The Politics,Power,and Pathologies
ofInternationalOrganizations
MichaelN. Barnett
andMarthaFinnemore
Do international
organizations
reallydo whattheircreators
intendthemtodo? In the
thenumber
ofinternational
pastcentury
organizations
(1Os) has increasedexponentially,and we have a varietyof vigoroustheoriesto explainwhytheyhave been
created.Most of thesetheoriesexplainIO creationas a responseto problemsof
transaction
toParetoefficiency
incomplete
information,
costs,andotherbarriers
and
welfareimprovement
fortheirmembers.
Researchflowing
fromthesetheories,
howtohowIOs actuallybehaveaftertheyarecreated.Closer
ever,haspaidlittleattention
would
reveal
that
scrutiny
manyIOs strayfromtheefficiency
goals thesetheories
in waysunintended
and
imputeand thatmanyIOs exercisepowerautonomously
how thisis so requiresa
unanticipated
by statesat theircreation.Understanding
reconsideration
ofIOs andwhattheydo.
In thisarticlewe developa constructivist
approachrootedin sociologicalinstitutionalismto explainboththepowerof IOs and theirpropensity
fordysfunctional,
evenpathological,
behavior.Drawingon long-standing
Weberianarguments
about
and sociologicalinstitutionalist
bureaucracy
approachesto organizational
behavior,
we arguethattherational-legal
thatIOs embodygivesthempowerindepenauthority
dentofthestatesthatcreatedthemandchannelsthatpowerin particular
directions.
make rules,but in so doingtheyalso createsocial
Bureaucracies,
by definition,
tasks(like "development"),
createand
knowledge.
Theydefinesharedinternational
definenewcategories
ofactors(like "refugee"),createnewinterests
foractors(like
"promoting
humanrights"),andtransfer
modelsofpoliticalorganization
aroundthe
world(like marketsand democracy.)However,the same normative
valuationon
rulesthatdefines
andmakesthempowerful
in
impersonal,
generalized
bureaucracies
We aregrateful
toJohnBoli,RaymondDuvall,ErnstHaas,PeterHaas,RobertKeohane,KeithKrause,
M. J.Peterson,
MarkPollack,AndrewMoravcsik,Thomas
Jeffrey
Legro,JohnMalley,CraigMurphy,
referees
fortheircomments.
We
Risse,DuncanSnidal,SteveWeber,ThomasWeiss,andtwoanonymous
are especiallygrateful
forthecarefulattention
of theeditorsofInternational
EarlierverOrganization.
sionsofthisarticlewerepresented
atthe1997APSA meeting,
the1997ISA meeting,
andatvariousfora.
We also acknowledge
financialassistancefromtheSmithRichardson
Foundation
and theUnitedStates
ofPeace.
Institute
International
Organization
53, 4, Autumn1999,pp. 699-732
? 1999byThe 10 Foundation
ofTechnology
andtheMassachusetts
Institute
700 International
Organization
to theirenvironments,
modernlifecan also makethemunresponsive
obsessedwith
theirownrulesattheexpenseofprimary
missions,andultimately
lead toinefficient,
behavior.We are notthefirstto suggestthatIOs are morethanthe
self-defeating
reflection
of statepreferences
andthattheycan be autonomous
andpowerful
actors
in globalpolitics.1
Norarewe thefirst
tonotethat1Os,likeall organizations,
can be
dysfunctional
andinefficient.2
However,ouremphasisonthewaythatcharacteristics
ofbureaucracy
as a genericcultural
formshapeIO behaviorprovidesa different
and
verybroadbasisforthinking
abouthowIOs influence
worldpolitics.3
aboutIOs is onlyworthwhile
Developingan alternative
approachto thinking
ifit
producessignificant
insights
andnewopportunities
forresearchon majordebatesin
on at leastthree
thefield.Ourapproachallowsus to weighin withnewperspectives
suchdebates.First,itoffers
a differ'ent
viewofthepowerofIOs andwhether
orhow
theymatterin worldpolitics.This issue has been at the core of the neoliberalinstitutionalists'
debatewithneorealists
foryears.4We showin thisarticlehowneoliberal-institutionalists
actuallydisadvantage
themselves
intheirargument
withrealdo morethanjust
istsbylookingatonlyonefacetofIO power.Globalorganizations
collectiveaction
facilitate
cooperation
byhelpingstatestoovercomemarket
failures,
dilemmas,and problemsassociatedwithinterdependent
social choice.They also
andauthority
createactors,specify
responsibilities
amongthem,anddefinethework
theseactorsshoulddo,givingitmeaningandnormative
value.Evenwhentheylack
thesocial
materialresources,IOs exercisepoweras theyconstitute
and construct
world.5
Secondandrelated,ourperspective
basisfortreating
providesa theoretical
IOs as
a challengetothestatist
autonomous
actorsinworldpoliticsandthuspresents
ontolin international
relations
theories.
to interogyprevailing
Despiteall theirattention
orientation
ofneoliberalinstitutionnationalinstitutions,
oneresultofthetheoretical
treatthestate.IOs
alistsandregimestheorists
is thattheytreatIOs thewaypluralists
are mechanisms
which
others
through
(usuallystates)act; theyare notpurposive
is particularly
clearon thispoint.Regimesare "prinactors.The regimesliterature
Weber's
ciples,norms,
rules,anddecision-making
procedures;"
theyarenotactors.6
thatbureaucracies
aboutthenormative
insights
poweroftherational-legal
authority
forthewaysbureaucracies
embodyand itsimplications
produceand controlsocial
thisviewandtreating
knowledgeprovidea basisforchallenging
IOs as agents,not
justas structure.
1. ForGramscian
approaches,
see Cox 1980,1992,and 1996;andMurphy1995.ForSocietyofStates
see HurrellandWoods1995.Fortheepistemic
communities
see Haas 1992.ForIO
literature,
approaches,
decision-making
literature,
see Cox etal. 1974;Cox andJacobson1977;Cox 1996;andNess andBrechin
1988.Fora rationalchoiceperspective,
see Snidal1996.
2. Haas 1990.
3. Because theneorealistand neoliberalarguments
we engagehave focusedon intergovernmental
rather
fromwhichwe draw
organizations
thannongovernmental
ones,andbecauseWeberianarguments
inthisarticleand
withpublicbureaucracy,
we toofocusonintergovernmental
organizations
dealprimarily
use theterminternationalorganizations inthatway.
4. Baldwin1993.
5. See Finnemore
1993and 1996b;andMcNeely1995.
6. Krasner1983b.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations701
vantagepointfromwhichto assess the
Third,ourperspective
offersa different
have takenup thisissue,
desirability
of 1Os.Whilerealistsand somepolicymakers
or
surprisingly
fewotherstudentsof IOs have been criticalof theirperformance
stemsfromcentraltenetsof classicalliberalism,
desirability.7
Partofthisoptimism
change
whichhas longviewedIOs as a peacefulwaytomanagerapidtechnological
andglobalization,
farpreferable
to theobviousalternative-war.8
Also contributing
judgmentaboutIOs thatis builtintothe
to thisuncritical
stanceis thenormative
theoretical
assumptions
of mostneoliberaland regimesscholarsand theeconomic
theorieson whichtheydraw.IOs exist,in thisview,onlybecausethey
organization
areParetoimproving
andsolveproblems
forstates.Consequently,
ifan IO exists,it
axiom,
mustbe becauseitis moreusefulthanotheralternatives
since,bytheoretical
We findthisassumption
stateswillpull theplugon any10 thatdoes notperform.
outcomesrepeatandevenself-defeating
unsatisfying.
IOs oftenproduceundesirable
wantto
muchless dismantlement,
and we, as theorists,
edly,withoutpunishment
understand
why.International
relationsscholarsare familiarwithprincipal-agent
politicscancompromise
organizational
problems
andthewaysinwhichbureaucratic
these
buttheseapproacheshave rarelybeen appliedto 1Os. Further,
effectiveness,
no
means
sources
of
We
examine
one
such
source
dysfunction.
approaches
by
exhaust
thatflowsfromthesame rational-legal
characteristics
thatmakeIOs authoritative
and
we showhow
andpowerful.
from
research
in
sociology
anthropology,
Drawing
can also be theirweakness.
theveryfeatures
thatmakebureaucracies
powerful
The claimswe makein thisarticleflowfroman analysisofthe"social stuff"of
whichbureaucracy
is made.We are askinga standard
constructivist
questionabout
whatmakestheworldhangtogether
or,as AlexanderWendtputsit,"howarethings
intheworldputtogether
so thattheyhavetheproperties
theydo."9In thissense,our
anddiffers
frommostotherinternational
ofIO behavioris constitutive
explanation
relationsapproaches.This approachdoes notmakeourexplanation"meredescripofthingsdoes essentialworkin explaintheconstitution
tion,"sinceunderstanding
how
inghowthosethingsbehaveand whatcausesoutcomes.Justas understanding
makespossiblecausalarguthedouble-helix
DNA moleculeis constituted
materially
how
mentsaboutgenetics,
disease,andotherbiologicalprocesses,so understanding
aboutthebehaviorof
bureaucracies
areconstituted
sociallyallowsus tohypothesize
IOs andtheeffects
thissocialformmighthavein worldpolitics.Thistypeofconstisuchas "ifX haptutiveexplanation
does notallowus to offerlaw-likestatements
of
a morecompleteunderstanding
by providing
pens,thenY mustfollow."Rather,
of how certainkindsof bureauwhatbureaucracy
is, we can provideexplanations
craticbehaviorarepossible,orevenprobable,andwhy.10
theassumptions
different
branchesoforganiWe beginbyexamining
underlying
forthestudyof 1Os. We arguethat
zationtheoryand exploringtheirimplications
drawnfromeconomicsthatundergird
neoliberaland neorealisttreatassumptions
7. See Mearsheimer
1994;andHelms1996.
8. See Commission
on GlobalGovernance1995;Jacobson1979,1; andDoyle 1997.
9. See Ruggie1998;andWendt1998.
10. Wendt1998.
702 International
Organization
mentsof IOs do notalwaysreflect
theempiricalsituation
of mostIOs commonly
studiedbypoliticalscientists.
Further,
theyprovideresearchhypotheses
aboutonly
someaspectsofIOs (likewhytheyarecreated)andnotothers(likewhattheydo).
We thenintroduce
sociologicalarguments
thathelpremedy
theseproblems.
In thesecondsectionwe developa constructivist
approachfromthesesociological
arguments
to examinethepowerwieldedbyIOs andthesourcesoftheirinfluence.
Liberalandrealisttheories
onlymakepredictions
about,andconsequently
onlylook
effects
causedby1Os.Sociological
for,a verylimited
rangeofwelfare-improving
theories,
however,
expectandexplaina muchbroader
rangeofimpacts
organizations
canhaveand
theirrolein constructing
specifically
highlight
actors,interests,
and socialpurpose.
We provideillustrations
fromtheUN systemto showhowIOs do,infact,havesuch
incontemporary
Inthethird
thedysfuncworldpolitics.
section
weexplore
powerful
effects
tionalbehavior
of1Os,whichwe define
thatundermines
thestatedgoals of
as behavior
theorganization.
International
are familiarwithseveraltypesof
relationstheorists
theories
thatmightexplainsuchbehavior.Some locatethesourceof dysfunction
in
material
othersfocuson cultural
factors.
Some theorieslocatethesourceof
factors,
dysfunction
outsidetheorganization,
otherslocateitinside.We construct
a typology,
mappingthesetheoriesaccordingto thesourceof dysfunction
theyemphasize,and
showthatthesameinternally
cultural
forcesthatgiveIOs theirpowerand
generated
canalsobe a sourceofdysfunctional
behavior.
