doi:10.1016/j.cities.2008.04.003
Cities 25 (2008) 207–217
www.elsevier.com/locate/cities
Why city-region planning does not work
well in China: The case of Suzhou–
Wuxi–Changzhou
Xiaolong Luo
*
Nanjing Institute of Geography and Limnology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Nanjing 210008, PR China
Jianfa Shen
1
Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong
Received 16 April 2007; received in revised form 28 January 2008; accepted 20 April 2008
Available online 5 June 2008
In the age of globalization, the city-region is a form of spatial organization that promises to promote
inter-city cooperation and so enhance the competitiveness of the whole city-region. The notion was
well accepted in China recently and many local governments attempted to formulate city-region plans
for coordinated development. City-region planning thus becomes a new form of Chinese spatial planning, led often by a higher-level government. This study attempts to analyze the processes of cityregion planning and implementation, and the behavior of provincial and city governments, by a case
study of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou city-region planning. Despite a strong hierarchical administrative
system, it is found that the city-region planning did not work well. Lack of actor interaction and
information exchange during the top-down planning process, the difficulties in specifying detailed
planning contents, and a lack of good planning mechanisms are major factors in unsuccessful planning implementation, making powerful city governments prone to inter-city competition even within
the same region. The findings echo the recent experiences in Western countries that emphasize the
needs of interaction, negotiation and consensus building in the planning process. A more powerful
regional institution in charge of city-region planning and implementation is needed for sustainable
development of city-regions in China.
Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: City-region, Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou city-region planning, China
Introduction
ning are often conceived as wise policy choices for cities
to build competitiveness in the UK and other Western
European countries (for example, Cooke et al., 2004;
Heeg et al., 2003; Wannop, 1995).
Recent developments show that cities in China have
seen similar changes. The term city-region (Dushi Quan)
has also become a catchword in academics and government documents. Many cities are making their city-region
plans in order to enhance their competitiveness and
facilitate regionalization. However, such planning often
cannot achieve its expected goals. This study attempts
to unveil the reasons that can cause the failure of such
planning, using the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou
City-region Planning (SWC planning). This paper is a
City-regions have become the motors of the global economy in the age of globalization. Facing cross-border competitive pressure, city-regions are engaged actively in
institution-building and policy making in an effort to turn
globalization as far as possible to their benefit (Scott et al.,
2001). But economic coordination in such regions remains
a great challenge. Urban networking and regional plan-
*
Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 25 86882132; e-mails: xluo@niglas.
ac.cn, jianfa@cuhk.edu.hk
1
Tel.: +852 26096469.
0264-2751/$ - see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
207
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
preliminary enquiry on the practice of city-region planning and development in China.
This paper is organized as follows. The following section considers inter-city competition and city-region planning in post-reform China to provide a background for
this study. The third section introduces the SWC planning
as a background. The process of SWC planning is analyzed in the fourth section. In the fifth section, the implementation of SWC planning is assessed. Redefinition of
city-regions by cities in SWC region is addressed in the
sixth section to illustrate inter-city competition. Some
conclusions are reached in the final section.
Inter-city competition and city-region planning in
post-reform China
The transition from state socialism to market economy
has posed great challenges to cities in China. A local
developmental state has emerged. Cities are keen on inter-city competition instead of cooperation (Shen, 2007;
Wu, 2000; Zhang, 2002). In the competition to attract foreign investors to their own cities, the local states are keen
to embark on place promotion, prestige projects and mega
events (Wu, 2000). They also offer tax concessions and
cheap land for investors (Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhu, 1999,
p. 541). Some forms of intervention, regulation and coordination are thus essential as leaders of Chinese cities lack
financial discipline and public accountability (Xu and
Yeh, 2005). Indeed, regional coordination has been promoted by the Chinese government for a long time, aiming
for balanced spatial development and poverty alleviation.
Urban system planning was a coordinative instrument designed to organize cities into hierarchies within metropolitan areas, with different functions to overcome excessive
competition and duplication of infrastructure.
In recent years, many city governments have attempted
to build city-regions to enhance competitiveness (Gao,
2004; Qian and Xie, 2004; Zhang, 2003). City-region planning is becoming a new initiative in Chinese spatial planning. Over 15 cities have formulated city-region plans in
the whole country.2 City-region planning aims to coordinate several political entities, i.e., administrative areas,
within the same region (Wang, 2003). This coordinative
feature makes it different from the traditional urban and
regional planning in China that emphasizes both control
and development within the hierarchical administrative
system, such as urban master planning and urban system
planning (Ng and Tang, 2004a; Yeh and Wu, 1998). Indeed, urban master planning is made generally for the
core urban area of a single city while urban system planning and regional planning have been rare and ineffective
in the past. Thus, the new city-region planning is considered as a new mode of urban and regional governance
by some Chinese researchers (Li, 2004).
