Ó Springer 2005
Journal of Business Ethics (2005) 62: 277–297
DOI 10.1007/s10551-005-0849-1
Whistleblowing in Organizations:
An Examination of Correlates of
Whistleblowing Intentions,
Actions, and Retaliation
ABSTRACT. Whistleblowing
on
organizational
wrongdoing is becoming increasingly prevalent. What
aspects of the person, the context, and the transgression
relate to whistleblowing intentions and to actual whistleblowing on corporate wrongdoing? Which aspects
relate to retaliation against whistleblowers? Can we draw
conclusions about the whistleblowing process by assessing whistleblowing intentions? Meta-analytic examination of 193 correlations obtained from 26 samples
(N = 18,781) reveals differences in the correlates of
whistleblowing intentions and actions. Stronger relationships were found between personal, contextual, and
Chockalingam Viswesvaran (Ph.D. University of Iowa) is a
Professor of Psychology at Florida International University.
His research interests include business ethics, personnel selection, and human resource management. He has published in
Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and
Psychological Bulletin. He has served on 5 editorial boards
and as an Associate Editor of the International Journal of
Selection and Assessment. He is an elected fellow of the
Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology as well
as Divisions 5 (Measurement) and 14 (Industrial-Organizational Psychology) of the American Psychological
Association.
Jessica Mesmer-Magnus (Ph.D. 2005, Florida International
University) is an Assistant Professor of Management with the
Cameron School of Business at the University of North
Carolina at Wilmington. Her research interests include work/
family conflict/balance, organizational training program design, whistleblowing/counterproductive behavior, and business
ethics. She has published in the Journal of Vocational
Behavior, Journal of Business Ethics and Journal of
Labor Research. She is certified as a Senior Professional in
Human Resources and has worked as a Human Resources
Manager for a US-based national consulting firm.
Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus
Chockalingam Viswesvaran
wrongdoing characteristics and whistleblowing intent
than with actual whistleblowing. Retaliation might best
be predicted using contextual variables. Implications for
research and practice are discussed.
KEY WORDS: retaliation, retaliatory acts, organizational wrongdoing, organizational justice, whistleblowing, whistleblower characteristics, whistleblowing
intentions
Incidents of organizational wrongdoing are
increasingly making headlines (e.g., fraud, corruption, and other unethical acts in organizations like
Enron, WorldCom, Anderson, and Tyco). While
once thought to be rare, broad coverage of recent
corporate wrongdoing has led to a widely-held belief
that scandal may be uncovered in virtually every
business or organization (Anand et al., 2004). With
greater frequency, reports of wrongdoing are made
by members close to the inner workings of the
organization (e.g., by employees, board members or
internal auditors), rather than by external auditing
agencies. These individuals, often referred to as
whistle-blowers, risk retaliation both by their organization (e.g., via job loss, demotion, decreased
quality of working conditions) and by the public
(e.g., character assassinations, accusations of being
merely ‘‘sour grapes’’, spies, or ‘‘squealers’’) in their
efforts to expose perceived immoral or illegal acts
(Jubb, 1999; Near and Miceli, 1985).
In this manuscript, we examine potential predictors and correlates of whistleblowing behavior
and of retaliation against whistleblowers. Specifically, we employ meta-analytic methodology to
examine the personal and contextual correlates of
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Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran
whistleblowing intentions and behaviors, as well as
the correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers
in an effort to improve our understanding of the
whistleblowing process. Our main purpose in
conducting this study is to guide future research in
efforts to better predict and understand whistleblowing and retaliation, and to inform practice as
to the aspects of the work environment that may
foster the potential for effective whistleblowing. In
the following review, we will (1) provide an
overview of the whistleblowing construct, (2) review potential correlates of whistleblowing and of
retaliation against whistleblowers, and (3) draw a
distinction between an employee’s intent to blow
the whistle and actually blowing it. We hope to
inform research as to the feasibility of drawing
conclusions about whistleblowing from data based
on intentions rather than actual behaviors.
Whistleblowing defined
Whistleblowing is ‘‘the disclosure by organization
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or
illegitimate practices under the control of their
employers, to persons or organizations that may be
able to effect action.’’ (Near and Miceli, 1985, p. 4).
While whistleblowers typically have both internal
and external reporting channels available to report
organizational transgressions, research suggests that
nearly all whistleblowers initially attempt to report
wrongdoing via internal channels before utilizing (or
in lieu of) external channels (Miceli and Near, 1992,
2002). Even though whistleblowing via internal
channels is less threatening to an organization (as
compared with external reporting which threatens
public scrutiny or legal intervention; Miceli et al.,
1991a), whistleblowing within an organization is not
often welcomed. Rather, whistleblower reports of
wrongdoing are frequently buried or ignored (Miceli
et al., 1991b). In this scenario, the whistleblower is
unsuccessful in stopping organizational wrongdoing,
and worse, is placed in a position to experience
negative consequences to their action. Burying or
ignoring reports and retaliation against whistleblowers are more likely when whistleblowing is
perceived by top management to represent a
questioning of or challenge to the organization’s
authority structure (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002).
Whistleblowing research
Reviews of whistleblowing research have identified
two relatively robust foci of examination, in which
researchers have sought to identify the conditions
under which whistleblowing intentions are formed
and action taken, and retaliation occurs (Ellis and
Arieli, 1999; Miceli and Near, 2002). Studies of the
antecedents, correlates, and consequences of the
decision to blow the whistle on corporate wrongdoing, as well as those focused on modeling its process,
have typically drawn conceptual distinctions between
those variables related to the whistleblower (i.e.,
whistleblower characteristics), the context in which
the whistleblowing occurs (i.e., contextual variables),
and aspects of the wrongdoing and wrong-doer (e.g.,
King. 1997; Miceli et al., 1991a; Miceli and Near,
1985, 1988; Miceli et al., 1991b). Research exploring
the role of these variables in the whistleblowing process is typically approached in one of two ways: (1)
conducting surveys of actual whistleblowers, or (2)
using scenarios, interviews, or survey-based methods
to ascertain when an observer of organizational
wrongdoing will be likely to blow the whistle or will
report the intention to make a claim. Specifically,
while some authors have been successful in gaining
access to actual whistleblowers, others have resorted
to drawing conclusions about the whistleblowing
process using reports of whistleblowing intentions. In
the first case, actual whistleblowers have observed a
transgression, made the decision to report it, and then
actually followed through in making a claim. ‘‘Likely’’
or ‘‘intended’’ whistleblowers, on the other hand,
have been given information about a wrongdoing
(whether real or fictitious) and have reported either
‘‘how likely’’ they would be to blow the whistle or
whether they intended blow the whistle at some future time. The obvious difference between these approaches is that intended whistleblowers have not
actually followed through with blowing the whistle.
Researchers have justified using data gained from
intended rather than actual whistleblowers by (1)
citing the difficulty of carrying out investigations
into unethical conduct in actual organizations (e.g.,
Chiu, 2003), (2) suggesting that actual whistleblowers censor the information they provide to
investigators due to the perception that data gathered in actual organizations precludes their confidentiality or anonymity (e.g., Sims and Keenan,
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
1998), (3) illuminating the difficulty of locating
actual whistleblowers for questioning, or (4) citing
the inherently flawed nature of such data (e.g., selfreports of past events). While we believe these
concerns to be valid, we also believe that conclusions drawn based on testimonies of actual whistleblowers will be different than those from likely
whistleblowers. The real question, however, is how
different will these conclusions be. Specifically, are
the correlates of actual whistleblowing similar enough to those of likely/intended whistleblowing to
warrant firm conclusions about the whistleblowing
process? Or, given the nature of whistleblowing as a
behavior (rather than an attitude or intention), is
the ‘‘distance" between whistleblowing intent and
actual whistleblowing (e.g., deciding to blow the
whistle, accessing the internal or external channel,
making a claim of wrongdoing, supplying the
necessary evidence) so great as to void direct
comparison? Research on the intention–behavior
relationship suggests only a weak relationship
between the intention to act and the actual performance of a behavior (Miller and Grush, 1988).
In fact, measures of behavioral intentions have accounted for, at most, 10% of the variance in overt
behaviors (e.g., Mitchell, 1974). Further, the
intention–behavior relationship is thought to be
even weaker for some behaviors (i.e., those
behaviors that may be governed more heavily by
subjective norms and external support, like whistleblowing; e.g., Miller and Grush, 1988; Mitchell,
1974). According to Bagozzi’s (1992) Volitional
Model of Goal Directed Behaviors, behavioral
intention and overt action are ‘‘separated" by
extensive psychological, motivational, and implementation processes (i.e., planning, monitoring
activities, guidance and control, psychological
commitment, effort). This suggests there may be
multiple phases involved in moving from an
awareness of an illegitimate practice, to the decision
to blow the whistle, to actually making a claim.