Weusetheterm
to
autonomy
pathologies
describe
whenIO dysfunction
canbe tracedto bureaucratic
suchinstances
culture.We
howourperspective
conclude
bydiscussing
helpstowidentheresearch
agendafor1Os.
TheoreticalApproachesto Organizations
Withinsocialsciencetherearetwobroadstrands
oftheorizing
aboutorganizations.
of instrumental
and effiOne is economistic
and rootedin assumptions
rationality
and
ciencyconcerns;theotheris sociologicaland focusedon issuesof legitimacy
focusattenThedifferent
embeddedwithin
eachtypeoftheory
power.11
assumptions
tionon different
kindsofquestionsaboutorganizations
andprovideinsights
on different
kindsofproblems.
The economistic
outofeconomicsdepartments
approachcomes,notsurprisingly,
andbusinessschoolsforwhomthefundamental
theoretical
laidoutfirst
problem,
by
RonaldCoase and morerecently
by OliverWilliamson,is whywe have business
firms.Withinstandardmicroeconomic
to
logic,it shouldbe muchmoreefficient
or organizations.
conductall transactions
markets
rather
than"hierarchies"
through
thefactthateconomiclifeis dominated
Consequently,
byhugeorganizations
(businessfirms)
is an anomaly.
Thebodyoftheory
developedtoexplaintheexistenceand
as efficient
solutionsto contracting
powerof firmsfocuseson organizations
probandothermarket
lems,incomplete
information,
imperfections.12
11. See PowellandDiMaggio1991,chap.1; andGrandori1993.
12. See Williamson1975and 1985;andCoase 1937.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations703
This bodyof organization
theoryinforms
neoliberaland neorealistdebatesover
international
institutions.
FollowingKennethWaltz,neoliberalsandneorealists
understandworldpoliticsto be analogousto a marketfilledwithutility-maximizing
competitors.13
Thus,liketheeconomists,
theysee organizations
as welfare-improving solutionsto problemsof incomplete
information
and hightransaction
costs.14
Neoliberalsandrealistsdisagreeaboutthedegreetowhichconstraints
ofanarchy,
an
in relativeversusabsolutegains,and fearsof cheatingwill scuttleinternainterest
tionalinstitutional
arrangements
orhobbletheireffectiveness,
butbothagree,implicitlyorexplicitly,
thatIOs helpstatesfurther
theirinterests
wheretheyareallowedto
Statepowermaybe exercisedin politicalbattlesinsideIOs overwhere,on
work.15
theParetofrontier,
politicalbargainsfall,butthenotionthatIOs are instruments
createdto servestateinterests
is notmuchquestionedby neorealistor neoliberal
scholars.16
Afterall,whyelse wouldstatessetup theseorganizations
andcontinue
to
themiftheydidnotservestateinterests?
support
Approachesfromsociologyprovideone set of answersto thisquestion.They
providereasonswhy,infact,organizations
thatarenotefficient
oreffective
servants
ofmember
interests
mightexist.In so doing,theylead us to lookforkindsofpower
and sourcesof autonomy
in organizations
thateconomistsoverlook.Different
approacheswithinsociologytreatorganizations
in different
ways,butas a groupthey
standin sharpcontrast
to theeconomists'
in at leasttwoimportant
approaches
respects:
theyoffera different
oftherelationship
betweenorganizations
andtheir
conception
environments,
andtheyprovidea basisforunderstanding
organizational
autonomy.
assumedbyeconomicapproaches
IOs and theirenvironment.The environment
or
to organizations
is sociallyverythinanddevoidof socialrules,culturalcontent,
even otheractorsbeyondthoseconstructing
the organization.
exCompetition,
forefficiency
arethedominant
environmental
charchange,andconsequent
pressures
theformation
andbehavioroforganizations.
acteristics
driving
Sociologists,
byconina widerworldofnonmarket
trast,
studyorganizations
situations,
and,consequently,
aretreatedas "social facts"to
theybeginwithno suchassumptions.
Organizations
is an empirical
be investigated;
whether
theydo whattheyclaimor do itefficiently
of theseapproaches.Organizations
question,nota theoretical
assumption
respond
in theenvironment
butalso to
notonlyto otheractorspursuingmaterialinterests
normative
andcultural
forcesthatshapehoworganizations
see theworldandconcepfor
tualizetheirown missions.Environments
can "select" or favororganizations
orresponsive
behavior.For example,organizations
reasonsotherthanefficient
may
fitratherthan
be createdand supported
forreasonsof legitimacy
and normative
efficient
output;theymaybe creatednotforwhattheydo butforwhattheyare-for
17
whattheyrepresent
andthevaluestheyembody.
symbolically
13. Waltz1979.
14. See Vaubel1991,27; andDillon,Ilgen,andWillett1991.
15. Baldwin1993.
16. Krasner1991.
17. See DiMaggioand Powell 1983; Scott1992; Meyerand Scott1992, 1-5; Powell andDiMaggio
1996a.
1991;Weber1994;andFinnemore
704 International
Organization
Empirically,
organizational
environments
can takemanyforms.Some organizationsexistin competitive
environments
thatcreatestrongpressuresforefficient
or
responsive
behavior,
butmanydo not.Someorganizations
operatewithclearcriteria
for"success" (like firmsthathave balancesheets),whereasothers(like political
sciencedepartments)
operatewithmuchvaguermissions,withfewclearcriteria
for
successorfailureandno seriousthreat
ofelimination.
Ourpointis simplythatwhen
we choosea theoretical
framework,
we shouldchooseone whoseassumptions
approximate
theempirical
conditions
oftheIO we areanalyzing,
andthatwe shouldbe
awareof thebiases createdby thoseassumptions.
Economisticapproachesmake
certainassumptions
abouttheenvironment
in whichIOs are embeddedthatdrive
researchers
whouse themtolookforcertain
kindsofeffects
andnotothers.Specifyormorevariedenviro'nments
ingdifferent
forIOs wouldlead us to lookfordifferent
andmorevariedeffects
in worldpolitics.18
IO autonomy. Followingeconomistic
logic,regimetheory
andthebroadrangeof
scholarsworking
withinitgenerally
treatIOs as creationsof statesdesignedto furtherstateinterests.19
Analysisof subsequentIO behaviorfocuseson processesof
memberstatepreferences
withinthestrucaggregating
through
interaction
strategic
tureoftheJO.1Os,then,are simplyepiphenomena
of stateinteraction;
theyare,to
ofreductionism,
"understood
and
quoteWaltz'sdefinition
byknowingtheattributes
theinteractions
of [their]
parts."20
Thesetheories
thustreatIOs as emptyshellsorimpersonal
tobe
policymachinery
at itscreation,
manipulated
by otheractors.Politicalbargainsshapethemachinery
themachinery
inpursuit
oftheirpolicygoals,andthe
statesmaypolitickhardwithin
whatstatescan do, butthemachinery
normsand rulesmayconstrain
machinery's
itselfis passive.IOs arenotpurposive
politicalactorsin theirownrightandhaveno
To theextentthatIOs do, in fact,takeon a lifeof their
ontologicalindependence.
the
own,theybreachthe"limitsofrealism"as wellas ofneoliberalism
byviolating
ofthesetheories.21
ontologicalstructures
on interstate
thatis
The regimesconceptspawneda hugeliterature
cooperation
rather
thanagents.Muchof
consistent
initstreatment
ofIOs as structure
remarkably
literature
theneoliberalinstitutionalist
has been devotedto exploringthewaysin
betweenstates'
whichregimes(and1Os) can actas intervening
variables,mediating
ofopportunithestructure
ofself-interest
andpoliticaloutcomesbychanging
pursuit
in particutiesand constraints
theircontroloverinformation,
facingstatesthrough
accordsIOs some causal status(sincethey
lar.22
Althoughthisline of scholarship
andpurposeindedemonstrably
changeoutcomes),itdoesnotgrantthemautonomy
awareof themisapproacheshavebecomeincreasingly
18. Researchers
applyingtheseeconomistic
matchbetweentheassumptions
oftheirmodelsandtheempiricsof1Os.See Snidal1996.
19. Note thatempirically
thisis notthecase; mostIOs now are createdby other1Os. See Shanks,
Jacobson,
andKaplan1996.
20. Waltz1979,18.
1993.
1996b;andRittberger
21. Krasner1983a,355-68; butsee Finnemore
22. See Keohane1984;andBaldwin1993.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations705
pendentof thestatesthatcomprisethem.Another
branchof liberalism
has recently
divorceditselffromthestatistontologyand focusesinsteadon thepreferences
of
social groupsas thecausal engineof worldpolitics,but,again,thisview simply
arguesforattention
toa different
groupofagentsinvolvedintheconstruction
ofIOs
andcompeting
foraccesstoIO mechanisms.
Itdoesnotoffer
a fundamentally
differentconception
ofIOs.23
Therelevant
questionto ask aboutthisconceptualization
is whether
itis a reasonable approximation
oftheempiricalcondition
of most1Os. Ourreadingof detailed
empirical
case studiesofIO activity
suggestsnot.Yes,IOs areconstrained
bystates,
butthenotionthattheyarepassivemechanisms
withno independent
agendasoftheir
ownis notborneoutby anydetailedempiricalstudyof an JOthatwe have found.
Field studiesof the EuropeanUnion provideevidenceof independent
roles for
"eurocrats."24
Studiesof theWorldBankconsistently
culan independent
identify
tureandagendasforaction.25
StudiesofrecentUN peacekeeping
andreconstruction
efforts
similarly
document
a UN agendathatfrequently
withmemleadsto conflict
berstates.26
AccountsoftheUN HighCommission
on Refugees(UNHCR) routinely
notehow its autonomy
and authority
has grownovertheyears.Not onlyare IOs
independent
actorswiththeirownagendas,buttheymayembodymultipleagendas
andcontainmultiple
sourcesofagency-a problemwe takeup later.
Principal-agent
analysis,whichhas been increasingly
employedby students
of
international
relations
toexamineorganizational
couldpotentially
dynamics,
provide
JOautonomy.27
a sophisticated
approachto understanding
Buildingon theoriesof
rationalchoiceand of representation,
theseanalystsunderstand
IOs as "agents"of
states("principals").The analysisis concerned
withwhether
agentsareresponsible
whether
delegatesoftheirprincipals,
agentssmuggleinandpursuetheirownpreferences,and how principalscan construct
variousmechanisms
to keep theiragents
honest.28
This framework
providesa meansof treating
IOs as actorsin theirown
rightwithindependent
interests
andcapabilities.
actionbyIOs is tobe
Autonomous
It wouldalso explaina numberof thenonresponsive
expectedin thisperspective.
andpathologicalbehaviorsthatconcernus becausewe knowthatmonitoring
and
andthatthese
shirking
problemsarepervasivein theseprincipal-agent
relationships
can oftengetstuckat suboptimal
relationships
equilibria.
The problemwithapplyingprincipal-agent
analysisto thestudyof IOs is thatit
a prioritheoretical
requires
specification
ofwhatIOs want.Principal-agent
dynamics
arefueledbythedisjuncture
betweenwhatagentswantandwhatprincipals
want.To
thosetwosetsof interests
produceanyinsights,
cannotbe identical.In economics
thistypeof analysisis usuallyappliedto preexisting
agentsand principals(clients
23. Moravcsik1997.
24. See Pollack1997;Ross 1995;andZabusky1995;butsee Moravcsik1999.
25. See Ascher1983; Ayres1983; Ferguson1990; Escobar 1995; Wade 1996; Nelson 1995; and
Finnemore
1996a.
26. Joint
EvaluationofEmergency
AssistancetoRwanda1996.
