Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon
Series: Research Programs and Debates
Author(s): Ole R. Holsti
Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 439-466
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InternationalStudiesQuarterly
(1992) 36, 439-466
Public Opiniionand ForeignPolicy:Challenges
to theAlmond-Lippmann
Consensus
MershonSeries:ResearchPrograms
andDebates
OLE R. HOLSTI
Duke University
This articlesurveysand assessestheoriesand researchon public opinion
and foreignpolicy.Most of the evidence is drawnfromthe literatureon
the United States.Three twentieth-century
wars have had a significant
impact on theoryand scholarship.World War I-the firstpublic relations war-and postwar effortsto create a new internationalorder
directedmuch attentionto the nature of public opinion and its impact
on foreignaffairs,issues on which realistsand liberals came to quite
differentconclusions.The period surroundingWorld War II coincided
withthe developmentof scientificpolling. Much of the attentionduring
and immediatelyafterthe warfocusedon the extentto whichthe public
American role. Extensive
mightsupport or oppose an internationalist
researchduringthe firsttwodecades afterWorldWar II yieldeda broad
agreement (the "Almond-Lippmannconsensus") on three propositions
about public opinion: (1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate
foundationsfor stable and effectiveforeignpolicies, (2) it lacks coherence or structure,but (3) in the finalanalysis,it has littleif any impact
on foreignpolicy.The VietnamWar and its aftermathstimulateda new
on public opinion and foreignpolicy,much
outburstof researchactivity
of which has challenged each of these three propositions.The article
concludes with suggestionsfor furtherresearch efforts,including: (1)
case studiesemployingarchivalsourcesto assessmore directlythe impact
of public opinion, (2) cross-nationalstudies, (3) developmentof standard questionsin orderto encourage bettercumulationof surveyresults,
and (4) researchthatwillenable us to distinguishfindingsthatare timeand context-boundfromthosethattranscendthe Cold War period.
Introduction
Many questions about the role of public opinion in foreign policy are at the center
of persisting debates between the liberal-democratic and realist approaches to
foreign affairs.Is public opinion a force for enlightenment-indeed, a necessary if
not sufficientcondition for sound foreign policy-as celebrated by the Wilsonians
Author'snote: For helpfulcommentsand suggestionson an earlierdraftof thispaper I am gratefulto Stephen
Earl Bennett,WilliamChittick,Thomas Graham,Jon Hurwitz,Benjamin Page, Mark Peffley,Philip Powlick,Bruce
and twoanonymousreviewersforInternational
Russett,Eugene Wittkopf,
StudiesQuarterly.
?) 1992 InternationalStudiesAssociation
440
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
and otherliberals?There is a long,liberal-democratic
tradition,datingback at least
to Kant and Bentham,thatforeignpolicies of democraciesare more peaceful,at
least in partbecause the public can play a constructive
role in constrainingpolicy
of
to the public can restrainthewar-making
makers;onlyaccountability
proclivities
leaders.1
Alternatively,
are Hans Morgenthauand othersof the realistschool correctin
and coherentdiplomacy,hindescribingpublic opinion as a barrierto thoughtful
to promotenationalintereststhattranscendthe moods and passions
deringefforts
of the moment?The realisttraditionis intenselyskepticalof the public's contribution to effectiveforeignpolicy.At the veryminimum,most realistswould distinguish betweenforeignpolicyand other public policyissues; the public mightbe
sufficiently
informedto deal withlocal issues thatimpingeon theirdailylives,but
foreignaffairsare too remote fromtheirexperience,and in any case theyhave
littleinclinationto become more informedabout such complexand remoteissues.
Finally,the effectiveconduct of diplomacyrequiressecrecy,flexibility,
and other
qualitiesthatwould be seriouslyjeopardized were the public to have a significant
impacton foreignpolicy.Thus, to permitthe public a strongvoice in policywould
be to place the democracies,ifnot the stability
of the internationalsystemitself,at
a distinctdisadvantage.Moreover,it would permitthe emotional to govern the
rational.Hans Morgenthausummarizedthe case againstan activerole forpublic
opinion in words that would gain the support of most if not all realists:"The
rationalrequirementsof good foreignpolicycannot fromthe outsetcount upon
the support of a public opinion whose preferencesare emotional rather than
rational"(Morgenthau,1978:558).
The long-standing
debate betweenliberalsand realistswas intensifiedbyWorld
War I, whichmightbe describedas the firstpublic relationswar.Fromitsinception
both the Allied and CentralPowers tried to win over "worldopinion" in various
ways,including publicationby many governmentsof highlyselectivedocument
collections-the so-calledcolor books-all ofwhichwere intendedto absolvethem
and to place the blame for the war on their adversaries.The propaganda war
duringthe conflictwas almostas intenseas thaton thebattlefield.
PresidentWilson'shopes fora new postwarworldorder depended significantly
on democratizingforeign affairsand diplomacy. Elihu Root, a distinguished
summarizedthe positionof
Republican and formerSecretaryof State,effectively
those who welcomed an increasingrole for the public in the conduct of foreign
affairs.
When foreignofficeswere ruled by autocraciesor oligarchiesthe danger of war
was in sinisterpurpose. When foreignaffairsare ruled bydemocraciesthe danger
of war will be in mistakenbeliefs.The world will be gainer by the change, for,
while thereis no human wayto preventa kingfromhavinga bad heart,thereis a
human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. (Root,
1922:5)
By more effectiveinternationaleducation, "the people themselveswill have the
means to testmisinformation
and appeals to prejudiceand passionbased on error"
(Root, 1922:5).
But not all observersjoined Wilson and Root in applauding the prospect of
popular diplomacy. During the postwar era, the journalist Walter Lippmann
published two trenchantcritiquesof the central premisesof classical liberalism
(Lippmann, 1922, 1925). Accordingto Lippmann,the common man is too fully
engaged in the requirementsof earning a livingand otherwiseattendingto his
1 Recent research has found that the foreignpolicies of democracies are indeed different
fromthose of other
politiesand, further,
thatdemocraciesdo n-otengage in waragainsteach other.
OLE R. HOLSTI
441
most immediateneeds to have the time or inclinationto satisfythe heroic, but
clearlyunrealistic,assumptionsabout the informedand engaged citizencelebrated
in classicaldemocratictheory.The chasm betweentheoryand realityis especially
farremovedfromthe directexperiences
whichare typically
wide on foreignaffairs,
of the mass public. Consequently,the "picturesin the head" of the averagecitizen
are unlikelyto have much correspondencewith the real world of international
affairs.Moreover,journalist Lippmann became increasinglyskepticalabout the
to fillin the gap betweenthe real worldand
abilityof his own professioneffectively
His studyof the Russianrevolution,as depictedin
the averagecitizen'sstereotypes.
the pages of the NewYorkTimesduringthe period 1917-20,did nothingto assuage
his pessimism about the abilityof the media to serve as a source of valid
informationabout the world for the public (Lippmann and Metz, 1920). The
events of the 1930s and the outbreak of World War II, which seemed to raise
serious questions about Wilsonian assumptions while apparently providing
compelling empirical confirmationfor the realist approach to international
relations,furthertipped the balance of the debate on public opinion and foreign
policyin favorof the skeptics.
coincided
The period encompassingWorldWar II and itsimmediateaftermath
withthe inceptionof scientificpublic opinion polling.Despite the wounds to the
reputationof polling and pollstersinflictedby the LiteraiyDigest debacle in the
Roosevelt-Landonelection, we can date the era of scientificsurveysfrom the
of the Gallup poll in 1936 or of thePublic Opinion Quarterlytwoyears
establishment
later.It maybe worthnotingthatPresidentRooseveltwas a pioneer in the use of a
public opinion consultant-Hadley Cantril,one of the foundingfathersof the new
science-for guidance on policy.
Policy makersand manyotherswho feltthat an irresponsibleAmericanisolationismafter1919 had contributedto the outbreakof WorldWar II worriedthat
the public mood mighttrace out a patternresemblingthe experience of the
followedsoon
period afterWorld War I: wartimeidealism and internationalism,
thereafterby cynicismand disenchantmentwith active American leadership in
effortsto create a more stable internationalorder.2This concern was reflectedin
the frequencywithwhichpollingorganizationsduringWorldWar II asked respondentsgeneral questionsabout the United Statestakingan activerole in, or staying
out of, world affairs,and specificqueries about support for or opposition to
Americanmembershipin the UnitedNations.
These two features-an empirical approach that relied heavilyon systematic
polling data and a normativeconcern that an isolationistpublic mightlead the
United Statesto repeat the failedisolationistpolicies of the interwarperiod-may
be found in two of the pioneeringworkson public opinion and foreignpolicy:
Thomas Bailey's TheMan in theStreet(1948) and Gabriel Almond's TheAmerican
Policy(1950).
PeopleandForeign
The Post-WorldWarII Consensus
The availabilityafter World War II of growingsets of polling data and the
of systematic
studiesof votingbehavior,combinedwiththe assumption
institution
2JustbeforePresidentRooseveltleftforthe YaltaConferencein 1945, Hadley Cantrilgave the presidenta memo
which stated: "Although the overwhelmingmajorityof the American people now favor a strong international
organizationnecessarilydominated by the big powers,it is unrealisticto assume thatAmericansare internationalThe
minded. Their policyis ratherone of expediency,which,at the moment,takes the formof internationalism.
restson a ratherunstablefoundation:it is recent,it is not rooted in anybroad or long-range
presentinternationalism
ithas littleintellectualbasis" (Cantril,1967:76).
conceptionof self-interest,
442
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
of a leadership role in world affairsby the United States,served to stimulatea
growthindustryin analysesof public opinion. The consensusviewthatdeveloped
duringthisperiod of some fifteenor twentyyearsafterthe end of World War II
and just priorto theVietnamescalationcenteredon threemajorpropositions:
* Public opinion is highlyvolatileand thus it providesverydubiousfoundationsfor a
soundforeignpolicy.
* Public attitudeson foreignaffairsare so lackingin structureand coherencethatthey
mightbestbe describedas "non-attitudes."
* At the end of the day, however,public opinion has a verylimitedimpact on the
conductofforeign
policy.
Let us examine each of these propositions,and the evidence upon which they
rested,in more detail.