To understand city-region planning in China, it is also
necessary to examine the role of provincial governments
in the formulation and implementation of city-region
planning, as provincial governments are the key player
2
http://www.sina.com.cn, 8 July, 2004.
208
of city-region planning in practice. Generally speaking,
in China, a city-region is part of a province and consists
of several prefecture-level cities that may administer some
counties/county-level cities. In the reform period, city
governments acquired great administrative and economic
power due to decentralization from central and provincial
governments (Shen, 2007). Prefecture-level cities are relatively independent administrative units. There is more
competition than cooperation among these prefecture-level cities, especially those more open and developed cities
along the coast. To coordinate the development of prefecture-level cities, most provincial governments, as the highest level of local governments, often function as
coordinators to facilitate city-region development, by
making and implementing city-region plans. A city-region
plan is formulated by a provincial government and approved by itself, instead of a higher-level government.
As a new initiative of Chinese spatial planning, the mechanism for city-region planning is not well established. The
provincial government only has limited influence on city
governments, due to the rising power of local governments in China. Without thorough consultation and horizontal exchange and negotiation, the city-region planning
is bound to face problems in the stages of formulation and
implementation, as will be shown by the SWC case in this
paper. In some cases, city-region plans are driven by prefecture-level cities such as Harbin and Nanchang, as provincial capitals. In these cases, the city-region plan may be
implemented more smoothly. But there may be conflicts
between prefecture-level cities and their surrounding
areas.
A fewer studies have focused on the transformation of
urban and regional planning (Leaf, 1998; Ng and Tang,
1999,2004a,2004b; Ng and Xu, 2000; Xu and Ng, 1998;
Yeh and Wu, 1998; Zhang, 2002). Many scholars argued
that the government plays a dominant role in urban and region planning and the planning is not effective in development control in China (Ng and Xu, 2000; Xu and Ng, 1998;
Zhang, 2000). According to Ng and Xu (2000), ineffective
planning is caused by the absence of well-established
planning institutions, the arbitrary intervention of higherranking government officials, and widespread illegal land
transactions and land use (Wei and Li, 2002; Zhang,
2000; Zhu, 2004). Worse still, local officials often have a
short term of office but have the absolute power to commit
to large projects without a well-articulated decision-making mechanism. Cities often have no urban planning committee or advisory committee. Urban development
strategies and construction plans may be changed suddenly
due to a change in the top leadership of a city (Zhu, 1999).
There is one exception. Abramson et al. (2002) argued that
Quanzhou’s planning is relatively successful due to the
absence of state investment, the unusual high degree of
participation by local communities and the need for historical preservation (the government acting as preserver).
Previous studies reviewed above provide useful insights
for understanding urban and regional planning in China.
However, there are still some problems in the existing
literature. First, the analysis of the processes of planning
formulation and implementation is inadequate. We are
still unsure if planning formulation and implementation
will affect the effectiveness of planning. Second, local
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
governments have their own interests in urban development. They adopt and pursue different policies and strategies of urban and economic development. Therefore, to
evaluate planning effectiveness, it is necessary to examine
the behaviors of various governments and their interaction
in the planning process. Finally, as a new kind of planning
in the Chinese urban and regional planning system, no
study has been made on city-region planning in China.
SWC planning is selected for a detailed case study in
this paper. The SWC plan was formulated in 2002 and
was the first city-region plan approved by the Chinese
government. SWC planning has been highly praised by
the Ministry of Construction, not only as a model of
city-region planning, but also a solution for excessive urban competition. However, as a new and experimental
instrument by governments, city-region planning has inevitably encountered various problems in the process of plan
making and implementation. Its implementation has not
been effective since the completion of the plan. In this
study, we will trace the planning process and examine
stakeholder interaction. Through these two lenses, this
paper attempts to examine why city-region planning does
not work well in China.
The SWC planning: the region and planning
objectives
The SWC city-region consists of three prefecture-level
cities of Jiangsu province, Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou,
which is the core area of Yangtze River Delta (YRD)
Region (Figure 1). The SWC region can be seen as a
new regional entity created by the Jiangsu provincial
government. The region had a population of 12.63 million in an area of 18,011 km2 in 2002. Although the region accounted for only 17.55% and 17.00% of the
total area and population in Jiangsu, respectively, its
GDP (RMB 690.06 billion) accounted for 44.48% of
the provincial total in 2002 (JSSB, 2003). The SWC
city-region is one of the most urbanized regions in China. There were 3 prefecture-level cities consisting of 9
county-level cities and 19 urban districts in 2002. With
the same administrative rank and power, main cities
and county-level cities engaged in intense competition
for foreign direct investment (FDI) and infrastructure
projects such as railways and airports. Local governments implemented various economic and administrative
policies to protect local interests. Some authors have argued that administrative boundaries prevent the free
movement of production factors such as capital, labor
and technology (Liu, 1996; Zhang et al., 2002). Such
competition has caused many acute problems, such as
the duplication of industrial structure, urban sprawl and
environment pollution (JSCC and JSURPI, 2002). In
addition, the SWC city-region can be regarded as a polycentric city-region (PCR) which often faces fierce urban
competition (Kloosterman and Lambregts, 2001).
