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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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THESIS
DIRECT FIRE SYNCHRONIZATION
by
Robert W. Lamont
•
September 1992
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7.
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18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by
Synchronization, Defense in Sector, Direct Fire
SUB-GROUP
FIELD
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6.
9.
ABSTRACT
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in sector missions adapted from the National Training Center and conducted with the
Janus(A) high resolution combat model to check for relationships which influence direct fire synchronization. This
analysis should enhance the monitoring of unit performance in the area of concentration or massing of fires
consistent with the commander's intent. The combat fighting vehicle, which combines the characteristics of mobility
This thesis analyzes defense
volumes of firepower, dominates the desert battlefield and is the focus of this study. Graphical methods
and analytic techniques are developed to describe the battle in terms of direct fire synchronization and a mission
measure of effectiveness (MOE). This research is being conducted under the U.S. Army's Battle Enhanced Analysis
Methodologies (BEAM) study, which is developing objective doctrinal AirLand battle measures and visuals displays
to enhance training analysis. The thesis also describes the training environment of the NTC, defense in sector
doctrine for both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps with emphasis on asymmetries, and threat offensive
with high
doctrine.
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Direct Fire Synchronization
by
Robert W. Lamont
Major, United States Marine Corps
BS, United States Naval Academy, 1978
y
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 1992
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes defense in sector missions adapted from the National
Training Center and conducted with the Janus(A) high resolution combat model to
check for relationships which influence direct
fire
synchronization. This analysis
should enhance the monitoring of unit performance in the area of concentration or
massing of fires consistent with the commander's
intent.
The combat
fighting vehicle,
which combines the characteristics of mobility with high volumes of firepower,
dominates the desert battlefield and
is
the focus of this study. Graphical methods and
analytic techniques are developed to describe the battle in terms of direct fire
synchronization and a mission measure of effectiveness
(MOE). This research
is
being conducted under the U.S. Army's Battle Enhanced Analysis Methodologies
(BEAM)
study,
which
visual displays to
is
developing objective doctrinal AirLand battle measures and
enhance training
environment of the NTC, defense
analysis.
The
thesis also describes the training
in sector doctrine for
both the U.S.
Army and
the
U.S. Marine Corps with emphasis on asymmetries, and threat offensive doctrine.
in
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
INTRODUCTION
1
A.
BACKGROUND
1
B.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
2
C.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS
3
TERRAIN AND OPPOSING DOCTRINES
5
A.
TERRAIN
5
B.
THREAT OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE
7
C.
FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE
12
THE EXPERIMENT
17
A.
THE SCENARIO
B.
TACTICAL
17
PARAMETERS
AND
MEASURE
EFFECTIVENESS
IV.
V.
STATISTICAL
OF
20
METHODOLOGY
25
A.
STRATEGY AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
25
B.
HOMOGENITY OF VARIANCE
26
C.
DATA ANALYSIS
30
THE MODEL
36
A.
DEVELOPMENT
36
B.
VEHICLE OPERATIONAL LETHALITY INDEX
36
IV
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOI
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VI.
LIST
C.
THE DISPLAY
44
D.
MODEL ANALYSIS
54
CONCLUSIONS
60
A.
FINDINGS
60
B.
RECOMMENDATIONS
61
C.
FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
61
OF REFERENCES
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
63
65
Dv
W
M
LIST
OF TABLES
TABLE
1.
BARTLETTS TEST SUMMARY
28
TABLE
2.
ANOVA RESULTS
31
TABLE
3.
NONPARAMETRIC ANOVA RESULTS
33
TABLE
4.
OPENING RANGE SUMMARY
58
VI
LIST
OF FIGURES
Scenario Manuever Areas
7
9
9.
Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR)
Echelon Attach Concept
Blue Force Task Organization
Blue Force Defense in Sector Dispositions
OPFOR Plan of Attack
Experiment Design
Janus (A) Simulation
Results
Experimental Cells Box Plots
10.
ANOVA Summary
11.
Operational Lethality Index Factors
27
30
37
12.
Gun-Missile Paradox
38
Figure
13.
Figure
14.
40
43
Figure
15.
Threat Organizational Factors Example
M-l Tank P(hit) Curve
Missile P(hit) Curve
Figure
16.
Combat
47
Figure
17.
Historical Scenario at Start
Figure
18.
Figure
19.
Engagement Area Positioning Scheme
HAW-MAW-LAW Approach at Start
Figure
1.
Figure
2.
Figure
3.
Figure
4.
Figure
5.
Figure
6.
Figure
7.
Figure
8.
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
MOE
of
MOE
Results
TOW
Potential Surface Concept
at Start
10
15
18
19
21
25
45
48
50
51
Figure 20.
Historical Scenario at 120 minutes
52
Figure 21.
Engagemet Area Scenario
53
at
120 minutes
Figure 22.
HAW-MAW-LAW
Figure 23.
Optimum Opening Range Problem
55
Figure 24.
Operational Lethality Index (OLI)
57
Scenario at 120 minutes
vn
54
D.
N
M
I.
A.
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The National Training Center (NTC)
First,
the
located in the high desert of southern
NTC,
California. Since the establishment of the
tasked with a twofold mission.
is
NTC
in
is
June 1981, the center has been
to provide visiting units with the
most demanding training environment, short of war, that
limitations. This
mission
is
is
Second, data
array located
consistent with safety
accomplished with a dedicated opposing force
emulate soviet
to
is
style tactics
(OPFOR) whose
during free-play, force-on-force exercises.
collected from these engagements by an extensive instrumentation
on both combat
assess unit organization,
In 1986 a
potential of the
forces
and the surrounding terrain
weapons systems,
tactics,
had not been
realized.
was being met, but illuminated some
It
be used
to
and doctrine.
Government Accounting Office (GAO) study
NTC
to
is
stated that the full
acknowledged that the
first
objective
shortfalls with respect to the second.
These
included both an inability to use objective data for assessment of organizations and
to obtain solutions to battlefield deficiencies.
study called Battle
U.S. Army's
The
Battle
at
help overcome these limitations the
Enhanced Analysis Methodologies (BEAM) was
TRADOC Analysis
goal of the
(ALB)
To
initiated at the
Command-Monterey (TRAC-MTRY). [Ref
BEAM program
is
to develop objective
l:p. 2]
measures of AirLand
doctrine tenets to resolve deficiencies in the data collection required
Combat Training Centers and improve
identification
of key
performance
weaknesses
in the
doctrine are
by
BEAM
The
use of tactical AirLand Battle doctrine.
agility, initiative,
depth, and synchronization.
four tenets of
ALB
The measures developed
are envisioned as being graphical in nature, to be used in doctrinal
training analysis during or after a
show the warfighter how well the
combat simulation. The underlying concept
battle
is
going with respect to the
ALB
tenets.
to
is
[Ref
l:p. 3]
The
U.S. Army's Janus(A) combat model
is
a high resolution computer
simulation that allows both interactive and systemic operations. Developed by
researchers at the
Janus(A)
entities.
is
Center, Livermore National Laboratory,
an event scheduling, stochastic model that defines weapon systems as
Each of these
combat model
weapon
Combat Simulation
entities has
its
own
characteristics that defines
within the
as a whole. This precise level of modelling allows such factors as
capabilities,
ammunition and
fuel
represented in a realistic manner. This high
investigate the effects of
2:p. 9]
it
Janus(A)
is
new weapons and
used extensively
status,
fidelity
tactics to
and terrain
effects,
be
to
modelling allows Janus(A) to
produce plausible
in this research to
results. [Ref.
generate the data required
to investigate the issue of direct fire synchronization.
B.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Analysis efforts in direct
subjective in nature.
No
fire
synchronization at the
formal study has been done on
NTC
have so far been
this subject.
Observer-
Controllers and analysts have recognized shortfalls in unit direct fire synchronization
but quantitative analysis of "what happened" to support the study of these trends
is
lacking.
[Ref.
18]
This thesis presents a quantitative analysis of direct
synchronization based on Janus battles using an actual
this
study
is
commander
to quantify direct fire synchronization
in determining
if
his forces are
NTC
scenario.
performance
complying with
The
fire
goal of
to assist the unit
his intent
and vision of
the battle.
The scope
of this thesis
is
limited by the following constraints and assumptions:
o The Janus(A) combat model
is
representative of actual attrition and battlefield
effects.
o Battles were conducted on desert terrain represented
environment of the NTC's Siberia training area.
by
the
o The same defense in sector mission was used as the basis for
conducted in this research.
all
physical
battles
o Mechanized forces of both sides were operating consistent with the organization
equipment mixes and doctrine employment schemes outlined in the second
chapter.
The
analysis procedure can easily be extended to other battles, missions,
and forces
but extrapolation of the analysis results outside the above constraints could lead to
false conclusions.
C.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS
Two
key problems must be addressed
in this research. First,
synchronization be captured as envisioned by the
impact,
if
BEAM
any, does varying the battlefield in time
synchronization?
