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Peter Kreuzer
The Philippines:
Mafia style domination in an oligarchic polity
Paper: Prepared for IPSA's XXIInd World Congress of Political Science,
Reshaping Power, Shifting Boundaries, Madrid 2012
Abstract:
The Philippines not seldom are referred to as the oldest democracy in Asia. Yet, violence plays
a crucial role in political competition, as well as domination over the people and control of deviance.
This paper focuses on the role of violence in the exercise of leadership in three structurally different Philippine areas: the provinces of Pampanga and Negros Occidental and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
It sketches the oligarchic structure of domination and a specific style of leadership that closely
resembles the traditional Mafia, relying on a model, that understands Mafia as a comprehensive
social order, that reflects both its coercive characteristics and the consensual and norm-based
patterns of domination and control.
Irrespective of level of development or modernization, violence controlled and exerted by individual oligarchs (oligarchic families) is ruled out in none of the regions. Pampanga and Negros
Occidental developed informal institutions that made violence a rare instrument in intra-elite
competition, whereas in the Muslim Areas of the ARMM violent contention for political and economic domination still prevails. In all three regions violence is still a means for the control of the
people. Whereas in the ARMM it is used with respect to a broad range of “deviant acts”, in the
other two regions, violent domination closely focuses on threats to the economic domination of
the elites.
In all three regions the oligarchic elites managed to capture the state, establishing and upholding a para-political sphere, where not only rent-seeking and corruption, but also privately controlled and directed violence are systemic features of everyday politics. It is this “emphasis on
the element of violence” (Hess 1998: 176) that differentiates Philippine politics Mafia-style from
mere rent-seeking and corruption.
Democracy is no antidote to violence as long as it does not coincide with a state that is largely
insulated from politics and a secure regime of rule of law. In the Philippines politics trumps administration and rule of law is executed as rule by law and extralegal action.
1 Introduction
Despite its long history of democratic government, analysts of Philippine politics tend
to describe the political elite in terms of patronage, patrimonialism, feudalism, bossism,
caciquism or principalia-rule, characterized by vertical, dyadic relationships, a high degree of fragmentation, high levels of corruption and a fairly regular use of physical violence for political ends. Already in the mid 1990s did Benedict Kerkvliet encourage Philippine studies to move “toward a more comprehensive analysis of Philippine Politics:
beyond the patron-client, factional framework” (Kerkvliet 1995), an appeal, which was
followed by a host of new literature, that tried exactly to do this. All of those who tried to
follow this invitation found themselves in exactly this paradigm outlined with the above
mentioned concepts. New Millenium analyses of Philippine politics turn out to be worthy
successors to the earlier ones, situating current Philippine politics in theoretical frames
that closely resemble their precursors.
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Sidel’s utilization of the American concept of bossism (1999), actually highlighted one
facet of domination, physical violence, that has been discussed at length in older studies, but was hardly reflected in the typological conceptualization to any significant extent
before. Likewise Hutchcroft’s booty capitalism (1998) pointed to the crucial role of rentseeking dynamics in the most modern of Philippines’ economic sectors, banking, relying
on the traditional frameworks of patrimonialism and oligarchic rule.
This paper argues, that Kerkvliet in 1995 simply was wrong in asking to go beyond
the patron-client framework. It may simply be, that the time-worn epitaphs used for making sense of Philippine politics fit the political practice of what David Timberman has
called “a changeless land” (1991). If this was the case, the task would be, to refine the
framework, to integrate formerly neglected aspects and analyze in some detail change
in the overarching continuity of a dominant pattern of domination in order to try to better
streamline the mêlée of terms and concepts that, despite their seeming diversity, coalesce around a common core with respect to the characterization of structure and practice of domination in the Philippines.
In order to do so, this paper provides a comparative analysis of two provinces and
one region of the Philippines: Pampanga, Negros Occidental, and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). These three political units may be said to stretch
from the most developed, i.e. Pampanga, over mid-developed, i.e. Negros Occidental,
to the least developed areas of the country, the ARMM.
Such a comparison shows a fairly distinct pattern of oligarchy in which oligarchs directly dominate politics and
uphold their domination not only by utilizing their wealth
within the bounds of law, but resort to various forms of
criminalized governance in order to defend their claims to
property and wealth. Governance is criminal not only insofar as the oligarchs derive extralegal rents, but also insofar they directly engage in criminal business and reserve
to them the right to employ extralegal physical violence.
Before turning to the Philippines, let me first introduce
the two core concepts that inform the study. The core of
the paper are a number of comparative analyses of core
characteristics of domination in the Philippines. The first
establishing the oligarchic and familistic basis of domination, the second sketching the place of violence and the
third turning to the role of illegal business. The fourth
analysis fits the practice of peace-pacts between contending politicians into the general
picture of an oligarchy dominating Philippine society Mafia-style.
2 Oligarchy and criminal governance – two concepts for the analysis of political
domination and control.
2.1 Oligarchs and the provision of coercion
Oligarchy is understood in an “Aristotelian” sense, making wealth a necessary part of
the definition. Oligarchy is understood to exist only “when men of property have the
government in their hands; […]. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether
they be few or many, that is an oligarchy” (Aristotle Politics, no year: Book III). Going
beyond Aristotle it is argued that oligarchy is characterized by a distinct supreme aim:
“the politics of wealth defense” by those who stand out of the broad mass of the people
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on account of their extraordinary wealth. (Winters 2011: 7). The concept of oligarchy
then refers to the use of wealth in the pursuit of its defense. The only stable about oligarchy over time and space then is the oligarch; i.e. a person, who makes use of his
extraordinary wealth for its defense. The concrete forms oligarchy takes vary over time
and the structural as well as cultural environment (Winters 2011: 7).1
Even though oligarchs utilize a host of different strategies for wealth defense, as a
form of domination oligarchy is necessarily connected to successful coercion including
the threat and use of violence. Wealth defense needs control over a sufficient capacity
for violent coercion. This is either a) directly provided by the individual oligarchs, b) provided collectively by them, c) taken over by a supreme oligarch or d) guaranteed by an
overarching political unit (a state), that defends the oligarchs’ property and wealth in the
context of a general paradigm of property rights.
Four “idealtypes” of oligarchy emerge, if we differentiate oligarchy according to different types of violent defense of oligarchic wealth and property.
The most untamed and “anarchic” type of oligarchy may be called warring oligarchy,
referring to a fragmented order in which individual oligarchs utilize their own retainers
for the defense of the oligarchs’ wealth (and power). Cooperation normally takes the
form of oligarchic alliances, which however are unstable and prone to long-term failure
as oligarchs are constantly exposed to a security dilemma and balancing strategies.
Oligarchic violence goes in two directions: vertically towards the people they control and
horizontally towards their contenders for wealth (and power).
Anarchy may be mediated by cooperation between oligarchs, out of which a ruling oligarchy may emerge, in which oligarchs still maintain their crucial role as providers of
coercion, however “rule collectively and through institutions marked by norms or codes
of conduct” (Winters 2011: 35). With respect to violence, this movement can be described as the path from market to oligopoly to cartel. Violence is no longer an option for
dealing with horizontal contenders for wealth and power, but reserved for the defense of
the claims to wealth and property against threats “from below”.
A third form is the sultanistic oligarchy, the qualifier Sultanism referring to the regime
type defined by Juan Linz (1975: 259-263) as being “based on personal rulership with
loyalty to the ruler based […] on a mixture of fear and rewards for his collaboration”
(259). In the context of a theory of oligarchy, the term sultanistic oligarchy connotes a
form in which “a monopoly on the means of coercion is in the hand of one oligarch rather than an institutionalized state constrained by laws. […] the rule of law is either absent or operates as a personalistic system of rule by law” (Winters 2011: 35). The ruler’s
position depends to a significant extent on his coercive capacity. Insofar as other oligarchs can eventually choose to transform their wealth in other forms of power, it is also
based on the supreme ruler’s his willingness and ability to provide them with enough
income to keep them content and to defend them from lateral threats from other oligarchs as well as from the people below.