27. See Pollack1997;Lake 1996;Vaubel1991;andDillon,Ilgen,andWillett1991.
28. See PrattandZeckhauser1985;andKiewitandMcCubbins1991.
706 International
Organization
hiring
lawyers,
patients
visiting
doctors)whoseongoingindependent
existence
makes
of independent
interests
specification
relatively
straightforward.
The lawyeror the
doctorwouldprobably
be inbusinessevenifyouandI didnottakeourproblemsto
them.1Os,on theotherhand,are oftencreatedby theprincipals(states)and given
written
missionstatements
bytheprincipals.
How,then,can we imputeindependent
preferences
a priori?
in producing
ScholarsofAmericanpoliticshavemadesomeprogress
substantive
theoretical
propositions
aboutwhatU.S. bureaucratic
agencieswant.Beginning
with
thepioneering
workofWilliamNiskanen,scholarstheorized
thatbureaucracies
had
interests
defined
bytheabsoluteorrelativesize oftheirbudgetandtheexpansionor
protection
of theirturf.
At first
theseinterests
wereimputed,
andlatertheybecame
andinsomecases modified
morecloselyinvestigated,
orrejectedaltosubstantiated,
gether.29
Realismandliberalism,
however,
provideno basisforasserting
independent
utilfor1Os.Ontologically,
thesearetheories
aboutstates.Theyprovideno
ityfunctions
to IOs beyondthegoals states(thatis, principals)give
basis forimputing
interests
them.Simplyadopting
therather
battered
Niskanenhypothesis
seemslessthanpromisinggiventheglaringanomalies-forexample,theopposition
ofmanyNATO and
in Europe)bureaucrats
forSecurityand Cooperation
OSCE (Organization
to those
recentexpansionand institutionalization.
Thereare good reasonsto
organizations'
assumethatorganizations
care abouttheirresourcebase and turf,butthereis no
reasontopresumethatsuchmatters
exhaustorevendominate
theirinterests.
Indeed,
studiesofIOs describea worldinwhichorganizational
ethnographic
goalsarestrongly
thebureaucracy
thatdominate
andinwhichintershapedbynormsoftheprofession
eststhemselves
are varied,oftenin flux,debated,and workedoutthrough
interacandtheworldin whichtheyare embedtionsbetweenthestaffof thebureaucracy
ded.30
ofsociologicaltheory
canhelpus investigate
thegoalsandbehavVariousstrands
a verydifferent
thantheone used by
ior of IOs by offering
analyticalorientation
haveexploredthenotionthatbureaueconomists.
withWeber,sociologists
Beginning
moderncultural
formthatembodiescertainvaluesandcanhave
cracyis a peculiarly
Ratherthantreating
itsown distinct
agendaand behavioraldispositions.
organizawhichotheractorspursueinterests,
tionsas merearenasor mechanisms
through
manysociologicalapproachesexplorethesocial contentof theorganization-its
culture,its legitimacy
concerns,dominantnormsthatgovernbehaviorand shape
of theseto a largernormative
and therelationship
and culturalenvironinterests,
to efficiency
ment.Ratherthanassumingbehaviorthatcorresponds
criteriaalone,
also are boundup withpowerand
theseapproachesrecognizethatorganizations
concerns.
socialcontrolinwaysthatcan eclipseefficiency
29. See Niskanen1971; MillerandMoe 1983;WeingastandMoran1983; Moe 1984; and Sigelman
1986.
30. See Ascher1983;Zabusky1995;Barnett1997b;andWade 1996.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations707
The Power of IOs
IOs can becomeautonomous
sitesof authority,
independent
fromthestate"principals"whomayhavecreatedthem,
becauseofpowerflowing
fromatleasttwosources:
(1) thelegitimacy
of therational-legal
authority
theyembody,and (2) controlover
technical
The first
expertise
andinformation.
oftheseis almostentirely
neglected
by
thepoliticalscienceliterature,
andthesecond,we argue,has beenconceivedofvery
narrowly,
leadingscholarsto overlooksome of themostbasic and consequential
formsofIO influence.
Takentogether,
thesetwofeatures
providea theoretical
basis
fortreating
IOs as autonomous
actorsin contemporary
worldpoliticsbyidentifying
forthem,independent
sourcesof support
of states,in thelargersocialenvironment.
Sincerational-legal
andcontroloverexpertise
authority
arepartofwhatdefinesand
constitutes
anybureaucracy
(a bureaucracy
wouldnotbe a bureaucracy
without
them),
theautonomy
thatflowsfromthemis bestunderstood
as a constitutive
an
effect,
of thewaybureaucracy
effect
is constituted,
which,in turn,makespossible(and in
thatsensecauses)otherprocessesandeffects
inglobalpolitics.
SourcesofIO Autonomy
andAuthority
To understand
howIOs can becomeautonomous
we turntoWeber
sitesofauthority
and his classicstudyof bureaucratization.
Weberwas deeplyambivalent
aboutthe
bureaucratic
worldin whichhe livedandwas well-attuned
to thevices
increasingly
as wellas thevirtues
ofthisnewsocialformofauthority.3"
Bureaucracies
arerightly
considereda grandachievement,
he thought.
Theyprovidea framework
forsocial
interaction
thatcanrespondtotheincreasingly
technical
demandsofmodernlifeina
and nonviolent
and are technistable,predictable,
way;theyexemplify
rationality
topreviousformsofrulebecausetheybringprecision,
callysuperior
knowledge,
and
to increasingly
But suchtechnicaland rational
continuity
complexsocial tasks.32
toWeber,comeata steepprice.Bureaucracies
arepolitical
achievements,
according
creatures
thatcan be autonomous
fromtheircreatorsandcan cometo dominatethe
societiestheywerecreatedtoserve,becauseofboththenormative
appealofrationalin modernlifeandthebureaucracy's
controlovertechnicalexpertise
legalauthority
andinformation.
We considereachinturn.
Bureaucracies
embodya formofauthority,
thatmodernity
rational-legal
authority,
viewsas particularly
and good. In contrast
to earlierformsof authority
legitimate
thatwereinvestedin a leader,legitimate
modernauthority
is investedin legalities,
andrulesand thusrendered
Thisauthority
is "rational"in
procedures,
impersonal.
thatitdeployssociallyrecognized
relevant
knowledgetocreaterulesthatdetermine
howgoalswillbe pursued.The veryfactthattheyembodyrationality
is whatmakes
bureaucracies
andmakespeoplewillingto submittothiskindofauthority.
powerful
31. See Weber1978,196-97;Weber1947;Mouzelis1967;andBeetham1985and 1996.
32. See Schaar1984,120;Weber1978,973; andBeetham1985,69.
708 International
Organization
According
toWeber,
in legalauthority,
submission
does notrestuponthebeliefanddevotionto
charismatically
giftedpersons... oruponpietytowarda personallordand
masterwhois defined
byan orderedtradition....Rathersubmission
underlegal
bondto thegenerally
authority
is baseduponan impersonal
definedand
functional
"dutyofoffice."The official
duty-likethecorresponding
rightto
the"jurisdictional
exerciseauthority:
competency"-isfixedbyrationally
established
norms,
byenactments,
decrees,andregulations
in sucha mannerthat
oftheauthority
thelegitimacy
becomesthelegalityofthegeneralrule,whichis
withformalcorrectness.33
purposely
thought
out,enacted,andannounced
Whenbureaucrats
do something
contrary
to yourinterests
or thatyou do notlike,
theydefendthemselves
by saying'"Sorry,thoseare therules"or "just doingmy
job." "Therules"and "thejob" arethesourceofgreatpowerinmodemsociety.Itis
inIOs areperforming
becausebureaucrats
"dutiesofoffice"andimplementing
"ranorms"thattheyarepowerful.
tionally
established
A secondbasis of autonomyand authority,
intimately
connectedto thefirst,
is
A bureaucracy's
controloverinformation
debureaucratic
andexpertise.
autonomy
rivesfromspecializedtechnicalknowledge,
training,
andexperience
thatis notimmediately
availableto otheractors.Whilesuchknowledgemighthelpthebureaucracycarryoutthedirectives
of politiciansmoreefficiently,
Weberstressedthatit
also givesbureaucracies
poweroverpoliticians(and otheractors).It invitesand at
it.34
timesrequiresbureaucracies
to shapepolicy,notjustimplement
The ironyin bothof thesefeatures
of authority
is thattheymakebureaucracies
Thepowerof1Os,
theappearanceofdepoliticization.
powerful
precisely
bycreating
andbureaucracies
technois thattheypresentthemselves
as impersonal,
generally,
cratic,andneutral-asnotexercising
powerbutinsteadas serving
others;thepresenand authority.35
tationand acceptanceof theseclaimsis criticalto theirlegitimacy
tohim,thedepoliticized
charsaw through
theseclaims.According
Weber,however,
thatlegitimates
acterof bureaucracy
it could be a myth:"Behindthefunctional
Buofcourse,'ideas ofculture-values'
purposes[ofbureaucracy],
usuallystand."36
values.Thatpurpose
reaucracies
alwaysservesomesocialpurposeorsetofcultural
aroundhim
maybe normatively
"good,"as WeberbelievedthePrussiannationalism
was,buttherewas no a priorireasontoassumethis.
In additionto embodying
thatmight
culturalvaluesfromthelargerenvironment
and
be desirableor not,bureaucracies
also carrywiththembehavioraldispositions
form.Some of
fromtherationality
thatlegitimates
themas a cultural
valuesflowing
ofknowledgeandexpertise,
Weberadmired.Othersconthese,likethecelebration
andhisdescriptions
as an "ironcage" andbureaucernedhimgreatly,
ofbureaucracy
of thebureaucratic
cratsas "specialistswithoutspirit"are hardlyan endorsement
33. GerthandMills 1978,299 (italicsinoriginal).
34. See GerthandMills 1978,233; Beetham1985,74-75; andSchaar1984,120.
1997;
Also see Fisher1997;Ferguson1990;ShoreandWright
35. WethankJohnBoli forthisinsight.
andBurleyandMattli1993.
36. GerthandMills 1978,199.
Organizations709
PathologiesofInternational
ways.The very
can undermine
personalfreedomin important
form.37
Bureaucracy
it.
also dehumanizes
character
thatempowersbureaucracy
impersonal,
rule-bound
ways,in thenameofgeneral
Bureaucracies
oftenexercisetheirpowerin repressive
is exacerbated
bytheway
rulesbecauserulesaretheirraisond'etre.Thistendency
seekingsecurecareersinterselectandrewardnarrowed
professionals
bureaucracies
and inventivenally-people who are "lackingin heroism,humanspontaneity,
ratherthanassumethe "goodness"of
ness."738
FollowingWeber,we investigate
bureaucracy.
critiqueof thewaysin whichinternational
Weber'sinsights
providea powerful
of rational-legal
authority
sugrelationsscholarshave treated1Os. The legitimacy
of
of thepoliciesand interests
independent
geststhatIOs mayhave an authority
statesthatcreatethem,a possibility
obscuredby thetechnicaland apoliticaltreatconsidNorhaverealistsandneoliberals
mentofIOs bybothrealistsandneoliberals.
at
SusanStrange,
eredhowcontroloverinformation
handsIOs a basisofautonomy.
is power,has emphatically
theforefront
amongrealistsin claimingthatinformation
statedthatIOs aresimplytheagentsofstates.Neoliberalshavetendedtotreatinforanddepoliticized
way,failingtosee howinformation
mationina highlytechnocratic
among
and levelinformation
asymmetries
is power.39
As IOs createtransparencies
states(a commonpolicyprescription
of neoliberals)theycreatenew information
thatIOs have
asymmetries
betweenIOs andstates.Giventheneoliberalassumption
butif IOs have
are unimportant;
of states,suchasymmetries
no goals independent
thensuchasymmetries
maybe
autonomous
valuesand behavioralpredispositions,
highlyconsequential.
becauseof their
Examplesof thewaysin whichIOs have becomeautonomous
arenothardtofind.
andcontrol
overinformation
rationality
embodiment
oftechnical
The UN's peacekeepersderivepartof theirauthority
fromtheclaimthattheyare
CouncilresoSecurity
actorswhosimplyimplement
independent,
objective,neutral
lutions.UN officials
routinely
usethislanguagetodescribetheirroleandareexplicit
thattheyunderstand
thisto be thebasis of theirinfluence.
