12(e): power to grant ∆’s motion: more definite statement iii. Congress has power to add to heightened pleading standards: -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐LIFECYCLE: RESPONSIVE PLEADING & MOTIONS-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Pre-­‐Answer Motion to Dismiss Rule 12 For: Rule 12 When Lack of SMJx §§ 1331-­‐1332 & Art. III (b)(1) Any time 12(h)(3) Failure to state a claim 8(a) (b)(6) Through trial 12(h)(2) Lack of PJx 4(k) and DPC (b)(2) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) Improper venue §§ 1391, 1404, 1406 (also waived by forum selection) (b)(3) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) Insufficient process 4(a)-­‐(c) (also waived by returning waiver) (b)(4) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) Insufficient service 4(d)-­‐(e) (also waived by returning waiver) (b)(5) First chance or waived 12(g)(2), (h)(1) 2. Answers: a. Serve within: i. 21 days after being served summons and complaint 12(a)(1)(A) √ ii. If waived: 60 days after request for a waiver √ iii. 14 days after court denies motion or more definite statement served 12( b. Must Contain: i. Admissions 8(b) 1. Short plain terms defenses to each claim against it ⊕ 2. Admit or deny allegations asserted against it by opposing party a. Once issue removed from case by admission in answer NOT introduce evidence because no longer dispute in case (Fuentes = amended answer day of trial to admit negligence but π still proved circumstances of accident: NOT permissible) ii. Denials 1. Must fairly respond to substance 8(b)(2) a. Need to be clear about what you’re denying/admitting or ineffective denial (Zelinski = denied big paragraph that included negligence and ownership but wasn’t clear to π that ownership was denied. SOL barred π so equitable estoppel meant ∆ held liable anyway: ✓ because ∆ and real ∆ had same insurance) iii. Lack c. Avoidance/Affirmative Defenses FRCP 8(c)(1) i. Burden on ∆ to prove affirmative defenses ii. Must be raised before trial unless 1. Does NOT unfairly surprise π (Ingraham) iii. 8(c)(1) π is not required to address every element 1. Gomez = no basis to force π to anticipate defense by requiring to state in initial complaint Ü defense was not relevant to π’s initial COA 3. Amending FRCP 15 a. 15(a): Pre-­‐Trial i. 15(a)(1): As a matter of course One free shot: 1. (A): 21 days after serving it OR 2. (B): 21 days after service of responsive pleading or 12(b), (e), or (f) motion (whichever is earlier) ii. 15(a)(2): Other Amendments 1. Opposing party’s written consent OR 2. Court’s freely given leave when justice requires iii. 15(a)(3): Time to Respond 1. Whichever is later: a. Within 14 days after service OR b. Time remaining to respond to original pleading b. 15(b) During and After Trial i. 15(b)(1): If Objection 1. Court should freely permit amendments if they will aid in presenting merits and NOT prejudice other party on the merits c. 15(c) Relation Back of Amendments i. 15(c)(1)(a): Only relevant where Statute of Limitations bars amendment OR ii. 15(c)(1)(b): Adding Claims OR 1. Amendment asserts claim/defense that arouse of COA of original pleading, a. Can have different legal theories but needs to arise out of the same factual situation (Barcume = hiring vs. harassment NOT relate back) iii. 15(c)(1)(c): Adding Parties 1. Provided that a. 15(c)(1)(C)(i): Added party has constructive notice within 120 days of filing AND b. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii): Added party should have known it would have been sued absent mistake i. Krupski = Party to be added should have known NOT π’s knowledge -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON PLEADING: SANCTION-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐ 1. Rule 11 a. 11(a): Signature b. 11(b): Representations to the Court i. Certifies to the best of their knowledge: true and merits after inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 1. Not for any improper purpose i. Hopeless/cannot protest in courts (Saltany v. Regan/Bush) 2. Legal contentions warranted by existing law or non-­‐frivolous argument: modification existing law a. Knew there was no legal basis for their claim (Saltany) b. Requires counsel do legal research before filing and be aware of rules est. by USSC (Frantz) i. Inclusion of one sufficient/adequately investigated claim NOT permit counsel to file stream of unsubstantiated claims as riders 3. Factual contentions have/will evidentiary support a. NOT necessary that investigation into facts carried out to absolute certainty AND reasonable under circumstances: i. Signer have sufficient time for investigation ii. Extent relied on client: factual foundation underlying document iii. Whether case was accepted from another attorney iv. Fact-­‐complexity ⊕ attorney’s ability: sufficient pre-­‐filing investigation v. Discovery beneficial to development of underlying facts? 1. Kramer = private investigation 2. Arista = where discovery increasingly likely to yield facts their pleading was okay 4. Denials of factual contentions warranted c. 11(c): Sanctions i. May impose 11(c)(1) ii. Limited to what is sufficient to deter 11(c)(4) iii. How: 1. Motion 2. Court’s own initiative 2. Inherent Powers Doctrine (where no adequate law exists) a. Chambers = 11(b)(1-­‐4) sua sponte not enough but courts can still do their own thing i. Court inherent power to impose sanction for bad-­‐faith conduct (wantonly, etc.) 1. Temple of justice has been defiled ii. Courts can use inherent power to assess attorney fees as sanction b. Requires such circumstances as i. Willful disobedience of court order ii. Acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or oppressive reasons iii. Fraud practiced upon the court iv. Basically more than 11(b) improper purpose c. When π engaged in misconduct during course of litigation that is deliberate that is egregious and that renders any remedy short of dismissal inadequate to preserver fairness of the trial