A final form, as defined by Winters, is the civil oligarchy, meaning an order in which
the oligarchs are disarmed and no longer rule directly. Instead, the oligarchs’ private
coercion becomes the state’s public enforcement of rule compliance. This requires a
strong institutional setup, which takes the position of the oligarchs and defends their
property claims for them, reframing such property claims as property rights. Violence
becomes a perquisite of the state beyond the immediate grasp of the oligarchs.
In three of the four forms, oligarchs double as rulers, as they fend off threats to their
wealth through direct domination. If we accept the core assumption of oligarchy, that the
1
The following discussion is based on Winters 2011.
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principal aim of oligarchs is wealth defense, then politics is first and foremost subjected
to this overarching aim.
2.2 Criminal domination: a Mafia-model
Oligarchy provides a first frame for understanding certain types of polities, pointing to
one specific type of political actor, the oligarch, and the fundamental aim of his political
activities: property and wealth defense. Oligarchy also establishes the connex between
the individual ruler and the means of coercion, which the oligarchs try to control directly
in three of the four subtypes. One obvious, but not explicit aspect of oligarchy in a modern context of stateness is crime. Three of the four types of oligarchy are criminal “by
definition”, as the oligarchs’ utilization of violence in the context of domination and
wealth defense contradicts the modern states’ claim to a monopoly on the legitimate
means of violence.
This paper argues that a “criminal model” of politics, a model that analyses politics as
if it were (organized) crime provides an important additional lens, complementing more
standard perspectives on domination and governance. Abadinsky’s definition of organized crime centers on the core of the understanding of oligarchy: the goal of “money
and power”, corresponding to the above described wealth defense. Abadinsky posits
that organized crime “is not motivated by social doctrine, political beliefs, or ideological
concerns. Although political involvement may be part of the group’s activities, the purpose is usually to gain protection or immunity for its illegal activities” (Abadinsky 2010:
3). In addition, organized crime, does not aim at the overthrow of any government per
se, but at the formation of “a parallel government while coexisting with the existing one”
(Abadinsky 2010: 6). Organized crime, if powerful enough, hollows out the formal structures of the state, leaving the skeleton and surface intact, in order to utilize them for
their core purpose of wealth generation and defense. For both oligarchy and organized
crime alike, the crucial goals are the generation and defense of the wealth of the individual “family”. In both cases wealth defense requires political power or influence and
private control over sufficient means of coercion.
In this paper it is argued that “tradition-derived” forms of organized crime can provide
us with important models for understanding polities, who are dominated by persons or
small groups that aim at maximizing wealth. While being criminal from the perspective
of the state these persons and groups represent comprehensive social orders that relates to the state in various ways, depending on the latter’s independence from the local
social base on which the “criminal” actors were crafted. This paper argues for a Mafiamodel, as this fits Philippine reality to a significant extent.
The order constituted by the Mafia is segmentary. The constituent segments (families/clans) are similarily structured and “complete”; coexisting side by side, with each of
the segments in principle claiming the same status and the whole panoply of “rights”,
amongst them the right to prevent or penalize deviance (on segmentation see: White
1995, Sigrist 1979). As such, the individual families not only enjoy similar comprehensive rights and duties but are holistic entities encompassing the social, cultural and political sphere (Paoli 2001: 159).
In such settings political and social order are constructed from below (the family), coalescing into a system, that may be characterized as a more or less “regulated anarchy”
(Sigrist 1979).Similar to the state the individual units derive their legitimacy from the
recognition of all structurally homologous groups, dependent on their proven control
over a certain territory (Paoli 2003: 52). As states recognize each other, so do local Mafia groups/families. They develop and survive in an environment which is characterized
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by low levels of generalized trust, which, however, is substituted by specific forms of
personalized trust and extended systems of instrumental friendship. Its essence “lies in
the possibility of reciprocity in the exchange of resources, either one's own or acquired;
in the potential continuity of such exchange; and, finally, in the largely open nature of
the relationship” (Catanzaro 1985: 38).
A micro-macro model of the Mafia-mode of domination
Mafia families as a general rule try to minimize the actual use of physical violence.
Even though the ability to use violence is a core feature and “generalized ingredient of
Mafioso behavior” (Gambetta 2000: 168-169), everyday control is normally upheld
through the bonds of natural and artificial kinship. Within and beyond this circle control
is upheld by way of dispensing favors and thereby earning debts of loyalty. As the Mafiosi gives benefits without asking for specific returns, the very “vagueness of the repayment is translated into a perpetual debt of proofs of moral obligation that is, of symbols
and pledges of loyalty” (Catanzaro 1985: 46, see also Gambetta 2000: 170).
This capacity to dispense favors is crucial for continued domination and has to be
nourished by economic activities. Historically mafia organizations thrived on siphoning
off various types of economic rents they extracted by virtue of the debts of loyalty, their
control over local political positions, and/or connection to party officials and their capability at employing violence. It would be wrong to connect the Mafia with illegal activities
only, as many of their activities were perfectly legal. However, being “Mafia” obviously
helped in the legal business, where Mafia entrepreneurs could rely on their reputation
and if necessary selectively use “mafia methods“ (Paoli 1994: 224).
The normative foundation of this practice of business and social control is a negation
of the normative difference between legal and illegal behavior. The primacy of the statefocused rule of law principle is substituted by an alternative principle according to which
the informal seemingly tradition-bound cultural codes, as transmitted in and through the
mafia, reign supreme and demand unconditional loyalty. For all practical purposes, the
traditional Mafia groups governed their territories by providing crucial public goods
which characterize government: security, law and public order. And for most of the time,
these activities, while technically illegal, where not necessarily deemed illicit on the part
of the local population.
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In order to uphold his local legitimacy the Mafia boss had to pose as a “profitable altruist”, someone who by helping others in the community is also able to help himself
(Sabetti 2002: 96ff). This limited the options for repression and exploitation open to the
local Mafia (Sabetti 2002: 127) and cognitively transformed the Mafia-boss into a more
or less benevolent patron, while at the same time legitimating in principle the Mafiosi’s
right to the utilization of violence in the service of the local order.
Even though the Mafia-model of domination is advanced here as befitting Philippine
politics, one crucial difference has to be remembered: whereas the Italian Mafia always
had to contend with a much larger Italian state it could not completely conquer, the mafia-style Philippine oligarchy took control over the state in the early decades of the 20th
century.
3 Mafia style domination in the Philippines I: the oligarchic basis of comprehensive domination
Politics in the Philippines aims first and foremost at satisfying the interests of a small
and fairly wealthy economic and political elite, that controls the country on all levels.
This elite consists of competing and cooperating political families and individuals, who
aim at establishing what locally is called a political dynasty. The family is still the only
meaningful political unit for the analysis of Philippine politics. The same holds true for
the Philippine economy, which also is still very much a family affair. This family-centric
order is expressed in a multitude of analyses that show that in the Philippines it’s “all in
the family”, as the title of a classical study goes (Gutierrez/Torrente/Narca 1992).
In this context of a wholly personalized political system, politics can be understood as
the distribution of particular goods (rewards and punishments) based on the perpetual
re-alignment of political units (generally individual strongmen or political families). Politics neither aims at producing authoritative and general decisions nor at providing public
goods, but at fragmenting the social, economic and political subsystems in order to be
able to negotiate amongst particularistic forces for particularistic gains, with the dominant political families in the core position of broker.
