Helsinki Congress of the International Economic History Association,
21-25 AUGUST 2006: Session 93
American Firms in Germany.
The Case of Procter & Gamble and the Transfer of American
Marketing Strategies after World War II
Susanne Hilger, University of Dusseldorf
THIS TEXT IS ONLY THE FIRST DRAFT OF A STUDY WHICH IS DEVELOPED FOR THE HELSINKI
CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 2006, BUT WHICH WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED FOR THE FUTURE
PROCEEDINGS.
In the 20th century and particularly after World War II, Germany became one of the
most attractive European locations for American direct investment. And also in 2005
the Federal Republic with an investment volume of 120 billion Euro and 850,000
jobs is the place in Europe where American investment finds its highest
concentration.1 This is also underlined by a study of the Boston Consulting Group
(BCG), which had been published by the American Chamber of Commerce in
Frankfurt/Main in 2004. According to a survey among 100 American companies
Germany was first in Europe as a location for holding companies and for
manufacturing companies the country was third following Europe’s Eastern part and
Great Britain. Germany’s reputation as business location seems to be much better the
US than at home, as BCG stated: “If Germany would be dealt in shares, American
analysts actually would say: BUY.”2 The reason for this can not only be connected
with Germany’s geographic position in Europe but also with the fact, as BCG says,
that “Corporate Germany has recently strongly been americanized – not only in case
of the vocabulary being used in the head departments.” Also management strategies,
organisation and accounting are said to follow American patterns.“ Additionally,
‚hard economic facts’ such as market entry, research potential, labour force and the
reform efforts of the German government developed as investment incentives for
investors from the US.3
These things also held for the American consumer goods company Procter & Gamble,
which nowadays considers Germany as one of its most important European markets
according to sales. The company, which belongs to the outstanding companies in
American industry, was founded in 1837 by the candle maker William Procter and by
the soap maker James Gamble in Cincinnati, Ohio, is considered as the pioneer of
brand management in the business of detergents, household cleaners, personal care
and food products. With more than 100,000 employees worldwide and 300 brands
P&G does not only rank among „America’s most admired companies“ which are
annually nominated by „Fortune“4. According to James Collins und Jerry Porras it
also belongs to those companies which were „built to last”5. P&G stands for an
http://www.amcham.de.
Quoted Wolfgang Gehrmann, “I Love Germany. Amerikanische Unternehmer loben den
Standort Deutschland – und finden sogar an seinen Schwächen Gefallen“, Die Zeit, 29, 8.7.2004, p.
19.
3
Ibidem.
4
In 2006 P&G is third following GE and Toyota: See
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/03/06/8370762/index.htm.
5
James C. Collins/Jerry I. Porras, Built to last. Successful Habits of Visionary Companies,
New York, HarpersCollins Publishers, 1996, p. 3.
1
2
2
innovative brand management, which is seen as groundbreaking for consumer goods
business6.
In contrast to many American firms such as Singer, Harvester or Ford, which had
been engaged in Germany long before World War II, P&G entered the German market
only in the late 1950s where it became a transmitter of modern marketing know how.
Using the example of P&G the paper examines the American strategies of market
entry in Germany in order to analyse some of the main features of American
investment in the German consumer goods industry. What were the motives that
made P&G enter the German market? Which strategies were used? What marketing
know how was transferred with P&G’s market entry? Which innovative strategies in
case of product, sales and marketing took hold? What did P&G learn from its
exposure to the German competition regulations in case of price and sales promotion
for the globalization of its business? These and some more questions shall be
answered in the following. After a short overview on the history of American FDI in
Germany and on the corporate history of P&G, I will proceed according four features:
Strategies, i.e. product and market policy, structures, that is the implementation of a
German business, Reception, that is the adaption to the German market conditions
and Performance.
Besides unpublished records of German corporate archives of P&G’s main competitor
Henkel literature on P&G’s success story was used for this paper. The first one,
written by Alfred Lief, was followed by Oscar Schisgalls ‘official’ corporate history
„Eyes on tommorrow“ (1985) and recently by the study of Dyer (et alii, 2004), which
is also a ‘commissioned history’7. Besides this there is a number of publications on
P&G’s marketing and sales strategies, which are connected with the company’s
outstanding market success8. Additionally, there are also some critical books from
former employees and investigative journalists9.
