293
Legal and Criminological Psychology (2010), 15, 293–303
q 2010 The British Psychological Society
The
British
Psychological
Society
www.bpsjournals.co.uk
Playing the race card: Making race salient in
defence opening and closing statements
Donald O. Bucolo* and Ellen S. Cohn
University of New Hampshire, Durham, USA
Purpose. Researchers have reported that making a Black defendant’s race salient
reduces White jurors’ tendency to find Black defendants guilty (Sommers & Ellsworth,
2000). We examined whether making race salient by including racially salient
statements in the defence attorney’s opening and closing statements (i.e., ‘playing the
race card’) reduced White jurors’ racial bias against a Black defendant.
Method. We obtained scores on racial attitudes for 151 White college students who
participated in an experiment where defendant race (Black, White) and race salience
(not salient, salient) were manipulated in a between-subjects design. Participants read
one of four trial stimuli and completed dependent measures.
Results. ‘Playing the race card’ reduced White juror racial bias as White jurors’
ratings of guilt for Black defendants were significantly lower when the defence attorney’s
statements included racially salient statements. White juror ratings of guilt for White
defendants and Black defendants were not significantly different when race was not
made salient. This effect was separate from jurors’ level of prejudice (as measured by
racial attitudes) as high prejudice participants were more likely than low prejudice
participants to find the Black defendant guilty, independent of the race salience
manipulation.
Conclusion. Our study indicated that an explicit attempt by a defence attorney to ‘play
the race card’ was a beneficial trial strategy a defence attorney could use to reduce White
jurors’ bias towards Black defendants. However, the beneficial effect of such a strategy
may not reduce White jurors’ bias towards Black defendants for all White jurors.
Few individuals can forget what many have considered the ‘Trial of the twentieth
century’ (Schmalleger, 1996), the case of the State of California versus O. J. Simpson.
The issue of racial prejudice was brought to the forefront of the trial with the
testimony of LAPD Detective Mark Fuhrman. Simpson’s defence attorneys used
recorded evidence of Fuhrman using racial slurs as the backbone of a conspiracy
theory suggesting that the racist Fuhrman planted evidence in order to convict the
famous, and Black, Simpson. Successfully ‘playing the race card’ (Williams, 2001), the
* Correspondence should be addressed to Donald O. Bucolo, University of New Hampshire, 10 Library Way, Conant Hall,
Durham, NH 03824, USA (e-mail: Donald.Bucolo@unh.edu).
DOI:10.1348/135532508X400824
294 Donald O. Bucolo and Ellen S. Cohn
defence ultimately won the acquittal of Simpson, largely due to the racist comments
made by Fuhrman (see Shapiro & Warren, 1996).
Although the O. J. Simpson case is anecdotal evidence that Black defendants benefit
from highlighting race during a criminal trial, recent experimental studies have
indicated that emphasizing such issues does reduce White juror bias. Researchers
investigating race salience have found that White jurors are less likely to find Black
defendants guilty when the defendants’ race is emphasized by witness testimony during
a trial (Cohn, Bucolo, Pride, & Sommers, in press; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000, 2001). In
the current study, we were interested in determining if making race salient by having a
defence attorney use explicit, direct references about the defendant’s race in opening
and closing statements (i.e., ‘playing the race card’) affected White juror decisions in a
trial in which a Black defendant was accused of an interracial crime.
The Black defendant in the legal system
Archival analyses of sentencing and conviction rates routinely reveal that Blacks are
treated more harshly by the legal system than Whites (e.g., Mitchell, 2005; Mitchell,
Hawm, Pfeofer, & Meissner, 2005; Sorenson & Wallace, 1995); however, these analyses
are difficult to interpret because of the complex nature of each trial that occurs in the
criminal justice system. Research utilizing mock juror simulations in which defendant
race is manipulated and other variables are controlled have been inconclusive with some
researchers finding that Black defendants are more likely to be found guilty and receive
longer prison sentences than White defendants (DeSantis & Kayson, 1997; Gray &
Ashmore, 1976; Landwehr et al., 2002; Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler, & Moore, 2002) and
other researchers finding that Black defendants are not more likely to be found guilty or
sentenced more severely than Whites (Bagby & Rector, 1991; Braden-Maguire, Sigal, &
Perrino, 2005; Dean, Wayne, Mack, & Thomas, 2000; Voss, Wiley, Ciarrochi, Foltz, &
Silfies, 1996). According to Sommers (2007; see also Sommers & Ellsworth, 2003),
previous researchers’ failure to find a clear association between defendant race and juror
decisions may have more to do with the lack of a coherent theoretical framework in which
many of these studies were conducted. Considering that modern forms of racism, more
specifically aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), suggest that Whites react to
Blacks in a prejudicial manner only under certain conditions, the inconsistent results of
previous studies may be due to the way defendant race has been presented.