As a consequence,UN
theimagethat
to maintain
timeandenergyattempting
officials
spendconsiderable
of
ofanygreatpowerandmustbe seenas representatives
theyarenottheinstrument
as embodiedintherulesandresolutions
oftheUN.40
"theinternational
community"
The WorldBank is widelyrecognizedto have exercisedpoweroverdevelopment
ofNorth/South
aid flows,would
thanitsbudget,as a percentage
policiesfargreater
suggestbecauseof theexpertiseit houses.Whilecompetingsitesof expertisein
in recentyears,fordecades afterits founding
have proliferated
the
development
exWorldBank was a magnetforthe "bestand brightest"
among"development
Itsstaff
hadandcontinues
tohaveimpressive
fromthemostprescredentials
perts.?"
37. See Weber[1930] 1978,181-83;andClegg 1994a,152-55.
ofthisbureaucratic
charactermanifestation
38. GerthandMills 1978,216,50, 299. Fortheextreme
istic,seeArendt1977.
39. See Strange1997;andKeohane1984.
1996,19-24;
thatSaw No Evil,"TheNewRepublic,12February
40. See David Rieff,"The Institution
andBarnett
1997b.
710 International
Organization
and researchgroupsit has
tigiousuniversities
and theelaboratemodels,reports,
amongthe"development
experts"
sponsoredovertheyearswerewidelyinfluential
inthefield.Thisexpertise,
andits"apolitical"
coupledwithitsclaimto "neutrality"
voice
technocratic
decision-making
style,havegiventheWorldBankan authoritative
withwhichit has successfully
dictatedthecontent,
direction,
and scope of global
and longexperidevelopment
overthepastfifty
years.41
Similarly,
officialstanding
encewithreliefefforts
haveendowedtheUNHCR with"expert"statusandconseinrefugee
matters.
Thisexpertise,
coupledwithitsroleinimplementquentauthority
refugees),
has
inginternational
refugeeconventions
andlaw ("the rules"regarding
without
consultallowedtheUNHCR tomakelifeanddeathdecisionsaboutrefugees
theauthority
of statesin various
ingtherefugees,
themselves,
and to compromise
waysin settingup refugeecamps.42Note that,as theseexamplesshow,technical
in natureto createautonomy
and
neednotbe "scientific"
knowledgeandexpertise
powerfor1Os.
ThePowerofIOs
IfIOs haveautonomy
intheworld,whatdo theydo withit?A growing
andauthority
has examinedwaysin whichIOs
bodyof researchin sociologyand anthropology
statusas sitesofauthority;
exercisepowerbyvirtueoftheirculturally
constructed
we
distillfromthisresearchthreebroadtypesof IO power.We examinehow IOs (1)
classifytheworld,creatingcategoriesof actorsand action;(2) fixmeaningsin the
newnorms,
anddiffuse
andactorsaround
principles,
socialworld;and(3) articulate
theglobe.All of thesesourcesof powerflowfromtheabilityof IOs to structure
knowledge.43
is thattheyclassifyand
featureof bureaucracies
Classification. An elementary
and knowledge.This classification
processis boundup with
organizeinformation
power."Bureaucracies,"writesDon Handelman,"are waysof making,ordering,
andknowingsocialworlds."Theydo thisby "movingpersonsamongsocialcategoThe abilityto classifyobjects,
andapplyingsuchcategories."44
riesorbyinventing
andidentity,
is one ofbureaucracy's
sourcesof
to shifttheirverydefinition
greatest
treated
power.Thispoweris frequently
bytheobjectsofthatpoweras accomplished
but is legitimated
and
through
capriceand withoutregardto theircircumstances
to therulesand regulations
of thebureauwithreference
justifiedby bureaucrats
exerciseofpowermaybe identity
defining,
cracy.Consequencesofthisbureaucratic
orevenlifethreatening.
of "refugee."Thecategory
Considertheevolvingdefinition
"refugee"is notatall
fromothercategoriesofindividuals
who
andmustbe distinguished
straightforward
1996b;andNelson1995.
41. See Wade 1996;Ayres1983;Ascher1983;Finnemore
1989.
42. See Malkki1996;Hartigan1992;andHarrell-Bond
disrerelationstheorytypically
43. See Foucault1977,27; and Clegg 1994b,156-59. International
gardsthenegativesideoftheknowledgeandpowerequation.Foran example,see Haas 1992.
1994,22.
44. Handelman1995,280. See also Starr1992;andWright
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations711
are "temporarily"
and "involuntarily"
livingoutsidetheircountryof origindisplacedpersons,exiles,economicmigrants,
guestworkers,
diasporacommunities,
and thoseseekingpoliticalasylum.The debateoverthemeaningof "refugee"has
beenwagedin andaroundtheUNHCR. The UNHCR's legalandoperational
definitionofthecategory
strongly
influences
decisionsaboutwhois a refugeeandshapes
UNHCR staff
decisionsin thefield-decisionsthathavea tremendous
effect
on the
lifecircumstance
of thousandsof people.45These categoriesare notonlypolitical
andlegalbutalso discursive,
shapinga viewamongUNHCR officials
thatrefugees
must,bydefinition,
be powerless,
andthatas powerlessactorstheydo nothavetobe
indecisionssuchas asylumandrepatriation
consulted
thatwilldirectly
anddramatithem.46
callyaffect
GuyGransimilarly
describeshowtheWorldBanksetsupcriteria
to definesomeoneas a peasantin orderto distinguish
themfroma farmer,
day
andothercategories.
laborer,
The classification
matters
becauseonlycertainclasses
of people are recognizedby theWorldBank's development
as having
machinery
knowledgethatis relevantin solvingdevelopment
and
problems.47
Categorization
classification
area ubiquitous
feature
ofbureaucratization
thathaspotentially
importantimplications
forthosebeingclassified.To classifyis to engagein an act of
power.
The fixingofmeanings. IOs exercisepowerbyvirtueoftheirabilityto fixmeanings,whichis relatedtoclassification.48
Namingorlabelingthesocialcontext
establishestheparameters,
theveryboundaries,
of acceptableaction.Because actorsare
oriented
towardobjectsandobjectiveson thebasisofthemeaningthattheyhavefor
them,beingable to investsituations
witha particular
an impormeaningconstitutes
tantsourceof power.49
IOs do notact alonein thisregard,buttheirorganizational
resources
contribute
tothisend.
mightily
Thereis strongevidenceofthispowerfromdevelopment
studies.Arturo
Escobar
of theconceptof "development"
afterWorld
exploreshow theinstitutionalization
WarII spawneda hugeinternational
andhowthisapparatus
hasnowspread
apparatus
in domesticandinternational
itstentacles
thediscourseofdeveloppoliticsthrough
ment.The discourseof development,
createdand arbitrated
in largepartby 1Os,
determines
notonlywhatconstitutes
theactivity
(whatdevelopment
is) butalso who
andprivileged,
thatis, whogetsto do thedevelop(orwhat)is considered
powerful
ing(usuallythestateor1Os) andwhois theobjectofdevelopment
(local groups).50
theendoftheColdWarencouraged
a reexamination
ofthedefinition
of
Similarly,
ofthisdebate,arguing
thatsecurity
security.51
IOs havebeenattheforefront
pertains
notonlyto statesbutalso to individualsand thatthethreatsto securitymay be
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
See WeissandPasic 1997;Goodwin-Gill
1996;andAnonymous
1997.
See Harrell-Bond
1989;Walkup1997;andMalkki1996.
Gran1986.
See Williams1996;Clegg 1994b;Bourdieu1994;Carr[1939] 1964;andKeeley1990.
Blumer1969.
See Gupta1998;Escobar1995;CooperandPackard1998;Gran1986;Ferguson
1990;andWade1996.
See Matthews1989;andKrauseandWilliams1996.
712 International
Organization
In forwarding
these
economic,environmental,
and politicalas well as military.52
fromvariousIOs areempowering
a differalternative
definitions
ofsecurity,
officials
setof practices.Specifically,
when
entsetof actorsand legitimating
an alternative
meantsafetyfrominvadingnationalarmies,itprivileged
stateofficials
and
security
investedpowerin military
These alternative
definitions
of security
establishments.
whoarefrequently
threatshiftattention
awayfromstatesandtowardtheindividuals
enedby theirowngovernment,
practicesand towardotherfeaawayfrommilitary
a moreimmediate
turesof social lifethatmightrepresent
and dailydangerto the
livesofindividuals.
One consequenceoftheseredefined
meaningsofdevelopment
andsecurity
is that
inthedomestic
andevenrequire,
increasedlevelsofIO intervention
theylegitimate,
affairs
of states-particularly
ThirdWorldstates.Thisis fairlyobviousin therealm
TheWorldBank,theInternational
Fund(IMF), andother
ofdevelopment.
Monetary
have establisheda web of interventions
thataffectnearly
institutions
development
everyphaseoftheeconomyandpolityin manyThirdWorldstates.As "ruraldevelbecameincorporated
adjustment"
opment,""basic humanneeds,"and "structural
intothemeaningof development,
even required,to become
IOs werepermitted,
of developingpolitiesby postinginintimately
involvedin thedomesticworkings
thepoliticaleconomyofenhouse"advisors"to runmonetary
policy,reorganizing
betireruralregions,regulating
practices,and mediating
familyand reproductive
tweengovernments
andtheircitizensin a variety
ofways.53
maybe similar.Democratization,
human
The consequencesofredefining
security
have all now becometiedto international
peace and
rights,and theenvironment
in memberstateson thesegrounds,
andIOs justifytheirinterventions
parsecurity,
indeveloping
theanti-apartheid
inSouth
states.Forexample,during
struggle
ticularly
Africa,humanrightsabuses came to be classifiedas securitythreatsby theUN
there.Now,thatlinkage
CouncilandprovidedgroundsforUN involvement
Security
betweenhumanrightsand security
has becomea stapleofthepost-ColdWarenviarenowcauseforUN intervenronment.
humanrights
abusesanywhere
Widespread
missionswithout
theUN cannotcarryoutpeacekeeping
protion,and,conversely,
inEasternEuropeandthe
environmental
disasters
motinghumanrights.54
Similarly,
statesoftheformer
SovietUnionandwaterrightsallocationsin
newlyindependent
theMiddleEast havealso cometobe discussedundertherubricof "environmental
TheUnitedNationsDevelopment
forIO intervention.
andarethusgrounds
security"
linkbetweenhumansecurity
and sustainProgramarguesthatthereis an important
in themanagement
able development
andimplicitly
intervention
arguesforgreater
as a meanstopromote
humansecurity.55
ofenvironment
rulesandnorms,IOs areeagerto spread
Diffusionof norms. Havingestablished
of
thebenefits
andoftenactas conveyor
beltsforthetransmission
oftheirexpertise
52.
53.
54.
55.
1995.
Program1994;andBoutros-Ghali
See UN Development
See Escobar1995;Ferguson1990;andFeldstein1998.
on HumanRights1993.
WorldConference
Program1994.