Correlates of whistleblowing
Below we review research resulting from both reports
of whistleblowing intent and whistleblowing action.
Researchers have examined the same sets of variables
in studies of intended and actual whistleblowers (i.e.,
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relating to aspects of the whistleblower, context, and
wrongdoing potentially predictive of whistleblowing
intention/action). A qualitative review of the whistleblowing process yields relatively consistent findings
resulting from each approach. However, a cursory
examination of their results suggests stronger relationships may exist between key variables and whistleblowing intentions than whistleblowing actions.
Given that whistleblowing behavior may be heavily
governed by subjective norms and external supports, it
stands to reason that the relationship between intention and action may be even lower for whistleblowing
than other actions. Using a meta-analytic approach, we
examine correlates of whistleblowing intent and actual
whistleblowing separately so as to lend a greater
understanding of their common relation to predictors
and correlates. We hope to identify the relationship
between whistleblowing intent and whistleblowing
action, so that research may be better informed as to the
applicability of data regarding whistleblowing intentions to conclusions about whistleblowing actions.
Whistleblower characteristics
A variety of personal characteristics related to the
decision to engage in whistleblowing have been
examined: whistleblower demographics (i.e., age,
sex, level of education, level of job held, etc.),
personality variables (i.e., locus of control), morality
(i.e., ethical judgment), and other characteristics
(i.e., job performance, organizational commitment,
role responsibility, approval of whistleblowing; e.g.,
Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; Near and Miceli, 1996).
While results seem to differ slightly across studies,
whistleblowers (as compared with inactive observers) tend to have good job performance, to be more
highly educated, to hold higher-level or supervisory
positions, to score higher on tests of moral reasoning,
and to value whistleblowing in the face of unethical
behavior (e.g., Brabeck, 1984; Miceli and Near,
1984; Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and Keenan,
1998). Also, it appears that whistleblowers are more
likely (than inactive observers) to report a rolerelated responsibility or obligation to blow the whistle
(e.g., Near and Miceli, 1996). Age and organizational
tenure as predictors of whistleblowing have yielded
mixed results (e.g., Near and Miceli, 1996; Sims and
Keenan, 1998).
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Empirical findings regarding the personal correlates of whistleblowing intentions and actions are
typically interpreted through the lens of
social–psychological theories of behavior (cf. Casal
and Zalkind, 1995; Ellis and Arieli, 1999; Miceli and
Near, 1994; 2002; Near and Miceli, 1995). For
example, Hollander’s (1958) idiosyncrasy model
suggests that those individuals who are considered to
be the best contributors to group and organizational
objectives (i.e., have high job performance) will be
given greater leeway to deviate from group or
organizational norms. Specifically, employees with
good job performance will be more likely to have
accumulated idiosyncrasy credits (interpersonal
bonuses) within the organization, thus providing
some latitude to report wrongdoing without suffering retaliation, and more importantly, to effect the
desired change (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991a). Similarly,
Pheffer and Salancik’s (1978) Resource Dependence
Theory posits that when one party possesses resources
upon which another is dependent, that party will be
more powerful. Within the whistleblowing context,
an individual with more experience, tenure, and
better job performance is more valuable to an organization, thus giving them some leverage to report
misdeeds (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002). Perceived
leverage may increase whistleblowing potential and
action. Theories of power relationships (e.g., French
and Raven, 1959) suggest that individuals gain (and
exercise) various bases of power by possessing valued
and not easily replaceable characteristics (e.g., desired
or unique skills, good job performance, tenure or
position status, credibility). Thus, whistleblowers
with better job performance and tenure are more
likely to be successful in persuading organizational
actors to stop the undesirable acts, also increasing the
potential they will report (or intend to report) a
transgression (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994).
Organizational employees have three options to
address an unsatisfactory situation faced within an
organization: (1) to exit the organization, (2) voice
discontent (i.e., blow the whistle), or (3) remain
silent. Employees with greater tenure are more invested in the organization and may prefer voice to
exit. This is also congruent with predictions from
theories of power in organizations, where employees
with greater tenure may have greater power to effect
change, and therefore may prefer voice to exit or
silence (e.g., French and Raven, 1959). In a similar
vein, individuals demonstrating higher organizational
commitment are more invested in staying with the
organization, therefore are more likely to blow the
whistle rather than exit the organization (particularly
when the prospect of continued wrongdoing is
uncomfortable or unacceptable). Thus, theoretical
explanations based on available idiosyncrasy credits,
power relations, voice-exit choices, and control
theory are congruent with empirical findings that
older, high performing, more committed and more
experienced employees are more likely to report
wrongdoing in and by organizations.
Contextual variables
Compared with the personal characteristics of
whistleblowers, contextual variables seem to explain
more variance in an individual’s decision to blow the
whistle (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b; Miceli and Near,
1984; Near and Miceli, 1996). Such contextual
variables may include supervisor and coworker
support, organizational climate, threat of retaliation,
and size of organization. Research suggests that
perceptions of supervisor or top management support are instrumental in the decision to blow the
whistle, and in the determination of which reporting
channel will be employed (i.e., internal vs. external
to the organization; e.g., Keenan, 2000; Sims and
Keenan, 1998). For instance, predictions from Social
Exchange Theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) would
suggest that when there is a high level of supervisor
and co-worker support, norms of reciprocity will
develop that channel an individual to use internal
means to effect behavior change (before making the
charges public).
Other contextual variables are also worth pursuing. For example, whistleblowing seems to be
greater in organizations that value whistleblowing
and in those in which the whistleblower perceives a
high congruence between personal and organizational values (Berry, 2004; Near and Miceli, 1996).
This is in accordance with Enz’s (1988) theory of
value congruence. Similarly, potential whistleblowers who perceive a threat of retaliation (by the
organization, immediate supervisors, or co-workers)
are much less likely to blow the whistle than those
who do not perceive a retaliatory climate (Keenan,
1995; King, 1999; Near and Miceli, 1996).
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
Characteristics of wrong-doing
Evidence suggests that characteristics of the wrongdoing (i.e., perceived severity of the wrongdoing,
evidence of wrongdoing) and/or characteristics of
the wrong-doer (i.e., likeability of or closeness to the
wrongdoer) may have significant implications in the
decision to blow the whistle. Wrongdoing type and
perceived severity has been found to be moderately
positively related to whistleblowing (Miceli and
Near, 1985; Near and Miceli, 1996). There is also a
tradition of research in whistleblowing that addresses
whether the wrongdoing is sufficiently costly to
warrant pursuit. Thus, it has been suggested that
potential whistleblowers look for ‘‘materiality’’ (as
auditors do) before embarking on any actions.
Similarly, organization members seem to be more
likely to blow the whistle on organization wrongdoing when they have convincing evidence of the
wrongdoing, and when the transgression personally
affects them (Miceli and Near, 1985). The latter
finding parallels the research on the ‘‘bystander
effect’’ in explaining prosocial behavior: due to a
diffusion of responsibility, individuals are less likely
to help when several others are present (Latane and
Darley, 1970). On the other hand, to the extent
strong norms of reciprocity develop and social support is high between organizational members,
wrongdoing that harms the organization and/or
co-workers is more likely to be reported (especially
using internal channels). Interestingly, in organizations that depend upon the continuation of the
wrongdoing, whistleblowers are more likely to select
external reporting channels rather than attempt to
make an internal claim (Miceli and Near, 1985).
This relationship appears to be especially strong
when the whistleblower is fearful of retaliation by
the organization, supervisors, or coworkers (Miceli
and Near, 1985).
Retaliation against whistleblowers
Once an organization member has blown the whistle
on an organizational wrongdoing, management may
make two types of decisions: (1) whether to disregard the claim or take appropriate action, and (2)
whether to reward or retaliate against the whistle-
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blower (Near and Miceli, 1986). It is assumed that a
whistleblower’s experiences (perceived or actual,
reward or retaliation) following a whistleblowing
event will have strong effects on others’ willingness
and likelihood to blow the whistle in the future
(Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli and Near, 1992).
Logically, organizational response to whistleblower
action depends in part upon whether management
agrees with the merit of the claim and with the
whistleblower’s obligation to take action (Parmerlee et al., 1982). Under circumstances where an
organization is dependent upon the continuation of
the wrongdoing or when they are not dependent
upon the whistleblower (e.g., Resource Dependence Theory; Pheffer and Salancik, 1978), the
organization is more likely to retaliate against the
whistleblower and continue the wrongdoing (Near
and Miceli, 1986).