The theory of aversive racism
Whites’ self report of racial attitudes towards Blacks has become more favourable as Whites
are more likely to indicate they support racial equality and integration (Bobo, 2001;
Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), but negative stereotypes about Blacks are still
rampant in modern society (Devine & Elliot, 1995). Although prejudiced Whites believe
and act in accordance with negative stereotypes about Blacks (Devine, 1989; Lepore
& Brown, 1997), Whites who report not being prejudiced are still influenced by negative
stereotypes in more subtle ways (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2002;
Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
To make sense of the disparity between Whites’ explicit racial attitudes (which are
overwhelmingly positive) and implicit racial attitudes (which are overwhelmingly
negative), Dovidio and Gaertner (2004; see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, 2005) proposed
that modern racism characteristic of many Whites has become more discrete and subtle in
Playing the race card 295
nature. According to this aversive racism framework, Whites are socialized to believe that
racism and discrimination are wrong, but society reinforces and maintains negative
stereotypes regarding Blacks. So instead of harbouring hatred or hostility towards Blacks,
feelings routinely associated with blatant racism (Sommers & Norton, 2006), society
maintains a culture in which most Whites develop feelings of uneasiness and discomfort
towards Blacks. Therefore, Whites actively avoid appearing racist and react to situations
where they could be perceived as prejudiced in socially desirable ways. However, when
situations arise where the normative structure or the situation is ambiguous, Whites are
more likely to rely on stereotypical beliefs about Blacks and respond in a biased manner
(Frey & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002).
The aversive White juror
As the aversive racism framework (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) proposes, researchers
have revealed that White jurors are more likely to find a Black defendant guilty than a
White defendant when evidence pointing towards the defendant’s guilt is ambiguous,
i.e., there is no clear indication of the defendant’s guilty (Kerr, Hymes, & Anderson,
1995; Sargent & Bradfield, 2004; Van Prooijen, 2006). Similarly, White jurors are more
likely to react in a biased way towards Black defendants when they can use some other
factor to rationalize their biased decisions. For example, White jurors are more likely to
find a Black defendant guilty when they have knowledge of inadmissible evidence
pointing to the defendant’s guilt (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005; Johnson,
Whitestone, Jackson, & Gatto, 1995).
When aversive racists are reminded that their actions could appear prejudiced, they
respond to situations in a non-racist manner (Hodson et al., 2002). Similarly, researchers
find that judges’ instructions that include specific instructions to not rely on prejudice
reduces White jurors’ tendency to find Black defendants guilty (Pfiefer & Olgoff, 1991).
Further, Fein, Morgan, Norton, and Sommers (1997) revealed that White jurors were less
likely to use negative pre-trial publicity when the defence attorney for a Black defendant
cited racist motives for the negative pre-trial publicity. When the defence attorney did
not suggest that the negative pre-trial publicity was racially charged, White jurors were
more likely to use the account to find the Black defendant guilty.
As mentioned previously, researchers examining race salience have also reported
that highlighting Black defendants’ race reduces White jurors’ likelihood of finding Black
defendants guilty (Cohn et al., in press; Sommers, 2006; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000,
2001). For example, Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) reported that White jurors were
more likely to find a Black defendant guilty of a crime of assault when compared to a
White defendant when race was not made an issue during the trial. However, when the
interracial nature of the crime was emphasized in the trial through witness testimony,
there were no differences in verdicts reached by White jurors as a function of defendant
race. Similarly, Cohn et al. (in press) found that when testimony included defence
witness’ comments emphasizing that the defendant was on trial because he was Black
and the victim White, White jurors were significantly more likely to acquit the
Black defendant when compared to White jurors who did not hear such testimony.