1. On the history of American FDI in Germany
In the 20th century Germany developed into one of the most important target
countries for American FDI10. American companies with new technical procedures or
products began to expand their activities to Europe and to the German market in the
late 19th century as Mira Wilkins has shown. This applies before all for innovative
branches such as electrical industry, petroleum production, food or machine building
and firms such as GE, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Mergenthaler Linotype, National
P&G developed “quality and reliability as long term functions of brands”. Cf. Nancy Koehn,
Brand new. How Entrepreneurs earned Consumer’s Trust from Wedgewood to Dell, Boston,
Harvard Business School Press, 2001, p. 324, Davis Dyer (et alii), Rising Tide. Lessons from 165 Years
of Brand Building at Procter & Gamble, Boston, Mass., Harvard Business School Press, 2004, pp. 4–
7, call the following strategies as outstanding: focus on branded consumer products, broad approach
to creating and building brands, commitment to rigorous experimentation, tenacity.
7
Alfred Lief, „It floats“. The story of Procter & Gamble, New York/Toronto 1958. Oscar
Schisgall, Eyes on tomorrow. The Evolution of Procter & Gamble, Chicago/NY, Ferguson, 1981. Dyer,
Rising Tide.
8
Procter & Gamble. The House that Ivory built, Chicago, NTC, 1989. As ‚assistance’ in practice:
Charles L. Decker, „Das Beste ist nie gut genug“. Die 99 Erfolgsregeln von Procter & Gamble,
Landsberg/Lech, Verlag moderne Industrie, 1999.
9
For example: Alecia Swasy, Soap Opera. The Inside Story of Procter & Gamble, Time Books,
New York, Random House, 1993.
10
Frank A. Southard, The Evolution of international Business 1800–1945, Vol. 6: American
Industry in Europe, London/New York, Routledge, 1931.
6
3
Cash Register, Singer, Otis or International Harvester11. World War I changed the
American position in the world economy and brought an even stronger direct
economic engagement in the European markets12. One reason for this was the
growing productivity of the US economy and the prevailing protectionism in
international trade policy. Almost unsuperable tariff walls contributed to reduced
export profits in the aftermath of World War I. As a consequence manufacturing was
transferred abroad to evade these barriers13. But World War I also induced a
significant financial shift which made the US the worldwide most important creditor
nation. Particularly from the German perspective the American expansion to Europe
did not only result from the technical or industrial leadership but also from monetary
strength. The “change from debtor to creditor”, which now became evident, was seen
as “a consequence of America’s changed position on the capital market”14. Thus the
1920s saw the first boom of US foreign direct investment in Europe. Particularly after
the German currency reform of 1923/4 and as a consequence of the ‘Dawes Plan’
there was a strong inflow of American investment capital which can be seen not only
as an instrument of the US German policy but also as an element of the interallied
reparations system. After the currency stabilization the conditions for the
establishment of American subsidiaries in Germany had been improved greatly. Thus
up to the outbreak of the ‘Great Depression’ “a veritable wave of American
companies” came to Germany15. According to the information of the US commercial
attaché in Berlin there were about 1,500 American companies engaged in almost any
German branch in spring of 1930 as manufacturing plants, sales and service
companies and agencies16.
With this US FDI in Germany had increased from 445 million US dollar (USD) in 1900
to more than 1,7 billion USD in 1912 and to 7,5 billion USD in 1929. Compared to the
total amount of the American FDI in Europe, Germany with 216,5 million USD was
second after the UK with 485 million USD after France with 145 million USD and Italy
with 113 million USD 17. „Germans aim to be ‚Yankee of Europe’“, commented New
Ralph W. Hidy/Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–1911. History of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey), New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955, pp. 123ff. Also Mira Wilkins, The
Emergence of multinational Enterprise. American Enterprise abroad from the colonial Era to 1914,
2d. ed. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1976. Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of
multinational Enterprise. American Enterprise abroad from 1914 to 1970, Cambridge, Mass.,
Harvard University Press, 1974. Fritz Blaich, Amerikanische Firmen in Deutschland 1890–1918. USDirektinvestitionen im deutschen Maschinenbau, Wiesbaden, Steiner Verlag, 1984.