UN Development
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations713
normsand modelsof "good" politicalbehavior.56
Thereis nothingaccidentalor
unintended
aboutthisrole.Officials
in IOs ofteninsistthatpartoftheirmissionis to
andenforceglobalvaluesandnorms.Theyarethe"missionaries"
spread,inculcate,
ofourtime.Armedwitha notionofprogress,
an idea ofhowtocreatethebetter
life,
and some understanding
of theconversionprocess,manyIO eliteshave as their
statedpurposea desireto shape statepracticesby establishing,
articulating,
and
transmitting
normsthatdefinewhatconstitutes
acceptableandlegitimate
statebehavior.To be sure,theirsuccessdependson morethantheirpersuasivecapacities,for
theirrhetoric
mustbe supported
bypower,sometimes
(butnotalways)statepower.
Buttooverlookhowstatepowerandorganizational
missionaries
workintandemand
theways in whichIO officialschanneland shape states'exerciseof poweris to
a fundamental
feature
disregard
ofvaluediffusion.57
announcedan intentto
Considerdecolonization
as an example.The UN Charter
universalize
as a constitutive
sovereignty
principleof thesocietyof statesat a time
an
whenoverhalftheglobewas undersomekindofcolonialrule;italso established
institutional
apparatus
toachievethatend(mostprominently
theTrusteeship
Council
and the Special Committeeon Colonialism).These actionshad severalconsequences.One was to eliminatecertaincategoriesof acceptableactionforpowerful
states.Those statesthatattempted
to retaintheircolonialprivilegeswereincreasinglyviewedas illegitimate
by otherstates.Anotherconsequencewas to empower
for
international
bureaucrats
(at theTrusteeship
Council)to setnormsandstandards
the
decolonization
"stateness."Finally,theUN helpedto ensurethatthroughout
of thesenew stateswas coupledwithterritorial
Colonial
sovereignty
inviolability.
boundaries
oftendividedethnicandtribalgroups,andtheUN was quiteconcerned
thatin theprocessof "self-determination,"
thesegovernments
containing"multocreatea wholepersonality
territotiple"or "partial"selvesmightattempt
through
rialadjustment-afearsharedbymanyof thesenewlydecolonizedstates.The UN
theacceptanceofthenormofsovereignty-as-territorial-integrity
encouraged
through
and one famouspeacekeepingepiresolutions,
monitoring
devices,commissions,
sodeinCongoin the1960s.58
Notethat,as withotherJOpowers,normdiffusion,
too,has an expansionary
dyfornormdiffusion
namic.Developingstatescontinueto be populartargets
by 1Os,
The UN andtheEuropeanUnionarenow actively
evenaftertheyareindependent.
innon-Western
statesbecausetheybelieveWestern
involvedinpolicetraining
policingpracticeswillbe moreconducivetodemocratization
processesandtheestablishassumesthat
mentof civil society.But havinga professional
police establishment
can be triedand
thereis a professional
judiciaryandpenalsystemwherecriminals
thatthereare lawyersthat
in turn,presupposes
jailed; and a professional
judiciary,
can comebeforethecourt.Trainedlawyerspresupposea code oflaw.The resultis a
societies
non-Western
packageofreforms
sponsoredby IOs aimedat transforming
1996b;andLegro1997.
1996;Finnemore
56. See Katzenstein
57. See Alger1963,425; andClaude 1966,373.
58. See McNeely1995;andJackson1993.
714 International
Organization
intoWestern
societies.59
Again,whileWestern
statesareinvolvedin theseactivities
andtherefore
theirvaluesandinterests
arepartofthereasonsforthisprocess,internationalbureaucrats
involvedin theseactivities
maynotsee themselves
as doingthe
biddingforthesestatesbutrather
as expressing
theinterests
andvaluesofthebureaucracy.
Otherexamplesof thiskindof normdiffusion
arenothardto find.The IMF and
theWorldBankareexplicitabouttheirroleas transmitters
ofnormsandprinciples
fromadvancedmarket
economiestoless-developed
economies.60
TheIMF's Articles
ofAgreement
specifically
assignitthistaskofincorporating
less-developed
economiesintotheworldeconomy,
whichturnsoutto meanteachingthemhow to "be"
marketeconomies.The WorldBank,similarly,
has a majorrole in arbitrating
the
meaningofdevelopment
andnorm's
ofbehaviorappropriate
tothetaskofdeveloping
oneself,as was discussedearlier.The end of theCold Warhas openedup a whole
new set of statesto thiskindof normdiffusion
taskfor1Os.Accordingto former
of DefenseWilliamPerry,
one of thefunctions
ofNATO expansionis to
Secretary
inculcate"modern"valuesandnormsintotheEasternEuropeancountries
andtheir
militaries.61
TheEuropeanBankforReconstruction
andDevelopment
has,as partof
its mandate,thejob of spreadingdemocracyand privateenterprise.
The OSCE is
to createa community
based on sharedvalues,amongtheserespectfor
striving
andhumanrights.
Thislinkageis also strong
attheUN as evidentin The
democracy
andTheAgendaforPeace.62Oncedemocratization
and
AgendaforDemocratization
humanrightsare tiedto international
peace and security,
thedistinctions
between
international
and domesticgovernance
becomeeffectively
erasedand IOs have liin an authoritative
censetointervene
almostanywhere
andlegitimate
manner.63
Realistsandneoliberals
andarguethattheclassifimaywelllookat theseeffects
catoryschemes,meanings,and normsassociatedwithIOs are mostlyfavoredby
to IOs is simstrongstates.Consequently,
theywouldargue,thepowerwe attribute
ofstatepower.Thisargument
is certainly
onetheoretical
plyepiphenomenal
possibility,butit is nottheonlyone and mustbe testedagainstothers.Ourconcernis that
becausethesetheoriesprovideno ontologicalindependence
for1Os,theyhave no
causeorinclination
norhavetheyanytheoretical
totestfor
waytotestforautonomy
it since,by theoretical
cannotexist.The one empiricaldomainin
axiom,autonomy
whichthestatistview has been explicitlychallengedis theEuropeanUnion,and
forthe"intergovernempiricalstudiestherehavehardlyproducedobviousvictory
mentalist"
Recentempiricalstudiesin theareasofhumanrights,
approach.64
weapons taboos,and environmental
practicesalso castdoubton thestatistapproachby
evidenceaboutthewaysin whichnongovernmental
andintergovernmenproviding
59. Call andBamettforthcoming.
60. Wade 1996.
61. See Perry1996;andRuggie1996.
62. Boutros-Ghali
1995and 1996a,b.
organizations
andIOs can be thelong63. Keen andHendrie,however,
suggestthatnongovernmental
termbeneficiaries
ofintervention.
See Keen 1994;andHendrie1997.
64. See BurleyandMattli1993;Pollack1997;andSandholtz1993.
Organizations715
PathologiesofInternational
tal organizations
successfully
promotepoliciesthatare not(or notinitially)supstatesdo driveIO
portedbystrong
states.65
Certainly
thereareoccasionswhenstrong
behavior,
buttherearealso timeswhenotherforcesareatworkthateclipseorsignifiproducewhich
cantlydampentheeffects
ofstateson 1Os.Whichcausalmechanisms
onlyby
effects
underwhichconditions
is a setofrelationships
thatcanbe understood
intensiveempiricalstudyof how theseorganizations
actuallydo theirbusinessresearchthatwouldtracetheoriginsand evolutionof IO policies,theprocessesby
whichtheyareimplemented,
betweenimplementation
andpolicy,and
discrepancies
overalleffects
ofthesepolicies.
The PathologiesofIOs
Bureaucracies
arecreated,
andvaluedinmodemsocietybecauseoftheir
propagated,
in carrying
andeffectiveness
outsocialtasks.Thesesameconsupposedrationality
thefolkwisdomabout
siderations
also applyto 1Os.Ironically,
presumably
though,
is thattheyare inefficient
and unresponsive.
Bureaucracies
are infabureaucracies
mousforcreatingand implementing
policiesthatdefyrationallogic,foractingin
requestsof and
ways thatare at odds withtheirstatedmission,and forrefusing
theirbackson thoseto whomtheyare officially
responsible.66
Scholarsof
turning
enhaverecognizedthisproblemandhave devotedconsiderable
U.S. bureaucracy
a
behavto
wide
of
undesirable
and
inefficient
bureaucratic
ergy understanding
range
theconditions
under
iorscausedbybureaucratic
captureandslackandto exploring
which"suboptimal
structures.
scholSimilarly,
equilibria"
mayariseinorganizational
thoseinterested
arsresearching
foreign
policydecisionmakingand,morerecently,
thatproduce
in learning
in foreign
have
dynamics
policy
investigated
organizational
in
and
behavior
those
contexts.67
inefficient
self-defeating
butinternational
relations
scholars
1Os,too,arepronetodysfunctional
behaviors,
in
because
the
have rarelyinvestigated
we
theoretical
apparatus
this, part, suspect,
The stateJObehavior.68
theyuse providesfewgroundsforexpectingundesirable
centric
frameworks
mostinternational
relations
scholarshaveborutility-maximizing
rowedfromeconomicssimplyassumethatIOs are reasonablyresponsiveto state
thanalternatives),
otherwise
stateswouldwithinterests
(or,atleast,moreresponsive
axiomofthese
is a necessary
theoretical
drawfromthem.Thisassumption,
however,
it is rarelytreatedas a hypothesis
frameworks;
subjectto empiricalinvestigation.69
or self-defeating
Withlittletheoretical
reasonto expectsuboptimal
behaviorin 1Os,
thesescholarsdo notlook forit and have had littleto say aboutit. Policymakers,
havebeenquickerto perceiveandaddresstheseproblemsandareputting
however,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
See KeckandSikkink1998;Wapner1996;Price1997;andThomasforthcoming.
MarchandOlsen 1989,chap.5.
See Nye 1987;Haas 1990;Haas andHaas 1995;andSagan 1993.
Twoexceptions
areGallaroti1991;andSnidal1996.
Snidal1996.
Organization
716 International
Internal
Material
Cultural
FIGURE
1.
External
Bureaucratic
politics
Realism/
neoliberal
institutionalism
Bureaucratic
culture
Worldpolity
model
organization
dysfunction
Theoriesofinternational
themon thepoliticalagenda.It is timeforscholars,too,to beginto explorethese
issuesmorefully.
thatmightexplaindysfuncIn thissectionwe presentseveralbodiesoftheorizing
theJO's stated
tionalIO behavior,whichwe defineas behaviorthatundermines
(and laterpathology)is
objectives.Thusourvantagepointforjudgingdysfunction
Theremaybe occasionswhen
missionof theorganization.
thepubliclyproclaimed
forcertainmembers
orothoverallorganizational
is, in fact,functional
dysfunction
ersinvolvedin the1O's work,butgivenouranalysisofthewayclaimsofefficiency
in our culture,whether
authority
and effectiveness
act to legitimate
rational-legal
actuallydo whattheyclaimandaccomplishtheirmissionsis a particuorganizations
issue to examine.Severalbodiesof theoryprovidesomebasis for
larlyimportant
behaviorby1Os,each ofwhichemphasizesa different
understanding
dysfunctional
a typology
thesecauses,we construct
Analyzing
locusofcausalityforsuchbehavior.
thatlocatesthemin relationto one another.