As the results of the previous studies indicate, White jurors should be less likely to
find Black defendants guilty when they are reminded that their verdict could appear
prejudiced. Therefore, emphasizing a Black defendant’s race during a trial by ‘playing
the race card’ should be a beneficial strategy a defence attorney could use to reduce
White jurors’ tendency to find Black defendants guilty.
296 Donald O. Bucolo and Ellen S. Cohn
The current study
Utilizing this ‘aversive White juror framework’, we conducted an experiment in which
both defendant race (Black, White) and race salience (not salient, salient) were
manipulated. We manipulated race salience through the defence attorney’s opening and
closing statements by including additional statements in both phases of the trial that
emphasized the defendant’s race and the interracial nature of the crime (therefore,
‘playing the race card’). We hypothesized that a Black defendant would be more likely to
be found guilty of the crime than a White defendant when the defendant’s race was not
made salient. When the defendant’s race was made salient, we did not expect juror
ratings of guilt to differ as a function of defendant race.
Previous researchers have found that high prejudiced Whites (measured using racial
attitude scales) were more likely to find Black defendants guilty than low prejudiced
Whites (Dovidio et al., 1997; Hodson et al., 2005; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).
Recently, Cohn et al. (in press) also demonstrated that both high and low prejudiced
Whites (as measured by racism scales) were influenced by manipulations of race
salience as being high prejudiced was only associated with White jurors’ verdicts when
race was not made salient. Therefore, we included a measure of prejudice and
hypothesized that high prejudiced Whites would be more likely to find Black defendants
guilty than White defendants, only when the defendants’ race was not made salient.
Method
Participants
One hundred sixty-three students were recruited to participate in this study as a part of a
course requirement for Introduction to psychology. Because this was a study of White
juror racial bias, only responses from students indicating they were White were analyzed
(N ¼ 151). This somewhat smaller, Whites only, sample was 62% female (n ¼ 94) with
ages ranging from 18 to 22 (M ¼ 19:08, SD ¼ :99).
Trial transcript
All respondents received a 12 page trial transcript describing the trial of a defendant
accused of a simple assault for starting a fight in a bar after a football game. Similar to
previous studies of race salience (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), our trial transcript
described a case that was interracial in nature (i.e., the defendant was Black and the
victim was White, or the defendant was White and the victim was Black). According to
the transcript, the defendant – who was out of town travelling on business – was
accused of starting an altercation with another bar patron after watching his favourite
football team lose a game. The victim of the incident claimed that the defendant
physically attacked him, leaving the victim with a broken nose and a Black-eye. The
transcript included opening statements from the defence and prosecution, direct and
cross-examination of three prosecution witnesses (the victim, a bartender who
witnessed the altercation, and the police officer called to the scene), one defence
witness (the defendant), closing arguments from both the defence and prosecution, and
judges’ instructions (for a longer description of the case consult Bucolo & Cohn, 2007).
We piloted multiple versions of the transcript until a trial transcript that slightly
favoured guilt was developed. After reading the final version of the trial transcript,
participants rated how guilty the defendant was on an eleven point Likert scale ranging
Playing the race card 297
from 2 5 (definitely not guilty) to 0 (not sure) to 5 (definitely guilty); guilt ratings were
greater than zero [(M ¼ 1:28, SD ¼ 2:04), one sample tð47Þ ¼ 3:35, p ¼ :002]
indicating that the transcript did favour guilt.
Independent variables
Defendant race
In the trial transcript, the defendant’s race was described as either Black or White.
Similar to Sommers and Ellsworth (2000, 2001), we also manipulated defendants’ race
using names more representative of each race (White defendant, Rob Williams, and the
Black defendant, Antoine Robbins, respectively).
Race salience
Statements emphasizing the race of the defendant (e.g., ‘The defendant did what any
(Black/White) man in this situation would do’) and the interracial nature of the crime
(e.g., ‘The only reason the defendant, and not the supposed victim, is being charged
with this crime is because the defendant is (Black/White) and the victim is
(White/Black)’) were included in the defence attorney’s opening and closing
statements. There was no mention of racial issues in the opening and closing
statements of the defence attorney in the race not salient condition.