In order to alleviate the serious problems of urban competition mentioned previously, the provincial government
of Jiangsu initiated SWC Planning to coordinate the
development of three cities in the region in 2001, when
Jiangsu province began to implement its urban system
plan. The provincial Construction Commission consigned
the planning task to the Jiangsu Urban and Rural Planning Institute and the Urban Planning Institute of Nanjing
University to produce the plan jointly. The SWC Plan can
be viewed as a blueprint for cooperation initiated by the
higher-level provincial government to coordinate development among three cities. In this sense, it is very similar
to ‘‘the vertical policy coordination’’ in Germany’s regional planning (Arndt et al., 2000). Officially, four major
objectives of SWC planning are stipulated (JSCC and
JSURPI, 2002).
The first objective is to make use of the dominant role
of the SWC city-region for regional economic development. The SWC region should become an engine of
development in the province, stimulating the development of northern and middle regions of Jiangsu.
The second objective is to alleviate problems of serious
urban competition and to enhance urban and regional
competitiveness.
Figure 1 Location of Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou and other major cities.
209
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
The third objective is to improve the relationship
between the SWC region and Shanghai. It is undeniable that the development of the SWC region benefits
greatly from its proximity to Shanghai, an emerging
global city (Shi and Hamnett, 2002). However, in
recent years, the Shanghai Government implemented
the 173 Project, aiming to develop an Experimental
Industrial Zone of 173 km2 in its suburban areas. Many
preferential policies were offered to manufacturing
investors. This initiative enhanced Shanghai’s competitiveness in manufacturing industry, competing against
the SWC region for investment. Thus adjusting the
relationship between Shanghai and the SWC region is
an urgent issue.
The fourth objective is to enhance regional competitiveness to face the challenges of economic globalization and China’s WTO accession.
The process of SWC planning
SWC planning was a comprehensive process covering
industry, infrastructure development, spatial planning,
environment protection and more. It was initiated by
the provincial government and was conducted by planning
institutes with passive involvement of the governments,
officials and planners in three cities. Thus, it was formulated and implemented in a top-down manner, reflecting
the provincial government’s intention of cooperation
and coordination. During the planning process, planning
institutes only functioned as bridges among the governments of the three cities and the province. The top leaders
of provincial and city governments were influential in the
formulation of planning and development strategies. Planners were subordinated to the bureaucratic machine in
China and could not play their professional role well in
development control (as observed by Yeh and Wu, 1998).
On the other hand, there was little information exchange and interaction among various governments, preventing cities from reaching consensus and building up
mutual trust. In fact, formulation of a coordinative plan
in a top-down manner in the SWC planning process triggered many disputes, such as with regard to infrastructure
development and land-use planning, as no city government had an interest in talking to fellow cities. They were
interested only in bargaining with the provincial government in the top-down planning process. They tended to
maximize their own interests and simply ignored the interest of others. Typical cases include the location of proposed airports and bridges across the Yangtze River.
The following will examine the case of new airport
location.
The SWC region has been served by the Shanghai Hongqiao Airport for many years, but international flight services were re-located from Hongqiao airport to the new
Pudong airport in recent years. This change considerably
increased the distance from the SWC region to the international airport and negatively affected SWC’s accessibility in international air transportation of goods and
passengers. In order to solve this problem, the provincial
government decided to construct a new airport for southern Jiangsu, as the three cities had a small airport each
210
with limited capacity. This was a key project in SWC planning. Therefore, fighting for hosting the new airport came
to a climax in the planning process. Each city had its own
reasons to compete with others for the proposed airport:
‘‘Suzhou: Most FDI and foreign investors are concentrated
in Suzhou. The move of international airport in Shanghai
has had more negative effects on Suzhou’s export-oriented
economy than other fellow cities. The airport thus should be
located in Suzhou.
Wuxi: Situated in the middle of southern Jiangsu, Wuxi has
the locational advantage and thus the new airport will provide the best services for Suzhou and Changzhou. Moreover, Jiangyin Yangtze River Bridge in Wuxi will also
extend the service scope of the new airport to central and
even northern Jiangsu.
