2/04/2014 Air War in the Pacific Dr Richard R. Muller USAF School of Advanced Air & Space Studies Maxwell AFB, AL USA 12 March 2014 Outline • Introduction • The Airpower Balance • Carrier Aviation • Theater Air Power • Strategic Bombardment 1 2/04/2014 The Pacific Theater(s) • Central Pacific • South Pacific • Southwest Pacific • China-Burma-India (CBI) • Aleutians… 2 2/04/2014 Theater factors • Geography • Distance • Inhospitable combat environment • Logistical challenges • Impact of…and on… air power? The Airpower Balance--Japan • First rate naval and air forces – Army, naval aviation schism • Mahanian naval tradition— the decisive battle • Integrated air power with battle line • The Kido Butai 3 2/04/2014 IJN Carrier Force • Multi-carrier operations – 6 fleet carriers at Pearl Harbor • Rapid generation of strikes • “Glass jaw” – Armor, damage control – Training regimen Japan—Aviation Technology • Carrier aircraft: state of the art – A6M “Zero-sen” – B5N torpedo plane – D3A dive bomber 4 2/04/2014 The formidable Zero Long range strike and ISR • Land based naval attack planes – Island bases; littoral ops (China) • Long range flying boats 5 2/04/2014 The Airpower Balance: US • ORANGE: USN’s vision of a future war, 1890s-1940s • Central Pacific drive • Mahan’s decisive clash of the battlefleets • Updated into air age USS Indianapolis, 1932 ORANGE: The third dimension • 1921: BuAer established • RADM Wm Moffett • Dirigibles, flying boats – “eyes of the fleet” • CV-1: USS Langley 6 2/04/2014 Forging a Fast Carrier Force • 1927: advent of “fast carriers” Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3) • From fleet auxiliary to “complete freedom of action” separate from battle line – Aviators vs “the Gun Club” Honing the Edge: Fleet Problems • I (1923): validated need for carriers to cover vast Pacific • V(1927): simulated air strike • IX (1929): attack on Panama Canal • Sun, 7 Feb 1932: simulated carrier strike on Pearl Harbor 7 2/04/2014 Increasing sophistication • XVIII (1937): tested use of carriers for support of amphibious landing – Support landing or retain freedom of maneuver against enemy force? • Most important questions raised… Fog of war… Amphibious warfare • US Marine Corps—a service in search of a mission • Small Wars, 1920s • Amphibious assaults on defended shores, 1930s – Organic air power • Integration with ORANGE 8 2/04/2014 Army Air Corps • Billy Mitchell: displace USN as pillar of national defense • ACTS: focus on impending war with Germany The Carrier War • Carrier strike capability integral to Japanese designs • US ability to absorb blow, recover, go on offensive 9 2/04/2014 Why Pearl Harbor? • Forward base, US Pacific Fleet • Adm Yamamoto argued for quick strike to sweep US fleet aside, allow Japan to seize resource zone, defensive perimeter – “For six months I will run wild…” 10 2/04/2014 “Infamy” • Sunday, 7 December 1941 • 2 attack waves from 6 IJN flattops disabled US Pacific Fleet, airpower • Smashing tactical success The Japanese Run Wild • Malaya, Wake, Guam • Philippines – Disaster at Clark Field • • • • • Prince of Wales and Repulse Singapore, 15 Feb 42 Dutch East Indies Burma Threaten Australia 11 2/04/2014 On the Defensive • Carrier raids • The Doolittle Raid, 18 Apr 42 – Effects? • Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May 42 • Midway, 4-6 June 42 12 2/04/2014 Midway: June 1942 • Japanese plan: extend defensive perimeter, lure Pacific Fleet into decisive battle – Complex plan • USN response – Codebreaking (Station HYPO, Hawaii) – Station 3 carriers NE of Midway 13 2/04/2014 Midway: a near-run thing • Planning set the stage… now it’s up to the operational commanders • 4 June: Midway strike • The air-sea battle of 4 June – Fog, friction, chance… CENTPAC • The US Navy’s Ideal War – War Plan ORANGE • The might of US industry – Growth of fast carrier task force • Bring Japanese home islands under direct attack 14 2/04/2014 CENTPAC and the wider war • Japanese defensive perimeter – Interior vs Exterior lines • Keep defenders off-balance – Role of MacArthur’s effort, SWPAC • Only US and its allies capable of contemplating such a strategy A Tale of Two Recapitalizations (1) • Essex-class carriers • Independence-class light carriers • New generation of carrier aircraft • Supporting technology 15 2/04/2014 ESSEX-class fast carrier • Heart of the fast carrier task force • Capitalized on experience gained with Yorktown class • 27,100 tons • 872 feet long • 33 knots • 100 aircraft “One of the most important products of America’s warmaking capability…” 16 2/04/2014 17 2/04/2014 INDEPENDENCE-class light carrier • • • • 11,000 tons displacement 622 feet long 45 aircraft Augmented by dozens of escort or “jeep” carriers • US builds 100+carriers; Japan only launches 10 carriers during entire war New generation of carrier aircraft • Grumman F6F “Hellcat” • Grumman TBF/General Motors TBM Avenger • Curtiss SB2C “Helldiver” • Vought F4U “Corsair” 18 2/04/2014 