Dependent variables
The Old Fashioned Racism Scale (OFRS)
McConahay, Hardee, and Batts’ (1981) seven item scale measures explicit, overt racial
prejudice (e.g., ‘It is a bad idea for Blacks and Whites to marry each other’) with items
scored on a five point Likert Scale [ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree)]. Scores on the scale ranged from 7 to 23 (M ¼ 11:20, SD ¼ 3:62) again with
higher scores indicating greater racist beliefs. In the current study, the scale had
respectable reliability (Cronbach’s a ¼ :76).
Guilt
Mock jurors rated guilt on an 11 point quantitative scale ranging from 2 5 (definitely not
guilty) to 0 (not sure) to 5 (definitely guilty).
Sentencing
Participants who found the defendant guilty were also asked to sentence the defendant
to a prison sentence ranging from 1 to 60 months in prison.
Trial features
Participants were asked to rate how influential the following aspects of the trial were:
(1) the defence attorney’s statements, (2) the prosecutor’s statements, and (3) the
defendant’s race. Participants rated each factor on a seven point Likert Scale ranging
from 1(not at all influential) to 7 (very influential).
298 Donald O. Bucolo and Ellen S. Cohn
Procedure
We received approval from the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct the
experiment and recruited participants from the Psychology Department’s subject pool.
Participants who agreed to participate in the current study did so in groups ranging from
5 to 20 participants. Upon entering the lab, participants first completed informed consent
forms. Those who agreed to participate were then given a research packet and told to
complete the packet at their own pace. Each packet contained all dependent measures and
one of four randomized trial transcripts in which defendant race (Black, White) and race
salience (not salient, salient) were manipulated. Once students completed the entire
research packet, they returned the packet to the researcher, were debriefed, thanked for
participating in the experiment, and then dismissed.
Results
Juror attitudes
We obtained participants’ scores on the Old Fashioned Racism Scale (OFRS) from a
previous mass testing session in which participants completed multiple attitudinal
scales. We used a median (median ¼ 10) split procedure to categorize participants as
either low prejudiced (n ¼ 72) or high prejudiced (n ¼ 65). Participants at the median
(n ¼ 14) were excluded from the remaining analyses.
Jurors’ verdicts and sentencing
To test our two hypotheses we performed a defendant race (White, Black) £ race
salience (not salient, salient) £ prejudice level (low, high) between-subjects ANOVA
with the dependent variable being participants’ ratings of guilt. There was a main effect
for defendant race, Fð1; 137Þ ¼ 5:86, p ¼ :02, h2 ¼ :04 with juror ratings of guilt being
significantly higher when the defendant was White (M ¼ 1:13, SD ¼ 2:88) than Black
(M ¼ 2:01, SD ¼ 3:07). There was also a main effect for race salience,
Fð1; 137Þ ¼ 10:86, p ¼ :001, h2 ¼ :08, with ratings of guilt being lower when race
was made salient (M ¼ 2:20, SD ¼ 2:77) than when race was not made salient
(M ¼ 1:34, SD ¼ 3:15). These main effects were both qualified by a significant two-way
interaction among the variables, Fð1; 137Þ ¼ 8:87, p ¼ :003, h2 ¼ :06. A post hoc t test
(tð75Þ ¼ :24, p ¼ :81) revealed that ratings of guilt for a Black defendant (M ¼ 1:10,
SD ¼ 2:63) were not significantly different than ratings of guilt for a White defendant
(M ¼ :95, SD ¼ 2:92) when race was not made salient. When race was made salient, a
post hoc t test (tð72Þ ¼ 3:57, p ¼ :001) revealed that ratings of guilt were significantly
lower for a Black defendant (M ¼ 21:32, SD ¼ 2:91) than a White defendant
(M ¼ 1:31, SD ¼ 2:96). Lastly, there was a significant interaction between prejudice
level and defendant race, Fð1; 137Þ ¼ 17:39, p , :001, h2 ¼ :12. Post hoc t tests
revealed that when the defendant was Black, high prejudiced participants’ ratings of
guilt (M ¼ :83, SD ¼ 3:18) were higher than low prejudiced participants’ ratings
(M ¼ 21:18, SD ¼ 2:65), tð68Þ ¼ 22:84, p ¼ :006; there was also a tendency for high
prejudiced participants’ ratings of guilt (M ¼ :49, SD ¼ 2:87) to be lower than low
prejudiced participants’ ratings (M ¼ 1:77, SD ¼ 2:77) when the defendant was White,
tð66Þ ¼ 1:87, p ¼ :07.