Political and economic domination coincide in all three research areas. In all of them
domination is also a “personal affair”, meaning that it is directly connected to individual
persons, who, generally try to pass their dominant positions to other members of the
family, making the political family into the core political unit. These bonds are regularly
extended beyond the limits of natural kinship ties in order to regulate inter-family/clan
competition through intermarriage or fictive kinship ties (e.g. godfather relationships).
In all three cases control over executive positions is important as a core device for
upholding patronage networks, as it allows the oligarchs to dispense a multitude of favors to a host of people, from local businessmen over members of the state bureaucracy to the little guy on the street who may profit from a temporary job in a government
project. The oligarchs thereby can amass large debts of gratitude (utang na loob) that
have to be paid back in election times or in other situations critical to the oligarchs’ continued survival.
Economically the Negros as well as the Pampanga elite can draw on their control of
agriculturally productive land and a multitude of fairly diversified economic interests like
transport, real estate, shares in local monopolist suppliers (for example electricity and
water) banking institutions or illicit profits derived from operating or profiting from illegal
business ventures like gambling (see below).
Contrary to Negros Occidental, where the economic mainstay still is the mono-crop
sugar industry, Pampanga experienced a significant diversification within agriculture
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during the past few decades, making sugar much less important than in earlier decades.
In Pampanga, agriculture has lost much of its former economic importance. In 2000
employment was mostly in the service sector already (58 percent), industry coming second with 30 percent and only a small rest of 13 percent of the province’s labor force
being employed in agriculture. Compared to this Negros Occidental is still fairly backward with a proportion of 47.7 percent of the population employed in the agricultural
sector in 2002.2
On a national basis, agriculture in 2011 accounts for 33 percent of employment, industry for 14.9 percent and services for 52.1 percent. (DTI 2011). Even though with all
probability the distribution in Negros has shifted somewhat over the past 10 years, Negros is still a predominantly agricultural province, whereas Pampanga has moved towards a service oriented economy. The ARMM, being the most backward region of the
Philippines, reported a share of 71.1 percent of agricultural employment in 2010 (Business Mirror 14 Nov.2012).
3.1 Pampanga
With respect to the three cases under discussion, similar patterns apply, with the
province of Pampanga being dominated by two families: the Macapagal and the Piñeda.
Whereas Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo represents the province in Congress, Lilia Piñeda is
the provincial governor and a number of relatives and followers secure local government control in most municipalities of the province. Domination, however, first of all
generally means alliance building, integrating weaker Patrons into the own network and
establishing horizontal linkages with other Patrons for mutual gain.
Let me illustrate this for the Piñedas, who rose to power fairly recently during the last
three decades and who established a well-oiled network of friends and followers that
reaches into politics and legal but is also anchored in illegal business.
One of the many ventures of the Piñedas is the Aguman da reng pasabung Qng
Capampangan Inc. an association founded in 1994 amongst others by Rodolfo Piñeda,
Demetrio Piñeda, Robin Nepomuceno and Zenaida G. Cruz-Ducut, with the avowed aim
“To develop unity, understanding & brotherhood among the cockpit operators & members of the association” (http://www.gmanews.tv/images/article/20060609_table1.htm).
Robin Nepomuceno represents the powerful Nepomuceno family3 of Angeles City,
who amongst other business ventures owns the “Nepo Mall” and the local Electricity
provider.4 Robin has for many years been a Barangay leader in Angeles City, however,
2
3
4
No newer data on a provincial level are available (for Pampanga see: http://www.fao.org/
WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6170E/x6170e1r.htm; for Negros Occidental see: http://negros-occ.gov.
ph/negros-occidental-social-and-economic-trends/negros-occidental-social-and-economictrends-2009/).
The family was founded around the mid 19th century when Pio Rafael Nepomuceno became
gobernadorcillo (~mayor) of the city of Angeles. His son Juan became gobernadorcillo in
1879 and became the city’s Municipal Presidente in 1898. Juan’s sons served as mayors of
Angeles in the 1920s and a grandson became mayor in the 1980s. This grandson’s son is
Francis “Blueboy” Nepomuceno, who held the office of Congressman and mayor of Angeles
city in the new millennium.
Angeles Electric Corporation is chaired by Peter G. Nepomuceno and has become the “6th
largest privately-owned electric utility in the Philippines” (http://www.philstar.com/ Article.aspx?articleId =16746). In the 1960s already the Nepomucenos “converted their agricultural land into a subdivision, calling it Villa Teresa” (http://blogs.inquirer.net/openfor business/2009/05/22/how-the-nepomucenos-changed-angeles/). Peter Nepomuceno, the director
of the Angeles Electric Corporation also heads the Nepomuceno Realty Group, which for example markets the Nepomucenos’ land in Villa Teresa subdivision and Teresa Waterworks,
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he was also the President of the local Barangay Mayors League and is the brother of
Francis “BlueBoy” Nepomuceno, who started in politics as the Vice-Mayor of the local
economic hub Angeles City from 1995-1998, only to become Congressman for the first
district of Pampanga from which he changed to the mayorship of Angeles City. In 2010
he lost in an embittered contest to a local opponent.
Zenaida Cruz-Ducut has been born in Lubao, the hometown of the Piñedas, and is a
former Congresswoman for the 2nd district of Pampanga. In 2008 she was appointed
chairman of the Energy Regulatory Commission by her co-provincial, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This small snippet of one much more complex and comprehensive network, most of which remains invisible to the outsider is the lifeline of the
connected families’ and individuals’ political and economic survival. Through this and
other networks the Pampangan elite is integrated into a ruling oligarchy that successfully devised strategies and informal institutions that limit competition and transform the
local political and economic spheres into oligopolies, with a strong tendency towards
cartelization.
3.2 Negros Occidental
Negros Occidental is dominated by an elite of sugar cane planters and sugar mill
owners, who in past decades have branched out to a broad variety of other economic
interests: from transport (mostly shipping) over real estate to banking and even media.
Whereas the Negros sugar planters have been the single most powerful group in past
decades this no longer holds true since the 1980s, when their economic fortune declined in the wake of a global sugar crisis and their subjection to the control exerted by
three Marcos cronies. By and large, the current setup is characterized by a small number of oligarchs, each of whom dominates one of the provincial districts and a “godfather”, Danding Cojuangco, a national level businessman, who, with probably up to
20,000 ha also is the largest landowner on Negros Occidental. This setup is symbolized
by the United Negros Alliance, a political party established by Cojuangco, whose members dominate the elected provincial and municipal positions province-wide. To a certain
extent it may be argued that under the current power-cartel political competition hardly
exists, as for example during the last election (2010) four mayors and six vice-mayors
as well as one congressman and the representatives of the first, the second, the third,
the fourth district in the provincial board of Negros Occidental ran unopposed. In the
other two districts, there were contenders who however were without any chance
against the members of the dominant families.
3.3 The ARMM
The ARMM, consisting of several provinces and therefore being much larger than either Negros Occidental or Pampanga, is politically highly fractured. Whereas from 2001
to 2009 one family, the Ampatuans from Maguindanao had a fairly dominant position,
this is no longer the case. Now, as in earlier decades the relevant politicians/entrepreneurs are to be found on the provincial level. In most cases we encounter
a small number of families controlling their respective bailiwicks and competing for control over the larger provincial unit. In clear-cut difference from the other two provinces
political competition in the ARMM includes physical violence mostly in the form of as-
which amongst others, supplies the water for the local industrial park and much of Angeles
City. Peter Nepomuceno also represents the family in the executive committee of Holy Angel
University.
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sassinations of competitors. Therefore the role of the family/clan is even more important
than in the rest of the Philippines,
“… because if something happens to you, then the only people you can turn to is
your family, your clan. […] And if you don’t have that natural group then anybody
can, with the security situation in the south [ARMM; P.K.], anybody can kill you.”
(interview ARMM politician 2004, anonymized).