Changzhou: Currently, Changzhou has an airport with the
highest grade in SWC region. In order to avoid infrastructure duplication, the existing airport should be expanded
to become the new airport. In addition, Changzhou, as
the central city in the southern part of Jiangsu (da sunan,
the area on the south of Yangtze River in Jiangsu province),
has the locational advantage.’’3
The battle for the new airport forced the provincial government to create a compromise rather than a real solution. In the SWC plan, three existing airports would
remain in each city and the new airport, named Southern
Jiangsu Airport (Sunan jichang), was proposed to be located in Wuxi.4 However, Changzhou and Suzhou still
put forward their own airport proposals, subsequently
indicating that they did not agree with the plan at the very
beginning. This case supports the argument that active
lobbying by local governments can often change the decision of governments at upper levels in China5 (Walder,
1995). Perhaps, Changzhou and Suzhou also believed in
such chances in the decision-making process. Indeed, the
final decision on the opening of a new airport is in the
hands of Civil Aviation Administration of China rather
than the provincial government. Thus, the provincial government and even the SWC planners do not have the legal
power to enforce the development of a new airport in
Wuxi. There are three reasons for this to happen. First,
the SWC planning process on the location of airports does
not seek endorsement from the national authority in
charge of airport administration. Second, the provincial
government has weak administrative power and financial
capacity. Third, the local city governments have strong
administrative power and are financially responsible for
development projects such as airports. As a result,
upper-level intervention may not be successful. The best
solution is for the provincial or central governments to
cooperate airport development in the province and the
country without relying on local financial resources.
3
These reasons were raised by vice mayors of corresponding cities in
the final discussion conference in March 2002. One of authors attended
this conference.
4
China Interview 09060401.
5
According to the regulation of Chinese aviation industry, any new
airport proposals must be approved by the State Council, National Civil
Aviation Administration, and provincial governments. Due to some
reasons, Suzhou temporarily gave up its dream of airport later on.
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
Most interestingly, the lower level government did not
share the same interest with its prefecture-level government. Although three prefecture-level cities were competing for the new airport, all county-level cities under their
administration refused to build the proposed airport on
their land. The county-level cities did not like to allocate
land-use quotas for construction (jianshe yongdi zhibiao)
for the new airport.6 Indeed, almost all cities in the
YRD region had used up their land-use quotas for construction. It is clear that there are complicated relations
among cities at various levels, which call for close interactions for coordinative planning. But such interaction is
clearly lacking in SWC planning.
It should be pointed out that almost all infrastructure
projects proposed in the SWC plan were subjected to disputes among cities. The provincial government acknowledged that it could not force three cities to fully
implement the plan and the aim of planning was just to
provide a blueprint for cooperation, guiding cities toward
integration.7 Thus, the provincial government lacks the legal power to implement the planning. A coordinated plan
should pay more attention to the process of planning,
especially building trust and consensus among cities. Only
then would the direction for cooperation become clear.
But inadequate interaction for consensus building in
SWC planning inevitably leads to its failure in implementation; this will be examined in the following section.
Assessing the implementation of the SWC plan
The implementation of the SWC plan
In order to evaluate the performance of the plan implementation process after its approval in 2002, we interviewed the planning consignor (the Construction
Commission of Jiangsu Province), executors (three cities’
Urban Planning Bureaus) and planners (the Urban and
Rural Planning Institute of Jiangsu Province and the Urban Planning Institute of Nanjing University), respectively. The implementation of SWC plans will be
assessed according to five components of the plan including industry planning, spatial planning, environment protection planning, tourism planning and infrastructure
planning (Table 1). The first four components only document general macro-strategies and do not involve concrete projects or items. They can only be, and will be,
assessed generally. On the other hand, there are many
key projects in the infrastructure planning process that
can be traced one by one in the course of implementation.
The implementation of industry planning, spatial planning, environment protection planning and tourism planning is generally unsuccessful, as shown in Table 1.
Nothing has really been achieved, as there are no opera-
6
To overcome issues of farmland loss caused by rapid urban growth, the
Central Government of China controls the quantity of land-use conversion from agricultural land to land-use for construction tightly, by
introducing land-use quota for construction. The Central Government
allocates land-use quota for construction to provinces and then down to
cities and counties every year.
7
China Interview 10060401.
tional guidelines or solutions at the macro-level.8
Although such planning addresses important development
strategies and guidelines, the general statements in SWC
plans are difficult to operate and implement. Further
study is needed to seek how individual cities can actually
follow and respond to such general statements in cityregion planning through city-level regulation, and what
kind of mechanism can be adopted to ensure effective
implementation. In the existing planning system of China,
planning often stops when a plan is produced and no adequate mechanism is in place to implement or revise the
plan. In some cases, such as urban master planning, the
planning and approval processes are too long and often
lag behind the actual development on the ground.
The implementation of infrastructure planning can be
assessed directly; according to Table 1, it too does not
work well. There are 10 projects that were being changed
or debated, being suspended, were difficult to operate or
were cancelled (this out of 17 key projects (59%) investigated) in this research. The following outlines the situation and problems of these projects.