PublicOpinionIs Volatile
As noted earlier,WalterLippmann's books of the interwarperiod described the
mass public as neithersufficiently
interestednor informedto playthe pivotalrole
assignedto it by classicaldemocratictheory.At the heightof the Cold War thirty
yearslater,Lippmann had become even more alarmed,depictingthe mass public
as not merelyuninterestedand uninformed,but as a powerfulforcethatwas so out
of synchwithrealityas to constitutea massiveand potentiallyfatalthreatto effectivegovernmentand policies.
The unhappy truthis that the prevailingpublic opinion has been destructively
wrongat the criticaljunctures.The people have impresseda criticalveto upon the
judgments of informed and responsible officials.They have compelled the
whichusuallyknewwhatwould have been wiser,or was necessary,or
government,
whatwas more expedient,to be too late withtoo little,or too long withtoo much,
too pacifistin peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralistor appeasing in
negotiationsor too intransigent.Mass opinion has acquired mountingpower in
this country.It has shown itselfto be a dangerous masterof decision when the
stakesare lifeand death. (Lippmann,1955:20)
Similarlypessimisticconclusions and dire warnings were emerging from
disparateother quartersas well. Drawingon a growingbody of polling data and
fearing that the American public might relapse into a mindless isolationism,
covereda thickbedrockof
because onlya thinveneerof postwarinternationalism
indifferenceto the world,Gabriel Almond depicted public opinion as a volatile
and mood-drivenconstraintupon foreignpolicy:"The undertowof withdrawalis
stillverypowerful.Deeply ingrainedhabits do not die easy deaths. The world
outside is stillveryremotefor mostAmericans;and the tragiclessons of the last
decades have not been fullydigested"(Almond,1950:85). Consequently,"Perhaps
is thatof the instability
of
the gravestgeneral problem confrontingpolicy-makers
mass moods, the cyclicalfluctuationswhich stand in the way of policy stability"
(Almond,1950:239).3Six yearslater,Almondrestatedhis thesisin Lippmannesque
of public moods, but otherdeficienciesas
language,citingnot onlythe instability
well. He told an audience at the National War College, "For persons responsible
forthe makingof securitypolicythese mood impactsof the public have a highly
3 Almond's use of the term "mood" differsfromthat of Frank Klingberg.Almond refersto sudden shiftsof
interestand preferences,whereas Klingberghas used the term to explain American foreignpolicy in termsof
generation-longsocietal swingsbetween introversionand extraversion.For the latterusage, see Klingberg(1952,
1979, 1983) and Holmes (1985).
OLE R. HOLSTI
443
irrationaleffect.Often the public is apatheticwhen it should be concerned,and
panickywhenit should be calm" (Almond,1956:372,376).
Otherswhose writingsprovidedsupportforthe main outlinesof the pessimistic
Almond-Lippmannthesis included a distinguishedlist: the dean of American
diplomatic historians(Thomas A. Bailey); the foremostproponent of a realist
approach to internationalaffairs(Hans J. Morgenthau); and the diplomat-historianwho has oftenbeen depicted as the intellectualfatherof the Americanpolicy
of containment,George F. Kennan. For the latter,the metaphorof a dinosaur
vividly
depictedtheproblemsof democraticforeignpolicy.
But I sometimeswonderwhetherin thisrespecta democracyis not uncomfortably
similarto one of thoseprehistoricmonsterswitha bodyas long as thisroom and a
brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortableprimevalmud and pays
littleattentionto his environment;he is slow to wrath-in fact,you practically
have to whackhis tailoffto make him aware thathis interestsare being disturbed;
but,once he graspsthis,he laysabout him withsuch blind determinationthathe
not only destroyshis adversarybut largelywreckshis native habitat. (Kennan,
1951:59)
Furthersupportforthe criticsand skepticsemerged fromthe growingbody of
polling data whichyieldedample evidence of the public's limitedstoreof factual
knowledgeabout foreignaffairs.Innumerablesurveysrevealedsuch stunninggaps
in informationas: X percentof the Americanpublic are unaware that there is a
communistgovernmentin China, Y percent believe that the Soviet Union is a
memberof NATO, or Z percentcannot identify
a singlenationborderingon the
PacificOcean. Such data reinforcedthe case of the criticsand led some of themto
propose measuresto reduce the influenceof the public. Thus, Lippmann (1955)
called forstrongerexecutiveprerogativesin foreignaffairs,and Bailey (1948:13)
wonderedwhetherthe requirementsof an effective
foreignpolicymightmake it
necessaryfortheexecutivedeliberatelyto misleadthe public.
PublicOpinionLacksStructure
and Coherence
A growingvolume of data on public opinion and voting behavior, as well as
increasinglysophisticatedmethodologies,enabled analystsnot only to describe
aggregateresultsand trends,but also to delve into the structureof politicalbeliefs.
Owing to immediatepolicyconcernsabout the U.S. role in the postwarera, many
of the earlystudieswerelargelydescriptive,
focusingon such issuesas participation
in internationalorganizationsand alliances, the deploymentof troops abroad,
securitycommitments,foreignaid, trade and protectionism,and the like. The
dimensionwould
underlyingpremisewas thata single internationalist-isolationist
serveto structureforeignpolicybeliefs,much in the waythata liberal-conservative
dimensionwas assumedto providecoherence to preferenceson domesticissues.
In a classic studybased on data fromthe late 1950s and early 1960s, Philip
Converse(1964) concluded thatthe politicalbeliefsof the mass public lack a real
structureor coherence. Comparingresponsesacross severaldomesticand foreign
or underlyingideological structure
policyissues,he foundlittleifany "constraint"
thatmightprovidesome coherence to politicalthinking.In contrast,his analyses
of elites-congressional candidates-revealed substantiallyhigher correlations
among responsesto variousissues.Moreover,Conversefound thatboth mass and
elite attitudeson a given issue had a short half-life.Responses in 1956 only
modestlypredictedresponsestwoyearslater,much less in 1960. These findingsled
him to conclude that mass politicalbeliefsare best described as "non-attitudes."
AlthoughConverse'sfindingswere laterto become the centerof an activedebate,
it should be emphasized thathis was not a lone voice in the wilderness.His data
of Michigan,and
were drawnfromthe National Election Studiesat the University
his findingswere onlythe mostwidelyquoted of a seriesof studiesfromthe NES
444
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
that came to essentiallythe same conclusion about the absence of structure,
coherence,or persistencein the politicalbeliefsof the mass public-especially on
foreignaffairs(Campbell,Converse,Miller,and Stokes,1964).
ImpactonForeign
Policy
PublicOpinionHas Limited
A significant
reason forinterestin public opinion on foreignaffairsarisesfromthe
assumptionthatin some waysand at least some of the time it has an impact,for
betteror worse,on the conduct of the nation's externalpolicy.Certainlyit is easy
to find public expressionsby policy makers avowingthe importanceof public
opinion. Duringhis debateswithStephenDouglas,AbrahamLincoln assertedthat,
"withpublic sentimenton its side, everythingsucceeds; with public sentiment
against it, nothingsucceeds"; and in 1936 Secretaryof State Cordell Hull stated
that,"sincethe timewhen ThomasJefferson
insistedupon a 'decent respectto the
opinions of mankind,'public opinion has controlledforeignpolicyin all democracies"(NewYorkTimes,
Dec. 6, 1936).
Althoughsuch hyperbolicstatementsare unlikelyto withstandseriousempirical
scrutiny,the drivingforce behind much of the post-WorldWar II attentionto
public opinion on foreignpolicy issues was the fear that an ill-informedand
emotional mass public would serve as a powerfulconstrainton the conduct of
American diplomacy, establishing unwise limits on policy makers, creating
otherwisedoing
unrealisticexpectationsabout whatwas feasiblein foreignaffairs,
seriousmischiefto Americandiplomacyand, giventheAmericanrole in theworld,
As BernardCohen (1973) demonstratedin
perhaps even to internationalstability.
a criticalsurveyof the literature,however,the constrainingrole of public opinion
was oftenassertedbut rarelydemonstrated-or even put to a systematic
test.
By the middle of the 1960s a consensus in factseemed to emerge on a third
point: Public opinion has littleif any real impact on policy. Or, as the point
was made most pithilyby one State Department official:"To hell with public
opinion....
We should lead, and not follow" (quoted in Cohen, 1973:62). The
weightof research evidence cast doubt on the potencyof public opinion as a
constraintupon, foreignpolicy-making.
drivingforcebehind,or even a significant
For example, a classic studyof the public-legislatorrelationshiprevealed that
constituents'attitudeson foreignpolicyhad less impacton membersof the House
of Representativesthan did theirviews on domestic issues (Miller and Stokes,
1963). Cohen's research on the foreignpolicy bureaucracyindicated that State
Departmentofficialshad a rathermodest interestin public opinion, and to the
extent that they even thought about the public, it was as an entityto be
"educated" rather than a lodestar by which to be guided (Cohen, 1973). The
propositionthatthe presidenthas "almosta freehand" in the conduct of foreign
affairsreceived support from other analysts,including Lipset (1966), LaFeber
(1977), Levering(1978), Paterson(1979), and Graebner (1983).
This period also witnesseda proliferationof case studiesof keyforeignpolicy
decisions; with rare exceptions, however, they make no reference to public
opinion. But it is not alwaysclear whetherthatis because: (1) public opinion was
irrelevantas an explanation to the decisions under consideration,(2) decisionmakersquietlyanticipatepublic opinion withoutconsciouslydoing so, (3) it was
excluded from the research design and thus no effortwas made to assess its
impact,or (4) disproportionateresearchattentionto internationalcrises-events
thatare usuallycharacterizedby shortdecision time-tended to exclude episodes
in whichdecisionsare the culminationof a long politicalprocess;all otherthings
being equal, the more protractedthe decision process,the more likelyare policy
makersto be subjected to the impactof public opinion throughthe activitiesof
Congress,pressuregroups,the media,and opinion leaders.
OLE R. HOLSTI
445
Although these studies did not answer all questions about the impact of the
public-for example, the realitiesof researchaccess required Cohen to focus on
preciselythose personswho are most shelteredfromthe effectsof elections-the
weightof the evidence would at least have assuaged those who shared fearsthat
mass public opinion "has shownitselfto be a dangerousmasterof decision when
the stakesare lifeand death" (Lippmann, 1955:20).