The above questions provide
hypothesis investigated in this thesis.
project?
can direct
fire
Second, what
and space have on
direct fire
the required structure to advance the
The
following hypothesis will be tested for validity using data analysis: given a
model under
task force defense in sector mission conducted with the Janus(A)
there
conditions,
a
exists
relationship
between
synchronization and the mission's outcome.
synchronization
is
best achieved
mutual support and execution
is
study.
two step approach
First,
parameters,
is
of
direct
fire
further hypothesized that this
are positioned for
decentralized consistent with the commander's
displayed graphically, for direct
A
is
degree
when subordinate elements
Such a relationship could lead
intent.
that
is
It
the
NTC
to a quantified task force training standard,
fire
synchronization in the defense.
utilized to investigate the
problems advanced
in this
a simulation and data analysis will be conducted to see which tactical
when systematically varied in a scenario,
that appear to impact battle
outcome
will
influence the
MOE. Parameters
then be modelled in such a way that the
warfighter will be able to change the input parameters based on his operational
scheme. The second step of the study
will utilize this
model
to build a display that
graphically shows a unit their synchronization potential level or
display will include the
combat information
human
combat power. This
factors engineering required to provide relevant
to the warfighter.
TERRAIN AND OPPOSING DOCTRINES
II.
A.
TERRAIN
NTC
Because the
is
used to establish the scenario under investigation, a
knowledge of desert terrain and how
is
it
impacts the weapons systems of both sides
key to understanding the interactions between
tactical
parameters in the study. The
following are the military aspects of terrain: observation and fields of
fire,
cover and
concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. Terrain analysis
focuses on these factors [Ref 3:p. 4-9].
While observation involves target acquisition systems, both optical and
electronic, this
a unit's
paper focuses on horizontal or point
of
field
fire.
Overlapping these
fields
to point visibility described
of fire
is
a prerequisite for the
concentration of combat power and implies a potential for direct
Line-of-sight
on the
flat
and open areas of the
by
fire
synchronization.
NTC is only interrupted on the slopes,
which are cut with wadies formed from drainage patterns of the surrounding high
ground. This results in
correctly,
is
many
areas where a weapon's combat power,
largely limited only by the
maximum
range to which
it
when
positioned
can reach and the
accuracy associated with that range. [Ref 4:p.2]
Concealment
effects of fire.
[Ref
military operations.
is
protection from observation. Cover
3:p. 4-9]
Vegetation
is
is
protection from the
a historical source of concealment for
At the NTC, ground covering
is
extremely sparse. Available
vegetation
is
composed of
eighty-five percent creosote brush scrub
percent Joshua tree woodland shade scale scrub. Cover for vehicles
and
fifteen
limited to
is
wadies and the rolling nature of the valley floor or rock outcroppings. [Ref 4:p.l] The
lack of cover and concealment emphasizes the importance of accurate long range
fires.
[Ref
5:p. 1-1]
Rapid change
NTC. The
in elevation
is
the chief obstacle to mechanized
lack of precipitation, four inches
permanent water
obstacles. [Ref 4:p. 2]
on average per
Man-made
earthworks construction. Limitations on time,
areas of the
battlefield being
an environment
is
lift,
year,
movement
at the
means there are no
obstacles include minefields and
and barrier material
result in large
wide open to movement by mechanized
forces.
Such
conducive to the concentration of combat power for both the
attacker and defender.
Key
terrain are those points
on the
battlefield that provide a
marked
tactical
advantage to the side that controls them. The number of points that constitute key
terrain in a desert environment are limited.
mountains and
hills
are areas through which
High ground has the potential
of units that occupy
it.
Choke
enemy movement can be
to increase line-of-sight,
The value
of terrain
is
points or defiles between
more
and
in turn, the
likely to
controlled.
combat power
be defined
in
terms of
fighting positions for individual vehicles or small units rather than geographic
formations on whose control would hinge a battle. [Ref 5:p. 5-1]
desert warfare
is
the destruction of the enemy.
synchronization takes on additional importance.
To
this
The
end the value of
focus for
direct fire
National Training Center
(South)
f
N
Terrain
GO
SLOW GO
NO GO
KILOMETERS
$Q
Figure
1.
Lastly,
They vary
Scenario Maneuver Areas
avenues of approach
in size
from a width of
thirty to forty-two kilometers.
at the
six to
The
NTC
are formed by well defined corridors.
twelve kilometers and range in length from
result
is
a maneuver area that supports the
doctrinal styles of both U.S. and soviet-style forces. [Ref 4:p. 2]
southern end of the
B.
NTC
Figure
1
shows the
area where the scenario was conducted.
THREAT OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE
The
recent demise of the Soviet
Union
significantly reduces the likelihood of
any direct conflict with them. However, the degree to which they have trained and
equipped potential adversaries, notably
in the oil rich deserts of the Persian Gulf,
means
soviet-style doctrine
motorized
NTC
rifle
remains a threat. This section describes the soviet
regiment's offensive doctrine, organization, and tactics used in the
scenario under investigation.
Threat forces view offensive operations as the basic form of combat action.
Striking speed
and force
opponent
be overwhelmed.
will
size are considered as the
To implement
primary mechanisms by which the
on the
this
battlefield, soviet doctrine
emphasizes the following operational concepts: rapid concentration and dispersal of
combat power, using multiple axes of advance,
deep. [Ref 6:p. 2-2]
The
into tactical reality
is
hitting at
weak
points,
and attacking
organizational level at which these concepts are transferred
the motorized
While the soviet motorized
regiment.
rifle
rifle
regiment
(MRR)
is
change, Figure 2 outlines the basic composition of a typical
This force structure
is
representative of
many
undergoing consistent
MRR.
of the formations that have been
exported to the third world through the proliferation of soviet operational doctrine
and of the
OPFOR
at the
NTC. The MRR's
the 130
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
(MRBs),
forty tanks,
combat power
of the three motorized
is
located in
rifle
battalions
and twenty-four self-propelled howitzers. Tactical employment
of these weapons are the
[Ref
(BMPs)
principal
means by which
soviet operational concepts are achieved.
7:p. 163]
The
following are the fundamentals of soviet tactical thought: aggressive
reconnaissance, echelonment of forces, and adherence to march discipline.
reconnaissance
is
conducted
at all levels, for the soviet
8
While
ground commander division
X
III
H
II
A
II
-
1
•
i
&
1
1
1
1
1
X
1
®
Figure
2.
Motorized Rifle Regiment
and regimental reconnaissance
influenced.
fifty
A
T\
(MRR)
assets provide a direct
means by which
the battle
is
reconnaissance battalion precedes the Motorized Rifle Division by
kilometers.
They proceed on multiple routes and
rely
on
stealth to collect
information on the enemy's dispositions. This intelligence forms a basis on which the
regiment can formulate
its
plan of attack. The regimental reconnaissance company
precedes the advance guard by twenty-five kilometers and uses similar techniques as
the divisional reconnaissance unit.
prior to contact with the
The concept
main
They serve
to confirm
it
battlefield
attack. [Ref 6:p. 2-4]
of deploying units in echelons
Echelonment makes
and update the
is
key to soviet offensive
tactics.
possible to achieve numerical superiority without massing
all
the required forces
from the
on
The
line.
result
effects of nuclear strikes
weapons. The
first
to reduce the vulnerability of the attacker
is
and the improving accuracy of
echelon of an attacking unit
is
conventional
normally comprised of two of
its
component elements reinforced by strong attachments. These two elements then
advance abreast to the regimental objective. [Ref 7:p. 24]
This concept
is
illustrated
in Figure 3.
The
threat, or soviet style force,
emphasizes pressuring the enemy by retaining
contact with the
maximum number
tactical units to
permit the second echelon to accomplish tasks that Western units
of troops. Numerical superiority
is
counted on by
1
X
1
/
-"*
X
M
II
FIRST
ECHELON
II
<+)
X
w
III
X
II
SECOND
ECHELON
1
1
Figure
3.
1
1
Echelon Attack Concept
10
CP
n
cr>
(-)
ANTITANK
RESERVE
would use
focus
is
whose
their reserves for. In general, soviet doctrine uses small reserves
on anti-tank operations. [Ref
7:p. 24]
By combining the concepts of echelonment and
attack frontage, the threat
forces are able to achieve the correlation of forces that they view are required to win.
A superiority of at least three to one in tanks,
in
motorized
rifle
enemy can be
ratios
can
strength
is
six to
one
in artillery,
and four
However,
viewed as desirable for the attack.
one
to
if
the
neutralized with fire support, or surprised by maneuver, then these
fall to
the point
one. [Ref 7:p. 24]
where the threat
outnumbered by
is
as
much
as three to
This adds a degree of unpredictability to the threat operational
scheme.
March formations and techniques provide
commander
fights his unit.
