Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Lecture Notes (Book 1; Chapters 1-5, 7-8)
Book 1, Chapter 1 (Dover Thrift Edition Pagination; page 1)
Every art has its own end of which it aims. Examples: the end of the healing art is health; of the ship-building art,
a vessel; of the military art, victory; of domestic management, wealth.
There are sub-arts connected to each art and they possess their own end. However, the end of the sub-art is
always less choice-worthy (i.e. good) than the end of the art it is connected to because its end is pursued only
for the sake of the end of the art it is connected to. Example: Under horsemanship is the art of making bridles.
Book 1, Chapter 2 (pages 1-2)
Not everything can be desired only for the sake of something else. Thus some things must be intrinsic goods,
desired for their own sakes. Aristotle assumes further that there is one and only one intrinsic good for the sake of
which everything else is desired. (Objection to Aristotle: Couldn't there be several intrinsic goods?)
Aristotle identifies the art whose end is the one intrinsic good for the sake of which everything else is desired:
ethics (meant in a sense that includes both ethics and politics). All other arts are sub-arts of ethics.
Book 1, Chapter 3 (pages 2-3)
Aristotle's famous point about not seeking more exactness in a subject than the nature of the thing studied
admits. Aristotle's point is that in ethics we cannot have strict proofs like we do in mathematics.
Aristotle's dismissal of the young and immature from the discussion of ethics.
Book 1, Chapter 4 (pages 3-4)
Aristotle identifies the end of ethics; the intrinsic good for the sake of which everything else is desired:
“eudaimonia”. This Greek word is translated as “happiness” or “flourishing”. It refers to whatever sort of life is
most desirable or satisfactory, but it does not imply that such a life will be one of pleasure or enjoyment.
Aristotle then raises the question: What constitutes “flourishing”; what constitutes a good human life?
Possible answers Aristotle mentions here: health, pleasure, wealth, and honor.
Book 1, Chapter 5 (pages 4-5)
Aristotle takes there to be three forms of life that seem worth examining: the life of sensual pleasure (i.e.
pleasure), the life of society/politics (i.e. honor), and the life of contemplation.
Aristotle quickly dismisses the life of pleasure out of hand. He then argues that it can't be the life of society/honor
because: (1) “it is plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to rest with those who
pay rather than with him who receives, whereas the Chief Good we feel instinctively must be something which is
our own, and not easily to be taken from us.”; (2) Also, men who pursue honor do so to prove to themselves they
are good and virtuous. Clearly, then, virtue is higher than honor even for those who seek honor.
Aristotle then discusses the life of money making (i.e. wealth). It can't be this because: wealth is desired only for
the sake of something else, so it cannot be the one intrinsic good for which everything else is desired.
Book 1, Chapter 6 (pages 5-7)
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Book 1, Chapter 7 (pages 7-10)
The Chief Good is a “final good”. This implies (a) that it is desired for its own sake, and (b) that it is not desired
for the sake of anything else.
We do desire honor, pleasure, and intellect for their own sakes, but we also desire them for the sake of
flourishing / living a good life. That is, they satisfy (a) but not (b). Therefore, they cannot be the Chief Good.
The Chief Good is a “sufficient good”. This implies (c) alone makes a life choice-worthy, and (d) lacks nothing.
Aristotle then concludes that the Chief Good must be human flourishing (a.k.a. happiness).
Aristotle then asks what is human flourishing?
To answer this question, Aristotle begins his famous “Function Argument” (taking up most of page 9):
(1) You can identify the function of some type of thing by identifying what is unique about that type of thing.
(2) What's unique to man is rational activity.
(3) Man's function is rational activity. (From 1-2)
(4) A good thing is one that fulfills its function well.
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(5) A good man is one that reasons well. (From 3-4)
Some Objections to Aristotle's Function Argument:
Note: Objections must either target: (1) a specific premise or,
(2) an inference from specific premises to a conclusion. There is
no such thing as a general objection to an argument as a whole.
Objections to Premise 1: A “function” or purpose depends upon why someone made that thing or what
someone is intentionally using it for, not what is unique about that thing.
Objections to Premise 2: (a) There are other things unique to man; (b) Rational activity is not unique to man.
Objections to Premise 3: None, it is an intermediate conclusion. (Note: You can't object to conclusions)
Objections to Premise 4: None.
Objections to Conclusion 5: None, it is a conclusion. (Note: Again, you can't object to conclusions)
Objections to Inference from 3-4 to 5: (a) There seems to be a shift in the meaning of the word “good”. In
premise 4 it seems to mean “functionally good” or “efficient” where in the conclusion it seems to mean “morally
good”; (b) To be a good member of your type isn't necessarily what is good for you as an individual.
The conclusion of this argument is that human flourishing, the Chief Good for man, is the performance of rational
activity well. Aristotle then adds that “it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes spring” by which he means
that being a good man requires more than just reasoning well once or for some short period.
In giving the Function Argument, Aristotle distinguishes human life from the two other sorts of life:
Vegetative life = nutrition and reproduction.
Animal life = nutrition and reproduction via perception and action.
Rational life = nutrition and reproduction via perception, action, and rational choices.
A partial response to some of the above objections: “Function” isn't something's purpose. It doesn't matter how
or why the thing came into existence, or whether it was made or being used for a purpose. Rather, function is
“how it does what it does.” Anything that does anything has a function in the sense of a “how it does what it
does.” For example, a living thing has a “what it does”: it maintain its own form, its own manner of functioning, in
existence. It does this through the continuous self-rebuilding activities of nutrition and reproduction. Man's
particular way of living (“what it does”) is through rational activity (“how it does”). A good man is one that through
well performed rational activity, maintain themselves and reproduces. (cf. Korsgaard 2008:140-1)
Book 1, Chapter 8 (pages 10-12)
Division of Goods into 3 Classes:
(1) External Goods, “goods of fortune”; e.g. friends, wealth, power, good birth, good children.
(2) Goods of the Body; e.g. strength, health, appearance.
(3) Goods of the Soul; “intellectual virtues” like intelligence and “moral virtues” like generosity and temperance.
Aristotle points out that it isn't the possession of reason (or virtue) that matters, but exercising it. That is, man's
function is rational activity not just possessing reason; it isn't a state but an activity.
Virtue is its own reward. That is, if I am just then I will take pleasure from performing just acts. I do not need
some external reward for being just. Furthermore, this means a virtuous life can be a pleasurable one since if
you have a virtue you'll take pleasure from exercising it. However, Aristotle claims that external goods (wealth,
friends, etc.) are necessary for the virtues. For example, you cannot be charitable if you are poor.