(i) Highway and railway projects: The projects of changing the route of national highway No. 312 and upgrading
Hu-Ning (Shanghai–Nanjing) railway in the SWC plan
are infeasible, and thus difficult to realize. Thus, upgrading national highway No. 312 and raising train speeds on
the Hu-Ning railway were adopted as alternatives. There
are also disagreements on the route of the river-side railway. Only the preparation for the planning of NantongShanghai railway has begun. The implementation failure
of most projects suggests that projects in a coordinative
planning cannot be easily implemented. Thus, such projects should be studied and discussed in detail before
being listed in the plan. Some ambitious projects that
are at preliminary stage of consideration should be considered and documented in background planning studies
only and should not be formally listed in the final plan.
(ii) Rail transit: According to the SWC plan, the provincial government has formulated a SWC rail transit plan. It
is impossible to ‘‘translate’’ these proposed projects into
concrete action in the near future as these projects rely
on local governments for implementation and input of
financial resources. Two rail transit projects listed in Table
1, Changshu-Wujiang rail transit and Changzhou-Wujin
rail transit were mentioned in the SWC plan. They were
considered as suspended as local governments have no
intention to implement these projects yet. Following
SWC planning, Wuxi city also prepared a JiangyinWuxi-Yixing Rail Transit Plan and only this Rail Transit
is under preparation.
(iii) Bridges: Suzhou-Nantong Yangtze River Bridge
and Changzhou-Taizhou Yangtze River Bridge have been
included in the province’s transportation planning as key
projects of the province. Suzhou-Nantong Yangtze River
Bridge is under construction.
(iv) Airport: One original objective of SWC planning
was to coordinate airport development in the region and
the province has attempted to focus on the development
of Changzhou airport, the highest level airport in the
8
China Interview 10060401 and China Interview 14060401.
211
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
Table 1 Implementation assessment of the SWC plan
Proposed projects
Industry planning
Spatial planning
Environment protection
Tourism planning
Infrastructure projects
Changing the route of national highway No. 312
Upgrading Hu-Ning railway
River-side railway
Nantong–Shanghai railway
SWC rail transit
Changshu–Wujiang rail transit
Jiangyin–Wuxi–Yixing rail transit
Changzhou–Wujin rail transit
Suzhou–Nantong Yangtze River Bridge
Changzhou–Taizhou Yangtze River Bridge
Changzhou Benniu Airport as the key airport (4D)
Upgrading Suzhou Guangfu Airport (4C)
Upgrading Wuxi Shoufang Airport (4C)
Sunan Airport
Wuxi logistics center
Regional natural gas supply
Regional water supply
Implemented/
implementing
Partly
implemented
Planning/
preparing
Changing/
debating
Suspended
Difficult to
operate
Cancelled
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
Source: The authors’ interviews. The interviewees are urban planners and local officials who are directly involved in the projects under investigation.
region at that time. But SWC planning failed to coordinate airport development. As stated in the plan (JSCC
and JSURPI, 2002),
‘‘(the province) gives the highest priority to the development of Changzhou Benniu Airport (4D-level, provincial
level airport); then to improve Wuxi Shoufang Airport
and Suzhou Guangfu Airport (4C-level, local level airport).
. . .. . . In order to meet the needs of local economic development and transport in the future, (the province) can construct a new airport in Wuxi’’.
Thus the three existing airports will be further expanded/
improved while a new airport will be built. It is clear that
the province is in a dilemma due to keen competition for
the new airport among three cities mentioned above. As argued by other scholars (Wei, 2001), higher-level governments in China can no longer control their subordinate
authorities in a command-and-control fashion due to the
growing power of local governments in the reform period.
The provincial government finds it difficult to force any city
to give up its own interests by order, such as closing the
existing airport. The conflict between collective interests
(the province and SWC region’s interests) and individual
cities’ interests cannot be easily solved by the provincial
government. After the coordination failed, surprisingly, a
proposal for a new airport, Sunan (Southern Jiangsu) Airport, was put forward by the provincial government. But
subsequent development of airports in the region did not
follow the trajectory set-up by the plan. In August 2003,
Wuxi Shoufang Airport began Phase II construction with
investment from Wuxi city government and the number
of flights increased to 21 a day, including flights to Hong
Kong and Macau by 22 August 2007, becoming the most
influential airport in the region. The Phase II expansion
212
was scheduled for completion by September 2007 and it
may replace the planned new Sunan Airport (Yao, 2007).
Thus, ‘‘giving the highest priority to the development of
Changzhou Benniu Airport’’ and the construction of Sunan new airport perhaps will never be implemented.
(v) Logistics center: In the SWC plan, the province proposed to establish Wuxi Logistics Center in southern
Jiangsu. Because it is just an idea of functional division
rather than a concrete project, its implementation relies
on local needs and the local government. In addition,
the need for such a logistics center should be decided by
the market, local economic development, and the strategy
of local government, rather than assignment by a high level government. Without thorough consultation with the
local government about the needs and possibility of the
logistics center, the project may not be realized.