The Renaissanceof Interestin Public Opinion and ForeignPolicy
Justas WorldWar II and fearsof postwarisolationismamong the mass public gave
rise to concern about public opinion and its impacton foreignpolicy,the war in
Vietnamwas the impetusfora renewedinterestin the subject.It was a majorcatalyst
in stimulatinga reexaminationof the consensusthathad emergedduringthe two
decades afterWorldWar II. The VietnamWar had at least twodirecteffects.Most
broadly,
manyof thosewho had believedthata strongerexecutivehand on the tiller
of public policy,relatively
freefromthe whimsand vagariesof public moods, best
servesboth nationalinterestsand global stability,
came to reexaminetheirviewsin
the lightof the VietnamWar. Indeed, the widelyread columnistWalterLippmann,
who only a littlemore than a decade earlier had despaired of the tyranny
of a
fecklesspublic and had called for a strongerexecutiveto counteractthe mass
public, became a leading criticof the Johnson administration's
Vietnam policy;
eventuallyhe came to regardthepublic,whichhad become increasingly
skepticalof
thewareffort,
as more enlightenedthanthe administration.
At a narrower
level, some criticsof the war became increasinglypersuaded that
the Gallup, Harris,and other commercialpolls distortedpublic attitudestoward
the war by posing excessivelyrestrictiveand simplisticquestions. For example,
among the most widelyasked questions was whetherrespondentssupportedor
opposed currentAmerican policy in Vietnam; deeper probes that might have
offeredrespondents an opportunityto express their views about other policy
optionswere farless commonlyemployedby these pollingorganizations.Thus, in
addition to secondaryanalysesof surveydata relatingto the war (e.g., Mueller,
1973), the conflictin SoutheastAsia also stimulatedindependentsurveysdesigned
specificallyto assess foreignpolicyin greaterdepth and breadth than the typical
surveyconductedbyGallup and the othermajorpollingorganizations.
The firstof these studies, the Verba-Stanfordsurveys,focused on American
policy in Vietnam (Verba, Brody,Parker,Nie, Polsby,Ekman, and Black, 1967;
Verba and Brody,1970). Verba and his colleagues in factfound supportfor the
administration'sVietnam policy, but they also unearthed approval for such
alternativepolicies as negotiatingan end to the conflict.The period followingthe
Verba-Stanford
polls has witnesseda proliferationof studieswitha foreignaffairs
focus,includingsurveysof both the mass public (Rielly,1975, 1979, 1983, 1987,
1991; Hurwitz and Peffley,1987, 1990; Americans Talk Security,1987-1991;
Americans Talk Issues, 1991) and of opinion leaders (Barton, 1974-75, 1980;
Rielly, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991; Russett and Hanson, 1975; Holsti and
Rosenau, 1984, 1988, 1990; Chittickand Billingsley,1989; Koopman, Snyder,and
Jervis,1990a, 1990b, 1991). As a consequence, we are no longer totallydependent
on evidence generated by the major polling organizations.Moreover, these
independent surveysare oftendesigned withpolicyand/or theoreticalconcerns
be probed bysecondaryanalysesof the Gallup and other,
thatcan onlyimperfectly
more generalpublic opinion polls.
Thus, armed with growingcentral archivesof data generated by the major
polling organizationsas well as evidence produced by the independent surveys,
duringthe past twodecades analystshave begun to challengeimportantaspectsof
the consensusdescribedabove.
446
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
#1:Is PublicOpinionReallySo Volatile?
Challenge
challenge to the Almond thesisthat
WilliamCasparypresentedthe firstsystematic
public opinion on foreignaffairsis best characterizedbyvolatilemoods.4He took
issuewithAlmond'sheavyrelianceon a singlequestionin whichrespondentswere
asked to identify"the mostimportantissue today."Caspary'sanalysisof a broader
set of questionsled him to conclude that "Americanpublic opinion is characterized by a strongand stable permissivemood" towardactiveinternationalinvolvement (Caspary,1970:546).
Mueller's (1973) studyof public opinion towardthe Korean and Vietnamwars
posed anotherchallenge to the thesisof mindlesschanges in public attitudes.To
be sure,public supportforthe U.S. wareffortin both conflictseventuallychanged,
but in waysthatseemed explicableand rational,ratherthanrandomand mindless.
More specifically,
he foundthatincreasingpublic oppositionto the conflictstraced
out a patternthatfita curveof risingbattledeaths,suggestingthatthe public used
an understandable,ifsimple,heuristicto assessAmericanpolicy.5
The most comprehensive challenge to the Almond-Lippmannthesis has
emergedfromstudiesconductedbyBenjaminPage and RobertShapiro.Their evidence includes all questionsthathave been posed by major polling organizations
since the inception of systematicsurveysin the 1930s. Of the more than 6000
questions,almost 20 percenthave been asked at least twice,providingPage and
and change in mass
Shapiro witha large data set to assess the degree of stability
public attitudes.Employinga cutoffpoint of a differenceof 6 percentfromone
surveyto another to distinguishbetween continuityand change, theyfound that
mass opinion in the aggregateis in factcharacterizedby a good deal of stability,
and thatthisis no less true of foreignpolicythan on domesticissues (Page and
Shapiro, 1988). More important,when attitudeshiftstake place, theyseem to be
neitherrandom nor 180 degrees removed fromthe true state of world affairs.
Rather, changes appear to be "reasonable, event driven"reactions to the real
upon whichtheyare based is marginallyadequate at
world,even ifthe information
best.Theyconcluded that,
all the rapid shifts[in public opinion] we foundwere related to political
virtually
eventswhichsensiblecitizenswould
and economic circumstancesor to significant
take into account. In particular,mostabruptforeignpolicychanges took place in
connection withwars,confrontations,
or crises in which major changes in the
actions of the United States or other nations quite naturallyaffectpreferences
about whatpolicies to pursue.6
Because theiranalysesare based on aggregateresponsesratherthan on panel
studies in which the same respondents are interviewedrepeatedly,Page and
one aspect of the volatility
question: Precisely
Shapiro cannot address definitively
whatproportionof individualshave in factchanged theirminds?For an issue on
whichthe public divided 50 percent-50percentin each of two timeperiods,it is
approaching
theoretically
possible thatall respondentsdid so. However,volatility
4 By 1960, Almond himselfwas backing away from his most pessimisticdiagnoses. See his new preface to a
Policy.
reprintingof TheAmerican
PeopleandForeign1
5 "During the summerof 1965, as the JohnsonAdministration
was movingtowardfatefuldecisions regarding
Vietnam,George Ball warned:'We can't win,' he said, his deep voice dominatingthe Cabinet Room. 'The warwillbe
long and protracted,withheavycasualties.The mostwe can hope foris a messyconclusion.We mustmeasure this
loss thatwillresultfromwithdrawal.'Producinga chartthatcorrelatedpublic
long-termprice againstthe short-term
opinion withAmericancasualtiesin Korea, Ball predictedthat the Americanpublic would not supporta long and
inconclusivewar" (Clifford,1991:412).
6 Page and Shapiro (1982:34); see also Page and Shapiro (1983, 1984, 1988, 1992); Page, Shapiro,anidDempsey
(1987); Shapiro and Page (1988).
OLE R. HOLSTI
447
this magnitudeseems highlyunlikelybecause, as Page and Shapiro have shown,
opinion changestend to be in directionsthat"makesense"in termsof events.
ratherthan
The volatilitythesiscan be tested most directlyby individual-level
aggregate analysisof opinion data. Using differentmethods for correctingfor
thatat the individual
measurementerror,severalstudieshave shownconvincingly
level mass foreignpolicy attitudesare everybit as stable as domestic attitudes
(Achen, 1975; Peffleyand Hurwitz,1992a). These studiesrevealed an impressive
level of stabilityduring times of constancyin the internationalenvironment.A
in
panel studyby Peffleyand Hurwitz(1992a) also foundverysubstantialstability
policyattitudesand internationalimages even duringa period-the late 1980sthatwitnessedrapid and dramaticchanges in Soviet-Americanrelationsand other
aspectsof internationalaffairs.
Similar conclusions,supportingPage and Shapiro and castingdoubt on the
Almond-Lippmannthesis,have also emergedfromotherstudies.Jentleson(1992)
era, variationsin public supportforthe use of
foundthatduringthe post-Vietnam
force are best explained by differencesbetween force to coerce foreignpolicy
restraintby others,and force to influenceor impose internalpolitical changes
withinanotherstate;the formergoal has receivedmuch strongersupportthan the
latter.7
An interestingvariantof the "rationalpublic" thesisstipulatesthat the public
attemptsto moderateAmericanbehavior towardthe USSR by expressingpreferwhile supporting
ences for a conciliatorystance from hawkishadministrations
more assertivepoliciesfromdovishones (Nincic,1988). To the extentthatone can
to
generalizefromthisstudyfocusingon the Carterand Reagan administrations
otherperiods or otheraspectsof foreignpolicy,it furtherchallengesthe AlmondLippmann thesis-indeed, it turnsthat propositionon its head-for it identifies
the public as a source of moderationand continuity
and
ratherthan of instability
unpredictability.
It is important to emphasize that none of these challenges to the
Almond-Lippmannthesisis based on some newlyfoundevidencethatthe public is
in factwell informedabout foreignaffairs.Not onlydo polls repeatedlyrevealthat
the mass public has a very thin veneer of factual knowledge about politics,
economics,and geography;theyalso reveal that it is poorlyinformedabout the
of
specificsof conflicts,treaties,negotiationswith other nations, characteristics
weapons systems,foreignleaders, and the like. Because the modest factualbasis
upon which the mass public reacts to international affairs remains an
unchallenged-and unchallengeable-fact, we are faced with a puzzle: If a
generallypoorlyinformedmass public does indeed reactto internationalaffairsin
rational manner,what are the means that permitit to do so?
an events-driven,
Recall thata not-insignificant
bodyof researchevidenceindicatedthatmasspublic
attitudeslack the kind of ideological structurethatwould providesome coherence
acrossspecificissuesand persistencethroughtime.
LackStructure
and Coherence?