12
Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 23. Olivier
Zunz, Why the American Century, Chicago,University of Chicago Press, 1998. Emily Rosenberg,
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945, New
York, Hill & Wang, 1982, p. 229, p. 21: “The major characteristics of American exports [...] were
established by 1900. American trade advantages were based on an extensive transportation network,
technological advances, aggressive marketing, and scientific innovation.“ Recently Victoria de Grazia,
Irresistible Empire. America’s Advance through twentieth-century Europe, Cambridge, Mass.,
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
13
Southard, Evolution, p. 4. Clemens Verenkotte, Das brüchige Bündnis. Amerikanische
Anleihen und deutsche Industrie 1923–1934, Diss. Freiburg 1991, pp. 16f. Also William McNeil,
American Money and the Weimar Republic. Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great
Depression, New York Columbia University Press, 1986.
14
August Gebhardt, Die Expansion der amerikanischen Elektro-Konzerne in Europa, Diss.
Heidelberg 1932, p. 71.
15
Verenkotte, Bündnis, p. 263.
16
Quoted Verenkotte, Bündnis, p. 263f. Cf. also Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie,
Geschäftliche Mitteilungen, XII. Jg. 1930, Nr. 29, Nr. 660: „Amerikanische Firmen in Deutschland“.
17
Verenkotte, Bündnis, p. 262.
11
4
York Times in 1928 on the increasing popularity of the German market for American
direct investments18. But the the first boom of American investment in Europe was
soon stopped in the 1930s by the disintegration of the world market in the course of
the Great Depression and of the ongoing nationalism and protectionism before the
outbreak of the Second World War.
With the European Recovery Program, the founding of EEC and world monetary
system a step by step liberalisation of world trade set in and provided new challenges
for economic growth.19 Seeking new markets, American firms were very much
attracted by the process of political and economic integration taking place in postwar Europe, where traditional suppliers were exposed to previously unknown
competitive pressure20. The European Community in the 1960s mobilized more
American investments than any other region worldwide. Not least due to the high
custom tariffs local manufacturing plants were more profitable than export business.
Thus private capital transfer by direct investment became one of the central features
of international economic integration, which turned Europe in an „economic
gravitational field“.21
Up to the 1950s US FDI in the Federal Republic up had been limited due to Alliied
occupation and lack of exchange. Liberalization did not set in before 1958 when the
full convertibility of the German Mark was achieved22. Since then the share of
American FDI in West Germany rose from 32 percent in 1950 to 35 percent in early
1959 and reached 42 percent in early 1969. The increase was to the loss of the UK and
France, the latter had “consciously slowed down” investments from the US at that
time23. US FDI in German in total rose from 204 million USD in 1950 to more than 1
billion in 1960 and 4,5 billion in 1970 (chart 1).
Quoted ibid., Bündnis, p. 264. Wilkins, Maturing, pp. 60–69.
Recently on the transatlantic economic relations Joseph P. Quinlan, Drifting Apart or
Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy, Washington, Center for
Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins University, 2003, p. 7.
20
Heinz Hartmann, Amerikanische Firmen in Deutschland. Beobachtungen über Kontakte und
Kontraste zwischen Industriegesellschaften, Köln/Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1963. Rainer
Hellmann, Amerika auf dem Europamarkt. US-Direktinvestitionen im Gemeinsamen Markt, Baden
Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1966. Knut Kiesewetter, „Beasts or Beagles? Amerikanische
Unternehmen in Deutschland“, in Hans Pohl (ed.), Der Einfluß ausländischer Unternehmen auf die
deutsche Wirtschaft vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 1992, pp. 165196. Knut Kiesewetter, „Amerikanische Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950–
1974“, in: Hartmut Kaelble (ed.), Der Boom 1948–1973. Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Europa, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992, pp. 63–81.