Retaliation may take many forms, ranging from
attempted coercion of the whistleblower to withdraw accusations of wrongdoing to the outright
exclusion of the whistleblower from the organization (e.g., Parmerlee et al., 1982). Other retaliatory
acts may include organizational steps taken to
undermine the complaint process, isolation of the
whistleblower, character defamation, imposition of
hardship or disgrace upon the whistleblower,
exclusion from meetings, elimination of perquisites,
and other forms of discrimination or harassment
(e.g., Parmerlee et al., 1982). Retaliatory acts may be
motivated by the organization’s desire to (1) silence
the whistleblower completely, (2) prevent a full
public knowledge of the complaint, (3) discredit the
whistleblower, and/or (4) discourage other potential
whistleblowers from taking action (Miceli and Near,
1994; Parmerlee et al., 1982).
Retaliation is not always initiated by organizational top management. Rather, isolated acts of
retaliation may be initiated by the whistleblower’s
supervisor or coworkers with or without (formal or
informal) sanctioning by top management. Supervisors may be motivated to retaliate against whistleblowers for a variety of reasons, but they
frequently do so out of fear that a whistleblowing
claim signals their inability to maintain order and
compliance within their departments, or the fear that
valid complaints will result in the restriction or
cessation of their own operations or influence
(O’Day, 1972; Parmerlee et al., 1982).
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Correlates of retaliation against
whistleblowers
Predictors or correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers fall into one of four broad categories: (1)
characteristics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken
by the whistleblower in reporting organizational
wrongdoing, (3) situational or environmental variables related to the organization, and (4) characteristics of the wrongdoing or wrongdoer.
targets for retaliation. Finally, evidence suggests that
whistleblowers whose values regarding right and wrong
are not congruent with those of the organization, are
more likely to be retaliated against (Miceli and Near,
1994), presumably because organization top management does not deem the wrongdoing to be as
severe as is perceived by the whistleblower, thus casting
doubt on the merit of the whistleblower’s complaint.
Actions taken by the whistleblower
Characteristics of the whistleblower
Characteristics of the whistleblower examined in
relation to retaliation include whistleblower age,
education level, job level, role responsibility, and
value congruence with the organization. While
demographic characteristics of whistleblowers are
thought to be less predictive of retaliation than are
contextual variables (Miceli and Near, 2002), research
suggests that individuals who blow the whistle because it is their job to do so (e.g., audit or role
responsibility) are less likely to be retaliated against
and are more likely to be successful in stopping the
transgression (e.g., Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli
and Near, 2002). Further, Parmerlee and colleagues
(1982) found preliminary evidence that older
whistleblowers are more likely to be retaliated against
than are younger whistleblowers. Interestingly, their
results also suggest that whistleblowers that are valuable
to their organization (e.g., due to age, experience,
education, job level) are more likely to be retaliated
against as compared to less valuable whistleblowers.
Perhaps, for older individuals and those at higher job
levels and with more experience, greater organizational loyalty is expected. When such individuals
blow the whistle, other organizational members may
feel a greater sense of betrayal, thus paving the way
for more retaliatory behaviors. This is especially true
when external channels are employed to report violations. Norms of reciprocity and notions of perceived
justice violations (however misguided) appear to
predict retaliation. Theories of power also suggest that
whistleblowers at higher job levels, who are expected
to enforce the power structure, upon violating this
mandate are more likely to suffer retaliation. On the
other hand, individuals at lower levels of the organizational structure may have lesser power, thus being easy
Some researchers have examined whether specific
actions taken by a whistleblower influence the degree to which they are retaliated against (e.g.,
whether the whistleblower used an internal or
external channel to report wrongdoing, whether the
whistleblower attempted to remain anonymous
during the whistleblowing process, how successful
the whistleblower was in ultimately curbing the
organizational wrongdoing, and even whether
others in the organization ignored wrongdoing).
Indeed, research suggests that when whistleblowers
report wrongdoing via external channels, they are
more likely to receive retaliation, and such retaliation is likely to be more severe than when internal
channels are utilized (Near and Miceli, 1986).
Starting with Weber (1947) and Barnard (1938),
organizations have relied on the concept of legitimate authority. Thus, the use of external channels
is more likely to elicit retaliatory behaviors, as it
violates the power and authority structure present
within the organization. Similarly, whistleblowers
who unsuccessfully attempted to remain anonymous
during the whistleblowing process were more likely
to be retaliated against (Miceli and Near, 1994).
Inconsistent results have been reported regarding
the effectiveness of the whistleblower in curbing
wrongdoing and experience of retaliation. Specifically, Miceli and Near (2002) report that effective
whistleblowers are less likely to experience retaliation
unless the supervisor or top management simultaneously curbed the wrongdoing and retaliated
simply for blowing the whistle. This suggests that
even when the transgression is agreed to be harmful
and is subsequently stopped, some organizations are
particularly sensitive to violations of the authority
structure via whistleblowing. This seems to be
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
especially likely when whistleblowers have utilized
external channels.
Contextual variables
Context variables examined in relation to retaliation
include top management, supervisor, and coworker
support, as well as organizational climate for whistleblowing. While lack of support from supervisors
and top management is likely predictive of retaliation against whistleblowers, coworker support does
not appear to be related to perceived or experienced
retaliation (Near and Miceli, 1986). This finding is
likely due to the low occurrence of retaliation initiated by coworkers (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994).
However, this finding may be indicative of organizational norms for treatment of whistleblowers.
Specifically, in organizations where whistleblowing
is not sanctioned, coworkers are likely less willing to
offer support or protection from retaliation to a
whistleblower.
Characteristics of the wrongdoing
Lastly, in addition to the other predictors of retaliation, researchers have examined aspects of the
wrongdoing that may influence retaliation (e.g.,
frequency, severity, and evidence of wrongdoing).
Logic suggests that when wrongdoing in an organization is widespread or when the organization is
dependent upon the continuation of wrongdoing,
the organization’s top management would be more
likely to lash out at individuals who blow the whistle
(Casal and Zalkind, 1995). However, Near and
Miceli (1986) found that a whistleblower’s report of
(a) multiple incidents of wrongdoing, (b) multiple
individuals involved in the wrongdoing, or (c)
multiple sources of evidence, appear unrelated to
retaliation. This could be explained in terms of the
effort needed to retaliate against a whistleblower
with strong evidence of wrongdoing, particularly
when the wrongdoing is widespread and impacts
multiple individuals (Parmerlee et al., 1982).
In sum, our first purpose in conducting this research was to investigate the antecedents and correlates of whistleblowing, and to determine whether
these were different for whistleblowing intent versus
283
actual behavior. Our second purpose in conducting
the present study was to examine likely antecedents
and correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers,
and to determine the relative importance of each
variable in predicting retaliation. To address these
questions, meta-analytic cumulation of the extant
literature was employed to summarize and integrate
findings from individual studies.
Method
Database
One hundred and ninety-three correlations from 26
samples reported in 21 articles (total N = 18,781)
examining whistleblowing (including intent to blow
the whistle, likelihood of blowing the whistle, and
actual whistleblowing, both via internal and external
channels) and retaliation against whistleblowers were
included in this meta-analysis. To ensure a comprehensive search, these studies were located using
the following strategies: (1) conducting a computerized search of the PsycInfo (1887 to present) and
ABI Inform (1971 to present) databases, using
appropriate keywords and phrases (e.g., whistleblowing, blowing the whistle, organizational wrongdoing,
retaliation, dissent, counterproductive behavior, corruption),
(2) conducting a manual search of references cited in
studies included in this meta-analysis and cited in this
manuscript, (3) snowballing references cited in
recently published reviews of the whistleblowing
literature (e.g., Gundlach et al., 2003; Miceli et al.,
1991b; Near and Miceli, 1995, 1996), and (4)
soliciting relevant, but as yet unpublished, research
from authors at the 2004 and 2005 meetings of the
Society of Industrial Organizational Psychology.
These methods yielded an initial 67 journal
articles, dissertations, and theses with the potential to
provide usable data. An attempt was made to obtain
all studies identified. When a manuscript was not
available via interlibrary loan, a request for a copy
was sent directly to the study’s primary author.