(vi) Regional natural gas and regional water supply: The
provincial government has formulated thematic plans for
these on the basis of SWC Plans. According to interviews
in Jiangsu, each prefecture-level city can implement regional natural gas and water supply plans within its own jurisdiction. However, these projects face various handicaps at
the regional scale for two reasons. First, there is no trust
among three cities in the SWC region due to little information exchange and interaction among them. ‘‘Some cities worry that natural gas and water supplied to other
cities may be used ‘freely’ by other cities not following
the regulations’’9. Second, each city is keen to protect its
own economic interests. ‘‘Constructing one’s own waterworks and gasworks means that local governments can
make big profits with small amounts of capit al’’10.
Thus each city government is not willing to give up these
9
10
China Interview 14060401.
China Interview 15060401.
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
projects, which will result in infrastructure duplication. As
conflicts within one jurisdiction can be solved more easily
than those involving a couple of jurisdictions, some prefecture-level cities have successfully completed the projects of regional natural gas and water supply in their
own jurisdictions.11 Clearly, the government of a prefecture-level city can influence the county-level cities and districts more effectively than a provincial government over
the government of prefecture-level cities (Shen, 2007).
In conclusion, the performance of planning implementation is far from satisfactory. This is largely due to the
difficulties in specifying detailed contents of planning
and other reasons which will be analyzed in the next section in detail.
The reasons for unsuccessful plan implementation
In order to find out the reasons for ineffective plan
implementation, semi-structural interviews were conducted to collect additional information. Eleven interviewees were selected from the planning consignor (one
provincial official), planning institutes (two chief planners in two institutes), and planning executors (eight local officials in local planning bureaus and heads of local
planning institutes in three cities). They were asked to
indicate their views on city-region planning and the reasons for unsuccessful plan implementation. All interviewees are key figures involved in SWC planning. Thus,
the information obtained from these interviewees is
pertinent.
Regarding the role of city-region planning, almost all
interviewees believed that city-region planning was an
important instrument for building competitiveness and
sustainable development. However, they also acknowledged that while there is much competition in the SWC
region, cooperation is rare. They explained that there
are few complementarities in economic structure and
industry development among cities in the region. In the
long run, inter-city competition at a given spatial scale will
give way to cooperation in order to compete with other
scales effectively. For example, in the YRD region, various urban forums and cooperative initiatives have
emerged. However, in the SWC region, it will be a long
journey to form similar cooperative initiatives. Figure 2
presents three major reasons for unsuccessful planning
implementation mentioned by interviewees.
First, urban competition is the main cause of the implementation failure of SWC plans. There was keen competition in areas such as investment and infrastructure
projects, among three cities to be coordinated. As a polycentric city-region (Kloosterman and Lambregts, 2001),
competition was more serious in the region than other
city-regions in China. Thus, the prefecture-level city governments, who are the key players in implementing the
SWC planning, may not have much interest in cooperation. Most importantly, as SWC plans covered industry
development, functional division and infrastructure, it
was difficult for these cities to achieve consensus in so
many areas of cooperation. On the other hand, conflicts
11
China Interview 15060401 and China Interview 12060401.
between the provincial government and its subordinate
city governments also contributed to unsuccessful plan
implementation although they also had some common
interests. As mentioned in the previous discussion on
the planning process, the provincial government tried to
coordinate the development of subordinate cities by using
its policy-making power in an attempt to enhance the
competitiveness of SWC region. However, this also means
that the maximization of collective interest may be at the
cost of the interest of some individual cities. This inevitably spurred conflicts among governments at different
administrative levels.
To alleviate urban competition, the provincial government even exchanged local leaders between cities in
SWC region. For example, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) secretary of Wuxi was appointed as the CCP secretary of Suzhou; the mayor of Suzhou was appointed as the
CCP secretary of Wuxi. In China, the party secretaries are
generally the most influential top official (yibashou) at
each city in charge of nominating officials and policy-making while mayors are in charge of routine administrative
matters. By the above exchange of local officials in Suzhou and Wuxi, the provincial government attempted to
enhance the linkages between the two cities and coordinate two cities’ development. However, in practice, such
arrangement cannot alleviate urban competition at all.
Urban competition is still in place, because local economic development is regarded as the top priority of local
government. Furthermore, local officials’ possible promotion depends on economic performance of the city under
their leadership (Zhu, 2004).
Second, there was no coordinating mechanism among
cities for plan implementation. Although the provincial
government formulated the plan to coordinate the development of three cities, no measures were introduced
regarding plan implementation and administration. Thus
there was no mechanism to enforce the implementation
of the plan. The lack of good planning mechanisms also
caused serious conflicts among various plans. For example, the Development and Planning Commission, the
Land Use Bureau and the Urban Planning Bureau of
the province are in charge of regional planning, land-use
planning and urban planning, respectively. Each government department formulates their sector plans based on
their own interests, rarely considering other departments’
planning.