#2:Do PublicAttitudes
Challenge
Philip Converse's (1964) chapteron mass beliefsystemsis one of the mostwidely
cited studiesin the Americanpoliticalscience literature.In recentyearsit has also
spawned a vast literaturewhich has, on the one hand, vigorouslychallenged his
findingsand, on the other,supportedthe main thrustof Converse'sconclusions
7 For additional evidence about the "rationalpublic," the stabilityof policy preferences,and issue voting,see
Bennett(1972:742), Free and Watts(1980:50), Wittkopf(1986, 1990), Graham (1986, 1988, 1989), Krosnick(1988a,
1988b, 1990, 1991), Russett(1990), and Peffleyand Hurwitz(1992a, 1992b).
448
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
thatmass public attitudeslack ideological structure,
whereasthose of leaders are
characterizedby far greater coherence. Part of the debate is methodological,
centeringon the manner in which questionsare framed,the clarityof questions,
the degree to whichthe unsure are prodded to statea position,and similarissues
of research procedures. Did the evidentiarybase include enough questions to
support the conclusions? Did the analytical methods deal adequately with
problems of measurementerror? Does an analysisthat examines correlations
across specificpublic policy issues exhaust the possible structuresthat mightbe
used to lend coherence to politicalthinking?Studies thathave raised significant
methodologicalquestionsabout the Conversefindingsinclude Achen (1975) and
Sullivan,Piereson,and Marcus (1978).
Anotherpartof the controversy
focuseson trends,specifically
on the durability
of findingsthat,to a largedegree,drewfromevidencegeneratedduringthe 1950s.
This was a period of American economic, political,and militarydominance in
foreignaffairs-theshock of Sputnikin 1957 notwithstanding-with
the 1956 and
1960 elections takingplace afterthe Korean War and before escalation of the
Vietnamconflict.Domestically,the Eisenhoweryearsweremarkedbyrelatively
low
inflationand unemploymentand, despite the Montgomerybus boycott and
Greensborosit-ins,the fullimpactof the civilrightsmovementhad yetto be felt.
Accordingto the critics,this period, both celebrated and criticizedfor marking
"the end of ideology,"is insufficiently
representative
for assessingthe degree of
ideological consistencyamong the general public. In support of that view, a
number of analystsfound that,beginningwith the Johnson-Goldwater
election
campaign of 1964, ideological consistencyamong the public did in factincrease
(Nie and Anderson,1974; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik,1976). Some corroborating
evidence also appeared to emerge from Hero's (1969) assessmentof public
opinion polls on domesticand foreignpolicyissuesfromthe late 1930s to 1967. In
general,he founda veryweak relationshipbetweenthe two,withsome indications
of a strengthening
duringthepost-Eisenhower
years.
Those who claim to have found a greaterideological consistencyamong the
general public duringthe turbulentera of the 1960s and 1970s have also encountered criticism.Are the claims of greaterissue consistencyrooted in increasing
ideological consciousness?Alternatively,
are theymerelythe resultof parrotingof
ideological rhetoric,or of some methodologicalartifact?This is not the place to
providea blow-by-blow
account of the manyand variedanswersto theseand other
questionson the issue; forexcellentand detailed summariesof the vastliterature,
see Kinder (1983), Kinderand Sears (1985), and Snidermanand Tetlock (1986). It
will sufficeto say that there appears to be an emergingconsensus that public
responses to issues are not adequately captured by the most familiarbipolar
dimensions: liberal-to-conservative
If these
or internationalist-to-isolationist.
dimensionsconstitutethe standard,then mass public attitudesdo indeed appear
to lack structure.Given that tentativeconclusion,does the literatureon foreign
policy attitudesreveal anythingelse about organizingconcepts that mightlend
some coherence to masspublic attitudeson internationalaffairs?
Althoughthe more recentresearchliteraturehas yetto createa consensuson all
aspects of the question, there does appear to be a considerable convergenceof
findingson twogeneralpointsrelatingto beliefstructures:
1. Even though the general public may be ratherpoorly informed,attitudes
about foreignaffairsare in factstructuredin at least moderatelycoherent
ways.Indeed, low informationand an ambiguous foreignpolicy environment are actually likely to motivate rather than preclude some type of
attitudestructure.
2. A singleisolationist-to-internationalist
dimensioninadequatelydescribesthe
main dimensionsof public opinion on internationalaffairs.
OLE R. HOLSTI
449
An early study,based on the firstof the quadrennial Chicago Council on
employedfactoranalysisand othermethodsto
ForeignRelations(CCFR) surveys,
"conservative
uncover three foreignpolicy outlooks: "liberal internationalism,"
internationalism,"and "non-internationalism"(Mandelbaum and Schneider,
1979). A comparable trichotomy("three-headed eagle") emerged from early
analysesof the data on opinion leadersgeneratedbythe ForeignPolicyLeadership
Project(FPLP) (Holsti,1979; Holstiand Rosenau, 1979, 1984).
Others have questioned the divisionof foreignpolicyattitudesinto three types
and theyhave offeredcompellingevidence in supportof
ratherthan dimensions,
theircritiques.Chittickand Billingsley(1989) have undertakenboth originaland
includingone
secondaryanalyseswhich indicated the need for three dimensions,
that taps unilateralist-multilateralist
sentiments,not three types,to describe
adequatelythe foreignpolicybeliefsof both the masspublic and leaders. (See also
and Travis,1990).
Bardes and Oldendick,1978; Chittick,Billingsley,
A major set of contributionsto the debate about how best to describe foreign
policy attitudeshas come fromWittkopf'sexemplarysecondaryanalysesof the
1986, 1990). His
CCFR surveysof both the general public and leaders (Wittkopf,
revealedthatwitha
fromthe firstfourCCFR surveys,
results,developed inductively
singleexception,twodimensionsare necessaryto describeforeignpolicyattitudes:
(MI) and "support-opposecooperative
"support-opposemilitantinternationalism"
internationalism"
(CI). Dichotomizingand crossingthese dimensionsyieldsfour
(support MI, oppose CI),
types, with the quadrants labeled as hard-liners
(oppose MI, oppose CI), and
internationalists
(supportMI, supportCI), isolationists
accommodationists
(oppose MI, supportCI).
Support for Wittkopf'sMI/Cl scheme also emerges froma reanalysisof the
FPLP data on Americanopinion leaders (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990). That study
put the MI/Cl scheme to a demandingtestbecause of threemajor differencesin
the data sets: (1) The CCFR surveyswere undertakenin 1974, 1978, 1982, and
1986, whereasthe fourFPLP studiesfollowedtwoyearslaterin each case; (2) the
two sets of surveyshave only a fewquestionnaireitemsin common; and (3) the
MI/Cl scheme was developed largelyfromdata on the mass public, whereasthe
FPLP surveysfocusedsolelyon opinion leaders.
It may be worthnoting that although the originsof the MI/Cl scheme are
and cooperativeinternationalism
strictly
inductive,the militantinternationalism
dimensionscorrespondcloselyto the mostvenerableapproaches to international
relations: realism and liberalism.Realism views conflictbetween nations as a
natural state of affairsrather than an aberrationthat is subject to permanent
amelioration.Such realistconcepts as securitydilemma,relativecapabilities,and
"zero sum"viewof conflictare also basic to the MI dimension.There are similarly
dimension.
intimatelinksbetweenliberalismand the cooperativeinternationalism
Liberalism denies that conflictis an immutableelement of relations between
nations.It definessecurityin termsthatare broader than the geopolitical-military
dimensions, and it emphasizes the cooperative aspects of relations between
nations.Institutionbuilding,improvedinternationaleducation and communication,and tradeare but a fewof thewaysin whichnationsmayjointlygain and thus
mitigate,if not eliminate,the harshestfeaturesof internationalrelationsin an
anarchic system.In short,the CL dimension shares importantelementswiththe
liberal school of internationalrelationstheory.These MI and CL dimensionsalso
seem clearlyrelated to other conceptualizationsof Americanthoughton foreign
affairs.For example,Hughes's (1980:50) distinctionbetweenthe "security
culture"
and "equityculture"in Americanforeignpolicy,or Billington's(1987:632) cateand "idealist-liberals"
appear to parallel, if not
gories of "realist-conservatives"
matchexactly,the MI and CL dimensions.
Even if one accepts the necessityof tapping attitudeson both militantand
however,there is also some evidence that theyare
cooperativeinternationalism,
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PublicOpinionand ForeignPolicy
foreignpolicyattitudes.A
not sufficient
to describeall contoursof contemporary
has been suggestedbya
further
distinctionbetweenunilateralismand multilateralism
numberof studies(Wittkopf,
1986; Hinckley,1988, 1992; Chittickand Billingsley,
1989; Russett,1990). It is not reasonable to demand that any belief structure
and thereis indeed rather
should encompassall possibleaspectsof foreignaffairs,
persuasiveevidence thatattitudestowardsome ratherimportantissues cut across
an issue that is
the main dimensionsidentifiedabove. Trade and protectionism,
likelyto become more ratherthan less contentiousduringthe 1990s,is one such
example; questions revolvingaround Israel and American policy toward that
nationappear to formanotherclusterof attitudesthatdoes not fitneatlyinto the
MI/Cl scheme.
A somewhatdifferent
emergesfromseveral
approach towardattitudestructures
importantstudiesof the mass public conducted byJonHurwitzand Mark Peffley
(1987, 1990; Peffleyand Hurwitz,1985, 1992a, 1992b). In contrastto Converse's
search for "horizontal"coherence that relies on correlationsamong attitudes
towardvarious issues, Hurwitzand Peffleyproposed and tested a hierarchically
organized foreignpolicybelief structurein which specificpolicypreferencesare
anticommunism,
and isolationism)that,in turn,
derivedfrompostures(militarism,
are assumed to be constrainedby a set of corevalues (moralityof warfare,ethnocentrism)about the internationalcommunity.They found thatsuch structures
did in factexist among respondentsto theirsurveys.Thus, a fewrathergeneral
or a generalpreferencetowarda
beliefs-forexample,attitudestowardmilitarism,
"tough-minded"approach toward foreignaffairs-appear to serve as heuristics
whichenable one to respondin a reasonablycoherentmannerto a broad range of
issues, including defense spending, nuclear arms policy, militaryinvolvement
1987).
abroad,Sovietpolicy,and internationaltrade (Hurwitzand Peffley,
It is importantto state once again that none of these studies challenges the
overwhelmingevidence that the American public is poorly informed about
internationalaffairs;indeed, even the Persian Gulf War, the firstconflictto be
telecastin real time,increased the normallylow level of informationamong the
generalpublicbyonlya verymodestamount (Bennett,1992). Rather,thesestudies
appear to suggestthat,even in the absence of much factualknowledge,members
in order
of the mass public use some simple-perhaps even simplistic-heuristics
to make some sense of an increasingly
complexworld;a fewsalientcriteriarather
than completeinformationmayserveas the bases ofjudgment.Stated differently,
although lacking a deep reservoirof factualinformation,membersof the mass
public mayoperate as "cognitivemisers,"employinga fewsuperordinatebeliefsto
guide theirthinkingon a broad range of issues.For furtherevidence thatpeople
organize theirpoliticalworldsin richerand more diversewaysthan indicatedby
Converseand his colleagues,see Conoverand Feldman (1984).