Studies were included only if they reported a correlation (or an effect size which could be converted
to a correlation using appropriate conversion formulas) between one of the several predictors and
whistleblowing (intent/likelihood or behavior) or
instances of retaliation. Studies that examined
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Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran
constructs different from those of interest (e.g.,
perceptions of or reactions to unethical behaviors/
incidences other than those of actual or intended
whistleblowing) or those that reported only anecdotal data, regression coefficients, or other effect
sizes not representative of a clean relationship
between whistleblowing intent/action and a relevant
correlate, were not code-able. When authors
reported separate correlations for different subgroups
(e.g., males and females), samples, administrations (as
in a longitudinal study), or measures of the same
construct, those correlations were examined separately. The studies included in this meta-analysis are
listed in the references prefixed with an asterisk. The
studies included in this meta-analysis, for the most
part, utilized largely male samples of working adults
(average ages between mid-1920’s and late-1940’s)
who have (or could have) witnessed and reported (or
considered reporting) organizational wrongdoing
(i.e., internal auditors, military and government
employees, accountants). Experimental, scenariobased, and survey-based designs were utilized.
Coding procedure
The first author made an initial independent effort to
code the 21 articles selected for inclusion in this
study. A random subset of these articles was coded
by the second author in an effort to determine coder
reliability. Inter-coder agreement was very high,
likely due to the objective nature of the data coded.
In reference to whistleblowing intentions and
actions, the variables coded included those related
to (1) the characteristics of a whistleblower (e.g.,
demographics, like age, sex, education, tenure, and
job level, and other characteristics, like ethical
judgment, job satisfaction, job performance, role
responsibility to blow the whistle, and approval of
whistleblowing), (2) the context in which whistleblowing takes place (e.g., organizational climate for
whistleblowing, fear or threat of retaliation against
whistleblowers, organizational size, and supervisor
and co-worker support), and (3) the characteristics of
the wrongdoing or the wrong-doer (e.g., the seriousness of the wrongdoing, the amount of evidence
of the wrongdoing possessed by the whistleblower,
whether the whistleblower was effective in stopping
the wrongdoing, and the degree to which the
whistleblower works near or closely with the
wrong-doer). These correlates were coded with respect to whether the data was collected from intended or likely whistleblowers or from actual
whistleblowers. Further, the data were coded with
respect to whether the whistleblower used (or intended to use) an internal or external reporting
channel. If the reporting channel was not specified
or was mixed, this was coded separately. While we
had hoped to be able to examine correlations between whistleblowing correlates and whistleblowing
intentions and behaviors by the type of reporting
channel employed (intended), there was an insufficient number of studies available to facilitate this
specificity. We chose instead to examine the relationships of whistleblowing correlates with either
intentions or actions, regardless of reporting channel.
In reference to correlates of retaliation against
whistleblowers, the variables coded included those
related to the (1) characteristics of a whistleblower
(e.g., like age, education, job level, role responsibility to blow the whistle, perceived alternative job
opportunities, and degree to which the whistleblower perceived value congruence with the organization), (2) actions taken by the whistleblower
in reporting an organizational wrongdoing (e.g.,
utilizing an external channel, attempting to remain
anonymous during the whistleblowing process, and
success in stopping the wrongdoing), (3) contextual
variables (e.g., supervisor and co-worker support),
and (4) characteristics of the transgression (e.g.,
frequency of wrongdoing in the organization, the
severity of the transgression, and the amount of
evidence about the wrongdoing possessed by the
whistleblower).
Analysis
The meta-analytic methods outlined by Hunter and
Schmidt (2004) were employed to analyze this data.
The three outcomes investigated are (1) intent to
blow the whistle, (2) whistle-blowing behavior, and
(3) retaliation experienced. Each set of bivariate
correlations (between a predictor and outcome)
were analyzed separately. The sample-size weighted
mean observed correlation and the sample-size
weighted standard deviation of the observed correlations were computed. These two estimated
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
parameters provide a distribution of the observed
effect sizes. Unfortunately, insufficient information
was available to correct for unreliability in the
measures. This concern is mitigated to some extent
by the ‘‘objective’’ nature of some of the predictors
included (e.g., gender, tenure). To the extent statistical artifacts like unreliability and range restriction
in the measures affect the results, our reported
findings underestimate the ‘‘true’’ magnitude of the
correlations and overestimate the ‘‘true’’ variability
across studies. Note, however, that our analyses are
conservative in that true correlations will actually be
higher and we are more likely to consider potential
moderators (even when their effects are weak).
The sampling error variance associated with the
mean observed correlation was computed (Hunter
and Schmidt, 2004) and subtracted from the
observed variance. The resulting residual variance
was used to compute the confidence intervals
around the observed mean. The percent of observed
variance attributable to sampling error was also
computed. Usually, if 60% or more of the observed
variance is attributable to sampling error, one can
assume that variance across studies due to uncorrected artifacts like unreliability and range restriction
in the measures correlated can explain the remaining
variability. Such a finding suggests that the relationship generalizes or transports across contexts.
Thus, our analyses could be construed to be a barebones meta-analysis (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004).
We report for each meta-analysis, the number of
correlations included (k), the total sample size across
all estimates (N), the sample-size weighted mean
observed correlation (r), the sample-size weighted
standard deviation (SDr), the sampling error standard
deviation, the residual standard deviation (resSD),
the percent of observed variance attributable to
sampling error, and the 95% confidence interval
around the sample-size weighted mean observed
correlation. For studies with a mean observed correlation of greater than 0.05, we conducted a file
drawer analysis (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004), and
provide a ‘‘file drawer k’’, which represents the
number of missing studies averaging null results
required to reduce our reported sample-size weighted
mean observed correlation to 0.05.
For the most part, we conducted meta-analyses
only when a minimum of three studies reporting a
relationship between whistleblowing intent/action
285
and a relevant correlate were available. However,
given that one of the purposes of this study was to
compare conclusions drawn from reports of whistleblowing intentions with those drawn from reports
of whistleblowing actions, in cases where fewer than
three studies were available examining a ‘‘comparison’’ relationship of interest (i.e., a sufficient number
of studies were available to meta-analyze the relationship between a correlate and either whistleblowing intention or whistleblowing action, and less
than three were available for the other relevant metaanalysis), we report the results of the other relationship for purposes of description and comparison.
Results
The results of the meta-analysis of correlations
between whistleblower characteristics and whistleblowing intentions (Intent WB) and actions (Actual
WB) are presented in Table I. Results indicate that
older employees are more likely to intend to blow the
whistle than are younger employees (r = 0.19).
Unfortunately, no studies examining age and actual
whistleblowing were located, so we cannot be sure
whether this relationship translates to actual whistleblowers. Sex and tenure appear to be related to actual
whistleblowing (r = 0.13 and 0.10, respectively), but
not to whistleblowing intent. Specifically, females
and more tenured employees appear to be slightly
more likely to actually blow the whistle. Job level
appears to have a similar relationship with whistleblowing intentions (r = 0.10) as with actual whistleblowing. These results support the contention that
older employees with greater tenure and at higher
levels are more likely to have the commitment and
power to employ voice rather than exit mechanisms.
More interesting than the demographic characteristics of whistleblowers were the results related
to other whistleblower characteristics and intent or
actual whistleblowing. Specifically, ethical judgment,
while moderately related to the intent to blow the
whistle (r = 0.45), is not related to actual whistleblowing (r = )0.08). Similarly, while role responsibility, approval of whistleblowing, and perceptions
that blowing the whistle would be in one’s best
interests, appear to be predictive of the intent to
blow the whistle (r = 0.15, 0.44, and 0.31, respectively), they do not appear to be related to actual
Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran
286
TABLE I
Correlations between Whistleblower Characteristics and Whistleblowing Intentions and Actions
Meta-analysis
Whistleblower
demographics
Age
Sex
Education
Tenure
Job level
Other characteristics
Ethical judgment
Job satisfaction
Organizational
commitment
Job performance
Role responsibility
Approve of
whistleblowing
k
N
r
SDr
SESD
resSD
%SEV
95%CI
3
–
2
4
3
6
3
2
4
8
1279
–
1131
1707
1667
7851
1563
1383
1938
9200
0.19
–
)0.05
0.13
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.10
0.10
0.08
0.1902
–
0.0866
0.0368
0.0867
0.0619
0.0651
0.0100
0.1164
0.0320
0.0457
–
0.0414
0.0460
0.0418
0.0275
0.0436
0.0376
0.0439
0.0293
0.1847
–
0.0760
0
0.0759
0.0555
0.0483
0
0.1078
0.0130
5.77
–
22.93
100
23.32
19.76
44.93
100
14.22
83.56
)0.17/0.55
–
)0.20/0.09
0.13/0.13
)0.13/0.17
)0.09/0.12
)0.07/0.12
0.10/0.10
)0.11/0.31
0.05/0.10
9
–
–
7
–
–
–
2
4
5
4
2
2
2
8
–
2
2
4
6
6
2
1147
320
838
1164
2170
–
1315
1401
1494
7762
2143
5514
0.45
)0.08
)0.01
0.19
0.03
–
0.05
0.11
0.15
0.06
0.44
0.06
0.0707
0.1669
0.0503
0.0300
0.0637
–
0
0.0156
0.1556
0.1048
0.1406
0.0200
0.0472
0.0695
0.0487
0.0399
0.0603
–
0.0389
0.0373
0.0474
0.0274
0.0394
0.0190
0.0527
0.1518
0.0128
0
0.0202
–
0
0
0.1482
0.1011
0.1349
0.0064
44.49
17.32
93.58
100
89.89
–
–
100
9.28
6.85
7.86
89.92
0.35/0.56
)0.38/0.22
)0.03/0.02
0.19/0.19
)0.01/0.07
–
0.05/0.05
0.11/0.11
)0.14/0.44
)0.14/0.26
0.18/0.71
0.05/0.07
32
2
–
6
–
–
–
3
8
2
47
1
File drawer k
Action
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Action
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Notes: k = number of studies included in the meta-analysis; N = total number of participants across studies included in the
meta-analysis; r = sample-size weighted mean observed correlation; SDr = tandard deviation of sample-size weighted
mean observed correlation; SESD = standard error of the standard deviation; resSD = residual standard deviation;
%SEV = percent variance due to sampling error; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval formed around the sample-size
weighted mean observed correlation (the number before the slash indicates the lower bound and the number after the
slash indicates the upper bound); File drawer k indicates the number of missing studies averaging null results required to
reduce the mean observed correlation to 0.05. Intent WB indicates participants indicated they intended or were likely to
blow the whistle on a wrongdoing; Actual WB indicates participants actually blew the whistle on a wrongdoing.