4 Mafia-style domination in the Philippines II – sketching the place of violence in
domination
If someone is a bad person, he should be killed. Killing a criminal is not a sin.
What is wrong is if you kill just anybody. (Luis Chavit Singson, longtime congressman and governor of Ilocos Sur, cited in Torres 2003: 42)
One crucial aspect of mafia-style domination is the privatization of violence for the
settlement of horizontal conflict with contenders for power and for the repression of dissent and penalization of followers and dissatisfied local elements.
4.1 Violence in inter-oligarchic competition
Horizontal violence utilized in the context of inter-family conflict over political position
and local domination has at all times been prominent in the Philippines. Since the American colonial government established an electoral democracy in the early years of the
20th century, elections have been highly critical periods, accompanied by mutual threats
and allegations of vote buying and ballot rigging. As long as the American colonial power controlled the police, violence seems to have played no significant role.
With the granting of independence violence became a regular feature in elections.
While for the early elections in the late 1940s reliable quantitative data are lacking, it is
clear, that the number of deaths must have been significant. Later elections regularly
cost between about 50 and 200 lives. For the past four elections the percentage of candidates to total victims has been at least 20 percent. Even though elections in the Philippines were introduced in 1907, when the first National Assembly was elected, Filipino
politicians at no point in time succeeded in accepting democracy as the only game in
town. Quite to the contrary: While elections are the formal means of leadership selection, the respective social practice is a contest of various forms of capital, that can bring
victory. The most crucial ones being control of financial resources that can be translated
into concrete benefits to be doled out to clients in exchange for their loyalty, excellent
networks in the local state administration that help to rig the results if necessary, and
control of private or public means of coercion, that can be used for intimidation.
Looking at elections only, curtails the role of violence in inter-oligarchic competition.
Whereas violence regularly peaks in the months before and the days after elections, the
periods in between are far from violence free. Official police data give 95 attacks on
elective officials from June 2009 to early March 2010 with 102 victims of which 65 were
killed (Philippine Star 2010a). The first few months of the year 2009 (from Jan. 1 to May
20), when there was no upcoming election, brought 52 shooting incidents victimizing
local elective officials, of which 30 resulted in one or more deaths (Inquirer.net 2009).
In this context it is important to point to a significant difference between the ARMM
and the two provinces of Negros Occidental and Pampanga. Whereas in the ARMM,
inter-oligarchic violence regularly costs significant numbers of victims, this is much less
prominent in the two other provinces, which actually stand out as fairly peaceful during
the past decades. While intra-elite violence exists, it is on a low level.
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During the election year 2010 at least 9 village officials, 4 politician’s employees,
three of their supporters, one close relative and 5 public officials were killed in
Maguindanao (part of ARMM) and adjacent territories (including Cotabato City) (calculation based on confidential sources). Most of the killings were done by lone assassins or
killers riding in tandem on motorcycles. In addition there are multiple blood feuds between contending families, which in 2010 cost at least 20 lives and made more than
4,000 families at least to temporary IDPs in Maguindanao and adjacent regions of North
Cotabato (confidential sources). The year 2009 stood out for its high number of IEDs
(improvised explosive device), which cost at least 21 lives and around 100 wounded
(confidential sources). One should also mention the killing of core witnesses in a spectacular murder trial against members of the dominant Ampatuan clan. In this case a distant relative of the Ampatuans and member of an allied clan, Razul Sangki, decided to
stand as witness against the perpetrators of a political massacre that killed 57 persons.
Shortly after, a gasoline station owned by him was bombed, his house was attacked
with mortar shells, before in April 2010 his uncle was killed by unknown assassins. Last
but not least also the various local revolutionary forces, the MILF, the MNLF but also the
BIFF regularly trade bullets. Since the beginning of 2010 until the present, a rough
count gives at least 11 mayor armed conflicts, mostly focusing on control over land and
local political control. These cost at least 140 lives and led to the temporary displacement of several hundred families.
Compared to the ARMM, but also to a number of other regions of the Philippines,
competitive violence is low in the other two cases. The 2010 elections cost the lives of
one campaign supporter in Pampanga and one candidate in Negros Occidental only.
Despite such cases, physical violence is clearly the exception to the rule in mainstream
contests for local political position.
4.2 Violence in the control of the population
Repressive violence is clearly a recurrent and stable feature of Philippine politics for
the past century up to the present. Extralegal executions have been practiced for decades and have been especially rampant during the past decade. Depending on the
source, the Philippines witnessed between several hundred and more than 1000 extralegal executions during the Macapagal-Arroyo presidency (2001-2010), targeting a
broad array of critics, from journalists over farmers (who hoped to benefit from landreform), public officers and judges to members of various activist groups, journalists and
elected politicians (Parreno 2010). While most of the identified suspects belong to the
military (19 percent) and the police (9 percent), in more than a half of the cases no suspects could be identified. Resolution rate lay at a meager 1 percent making for an impunity rate of up to 99 percent (Parreno 2010: 13).
4.2.1 Violent domination in the ARMM
In the ARMM violence is not only an important ultimate means in intra-oligarchic
competition, but also plays an important role in the control of the local population. The
instruments of control have been and still are armed personal retainers of the dominant
members of the political families. The crucial difference between the centuries of Moro
self-rule and their inclusion into the Philippines is, that in the latter times, those personal
retainers mostly belong to the state security forces, either being policemen or member
of various government paid police or army auxiliaries. Then as now, in the final analysis,
the Datus (local leadership class) still are masters of live and death in the areas they
control.
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It is important to note that not only the current times, but already traditional practices
allowed for a significant amount of fairly arbitrary Datu-violence, that could be employed
for intimidating or even terrorizing the people into obedience. While documentation of
arbitrary violence in earlier centuries is sparse, it is clear, that the dominant Datus fairly
regularly seem to have resorted to exemplary punishment, that was not regulated by the
rules of the fairly comprehensive traditional system of conflict resolution via mediation
and adjudication. In addition, there are a number of reports on Datus, who terrorized the
local population.5
As Jeremy Beckett, argues in a study on Maguindanao clans, “personal power could
never be contained by notions of order or legitimacy; to a degree power became its own
legitimacy. […] finally, a datu was what a datu did” (Beckett 1982: 396; see also Loyre
1991: 26).
The modern Philippine state enabled the Datus to continue this practice, as from the
1950s onwards the local chief executives controlling the local police forces could easily
utilize them as armed support if necessary. The civil war beginning in the early 1970s
brought additional power to the Datus, as the state enlarged the number of militias recruited and deployed locally.
The past four decades saw the transformation of fairly traditional leaders who could
command a certain amount of armed followers into modern type warlords, who were at
the same time able to control larger numbers of armed persons and externalize the
costs to the state budget.
Control over a significant amount of firepower allowed new Datus to establish themselves amongst older families, as for example former Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) commander, Tupay T. Loong and his brother Ben, who established their political fortune on Sulu province by relying on Ben Loongs control over his MNLF-troops,
which after his return to the fold of government became his private fighting force, reportedly numbering about 1000 men. Tupay T. Loong is the representative of the first
congressional district of Sulu, his brother Ben Loong has been Governor of Sulu Province from 2005-2007 and is currently Vice-Governor under his political enemy, governor
Sakur Tan. The latter reputedly controls about 3,000 armed followers. The dreaded
Ampatuan clan in Maguindanao is said to have had a privately controlled (but largely
government financed) force of 3,000 to 5,000 armed men.