21
Rainer Hellmann, Weltunternehmen nur amerikanisch?, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1970, p. 12. On the discussion about foreign infiltration: Kurt Blauhorn,
Ausverkauf in Germany, München, Moderne VerlagsGmbH, 1966. Jürgen Jeske, „Den Fuß in der
Tür. Amerikanische Textilkonzerne kaufen sich ein“, FAZ vom 16.1.1968. „Wir kaufen die ganze
deutsche Industrie“, Der Spiegel, 6.10. and 20.10. 1965. Also Hans-Eckart Scharrer/Kerstin MüllerNeuhof, „Von der staatlichen Wiederaufbauhilfe zur privaten Kapitalverflechtung: Direkt- und
Portfolioinvestitionen“, in Detlev Junker (ed.), Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten
Krieges. Ein Handbuch, Bd. I 1945–1968, Stuttgart/München, DVA, 2001, pp. 524–534, p. 525. See
also Joyce Kolko & Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign Policy,
1945–54, New York, 1972.
22
Kiesewetter, Unternehmen, p. 67. Scharrer/Müller-Neuhof, Kapitalverflechtung p. 526f.
Klaus-Heinrich Standke, Amerikanische Investitionspolitik in der EWG, Berlin, Beuth Verlag, 1965,
pp. 48ff.
23
Hellmann, Weltunternehmen, pp. 45, 57. Gareth P. Dyas/Heinz T. Thanheiser, The Emerging
European Enterprise. Strategy and Structure in French and German Industry, Boulder, Colorado,
Westview Press, 1976, p. 60.
18
19
5
Chart 1: U.S. FDI in Germany 1950-2000 in Million USD
60000
50000
in Mio. US-Dollar
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
98
19
95
19
89
19
86
19
83
19
80
19
77
19
74
19
70
19
66
19
62
19
58
19
55
19
50
19
Source: US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts. Monatsberichte der Deutschen
Bundesbank: http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.php.
Again American investors concentrated on traditional fields such as petroleum
production or automobiles, but also on synthetic materials or electrical equipment24.
Besides ‚classic’ reasons for investment such as marketing and cost considerations or
advantages by local manufacturing, the positive prospects of the German market,
which in the 1950s and 1960s showed the highest growth rates in Europe and second
highest in the world (chart 2), were of prime concern for American firms. In this
context the emerging political stability and west orientation but also the liberal
investment climate, the undervaluation of the German Mark compared to the US
dollar, qualified workforce and comparatively low wages proved to be most attractive.
And from 1954 onwards there was also a double taxation agreement, which provided
American Investors in the Federal Republic with tax advantages25.
C hart 2: Growth of GNP in diffe ren t coun tries in percent in 1963
7
6
in percent
5
4
3
2
1
0
U
K
an
Fr
ce
G
ly
Ita
FR
.
.S
n
pa
Ja
U
Source: xxx.
Standke, Investitionspolitik, p. 16. Hellmann, Weltunternehmen, p. 60. Kiesewetter,
Unternehmen, pp. 77–78.
25
Standke, Investitionspolitik, pp. 35–37, 42f. Scharrer/Müller-Neuhof, Kapitalverflechtung, p.
531. Kiesewetter, Unternehmen p. 80.
24
6
2. Procter & Gamble on the West German market for consumer
chemicals strategies
In contrast to its main competitors Lever and Colgate which had been engaged on the
German market with subsidiaries already before World War I or from the 1920s
onwards, Procter & Gamble was late entering Germany at the end of the 1950s. At
that time the company had already been engaged in the highly oligopolistic US
market for soaps, detergents and shortenings for more than a century26. “Hardpressed and unable to achieve anything like breakout success against its main
competitors” Colgate or Lever Brothers, Dyer describes P&G’s business as “profitable,
but by no means comfortable through 1945” (chart 3)27.
Chart 3: P&G, Worldwide Sales and Earnings in Mio. USD 1929-2003
45000
40000
35000
in Mio. USD
30000
Net Sales (million of dollars)
Net Earnings (million of dollars)
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
-5000
99
19
94
19
89
19
84
19
79
19
74
19
69
19
64
19
59
19
54
19
49
19
44
19
39
19
34
19
29
19
Source: Dyer et al., Rising Tide, Appendix 2.