We then conducted a defendant race £ race salience £ prejudice level ANOVA with
prison sentences (in months) as the dependent variable among individuals (n ¼ 65)
Playing the race card 299
whose ratings of guilt were greater than zero (indicating that the individuals rated the
defendant as guilty); none of the variables had a significant effect on prison sentences
(all F , 1, p . :40).
Trial elements
Cohn et al. (in press) found that making race salient reduced the tendency for White
jurors to find Black defendants guilty partially by influencing their perceptions of trial
elements; therefore, a series of three-way ANOVAs were also performed to assess the
effect of the independent variables on the trial elements (the prosecutor’s statements,
the defence attorney’s statements, and the defendant’s race). For both the prosecutor’s
statements and the defence attorney’s statements, the independent variables had no
effect on participants’ ratings of how influential these trial elements were to their
verdict (all F , 1:25, p . :30). There was a main effect for prejudice level,
Fð1; 137Þ ¼ 7:48, p ¼ :007, h2 ¼ :06 when the dependent variable was defendant
race with high prejudiced participants rating the defendant’s race as more influential
(M ¼ 3:34, SD ¼ 1:96) than low prejudiced participants (M ¼ 2:47, SD ¼ 1:79)1.
Discussion
In previous studies investigating race salience, researchers have found that White jurors
are more likely to find Black defendants guilty when race is not made salient, but when
race is made salient, White jurors are not more likely to convict Black defendants than
White defendants (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000, 2001). In the current study, we did
not find that White participants’ ratings of guilt were higher when they read an
interracial case in which the defendant was Black compared to such a case where the
defendant was White. However, when the defence attorney’s opening and closing
statements included racially salient remarks, White jurors’ ratings of guilt were
significantly lower when the defendant was Black than when the defendant was White.
Thus, ‘playing the race card’ in an interracial trial was a beneficial defence strategy when
the defendant was Black, leading to decreased ratings of guilt.
Contrary to our hypothesis, prejudice level did not interact with our manipulation of
race salience. Instead, we found that jurors’ level of prejudice had a separate effect on
jurors’ ratings of guilt, with high prejudiced participants’ ratings being higher when the
defendant was Black than White. Previous researchers have reported that race salience
reduced White jurors racial bias among participants who were both high prejudiced and
low prejudiced (Cohn et al., in press), but in the current study we found that both race
salience and prejudice level influenced jurors’ decisions.
Surprisingly, defendant race and race salience did not affect jurors’ perceptions of the
trial elements. The only effects we found in the current study dealt with participants’ratings
of how influential the defendant’s race was in their ratings of guilt; high prejudiced
participants reported that the defendant’s race had more influence on their verdict than
low prejudiced participants. Thus, even when the defendant was White, high prejudice
individuals were affected by the defendant’s race. These results suggest that jurors who are
1
The effect was in the same direction and significant when we examined participants whose ratings of guilt were less than zero
(i.e., found the defendant not guilty) or were greater than zero (i.e., found the defendant guilty).
300 Donald O. Bucolo and Ellen S. Cohn
high prejudiced use racial information regardless of the race of the defendant and that these
jurors are not only anti-Black defendants, but are pro-White defendants.
Implications
The theory of aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) indicates that Whites react to
Blacks in a prejudicial manner under certain conditions. Researchers studying race
salience (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000) have revealed White jurors’ tendency to find
Blacks guilty was reduced when race is emphasized during a trial. Our research implies
that emphasizing race in defence attorney statements, i.e., ‘playing the race card’, acts
like other manipulations of race salience, reducing White juror bias towards Black
defendants. This most likely occurs because ‘playing the race card’ reminds White jurors
that their decision could make them appear prejudiced; therefore, they respond in more
socially appropriate ways, being less likely to find Black defendants guilty.