whistleblowing behavior (r = 0.06, 0.06, and 0.04).
Conversely, while job satisfaction and job performance relate to actual whistleblowing (r = 0.19 and
0.11, respectively), they are unrelated to whistleblowing intentions (r = )0.01 and 0.05, respectively). Finally, organizational commitment does not
appear to be related to either whistleblowing intentions or actual whistleblowing. It should be noted,
that while our analysis suggests that role responsibility
is unrelated to actual whistleblowing behavior, it is
possible that this relationship may be moderated by
the whistleblowing channel used. Specifically, the
data included in our analysis suggest a small, but
positive correlation may exist between role responsibility and the use of an internal reporting channel,
while no (or a negative) relationship may exist with
the use of an external channel.
The results of the meta-analytic examination of
correlations between contextual aspects of the
whistleblowing situation and whistleblowing intentions (Intent WB) and actions (Actual WB) are
presented in Table II. Organizational climate for
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
287
TABLE II
Correlations between contextual variables and whistleblowing intentions and actions
k
Meta-analysis
Contextual variables
Organizational climate
for whistleblowing
Threat of retaliation
Supervisor support
Organizational size
Action
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
N
r
SDr
SESD
8 2947 0.28 0.1738
5 6960 0.10 0.0375
7 2849 )0.27 0.1292
8 11974 0.04 0.0907
4 1443 0.28 0.0530
2
789 )0.12 0.0088
1
725 )0.10 –
5 5803 0.09 0.0783
0.0457
0.0263
0.0459
0.0251
0.0484
0.0495
–
0.0286
resSD
%SEV
0.1677
6.92
0.0266 49.45
0.1208 12.61
0.0872
7.65
0.0216 83.41
0
100
–
–
0.0729 13.34
95%CI
File drawer k
)0.05/0.61 37
0.05/0.15
5
)0.51/-0.03 31
)0.13/0.21
–
0.23/0.32 19
)0.12/)0.12 3
–
1
)0.05/0.23
4
See Note to Table I.
TABLE III
Correlations between characteristics of the wrongdoing/wrongdoer and whistleblowing intentions and actions
k
Meta-analysis
Wrongdoing/wrongdoer
Seriousness of
wrongdoing
Evidence of
wrongdoing
Closeness to
wrongdoer
Effective in stopping
wrongdoing
Action
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
Intent WB
Actual WB
7
6
1
3
4
–
–
3
N
r
SDr
SESD
resSD
%SEV
95% CI
File drawer k
3207
0.16 0.2642 0.0413 0.2609
2.44 )0.35/0.67 16
6460
0.13 0.0348 0.0299 0.0180 73.41
0.10/0.17 10
636 )0.06 –
–
–
–
–
1
4759
0.06 0.0079 0.0250 0
100
0.06/0.06 1
965
0.45 0.1768 0.0527 0.1687
8.88
0.12/0.78 32
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
1714 )0.07 0.0741 0.0410 0.0617 30.65 )0.19/0.05 2
See Note to Table I.
whistleblowing is more strongly related to whistleblowing intentions than actual whistleblowing, but
the direction of the relationship is consistent
(r = 0.28 and 0.10, respectively). Of greater interest
is that threat of retaliation is negatively related to the
intent to blow the whistle, but appears to be unrelated to actual whistleblowing behaviors (r = )0.27
and 0.04, respectively). Also intriguing is the finding
that supervisor support is positively related to
whistleblowing intent (r = 0.28), but negatively
related to actual whistleblowing (r = )0.12), suggesting that supervisor support may facilitate one’s
decision to blow the whistle, but work to inhibit
behaviors required to actually blow it.
The results of the meta-analysis of correlations
between characteristics of the wrongdoing and of
the wrong-doer and whistleblowing intentions
(Intent WB) and actions (Actual WB) are presented
in Table III. We found similar small relationships
between seriousness of the wrongdoing and whistleblowing intentions and actions (r = 0.16 and 0.13,
respectively). Importantly, the observed correlations
used to compute the relationship between severity of
the transgression and whistleblowing intent varied
widely in magnitude, potentially signaling the presence of a moderator. Of interest is the moderate
effect size found for the relationship between
closeness to the wrong-doer and intent to blow the
whistle (r = 0.45); this finding suggests that the
closer the potential whistle-blower is to the wrongdoer (whether interpersonally or with respect to
organizational structure), the greater their intention
to blow the whistle on the transgression. Unfortunately, similar data was not available for actual
288
Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran
whistleblowing, so we do not know if this relationship will generalize. Also noteworthy is the small
negative correlation found between actual whistleblowing and the whistleblower’s success in stopping
the wrongdoing (r = )0.07). This finding suggests
that whistleblowers are not frequently successful in
their efforts to curb organizational wrongdoing. It is
worth noting, however, that all correlations included
in this computation reflect the success of whistleblowers who utilized an external reporting channel.
Lastly, displayed in Table IV are the results of the
meta-analysis of correlates of retaliation against
whistleblowers. Information is arranged according to
the four types of correlates examined (1) characteristics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken by the
whistleblower, (3) contextual variables, and (4)
characteristics of the wrongdoing. Education, job
level, and the role-prescribed responsibility to blow
the whistle appear to be relatively unrelated to
retaliation against whistleblowers (r = 0.04, )0.07,
and )0.07, respectively). While small relationships, it
is important to note that the correlation between
retaliation and role responsibility is in the desired
direction. Also, while based on only one study each,
it appears that older whistleblowers are more likely
to be retaliated against, as are those with greater
perceived value congruence with the organization.
This second finding may indicate a misperception as
to the organization’s values regarding whistleblowing and/or wrongdoing.
Not surprisingly, whistleblowers who utilize an
external reporting channel are more likely to be
retaliated against (r = 0.17). However, those whistleblowers who are effective in stopping the transgression are less likely to experience retaliation for
blowing the whistle (r = )0.20), as are those who
produce convincing evidence (r = )0.25), and those
who enjoy support from their supervisor (r = )0.39).
More intriguing, however, was our finding that
blowing the whistle on serious transgressions or
those that frequently occur in the organization, are
more likely to be met with retaliation, than are
infrequent or less severe wrongdoings (r = 0.30 and
0.13, respectively).