These forces at the same time deter contenders for power and are for intimidating
the local population. Human Rights Watch cites a Barangay official, who reports that
members of a locally dominant (and ruthless) clan “are viewed as almost God, very
powerful. A single word is enough to frighten the people, whatever they ask is done…
Their arms make them powerful. They kill people” (Barangay official cited in HRW 2010:
25). Wahab Akbar, a former governor and congressman of Basilan, who was killed in
2007, described his stand in the following words: „
I have to be tough. I have to be a dictator. I must not show pity. [...] I have no time
to explain to them what I am doing. I have no time to play politics. I have a lot of
work to do. [...] Nobody should question me. I am the governor. I will do what I believe is good for the people, whether they like it or not, whether they will love me
for it or not. I don’t care“ (Akbar cited in GMA News 2007).
While denying to having ordered killings, his remarks clearly illustrate that killing has
its legitimate place in competition and control: „I haven’t killed anybody. People look at
me as if I am a killer, but nobody has been killed on my order. Many asked for my permission to kill, but I would always ask, is there really a need to kill?“ (Akbar cited in
5
For an overview see Kreuzer 2011.
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GMA News 2007). Politics in neighbouring Sulu has been characterized by a local advisor of the MILF with the following words: “people are slaves, that is how politics is done
in Sulu” (cited in ICG 2012: 16).
While killing is normally not the first option in either political competition or domination, it nevertheless is almost never ruled out – it may be the last option, however, it always is an option.
4.2.2 Violent Domination in Negros Occidental
Physical violence has accompanied the development of Negros Occidental since at
least the early centuries of Spanish colonization, but, it most probably has also had its
place in the indigenous pre-colonial orders.
The enmeshment of local domination and semi-private but state legitimated coercive
power developed during the 18th and early 19th century under the Spanish colonial administration, when local notables acted as gobernadorcillos, uniting the functions of
mayor, judge of the first instance and chief of the police (Bankoff 1996). One crucial
means safeguarding the local dominance of the governadorcillo seems to have been an
extensive use of physical punishment (Scott 1982, 158).
When the new planters established their vast haciendas from around 1850 onwards,
they took over political power from the old elite. Worcester reports in the 1880s that the
new planter-gobernadorcillos regularly used flogging for penalization and intimidation.
Even delinquent taxpayers if caught by the local police where regularly “flogged in a
most scientific manner” (Worcester 1989: 256).
A similar practice seems to have pervaded overall relationships between the planters
on the one and the poor on the other side. There were no regulations that could constrain hacendero violence in the late Spanish era, when encargados (overseers) and
hacenderos alike still seemed to have made use of the whip on a regular basis (see early reports by Norris 1902; General Hughes in: Senate US 1902: 535; see also McCoy
1982. 320)
In addition to that, planters employed armed patrols, that guarded the haciendas, not
so much in order to prevent foreigners from entering it, but for preventing workers from
absconding (McCoy 1992: 119; Larkin 1993: 79). Hacenderos also seem to have made
use of the Guardia Civil or the cuadrilleros (a form of local police), letting them do the
beating in order to deflect anger and feelings of revenge (Aguilar 1998: 144). Finally,
hacenderos did not stop short of killing disobedient workers, even though this certainly
have been more the exception to the rule (Aguilar 1998: 185). American colonial order
further empowered local oligarchs, who gained access to a significant number of firearms under the new liberal laws enacted in 1906 (Aguilar 1998: 185), This made the
planters collectively into a stronger armed force than the military stationed on Negros.
While these weapons were used to defend the haciendas against the then wide spread
threat of banditry (tulisanes) and millenarian movements, they could also be employed
to discipline workers and get control over further tracts of land in a process of landgrabbing that continued unabated in the first decades of the new century (see McCoy
1982: 321; Larkin 1993. 69, 252-254).
Despite this, violence only played a secondary role in domination as the oligarchs
could normally rely on their structural control through an environment of total dependency centering on the hacienda-structure and oligarchic monopoly on public office (including the judiciary).
When, however, in the early 1980s sugar prices broke down and thousands of farm
workers were dismissed, many of whom went to the mountains to fight either for a living
or the revolution, structural violence turned into physical violence, which in many cases
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degenerated into pure terror during the last years of President Marcos and the early
years of the new president Corazon Aquino.
After Marcos’ downfall the majority of the Negros oligarchs, having been partially deprived of their control over the local means of violence initially relied on buying the services of various vigilante organizations, slowly getting control over them and remaking
segments of them into either state-sponsored militias or private guards, thereby regulating and disciplining the fairly anomic violence of the late 1980s. Besides, the oligarchs
tapped the reservoir of the Armed Forces stationed in Negros Occidental to suppress
the rebellion.
Since the early 1990s violence as a control strategy is employed in two different contexts: Firstly in the conflict between the communist New People’s Army and the Philippine state. Here violence is characterized by its semi-military nature (ambushes, firefights, raids, etc.). Here the oligarchs are involved mostly on an indirect basis, either
asking for military assistance or providing space and support for military or militiadetachments in the areas controlled by them either economically (their haciendas) or
politically (municipalities).
It is the conflict about ownership of and control over land, in which oligarchs directly
resort to violence, if other means prove insufficient. Land reform put oligarchs against
rural poor, who stand to benefit from the redistribution of the oligarchs lands. Even
though the most important lines of oligarchic defense against land reform are economic
and judicial, there is a final third line of defense, that consists of intimidation and can
also include actual physical violence and even extralegal executions.
The normal potential land-reform beneficiary tends to become a victim of intimidation,
mostly perpetrated by private agents of violence, who are either employed by the landlord (so-called blue guards) or workers loyal to him. Extralegal execution is normally
“reserved” for the more prominent local activists. Most probably the agents of this type
of violence belong either to the Armed Forces, the army militia (CAFGU) or the former
rebel group RPA-ABB, that has turned into a semi-autonomous auxiliary force for oligarchic wealth defense. With respect to all types of violence impunity is total, signaling
to those dominated and controlled their position of fundamental powerlessness.
With respect to the killing of agrarian and other activists, Negros Occidental stands
out in national comparison. According to a study by Al Parreno, Negros Occidental had
the second highest number (39) of victims of extralegal executions from 2001 to mid
2010 (Parreno 2010: 17). In Negros Occidental, which harbors about 3.4 percent of the
population a full 10 percent of the extralegal executions took place.
Most interestingly violence does not stop short of targeting state agencies, most importantly the Department of Agrarian Reform, whose representatives not seldom have
to work under police or military protection as they are threatened by various forces
known to be close to dominant local oligarchs. Not seldom there are stand-offs between
the DAR-representatives, backed by police or military support who try to install agrarian
reform beneficiaries, and various private armed forces loyal to the local planters. In such
cases “the state” will normally not enforce the law, but enter into negotiation, which
eventually results in vastly diminished benefits for the CARP beneficiaries, signaling
time and again that intimidation and the use of violence pay. However, most of the violence is outsourced, as this enables the oligarchs to deny complicity.
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4.2.3 Violent Domination in Pampanga
The present governor who was also a candidate then shot out a lot of
money. […] With the condition that she has to win. But she did not. So after that she ran after the different political leaders and four were killed. (Interview Pampanga 2011, anonymised)
In Pampanga, the early patterns of violence closely resemble Negros Occidental.
However, whereas the Negros oligarchs succeeded in keeping serious protest, unionization and rebellion out of the province until the 1970s, Pampanga was the hotbed of
rebellion in the Philippines between the 1930s and 1960s. Those decades saw steeply
rising discontent that culminated in outright civil war after the second world war, with the
landlords replenishing the still fairly weak state security forces with private armies in an
extraordinary dirty war. Their enemy was the Hukbalahap (HUK), a left leaning movement, that had been actively and vigorously fighting the Japanese during the Years of
occupation with their base area around mount Arayat in northern Pampanga.
Despite the military defeat of the HUKs in the early 1950s, neither could the issues
advanced by them be put back into the bottle, nor could nor armed resistance be completely wiped out. It lessened only to come back with a vengeance after President Marcos’ declaration of Martial law. Even though the communist New People’s Army lost
most of its threat potential since the early 1990s, some remnants still exist in a small
number of rural municipalities in Pampanga.