Thirdly, according to interviewees, many items specified
in the SWC plan were too general and difficult to materialize. Thus city governments could not fully ‘translate’
SWC plan into concrete actions. The unfeasibility of
SWC plan will result in the failure of plan implementation, let alone coordination and cooperation.
This case provides an important planning lesson on the
content of city-region planning. Whether a plan can be
successfully implemented or not depends on the content
of the plan. Generally speaking, a plan consists of
themes/projects at micro and macro levels that need to
be coordinated. General and unfeasible content that is difficult for implementation by local governments should be
avoided. Meanwhile, the content of a plan should also not
be too detailed, otherwise the plan will have little
flexibility.
213
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
D
Planning Consignor
C
Planning Institutions
B
Planning Executors
A
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Reasons: A – Urban competition
B – Lack of coordinative mechanisms
C – Difficult to operate
D – Conflicts among governments at various levels
Figure 2 Reasons of unsuccessful plan implementation based on interviews.
The above analysis suggests that it is difficult to coordinate competitive projects in the planning process. Instead,
cities are inclined to form partnerships in those areas that
they share common interests, such as transportation
development. How to enhance city cooperation and coordination in competitive areas is the crux of the coordinative planning challenge.
In summary, urban competition, lack of necessary coordinating mechanisms, impractical planning content and
conflicts among governments at various levels are major
causes of ineffective implementation of SWC plan. In
terms of urban and regional governance, prefecture-level
cities are powerful units in urban economic development
and the implementation of SWC planning in control of
land and financial resources. They may not be keen to
cooperate as stipulated by provincial government in
SWC plans without adequate discussion and consultation.
The provincial government lacks financial capacity and legal power to implement the SWC plan. While planners,
scholars and provincial government believe in the benefit
of SWC planning for coordinated development, lack of
the support of prefecture-level city governments, the key
players, leads to failure in the implementation of SWC
planning. Thus, both the SWC planning process, the plan
itself and the power relations between different governments are major reasons of the SWC planning failure.
New competition: defining new city-regions by prefecture cities
Although the provincial government was able to ‘‘dictate’’ a city-region plan for SWC region, it lacked the
teeth to implement the plan. The SWC plan could not
mitigate existing problems of inter-city competition. On
the contrary, it spurred a new round of competition in
the SWC region. The cities in the SWC region attempted
to formulate their own urban development strategies and
214
policies. Cities did not accept the provincial government’s arrangement as member cities of the SWC region,
even after the approval of SWC plans. They defined
their own city-regions that were different from the
SWC city-region to serve their own interests. In the
Development Forum of the Yangtze River Delta (Lake
Tai) (Changsanjiao (Taihu) fazhan luntan) sponsored
by the Suzhou government, Suzhou put forward a new
definition of city-region – City-region around Lake Tai.
This new city-region consisted of two sub-city-regions
with a total of five cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, namely, SWC city-region and Suzhou–Jiaxing–
Huzhou city-region (Figure 3). By this definition, Suzhou
made itself the center and the head of city-regions in
southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang.
Like Suzhou city, Wuxi also defined its own city-region
in order to extend its development space. Wuxi also
deemed it impossible to achieve the aims of the SWC
plan due to heavy conflicts of interest among three cities.
Thus it was necessary for Wuxi to devise a new plan
regarding city-regions. A new plan – Wuxi Development
Strategic Plan was then formulated by the Wuxi government. This new plan broke down the SWC city-region
devised by the SWC Plan, replacing it with Wuxi–
Changzhou–Taizhou city-region and Suzhou–Shanghai–
Nantong city-region (Figure 3). In this city-region
classification, Wuxi claimed itself the leading city of
Wuxi-Changzhou–Taizhou city-region, but put Suzhou
under the wing of Shanghai. The reclassification
of city-regions indicates that cities did not accept the
arranged identities by the provincial government (as
member cities of the SWC city-region) and had the
intention to expand their own developmental space.
Although redefinition of city-regions was mere rhetoric
in policies and urban development strategies, it indicated
that not all cities in the region shared a common regional
identity (SWC) and competed against each other.
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
Figure 3 City-regions defined by Prefecture cities.
Conclusion
In western countries, city-regions are considered effective
arenas for situating the institutions of post-Fordist economic governance (Scott et al., 2001). The regional scale
is thus conceived as a ‘‘functional space’’ for economic
planning and political governance (Keating, 1998). Under
different contexts of urban and regional development,
many city-regions are being formed in China for planning
and development. Through city-region planning, a higherlevel government attempts to create a new tier of
governance, upon which it can coordinate city-region
development and promote cooperation. Unfortunately,
most grand city-region plans encounter failure in subsequent implementation. To uncover the reasons of unsuccessful planning implementation, this study selected
SWC planning for a case study. After analyzing the process
of SWC planning and assessing the implementation of
SWC plans, the following three reasons were identified.