Clearlythe recentresearchhas yetto produce a consensuson manyimportant
issues relatingto the structureand foreignpolicybeliefsamong the mass public.
Nevertheless,it is evidentthat the earlierconsensusdepictingpublic attitudesas
lackinganyreal coherence has been challengedfromvariousquarters.As a result
of substantialempiricalresearch,there is now a good deal of credible evidence
suggestingthatthe public does use variousheuristics-althoughnot necessarilythe
or internationalist-isolationist
traditional liberal-to-conservative
blueprints-for
organizingpoliticalthinking.
#3:Is PublicOpinionReallyImpotent?
Challenge
Amongthe mostimportantquestionsabout public opinion are: To whatextent,on
what kinds of issues, under what circumstances,and in what typesof political
OLE R. HOLSTI
451
ifany,does it have an impacton public policy?If it has an influence,what
systems,
are the means bywhichpublic attitudesmake theirimpactfeltbydecision-makers?
These are also the most difficultquestions,for our abilityto answerthem is not
materiallyenhanced by the manytechnicalimprovements
thathave characterized
public opinion research during the past half century:better sampling designs,
models
greaterattentionto constructionof questions,more sophisticatedstatistical
to analyzethe data, and the like. Not surprisingly,
then,we have a good deal more
systematic
evidence describingthe stateof, or trendsin, public opinion than on
how it has affectedthe actual conductof foreignaffairs.
As noted earlier,most of the evidence throughthe 1960s pointed towardthe
conclusionof public impotencein the foreignpolicy-makingprocess.Even when
thereappeared to be some correspondencebetweenpublic sentimentsand foreign
policy,not all analystswere prepared to accept the inferencethatthe formerhad
any independent impact on the latter.Accordingto several of them,including
revisionisthistorians,any evidence of a correlationbetween public opinion and
of effortsby policy
foreignpolicy merelyservesto underscore the effectiveness
makers,aided and abettedbypliantprintand electronicmedia, to manipulatethe
masspublic intoacceptanceof therulingelites'class-basedinterests.
There is no shortageof evidence thatmostpost-WorldWar II presidentshave
followedTheodore Rooseveltin thinkingthatthe WhiteHouse is a "bullypulpit,"
whetherit is used to "scarethe hell out of them"in orderto gain supportforaid to
Greece and Turkey,to warn against the dangers of "unwarrantedinfluence,
whethersoughtor unsought,by the military-industrial
complex,"or to drum up
supportforassistanceto the contrasin Nicaragua.It is also evidentthatsuch efforts
have not been equally successful.At least one noted public opinion analysthas
asserted that the relationshipbetween leaders and the public has changed"farewellto 'the Presidentknowsbest,"'as he put it-but it remainsto be demonstratedthatthe equation has been permanently
changed (Yankelovich,1979).
The more difficult
questionconcernsthe influencein the otherdirection.How
much did public impatiencelead the Carteradministration
to embarkon the illfated effortto free Americanhostages in Iran, or the Reagan administrationto
withdrawU.S. Marines fromLebanon? Did PresidentKennedygenuinelybelieve
thathe would be impeached should he failto forceremovalof Sovietmissilesfrom
Cuba, as he told his brother,or was he merelyseekingto bolsterdecisionsarrived
at forreasons thathad nothingto do withpublic opinion? Perhaps a more telling
example from the Caribbean confrontationemerges from recentlypublished
transcripts
of a crucial White House meetingon October 27, the day before the
crisiswas resolvedpeacefully.It appears that Kennedywas prepared to accept a
compromise solution-withdrawalof Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for
removalof Americanmissilesin Turkey-ratherthan initiatea furtherescalation
of the confrontation,
and thathe would have done so in large part becauseit would
had been
havebeenhardtoexplaintothepublicwhysucha seemingly
equitable
arrangement
rejected(Bundyand Blight,1987).
Some other anecdotal evidence may also be suggestive,but it hardlyoffers
irrefutable
answersto thisquestion.FranklinD. Rooseveltwas the firstpresidentto
make extensiveuse of public opinion data, but during recent decades every
few
administration
has employedpublic opinion professionals.We have relatively
detailedaccountsfromtheseanalystsabout how theirexpertiseand data wereused
in the policyprocess,but those thatexist (e.g., Cantril,1967; Beal and Hinckley,
1984; Hinckley,1992) suggestthat the mass public is not viewed merelyas an
essentiallyshapeless,malleable lump that can readilybe molded throughpublic
relations activitiesand compliant media to meet the immediate needs of the
administration.Hadley Cantril, who undertook public opinion analyses for
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PublicOpinionand ForeignPolicy
PresidentsRoosevelt,Eisenhower,and Kennedy,summarizedhis experiencein this
manner:"I wantto emphasizethatno claimis made here thatthe [publicopinion]
data and suggestionsLambert and I provided the President [Roosevelt] were
crucial to his decisions. But actions taken were certainlyveryoften completely
consistentwithour recommendations"(Cantril,1967:42).
Althoughit bears repeatingthatthe evidence describingpublic opinion stillfar
outstrips,both in quantityand quality,that on the causal links between public
opinion and foreignpolicy,researchin recentyearshas begun to castdoubt on the
earlierconsensusabout public impotence.In addition to anecdotal evidence,two
classes of studies have contributedto challengingthe thesis that foreignpolicy
processes are imperviousto impact from the public: quantitative/correlational
analysesand case studies.
Severalrecentquantitativestudieshave challengedsome importantfoundations
of the theorythat,at least on foreignand defense issues, the public is virtually
freeagents
impotent.One elementof thatthesisis thatpolicymakersare relatively
on foreignpolicy questions because these issues pose few dangers of electoral
retributionby voters; elections are said to be decided by domestic questions,
especiallythosesometimesdescribedas "pocketbook"or "breadand butter"issues.
However,a systematicstudyof presidentialcampaigns between 1952 and 1984
revealedthatin fiveof the nine electionsduringthe period, foreignpolicyissues
had "largeeffects."Or, as the authorsput it,when presidentialcandidatesdevote
campaign time and other resourcesto foreignpolicyissues,theyare not merely
"waltzingbeforea blind audience" (Aldrich,Sullivan,and Borgida,1989).
Recent research on votingbehavior has also emphasized the importanceof
retrospectiveevaluations on performanceon voter choice among candidates,
especiallywhen one of themis an incumbent(Fiorina,1981; Abramson,Aldrich,
and Rhode, 1990). Because votersare perceived as punishingincumbentcandidates or partiesforforeignpolicyfailures(forexample,the Iran hostageepisode)
or rewardingthemforsuccesses (forexample, the invasionof Panama to capture
General Noriega), decisionsbyforeignpolicyleaders maybe made in anticipation
of public reactionsand the probabilitiesof successor failure.
kind of testin a study
The electoralretributionhypothesisreceiveda different
ofAmericanpolicytowardChina duringthe threedecades followingestablishment
of Mao Tse-tung'sgovernmentin 1949. Kusnitzfound that,withfewexceptions,
the correspondencebetween public preferencesand U.S. policywas remarkably
high.At timespolicyled opinion and at othertimesopinion led policy,but on the
whole the two remained in harmony.These findingsare explained by issue
visibility,
partisan differences,and the nonrandom changes of opinion, which
combined to create the belief among leaders that the possibilityof electoral
retributionrequired them to pay close attentionto public opinion on the China
issue (Kusnitz,1984:173,176).
Anotherrecentstudyseems to cast some doubt on the universalvalidityof the
classicMiller-Stokes(1963) findingthat,compared to domesticissues,public attitudes on foreignpolicyquestionshave farless impacton membersof Congress.A
careful analysisof voting on Pentagon appropriationsat the beginning of the
Reagan administration's defense buildup revealed that
". . .
public opinion was a
powerfulforceforpolicychange in the realm of defensespendingin the firstyear
of the Reagan administration.Moreover, the impact of constituencyopinion
broad-based,influencingall sortsof representaappears to have been remarkably
tivesacrossa wide spectrumofspecificdefensespendingissues"(Bartels,1991:467).
Finally,two major studieshave measured the congruencebetween changes in
public preferencesand a broad range of policies overextended periods.The first,
a studyof public opinion and policy outcomes spanning the years 1960-1974,
revealed thatin almost two thirdsof 222 cases, policyoutcomes correspondedto
OLE R. HOLSTI
453
public preferences.The consistencywas especiallyhigh (92%) on foreignpolicy
issues. Monroe (1979:11) offersthree possible explanations for his findings:
Foreignpolicyissues permitmore decision-makingby the executive,are likelyto
be the object of relatively
less interestand influenceby organizedinterestgroups,
and are especiallysusceptibleto elite manipulation.The second studycoveredan
even longerspan-1935 to 1979-which included 357 significant
changesof public
preferences(Page and Shapiro, 1983). Of the 231 instancesof subsequentpolicy
changes,153 (66%) werecongruentwithchangesin public preferences.There was
littledifferencein the level of congruencefordomestic(70%) and foreignpolicy
(62%) issues.