Then,drawingon
oftheseexplanations
theworkofJamesMarchandJohanOlsen,Paul DiMaggioandWalterPowell,and
we elaboratehow thesame sourcesof bureauothersociologicalinstitutionalists,
behavior.
cancausedysfunctional
Wetermthisparticucraticpower,sketched
earlier,
that
fivefeaturesof bureaucracy
We identify
lar typeof dysfunction
pathology.70
the
andusingexamplesfromtheUN systemwe illustrate
mightproducepathology,
waythesemightworkin 1Os.
canbe categorized
intwodimensions:
(1) whether
Extanttheories
aboutdysfunction
and (2)
insideor outsidetheorganization,
theylocatethecause of JOdysfunction
whether
theytracethecauses to materialor culturalforces.Mappingtheorieson
showninFigure1.
createsthetypology
thesedimensions
a representative
Withineach cell we have identified
bodyof theoryfamiliarto
thatemphasize
ofJOdysfunction
scholars.Explanations
relations
mostinternational
withinan organization
examinehowcomofmaterialinterests
thepursuit
typically
leadstheorganization
tomakedeciresources
overmaterial
amongsubunits
petition
ina waysimilartoourusage.We thankHaywardAlker
70. KarlDeutschusedtheconceptofpathology
forthispoint.Deutsch1963,170.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations717
sionsand engagein behaviorsthatare inefficient
or undesirable
as judgedagainst
someidealpolicythatwouldbetterallowthe10 to achieveitsstatedgoals.Bureaucraticpoliticsis thebest-known
theory
here,andthoughcurrent
scholarsofinternationalpoliticshavenotwidelyadoptedthisperspective
to explain10 behavior,
itis
relatively
welldevelopedin theolderIO literature.71
GrahamAllison'scentralargumentis thatthe"nameofthegameis politics:bargaining
alongregularized
circuits
amongplayerspositioned
hierarchically
withinthegovernment.
Government
behaviorcan thusbe understood
as .. . resultsofthesebargaining
games."72In thisview,
decisionsarenotmadeaftera rational
decisionprocessbutrather
a competithrough
tivebargaining
processoverturf,budgets,and staffthatmaybenefitpartsof the
attheexpenseofoverallgoals.
organization
Another
bodyofliterature
traces10 dysfunctional
behaviorto thematerial
forces
locatedoutsidetheorganization.
Realistandneoliberal
theories
might
positthatstate
10 dysfunctional
preferences
andconstraints
areresponsible
forunderstanding
behavior.In thisviewIOs arenottoblameforbadoutcomes,
statesare.IOs do nothavethe
are frequently
luxuryof choosingtheoptimalpolicybutrather
forcedto chosebetweenthebad andtheawfulbecausemoredesirablepoliciesaredeniedto themby
stateswhodo notagreeamongthemselves
do notwishto see the10 fulfill
and/or
its
mandatein someparticular
As RobertKeohaneobserved,
instance.
IOs oftenengage
inpoliciesnotbecausetheyarestrong
andhaveautonomy
butbecausetheyareweak
andhavenone.73
The important
pointofthesetheories
is thattheytrace10 dysfunctionalbehaviorbackto theenvironmental
conditions
established
by,or theexplicit
preferences
of,states.
Culturaltheoriesalso have internaland externalvariants.We shouldnotethat
manyadvocatesof culturaltheorieswouldrejecttheclaimthatan organization
can
be understood
orthatcultureis separablefromthemateapartfromitsenvironment
rialworld.Insteadtheywouldstresshowtheorganization
is permeated
bythatenviinbothmaterial
defined
andcultural
in whichitis embedded.Many
ronment,
terms,
are also quitesensitiveto thewaysin whichresourceconstraints
and thematerial
culture.Thatsaid,thesearguactorswill shapeorganizational
powerof important
mentsclearlydiffer
fromtheprevioustwotypesin theiremphasison ideationaland
cultural
factors
inthemotors
andclearlydiffer
ofbehavioremphaamongthemselves
theories
towhether
sized.Foranalytical
we dividecultural
clarity
according
theysee
theprimary
causesofthe10's dysfunctional
behavioras deriving
fromtheculture
of
theorganization
oroftheenvironment
(internal)
(external).
Theworldpolitymodelexemplifies
theories
thatlooktoexternal
culture
tounderstandan 10's dysfunctional
behavior.
Therearetworeasonsto expectdysfunctional
behaviorhere.First,because10 practicesreflect
a searchforsymboliclegitimacy
10 behaviormightbe onlyremotely
rather
thanefficiency,
connected
to theefficient
thatcome
ofitsgoalsandmorecloselycoupledtolegitimacy
criteria
implementation
71. See Allison1971;Haas 1990;Cox etal. 1974;andCox andJacobson1977.
72. See Allison1971,144; andBendorandHammond1992.
73. Personalcommunication
totheauthors.
718 International
Organization
fromtheculturalenvironment.74
For instance,manyarms-export
controlregimes
nowhavea multilateral
character
notbecauseofanyevidencethatthisarchitecture
is
themostefficient
waytomonitor
andprevent
armsexportsbutrather
becausemultilateralism
hasattained
a degreeoflegitimacy
thatis notempirically
connected
toany
efficiency
criteria.75
Second,theworldpolityis fullofcontradictions;
forinstance,
a
liberalworldpolityhas severaldefining
principles,
including
market
economicsand
humanequality,
thatmightconflict
atanyonemoment.
Thus,environments
areoften
ambiguousaboutmissionsand containvaried,oftenconflicting,
functional,
normative,andlegitimacy
imperatives.76
Becausetheyareembeddedin thatcultural
environment,
IOs canmirror
andreproduce
thosecontradictions,
which,inturn,
canlead
tocontradictory
andultimately
dysfunctional
behavior.
Finally,organizations
frequently
developdistinctive
internal
cultures
thatcanpromotedysfunctional
behavior,
behaviorthatwe call "pathological."The basic logic
of thisargument
flowsdirectly
fromourpreviousobservations
aboutthenatureof
areestablished
as a socialform.Bureaucracies
as rationalized
meansto
bureaucracy
collectivegoalsandtospreadparticular
values.To do this,bureaucracies
accomplish
createsocialknowledgeanddevelopexpertise
as theyactupontheworld(and thus
exercisepower).Butthewaybureaucracies
areconstituted
to accomplishtheseends
createa culturaldisposition
can,ironically,
towardundesirable
andultimately
selfbehavior.77
Two features
ofthemodernbureaucratic
formareparticularly
defeating
in thisregard.The first
important
is thesimplefactthatbureaucracies
areorganized
andstandard
a stanaroundrules,routines,
operating
procedures
designedtotrigger
dardandpredictable
stimuli.
Theserulescanbe formalor
responsetoenvironmental
inresponseto
butineithercase theytellactorswhichactionis appropriate
informal,
a specificstimuli,
ordemand.Thiskindofroutinization
request,
is,afterall,precisely
whatbureaucracies
are supposedto exhibit-itis whatmakesthemeffective
and
in performing
competent
complexsocialtasks.However,thepresenceof suchrules
drivesorganizational
also compromises
theextentto whichmeans-ends
rationality
behavior.
Rulesandroutines
maycometoobscureoverallmissionsandlargersocial
a very
and construct
goals. Theymaycreate"ritualizedbehavior"in bureaucrats
withintheorganization
whoseconnection
to the
environment
parochialnormative
is tenuousatbest.78
largersocialenvironment
Second,bureaucracies
specializeandcompartmentalize.
Theycreatea divisionof
haveonlyso muchtime,knowledge,
and
laboron thelogicthatbecauseindividuals
will allow theorganization
to emulatea rationaldecisionexpertise,
specialization
inthatitprovidesa
ofbureaucracy
makingprocess.79
Again,thisis oneofthevirtues
andknowledge
thelimitations
ofindividual
wayofovercoming
rationality
byembedin a structure
thattakesadvantageoftheircompetencies
withdingthoseindividuals
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
1996a.
See MeyerandRowan1977;MeyerandZucker1989;Weber1994;andFinnemore
Lipson1999.
McNeely1995.
See Vaughan1996;andLipartito1995.
See MarchandOlsen 1989,21-27; andMeyerandRowan1977.
See MarchandOlsen 1989,26-27; andMarch1997.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations719
outhavingto relyon theirweaknesses.However,it,too,has somenegativeconsecan
quences.Justas rulescaneclipsegoals,concentrated
expertise
andspecialization
within
(and perhapsmust)limitbureaucrats'
fieldof visionand createsubcultures
trainbureaucracy
thataredistinct
fromthoseofthelargerenvironment.
Professional
ingplaysa particularly
strong
roleheresincethisis onewidespread
waywe disseminatespecializedknowledgeandcredential
"experts."Such training
oftengivesexworldviewand normative
perts,indeedis designedto give them,a distinctive
in a subunitof an organization,
can have
commitments,
which,whenconcentrated
effects
pronounced
on behavior.80
Once in place,an organization's
culture,
understood
as therules,rituals,andbeconseliefsthatare embeddedin theorganization
(and itssubunits),
has important
makesense of the
quencesfortheway individualswho inhabitthatorganization
framesthatindividualsuse to generatemeaning.81
world.It providesinterpretive
Thisis morethanjustboundedrationality;
in thisview,actors'rationality
itself,the
culture.82
verymeansand ends thattheyvalue,are shapedby theorganizational
Divisionsand subunitswithintheorganization
may developtheirown cognitive
withbutstilldistinct
fromthelargerorganization,
frameworks
thatare consistent
further
thisprocess.
complicating
All organizations
have theirown culture(or cultures)thatshapetheirbehavior.
The effects
Indeed,speofbureaucratic
culture,
however,
neednotbe dysfunctional.
cificorganizational
culturesmaybe valuedand activelypromotedas a sourceof
"good" behavior,as students
of businesscultureknowverywell. Organizational
culture
is tiedto "good" and "bad" behavior,
alike,andtheeffects
oforganizational
cultureon behaviorarean empirical
questiontobe researched.
To further
we drawfromstudiesin sociologyandanthropology
to
suchresearch,
in1Os:
culture
canbreedpathologies
explorefivemechanisms
bywhichbureaucratic
ofrationalization,
normalization
ofdeviance,organizatheirrationality
universalism,
and culturalcontestation.
threeof thesemechanisms
all
tionalinsulation,
The first
we expectthemto
flowfromdefining
features
ofbureaucracy
itself.Consequently,
to a limiteddegree.Theirseverity
be presentin anybureaucracy
maybe increased,
oftheorganization.
however,
by specificempiricalconditions
Vaguemission,weak
all havethepotential
to
andstrong
feedbackfromtheenvironment,
professionalism
and
to
create
two
insulation
and
exacerbate
thesemechanisms
others,
organizational
is
culturalcontestation,
through
processeswe describelater.Our claim,therefore,
ofwhichitis made-creates
thattheverynatureofbureaucracy-the"social stuff"
thatmakebureaucracy
behavioralpredispositions
proneto thesekindsof behavand pathological
behavioris
iors.83But theconnection
betweenthesemechanisms
not deterministic,
and is consistentwithour constitutive
analysis.
probabilistic,
in fact,mission-defeating
behavioroccursdependson empiricalcondiWhether,
80. See DiMaggioandPowell1983;andSchien1996.
81. See Starr1992,160;Douglas 1986;andBergerandLuckman1966,chap.1.
82. See Campbell1998,378; Alvesson1996;BurrellandMorgan1979;Dobbin 1994; andImmergut
1998,14-19.
83. Wendt1998.
720 International
Organization
important
(mission,
tions.We identify
threesuch conditionsthatare particularly
predispoandprofessionals)
anddiscusshowtheyintensify
theseinherent
feedback,
ones.
sitionsandactivateorcreateadditional
prothatthe"rationalization"
Irrationality
ofrationalization. Weberrecognized
cesses at whichbureaucracies
excelledcould be takento extremesand ultimately
to do their
iftherulesandprocedures
thatenabledbureaucracies
becomeirrational
and
Ratherthandesigningthemostappropriate
jobs becameends in themselves.
rulesandprocedures
bureaucracies
oftentailor
efficient
toaccomplish
theirmissions,
rulebook.84
Thus,
and comfortable
theirmissionsto fittheexisting,well-known,
means(rulesand procedures)maybecomeso embeddedand powerfulthatthey
determine
endsandthewaytheorganization
definesitsgoals.One observerof the
WorldBanknotedhow,at an operational
level,thebankdidnotdecideon developmentgoals and collectdata necessaryto pursuethem.Rather,it continuedto use
andformulated
plansfrom
data-collection
goalsanddevelopment
existing
procedures
electionsmaybe anotherinstancewheremeans
thosedata alone.85UN-mandated
becomeendsin themselves.