The regiment
reinforcing three rifle battalions with a
a
company
size anti-tank reserve.
the tactical glue by which the
normally organized for the march by
is
company from
These reinforced
echeloned as described above. The regiment
will
forced to deploy laterally into prebattle formation.
on the enemy, the commander
will elect to
the
enemy
situation
is
units then
remain
As
five to ten kilometers
in
march along two routes
march formation
is
the regiment continues to close
commander will
A
accomplished by placing a reinforced
Combat Reconnaissance
11
in prebattle
task his forward
forward of the battalion. This company
Forward Security Element (FSE).
until
his unit into attack formation.
vague, the regimental
MRB to push forward security elements. This
company
the tank battalion and forming
push through the opposition
formation to retain speed, or continue to deploy
If
MRR
will act as a
Patrol
(CRP),
consisting of a reinforced platoon,
front of the
first
The mission
is
enemy
is
ensure favorable deployment of the main
will
gained. [Ref 6:p. 2-4]
reconnaissance elements are able to pin-point the
If threat
This
deployed approximately ten kilometers to the
FSE. This advanced guard
force once contact with the
then the
is
element to
strike the defensive line
of the forward detachment
accomplished by seizing key
is
may be
terrain,
the forward detachment.
a choke point or high ground, on which
is
for the forward
to pin elements of the defending force in place to allow the
critical targets at
detachment
main body
to concentrate
on the
ability of long-
fraction of the defensive line. This concept hinges
range reconnaissance patrols to identify
defenses,
to disrupt the continuity of the defense.
the defensive positions are situated. Another technique
on a smaller
enemy
which to
strike.
[Ref
7:p.
56.]
C.
FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE
AirLand Battle Doctrine (ALB)
combat power
to the battlefield.
articulates the
Combat power
is
Army's method of applying
generated by combining the
following factors: maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership.
The
first
two
factors are key to direct fire synchronization. [Ref. 3:p. 11]
Maneuver
is
the alignment of friendly forces which obtains a positional
advantage over the enemy. During offensive operations, or while counter attacking
in the
defense,
movement
of ground units can be used to achieve positional
advantage. However, friendly
defense,
if
the
enemy
is
movement
drawn
is
not a prerequisite to maneuver. In the
into a disadvantageous position
12
where
friendly fires
are massed or his attack formation
is
disrupted, then
mechanism without ground movement.
Firepower
ability
and
Maneuver can be
will to fight.
is
reached. Firepower
agility,
used as a defeat
used
removing both the enemy's
in
when firepower
movement and
is
used to
thus insure a position
be used independently of maneuver
to
forces. [Ref. 3:p. 12]
battle doctrine recognizes the following four basic tenets: initiative,
depth, and synchronization.
framework can determine
the enemy.
also
uncommitted enemy
destroy, delay, or disrupt
AirLand
may
is
facilitated
suppress the enemy's ability to counter friendly
of advantage
is
[Ref. 3:p. 12]
the destructive force which
is
maneuver
Initiative is
The
ability
under
to successfully fight
battlefield success. Agility
this
the ability to act faster than
is
seen as setting the terms of the battle. Depth
is
viewed as
the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. Lastly, synchronization
is
the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce
maximum
relative
combat power
at the decisive point. [Ref. 3:p. 15-17]
Synchronization includes concentration of forces and
firepower and maneuver
Corps doctrinal
literature.
understand
of
the
communications
seen as a recurring theme in both
The
integration of
Army and Marine
Such synchronization need not depend solely on the
The commander extends his span of control beyond the physical
explicit coordination.
limitations
is
fires.
communications
his
intent
fail
of his
architecture
operational
by
plans.
and face-to-face coordination
In
is
insuring
the
chaos
impossible,
coordination can provide the vehicle by which synchronization
13
his
is
subordinates
of
battle,
if
such implicit
achieved. [Ref. 3:p.
17]
For direct
able to overlap effective
systems
achieve concentration, their
fire forces to
fires.
Currently, the
maximum
weapon systems must be
range of gun and missile
MRR
about four kilometers. The width of a zone of attack for a
is
extend from three to eight kilometers. [Ref.
battalion to mass sufficient
can
This means that for a
9:p. 4-55]
numbers of antiarmor weapons
MRR,
to defeat a
its
defensive sector should not exceed a width that would prevent the concentration of
direct fire.
Based on these physical limitations of the weapon systems
allow for a frontage of four to eight kilometers. Thus,
it
is
would
seems that the battalion
provides the highest organizational level at which direct
achieved, and as such,
this
fire
synchronization
the focus of this study.
While pure battalion organizations are assigned
tactical missions, the cross-
attachment of subordinate elements between infantry and tank battalions
fundamental concept that increases mission
result
flexibility.
The
one of the ways to increase combat power. The company
is
is
a
units
is
the lowest level at which
cross-attachment occurs and once complete the resulting organization
A battalion that
is
synergistic effects that
from combining the individual strengths and weaknesses of dissimilar
as a team.
is
organized for a combat mission
is
is
referred to
called a task force.
Figure 4 outlines the task organization used by the friendly force in the
historical
NTC scenario. [Ref. 8:p.l2]
course of this study.
Arms Heavy
FM
This organization remains constant during the
71-123 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Forces, outlines the doctrinal
Combined
employment of this task force (TF) during
the defense in sector (DIS) mission.
14
TmA
Tm Scout
Scout
Pit
2/A Armor
Mech
3/A Mech
2/A Mech
3/A Armor
1
2 x Stinger
TmF
/A Armor
1/A
2/B Mech
BCo
Stinger
D Co(-)
TF Control
1/B Armor
2/D Armor
Hqs Tk Sec
2/B Armor
3/D Armor
A/-
3/B Armor
1/EAT
Stinger
Vul
Figure
The
4.
Eng(-)
1/A/- Eng(-)
Hvy Mtr
(DS)
Pit
Pit
Blue Force Task Organization
battalion
commander develops
his direct fire
plan by determining likely
platoon battle positions. Forces are placed on the battlefield to insure a good line-ofsight,
lateral
positions.
dispersion,
Once
cover and concealment, and mutual support between
these positions are identified, platoons are combined into
and team organizations
to provide for the required
command and
company
control. [Ref. 9:p.
4-72]
Fire control
is
established over
TF
elements to insure the enemy
the best terms. Direct fires are oriented
on
is
target reference points
engagement areas (EAs) where the commander plans
to destroy the
engaged on
(TRPs) and
enemy. Timing
of the engagement can be either centralized or decentralized by using control
15
measures. Trigger lines allow subordinate elements to
fire
a set point on the battlefield. This means that weapons
maximum range and
of
fire.
until
force the
Another approach
enemy
into
EA
start
enemy reaches
engaging at their
and ever-increasing volumes
to hold the
opening of the engagement
fire into
an
may
the
to face concentric
to fire control
numerous weapons can
that draws the
enemy
when
is
the
EA. The US Army
and masses
fires
prefers the technique
simultaneously on him. [Ref.
9:p.4-73]
The Marine Corps on
prefers to
when faced with a
the other hand,
open the anti-armor
battle at
maximum
MRR
range. This concept, which
envisions long opening ranges for each class of anti-armor system,
MAW-LAW.
Each anti-armor weapon (AW)
on range. Heavy
AWs
fill
in
fire at
long range, light
between the heavy and
of the spectrum.
to
AWs
The
is
light
intent of this tactic
to
engage the enemy armor formation. [Ref.
16
is
called
HAW-
broken down into a category based
AWs
fire at short
systems with
is
sized threat,
range, and
medium
some overlapping on each end
maximize the amount of time available
6:p. 14]
III.
THE EXPERIMENT
THE SCENARIO
A.
The
historical scenario being investigated for the
synchronization
is
purpose of studying direct
a defense in sector mission by an armor-heavy task force.
defensive concept divided the operation into two phases. Phase one
reconnaissance battle and phase two
commander's
he would
10]
intent
fight
The
was
to deceive the
enemy
is
the counter-
is
task force
as to the primary positions
from which
by conducting an aggressive counter-reconnaissance
goal of this part of the battle
to prevent the
effort. [Ref. 8:p.
OPFOR
from using a
forward detachment to unhinge the defense by blinding his reconnaissance
If
successful
OPFOR
it
The
The
the defense in sector.
is
fire
would deny the forward detachment an aiming
point.
efforts.
The subsequent
operating scheme reveals the task force failed to prevent the
enemy from
finding an objective for the forward detachment.
Figure 5 shows the defender's dispositions for the second phase of the
fight.
In
phase two of the defense the task force commander intended to destroy the enemy
in
EAs
orient
into
SHARK and PIRANHA. Tm A was
its fires
into
EA SHARK. B Co
EA PIRANHA.
move
to
BP
occupying
If
the
34 and orient
BP
enemy
its
fires
25 and orienting
its
to
occupy battle position (BP) 22 and
had the mission
to
occupy
BP
24 and orient
attack developed in the south then
on Red
fires into
17
Pass.
D
B Co was
to
Co(-) had the responsibility for
EA Shark. Furthermore,
they had an on-
National Training Center
—
10r—
^cr^S7^*rr7>A
V773
=T1
(South)
^
I
t
^&ZZZ&
N
Terrain
GO
SLOW GO
NO GO
PL VICTORIA
KILOMETERS
60
Figure
Blue Force Defense in Sector Dispositions
5.
order mission to redirect their
through in the south
vicinity of
occupy
BP
Co
EA CUDA
The
of the
task force
defense
synchronization. This
engagements
will
its
is
fires
move
to
on
EA CUDA.
BP
31 and place
commander's
make
due
occur during
key
the
enemy pushed
the
enemy attacked
its fires
our
MRR. Tm F
into
was
to
in the
EA PIRANHA
enemy
in the
second
of
direct
fire
the fact that the majority of the
direct
fire
this
to
If
intent to destroy the
phase
if
vehicles to the firing line in the
and engage the second echelon of the
21 and orient their
[Ref. 8:p. 10]
EA PIRANHA. Lastly,
D(-) was to reposition
north then this team was to
phase
fires into
in
this part of the battle.