This mirrors the competitive situation on the American market for soap and
detergents where domestic growth was no longer possible because of the “Big
Soapers” Lever, P&G and Colgate-Palmolive, which together held 75 percent of the
soap market and 90 percent of the market for household cleaners28. Foreign growth
should have been a solution in this stand-off. But besides business in raw materials
in Cuba, on the Philippines and in Indonesia, P&G only maintained subsidiaries in
Canada and the UK. The first foreign plant had been founded in 1915 in Canada and
in 1930 P&G acquired the English soap manufacturing plant Thomas Hedley & Co.
Ltd. in Newcastle/Tyne. The small company could have served as a ‘bridgehead’ just
to get P&G “a general idea of the European soap business“29, but the headquarters in
Cincinnati up to World War II did not undertake any other acquisitions in Europe.
As one reason for P&G’s reluctance toward expansion on the European markets
might be seen the high tariff walls. Additionally there was the „potential instability in
Europe“ at that time which also contributed to the fact „that P&G would have no
Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 16 und 19f. Dyer et al, Rising Tide. Lief, It floats, pp. 29ff.
Dyer et al., Rising Tide, p. 67.
28
Richard E. Reichel, Direktinvestitionen deutscher Unternehmen in den USA, Gelsenkirchen
1982, pp. 171–173. Cf. also Henkel Corporate Archives Dusseldorf (HA) 153/8, Daily minutes,
16.12.1952. HA 333/1, Wohlthat, Note, 23.12.1953 concerning the relationship to P&G.
29
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 48, Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 155f. Lief, It floats, pp. 166f., 194.
Also Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 101: Most of the US corporations showed a similar ‚pattern of having
foreign subdivisions’. These were small outposts, but no independent companies.
26
27
7
fixed investments there“30. Another point might have been the prevailing competitive
conditions. P&G was probably „reluctant to tackle head-on the strong, entrenched
competitors such as Lever and Henkel & Cie. GmbH, the latter a party to a technical
exchange agreement with P&G” on the development of synthetic detergents. With
this pact the company followed the example of many US companies, which in the
1920s and 1930s maintained „tacit agreements with European competitors“ in order
„to leave each other’s home markets alone“.31 In case of P&G and Henkel this led to
arrangements on geographic markets, limiting Procter’s business interests to North
America and the UK.
Thus P&G’s European expansion did not begin before the end of World War II with
the start of the detergent Tide, which increased P&G’s share of the American market
for detergents from 30 percent in 1925 to 69 percent in 1953 (table 1)32. As the first
synthetic detergent worldwide Tide was suited for all household cleaning from
laundry to dishwashing but it profited most from the spread of automatic washing
machines which doubled the consumption of detergents. Being the “first mover” on
this field Tide gave P&G ”its edge over Colgate and Lever“33.
P&G
Lever
Colgate
Others
Table 1: Market shares of the American market for Detergents in percent
1948
1953
1958
1963/64
1966
49%
57%
58%
60%
55%
22%
18%
23%
20%
15%
14%
11%
10%
10%
15%
15%
14%
9%
10%
15%
Source: Henkel Archives 153/32, Daily minutes, 7.3.1967.
With an increase of sales by 110 percent between 1955 and 1965 P&G belongs “to the
corporate miracles in American economy“34. At least for this period P&G seemed to
pursue the „unofficial goal of doubling its business every ten years or so“.35 P&G’s
comfortable equity base offered an adquate starting point for expansion although the
American Antitrust policy (1950 Celer-Kefauver Act) made vertical integration
suspect under law and contributed to the fact, that P&G on its domestic market had
only limited chances to make important acquisitions. Alternatively foreign expansion
in Latin America and in Europe increased36. Europe became the most important
target for P&G’s corporate growth. According to P&G-Chairman Neil McElroy, the US
secretary of defence from 1957 to 1959, business expansion was „absolutely
necessary“, because „of the Common European Market“37. Thus from then on P&G
expanded „aggressively into new products and geographies”, because “the
phenomenal success of Tide gave the company both the confidence and the financial
strength to explore new products and businesses”38. As old pre-war agreements had
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 101. Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, p. 248.