First, city governments have acquired great administrative and economic power due to decentralization from
central and provincial governments in the reform period
(Shen, 2007). Prefecture-level cities have strong administrative power and are financially responsible for development projects such as airports. The prefecture-level city
governments, who are the key players in implementing
the SWC planning, may not have much interest in the
cooperation stipulated by provincial governments in the
SWC plan, without adequate discussion and consultation.
The provincial government lacks financial capacity and legal power to implement the SWC plan. While planners,
scholars and provincial governments believe in the benefit
of SWC planning for coordinated development, lack of
the support of prefecture-level city governments, the key
player, leads to failure in the implementation of SWC
planning.
Second, a coordinating plan should pay more attention
to the process of planning, especially building trust and
consensus among cities. Only then the direction for cooperation would become clear. But SWC planning lacks
stakeholders’ interaction and consensus building in the
planning process. In other words, ‘‘the pursuit of region’’
was not embodied in the planning process. The SWC planning process was initiated by the provincial government. It
emphasizes coordination and differs greatly from those
traditional planning efforts that focus on stimulating economic development. Thus the SWC planning is regarded
by some scholars as a new initiative of urban and regional
governance (Li, 2004). However, the ‘‘coordination’’ was
conducted by the provincial government in a top-down
manner in the planning process. The core elements of governance, stakeholders’ interaction and consensus building
(CGG, 1995; Jessop, 1998; Stoker, 1998), did not materialize in the process of planning and implementation. It is argued here that city-region planning should pay more
attention to the process of building trust and understanding, instead of simply making a plan. The government at
the higher level, while acting as a coordinator in the planning, should pay more attention to mobilizing cities at the
lower level and creating a favorable atmosphere for their
participation, interaction and exchange in the planning
process. Only in this way could a solid city-region plan
be made and successfully implemented. This is consistent
with the recent findings on regional planning in UK which
was based more on negotiation process than formal plans
in the 1990s (Wannop, 1995).
Third, the difficulty in specifying detailed content in
SWC plan is a major reason for the failure of plan imple215
Why city-region planning does not work well in China the case of Suzhou–Wuxi–Changzhou: X Luo and J Shen
mentation. As a new kind of planning, the content of the
city-region planning could not follow those traditional
planning processes such as master planning and urban system planning and should be flexible. But in SWC plans,
the content and direction of coordination proposed by
the higher-level government were either too general and
difficult to be implemented by local governments, or too
detailed, which reduced the flexibility of the plan.
Fourth, SWC planning lacks essential mechanisms of
planning and implementation. This contributed to the
unsuccessful implementation of the SWC plan. This finding is consistent with previous studies on Chinese planning
(Ng and Xu, 2000; Yeh and Wu, 1998). Thus, there is an
urgent need to establish necessary mechanisms to improve
the effectiveness of city-region planning. Standards and
procedures of city-region planning should be set up on
the definition and classification of city-regions, planning
processes, planning approval, institutions for city collaboration as well as procedures to deal with uncertainty.
The above lessons drawn from SWC planning can shed
light on other city-region planning in China and even
other countries. Chinese city-region planning can also
learn a lot from the experiences of inter-city cooperation,
urban networks and regional planning in other countries
(Cooke et al., 2004; Wannop, 1995). To achieve sustainable development of SWC city-region, we have the following suggestions.
First, the provincial government should play an enabling role in regional coordination, instead of ‘‘commander’’. The higher-level government should launch
some concrete initiatives, such as structural funds and
Interreg III in the EU, to facilitate inter-city cooperation
in the region. For example, the provincial or central governments can set up an airport cooperative to be responsible for airport development in the province and the
country without relying on local financial resources.
Second, like its western counterparts, the SWC city-region should form a city network and build its governing
capacities. To achieve this goal, the first step is to establish an urban forum which may serve as the platform for
member cities to share their views and visions on the
development of the region. After long-term exchange
among cities, a Development Commission of the SWC
City-region should be established to be in charge of regional and coordinative matters in the region. This commission should have a flexible governance structure,
consisting of a general assembly, a steering group and
thematic cooperation groups. The establishment of such
commission represents the institutionalization of an urban network. Through the above institution-building,
SWC plans can be implemented effectively, and the
SWC city-region will become an integrated and promising regional entity with enhanced cooperation among
member cities.
Acknowledgements
This research is supported by the Urban China Research
Network and the National Natural Science Foundation of
China (NSFC Grant No. 40601031). The authors would
like to thank anonymous referees and Professor Andrew
216
Kirby for their constructive comments to improve the
manuscript.
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