18
analysis
Figure 6 outlines the key elements of the
the
enemy
MRR
was
to conduct
OPFOR
attack plan.
The mission
of
an attack with the purpose of penetrating the
forward blue positions, destroy the majority of his combat power, and retain sufficient
OPFOR combat power for a follow-on attack. Their concept of operations was to pin
the defending
enemy
in the vicinity of
Red
Pass with the forward detachment.
The
MRR main body would then attack the center of the defensive sector to open a hole
for the second echelon. Lastly, the following echelon
echelon and continue moving to their
would push through the
final objective.
National Training Center (South)
t
N
Terrain
GO
Red Pass
SLOW GO
NO GO
60
Figure
6.
OPFOR
Plan of Attack
19
Kilometers
first
B.
TACTICAL PARAMETERS AND MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
In 1914 F.
combat
attrition
W. Lanchester formulated two
under
specific conditions.
He
models
differential equation
for
contrasted a battlefield that was
partitioned into a series of one-on-one duels with one in which firers could
concentrate on surviving
The
scenario.
illustrates the
enemy from dispersed
result of this effort
in
many low
many-on-one
was Lanchester's square law of combat which
advantage of concentrating combat power. [Ref. 10:p. 63]
combat models are useful
imbedded
locations to generate a
While these
in the study of warfare at the aggregated level,
resolution simulations, they
fail
and are
to capture the spatial aspects
of the battalion level fight. Tactical parameters were selected to test the concept of
concentration of force, and hence the influence of direct
fire
synchronization, in high
where
spatial aspects play a role in determining the battle
start of the
engagement and vehicle positioning are the two key
resolution simulations
outcome.
Timing the
doctrinal factors for effective direct
fire.
Figure 7 outlines the experiment in matrix
form.
Vehicle locations were
became
run from the historical scenario at the
NTC.
the baseline case against which other parameters could be tested.
these runs
companies
it
was noted
that the initial direct fire battles
changes in direct
would be limited
to these
fire effectiveness to
20
This
During
were conducted by the two
in the southern half of the defensive sector. It
in vehicle dispositions
limit
first
was decided
that changes
two companies. The goal was to
the actual influence of moving vehicle
TIME
SPACE
FREE
TRIGGER
FIRE
UNE
(
ON
COMMAND
HISTORICAL
(NTC ROTATION)
ENGAGEMENT
AREA
HAW-MAW-UWV
Figure
positions
7.
Experiment Design
and adjusting the engagement timing. This was insured by keeping the
localized force ratios constant in the area of
To
first
contact.
further explore the spatial aspects of direct fire synchronization,
Marine Corps doctrinal positioning techniques were
companies were repositioned
result of this
the
OPFOR
to focus their direct fire
utilized.
weapons
The southern two
into
EA CUDA. The
change was a concave alignment of combat fighting vehicles,
direction of attack, around the edge of
were repositioned
criteria of the
in
a linear fashion to support the
Haw-Maw-Law
approach.
21
EA CUDA.
maximum
Army and
relative to
Lastly, the forces
range engagement
Timing of the
initial
engagement was varied from no control through
positive control by the battalion
to
open
line,
fire
commander. The
when an enemy vehicle came within
strict
free fire runs allowed the defender
effective
weapons range. The
trigger
used to evaluate the second timing approach, was Phase Line Lisa or any enemy
vehicle that entered
EA CUDA. This allowed
the southern two companies to fire as
independent elements when the situation permitted. Lastly, an on-command
technique was tested to see the effects of starting an engagement only in self defense
or
when
directed to do so by the battalion
The
tactical
experiment. His
parameters for the
movement and
commander.
OPFOR
attack plan, as outlined in the previous section, did
not change. His vehicles were kept in a free
engagement
at
were held constant throughout the
fire status
and allowed
to start
an
any time the defender was observed within effective range. Again the
idea here was to
limit
the
impact of factors outside the parameters under
investigation.
To capture
was developed
levels
the results of each simulation run a measure of effectiveness
to reflect the
on both
synchronization.
degree of direct
sides provide
The more
fire
a quantitative
effectively that
(MOE)
synchronization. Changes in force
method
combat power
for
is
measuring direct
applied to the
enemy
fire
the
higher his losses will be. This destruction will in turn attenuate the effects of his
direct fires
and maximize the number of friendly forces that survive the
22
battle.
The
direct fire synchronization
MOE
is
shown below.
It
includes the quantifiable
BN/TFMOE=(a)%ENEMYKILLED+(\-a)%FRIENDLYSURVIVAL
mission objectives of enemy force destruction and friendly force survival.
of
enemy
killed
is
the total starting
number of
the
sum
enemy
friendly
of the combat vehicles destroyed in the battle divided by
strength. Friendly survival
combat vehicles
and dividing by the
The percent
initial
killed in the
number of combat
was found by subtracting the
engagement from the
vehicles.
starting total
These two aspects can be
weighted by the commander using an a value between zero and one. During
study,
a was
If
set at .5 to equally
run as a
level out as
this
weight the two goals. [Ref. ll:p. 38]
"fight-to-the-finish", the attrition results
from the scenario tend
to
both sides drive each others combat power down toward zero. This in
turn obscures the influence of the tactical parameters under investigation as other
factors,
such as the counter-attacking force and non-combat elements, impact the
computation of the
MOE. By
tracking the temporal direct fire intensity, the battle
can be partitioned into periods of
interest.
The two key
periods,
synchronization point of view, are the combat during the
forward detachment and main body of the
conducted in succession and end
simulation. [Ref. 8:p. 45]
for
at
MRR.
initial
from a
direct fire
contact with the
These two key events are
approximately 120 minutes into the Janus(A)
This point in the battle was selected to compute the
MOE
each run. Hence, by limiting the factors external to the experiment, to the
greatest extent that a controlled simulation
23
would allow, the
tactical
parameters of
the study are reflected in the
their influence
on the
battle
MOE and statistical techniques can be used to analyze
outcome.
24
STATISTICAL
IV.
A.
METHODOLOGY
STRATEGY AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
Each Janus(A) simulation run required
three hours of run time for the battle
to capture the events of interest. This placed a limit
could be generated for
tally
the
total
number of runs
For each of the nine combinations of
this research.
The
parameters, five runs were conducted.
provided the data to
on the
MOEs
for each experimental cell.
They are shown
TIME
HISTORICAL
(NTC ROTATION)
ENGAGEMENT
AREA
HAW-MAW-LAW
FREE
TRIGGER
FIRE
LINE
.6512
.5304
.6527
.6996
.7036
.6539
.6586
.6112
.6277
.5629
.8659
.8917
.8884
.7576
.8567
.8179
.8417
.8764
.8917
.8667
.8812
.8041
.7631
.7236
.8667
.5562
.8443
.8212
.8495
.8631
Figure
8.
Janus(A) Simulation
MOE
25
tactical
resulting killer-victim scoreboards
below.
SPACE
that
Results
ON
COMMAND
.5086
.3701
.4982
.5236
.4751
.5329
.7233
.5579
.7762
.6315
.6226
.6217
.5520
.6079
.5867
The
MOE result from
the actual battle data was .3799. Only one of the forty-
may
runs was below the historical result. This
five simulations
differences in direct fire intensity attributable to
human
in part
degradation during the
In addition, the simulated battles were stopped after 120
battle. [Ref.8, p. 58]
minutes into the battle while the historical engagement was run as a
increased time available for attrition
finish; this
be due to
may account
fight to the
for the lower
MOE
results during the rotation.
This data will form a basis to test the interaction of the tactical parameters
utilizing analysis of variance
(ANOVA)
techniques. Because
ANO VA methodology
requires an underlying assumption of homogeneity of variance between
variance of the output, as represented by the
spread of the
MOE
Bartlett's test for
approach
fails,
was studied using box
homogeneity of variance.
then the
framework required by
will
plots.
was investigated.
the
Initially,
the
This in turn was followed by
the hypothesis underlying the
ANOVA
data will be transformed in an attempt to establish the
ANOVA techniques.
Lastly,
each of the
be developed to see which positively effect the
interaction
B.
If
MOE,
cells,
between the parameters of
MOE
tactical
and
if
parameters
there
is
any
interest.
HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE
Figure 9 shows
a box plot for each of the experimental cells outlined in
chapter three. Each box plot
is
a visual representation of
some
statistical attributes
of the data, collected during the simulation, as described by the
of the box from end to end
is
the distance between the
26
first
and
MOE. The
length
third quartiles or
BOX PLOTS FOR TACTICAL PARAMETERS
1
I
ID
UJ
C>
o
2
z
o
4
6
CELL NUMBER
Figure
9.
Experimental Cells Box Plots
interquartile range (IQR).
within the box
is
The
the mean.
which the adjacent values
line
through the box
is
The Xs above and below
fall.
