Web Hacking Incidents Revealed - Trends, Stats and How to Defend

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Web Hacking Incidents Revealed:

Trends, Stats and How to Defend

Ryan Barnett

Senior Security Researcher

SpiderLabs Research

Ryan Barnett - Background

Trustwave

Senior Security Researcher

− Web application firewall research/development

− Virtual patching for web applications

Member of the SpiderLabs Research Team

− Web application firewall signature lead

ModSecurity Community Manager

− Interface with the community on public mail-list

− Steer the internal development of ModSecurity

Author

“Preventing Web Attacks with Apache”

Confidential Copyright Trustwave 2010

Ryan Barnett – Community Projects

Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)

Speaker/Instructor

Project Leader, ModSecurity Core Rule Set

Project Contributor, OWASP Top 10

Project Contributor, AppSensor

Web Application Security Consortium (WASC)

Board Member

Project Leader, Web Hacking Incident Database

Project Leader, Distributed Open Proxy Honeypots

Project Contributor, Web Application Firewall Evaluation Criteria

Project Contributor, Threat Classification

The SANS Institute

Courseware Developer/Instructor

Project Contributor, CWE/SANS Top 25 Worst Programming Errors

Confidential Copyright Trustwave 2010

Session Outline

The Challenge of Risk Analysis for Web Applications

Risk Rating Methodology

How to quantify risk?

WASC Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID)

What is it?

Goals

Recent Project Changes and Updates

2010 Semiannual Report (July – December)

Incidents By Attacked Entity Field

Incidents By Outcome

Incidents By Attack Methods

Incidents By Application Weakness

Comparing the OWASP Top 10 vs. the WHID Top 10

Incidents of Interest

Conclusion

Confidential Copyright Trustwave 2010

The Challenge of Risk Analysis for Web Application

Security

OWASP Risk Rating Methodology

#Step 1: Identifying a Risk

#Step 2: Factors for Estimating Likelihood

#Step 3: Factors for Estimating Impact

#Step 4: Determining Severity of the Risk

#Step 5: Deciding What to Fix

#Step 6: Customizing Your Risk Rating Model http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology

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OWASP Risk Rating Methodology

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The Challenge of

Risk Analysis for

Web Applications:

Analyzing Public Incidents

Risk Rating Problem

Instead of being concerned about what CAN happen (theoretical scenarios), perhaps we should first be dealing with what IS happening

(analysis of real-world web compromises)…

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Publicly Quantifying Web Incidents is Challenging

Incidents are not detected

• ~156 day lapse between compromise and detection*

• Vast majority of cases the merchant did not identify the intrusion – a 3rd party did based on fraud detection

(card brands and banks)*

• Logging Issues - poor logging and/or no one reviewing them for signs of compromise https://www.trustwave.com/downloads/whitepapers/Trustwave_WP_Global_Security_Report_2010.pdf

Copyright Trustwave 2010 Confidential

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Publicly Quantifying Web Incidents is Challenging

Victims hide breaches

• Defacement (visible) and information leakage

(regulated) are publicized more than other breaches

• Example - Banks are not forced to disclose when individual customer funds are stolen

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Web Hacking

Incident Database

(WHID)

WASC Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID) http://projects.webappsec.org/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database

Confidential Copyright Trustwave 2010

Tracking Public Web Compromises

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WHID Goals

• Raise awareness of real-world, web application security incidents

• Provide data for the following Risk Rating steps:

• #Step 2: Factors for Estimating Likelihood

What application weaknesses are actively being targeted?

• #Step 3: Factors for Estimating Impact

What outcome are you worried about?

• #Step 5: Deciding What to Fix

Prioritized listing of remediation issues

• #Step 6: Customizing Your Risk Rating Model

Customized view based on your vertical-market

Confidential Copyright Trustwave 2010

WHID Data

• Data Samples (statistically insignificant)

• Focus on % rather than raw numbers

• Inclusion Criteria

• Only publicly disclosed, web related incidents

• Incidents of interest

• Defacements of “High Profile” sites are included

• Ensure quality and correctness of incidents

• Severely limits the number of incidents that get in

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WHID Data: Community Submittal Form

• Community incident submission leverages crowdsourcing

• Project team validation ensures quality http://projects.webappsec.org/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database#SubmitanIncident

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WHID Database Content

~222 incidents for 2010

Incidents since 1999

Each incident is classified

Attack type

Application Weakness

Outcome

Country of organization attacked

Industry segment of organization attacked

Country of origin of the attack (if known)

Vulnerable Software

Additional information:

A unique identifier: WHID

200x-yy

Dates of occurrence and reporting

Description

Internet references

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Real-Time Statistics

• Browse real-time data

• Drill down in to incident details

• Pivot on key variables

(year/vertical market)

Copyright Trustwave 2010 http://projects.webappsec.org/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database

Confidential

Real-time, Searchable DB

WHID data is available year-round

Useful for application developers and researchers

Search by

• Attack method

• Outcome

• Source geography

• and many more… http://projects.webappsec.org/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database#SearchtheWHIDDatabase

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Geographic Views

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Monitoring WHID Updates http://projects.webappsec.org/Web-Hacking-Incident-

Database#RSSFeed

@wascwhid

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WHID 2010 Biannual

Status Report:

July-December

What Vertical Markets are Attacked Most Often?

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What are the Goals for Web Hacking?

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What Attack Methods do Hackers Use?

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Which Application Weaknesses are Exploited?

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#Step 5: Deciding What to Fix

Prioritized listing of remediation issues

OWASP vs. WHID Top 10

OWASP Top 10

1 Injection

2 Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

3

Broken Authentication and Session

Management

4 Insecure Direct Object Reference

5 CSRF

6 Security Misconfiguration

7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage

1

0

8 Failure to Restrict URL Access

9 Insecure Transport Layer Protection

Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

WHID Top 10

Insufficient Anti-Automation (Brute Force and DoS)

Improper Output Handling (XSS and Planting of

Malware)

Improper Input Handling (SQL Injection)

Application Misconfiguration (Detailed error messages)

Insufficient Authentication (Stolen

Credentials/Banking Trojans)

Insufficient Process Validation (CSRF and DNS

Hijacking)

Insufficient Authorization (Predictable Resource

Location/Forceful Browsing)

Abuse of Functionality (CSRF/Click-Fraud)

Insufficient Password Recovery (Brute Force)

Improper Filesystem Permissions (info Leakages)

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Top Trends

Denial of Service

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Layer 4 DDoS Attacks

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Layer 4 DDoS Attacks - Botnets

 Reach bandwidth or connection limits of hosts or networking equipment .

 Fortunately, current anti-

DDOS solutions are effective in handling Layer

4 DDOS attacks.

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34

Confidential

Layer 7 DDoS Attacks

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Layer 7 DDoS Attacks

 Legitimate TCP or UDP connections. Difficult to differentiate from legitimate users => higher obscurity.

 Requires lesser number of connections => higher efficiency.

 Reach resource limits of services.

Can deny services regardless of hardware capabilities of host => higher lethality.

 We will focus on protocol weaknesses of HTTP or HTTPS.

 HTTP GET => Michal Zalewski, Adrian Ilarion Ciobanu,

RSnake (Slowloris)

 HTTP POST => Wong Onn Chee

Confidential Copyright Trustwave 2010

Copyright Trustwave 2010 http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_HTTP_Post_Tool

Confidential

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Application Performance Monitoring Dashboard

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Excessive Access Rate Detection

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Cross-site Scripting (XSS) Defense

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Banking Trojans

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Questions?

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