Supporting technology • AAA protection – 5 inch, 40mm, 20mm – Proximity fuse • Radar • Command and control – Combat Information Center • Communications – VHF • The personnel dimension USAAF revitalized • P-40, P-39, A-20 give way to P-38, P-47, P-51, late-model B-25 • B-29 in pipeline • Slowed somewhat by Europe-first strategy – Kenney “living beyond his means” 19 2/04/2014 A Tale of Two Recapitalizations (2) • IJNAF: stuck with obsolescent 1941 front line • New types: too few, too late – Critical neglect of ASW, air defense • Training program – Sakai’s testimony Kawanishi N1K2 “George” Marianas operations, June 1944 • Midway: 3 carriers (ca. 250 aircraft), 8 cruisers, 14 destroyers • Marianas: Task Force 58 (Mitscher) under Fifth Fleet (Spruance): 15 carriers (891 aircraft), 7 BBs, 21 cruisers, 69 destroyers 20 2/04/2014 Marianas operations • Support to amphibious landing force – B-29 bases • Japanese task force sorties • 19 June: Battle of the Philippine Sea – “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot” At Full Stride • Fast carrier ops, 1944-1945 – Amphibious assaults (Philippines, Iwo, Okinawa) – Fleet actions (Leyte, October 1944) • Flexibility, mobility, endurance – “the fleet that came to stay” “Murderers’ Row” (1944) 21 2/04/2014 The Kamikaze Campaign • Nimitz: Only thing not predicted… • Kamikaze Special Attack Force (Tokkō) • “Divine Wind” – Totally alien to Western mindset • Present day implications? 22 2/04/2014 Theater Air Power • Land based airpower’s contribution enormous…yet not quite what prewar doctrine predicted Guadalcanal and the Solomons • First major US offensive of the war – FDR demanded daily updates • THE model for joint expeditionary operations in hostile environment • The sea/air/land/subsurface battle for Guadalcanal AAF P-39s, Guadalcanal 23 2/04/2014 Why Guadalcanal? • Post-Midway, opportunity to take limited offensive • Japanese airstrip construction on Guadalcanal • US landing, 7 Aug 42 – WATCHTOWER Japanese land-based torpedo planes attack US landing force, 8 Aug 42 Context • Harsh, bare base conditions • Climate • Disease • Logistical nightmare • Distance from US • Confined operating area – “The Slot” 24 2/04/2014 The Land/Sea /Air Battle for Guadalcanal • “unique for variety and multiplicity of weapons employed and for coordination between sea power, ground power and air power” --Morison Marines dig in, Henderson Field The Guadalcanal Campaign • Henderson Field • CACTUS Air Force • Japanese reinforcements, US defense – Tokyo Express – Banzai charges • Japanese withdrawal, Feb 43 – “Tokyo Express no longer has terminus on Guadalcanal” 25 2/04/2014 The Southwest Pacific Theater • An airpower laboratory • New Guinea • “Island Hopping” – Bypass strongholds • George Kenney, Fifth Air Force • Battle of Bismarck Sea, March 43 Kenney’s Air Power Formula • • • • • Air control Air blockade Hammer enemy positions Cover/assist own forces Advance bomber line… 26 2/04/2014 A war for airbases… B-25 skip-bombing 27 2/04/2014 31 (Beaufighter) Sqdn RAAF in SWPAC Turning the vertical flank • New Guinea airlift ops • Wau, Jan 43 – Reinforce, hold key airstrip • Nadzab, Sept 43 – Enable offensive 28 2/04/2014 7th (Australian) Division, airlanded at Nadzab, 11 Sep 43 The CBI • AVG—the Flying Tigers – Claire Chennault • The Hump – William Tunner • Imphal/Kohima • First Air Commandos 29 2/04/2014 Closing In • Japanese strategy: make war so costly… – New defensive doctrines • Iwo Jima, Feb 45 • Okinawa, Apr-May 45 • The limits of airpower? – “blowtorch and corkscrew” Strategic Bombardment • Prewar thinking: focus on Europe – AWPD-1, 42 • B-17, B-24 really “theater-range” aircraft – B-15, B-19 not developed Douglas B-19 30 2/04/2014 Early efforts • B-17s as deterrent, Pearl Harbor, Philippines • Midway • Raids on Rabaul The B-29 Campaign • • • • • China ops Marianas bases Twentieth Air Force Low level incendiary attacks March 1945: Operation MEETINGHOUSE, Tokyo – Possibly most lethal air attack in history Not “global reach,” but “hemispheric reach”: B-29 31 2/04/2014 The Atomic Strikes • • • • • Manhattan Project Little Boy and Fat Man Hiroshima, 6 Aug 45 Nagasaki, 9 Aug 45 Emperor Hirohito: “Bear the unbearable…” Expert testimony • Hideki Tojo, former Japanese premier, 1945, on principal causes of Japan’s defeat – The US submarine campaign – The island-hopping campaign, bypassing key Japanese strongholds – The independent operations of fast carrier task forces 32 2/04/2014 Two Visions of Victory • USN: The triumph of the fast carrier task force • USAAF: strategic air power • Stage set for postwar rivalry – Revolt of the Admirals, 1949 Pushed to the background? • Contribution of theater air power • Airmobility – Strategic and tactical • Unconventional ops 33 2/04/2014 Summing Up • Allies went from holding strategy to massive counteroffensive to bring Japan under siege • Airpower even more central than in Europe… • Dawn of atomic age…roots of the Cold War…AirSea Battle? 34