Game Theory and Formal Modeling
Syllabus
Mgr. Matus Halas, Ph.D.
Institute of European Studies and International Relations
matus.halas@fses.uniba.sk
Classification:
Continuous assessment (100%)
Participation:
10 pts
Presentation:
30 pts
Tests:
40 + 20 pts
A: 100 – 91%
B: 90 – 81%
C: 80 – 73%
D: 72 – 66%
E: 65 – 60%
Course type:
Code:
Semester:
Where:
When:
facultative
2-UES-450
Winter, 6 credits
B 122
8:00 - 10:30 (Thu)
Literature: all books and articles listed under the required or supplementary readings
will be available in electronic form. Texts are mostly in English.
Course overview: sessions offer an opportunity to acquire elementary knowledge of
game theory. As a way of analyzing strategic problems it overlaps various scientific
disciplines. The approach is especially useful for analyzing situations, when players
interact strategically like for example in security dilemma, arms races, or at the onset of
wars. At the end of the semester, students will be able to analyze and understand gametheoretic literature in political science and to interpret real world problems accordingly.
Grading system: Student can either make a presentation from supplementary literature
or write at least six short memos from the required readings (5 pts per memo at max). The
first of two tests (40 pts) will be held at the 8th session and the second one (20 pts) during
the last week. Missing of more than two sessions will be penalized. 7-words rule applies.
1st week (9/26): Intro: course overview, structure of individual sessions, setting the
rules, assigning the presentations, required literature, game theory and its background.
2nd week (10/3): Game theory foundations: what is a game, cooperative and noncooperative games, zero-sum, (bounded) rationality, level of analysis, utility,
(un)certainty, what is science and what is a research program, why we propose models.
Required Reading:
Nicholson, Michael (1992): Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-62.
Morrow, James D. (1994): Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, pp. 1-8, 16-43.
Additional Sources:
Popper, Karl (2002 [1959]): The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge.
Lakatos, Imre (1970): Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes. IN: Lakatos, Imre & Musgrave, Alan (eds.): Criticism and the Growth
of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91-196.
Nicholson, Michael (1992): Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-41.
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3rd week (10/10): Classical game theory: games in strategic/normal and extended form,
common knowledge, (dominant) strategy, information, Nash equilibrium, minmax rule,
Pareto optimality, agreeing to disagree, different waves of formal modeling research.
Required Reading:
Morrow, James D. (1994): Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, pp. 73-98.
Additional Sources:
Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P. & Varoufakis, Yanis (1995): Game Theory: A Critical
Introduction. London: Routledge.
Zagare, Frank C. & Slantchev, Branislav L. (2010): Game Theory and Other Modeling
Approaches. IN: Denemark, Robert A. et al. (eds.): The International Studies
Encyclopedia. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, vol. IV, pp. 2591–2610.
Morrow, James D. (1994): Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, pp. 51-66.
4th week (10/17): Prisoner’s Dilemma: payoff arrangement, individual and collective
benefit, supergame, solutions of the single-shot game, anarchy and the state of nature,
different games (Chicken, Deadlock, Stag hunt), security dilemma.
Required Reading:
Rapoport, Anatol & Chammah, Albert M. (1965): Prisoner’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, pp. 33-36.
Nicholson, Michael (1992): Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 63-88.
Additional Sources:
Taylor, Michael (1987): The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 125-163.
Wagner, Harrison R. (1983): The Theory of Games and the Problem of International
Cooperation. American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 330-346.
Hobbes, Thomas (1998 [1651]): Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65-115.
Jervis, Robert (1978): Cooperation Under Security Dilemma. World Politics, Vol. 30,
No. 2, pp. 167-214.
5th week (10/24): Two ways of solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma: five roads to
cooperation, different kinds of stability, third way of doing science, factors influencing
emergence and stability of cooperation during the simulations.
Required Reading:
Halas, Matus (2011): Vznik kooperacie vo vaznovej dileme. Mezinarodni vztahy, Vol.
46, No. 1, pp. 31-50.
Additional Sources:
Nowak, Martin A. (2006): Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, Vol.
314, No. 5805 s. 1560-1563.
Johnson, Paul E. (1999): Simulation Modeling in Political Science. American
Behavioral Science, Vol. 42, No. 10, s. 1509-1530.
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Pepinsky, Thomas B. (2005): From Agents to Outcomes: Simulation in International
Relations. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 3, s. 367-394.
6th week (10/31): Stability of strategies: strong and weak evolutionary stability,
different evolutionary mechanisms, (collectively) unbeatable, collective stability,
robustness and the advantages of cooperative strategies.
Required Reading:
Bendor, Jonathan & Swistak, Piotr (1997): The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation.
American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 (1997), No. 2, pp. 290-307.
Additional Sources:
Axelrod, Robert (1981): The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists. American
Political Science Review, Vol. 75 (1981), No. 2, pp. 306-318.
Boyd, Robert (1989): Mistakes Allow Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 136 (1), pp. 47-56.
Boyd, Robert & Lorberbaum, Jeffrey P. (1987): No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily
Stable in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Nature, Vol. 327, No. 6117, pp.
58-59.