These points extend as
the
median and the
the box
mark
far as 1.5
circle
the points at
IQRs beyond
the
range of the box and must end at a data observation. This explains the folding back
effect of cell 8
seen as the
circle
representation
sample
which
is
is
unduly influenced by the single
below the box
plot. [Ref. 17, p. 53.]
that only the final
size of five observations in the
outlier.
This point can be
One drawback
to the graphical
outcomes are communicated.
above
27
statistics, is
masked
Sensitivity to
in the display.
The assumption
of homogeneity of variance appears to be doubtful
length of the box plot in cell six
cells are
dropped from the
is
contrasted with that of cell seven.
more
the
these two
remaining box plots appear to be roughly
analysis, the
similar in size. This suggests a
If
when
precise technique be
employed
to test the
hypothesis of equal variance.
Bartlett's test for
MOE
results.
(number of
The
This
homogeneity of variance was
test uses
cells less one).
result of this test
The
significance level
was
set at
a =.05. [Ref.
12, p.
DoF
if
the variance could be stabilized.
Chi -Sq Value
Test*
Bartlett's
Chi -Sq Value
Acceptance
Outcome
Original
8
25.56
15.50
Reject
Arcsin
8
23.50
15.50
Reject
SqRoot
8
26.46
15.50
Reject
Log
8
28.40
15.50
Reject
Data less
Cells 8 & 7.
6
11.45
12.59
Ho: Equal Variance
Less correction
TABLE
1.
249]
was rejection of the hypothesis of equal variance. This rejection
Transforms
*
on the experimental
a Chi-Square value, with eight degrees of freedom
led to attempts to transform the data to see
DATA/
utilized
factor.
BARTLETT'S TEST
SUMMARY
28
Fail to
Reject
The
MOE employed must lie between zero and one. The usual transformations
for this type of data, to stabilize the variance, include arcsin, square root,
First,
the arcsin transformation was conducted and while
from
25.56, with the original values, to 23.5
of fifteen.
The square
it
fell
2
2
techniques
may be used
of 28.4 and Bartlett's test again rejected the
statistic
summarized
to gain
statistic
value to 26.46. Lastly, the log
hypothesis that the variance was the same across the experimental
to transform the data are
2
log.
well short of the acceptance level
root transformation raised the %
transform resulted in a %
lowered the %
it
and
some
in
Table
1.
Thus,
insights into trends
it
cells.
The attempts
appears that
ANOVA
between parameters but the
associated statistical confidence limits that these procedures normally provide
may
not be valid.
The
tactical
of
large variability in cell six
parameters that
initial direct fire, as
were received
controller.
of these
that orders
at the
Human
This
combines the highest volume
method of control. The "on command"
fire status
be allowed to
level.
tactical
fire for self
from the battalion commander
company
defense or
to initiate the
may have
human
when
engagement
increased the variability
Conversely, the very small variance of cell seven
by the complete lack of
parameter
This required manual input from the experiment
induced judgmental decisions
MOE results.
cell
represented by the mass achieved with the engagement area
required that units on a hold
was deemed
partly be explained by the combination of
this cell represents.
technique, with the strictest
it
may
interaction.
29
is
explained
S
0.8
Engagement Area
0.6
Haw-Maw-Law
Li.
S
NTC
Historical
0.4
0.2
Trigger
Line
On
Command
_L
ANOVA Summary
Figure 10.
Removing
Law
the
human element from
MOE
Results
the process,
when coupled
with the
positioning scheme, maximized the time available for each
engage with direct
C.
of
Haw-Maw-
weapon system
to
fire.
DATA ANALYSIS
The
results
summarized
in
of an analysis
Table
2.
An
of variance
for
the
experimental
important development from the
ANOVA
MOE
table
is
are
the
apparent low level of interaction between the time and space parameters. This
demonstrated graphically in Figure
parallel the historical scenario
10.
The top two
tactical test results
which indicates no interaction.
30
is
tend to
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (MOE RESULTS)
SOURCE
DF
SS
MS
Time
2
.3916
.1958
40.79
Space
2
.3094
.1547
32.23
Interaction
4
.0170
.0042
Error
36
.1729
.0048
F Ratio
*
44
Total
.8910
j
TABLE
2.
When
ANOVA RESULTS
analyzing the
MOE
to indicate that the free fire
results in Figure 10 the experimental results
command and
control technique
is
superior
seem
when
coupled with any of the positioning schemes. Furthermore, when the free
technique
is
not used the engagement area positioning scheme
approach. Combining the free
Maw-Law
This
is
positioning
threat
is
least
command and
the preferred
control approach with the
Haw-
the dominant tactical approach in the experiment.
evident from Figure 9 as
coupled with the
It
scheme
fire
is
fire
this cell's
box plot has the highest
MOE
value
apparent variance.
should be noted that in the scenario under investigation the actions of the
were held constant. The Marine Air Ground Task Force Antiarmor operations
31
manual
(FMFM 2-12) warns that a chief drawback of the Haw-Maw-Law positioning
scheme
is
engagements
that early
methodology before
his full firepower
MOE
The
[Ref. 6, p. 3-13]
long range
at
against the defender
if
he
may
reveal the defender's operating
weight can be brought to bear on the attacker.
from our experiment does not capture any penalty
fires early.
The
visual
model of
direct fire synchronization
needs to incorporate the aspect of firepower density over both space and time.
The
make
last
aspect of our statistical analysis
a difference that
is
statistically significant.
to explore the hypothesis that the parameters
equal.
Notched box
plots
is
The
The
if
the tactical parameters
strategy will be to use
box plots
have no impact and the medians are
can provide a hypothesis
of observations in the experiment.
to see
test that is sensitive to the
number
following formula was used to establish the
ends of the notches.
Median ±\.51x{IQRJsfn)
When
and
comparing
cell
6 with cell
(.87, .89) respectively
the difference in medians
and
is
7,
the notched regions were
bounded by
(.48, .77)
failed to overlap. This provides strong evidence that
attributed to the tactical parameters and not
random
fluctuations of the data. [Ref. 14:p. 62.]
Since the data set failed to conform to the constraint of equal variance required
of classical statistical methodology, a nonparametric approach was also used.
MOE outcomes were ranked and an analysis of variance was performed.
paralleled the earlier
ANOVA
findings.
Table 3 outlines the
The
results
The
results
from
this
methodology. The P value for the interaction effects was .1889 and the alternative
32
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (NONPARAMETRIC)
SOURCE
DF
SS
MS
F Ratio
Time
2
3493.4
1746.7
28.83
Space
2
2358.5
1 1
79.3
42.70
Interaction
4
266.1
66.5
Error
36
1470.9
40.9
•
44
Total
7589.0
/
TABLE
3.
NONPARAMETRIC ANOVA RESULTS
hypothesis of no interaction was accepted.
The zero P values
for both the space
and
timing factors indicated that they are significant and should again be included in our
model of
direct fire synchronization.
Finally, the issue of
which combinations of
superior must be investigated.
The
strategy
was
tactical
to use a
pair-wise analysis of the data from experimental
cells.
selected to check the null hypothesis that the resulting
cells.
A
parameters are
nonparametric approach
The Krusal-Wallis
is
test
in
was
means were equal between
confidence level of a = .05 was utilized throughout
hypothesis
statistically
this
procedure.
If this
rejected then the level of battlefield performance attributed to these
33
tactical techniques
approach
can be quantified and insight gained as to which operational
preferred.
is
the
First,
NTC
scheme was contrasted with the
positioning
historical
engagement area and Haw-Maw-Law approach. In each
significant. Either of the doctrinal positioning
test the result
was found
concepts would have been preferred
to those of the historical scenario. This finding suggests that the battalion
investigation
would benefit from increased
weapon
their
systems.
training
Execution of current
improved the performance, as defined by the
under
on the doctrinal employment of
tactical
MOE,
methodology would have
of the blue force in the
NTC
scenario.
The engagement area technique was contrasted with
positioning
scheme
for
each of the
board, no statistical difference in
command and
mean
the
Haw-Maw-Law
control procedures. Across the
MOE performance was detected between the
two positioning approaches. Given a simulation
in
which the threat force scheme of
maneuver remains unchanged, the engagement area approach of massing
shorter duration of time was found indistinguishable from the
Law
more
linear
fires for
a
Haw-Maw-
technique that maximized the time available to employ antitank weapons.
Next, the influence of the various
investigated.
commander
found to be
mean
MOE
In
all
retained
cases
the
on-command
strict positive
statistically different
associated with this
command and
technique,
control approaches was
in
which the battalion
control over the direct fires of the task force,
was
from the two decentralized methods. The lower
command and
34
control technique suggests that
it is
the least preferred approach for initiating a direct fire engagement. For the
engagement area positioning scheme no difference
detected
when
in
mean
MOE performance was
the free fire approach was contrasted with using a trigger line to start
the battle. Conversely, with the
Haw-Maw-Law tactic the free
fire
method statistically
out performed the trigger line approach.
Thus, our nonparametric analysis has resulted in the identification of three
dominant
tactical
approaches for
this scenario. If
either the free fire or trigger line
good
results.
On the other hand,
be coupled with a free
fire
if
command and
a
control approaches
utilized then
seem
then
to yield
it
should
control technique. This insight supports the
original hypothesis of this study that the
is
is
Haw-Maw-Law tactic is employed
command and
maximized when execution
an engagement area
MOE
for direct fire synchronization
is
decentralized consistent with the commander's intent.