Discussion
Our purpose in conducting this research was to
examine the antecedents and correlates of whistleblowing and retaliation against whistleblowers so
that we might better understand their role as predictors and within the whistleblowing process. A
secondary goal was to evaluate the feasibility of
drawing conclusions about whistleblowing utilizing
data gathered on whistleblowing intentions rather
than whistleblowing actions. Overall, our results
suggest that the predictors of the intent to blow the
whistle are not the same as those of actual whistleblowing. Further, many of the variables typically
measured in studies of whistleblowing are stronger
TABLE IV
Correlations of retaliation against a whistleblower
Meta-analysis
Whistleblower characteristics
Education
Job level
Role responsibility
Whistleblower actions
Used external channel
Success in stopping wrongdoing
Contextual variables
Supervisor support
Co-worker support
Characteristics of the wrongdoing
Frequency of wrongdoing
Seriousness of wrongdoing
See Note to Table I.
k
N
r
SDr
SESD
resSD
%SEV
95%CI
5 2405
0.04 0.0329 0.0452 0
100
0.04/0.04
6 2624 )0.07 0.0606 0.0471 0.0381 60.41 )0.14/0.01
4 2314 )0.07 0.0730 0.0408 0.0605 31.27 )0.18/0.05
4 2337
0.17 0.0871 0.0391 0.0778
5 2410 )0.20 0.0782 0.0425 0.0656
3 923 )0.39 0.0027 0.0482 0
3 1194
0.03 0.0155 0.0501 0
2 855
6 3046
0.30 0.0788 0.0448 0.0648
0.13 0.0503 0.0431 0.0259
File drawer k
–
3
2
20.12
0.02/0.33
10
29.63 )0.33/)0.07 15
100
100
32.30
73.58
)0.39/)0.39 21
0.03/0.03
–
0.18/0.43
0.08/0.19
10
10
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
correlates of whistleblowing intent than of whistleblowing action.
Correlates of whistleblowing
We organized the presentation of the results of our
meta-analyses of whistleblowing (intent and action)
according to characteristics of the whistleblower,
work context, wrongdoing and wrongdoer, as we
felt that such variables would provide unique
information regarding the whistleblowing process
(Gundlach et al., 2003; Miceli and Near, 1988; Near
and Miceli, 1995, 1996). Further, we anticipated
differences in both the direction and strength of
these relationships according to these dimensions
(e.g., Dozier and Miceli, 1985; Miceli et al., 1991b;
Near and Miceli, 1995). We expected that demographics and other characteristics of the whistleblower would have stronger correlations with the
intent to blow the whistle, while contextual variables
and aspects of the transgression would have stronger
implications for actual whistleblowing.
Whistleblower characteristics
With regard to demographic characteristics, our
results suggest that whistleblowing intent might best
be predicted from whistleblower age and the level of
the job held by the intended whistleblower. Similarly, actual whistleblowing is likely to be predicted
by job level and organizational tenure but also the
sex of the whistleblower (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b).
While we found no studies which examined age of
whistleblower with actual whistleblowing, one
would think that older employees are more likely to
hold positions at higher levels within the organizational hierarchy and also have greater tenure (this is
particularly true for tenure-based promotion systems
commonly found in government organizations).
Therefore, we would expect that older employees
are also more likely to follow through with blowing
the whistle. Also likely is that older workers are
more secure in their value systems than are younger
workers, and therefore are more willing to defend
these values throughout the lengthy whistleblowing
process and in the face of retaliation (Chiu, 2003).
Likewise, more senior and higher-level employees
are more likely to have access organizational members with the ability to exact change within the
289
organization (Keenan, 2000). Consistent with control theory and theories of power, organizational
members with greater tenure and of higher job levels
usually have stronger power bases (as compared with
their younger and newer counterparts), and therefore may be more confident in their abilities to exact
change within the organization via whistleblowing.
In other words, these individuals may be more
certain that the risks they take in blowing the whistle
will not be in vain. Lastly, employees higher in the
organizational hierarchy and those that have been
with the organization for longer are likely to have a
greater understanding of, appreciation for, and
commitment to the espoused values of the organization, and thus a greater desire to protect this culture (e.g., Berry, 2004; Schein, 1996).
We were surprised to find that ethical judgment,
approval of whistleblowing, and a perception that
blowing the whistle is in one’s best interests were
related to whistleblowing intent but not to actual
whistleblowing. One would have thought that
morality or ethicality, in particular, would be predictive of whistleblowing (e.g., Brabeck, 1984; Brief
and Motowildo, 1986; Miceli et al., 1991b). Certainly, we anticipated that workers would be more
likely to blow the whistle when they perceive that it
is in their best interests to do so (e.g., Miceli and
Near, 1985). Perhaps, however, the influence of
contextual factors on the decision to blow the
whistle (e.g., fear of retaliation, perceived costs
versus benefits, severity of the transgression, perceived support from supervisors and coworkers, etc.)
are so great as to preclude whistleblowing on the
basis of personal need or desire. Or, perhaps, the
commitment to the organization is so great that the
desire to meet the needs of the greater workgroup is
stronger than that of meeting individual needs.
While this potential is appealing, we were disheartened to find no correlation between organizational
commitment and whistleblowing intent (e.g.,
Somers and Casal, 1994). We expected to find that
greater organizational commitment would yield a
desire to exercise voice rather than either silence or
exit strategies. It should be noted, however, that we
were unable to locate any studies that reported a
correlation between actual whistleblowing and
organizational commitment. As such, we cannot be
sure that there is not a relationship between this
variable and the decision to blow the whistle.
290
Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran
Of particular interest is that job satisfaction and job
performance were positively related to whistleblowing action but not to whistleblowing intent.
This finding makes sense in light of various propositions of resource dependence and power theories
(e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b). Specifically, while one’s
job performance may not enter into the decision to
blow the whistle on an organizational wrongdoing,
when one considers the likelihood that one might be
able to effect change by blowing the whistle and/or
when one considers the likelihood one will suffer
retaliation by organizational members, it becomes
likely that the intended whistleblower will consider
their relative value to and power within the organization prior to taking action (e.g., Miceli and Near,
1994). Specifically, resource dependence theory
suggests that individuals with better job performance
are more valuable to the organization, suggesting the
organization officials would be more likely to want to
correct the transgression than risk losing the whistleblower (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b). Similarly,
power theory would predict that high performing
whistleblowers would be in a better position to exact
change through voice mechanisms (cf. French and
Raven, 1959). Also, in the making the decision to
engage in whistleblowing, an employee with better
job performance might be more comfortable in
expressing a dissenting opinion than their fellow
employees who may possess fewer idiosyncrasy
credits (due to less satisfactory job performance; e.g.,
Hollander, 1958). Future research should examine
the potential for job performance to predict retaliation against whistleblowers. It would seem likely that
individuals with higher job performance would have
accumulated more idiosyncrasy credits and would
also be less likely to suffer retaliation.
Curiously, we found that role responsibility to
blow the whistle is predictive of intent to blow the
whistle but not of actual whistleblowing. This finding
is unexpected, as one would expect that the organization creates and staffs internal ‘‘watchdog’’ positions
to facilitate whistleblowing on unsanctioned practices
(e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b; Near and Miceli, 1996).
Furthermore, in certain occupations and industries,
all employees are expected to voice concerns of illegitimate or unsanctioned activities (e.g., government
employees, military, and employees of many government contractors). However, it may be that these
individuals actually follow through with blowing the
whistle, but utilize non-traditional channels in doing
so. While in many cases this would still qualify as
whistleblowing, use of such reporting channels makes
the tracking and identification of these whistleblowers more difficult. Alternatively, certain internal
auditors may be chosen from a select inner circle
within the organization and possess the ultimate goal
of preventing damage to the organization’s public
image rather than stopping wrongdoing. In this case,
these individuals may opt to ignore certain transgressions they know to be unethical, or in some other
non-traditional way deal with the transgression so as
to minimize public knowledge and scrutiny. Our data
does not preclude the potential that this relationship
(between role responsibility and whistleblowing) is
moderated by the whistleblowing channel utilized
(internal versus external). Regardless, our data suggest
that having a role-related responsibility to blow the
whistle may not be sufficient to ensure whistleblowing action. Other factors may be of greater
importance, or may play a moderating role, in the
whistleblowing decision-making process. This is a
matter for future research.
Contextual aspects of whistleblowing
An examination of the meta-analyses of contextual
variables and whistleblowing reveal somewhat surprising findings for organizational climate, fear of
retaliation, and supervisor support. As expected,
organizational climate for whistleblowing is positively related to whistleblowing intent (Berry, 2004),
however, the relationship is considerably weaker for
whistleblowing action. This may be a function of the
‘‘distance’’ between whistleblowing intent and
action (e.g., Bagozzi, 1992). Alternatively, this may
signal the presence of other contextual or individual
variables that may moderate this relationship and
may account for the reduction in explained variance.