Although anecdotal evidence and correlational analyses can make useful
contributionstowardunderstandingthe opinion-policyrelationship,theyare not
an entirelysatisfactory
substitutefor intensivecase studiesthat could shed more
directlighton how,ifat all, public opinion influencesforeignpolicy-making.It is
to describethe stateof or trendsin public opinion on an issue
not whollysufficient
immediatelypreceding or during foreignpolicy decisions.A findingthat major
decisionsseemed to be correlatedwithpublic preferencesdoes not,byitself,establisha causal link;forexample,policy-makers
mightbe respondingto pressuresand
constraintsfrom the internationalsystem-as realist theoristsinsist that they
should-without anysignificant
attentionto public sentimentson the issue,even if
those attitudes are highly congruent with those of the decision-makers.
the actual directionof causalitymightrun frompolicy-makers
to the
Alternatively,
public ratherthanvice versa,as depicted by criticswho describethe public as the
malleable targetsof public relationseffortsby Americanelites (Ginsburg,1988;
Margolisand Mauser, 1989). When opinion change precedes policychange, this
loses potency.However,we could not rule out stillanother possiinterpretation
bility:the administration
manipulatesevents;the events,now part of the information available to the public,resultin opinion change, followedby policychanges
thatare congruentwithopinions.A somewhatrelatedvariantof thissequence is
the "rally'round the president"hypothesis,accordingto whichthe executivemay
and responding
manipulatethe public indirectly
byundertakingexternalinitiatives
to eventsabroad in a mannercalculated to increase his popularitywithdomestic
constituents(Brodyand Shapiro,1989; Marra,Ostrom,and Simon,1990).
Among the more difficultcases are those dealing with public opinion as a
possible constrainton action. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration
undertook a massivepublic relationscampaign of dubious legalityto generate
public support for assistance to the "contra" rebels in Nicaragua (Parry and
Kornbluth,1988), but a carefulanalysisof surveyson the issue revealed that a
majorityof the public opposed Americanmilitary
involvementin CentralAmerica
(Sobel, 1989; see also Hinckley,1992). Would the Reagan administrationhave
intervenedmore directlyor massively
in Nicaraguaor El Salvadorin the absence of
such attitudes?Solid evidenceabout contemporary
non-eventsis, to understatethe
case, ratherhard to come by.Case studiesseem to be the onlywayto addresssuch
questions,although even this approach is not whollyfree of potentialproblems.
Does an absence of documentaryreferencesto public opinion indicate a lack of
interestby decision-makers?Alternatively,
was attentionto public attitudesso
deeplyingrainedin theirworkinghabitsthatit was unnecessaryto make constant
referencesto it? Are frequentreferencesto public opinion an indication of a
significantimpact on decisions-or of a desire on the part of officialsto be "on
record"as havingpaid attentionto public sentiments?
These examples do not implythat we are limited to simple one-directional
models of the links between the public and policy makers; examples of more
complex alternativesmay be found in Rosenau (1961), Graber (1968), Russett
(1990), Hughes (1978), and Hinckley (1992). Moreover,a full analysisof the
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Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
opinion-policylinks would often require explorationsinto many aspects of the
domesticpoliticalprocess,includingthe role of partiesand candidatesin raising
issues, the impact of interestgroups, the role of the media, the level of elite
competitionon specificissues,and the like.The literatureon each of thesetopics,
even if strictly
limitedto foreignpolicyissues in the United States,is enormous,
and space limitationspreclude their inclusion in this essay; Bauer, Pool, and
Dexter (1963) and Hughes (1978) are usefulin thisrespect.
In orderto selectbetweencompetinghypothesesabout opinion-policylinkages,
alternativesto carefullycraftedcase studies employing
there are no satisfactory
interviewsand/or archivalresearch designed to uncover how, if at all, decisionmakersperceive public opinion; feel themselvesmotivatedor constrainedby it;
factorit into theiranalysesof policyoptions; and otherwisetake it into account
when selectinga course of action,includinga decisionnot to takeexternalaction.
Althoughthe literatureaddressingthese questionsis not large,especiallywhen
compared to the number of studies that describe the state of public opinion,
several examples illustratethis type of research. The availabilityof substantial
collectionsof documents relatingto the 1914 European crisisenabled Richard
Fagen (1960) to studythe uses and assessmentsof public opinion duringtheweeks
leading up to World War I. Doris Graber undertookan intensivestudyof four
decisionsduringthe earlyperiod of Americanhistory-Adams'sdecision to renew
negotiationswith France in 1800, the Louisiana Purchase, Madison's policies
leading up to the War of 1812, and enunciationof the Monroe Doctrine.Despite
personality,ideological, and other differencesamong the four presidents,she
found that in each case public opinion was "an importantfactorin decision
making,but byno means the mostimportantsinglefactor"(Graber,1968:318).
A studyofforeignpolicy-makingabout a centurylatercame to a ratherdifferent
conclusion.RobertHilderbrandwas unable to discoverthatpublic opinion had a
significantimpact on foreign policy-making during the quarter century
(1897-1921) encompassingthe McKinley,Roosevelt,Taft,and Wilson administrations;to the extentthatpublic opinion entered into executivediscussions,it was
onlyafterpolicydecisionshad been made (Hilderbrand,1981:202). Stilldifferent
findingsemerged from a studyof public opinion and foreignpolicy from the
period leading up to World War II through PresidentTruman's 1947 speech
requestingaid to Greece and Turkey.Michael Leigh (1976) testedtwoapproaches
to the foreignpolicy process: the traditionalmodel that the public constrains
Americanpolicymakers,versusthe radical model thatmanipulationof the public
in favorof predeterminedpolicychoices not only takes place but also invariably
succeeds.His findingsvalidatedneithermodel.
impacton policyemerges
Strikingevidence thatpublic opinion has a significant
froma studyof fourcases of Americanarmscontrolpolicy-internationalcontrol
of atomicenergy,the LimitedTest Ban Treaty,the SALT I/ABM Treaty,and SALT
II-spanning every administrationbetween Presidents Truman and Reagan.
Graham (1989) used a researchdesign thatincluded an analysisof over500 public
opinion surveysand an examinationof primarysource materialsto determineif
correlationsbetweenpublic opinion and policydecisionswere causal or spurious.
The evidence revealed thatpublic opinion had an importantimpacton decisions
at all stagesof the policyprocess,fromgettingon the agenda throughnegotiation,
ratification,and implementation.Moreover, its impact varied, depending on
whether public support for a policy reached the level of majority(50-59%),
consensus(60-69%), preponderant(70-79%) or virtuallyunanimous (80%+).
Studies of the opinion-policylinksare not limitedto cases in which sufficient
time has passed to permit full examination of the relevant archives. Philip
Powlick'sanalysisof the role of public opinion in U.S. decisions on the Lebanon
OLE R. HOLSTI
455
interventionduring the firstReagan administrationrelied almost wholly on
interviews
withpolicymakers.Whereas public opinion influencedmanymid-level
officialsand a fewhigher ones-for example, Caspar Weinberger8-it had little
impact on others, including Ronald Reagan, Robert McFarlane, and George
Shultz. Foreign policy officialstended to regard congressional moods as the
relevantmanifestation
of public opinion.9Powlickconcluded thatpublic opinion
formedthe basis of severalrecommendationsto pull the Marinesout of Lebanon;
it helped ensure thatthe decision to withdrawwould be warmlyreceivedby most
officialsand members of Congress. However, President Reagan's decision to
withdrawwas apparentlyless influencedby public opinion than by the kinds of
externalsources that realistswould advocate following.Public opinion was thus
onlyone of severalfactorsthatcame togetherto bringabout the evacuationfrom
Beirutin February,1984 (Powlick,forthcoming).
Taken as a whole, these case studieswould seem to suggestthatthe impactof
public opinion has increasedduringrecentdecades. This tentativeconclusionalso
receives some support from interviewsof foreignpolicy officials.Although the
bureaucratsinterviewed
by Powlick(1991) were not notablymore sanguineabout
the public than were those takingpart in similarresearchby Cohen (1973) two
decades earlier,theyweremore inclinedto accept the legitimacy
of a public contribution to the policyprocess.Consequently,these officialstended to avoid policies
thatwereseen as likelyto engenderpublic opposition.In contrast,Graham (1989)
foundlittlechange over timebecause the public opinion has playedan important
role in arms controldecisions since the Truman years.This, then, is one of the
areas in whichthe need foradditionalresearchis mostapparent.
OtherRecentResearchDevelopments
OpinionLeaders
Until recently,one of the glaringgaps in public opinion researchhas been the
neglectof opinion leaders.Virtuallyall approaches to government-fromtheories
that view the United States as a pluralistdemocracyto those that depict it as
eliteswho seek to use foreignpolicy
pseudo-democracyruled by self-perpetuating
as an instrumentof narrow,class-basedinterests-recognizethe disproportionate
influence of some citizens (Devine, 1970). Moreover,at least since Almond's
seminalstudyof TheAmerican
PeopleandForeign
Policy(1950), it has been customary
to distinguishbetweenvariousstrataof the public. Typicallya distinctionhas been
drawnbetweenopinion leaders,the informedpublic,and the mass or uninformed
public,althoughthe precise termsand the shape of the distribution
among strata
mayvaryfromstudyto study(compare Kreisberg,1949; Almond, 1950; Rosenau,
1961; Genco, 1984; and Neuman, 1986). But onlyrarelyhave systematic
studiesof
respondents in the top strata been undertaken. On occasion the Gallup
Organizationhas surveyedsamples of personslistedin Who's Who in America-for
example, a July1953 poll on tariffs-butnot frequently
enough to be of value in
8Among six conditionsthatshould be met beforethe United Statescommitscombatforcesabroad, accordingto
Weinberger,"theremustbe some reasonable assurancewe willhave the supportof the Americanpeople" (New York
Times,November 26, 1984, A5:1). There is also evidence that General Schwarzkopfwas reluctantto fightin the
PersianGulfwithoutappropriatepublic support(Hinckley,1992:20).
9 If congressionalmoods are more generallyviewed by the executiveas expressionsof public opinion, then it
opens up another large body of evidence on interveningvariablesbetweenpublic opinion and foreignpolicy.For
recentstudiesthatexplore theselinkageson the StrategicDefense Initiative,
weapons procurement,and sanctionson
South Africa,see Lindsay(1990, 1991) and Hill (1992).