During the last decade Pampanga, despite being one of the most developed provinces of the country, registered the highest number of extrajudicial killings with 41 deaths.6
Whereas, however, in the case of Negros Occidental most of the victims were
farmer/activists in Pampanga the majority were “elected government officials or alleged
members of the NPA” (Parreno 2010: 17).
Generally, it is assumed that in Region III to which Pampanga belongs, most of the
enforced disappearances and extralegal executions have been perpetrated by the
Armed Forces, especially during the time, when General Jovito Palparan was Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division in Central Luzon from September 2005 to
September 2006.7 However, the pattern of EJKs in Pampanga cannot be explained in
this way. Here extralegal executions seem to be a continuous pattern from 2005 to
2009. It is only in 2010, when the new government of Lilia Piñeda took over, that extralegal executions turned to zero.
This should not be misunderstood as the coming of a more humane political leadership. The image of the new governor is actually that of a very traditional politician, combining traditional patterns of patronage with an aura of assertiveness and violence.
Similar to the Mafia-godfather, Lilia Piñeda is at the same time feared and adored. Adoration becomes visible her local name, “Nanay Baby” (Mother Baby) and relates to the
highly personal and caring style of the governor, who during her long years as mayor of
6
7
It should be mentioned, that the past few years saw a regular pattern of police shoot-outs
with criminals, in which normally all criminals died, whereas the police suffered no casualties
at all. While there are a large number of real shoot-outs in various regions of the Philippines,
the Pampanga patterns probably point to a hidden form of extralegal execution, that targets
socially deviant persons.
Palparan is the most prominent case of a high ranking AFP officer, who time and again has
been connected to extrajudicial killings. After his retirement in late 2006 Palparan turned to
politics, establishing his own anti-communist party Bayan (short for: Bagong alyansang
Makabayan; New Patriotic Alliance) and after two years of bickering gaining a congress-seat
in 2009 based on election results of the 2007 elections. In 2010 he ran for senator, but lost.
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Lubao and provincial board member always seems to have been an exemplary patron,
who cared for her clients.
Extrajudicial killings in Region III per province 2005-2010
16
14
Zambales
12
Tarlac
10
Nueva Ecija
8
Bulacan
6
Bataan
4
2
Aurora
0
Pampanga
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
(datasets provided by the Commission on Human Rights Reg III, May 2011)
The less benign side of the provincial first lady shows up in various allegations relating to her husband and son, some of them focusing on the election of 2007, when Lilia
Piñeda ran, but lost to a reform-oriented priest, Eddie Panlilio, who had decided to run
for governor at the last minute. Shortly after the elections one Barangay captain was
killed by gunmen, supposedly from the RHB (Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan), a
splinter group of the NPA. Several other Barangay captains went into hiding, as everybody assumed, that the Barangay captain, who had been campaigning for Panlilio, had
been killed on orders of the defeated candidate. Various interviews amongst others with
policemen, gave the following picture. The killed Barangay captain seems to have taken
money from the husband of Lilia Piñeda to make sure she won in his Barangay by a big
margin. When, however, Panlilio announced his candidacy, he and a small number of
other Barangay heads changed their mind. He is said to have given back the money to
the Piñedas, in order to be able to campaign for Panlilio (interviews May 2011,
anonymized). This was interpreted as a breach of loyalty and sanctioned accordingly by
the Piñedas.
Control over the police, according to an undercover agent of the police is guaranteed
by regular bribes of the police officers, who travel to certain places once a week to cash
in their payola (bribe money) (informal interview, 2011). According to this informant not
even lowest level policemen can get any promotion without the explicit approval of the
Piñedas. Everyday control is upheld by Dennis Piñeda and a son of former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who is connected via a godmother relationship to the
Piñedas.
This fits nicely with information given to the author by a local businessman from San
Fernando, about Melchor Caluag, who supposedly controlled the Jueteng business in
the city and did not comply, when Bong Piñeda told him that he wanted to take it over.
He was shot in broad daylight in front of a number of witnesses, none of whom was willing to testify. As he survived, he was able to retrieve his money from the Jueteng business and invest it in various legal businesses, amongst it a hospital and a hotel, the latter of which he converted into a casino. As the casino proved to be very profitable, he
got an offer from Bong Piñeda, probably an offer he can’t refuse (interview, not recorded
May 2011).
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With respect to their effect, it is irrelevant, whether the individual stories are true.
What is important is, that people believe them to be true, they feel them to be credible
examples of the state of affairs and consequently the act accordingly.
5 Mafia-style domination in the Philippines III – illegal business
Illegal business in a multitude of shades certainly constitutes one of the mainstays of
oligarchic wealth and continued domination in the Philippines. While illegal business is
multifarious, this presentation will focus on two aspects only, that are discussed on the
basis of data, that mostly focus on the case studies compared below. One general feature of local politics and enrichment in the Philippines is illegal gambling, which generally seems to be either directly organized or at least indirectly skimmed by politicians and
the relevant representatives of the state security institutions. The other one is embezzlement and misappropriation (estafa) of public funds, a broad phenomenon that goes
from outright corruption to probably illegitimate but formally still legal rent-seeking.
5.1 Jueteng business
Jueteng is a most popular, but illegal numbers game, where the gambler selects two
numbers from one through 37. Even though there are no limits on maximum bets, the
vast majority of bets are small scale (below 1 US$). However, as drawings are up to
three times a day, for the poorer segments of the population, Jueteng can result in financial ruin. Despite its illegality, it is one of the crucial legs of political and public finance beyond the state purse. This money is then partly doled out to a variety of clients
in a way that indebt the receivers and ensure significant social control of the patrons
over the vast majority of the clients. At the same time the vast networks of betting
agents function as the eyes and ears of the operators and can be utilized for “propaganda” as well.
Jueteng-operators not seldom substitute for the
“departments of social welfare and of public works in many towns and provinces,
considering the amount of money they pour into community projects such as artesian wells, basketball courts, and roads, as well as the doleouts they give to almost anyone who approaches them for financial help.” (Orejas 2007).
Another analyst argues that
“Jueteng profits finance local social safety nets, maintain local media as retainers,
and keep local clergy in tow. Local government executives figure heavily among
operators. In many provinces, towns, and cities, the duly elected local executive is
the Jueteng operator” (Fabella 2007: 109)
So Jueteng can to a significant extent be analysed pars pro toto as one crucial criminal denominator of politics and governance.
In a privilege speech in September 2010 Philippine senator Miriam Defensor Santiago gave a succinct overview over about 50 percent of the Philippine Jueteng industry,
which according to her, had a daily turnover of 14 million Pesos in Laguna province, 9
Million in Pampanga and Pangasinan each, 8.5 million in Batangas, 8 million in
Bulacan, and 7.5 Million in Nueva Ecija and Quezon each. Together this amounts to
63.5 Million Pesos (1.5 Million US$). On the national level 1 percent go to the DILG secretary, the PNP chief and the CIDG head; another 2 percent to the PCSO leadership
and another 1 percent to the Games and Amusement Board and media. On the regional
level the various responsible bureaucracy heads (mostly PNP regional directors) profit
of 1 percent. On the provincial level, 3 percent go to the governor, vice-governor and
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the members of the provincial assembly, a further 1 percent goes to the PNP provincial
director, 0.2 percent to the NBI Provincial Director.8 The municipal level profits most, as
5 percent go to the mayor, vice-mayor and the municipal board members, 2 percent to
the congressman and 1 percent to the chief of the local police.9 The Jueteng operators
named by Miriam Defensor Santiago include the Governor of Ilocos Sur Luis (Chavit)
Crisologo Singson, his brother Jose (Bonito) Luis Singson and his son Ronald Singson.