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 101. The good relationship between Procter and Henkel before World
War II based on a licence cooperation from 1932 on the manufacturing of so called fatty alcohols,
which became essential for the development of synthetic cleaning products. HA 0 22, undated report
for the British Military Government. HA 333/1, Wohlthat, note, 23.12.1953.
32
HA 153/9, Daily minutes, 29.9. and 13.10.1953.
33
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 75. Lief, It floats, p. 245.
34
„P&G’s Offensive Defense”, in Forbes, 15.4.1965.
35
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 88. Also Thomas McCraw, American Business, p. 52.
36
Dyer, Rising Tide, 106ff. 108, Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 317ff., 336f. In the 1960s P&G
came into the focus of the US regulation authorities. As a consequence there were divestments at
Clorox and Folger.
37
HA 455/20, Willy Lange to Jost Henkel, 1.1.1960. Ibidem, Manchot, note, 19.10.1969.
38
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 87.
30
31
8
become less important for the company, it prepared its market entry into Europe in
the second half of the 1940s. First of all, a detergent plant in the UK was acquired to
support the local demand and also the export business to the continent. As first
subsidiary on the continent the P&G AG was established in Lucerne, Switzerland, in
1953. Similar to other companies P&G used Belgium as a ‘gateway to Europe’39, where
a detergent plant in Malines/Mechelen/Belgium was acquired in 1956 to supply “the
continental European markets“40. Further acquisitions of manufacturing plants
followed in France and in Italy from the late 1950s onwards.
As a consequence the entry in the West German market became „the next logical
step“ for the company41. However, with view to its attractiveness it seems quite
astonishing that P&G entered Germany so late. This might not only be explained out
of respect for the German firm Henkel, as observers supposed, but more than this by
the German competitive law which emerged in 1957 with the “Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung” (GWB) and a regulating authority called the
‘Bundeskartellamt”42. Although P&G’s Tide brand had already been registered in
Germany in 1953, the Federal Republic as well as Austria was not yet included in
Procter’s European activities43.
Nevertheless, with P&G’s entry in the European market the „cold war“ between „the
big soapers“ began, as the press put it44. And the commencement of a European
business, of course, caused some strains in P&G’s relationship to Henkel, which did
not only considered Germany but also Europe as its own „traditional market“.45 This
conflict mirrors the different perceptions of competition in German and American
companies, because P&G reacted to Henkel’s critical attitude with a lack of
understanding. The Americans, as a Henkel executive put it, could „not believe, that
we put an end to our know how exchange because of them entering the European
markets”46. Henkel assumed that „P&G’s younger managers“ did not want to „hold on
to the friendly relationship any longer that we had in former times“47. Indeed,
according to P&G’s president Neil McElroy, there was „basically no reason, which
Ibidem, p. 102, Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, p. 384
HA 455/19, Walter Kain, Activities of American Chemical Companies in Europe, 24.4.1963.
41
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 102, Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, p. 247.
42
Susanne Hilger, „Zur Genese des ‚German model' – Die Bedeutung des Ordoliberalismus für
die Ausgestaltung der bundesdeutschen Wettbewerbsordnung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg“, in Paul
Windolf (ed.), Vom Manager- zum Finanzmarktkapitalismus, Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2005, pp.
222-241.
43
HA 153/9, Daily minutes, 5.5.1953. HA 333/1, Brandt, Debus, note on P&G, 21.4.1958: P&G
stated in 1958, that “man nach wie vor aus Dtld. und Oesterreich herausbleiben würde, da man dies
als das Herz unseres Geschäftes ansehen würde”. This impression was confirmed in a meeting with
Lever representatives: HA 333/2, Wohlthat, note on a meeting in Den Haag, 23.1.1955: “Die Herren
von Lever meinten, Dtld. sei von P&G zurückgestellt worden”.
44
HA 153/10, Daily minutes, 2.3.1954. HA 455/19, Henkel, report, 17.8.1964. Also HA 455/19,
Dieter Schneider, „Millionen für einen Waschmittelkrieg“, Welt der Arbeit, 20.9.1963, “We are facing
a soap war.