456
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
assessing trends. Until the firstof the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
surveysin 1974 (Rielly,1975) -followed bysimilarstudiesin 1978, 1982, 1986,and
1990 (Rielly,1979, 1983, 1987, 1991)-and the ForeignPolicyLeadership surveys
institutedtwoyearslater (1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992), therewas relatively
littlesystematic
informationabout leadershipviewson foreignaffairs.In addition
to the CCFR and FPLP surveys,
duringrecentyearstherehave also been a number
of one-time studies of opinion leaders (Barton, 1974-75, 1980; Russett and
Hanson, 1975; Sussman,1976; Chittickand Billingsley,1989). A continuingseries
of surveys,focused on national securityexperts,has also been initiatedrecently
(Koopman, Snyder,andJervis,1990a, 1990b, 1991).
The prior question of identifying"opinion leaders" is among the possible
barriersand sources of controversy
in studiesof thistype.There is, of course, an
extensivedebate on the precisedefinitionof opinion leaders in the United States,
and if consensuson thatquestion were a prerequisiteto elite surveys,theywould
bypassed
never be undertaken.Those designingleadershipstudieshave typically
the broader question and selected subjectsin one of twoways:(1) identifying
key
groups
roles and then surveying
a sample of those fillingthem,or (2) identifying
thoughtto be logical sources of opinion leaders and then drawingsamples from
directoriesor rostersof such persons-for example, biographiesin Who'sWhoin
America, Who's Who in American Politics, and similar sources; subscribers to the
or studentsat the NationalWar College.
journal International
Security;
A somewhatnarrowerarea of disagreementrevolvesaround the abilityto use
data from national probabilitysamples for studyingelites. To oversimplify
somewhat,the contendingviewscan be reduced to twopositionson the adequacy
of respondents'education levels as a surrogatemeasure of leadershipstatus.The
affirmative
viewwas presentedin a prognosisof how public opinion researchis
likelyto develop duringthe nexthalfcentury.
The mathematicsand economics of surveysmake them most cost-effective
for
assessinglarge undifferentiated
populations,i.e. mass publics. And untilyou get
to a handful of individualsat the verytop, you don't learn verymuch from
studying"elites"-theyseem to be just like bettereducated people in the general
population. These two generalizationssuggestno major shiftin our attention.
The same is truein totalitariancountries(and, I suspect,poor countries). (Davis,
1987:S178-S179)
Although the question is far fromsettled,at this point the proponentsof the
opposite viewpointwould appear to have at least a plausible case. A number of
studieshave found that,by itself,the level of educationalattainmentis an inadeforidentifying
quate yardstick
opinionleaders.Extensiveanalysesof the 1968, 1980,
and 1984 National ElectionStudiesand the firstthreeChicago Council surveysby
indicatorof
Krosnickand Carnot (1988) indicatethateducation is an insufficient
the attentiveforeignpolicypublic,much less of foreignpolicyopinion leadership.
Their findingsreveal little support for the hypothesisthat the "foreignpolicy
attentivepublic"is composed simplyof highlyeducated personswho are concerned
of
withall aspectsof publicpolicy.An earlierstudyalso castdoubton the sufficiency
educationas a measureofleadership(Rogers,Stuhler,and Koenig,1967).
Several studies have compared the viewsof opinion leaders and the general
public (Luttbeg, 1968; Rielly,1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991; Holsti, 1987, 1991;
Chitticket al., 1990; Wittkopf,1990; Schneider, 1992). Much of the evidence
indicatesgreatersimilaritiesthan differencesin the waysthatrespondentsin the
two groups structure
their political beliefs (Luttbeg, 1968; Wittkopf,1990), but
Chittickand his colleagues (1990) found some differenceswhen foreignpolicy
beliefstructuresare tracedover time.On the otherhand, thereexistsome rather
of theirpolicy opinions. A few examples
substantialdifferencesin the substance
fromthe mostrecent (1990) Chicago Council surveywillbe sufficient
to illustrate
OLE R. HOLSTI
457
some of the more persistentgaps betweenopinion leaders and the general public
(Rielly,1991). Leaders overwhelmingly
(97%) supported an active U.S. role in
worldaffairs,
whereasthe general public was more tepid in itsenthusiasm(59%).
Both groupshave shownlittlevariationin thisrespectover a period of nearlytwo
decades. Almostthreefourthsof the leaders agreed thatthe Cold War has ended,
but only about a third of the general public expressed that view. Whereas 90
percentof the leaders favoredforeigneconomic aid, especiallyto EasternEurope,
onlyhalfthatproportionof the generalpublic did so; moreover,among the latter,
fightingdrugsin Latin Americawas a favoritetargetof assistanceprograms.When
asked to identifythe mostimportantforeignpolicyproblems,the top threeitems
forleaders included issueswithan overwhelmingly
internationalcharacter:spread
of nuclear weapons,armscontrol,and improvementof the internationalenvironment.The comparablelistforthe generalpublic included issueswitha significant
domestic dimension: protectionof Americanjobs, protectionof U.S. business
interestsabroad, and adequate energysupplies.
The momentouschanges in the formerSovietUnion and elsewherethathave
characterizedthe period since 1988 suggestthe possibility-butcertainlynot the
inevitability-ofa "great debate" on the appropriate values, goals, roles, and
strategiesthat the United Statesshould pursue in the post-Cold War era. If one
assumes that top officialsand opinion leaders will have overwhelminginfluence,
whereasthe generalpublic willhave littleor none, then the evidencesuggeststhat
the United Stateswillcontinueto pursuean internationalist
foreignpolicy,broadly
defined. In that case, the debates are likelyto center on how the United States
participates(hard-linersvs. accommodationists).If, on the other hand, public
preferencesplay a significantrole in shaping at least the broad contours of
the
Americanforeignpolicy,then the policydebates are likelyto focuson whether
United Statesshould playan activeinternationalrole or focusmore on issuesthat
vs.isolationists).
have a directdomesticimpact(internationalists
TheSourcesofForeign
PolicyOpinions
During the early post-WorldWar II years,bipartisancooperation between the
White House and Congress made possible such initiativesas aid to Greece and
Turkey,the Marshall Plan, and NATO. Each of these strikingdeparturesfrom
traditionalforeignpolicieshad rathersolid public support;forfurtherevidenceon
these and other undertakings,see Levering (1978), Foster (1983), and Wittkopf
(1990:166-193). Agreementamong prominentleaders of the twomajor partiesno
doubt contributedto the fact that,among the general public, Democrats and
Republicansdifferedlittlewithrespectto these and other internationalist
foreign
A 1946 Gallup Poll revealedthat72 percentof respondentsin
policyundertakings.
both politicalpartiesfavoredan "active"internationalrole for the United States,
and the 1947 programof aid to Greece and Turkeyreceived approval from56
percent of both Democrats and Republicans. Nor were there notable partisan
in oppositionto sendingU.S. troopsto Indo-Chinain 1953 and 1954.
differences
reinforcedby even deeper
Since the VietnamWar, sharp partisandifferences,
ideological cleavages,have characterizedthe foreignpolicybeliefsof both opinion
leaders and the general public (Wittkopf,
1990; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984, 1990).
These differenceshave persisted into the 1990s, although President Reagan's
second-termturnaroundon such issues as arms control and conciliationof the
SovietUnion did tend to reduce Republican and conservativeoppositionto such
policies,therebyclosingsomewhatthe partisanand ideologicalgaps (Holsti,1991).
The ideological-partisan
cleavageson domesticissuestend to reinforcethoseon
not the case duringthe period betweenthe end
foreignpolicy.This was distinctly
of World War II and escalation of the conflictin Vietnam.In theirstudyof the
458
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
1948 election, Berelson and his colleagues (1954) found a limited correlation
between domesticeconomic issues and either civilrightsor internationalissues.
'To know,forexample,thatsomeone supportedthe New Deal on economic issues
provided no indication of his internationalor civil rightsposition" (Berelson,
Lazarsfeld,and McPhee, 1954:197-198). For furtherevidence of the lack of
correlationbetweendomesticand foreignpolicyissues duringthe decade and a
halfafterWorldWarII, see Campbellet al. (1964:113) and Key (1961:158).
Duringthe past twodecades the linesof cleavageon domesticand foreignpolicy
issues have increasinglycome to overlap (Russettand Hanson, 1975; Wittkopf,
1990). The evidence is especiallystrongat the level of opinion leadership (Holsti
and Rosenau, 1988). Consequently,the putative,moderatinginfluenceof cross-cuttingcleavageshas oftenbeen absentin the stridentpoliticsof the 1970sand 1980s.
Two other "gaps" have received considerableattentionfromopinion analysts.
The VietnamWar era spawned interestin generationaltheoriesof politics.The
fromKarl Mannheimto Sam Huntington,
writingof distinguishedsocial scientists,
seemed to offercogent hypothesesto explain the divisionsof Americansociety
duringthe Vietnamtrauma,pitting,accordingto some, the "Munichgeneration,"
which had witnessedthe bitterconsequences of effortsto appease expansionist
dictators,againstthe 'Vietnamgeneration,"whichargued thatitwas experiencing
effortto apply the "lessonsof Munich" to
the poisoned legacyof an ill-informed
the jungles of SoutheastAsia (Allison,1970-71; Roskin,1974). This explanation
has encountered mixed success when confrontedwith hard evidence. Wittkopf
(1990) found evidence of generationaldifferencesamong the general public.
However,at the level of opinion leaders the primarylines of cleavageappear to lie
withinratherthan between generations(Holsti and Rosenau, 1980, 1990). The
generationalhypothesisappears to farebest when applied to specificgroups such
as politicalactivists(Converse,1987) or protesters(Jennings,1987).