35
V.
THE MODEL
DEVELOPMENT
A.
The main
focus of the
BEAM project
to
is
meaningful to the warfighter. The approach to
produce diagnostic displays that are
this
problem
will
be to represent the
time and space parameters of synchronization in a graphical display. This display
must be ergonomically friendly
training
to
interpret.
characteristics of the
to
A
to the warfighter
combat potential
armored
Since this display
will
is
killing
fighting vehicles
under investigation, can be
utilized
demand
it
the
combat power
is
quantified.
An
be a widely disseminated product. This
will
require the classified probabilities of
model development.
that vehicle
direct fire synchronization
envisioned as a training tool, intended for inclusion in
exercise after-action reviews,
B.
which models the
surface,
show the warfighter areas where the prerequisites of
have been achieved. This
in
and require minimal additional
hit,
for various
weapon
alternative modelling technique
combat potential surface
is
realistic
and
will
systems, not be utilized
is
introduced to insure
unclassified.
VEHICLE OPERATIONAL LETHALITY INDEX
Because the majority of the MRR's combat power
fighting vehicles
the U.S.
which are embedded
Task Force
is
in
its
is
located in the armored
organization, the antiarmor lethality of
key to halting their attack. The two main platforms which
influence the battle are the
M-l Abrams tank and
36
the
M-2 Bradley
Infantry Fighting
Vehicle.
gun,
The
TOW
principle antiarmor
missile,
and
25mm
weapons on these vehicles
Chain Gun.
The
factors that
combat potential of these weapon systems are outlined
Figure
An
it's
11.
are:
120mm
may
tank main
influence the
in Figure ll.[Ref. 13:p. 83]
Operational Lethality Index Factors
Operational Lethality Index (OLI) for each vehicle will be developed to model
ability to inflict
damage. The OLI
from our antiarmor weapons
the time parameter to the
The
combat potential
fired.
weapon system
Because
it is
expected number of vehicle
one minute period. This method
strategy to develop the
Reliability of the
rounds
in a
will reflect the
is
OLI
is
will serve to
kills
add
surface.
to
explore the factors in Figure 11.
a constant and will influence the number of
a constant the net effect on our combat potential surface
37
would be
to lower
it
by a uniform height. Given our small time interval of one
minute the likelihood of failure
is
developed further. Apart from
very small and this aspect of the model will not be
reliability,
the
armament of tanks and APCs have
distinctive characteristics.
When
modelling the
traits
of combat fighting vehicles the asymmetries of guns
versus missiles must be included. Figure 12 outlines the general concept of the gunmissile paradox. Characteristics of both guns
and missiles
will influence the
potential surface.
GUNS
P(Hit)
MISSILES
"~V
f
Range
Range
High
Low
Rate of
Fire
Accuracy
Over
Decreasing
Range
Figure 12.
Gun-Missile Paradox
38
Increasing
combat
The number
interval
of rounds that a tank can fire at an armored target in one minute
constant. This
is fairly
is
driven by the fact that the main gun
destroy vehicles with either light or heavy armor.
tank
may
use
main
its
fire
characteristics of these
battle
is
By changing ammunition
control system in each of the engagements.
120mm
basically the same.
used to
is
types the
The
physical
rounds are so similar that their handling time in
The tank
rate of fire
set at three
is
rounds per minute,
accounting for reload time, the interval of time for dust to settle between rounds, and
gunner
lay adjustments.
These conditions do not hold
for the
APC.
Both the M-2 Bradley and the BMP-2 are equipped with a dual main
armament. Each
APC carries a heavy anti-tank missile and a rapid fire cannon. This
combination produces the
at different rates,
of each
(T/O)
fire for
will
the types of targets
Figure 13
use anti-tank (AT) missiles
APCs. This aspect of the model
following example
is
lightly
on the
when
is
armored vehicles but
is
battlefield. It
firing at tanks
approach a Bradley platoon
in the defense.
assumed
and reserve
his
APCs.
used to explain the concept of the
the micro battlefield for this discussion.
is
captured in threat organization
factors that are used to adjust the lethality of
The
targets
gunner
both heavily and
with the two different weapons. This makes the employment times
weapon dependent on
that each
cannon
ability to kill
Both heavy and
The
T/O
factors.
light
armored
type of target density will
determine, in an aggregated sense, the amount of lethality the platoon collectively
discharges from
its
two weapon systems. Since two of the ten attackers are tanks, the
TOW missile will add twenty percent of
its
39
lethality to the
combat potential
surface.
o
o
<>
o
oo
o
o
<D>
L_L
I
O
O
o
BMP (Light Armor)
<t>
M-2 Bradley
Tank (Heavy Armor)
1
1
Figure 13. Threat Organizational Factors Example
The other
eighty percent of the Bradley's lethality will be delivered by their chain
guns. This procedure precludes double counting of expected
time interval by preventing an
gun
APC from
kills in
the one minute
simultaneously adding both tow and chain
lethality for the full period.
For the model these
in the
MRR
by the
total
T/O
factors
combat
fighting vehicles in the regiment. This yielded a
fraction of .29 for the contribution of
AT missiles were given a rate of fire
required during
firing, tracking,
were found by dividing the number of tanks
TOW lethality to the combat potential surface.
of one per minute which accounted for the time
and reloading.
40
A similar
approach was used with the chain gun.
If
a Bradley was not firing at
a tank, then the chain gun would add seventy-one percent of
combat potential
when
firing
than a tank,
ability of the
Because the chain gun produces
surface.
its
rate of fire will tend to
its
less of
lethality to the
a dust signature
be higher. This accounted for the
chain gun to rapidly re-engage a target and apply burst-on-target
techniques to walk rounds onto the enemy. Each
APC was considered able to deliver
four bursts per minute of well aimed fire with their chain gun.
The range and accuracy
form the probability
of a
that a target
to
remove a vehicle from
have assumed gunners
likelihood of a
that,
is
hit
and
killed.
given a hit times the probability of a
kill
damage
factors of the vehicle's
kill
will
may
hit.
is
A
explained as the probability
kill is
defined as sufficient
further influencing the battle at hand. Since
is
it
we
on the
fact
combat subsystems of
fire
mechanisms
will
essentially one. This conclusion rests
survive a
hit,
damage
to the
control and boresighting, communications, and the track mobility
render
to
use the correct type of ammunition against the target, the
given a hit
while a vehicle
This
weapon systems combine
not repairable before the battle will end. This result allows the model to
focus on the probability of a hit to capture the factors of accuracy and range.
Because probability of
this
hit
data
is
restricted another
approach was required
to
model
aspect of the OLI.
Seth Bonder proposed one method for attenuating Lanchester attrition
coefficients over range using the formula below:
41
a(r)=a o x(l-(r/Rmax)r
with a(r) being the Lanchester coefficient for the current range
is
the
maximum
and serves as an unclassified probability of a
employment range of the weapon system.
power 11 accounts
hit in
/* is
currently used in the
VECTOR
is fifty
is
then
percent, information which
weapon systems
this
fit
is
part of
is
the
maximum
used as a shaping constant to
on the
fit
the
main armament. This method
combat models.
points of each curve are based
weapon. The shaping coefficient
a hit
series of
The
for the range effects
Rmax
the model.
probability of a hit curve to the characteristics of each
The end
[Ref. 10:p. 5-6] a^
value of the attrition coefficient at point blank range.
the equation in parenthesis and raised to the
is
r.
[Ref. 10:p. 91.]
technical characteristics of the
to the range at
which the probability of
available in unclassified form. For
approach worked well to capture the
effects of decreasing
probability of a hit over range. Figure 14 portrays this approach for the
M-l
Bonder equation.
Missile systems required a modification to the Seth
gun
tank.
When
a gunner fires a missile, the back blast and violent launch of the projectile briefly
interrupt the tracking process. This period of gunner dazzle lasts approximately
to
two seconds. During
meters per second.
warhead's
sixty-five
this time, the missile is traveling
When
down range
the effects described above are
meter arming distance, the
42
result
is
at
one
two hundred
combined with the
a dead zone around the
120mm Gun
-P(Hit)
\J
0.8
•
&
0.6
4
-Q
j
O
£
0.4
0.2
^
....
i
....
i
....
500 1000
1
i
....
i
.
.
.
.
i
....
i
....
i
500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Range (Meters)
Figure 14.
Ml Tank P(Hit)
Curve
point of missile launch. This effect disappears as the missile
gunner and normal tracking
following change was
made
is
resumed.
to the Seth
To
capture these battlefield effects, the
Bonder equation:
43
moves away from the
a(r)=a -a o x(l-(r/Rmwc)r.
The
hit probability
The
TOW missile
curve for the
final operational lethality
index
is
shown
in Figure 15, with a
=
.9.
is:
OU= (RoF) xP(Hit) x(770).
This value
location
is
summed
on the ground
for all
combat vehicles
to define the
combat potential
combat potential surface increases so does the
their fires.
Whether
this
that have line-of-sight to a given
combat potential
is
surface.
As
the height of the
ability of the task force to
realized or not
synchronize
may depend on
factors
external to this study.
C.
