THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2013-0617, State of New Hampshire v. Robert
L. Obin, the court on October 21, 2014, issued the following
order:
The defendant, Robert L. Obin, appeals his convictions on one count of
possession of oxycodone and one count of possession of methadone. See RSA
318-B:2, I (2011). He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict because, he asserts, he had lawful prescriptions for the
drugs. We affirm.
RSA 318-B:2, I, generally prohibits the possession of controlled drugs.
However, persons possessing prescription drugs dispensed to them pursuant to
a lawful prescription are exempt from this prohibition. See RSA 318-B:15, II
(2011). The “lawful prescription” exemption is an affirmative defense, which
the defendant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
See RSA 318-B:22 (2011); State v. Larose, 157 N.H. 28, 35 (2008). This
standard “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact
is more probable than its nonexistence.” State v. Addison, 165 N.H. 381, 590
(2013) (quotation omitted). When a defendant moves for a directed verdict
based upon an affirmative defense, the question is whether the evidence
compels a finding that the defendant has established the affirmative defense as
a matter of law, State v. Jernigan, 133 N.H. 396, 399 (1990), a question which
we review de novo, State v. Kay, 162 N.H. 237, 243 (2011). We will not reverse
the trial court’s decision when it reaches the correct result and valid alternative
grounds exist to reach that result. State v. Berry, 148 N.H. 88, 91 (2002).
The State’s first witness testified that she contacted the police to report
“two suspicious cars” in the parking lot of her apartment complex. The police
officer who responded to the call testified that when he approached the
defendant’s vehicle, he noticed that the defendant and his passenger “began to
make furtive movements . . . reaching around the front passenger and driver
seat area, around the seats and on the side of the seats.” As the officer came
closer to the vehicle, he observed that the defendant had a pill bottle in his
hand, which he placed on the center console. After ordering the defendant to
exit the vehicle, the officer observed that the defendant was “sweating
profusely” and “acting nervous.” He testified that the defendant “couldn’t stand
still when I was talking to him. He seemed very jumpy, just jittery.” The officer
examined the pill bottle and noted that, according to the label, it should have
contained fifteen-milligram oxycodone pills that were green and inscribed with
the number “4811” on one side and a “V” on the other side. However, when he
opened the bottle, he observed that none of the pills in the bottle matched the
description on the label. One set of pills was blue, round, and marked with the
number “224” on one side and a score on the other side. The other set was
green, round, and marked with the number “187” on one side and a score on
the other side. A laboratory analysis confirmed that the pills marked with the
number “224” were thirty-milligram oxycodone tablets, and the pills marked
with the number “187” were fifteen-milligram oxycodone tablets.
The officer arrested the defendant and transported him to the police
station, where he was booked and searched. The police found $789 in cash in
his pockets. The next day, the police searched the defendant’s vehicle and
found a small plastic bag under the front passenger’s seat containing ten white
pills that were round, scored, and marked with the number “54/142.”
Laboratory analysis confirmed that these pills were ten-milligram methadone
tablets. In the trunk, the police found a four-inch, plastic straw containing a
white powdery substance which laboratory analysis confirmed to be oxycodone.
The officer testified that the day after the arrest, the defendant’s wife
arrived at the police station with three empty prescription bottles, and that the
descriptions on the labels matched the pills that were found in the defendant’s
possession. The officer then reviewed the labels to determine when the
prescriptions were filled, how many pills were dispensed, and how many pills
would be remaining if the medication were used in the prescribed manner
shown on the labels. The officer determined that there were 142 tablets
missing from the thirty-milligram oxycodone prescription, 74 tablets missing
from the fifteen-milligram oxycodone prescription, and 140 tablets missing
from the methadone prescription.
The passenger who was in the defendant’s vehicle at the time of the
arrest testified that she was having an affair with the defendant, that he flew to
Florida once a month to obtain the prescriptions, and that on each trip, the
defendant obtained 180 fifteen-milligram tablets of oxycodone, 230 thirtymilligram tablets of oxycodone, and 180 tablets of methadone. She testified
that the defendant paid for his trips to Florida with the money he made from
selling the prescriptions.
At the close of the State’s evidence, the defendant moved for a directed
verdict, arguing that he “had lawfully prescribed prescriptions for the three
medications” that were found in his possession. The State objected, arguing
that while “[t]here was evidence that the Defendant may have had prescriptions
for the drugs” found, “we don’t know the source of the drugs,” and “we don’t
necessarily know if they came from the bottles themselves.” The trial court
denied the motion, stating:
The pills that were found in [the defendant’s] motor vehicle did not
match the prescription bottle that they were found within, and the
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empty prescription bottles that were brought in some hours or
days later by his wife – at this point I don’t have any connection
relative to the pills that were found. That is, even though [the
defendant] had a prescription apparently for various controlled
substances, I don’t have evidence that the pills found in the car
came from those prescriptions.
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the
court “[did not] have evidence that the pills found in the car came from those
prescriptions.” We agree with the defendant that the evidence supported a
reasonable inference that the drugs found in his possession came from the pill
bottles provided by his wife. However, we do not agree that this evidence,
considered in context, compels a finding that the defendant possessed the
drugs pursuant to lawful prescriptions. See Jernigan, 133 N.H. at 399. To the
contrary, the evidence recited above was more than sufficient to permit the jury
to infer that he possessed the drugs for the purpose of sale or distribution and
not for a legitimate medical condition.
Affirmed.
HICKS, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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