For example, supervisor support, if low, may serve
to de-motivate an employee to blow the whistle
even when this individual is part of an organization
that (with regard to organizational wrongdoing)
values employee dissent (Dozier and Miceli, 1985;
Miceli and Near, 1985). Also of interest, is that
threat or fear of retaliation appears to greatly reduce
the likelihood that an observer of wrongdoing will
intend to blow the whistle, but does not impact
actual whistleblowing. Therefore, it appears that
once the intention to whistle-blow is formed, fear of
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
retaliation for whistleblowing does not serve to
de-motivate action. It may be that, in their decision
to blow the whistle, employees weigh aspects of the
situation (like their relative power to exact change,
the severity of the transgression, the likelihood that
they will experience retaliation for blowing the
whistle on this particular transgression, which is also
likely to be a function of their relative power within
the organization and their relative balance of idiosyncrasy credits which will ‘‘protect’’ them from
retaliation), and thus only decide to blow the whistle
when they perceive their chances of receiving
retaliation are low (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994; Sims
and Keenan, 1998). Also, once the decision is made
to blow the whistle, they may be so committed to
taking action that they are no longer able to back
out. Researchers should explore the possibility that
the relationship between fear of retaliation and actual
whistleblowing is moderated by such processes and
contextual variables, as well as by the reporting
channel employed (Miceli and Near, 2002).
Another unexpected finding was that for supervisor
support and whistleblowing intent versus action (e.g.,
Miceli et al., 1991b). Specifically, supervisor support
seems to increase the likelihood that an observer of
wrongdoing will intend to blow the whistle, but to
decrease actual whistleblowing behavior (e.g., Near
and Miceli, 1986). This suggests that employees who
enjoy the support of their supervisors in some domains
perceive that this support is likely to extend to a
whistleblowing situation. As such, they may be more
likely to intend to blow the whistle upon observing a
wrongdoing, knowing their supervisor will likely
‘‘back them up’’. However, given the reverse in the
direction of this relationship for actual whistleblowing, some other variable or process is likely acting as a
moderator. One possible explanation is that employees with supportive supervisors may feel a greater
responsibility to ensure that their supervisors are not
adversely affected by a whistleblowing claim. These
individuals may choose silence to voice in an effort to
spare the supervisor embarrassment or discipline that
may result from a report of illegitimate, unsanctioned,
or immoral acts occurring within their department/
division.
291
on whistleblowing yield two interesting findings.
First, while the relationships were similar for whistleblowing intent and action, we were surprised by the
relatively small correlation between severity of the
wrongdoing and whistleblowing. We would have
thought that a more serious transgression would merit
action more so than a less severe transgression (e.g.,
Trevino and Victor, 1992). In fact, severity of the
wrongdoing explains less than 3% of the variance in
both whistleblowing intent and action. It may be that
in some cases employees perceive that reports of very
severe organizational wrongdoing are more likely to
be met with resistance and retaliation by organizational members (e.g., Dozier and Miceli, 1985).
Alternatively, this finding may be indicative of an
overall inconsistency in assessments of the severity of
various actions. For example, it may be that individuals with varying value orientations may assess the
same action as more or less severe, or even as more or
less wrong. Additionally, this may indicate incongruence between the employee’s values and the
organization’s espoused values (e.g., Miceli and Near,
1994). Researchers might explore the possibility that
value congruence between the organization and the
whistleblower moderates the relationship between
transgression severity and whistleblowing.
Finally, we were at first somewhat amazed by the
strong positive correlation between whistleblowing
intent and relational closeness to the wrong-doer (i.e.,
the closer the observer was to the wrong-doer, whether interpersonally or with respect to organizational
structure, the more likely it was that he or she intended
to blow the whistle; e.g., King, 1997). However, it
would make sense that one is more likely to observe
wrongdoing by a person with which one is in close
proximity. Further, the closer one is to the wrongdoer, the more likely one has access to sufficient evidence of wrongdoing. Knowledge of wrongdoing is
logically the first step in the whistleblowing process. It
would be interesting, however, to determine whether
this relationship holds for actual whistleblowing.
Unfortunately, no studies were found that reported
this correlation.
Intending to blow the whistle versus actually blowing it
The role of wrongdoing in whistleblowing
Examination of meta-analytic results for the influence
of characteristics of the wrongdoing and wrongdoer
Our discussion of the correlates of whistleblowing
intent versus actual whistleblowing points to a likely
292
Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran
difference in the predictors of each. More importantly, these differences probably reflect the ‘‘psychological distance’’ between behavioral intention
and overt action (Bagozzi, 1992). Specifically,
whistleblowing intention and action are logically
separated by psychological, motivational, and
implementation processes (e.g., planning, monitoring, guidance and control, psychological commitment, effort; e.g., Azjen, 1992; Bagozzi, 1992).
Therefore, a complete model of the whistleblowing
process requires the identification and explication of
the entire process (from observation, to intent, to
action, and all steps in between). Certainly, most
researchers in this domain are interested in drawing
conclusions about actual whistleblowing; however,
few have designed research to allow such enumeration of the process. We suspect that this is a
byproduct of the difficulty in gaining longitudinal
data and data from actual whistleblowers (e.g., Chiu,
2003; Sims and Keenan, 1998).
Of the studies included in this meta-analysis, only
two examined whistleblowing from the perspective
of both the intended and actual whistleblower;
therefore only two reported a correlation between
intending to blow the whistle and actual whistleblowing behavior. The sample-size weighted, mean
observed correlation between whistleblowing intent
and actual whistleblowing was only 0.05 (total
N = 789, k = 2). While we can not be sure of the
true relationship between intent and action, this is
consistent with research in other domains that has
reported a lower than expected relationship (e.g.,
Ajzen, 1992). In sum, generalizing from intent to
actual whistleblowing may not be a wise strategy.
Granted, actual behavior is more difficult to study,
especially in a sensitive area such as this. However, it
is still imperative that such studies are conducted and
published.
Correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers
We examined four potential types of correlates of
retaliation against whistleblowers. The strongest
correlates of retaliation against whistleblowers were
found for characteristics of the wrongdoing
(frequency and severity of wrongdoing), whistleblower actions during the whistleblowing process
(use of an external reporting channel and success in
stopping the wrongdoing), and contextual aspects,
namely supervisor support. It is interesting that positive correlations surfaced between retaliation and
both the severity and the frequency of the wrongdoing. This finding likely reflects a greater threat to
the organization’s future performance by whistleblowers who report information on a severe or
frequent organizational wrongdoing (e.g., Miceli
and Near, 2002). This may be particularly strong in
instances where an external reporting channel is
utilized, as the risk of public scrutiny and legal
intervention increases (Miceli et al., 1991b). In
addition, in organizations where wrongdoing is
frequent, it is more likely that a cultural norm
actively operates to continue and support the
transgressions (e.g., Schein, 1996). In such cases, a
whistleblower who reports wrongdoing (regardless
of the channel employed) is actively violating this
norm. According to Schein (1996), norm-violators,
particularly in cases where a norm is widely shared,
often face severe repercussions. Whistleblowers who
already possess fewer idiosyncrasy credits (e.g., due
to low job performance, low organizational value,
etc.; Hollander, 1958), upon dissent, are likely to
face the harshest retaliation.
As expected, whistleblowers who possess convincing evidence of wrongdoing and those who are
effective in stopping the transgression are less likely
to be retaliated against (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002;
Parmerlee et al., 1982). It is logical that when the
whistleblower possesses convincing evidence of the
transgression, the organization would be well-served
to halt the practice and not retaliate. Similarly, it
seems likely that in organizations where whistleblowers are effective in stopping wrongdoing, the
organization and the whistleblower were in agreement that the wrongdoing must be stopped (e.g., the
practice violated the espoused values of the organization), and therefore it would be less likely that the
whistleblower would experience organizationallysanctioned retaliation (Miceli and Near, 1994). It is
important to note that retaliation may occur even
when not sanctioned by the organization’s top
management (Miceli and Near, 1994; Parmerlee
et al., 1982). Future research should examine
sanctioned and unsanctioned retaliation separately,
as this would facilitate a more comprehensive
understanding of the retaliation process.
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
We were not surprised to find that whistleblowers
who employed an external reporting channel were
more likely to suffer retaliation, as the use of an
external channel is likely to be interpreted as a threat
to the organization’s structure and legitimate
authority (e.g., Miceli and Near, 2002; Near and
Miceli, 1986; Weber, 1947). The correlation,
however, was smaller than would be predicted by
these theories. This is likely due to the immediate
external scrutiny that these organizations would
suffer as a result of the whistleblower’s use of an
external reporting channel (Dworkin and Baucus,
1998). Any retaliatory acts sanctioned by the
organization are likely also to be reported through
this external channel, thus further increasing the
potential for public scrutiny and legal intervention
(Miceli et al., 1991).
Our finding of a small negative relationship
between job level and retaliation is also noteworthy.