THE DISPLAY
The use
brain system
of visual displays to present statistical information
is
is
not new.
The
eye-
the most sophisticated information processor ever developed, and
through graphical presentation
we can
gain insight into the structure being studied.
Large volumes of information can be conveyed with graphs since the eye-brain
system can summarize information quickly and extract the key features. [Ref. 14:p.
1]
The
visual display technique
and relationships inherent
Since the
product,
it
is
BEAM
is
an effective method for communicating the patterns
in the spacial aspects of direct fire synchronization.
project
the warfighter
is
geared to providing the warfighter with a usable
who became
the focus of our visual display design.
Effective visual displays have the following properties: visibility, distinguishability, and
interpretability.
Visibility
means
insuring
44
all
critical
elements
are
seen.
- P(Hit) TOW Missile
:
:
;
i
«
J
|
0.9
0.8
|/|
;
0.7
/
!
|
I
I
"ft
I
1
0.5
Ql
0.4
O
0.3
0.2
0.1
|
|
£• 0.6
I
|
|
|
:/!!![
;/
I
!
!
l/
I
I
!
I
|
|
1
L.I..1..L.I
1
I
L
1
I
!
I
!
I
I
I
i
|j
1
1
500 1000
I
1
1
t
1
1
1
1
1
!
t
t
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
.
1
,
,
,
i
t
I
IX
500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Ranae (Meters^
Figure 15.
TOW Missile
P(Hit) Curve
Distinguishability provides
Interpretability
15:p. 205]
means
that
all
elements of the display can be separated.
the parts and symbols of the display can be understood. [Ref.
Interpretability
is
enhanced when information
reference familiar to the user.
45
is
placed in a frame of
The frame
of reference which
about military operations
their entry level
is
most accepted
is
to
communicate information
the map. All warfighters receive
programs and are comfortable with
this
map
medium.
training during
A map of the area
of operations, overlaid with a grid system of measurement, will provide the backdrop
to the display.
This will provide the warfighter directly with the range parameter
developed in the model. The time parameter
shots" of the battlefield during the
will
be introduced by taking "snap-
engagement. The battle can then be animated
different points in time to depict direct fire synchronization.
the visual display must
show
The general concept
in the
is
the height of the
16.
The
picture
combat potential
on the
Z
the
axis
OLI, and
line-of-sight
(LOS)
to
based on combining vehicle
is
The
considerations.
serves as an indicator variable to turn
on and
specific point.
combat potential surface presented
in
resulting formula for
off
The
combat power based on
picture
on the
right
contour form. The small circle
or high value of combat power, which radiates
will
illustrated
OLI{x,y)xLOS{x,y).
whether or not a vehicle can engage a
the
is
is:
Z=Y, units
LOS
surface.
shows the three dimensional
left
nature of the combat potential surface. This surface
position, the
third aspect that
combat potential surface
for displaying the
two pictures of Figure
The
at
downward over
is
shows
the top,
range. This display
be come the visual medium for communicating the model output with regards
combat potential or
direct fire synchronization.
46
Figure 16.
Combat
Potential Surface Concept
The information presentation technique
of small multiples uses a single display
format and updates the data for repeated images. Since the
same over the period of animation a
warfighter has decoded the
initial
similar approach
map
may be
will
remain the
utilized.
Once
the
data design, he will only have to adjust his
perception to the changes in the combat potential surface to comprehend his current
level of direct fire synchronization.
summary
The use of small
of data by providing the decision
the major substantive theme.
The problem
that
the
multiples works as an efficient
maker with complementary
variations of
[Ref. 16:p. 30]
display
must overcome
is
translating
the
three
dimensional combat potential surface onto a two dimensional presentation media.
47
HISTORICAL NTC SCENARIO
(COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE)
BATTLE TIME:
MINS
^nm4HBIcombat
potential
£
SCORE
(F[k,tM
min)
Figure 17. Historical Scenario at Start
Color can be an important channel for conveying information.
the use of color in a display can reduce visual search time by
and increase accuracy
is
at the
overcome by contouring
The
same
the
time. [Ref. 16:p. 216]
to
fifty
to seventy percent
The presentation problem
on a map provides a
point for this approach. Theories of vision show that the
Lastly, a familiar
has been shown that
combat potential surface based on a color scheme.
warfighter's familiarity with elevation contours
gives considerable
It
human
cognitive processing
and decisive weight to contour information. [Ref.
frame of reference was used
show hot areas with a
large
volume of
to color
starting
16:p.
code the contours. Red
is
94]
used
direct fire. Conversely, blue represented the
48
cool areas
where combat potential
is
low.
Green and yellow are used
between these two extremes.
links
The assignment
of color to the combat potential surface was tied to the
synchronization requirement for the battalion.
The
task force
is
attempting to overlap
commander
the killing potential of the subordinate company/teams. If the
successful in his positioning
will
as transitional
scheme then the
effective
combat power of two teams
range the same area where he intends to destroy the enemy.
effective
combat power
is
defined as half of the total expected
For
kills that
this study,
a company
in
an upper bound on
scheme of forty-two. The red and yellow areas show
battlefield locations
potentially could inflict in a
the coloring
is
where the expected
one minute period. This resulted
killing potential of
two companies are massed. The blue and
green areas represent points where the battalion can
but only one company's killing potential
is
inflict
damage on
the enemy,
present. This implies that the prerequisite
conditions for direct fire synchronization have not been established at the battalion
level.
The
final
key component of the display
battalion's defensive plan. This uses
to visually
conducted.
The contours
allocated within
EAs
the operational overlay of the
common military symbols,
show the commander's
literature,
is
intent of
found
how
how
the battle will be
of the combat potential surface will show
if
direct fires
were
according to the battalion commander's plan. This display can
serve as a key tool in the after-action review process to help
levels, visualize
in the doctrinal
commanders,
at all
well their elements performed direct fire synchronization.
49
ENGAGEMENT AREA MODIFICATION
NTC SCENARIO
(COMBAT POTENT! AL DENSITY SURFACE)
MINS
BATTLE TIME:
Figure 18. Engagement Area Positioning Scheme at Start
Figure 17
is
historical scenario.
and to a
an example display based on the
It
lesser extent overlapped a
vehicles can greatly increase the
Haw- Maw-Law approach
in
battlefield
is
EA
positions of the
NTC
EA
Shark
shows that the task force had massed some
few areas in
EA
with the engagement area dispositions, Figure 18,
achieved
initial
is
it is
combat potential
captured in Figure
Cuda.
19.
in
fires in
When
this is
contrasted
seen that the repositioning of
EA
Cuda. The nature of the
While some massing of
fires is
Cuda, the increased width of the green band running across the
representative of the piecewise linearization of
with this technique. While these diagrams show
50
combat power associated
some minor
differences in the
HAW-MAW-LAW MODIFICATION
NTC SCENARIO
(COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE)
BATTLE TIME:
Figure 19.
Haw-Maw-Law Approach
relative synchronization of fires they
different
MOE
results
noted
in
now shows
the
at Start
do not appear
to account for the statistically
Chapter IV.
The increment was updated
Figure 20
for these three cases to 120
combat
fires
battle.
of two companies overlapping. In
the center of the task force holes have been opened by the
as white areas
minutes into the
potential status under the historical positioning
scheme. Nowhere on the battlefield are the
These are shown
MINS
on the north side of
51
EA
OPFOR
Cuda. At
first
echelon.
this point in the
HISTORICAL NTC SCENARIO
(COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE)
BATTLE TIME:
45
46
47
48
49
56
55
SO
57
MINS
120
58
60
59
Figure 20. Historical Scenario at 120 minutes
engagement the enemy has destroyed
southern end of the sector and
is
the counter-reconnaissance forces
well on his
way
to passing the
from the
second echelon
through the defense.
Contrast
21, at 120
this situation
minutes into the
been maintained
unable to force
battle. In this case the
as indicated by the bright
has been added behind
enemy has been
with the engagement area positioning scheme, in Figure
EA
able to
his
way
Cuda
roll
synchronization in
band running through
as forces repositioned
from
EA
back counter-reconnaissance forces
across
EA
Cuda.
52
its
EA
Cuda
center.
has
Depth
Shark. While the
as before,
he was
ENGAGEMENT AREA MODIFICATION
NTC SCENARIO
(COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE)
BATTLE TIME:
120
MINS
Figure 21. Engagement Area Scenario at 120 minutes
Lastly, Figure
While the
22 shows the end game position for the
level of direct fire
massing in
engagement area scheme, the two
EA
Cuda
is
Haw-Maw-Law
somewhat
less
figures look very similar. This
than the
was reinforced by
the statistical analysis in chapter four that could not differentiate the
for these
Law
two
tactic as
how can
tactical
MOE
approaches. Since the starting points showed the
results
Haw-Maw-
having a lower combat potential then the engagement area technique,
the two tactical approaches finish with similar results?
the different
approach.
command and
The answer
is
with
control approaches used. Since the free fire technique
was coupled with the Haw-Maw-Law approach,
53
this resulted in a
lower level of
HAW-MAW-LAW MODIFICATION
NTC SCENARIO
(COMBAT POTENTIAL DENSITY SURFACE)
BATTLE TIME:
120
MINS
J"
Figure 22.