Another crucial name is Rodolfo (Bong) Piñeda, whose wife is the current Governor of
Pampanga province. According to Defensor-Santiago, Piñeda controls illegal gambling
in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bataan, Camarines Sur,
Sorsogon and the City of Angeles (http//:Miriam.com.ph/newsblog/?p=256). The Senator’s details correlate with the presentations given by various witnesses in former hearings conducted by a blue ribbon committee in 2000 (www.nenepimentel.org/bluerib/
TOC.shtml). And are also corroborated by the testimony of Ilocos Sur Governor Luis
Singson, who, in the trial against former president Estrada admitted delivering to the
president bags containing five million pesos Jueteng money in cash every two weeks.10
Despite the overwhelming evidence of Jueteng being an important economic venture for
most politicians from the local to the national level, there is complete impunity. A former
president of the League of Municipalities of the Philippines estimated that about 80 percent of local politicians elected, won their elections “primarily or largely with the help of
jueteng money” (cited in: Go 2003a: 111).
Even the church profits, as for example the Piñedas from Lubao, Pampanga
“The Piñedas were so generous to a number of priests that they usually sent roast
pig (lechon), wine and other goodies during their birthdays. The ‘beneficiaries’
would return the favor by not missing special occasions, such as birthdays of any
Piñeda family member or their closest friends” (Philippine Daily Inquirer 05.Aug
2005 p. A6 Article: ‘Jueteng’ witness says sorry to GMA p. A1+A6).
Despite being widely known as a gambling lord, Piñeda enjoys a perfect patronal image in his home-base. Bong Piñeda “was able to build a reputation for legendary generosity. […] On Christmas Day, the Piñeda mansion is opened for gift-giving, with poor
people lining up by the thousands to avail themselves of packages of food.” Lilia Piñeda
is variously called “mother of perpetual help”, “Nanay Baby” (mother baby), who helped
“hundreds of people ill with cancer or with psychological problems, as well as provided
shelter for many abused women and children” (Orejas 2007).
In addition to the direct income from the jueteng business and the vast influence created by the patronage directly financed through jueteng, the numbers game further enlarges the operator’s power indirectly, as the locals who work for him as collectors can
readily be utilized during election time. Whomever the jueteng lord wants to win, the
collectors (and their immediate family members) will elect, and, even more important,
they will function like a free campaign aid for the respective politician (PCIJ/IPD 1995).
In Pampanga crime and politics seem to be controlled by a husband-and-wife team,
enforced by the children and strengthened by alliance-building: Whereas Roberto
Piñeda is generally assumed to be the top Jueteng operator for Pampanga and a host
of other provinces, his wife for long years secured the homebase in Lubao, by holding
8
DILG: Department of Interior and Local Government; PNP: Philippine National Police; CIDG:
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group; PCSO: Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
NBI: National Bureau for Investigation.
9
For corresponding data for the late 1990s see Coronel 2000; McCoy 2009, 226, see also:
PCIJ/IPD 1995, Tan 2003.
10
For the mind-boggling details of the Estrada case see the Decision of the Sandiganbayan on
the plunder case against former President Estrada (Sandiganbayan 2007).
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the mayoral position. In the meantime, Piñeda’s enhanced economic clout has translated in a stronger political position, with his son taking over the homebase and his wife
securing the family fortune through control over the province.
There has been repeated evidence that the Macapagal-Arroyos are likewise involved
in jueteng (and smuggling). Similar to the Piñedas, the wife seems to be securing the
political front and the husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo, controls (legal and illegal) business,
supported by the son, who seems to bridge the two fields of politics and crime.11 In a
confidential cable to Washington, the American embassy in Manila cited a prominent
businessman who claims that “Mike Arroyo is heavily involved in the illegal gambling or
‘jueteng’ networks and closely connected with major smuggling syndicates”, with another businessman echoing these concerns by “pointing to his links to ‘jueteng’ and the
many politicians and local officials involved in the illegal gambling racket”. Other
sources go into more details, accusing “’a relative of a top government official’ (widely
believed to be the First Gentleman) of doling out PNP assignments in Central Luzoon in
exchange for 60 percent of the jueteng protection money paid to Luzon PNP commanders” (US Embassy 2005b; see also US Embassy 2005a). Other witnesses accused then
President Macapagal-Arroyo’s son, Juan Miguel Arroyo (congressman from Pampanga)
“of receiving profits from the game” and “claimed that Mikey Arroyo had received large
payoffs of protection money […]” (US Embassy 2005c; see also: inuirer.net/inquirer
headlines/nation/view/20100301-255963/Mayor-the-jueteng-operator)..
Information on illegal numbers games is scarce with respect to Negros Occidental,
most of it being rumours, lining it to a certain Julio J. Jalandoni, who is said to dominate
the Jueteng business of the provincial capital Bacolod. He is said to have got hold of
this position through good contacts to the family of the former President MacapagalArroyo via the Negros Occidental Arroyo family branch led by Ignacio Arroyo (died 26
January 2012), who owned vast lands in Negros Occidental and represented its fifth
district in Congress. Jalandoni seems to be a businessman, together with his wife Sylvia
owning significant numbers of stocks of Globe Telecom, Ayala Land and Jollibee. According to interview partners on Negros Jueteng is less important than Jai-alai and
Masiao (interviews Bacolod 2011) and it is widely assumed (but officially denied) that
the transfer of Bacolod police chief and his deputy was related to their involvement in
illegal games. All interview partners (from representatives of state institutions to journalists and local researchers) unanimously assumed, that politicians and the police were
protecting illegal gambling, however, nobody ever mentioned any names.
For the ARMM, there are no serious information on illegal gambling. While it is supposed to exist it does not seem to play the same role as a source of illegal financing. In
the ARMM illegal activities seem to revolve more around money laundering, smuggling,
kidnap for ransom (Ugarte 2008), and illegal drug business. In view of the very real
danger interview partners were very careful with their comments, generally confirming
respective reports, however, refusing to go into any detail. Information garnered in interviews concerning the drug business closely correspond to the description given by
American embassy members, who report for example that the local drug lord in
Cotabato city “is a member of a powerful clan with a long history of smuggling” and
more generally that “drug lords” include local politicians and clan leaders with private
armies [who are; P.K.] supported by the police” (US Embassy 2006). According to a
high ranking Philippine officer, drug lords in 2006 held “mayorships in at least nine mu11
It is important to point out, that nothing can be proven in a legal sense. While rumours and
evidence for criminal behavior of Philippine politicians abounds, convictions are virtually nonexistent.
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nicipalities in Lanao Del Sur Province. Mayors of fourteen municipalities in Maguindanao Province, and nearly all of the mayors, including the Vice-Governor of Sulu province”. Two ARMM provincial governors were likewise suspected to be involved in the
business (US Embassy 2006).
5.2 Exploiting the state
Some of the most important resources utilized for upholding oligarchic domination
are delivered by the state itself in the form of public funds, that are supposed to be used
to finance the administration, various projects and grant benefits in a wide range of government programs. Local political power to a significant extent can be measured in the
currency of control over the utilization of these resources.
If we judge from the various reports of the Commission on Audit12 corruption and
rent-seeking via public office and the accompanying control over public money is widespread For reasons of space, any detailed analysis cannot be given here. However, the
crucial similarity that unites the slightly different practices in the ARMM, Negros Occidental and Pampanga is that the local state is captured by specific elite families, who
then “provide targeted benefits to particular constituents […] as opposed to public goods
that benefit a large number of voters” (Hasnain/Matsuda 2011: 3). As a matter of fact
“capturing public apparatuses and using their political power and influence to consolidate their hold on local economic activities are among the most common means for
wealth accumulation among Filipino political elites” (Hasnain/Matsuda 2011: 8).