The "end" pursuedin themanytroubledstateswhere
theUN has been involvedin reconstruction
is presumably
somekindof peaceful,
Towardthatend,theUN hasdevelopeda repertoire
ofinstrustable,justgovernment.
topromote
something
akinto a demomentsandresponsesthatarelargelyintended
craticgovernment.
electionshave becomepriviAmongthosevariousrepertoires,
successful
conclusion.
legedas a measureof "success"anda signalofan operation's
UN (andother10) officials
haveconducted
electionsevenwheneviConsequently,
orperhapsevencounterprodencesuggeststhatsuchelectionsareeitherpremature
In placeslike
as muchbystateandUN officials).86
acknowledged
ductive(frequently
preciselytheoutcometheUN andoutsidepowershad
Bosniaelectionshaveratified
intervened
toprevent-ethnic
cleansing-andinplaceslikeAfricaelectionsarecrititheveryethnictensions
designedtoquell.
cizedas exacerbating
theywereostensibly
UN peacekeeping
mightalso provideexamples.As theUN begantoinvolveitself
thatentailedthemanagement
andreconoperations"
in various"second-generation
itturned
totheonlyinstrument
thatwas readilyavailciliationofdomesticconflicts
aremilitary
units.Peacekeepers,
ablein sufficient
however,
numbers-peacekeeping
conflict
andtobe interposed
betweentwocontendtrained
tohandleinterstate
troops,
stateofficials,
and
withtheirconsent.SomeUN staff,
ingnationalarmies,operating
forthedescholarsworriedthatpeacekeepers
mightbe inappropriate
peacekeeping
wouldtransfer
mandsofhandlingdomesticsecurity.
Theyfearedthatpeacekeepers
to another
without
thathadbeenhonedforone environment
theskillsand attitudes
tosomeobservers,
theadjustments
peacekeeprequired.
According
fullyconsidering
intonew
conflict
andmindset
ersdidjustthat:theycarriedtheirinterstate
equipment
mindedposturethan
and so createda moreaggressiveand offensively
situations
84. Beetham1985,76.
85. See Ferguson1990;andNelson1995.
86. Paris1997.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations721
wouldotherwise
havebeenthecase. The resultwas operations
thatundermined
the
objectivesofthemandate.87
Bureaucraticuniversalism. A secondsourceofpathology
inIOs derivesfromthe
factthatbureaucracies
"orchestrate
numerous
local contexts
atonce."88Bureaucrats
necessarily
flatten
diversity
becausetheyare supposedto generateuniversalrules
and categoriesthatare,by design,inattentive
to contextual
conandparticularistic
cerns.Partofthejustification
forthis,ofcourse,is thebureaucratic
viewthattechnical knowledge
is transferable
acrosscircumstances.
Sometimes
thisis a goodassumption,but not always; whenparticularcircumstances
are not appropriate
to the
generalized
knowledge
beingapplied,theresultscanbe disastrous.89
oftheAsianfinancial
ManycriticsoftheIMF's ha'ndling
criseshavearguedthat
theIMF inappropriately
applieda standardized
formulaof budgetcutsplus high
interest
ratesto combatrapidcurrency
without
theunique
depreciation
appreciating
andlocal causesofthisdepreciation.
Thesegovernments
werenotprofligate
spenders,and austerity
policiesdid littleto reassureinvestors,
yettheIMF prescribed
thesameremedythatithadinLatinAmerica.The result,
roughly
bytheIMF's later
was tomakematters
admission,
worse.90
in Cambodia
Similarly,
manyof thosewho workedin peacekeepingoperations
weretransferred
topeacekeeping
inBosniaorSomaliaon theassumption
operations
thattheknowledgegainedin one locationwouldbe applicableto others.Although
sometechnicalskillscanbe transferred
acrosscontexts,
notall knowledgeandorganizationallessonsderivedfromonecontext
areappropriate
elsewhere.
The UN has a
commitment
to neutrality,
whichoperationally
longstanding
translates
intotheview
thattheUN shouldavoid theuse of forceand theappearanceof partiality.
This
knowledgewas employedwithsomesuccessbyUN envoyYasushiAkashiin Cambodia. Afterhis stintin Cambodia,he becametheUN Special Representative
in
to
Yugoslavia.As manycriticsof Akashihave argued,however,his commitment
theserules,combinedwithhis failureto recognizethatBosnia was substantially
different
fromCambodia,led himtofailtouse forcetodefendthesafehavenswhen
itwas appropriate
andlikelytobe effective.91
Normalizationof deviance. We derivea thirdtypeof pathologyfromDiane
the
Vaughan'sstudyofthespaceshuttle
Challengerdisasterin whichshechronicles
torules(deviance)overtimebecomeroutinized
andnormalpartsof
wayexceptions
Bureaucracies
establishrulestoprovidea predictable
procedures.92
responsetoenvironmental
stimuliin waysthatsafeguard
againstdecisionsthatmightlead to accidentsandfaultydecisions.Attimes,however,
bureaucracies
makesmall,calculated
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
See Featherston
1995;Chopra,Eknes,andNordbo1995;andHirschandOakley1995,chap.6.
Heyman1995,262.
Haas 1990,chap.3.
See Feldstein1998;RadeletandSachs 1999;andKapur1998.
Rieff1996.
Vaughan1996.
722 International
Organization
or institutional
dedeviationsfromestablished
rulesbecauseofnewenvironmental
velopments,
explicitly
calculatingthatbendingtherulesin thisinstancedoes not
createexcessiveriskofpolicyfailure.Overtime,theseexceptionscan becomethe
rule-theybecomenormal,notexceptionsat all: theycan becomeinstitutionalized
Theresultofthisprocessis thatwhatat
tothepointwheredevianceis "normalized."
anddebatedas a potentially
unacceptable
riskor
timet1mightbe weighedseriously
dangerousprocedurecomesto be treatedas normalat timetn.Indeed,becauseof
thosemakingdecisionsat a laterpointin timemightbe unawarethat
staff
turnover,
thenow-routine
behaviorwas everviewedas riskyordangerous.
We areunawareofanystudiesthathaveexaminedthisnormalization
ofdeviance
in IO decisionmaking,thoughone exampleof deviancenormalization
comes to
as onlyone of threedurable
mind.Before1980 theUNHCR viewedrepatriation
solutionsto refugeecrises(theothersbeingthird-country
asylumandhost-country
In itsview,repatriation
hadtobe bothsafeandvoluntary
becauseforced
integration).
ofnonrefoulement,
whichis the
repatriation
violatestheinternational
legalprinciple
of international
cornerstone
refugeelaw and codifiedin theUNHCR's convention.
emphasizedthattheprinciples
Priorto 1980,UNHCR's discussionsof repatriation
mustbe safeguarded
at all costs.Accordingto many
of safetyand voluntariness
to repatriacommentators,
however,theUNHCR has steadilyloweredthebarriers
protection
manutionovertheyears.Evidenceforthiscanbe foundin international
thatnowweighs
Committee
anddiscourse
resolutions,
repatriaals,theUNHCRExecutive
othergoalssucha peacebuilding.This
tionandtheprinciple
ofnonrefoulement
against
as initialdeviations
fromorganizational
was a steadyandincremental
development
ofdeviance.The resultwas
overtimeandled to a normalization
normsaccumulated
andan increaseinthefrequency
a lowering
ofthebarriers
torepatriation
ofinvoluntaryrepatriation.93
Insulation. Organizations
varygreatlyin thedegreeto whichtheyreceiveand
aboutperformance.
Those insulatedfrom
processfeedbackfromtheirenvironment
culturesand worldviews
thatdo notpromote
suchfeedbackoftendevelopinternal
whocreateditandwhom
ofthoseoutsidetheorganization
thegoalsandexpectations
worldviewscan createtheconditionsforpathological
it serves.These distinctive
and categorization
schemescome to define
behaviorwhenparochialclassification
theworld-suchthattheyroutinely
understand
ignoreinreality-howbureaucrats
oftheirgoals.94
formation
thatis essentialtotheaccomplishment
is profesTwo causes of insulation
seemparticularly
applicableto 1Os.The first
does morethanimparttechnicalknowledge.It acsionalism.Professional
training
orientation
and worldviewsof thosewho are
tivelyseeks to shapethenormative
trained.
Doctorsaretrainedto valuelifeaboveall else,soldiersaretrainedto sacriInternational
1997a,b;HumanRightsWatch1997; Zieck 1997,
93. See Chimni1993,447; Amnesty
"The ShieldforExilesIs Lowered,"TheNew YorkTimes,22
433, 434, 438-39; andBarbaraCrossette,
December1996,4-1.
94. See BergerandLuckman1967,chap. 1; Douglas 1986;Biuner1990;MarchandOlsen 1989;and
Starr1992.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations723
ficelifeforcertainstrategic
objectives,and economistsare trainedto value efficiency.Bureaucracies,
by theirnature,concentrate
professionals
insideorganizatraining
tions,andconcentrations
ofpeoplewiththesameexpertise
or professional
Seccan createan organizational
worldviewdistinct
fromthelargerenvironment.
ond,organizations
forwhom"successfulperformance"
is difficult
tomeasure-that
is, theyarevaluedforwhattheyrepresent
ratherthanforwhattheydo anddo not
fromselec"compete"withotherorganizations
onthebasisofoutput-areprotected
tionandperformance
pressures
thateconomistic
modelssimplyassumewilloperate.
Theabsenceofa competitive
coupled
environment
thatselectsoutinefficient
practices
withalreadyexistingtendencies
towardinstitutionalization
ofrulesandprocedures
insulatestheorganization
fromfeedbackandincreasesthelikelihoodofpathologies.
inthedegreetowhichtheprofessionals
havedistincIOs varygreatly
theyrecruit
tiveworldviewsand thedegreeto whichtheyface competitive
butit is
pressures,
insulatesomeIOs to somedegreeandin so doing
clearlythecase thatthesefactors
createa tendency
towardpathology.
The WorldBank,forexample,has beendomito
natedformuchofitshistory
byeconomists,
which,atleastinpart,hascontributed
manycritiques
ofthebank'spolicies.In one suchcritiqueJamesFergusonopenshis
thebank'sintroductory
in Lesothobycomparing
studyoftheWorldBank'sactivity
description
ofLesothoin itsreporton thatcountry
to factson theground;he shows
geoghowthebank"creates"a worldthathas littleresemblance
towhathistorians,
raphers,
ordemographers
see on thegroundin Lesothobutis uniquelysuitedto the
bank'sorganizational
abilitiesand presents
preciselytheproblemsthebankknows
how to solve.This is notsimply"staggeringly
bad scholarship,"
Fergusonargues,
froma particular
buta wayofmakingtheworldintelligible
andmeaningful
perspective-the WorldBank's.95The problem,however,is thatthisdifferent
worldview
whichFergusonexploresindetail.
translates
intoa recordofdevelopment
failures,
well-known
feature
oforganizaInsulation
contributes
toandis causedbyanother
to evalufeedbackloopsthatallowtheorganization
tions-theabsenceofeffective
Thisis surelya
tocorrect
established
routines.
ateitsefforts
anduse newinformation
in anysocialtaskbutis onethatmanyorganizations,
"rational"procedure
including
headofthe
andeventhecurrent
1Os,failtoperform.96
Manyscholarsandjournalists,
a rather
distinctive
record
WorldBank,havenoticedthatthebankhas accumulated
andhas showna marked
tooperatewiththesamecriteria
of "failures"butcontinues
ofitsownprojects.97
The sameis true
in evaluating
theeffectiveness
lackofinterest
conferences
thatwere
of other1Os. JaratChopraobservesthatthelessons-learned
could
establishedafterSomalia werestructurally
arrangedso thatno information
atfacesaving,Chopra
comeoutthatwouldblemishtheUN's record.Suchattempts
Sometimes
cautions,makeit morelikelythatthesemaladieswill go uncorrected.98
95. Ferguson1990,25-73.
96. MarchandOlsen 1989,chap.5; Haas 1990.
97. See Wade 1996,14-17; Nelson1995,chaps.6, 7; andRichardStevenson,"The ChiefBankerfor
1997,sec. 3, 1, 12-14.
theNationsattheBottomoftheHeap,"New YorkTimes,14 September
98. Chopra1996.
724 International
Organization
newevaluativecriteria
arehoistedin orderto demonstrate
thatthefailureswerenot
reallyfailures
butsuccesses.