However, it is possible that ‘playing the race card’ may not always reduce White juror
prejudice–the strategy may actually backfire under certain conditions. For instance, all
research investigating race salience has only examined this effect in interracial trials. White
jurors may not be swayed by such pleas in intraracial cases (i.e., when both the defendant
and victim are Black) or in trials in which race is not central to case. Further, research has
indicated that making race apparent to Whites increase their cognitive processing
(Sommers, Warp, & Mahoney, 2008; White & Harkins, 1994). Therefore, it is possible that in
cases where there is strong evidence against a Black defendant, White jurors may focus on
evidence more closely when race is made salient, increasing the likelihood that the Black
defendant will actually be found guilty. This increased processing may also lead some jurors
to overemphasize issues of race, leading more prejudiced jurors to be more likely to find a
Black defendant guilty. Indeed, some preliminary evidence has revealed that making race
salient does lead to increased White juror bias towards a Black defendant for jurors who are
more sensitive to the manipulation, as measured by implicit racial attitudes (Bucolo &
Cohn, 2007). Even though studies have confirmed that both high and low prejudiced jurors
are affected by slight race salience manipulations when they occur in a trial (Cohn et al.,
in press), our research failed to find that association with a more explicit and direct
manipulation of race salience. The nature of ‘playing the race card’ is not as subtle as
previous manipulations of race salience; therefore, it is possible that in some instances,
making race salient during a criminal trial may not benefit Black defendants.
Future directions
The findings of this study are tentative; thus, future research should examine if ‘playing the
race card’ is a beneficial defence attorney strategy for all Black defendants. If we consider
the results of this study in a legal context, future researchers should assess the extent and
strength of this effect. In our study, we manipulated race salience using defence attorney
opening and closing statements. It is possible that attorneys could use other means of
highlighting race in a trial such as presenting certain pieces of evidence or calling character
witnesses. For example, more recently researchers have manipulated race salience during
voir dire and have revealed that such manipulations have reduced White juror bias
(Sommers, 2006). Future research should examine other manipulations of race salience to
determine when using such a strategy benefits Black defendants.
It is also possible that any benefit Black defendants receive from making race salient
can be countered or eliminated by other trial procedures that exist in the legal system,
Playing the race card 301
such as the prosecution countering the attempts of the defence attorney to ‘play the
race card’ during cross examination. Further, it is possible that the findings of the current
study do not generalize to other populations of potential jurors. Although previous
research on race salience has revealed that adult samples are sensitive to these
manipulations (see Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), our current study utilized a
convenience sample of White college students. Future research should examine if the
explicit manipulation of ‘playing the race card’ has similar effects in adult samples that
are more likely to serve as jurors in actual trials.
From a psychological standpoint, future researchers should assess the nature of the race
salience effect and the mechanisms by which it alters White jurors’ behaviour (see
Sommers, 2007). Researchers thus far have focused primarily on describing the
phenomenon and reporting under what conditions the race salience effect occurs.
Although this research is important and should be continued, future work should also
attempt to uncover exactly how making race salient influences Whites–perhaps by
examining cognitive and emotional processing of White jurors in studies of race salience
(for example see Sommers et al., 2008). As the results of recent research (Cohn et al.,
in press) and the results of our current study indicate, future researchers should consider
the role juror prejudice in studies of race salience by incorporating implicit or unobtrusive
measures (e.g., see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) as well as explicit, self report measures (e.g.,
Devine, Plant, & Amodio, 2002) of White jurors’ prejudice to determine if making a Black
defendants’ race salient reduces White jurors’ racial bias for all Whites, all the time.
Conclusion
As the O. J. Simpson case revealed, making race a focal point of a trial can have benefits
for Black defendants that may result in acquittal. The results of this empirical
investigation built on studies of race salience (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000) and
anecdotal evidence of the Simpson case found that when a defence attorney ‘plays the
race card’, Whites’ ratings of guilt for a Black defendant were significantly lower than
when the defence attorney did not use the strategy. Although we like to believe that
racism and prejudice no longer exert such strong effects on our behaviour, more
modern conceptualizations of racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) find that Whites still
react in a biased manner towards Blacks under certain conditions. By emphasizing
potential racist motives, ‘playing the race card’ may reduce the tendency for White
jurors to find Black defendants guilty and serve as a legal strategy that may have benefits
when used in some trials with certain defendants.
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Received 26 March 2008; revised version received 4 December 2008