Haw-Maw-Law
Scenario at 120 minutes
combat power applied against
the
enemy
for a longer period of time. Conversely, the
use of a trigger line with the engagement area provided a high volume of
it
was delivered
D.
for a shorter duration.
The
fire,
but
net result was very similar outcomes.
MODEL ANALYSIS
The
last
aspect of this thesis asks the question, does the model provide any
insights into the tactical
parameters? The
investigated the effects of opening the
degree to which the control of direct
the distance to the
enemy decreases
command and
engagement
fires
control parameters have
at various
ranges based on the
were centralized. Before opening
the probability of a hit will increase.
54
fire,
Once
as
the
battle
is
joined, the dynamics of the
dispositions
at
on which the defense
what opening range
is
the
For gun based systems
for the
OLI
is
engagement
established.
The key
It is
assumed
this is
that
due
point to discover then,
a
classical optimization
to
enemy
tactical
problem of trading time
hitting
the
enemy
fire,
his doctrine, the P(Hit) will stop increasing
OU-(RoF) X
Figure 23.
IS
once the battle
(t)
X
P(Hit)
BEST RANGE TO START ENGAGEMENT
Optimum Opening Range Problem
55
he
or any other
G>
r
as
counter actions, such as shifting
the direction of the attack, suppressing the defense with artillery
measures consistent with
is
value maximized?
engagement versus an improving chance of
approaches.
rapidly alter the static
will
is
joined. For the purpose of this analysis
at the initial firing value.
was not investigated
If
the
OLI
is
assumed
that the P(hit) remains fixed
This model captures the active nature of the
enemy which
in the simulation scenario.
expanded beyond the one minute
organization factors are discounted as
formula
it is
weapon system
interval
specific,
and the threat
then the resulting
is:
OLI=(Rof)x(t)xP(Hit).
Time and
current target range are the two variables in this scheme.
process, time available for the
engagement
is
To
simplify the
expressed as the opening range divided
by the rate of enemy advance (RoA). The result of
this substitution
is:
OLI=(Rof)x(-^-)x(l--^—y.
RoA
Rmax
Figure 24
OLI
for
To
is
a graph of this function over opening range and shows the nature of the
an engagement under these conditions.
find the optimal range at which to start the
derivative to zero
and solved.
It
can be shown that
engagement we
set the first
this results in the
following
expression,
r
_
Rmax
"(i+n)
These
results yielded optimal
systems. For the
opening ranges for the two gun based weapon
missile based systems this analysis
was simplified by the
these functions are monotonically increasing in form. Their
56
maximum
will
fact the
occur at
M-1 OLI
16
—
14 —
',
!
J
y/-
!-
!
—
*<*
1
O
12
CD
oc
10
8
ID
CO
6
CO
4
c
o
1—
CD
Q.
O
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Range (Meters)
Figure 24.
Operational Lethality Index (OLI)
the non-zero end point or in this case the
summarizes the
or
Table 4
results of this analysis.
This appears to clarify the
fire
weapons maximum range.
statistical
outcomes
in chapter four.
Recall, the free
command and control methodology when paired with either the engagement area
Haw-Maw-Law positioning schemes and
trigger line
were not
statistically different.
57
the engagement area
Opening ranges
for
combined with the
gun based systems
WEAPON
OPENING
SYSTEM
RANGE
^
4b
*»
TABLE
2343
25mm GUN
1590
TOW
3750
MISSILE
OPENING RANGE SUMMARY
4.
tend to be
120mm GUN
less
than their maximum, thus discounting the use of free
and control methodology.
fire
command
Furthermore, the range disparity between missile based
systems and their gun counterparts
demand
non-linear emplacement for
maximum
direct fire volley intensity at the point of first contact. This result tends to nullify the
strengths of the
Haw-Maw-Law
approach.
Thus, the engagement area positioning scheme, augmented with the trigger line
command and
control technique seems to offer a superior tactical approach for
defense in sector missions. The high levels of
the
minimum
which
the
initial direct fire,
when coupled
with
reaction time afforded the enemy, result in a tactical alignment in
direct
fires
of
each
weapon system can be optimized through
58
synchronization. This was demonstrated in the graphical displays associated with the
BEAM
project.
59
VI.
CONCLUSIONS
FINDINGS
A.
The
following hypothesis was tested for validity. Direct fire synchronization in
the defense
is
best achieved
support and execution
is
when subordinate elements
decentralized consistent with the commander's intent.
Statistical analysis of simulation results, as
MOE,
measured by the battalion/task force
confirmed the hypothesis.
The
best tactical approach for the defense in sector mission
engagement area positioning scheme with the
the
are positioned for mutual
enemy
is
trigger line execution
faced with constrained freedom of action, then the
approach holds some promise when coupled with the free
enemy
of the
is
fire
to
combine the
methodology.
Haw-Maw-Law
technique.
to shift his point of attack following initial contact will help
whether intensity of the opening
fires
If
The
ability
determine
should be traded for increased engagement
time.
Capturing the influence of direct
BEAM project
fire
synchronization as envisioned by the
does indeed appear possible. The combat potential surface provides
the warfighter with a familiar visual reference through which to objectively explore
his tactical dispositions.
power
The commander can
track the concentrations of his
relative to the operational graphics to see
complying with
his
intent.
how
combat
well subordinate units are
This should provide for centralized planning and
60
decentralized
execution.
These
components
two
are
key
to
battlefield
synchronization.
As an
after action review tool, the
combat potential surface holds great
promise. Since the potential of the battalion can be tracked before the start of the
engagement, locating battlefield
is
now
shortfalls
beyond the scope of
possible in an objective manner. For example,
through an area where direct
to lack of
fires
if
the
tactical dispositions
OPFOR
is
able to push
have been massed then the problem can be traced
gunnery technique or
failure in boresighting vice
inadequate vehicle
positioning.
B.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Combat
of the
Potential Surface should be included in the instrumental upgrade
NTC's data
collection
exportability of this display
and processing equipment. The format, speed,
make
it
well suited to the future training process of
Army
battalions during defense in sector missions. This display has further potential to be
incorporated at
C.
Army
schools that use Janus(A) in their instruction.
FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
While the Combat Potential Surface has done a good job
mounted
anti-tank
weapon systems
at capturing vehicle
the dismounted side of task force operations has
not been modelled. Further efforts could include adding infantry weapons such as the
Dragon or other hand held weapons
to the display. Furthermore, a display that
focused on the dismounted aspects of the battle could provide insights into the
61
combat conducted
in the
potential of infantry
Lastly,
non-armor
weapons
weapons
still
in
fight.
This display would show the combat
in closed terrain.
development could be added
to the display
once their
operating parameters had been determined. This would allow for the visualization
of the battlefield contribution of systems like the Hyper-velocity Anti-Tank Missile.
Various
different
tactical
approaches could be modelled to gain insight as to the effect of
weapon parameters and
their input to
62
combat
potential.
LIST
1.
OF REFERENCES
United States General Accounting Office,"Report to the Secretary of the Army,
Army Training-National Training Center's Potential has not been Realized.",
Washington, D.C. July 1986.
2.
Kowalkosky, S. A., "Parametric Sensitivity Analysis of the JANUS(A) High
Resolution Combat Model", Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, March 1991.
3.
Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, "Operations",H e ad quarters
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. May 1986
4.
Shadell,
M.
Environment of the National Training Center and
Characteristics of Data Collected from the NTC Battlefield during Fiscal Years
1986-1989", Draft Paper Presented at the National Training Center and Fort
J.,
"The
Irwin, 21 April 1989.
5.
Department of the Army, Training Circular
Desert Operations", U.S.
Army Armor School,
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Units for
Fort Knox, Kentucky, September
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21
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December
Isby,
D. C, "Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army", Jane's Publishing Inc,
New York
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1990.
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Dryer, D., U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command, "Comparison of
JANUS(A) Combat Model to National Training Center (NTC) Battle Data",
Monterey, California. June 1991.
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Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-123 (Coordinating Draft), "Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Combined Arms Heavy Forces", U.S. Army
Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. June 1991.
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Hartman,
J.
K., "Lecture
Notes
in
Aggregated Combat Modelling" 1985.
63
11.
Dryer, D.,"An Analysis of
Ground Maneuver Concentration During
Deliberate Attack Missions and
its
NTC
Influence on Mission Effectiveness", Masters
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Cochran W. G. and Snedecor G. W.,
University Press, Ames, Iowa 1978.
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Dupuy, T.
N.,
"Statistical
Methods", Iowa State
"Understanding War", Paragon House Publishers,
New York, NY
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Chambers J. M., Cleveland W. S., Kleiner B., and Tukey P. A., "Graphical
Methods for Data Analysis", Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, Ca. 1983.
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Kantonitz B. H. and Sorkin R. D.,
York, NY 1983.
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Tufte, E. R., "Envisioning Information", Graphics Press, Cheshire, CT. 1990.
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Koopmans,
Press,
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L. H., "Introduction to
Boston
MA.
"Human
Factors", Wiley
Contemporary
Statistical
KY
New
Methods", Duxbury
1987.
"National Training Center Trend Line Analysis", U.S.
Knox,
and Sons,
1989.
64
Army Armor Center,
Fort
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