5.3 Preliminary summary
The above analysis shows that criminal activity by politicians focuses on, but is not
limited to state capture and rent-seeking but goes deeply into illegal business types
commonly controlled by criminal syndicates like illegal gambling (and probably drug
production as well as trafficking). It suggests that for much of the Philippine politicoeconomic elite there is no normative difference between legal and illegal means for advancing their political and economic interests.
The Philippines actually belongs to the category of the criminalized state, as understood by Legvold, a state that is “suffused with corruption. The state’s core activity may
not be corrupt, but the process by which the state acts is” (2009: 196; emphasis in original). It has been captured by oligarchs on all levels and corruption cannot be reduced to
“mere bribe-making […]. Rather than state officials and bureaucrats extorting
business firms or ordinary individuals, powerful individuals or groups use material
rewards or physical threats to reshape the state. Alternatively, the criminalized
state can be thought of as one where […] those in power or those with leverage
over those in power use state agency to advance their private interests at the expense of the broader public good” (Legvold 2009: 196-197).
When using the category of criminalized state it is important to realize that the form of
criminalization is decentralized and fairly anarchic, as the state does not control the
networks of corruption, but a multitude of such networks control the state, reconfiguring
it into a network state, the formal (bureaucratic) structure of which has largely been immobilized and replaced by an informal (political) network structure, with multiple focal
points. The problem is not about individual politicians being corrupt, but that politics as
12
See numerous reports on the homepage of the Commission on Audit, especially: http://www.coa.
gov.ph/Audit/ AAR.htm and http://www.coa.gov.ph/GWSPA/GWSPA.htm.
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such becomes distorted and criminalized, as the core players neither accept nor play
according to the formal rules of the political game.
If we advance the idea that state and society “transform and constitute one another”
(Migdal 2001), we may assume that a social class/group with the behavioral and cultural
attributes of a mafia may capture the state. In such a case there is no longer the need to
establish secret organizations that are able to advance the groups interest against an
actually or potentially hostile state, as the fundamental goal of wealth defense, shared
by oligarchs and mafia alike can be pursued from secure positions within the state.
However, having captured a modern state with its claim to comprehensive jurisdiction
over a wide range of behavior defined as criminal, all criminal aspects of the local practice of domination have to be denied. While “Mafia” as a comprehensive social order
and institutional setup may exist, it must remain invisible, as it clashes with the image of
the state, with the essence of stateness as such, even though, it may inform its practice.
6 Mafia style domination in the Philippines VI: Peace-pact politics
The cognitive and emotive autonomy of elite behavior from law is exemplified in the
practice of forging peace pacts, a practice that has left its mark on all elections of the
past decades. Philippine peace pacts are very akin to peace pacts entered into by competing Mafia families and likewise intend to avert or end bloodshed that results from inter-family competition.
In the Philippines such competition centers on political office. The country abounds
with peace pacts that center on mutual promises to respect the rule of law and fair play
and not to resort to vote buying or other illegal means including physical violence. The
contending forces normally meet on a neutral ground, with witnesses, not seldom fairly
high representatives of the church, the police, the military and the Commission of Election as well as higher level politicians attending and signing the covenants.
Public symbolism is most dramatic, sending the image of powerful contenders, who
for the sake of peace are willing to forgo some of their self-proclaimed right to dominate
with whatever means they deem fit. Neither in the negotiation processes leading to the
pacts nor in the public ceremonies themselves are government or state in any exalted
position. Cognitively the state is reduced to a mere witness of a voluntary agreement of
fully autonomous contending forces: individual “warriors” who pledge to abide by some
set of rules that, having been negotiated for a specific event, will lose force once the
event has passed.
Peace pacts are of special interest in the context of an analysis of Philippine politics
as a Mafia style endeavor, because they actually affirm the political elite’s right to decide autonomously on the use of violence and other illegal strategies in the context of
political competition. Reliance on peace pacts illustrates that the core personnel of the
political system, the mainstream-politicians themselves, do not submit to the laws of the
state, but reserve to themselves the right to either voluntarily sign or turn down a commitment to the formal rules of the game.
7 Conclusion
The three Philippine territories analyzed illustrate that oligarchic domination is extraordinarily stable. It is not restrained by either democratic institutions nor economic
development. The structural basis of domination lies in arrangements that nullify the
division of political powers and functional differentiation as well.
This type of domination is harmful in several respects:
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it denies full democracy, as oligarchs safeguard their continued domination through
the control of the institutions of the state. In the Philippines this is accomplished
through a combination of patronage, election fraud and intimidation.
• it denies rule of law, as the oligarchs are above the law in most respects.
• it denies the functioning of a market economy. Philippine oligarchs derive most of
their profit in the form of rent-seeking, which necessitates incomplete marketization.
At the same time the oligarchs and their henchmen have to disempower the state as
a redistributive institution, otherwise their patronage networks would be severely
weakened, as the dependence of the poor on personal favors of their patrons would
recede, and multidimensional dependency, the debts of gratitude tying the client to
the patron would lose its binding force.
• it denies the monopolization of violence by the state. Instead it grants local chief executives control over the police and various auxiliary organizations, thereby allowing
those forces to be privately controlled and tolerates private control over armed
groups.
What is the extra-value of the focus on Mafia-domination? This concept relates the
form of domination to the fundamental dimension of modern statehood: state-law. With
oligarchy focusing on the economy-governance nexus, Mafia-style domination highlights
the connection between crime and governance, pointing to the possibility that politics,
i.e. the authoritative allocation of values for a society (Easton), may aim at defending
the wealth of individuals, kinship groups and networks, who are in no way bound by the
formal principles that are supposed to guide this allocation, but regularly overstep them,
thereby establishing and upholding a para-political sphere, where criminal activity is a
regular, systemic, feature.
The concept of Mafia-style domination helps to relate crime, politics and economy, so
that an integrated order becomes visible that claims validity in all three spheres. The
analysis supports Hess’ argument that the concept of the Mafioso while originating in
Sicily, “in principle […] can be applied to any power phenomena functioning analogously
in other cultures.”. The crucial aspect differentiating a mere rent-seeking or corrupt political order from Mafia-style domination is the “emphasis on the element of violence” (citations: Hess 1998: 175-176).
Neither oligarchy nor mafia-domination enable generalized trust. Both thrive in and
depend on low trust environments and both are characterized by specific kinship-based
solutions to the problem of building trust. Trust is reserved for a small array of persons,
mostly linked by real or imagined kinship (godfather relations, marriage). Beyond this
trust is fairly non-existent. It is substituted by personal alliances (which are always precarious and prone to disintegration) and built on rational calculation of individual utility.
On the meso- and macro-level fragmentation takes precedence over integration and
institutionalization, as neither oligarchy nor Mafia allow for overcoming the problem of a
low trust environment, characterized by fairly exclusive kinship based forms of personalized trust only.
Democracy, rule of law and the modern nation-state are accepted, not because anybody really believes in them as forms of regulating competition and managing or resolving conflict that eschew violence. Democracy, law and the state are used as arenas
through which competition and domination can be realized in a way that guarantees
continued oligarchic domination. Democracy actually provides an ideal frame for perpetual balancing of a multitude of actors who put no trust into its very rules, but utilize
the formal framework for a perennial competition for power. The rule of law is practiced
in the form of a rule by law, that effectively transforms law into an instrument for the
control and repression of the weak and an additional arena in which oligarchs compete.
•
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And the state actually multiplies the oligarchs’ power, as it allows for capture, turning its
significant coercive and distributive resources to the service of the individual powerholder. While the playing field is provided by Democracy, stateness and law, the rules of
the game follow a different paradigm, as the individual oligarchs can neither risk forsaking their direct control over the means of violence or their way of ensuring total personal
control through the amalgamation of economic, political and social power.
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