7th week (11/7): Cooperation of egoists: reciprocal altruism, characteristics of tit-for-tat
strategy, noise, Pavlov, contrition, nice, provocable, optimal generosity, spatial models
and different topologies, United States and Europe.
Required Reading:
Axelrod, Robert (1980): More Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24 (1980), No. 3, pp. 379-403.
Additional Sources:
Wu, Jianzhong & Axelrod, Robert (1995): How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 183-189.
Axelrod, Robert & Dion, Douglas (1988): The Further Evolution of Cooperation.
Science, Vol. 242 (1988), No. 4884, pp. 1385-1390.
Jervis, Robert (1997): System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
8th week (11/14): Relative and absolute gains: neo-neo synthesis and different worlds
of cooperation, utility maximization, relative ‘absolute’ gains, transferable gains,
sensitivity coefficient, power, test.
Required Reading:
Halas, Matus (2009): Post Scriptum on Relative and Absolute Gains. Perspectives:
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17 (2009), No. 1, pp. 27-55.
Additional Sources:
Jervis, Robert (1999): Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the
Debate. International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 42-63.
Snidal, Duncan (1991): Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation.
American Political Science Review, Vol. 85 (1991), No. 3, pp. 701-726.
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Grieco, Joseph M. (1988): Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation:
Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model. Journal of Politics, Vol. 50
(1988), No. 3, pp. 600-624.
Grieco, Joseph & Powell, Robert & Snidal, Duncan (1993): The Relative-Gains Problem
for International Cooperation. American Political Science Review, pp. 3-25.
9h week (11/21): Formalization of war: expected utility theory, power shift, escalation
of crisis, formation of alliances, domestic politics and war, democratic peace, arms races.
Required Reading:
Fearon, James D. (1995): Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization,
Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 379-414.
Additional Sources:
Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Siverson, Randolph M. (1986): Arms Races
and Cooperation. IN: Oye, Kenneth A. (ed.): Cooperation under Anarchy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 118-146.
Evera, Stephen van (1985): Why Cooperation Failed in 1914? World Politics, Vol. 38,
No. 1, pp. 80-117.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1989): The Contribution of Expected-Utility Theory to the
Study of International Conflict. IN: Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): Handbook of War
Studies. London: Unwin Hyman, pp. 143-169.
10th week (11/28): Rationality of nuclear arms: Bayes rule, focal points, (un)certainty
paradox, deterrence, surprise attack, limited war, flexible response, NMD, balancing.
Required Reading:
Schelling, Thomas C. (1963): The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University
Press, pp. 53-80 & 230-254.
Additional Sources:
Powell, Robert (2003): Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National
Missile Defense. International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 86-118.
Huth, Paul K. (1999): Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and
Theoretical Debates. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, pp. 25-48.
Morrow, James D. (1994): Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, pp. 161-170 & 180-186.
11th week (12/5): Free riding and other problems: collective action, common goods,
observing the agreements, punishment, role of communication, self-governance,
segregation, orchestras, and airlifts.
Required Reading:
Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy (1992): Covenants with and without
a sword: Self-Governance is Possible. American Political Science Review, Vol. 86,
No. 2, pp. 404-417.
Additional Sources:
Taylor, Michael (1987): The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 1-30.
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Schelling, Thomas C. (1978): Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W. W.
Norton & Company.
Hardin, Russell (1982): Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Olson, Mancur (1971 [1965]): The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
12th week (12/12): Agent-based modeling in international relations: complexity, GUI,
history, types of computational models, emergence and other characteristics, fifth debate.
Required Reading:
Geller, Armando (2011): The Use of Complexity-Based Models in International
Relations: A Technical Overview and Discussion of Prospects and Challenges.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 63-80.
Additional Sources:
Kavalski, Emilian (2007): The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international
relations theory: notes on the application of complexity theory to the study of
international life. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.
435-454.
Jung, Danielle F. and Lake, David A. (2011): Market, Hierarchies, and Networks: An
Agent-Based Organizational Ecology. American Journal of Political Science, Vol.
55, No. 4, pp. 971-989.
Lustick, Ian S. and Miodownik, Dan (2009): Abstractions, Ensembles, and
Virtualizations: Simplicity and Complexity in Agent-Based Modeling. Comparative
Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 223-244.
13th week (12/19): Critique of formal theories: criteria of a good social science,
formalization and scientific progress, limits and advantages of game theory, how to
criticize it, prospect theory, framing, gains/losses, test.
Required Reading:
Walt, Stephen M. (1999): Rigor or Rigor Mortis? International Security, Vol. 23 (1999),
No. 4, pp. 5-48.
Additional Sources:
Levy, Jack S. (1997): Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations.
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 87-112.
Johnson, James (1996): How Not to Criticize Rational Choice Theory: The Pathologies
of Commonsense. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 77-91.
Niou, Emerson M.S. & Ordeshook, Peter C. (1999): Return of the Luddites. International
Security, Vol. 24 (1999), No. 2, pp. 84-96.
Martin, Lisa L. (1999): The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism.
International Security, Vol. 24 (1999), No. 2, pp. 74-83.
MacDonald, Paul K. (2003): Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing
Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory. American Political
Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 551-565.
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