The term "gender gap" has also become a prominentpart of our political
vocabulary.There is some evidence of a systematicgender gap. For example,
Converse (1987:61) found substantialgender differencesand that "'Rambo'
from males." According to Baxter and
themes come very disproportionately
Lansing (1983), war/peaceconcernsare an exceptionto the generalrule thatmen
and women agree on most issues. Wittkopf(1990) also found gender-based
and cooperativeinternationdifferencesalong both the militantinternationalist
alist dimensions, and another study identified gender as among the most
importantdemographicpredictorsof foreignpolicy attitudes(Fite, Genest,and
Wilcox, 1990). A broad examination of surveydata led Shapiro and Mahajan
(1986) to the conclusion that systematicgender differencesalso emerge from
"compassion" issues and those involvingregulation and protection.However,
Conover (1988) argues that "feminism,"an ideological predispositiontowarda
certainstance on women's issues,overshadowsgender in explainingbeliefsand
values.A numberof recentAmericansTalk Securitysurveysalso cast some doubt
Women consistently
on stereotypical
viewsof gender differences.
expressedmore
skepticalopinions about the USSR than did men. Althoughwomen were more
inclined to describethemselvesas doves (ATS-9:119), men offeredmore support
on all fivearmscontrolitemsby an averagemarginof 6 percent;expressedmore
trustin the USSR on six of seven items (6 percent); assessed Gorbachev more
on eightitems(9 percent); had more benignviewsof Sovietmotiveson
favorably
six of nine items (3 percent); assessed relationsbetween the superpowersmore
favorablyon ten of thirteenitems (5 percent); and expressed a more optimistic
viewon the likelihoodof nuclear war (10 percent). In the onlyexception to this
pattern,womenweremore criticalon threeitemsrelatingto the impactof defense
spending(6 percent).
OLE R. HOLSTI
459
At the level of opinion leaders, evidence of systematicgender differencesis
harderto come by,excepton such issuesas tradeand the environment;
womenare
more protectionistand pro-environment.
Four FPLP surveysspanning a dozen
years indicate that women in leadership positions hold attitudes,including on
war/peace issues,thatare generallyquite similarto those of men in comparable
roles. Moreover,in theirpoliticalattitudes,liberal women are likelyto resemble
liberalmen,Republicanwomentend to resembleRepublicanmen,and so on.
Surveyresearchershave also produced evidence on other backgroundfactors,
includingoccupation,education,military
service,travelabroad, region,and so on,
but the mutuallyreinforcingpartisanand ideological cleavageshave clearlybeen
dominant in recent years. The public opinion data generally support the
conclusion of three perceptive observers: "For two decades, the making of
Americanforeignpolicyhas been growingfarmore political-or more precisely,
farmore partisanand ideological" (Destler,Gelb, and Lake, 1984:13). Whetherthe
end of the Cold War will contributeto softeningand blurringthe partisanideologicalchasmremainsto be demonstrated.
Conclusion
The consensus of the mid-1960son the nature,structure,and impact of public
opinion has clearly come under vigorous challenge during the past quarter
century.The VietnamWar,whilenot the sole causal factorin the reexaminationof
the conventionalwisdom,was certainlya catalyst.If a new consensus has yet to
emerge on all of the issues discussedabove, at least it seems safe to statethatthe
fieldis markedbyinnovativeresearchand activedebateson the implicationsof the
results.Nevertheless,there are at least fourareas thatseem to call foradditional
effort:case studiesemployingarchivalsources thatwill providethe most directly
relevant evidence on the impact of public opinion, cross-nationalresearch,
developmentof standardquestions in order to encourage cumulationof survey
results,and researchthatwill enable us to distinguishresultsthat are time-and
context-bound
fromthosethattranscendthe Cold War period.
As indicatedearlier,byfarthe leastwell developed of the areas discussedin this
essayhas been the opinion-policylink.We have impressivecorrelationalevidence
that policy changes are in fact predominantlyin the directionfavoredby the
public,but our confidencewould be enhanced by more substantialevidence of a
causal nature.The typeof researchdesign employedin the previouslycited study
by Thomas Graham (1989), combining analyses of surveydata with archival
researchin orderto assessthe causal impactof public opinion on decisionmaking,
is a good model forfuturestudies.More researchof thistypeshould go a long way
towardansweringsome of the mostimportantquestionsabout the opinion-policy
relationship.It should also providefurtherinsightinto otherimportantquestions:
What are the relevantindicatorsof public opinion? How much do polls matter?
What about expressionsof congressionalpreferences?What about the impact of
the media or interest groups? How and why do policy makers (and
administrations)differ in their sensitivityto differentindicators of public
sentiments?
It willno doubt have occurredto readersby now thatthisessayis almostwholly
confined to evidence of American public opinion. But questions about public
opinion and foreignpolicyare obviouslyof much broaderconcern,especiallyin an
era of expandingdemocracy,and a good deal of futureeffortshould be directed
towardcomparativeanalysis.Some examples of innovativecomparativeresearch
include Eichenberg (1989) and Risse-Kappen (1991). The latter found that
460
Public Opinionand ForeignPolicy
althoughpublic opinion was importantin each of fourcountries-France,Japan,
affectedby
West Germany,and the United States-its impact was significantly
domesticstructuresand coalition-building
processesamong elites. Distinctionsof
thiskindclearlytakeus a long waytowarda fullerunderstandingof opinion-policy
linkages.Dramaticchangesin EasternEurope and the formerSovietUnion should
open up possibilitiesfora range of comparativestudiesthatwould have been quite
impossiblejust a fewyearsago.
Mueller (1973:265) has appropriatelypointed to an importantlimitationon
opinion surveysarisingfromthe factthat "the poll interviewis a ratherprimitive
social situationin whichpoorlythoughtout answersare casually
stimulus-response
fittedto questionsthatare overlyingenuous."At minimum,thatwarningreminds
us to be cautiousabout makinginferencesfroma singledatum on public opinion.
It is permissibleto be moreventuresomein drawingtrendsfromlongitudinaldata,
but doing so assumes thatthe questionsposed have remained constant.Whereas
commercialpolling organizationsask certainstandardquestions at quite regular
intervals-for example, on rating presidentialperformance-there is nothing
comparable with a strictlyforeignpolicy focus. During and immediatelyafter
WorldWar II, respondentswere regularlyasked about the desirability
of an active
U.S. role in the world,but interestin that question appears to have died in the
mid-1950s;it was only revivedin the wake of the war in Vietnam when global
activismcame under increasingcriticism.In othercases, longitudinalanalysesmay
be rendered suspect,as in 1956 when Gallup made a "minor"alterationto its
standard question on foreignaid by adding the phrase, "to preventtheir [the
recipientsof aid] going communistic"at the end of the question.
Among the usefulfeaturesof the Chicago Council quadrennial studies (Rielly,
1975-1991) has been a carryover
of certainquestionsfromsurveyto survey.Their
question askingrespondentsto rate the importanceof a series of foreignpolicy
goals has been especiallyusefulforthosewithan interestin trendanalyses.
With a few exceptions, however,the independent surveysthat have been
undertakenin recentyearsappear to have taken littlenote of questionsin other
studiesthatmightprovide the basis for comparativeanalysis.In one sense thisis
understandable;the whole rationale for an independent surveyis to undertake
probes that have been overlookedby others.But it is also regrettablethat there
appears to be ratherlimitedcommunicationat the planningstage betweenthose
The developmentof even a handfulof standardforeign
who are designingsurveys.
policyquestions thatwould be included in all such surveyswould go a long way
recordof cumulativefindings.
towardimprovinga less-than-outstanding
Finally,so much of the evidence cited above has emerged froma four-decadelong period in whichforeignaffairsweredominatedbythe Cold War thatwe need
to address questions about whetherand how the end of that confrontationmay
affector even render obsolete what we have learned about public opinion and
foreignpolicy.At the most obvious level, there has been a sea change in public
all of the issuesthatdominatedthe Cold War era. Indeed,
attitudestowardvirtually
one could make a plausible case thatin manyrespectschangingpublic attitudes
precededratherthan followedthose at the pinnacles of governmenton such issues
as the appropriatelevel of defense spending, the primarythreatsto American
national security,assessmentsof Mikhail Gorbachev'sgoals, and the motivations
underlyingSoviet foreignpolicy (ATS surveys;Holsti, 1991). For example, well
before the demolitionof the Berlin Wall or the final collapse of the USSR, the
public ranked the danger to Americannationalsecurityfromthe SovietUnion in
seventhplace,just behind thegreenhouseeffect(ATS-9:51-54).
The end of the Cold War also raises some questions about the structuring
of
foreignpolicy attitudes.Substantialevidence indicates that assessmentsof the
SovietUnion have playeda keyrole in foreignpolicybeliefstructures;
forexample,
OLE R. HOLSTI
461
it is a centralelementin the hierarchicalmodel developed byHurwitzand Peffley
(1990) as well as in Wittkopf's(1986, 1990) militantinternationalism
dimension.
researchquestionsemergefromthe collapse of the SovietUnion.
Some interesting
Will it resultformanyin a loss of structureand consequent disorientationabout
In a replacementof the Sovietsbyanotheradversarysuch as Japan?
foreignaffairs?
Are there persons who, if deprived of one enemy, must search for another?
Alternatively,
are the key concepts that structurebeliefs about foreign affairs
sufficiently
genericthattheywillsurvivethe dramaticinternationalchanges of the
past fewyears?It is my guess that such dimensionsas militantinternationalism,
and unilateralism-multilateralism
cooperative internationalism,
will continue to
structureforeignpolicyattitudes,but the changeswe have witnessedsince the late
1980s are of such unprecedented magnitude that this must be treated as a
hypothesisthatrequiressystematic
testing.
At the broadest level, if we are indeed enteringinto a period of fewermajor
and greaterattentionto such nonmilitaryissues as trade,
power confrontations,
immigration,
the environment,
and the like-there is ample surveydata thatmuch
of the Americanpublic believesthisto be the case-it mayalso be an era in which
public opinion playsa more autonomousrole. Even thosewho do not fullyaccept
the "manipulatedpublic" thesiswould acknowledgethatcrisesand confrontations
abroad providea settingin whichopportunitiesand temptationsformanipulating
the public are far greater than on nonstrategicissues. Not only are the latter
resolvedover a longer time period-providing greateropportunitiesfor
typically
the public, pressuregroups,the media, and Congressto play a significantrolebut they also tend to be more resistantto claims that the needs for secrecy,
flexibility,
and speed of action make it both necessaryand legitimatefor the
executiveto have a relatively
freehand.
In short,we may be movinginto a period in which the relationshipbetween
public opinion and foreign policy takes on added rather than diminished
but we should also be waryof assumptionsthatthe theories,evidence,
significance,
and linkages emergingfromresearch during the Cold War era will necessarily
travelintactintoan era of strikingly
different
circumstances.
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