Power theories and dependence-control theories
would have predicted that individuals of higher job
level would be in a better position to blow the
whistle on organizational wrongdoing (Casal and
Zalkind, 1995; Near and Miceli, 1986). However,
organizational members may feel a greater sense of
betrayal when a member of higher status in the
organization blows the whistle (e.g., Parmerlee et al.,
1982). Therefore, instead of being better protected
against retaliation, members of higher job level may
be at somewhat higher risk. Given the small relationship we found, however, neither of these
explanations fit the data. If valuable members of the
organization are more likely to be retaliated against
(due to feelings of betrayal, violation of power
structure, etc.), it may be that job level is no longer
an appropriate proxy variable for value. Specifically,
organizations are increasingly hiring for top management and supervisory positions from outside the
organization, rather than promoting from within (as
is typical in tenure-based promotion systems). In
these cases, individuals of high level in the organization are not necessarily more valuable, nor do they
necessarily possess a relationship with the organization as a whole that would induce a feeling of
betrayal after whistleblowing. Specifically, a feeling
of betrayal implies a break of a psychological contract made in a dyad (i.e., between two individuals,
such as between the whistleblower and the retaliator,
who is perhaps a supervisor or coworker) not
293
between an entire organization and the whistleblower. Future research should explore the potential
that retaliation is better predicted by examining
dyadic interactions or relationships (between whistleblower and likely retaliator) than by using a proxy
that is representative of an organizational-level variable (i.e., job level, value to organization, etc.; e.g.,
Casal and Zalkind, 1995).
While we did not have access to such data, it
would be interesting to examine the potential for
retaliation against intended whistleblowers. For
example, what is the likelihood that these individuals
share their intentions with others in the organization, perhaps to assess if, when, or how they should
blow the whistle on organizational wrongdoing
(e.g., via social comparison processes)? Individuals
with whom they share their intentions may be in a
position to retaliate against the intended whistleblower (perhaps to prevent the individual from
taking the charges any further), or to share his or her
intentions with another organizational member who
is in a position to retaliate. As this would have
implications for actual whistleblowing, it seems
important to understand and enumerate this process
as well as to determine the predictors and correlates
of retaliation against potential whistleblowers.
Practical implications
Whistleblowing on organizational wrongdoing has
the potential for many positive outcomes for the
organization (Miceli and Near, 1994; Near and
Miceli, 1995). Our results have a few implications
for the types of actions that should be taken to improve the potential for actual whistleblowing in
organizations. First, consistent with past research
findings (e.g., Miceli et al., 1991b), our results suggest that employees of higher tenure and job level
are more likely to blow the whistle. It may be that
younger employees or those of a lower job level are
uncomfortable with reporting wrongdoing (particularly by those at a higher level in the organizational
hierarchy). Similarly, these employees may lack
sufficient power or knowledge to blow the whistle
and effect change (Keenan, 1995). Organizations
may consider targeting this group of employees for
specific training focused on (1) what types of activities might be considered unethical/unsanctioned,
294
Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran
(2) how reports of wrongdoing might be made, and
(3) reemphasizing the organization’s commitment to
ethical practices, etc. (e.g., Miceli and Near, 1994).
Perhaps such training might be delivered during the
organizational orientation process. However, the
organization should be certain that these espoused
ethical values are consistent with those that are
enacted on a daily basis (e.g., Schein, 1996).
Incongruence between espoused and enacted values
may lead to feelings of confusion and even suspicion
within the targeted audience.
Second, we found that ethical judgment is related
to whistleblowing intent, but not actual whistleblowing. This suggests that employees may be aware
when an observed practice is questionable and
should be reported, however, this knowledge is
insufficient to instigate actual reporting. While this is
also a matter for future research, organizational
officials should consider the presence of other variables within their control that may work against
whistleblowing (e.g., fear or threat of retaliation,
perception that the costs of whistleblowing outweigh potential benefits, accurate perception/evaluation of the severity of the transgression, value
congruence with the organization, perception that
whistleblowing will not lead to change, etc.) Similarly, our research suggests that whistleblowers may
not frequently be successful in stopping wrongdoing.
A potential whistleblower may weigh this into his or
her decision to actually blow the whistle.
Third, our results suggest that role responsibility
to blow the whistle is relatively unrelated to actual
whistleblowing. Organizations should consider the
possibility that the individuals in these positions
(wrongly) believe their primary responsibility is to
‘‘save face’’ for the organization by, at times, covering up transgressions, or by dealing with wrongdoing using other non-traditional or unsanctioned
measures. Further, even though these employees
have been appointed to a ‘‘watchdog’’ role, they
may still fear they would betray their organization by
blowing the whistle; similarly, they may still fear
unsanctioned retaliation for whistleblowing by
coworkers or supervisors. Top management should
ensure that the internal reporting channels are
‘‘free from leaks’’ and are manned by trustworthy
individuals.
Finally, when possible, organizations may consider
publicizing when an incident of whistleblowing has
led to positive change. This act may improve the
likelihood that other potential whistleblowers will be
motivated to alert top management of wrongdoing.
It would be wise, however, to exercise caution that
this practice does not foster unsanctioned retaliatory
acts.
Limitations and future research directions
One limitation of our analyses is the relatively small
number of studies included under each meta-analysis. Although the number of studies was few, the
actual sample sizes were often in the thousands
suggesting some generalizability of our findings.
Furthermore, by integrating findings over three
decades of research, this study provides a comprehensive view of the correlates of intended and actual
whistleblowing as well as lending insight into the
retaliation process. Thus, while there remains a need
for more individual studies, this meta-analysis was
successful in providing a snapshot of the current state
of the field as well as in providing directions for
improving future research.
A second concern relates to our choice of only
published articles in the meta-analyses. Arguments
can be made that only significant findings are published, and thus by confining ourselves to the published literature we have overestimated the effect
sizes. This is the classic file-drawer effect (Rosenthal,
1979). To address this potential concern, we conducted file-drawer analyses and found that in many
instances we needed several studies to reverse our
substantive findings.
A third limitation concerns the lack of reliability
data available in the studies included in this metaanalysis. All measures are affected by measurement
error and thus the correlates reported here are
underestimates of true relationships. Related to
unreliability in the measures, we found that many
studies did not report adequate measures of construct
validity for the measures that were employed. Similarly, many studies used ad-hoc measures of retaliation. No evidence was presented why certain
behaviors are considered to be retaliatory. This
illuminates the need to focus on construct validity
issues in future. It would also be profitable if standardized measures are used for the main variables in
future research.
Whistleblowing and Retaliation
Another issue concerns the potential for alternative explanations for the differences reported
between studies examining whistleblowing intentions and those exploring whistleblowing actions.
Specifically, an anonymous reviewer raised the
important point that since many studies on behavioral intentions utilize scenario-based approaches,
something about this research methodology, other
than the fact that intentions rather than actions are
studied, may explain the differing results. This is always a concern in content domains where substantially similar research methodologies are consistently
employed (i.e., whistleblowing intentions research
relies heavily upon survey-based and scenario-based
approaches). It is possible that the use of the scenariobased method may be acting as a moderator. This
concern may best be addressed with future research
relying on the triangulation of research methods.
A final important consideration relates to the
samples used by the authors of four of the studies
included in this meta-analysis. Specifically, four
samples were drawn from the 1980 U.S. Merit
System Protection Board Survey. While it is possible
that the samples overlapped to some extent, the
selection criteria, sample sizes, and measured variables differed across the studies. As such, the potential for bias due to non-independence to impact
our results is mitigated.
Conclusion
Whistleblowing on organizational wrongdoing has
become increasingly publicized in recent years. Such
whistleblowing has assisted organizations and federal
agencies in halting practices that would otherwise
harm employees and consumers. Given the potential
for positive outcomes to result from whistleblowing,
it is disheartening to learn that many whistleblowers
may fear and even suffer retaliation (e.g., Miceli and
Near, 1996). Much research has been conducted in an
effort to understand and enumerate the whistleblowing process as well as to predict retaliation against
whistleblowers. We cumulated this literature using
meta-analytic methodology in an effort to ‘‘take
stock’’ of where we are in the field and to provide an
orientation for future research in whistleblowing.
Of greatest importance is the finding that research
conducted on whistleblowing intentions does not
295
easily translate into conclusions about whistleblowers.
Rather, to advance our understanding of this field, we
need to explore and enumerate the processes that
occur between the time wrongdoing is witnessed and
when actual whistleblowing occurs.
Acknowledgement
We wish to thank the Editor and two anonymous
reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this manuscript.
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Department of Management & Marketing,
University of North Carolina at Wilmington,
601 South College Road,
Wilmington, NC 28403, U.S.A.
E-mail: magnusj@uncw.edu
Department of Psychology,
Florida International University,
University Park Campus,
11200 SW 8th Street,
Miami, FL 33199, U.S.A.
E-mail: vish@fiu.edu
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