Culturalcontestation. Organizational
coherence
is an accomplishment
rather
than
a given.Organizational
controlwithina putativehierarchy
is alwaysincomplete,
creating
pocketsof autonomy
andpoliticalbattleswithinthebureaucracy.99
Thisis
partlya productofthefactthatbureaucracies
areorganizedaroundtheprincipleof
division-of-labor,
and different
divisionstendto be staffed
by individualswho are
"experts"in theirassignedtasks.Thesedifferent
divisionsmaybattleoverbudgets
or materialresourcesand so followthebureaucratic
politicsmodel,buttheymay
also clashbecauseofdistinct
internal
culturesthatgrowup insidedifferent
partsof
theorganization.
Different
segments
oftheorganization
maydevelopdifferent
ways
of makingsenseof theworld,experiencedifferent
local environments,
andreceive
different
stimulifromoutside;theymay also be populatedby different
mixesof
professions
orshapedbydifferent
historical
experiences.
All ofthesewouldcontributeto thedevelopment
ofdifferent
withintheorganization
anddifferlocal cultures
entwaysofperceiving
theenvironment
andtheorganization's
overallmission.Organizationsmaytrytominimize
complications
fromthesedivisionsbyarranging
these
demandshierarchically,
buttotheextentthathierarchy
resolvesconflict
bysquelchinginputfromsomesubunits
infavorofothers,
theorganization
losesthebenefits
of
a divisionof laborthatit was supposedto provide.More commonly,
though,attoreconcilecompeting
worldviews
aresimplyincomplete.
Most
tempts
hierarchically
andcontradictory
setsofpreferences
organizations
developoverlapping
amongsubdifferent
different
normative
groups.100
Consequently,
constituencies
representing
ina clash
viewswillsuggestdifferent
tasksandgoalsfortheorganization,
resulting
thatgenerates
tendencies.
ofcompeting
perspectives
pathological
The existenceof culturalcontestation
trueof high-profile
mightbe particularly
andexpansiveIOs liketheUN thathavevaguemissions,broadandpoliticizedconandlotsofdivisionsthataredevelopedovertimeandinresponsetonew
stituencies,
demands.Arguablya numberof themorespectaculardebaclesin
environmental
as theproductof these
recentUN peacekeepingoperationsmightbe interpreted
contradictions.
missionsand thevalue it
Considertheconflict
betweentheUN's humanitarian
and neutrality.
Withintheorganization
thereare manywho
places on impartiality
ofUN action.On theone hand,the
viewimpartiality
as a coreconstitutive
principle
anditsabilitytopersuadeall restonthisprinciple.
UN's moralstanding,
itsauthority,
of humanitarianism
On theotherhand,theprinciples
requiretheUN to giveaid to
thosein need-values thatare particularly
strongin a numberof UN reliefand
andhumanitarian
humanitarian
agencies.Thesetwonormsof neutrality
assistance,
in
mostdevotedto them,comeintodirectconflict
andthepartsof thebureaucracy
reliefmightjeopardizethe UN's
thosesituationswhereprovidinghumanitarian
99. See Clegg 1994a,30; Vaughan1996,64; andMartin1992.
100. Haas 1990,188.
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations725
vauntedprinciple
ofneutrality.
Bosniais theclassiccase in point.On theone hand,
the "all necessarymeans"provisionof SecurityCouncilresolutions
gave theUN
authority
to deliverhumanitarian
aid andprotect
civiliansin thesafehavens.On the
otherhand,theUN abstainedfrom"takingsides" because of thefearthatsuch
actionswouldcompromise
itsneutrality
andfuture
effectiveness.
The resultofthese
was a stringof contradictory
conflicts
policiesthatfailedto provideadequatelyfor
theUN's expandinghumanitarian
charges.101
Accordingto ShashiTharoor,a UN
official
intimately
involvedin thesedecisions,"It is extremely
difficult
tomakewar
andpeacewiththesamepeopleon thesameterritory
atthesametime."102
UNHCR providesanother
possibleexampleofculturalcontestation.
Historically,
theUNHCR's Protection
Divisionhas articulated
a legalisticapproachtowardrefuandthustendstoviewtheUNHCR anditselfas therefugee'slawyerand
gee matters
as theprotector
of refugeerightsunderinternational
law. Those thatinhabitthe
UNHCR's regionalbureaus,however,
havebeencharacterized
as takinga less "narrow"viewof theorganization's
thattheUNHCR musttakeinto
mission,stressing
accountthecausesofrefugeeflowsandstatepressures.
Thesecultural
conflicts
have
beenparticularly
evident,accordingto manyobservers,
whentheUNHCR contemplatesa repatriation
exercisein areasofpoliticalinstability
and conflict:
protection
officers
demandthattherefugees'rights,
be
includingtherightofnonrefoulement,
whereastheregionalbureausare morewillingto undertake
a risky
safeguarded,
exerciseifitmightservebroaderorganizational
repatriation
goals,suchas satisfying
theinterests
ofmemberstates,andregionalgoals,suchas facilitating
a peace agree103
ment.
it is a
cultureis nottheonlysourceof 10 dysfunction,
Althoughbureaucratic
one thatcreatesbroadpatterns
ofbehaviorthatshouldinterest
potentially
powerful
relationsscholars.Noneofthesourcesofpathologiessketched
international
hereis
and
likelyto appearin isolationin anyempiricaldomain.Theseprocessesinteract
feedon each otherin waysthatwillrequirefurther
andresearch.Moretheorizing
theorganization's
internal
we must
over,whilewe havehighlighted
characteristics,
environment
alwaysbearinmindthattheexternal
pressesuponandshapestheinteroftheorganization
in a hostofways.Culturalcontestation
within
nal characteristics
an organization
fromandremainslinkedto normative
contrafrequently
originates
dictionsin thelargerenvironment.
Demandsfromstatescanbe extremely
important
determinants
of 10 behaviorand mayoverrideinternal
culturaldynamics,
butthey
canalso settheminplaceifconflicting
statedemandsresultinthecreation
oforganizationalstructures
or missionsthatareproneto pathology.
As we beginto explore
andpathological
we mustbearinmindthecomplexrelationdysfunctional
behavior,
causalpathways,
toboththeintershipbetweendifferent
remaining
closelyattentive
nal organizational
andthe10's environment.
dynamics
4 September1995,41-48; David
101. See Barnett1997a;David Rieff,"We HateYou," New Yorker,
Rieff,"The Institution
ThatSaw No Evil," TheNewRepublic,12 February1996,19-24; andRieff1996.
102. QuotedinWeiss1996,85; also see Rieff1996,166,170,193.
103. See Kennedy1986;andLawyersCommittee
forHumanRights1991.
726 International
Organization
Conclusion
Forall theattention
international
relations
scholarshavepaidtointernational
institutionsoverthepastseveraldecades,we knowverylittleabouttheinternal
workings
ofIOs or abouttheeffects
theyhavein theworld.Ourignorance,
we suspect,is in
largeparta productof thetheoretical
lens we have applied.Froman economistic
perspective,
thetheoretically
interesting
questionto ask aboutIOs is whytheyare
createdin thefirstplace. Economistswantto knowwhywe have firms;political
wanttoknowwhywe have1Os.In bothcases,thequestionflowsnaturally
scientists
If you thinkthattheworldlookslike a microecofromfirst
theoretical
principles.
nomicmarket-anarchy,
firms(or states)competing
to maximizetheirutilitieswhatis anomalousand therefore
theoretically
interesting
is cooperation.Conseourresearchtendsto focuson thebargainsstatesstriketo makeorreshape
quently,
in theirday-to1Os. Scholarspayverylittleattention
to whatgoes on subsequently
oreventhelargereffects
dayoperations
thattheymighthaveon theworld.
a constructivist
or sociologicallens,as we suggesthere,
ViewingIOs through
10
features
reveals
of behaviorthatshouldconcerninternational
relationsscholars
becausetheybearon debatescentralto ourfield-debatesaboutwhether
and how
matter
anddebatesabouttheadequacyofa statist
international
institutions
ontology
in an eraofglobalization
ofthisalternative
andpoliticalchange.Threeimplications
approachareparticularly
important.
First,thisapproachprovidesa basisfortreating
IOs as purposiveactors.Mainstreamapproachesin politicalsciencethatare inhavetendedtolocateagencyinthestatesthatcomprise
formed
byeconomictheories
10 membership
andtreatIOs as merearenasinwhichstatespursuetheirpolicies.By
in thebroaderinternaexploringthenormative
supportforbureaucratic
authority
to construct
thesocial world,we
tionalcultureand theway IOs use thatauthority
fromstatemembersandwhyit may
providereasonswhyIOs mayhave autonomy
to treatthemas ontologically
makesenseanalytically
independent.
Second,byprowe also openup thepossibility
thatIOs arepowerful
vidinga basisforthatautonomy
effects
on theworld.We have suggestedvarious
actorswho can have independent
ways to thinkabouthow IOs are powerfulactorsin globalpolitics,all of which
of how IOs affectnotonlydiscreteoutcomesbut
encouragegreaterconsideration
basisofglobalpolitics.
also theconstitutive
to normative
evaluationsof IOs and
Third,thisapproachalso drawsattention
questionswhatappearsto us to be ratheruncritical
optimismabout10 behavior.
relations
international
scholarshavebeenquicktorecognizetheposiContemporary
Butforall
tivecontributions
thatIOs can make,andwe,too,aresimilarly
impressed.
can also be inefficient,
theirdesirablequalities,bureaucracies
ineffective,
repressive,
relations
haveshownlittleinterandunaccountable.
International
scholars,
however,
The liberalWilsoeffects.
estininvestigating
theseless savoryandmoredistressing
andagents
ofpeace,enginesofprogress,
tendsto see IOs as promoters
niantradition
foremancipation.
Neoliberalshavefocusedontheimpressive
wayinwhichIOs help
andachievedurablecooperation.
Realstatestoovercomecollectiveactionproblems
forcesin worldpolitics.Constructivists,
istshavefocusedon theirroleas stabilizing
PathologiesofInternational
Organizations727
too,havetendedto focuson themorehumaneand other-regarding
features
of 1Os,
butthereis nothing
aboutsocialconstruction
thatnecessitates
"good" outcomes.We
do notmeanto implythatIOs are "bad"; we meanonlyto pointout theoretical
reasonswhyundesirable
behaviormayoccurandsuggestthatnormative
evaluation
of10 behaviorshouldbe an empirical
andethicalmatter,
notan analyticassumption.
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