45
HA 333/1, Malitz/Debus, Note concerning P&G, 21.4.1958. Henkel’s “European interests”
included “at that time” Western and Northern Europe with Scandinavia and Italy. Although Henkel
found itself restrained because of the consequences of the war”, the company was eager “to reactivate
its interests”.
46
HA 333/1, Wohlthat, note on the relationship to P&G, 23.12.1953.
47
HA 153/9, Daily minutes, 29.9. and 13.10.1953. HA 153/15, Daily minutes, 17.3.1959. HA
153/11, Daily minutes, 25.1. and 22.3.1955. Also HA 153/14, Daily minutes, 15.7.1958: Henkel agreed
with Lever Sunlicht, to take defensive measures against the launch of P&G detergents on the German
market. See also HA 452/11, K. Henkel et alii, trip to the US, Sept./Oct. 1957.
39
40
9
could bar Procter & Gamble from starting business in any country and therefore also
in Germany”48.
As Dyer put it, „by the late 1950s, a multidivisional P&G had more than soaps, fats,
and detergents to sell, and the prospect of serving 40 million affluent German
consumers was too tempting to pass up. To establish itself as a viable competitor in
Europe, P&G could hardly afford to bypass West Germany”49. From the perspective of
Henkel, it seemed that P&G did not evaluate a „mutual competition as hard“ as
Henkel did and therefore “in a way take measures against themselves” as far as
technical cooperation was concerned50. Henkel continued to try to attract P&G with
offers in technical cooperation in detergent and fats and oil research. In in view of old
traditions those „licences on Henkel developments should be connected to local
agreements”51. But these kinds of offering were now rejected by the Americans
referring to pending antitrust actions at the American Supreme Court52. P&G’s
counterproposal to buy the Henkel soap and detergent business was rejected in
turn53.
3. P&G’s structure in Germany
P&G’s strategy now became evident at last. The American company obviously was in
search of an adequate foothold in the German market to start the business with
soaps, detergents and household cleaners. In summer 1960, the German branch
office in Frankfurt/Main was founded with a capital stock of 2 million DM54. The next
step aimed at the establishment of an adequate manufacturing plant and sales
organization. Thus P&G made offers to some German middle-sized soap and
detergents manufacturers such as UHU, Dalli-Werke Mäurer & Wirtz or Rei-Werke
which did not only maintain manufacturing capacities but also sales divisions55. In
October 1962 Rei-Werke AG in Boppard took over the distribution of the soap Camay
and of Fairy, a household cleaner, which were produced at the Dalli-Werke in
Stolberg near Aachen56. One year later the company started further products such as
the detergent Dash and the softener Lenor in Germany. As from an internal point of
view only the establishment of an own manufacturing plant was seen as „sure sign of
P&G’s commitment to the West German market“, in 1963 a newly constructed
detergent plant (“Dash-Werk”) in Worms was put up57. Together with REI-Werke,
which were acquired in 1965, this plant manufactured detergents predominantly for
the German market58.
HA 455/19, Debus, note, 27.4.1961.
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 103.
50
HA 333/1, Malitz/Debus, note concerning. P&G, 21.4.1958.
51
HA 153/15, Daily minutes, 9.6.1959. Henkel was eager to keep P&G out of Germany, whereas
P&G respected Henkel’s R&D capabilities and wanted a right of first use on any new technologies
Henkel should develop“. So Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 103.
52
HA 455/20, Malitz, 26.6.1958: Concerning Procter & Gamble.
53
HA 455/20, Manchot, note , 15.10.1959.
54
Procter & Gamble GmbH, Moonbeams Special. 40 Jahre P&G in Deutschland, Schwalbach
2000.
55
HA 153/16, Daily minutes, 8.11.1960.
56
HA 153/20, Daily minutes, 9.10.1962. Also HA O 22, Rheinische Post, 9.2.62. Following
Sunlicht and Henkel REI-Werke were the third biggest manufacturer in Germany employing about
1,700 people.
57
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 103.
58
HA 153/19, Daily minutes, 12.6.1962. HA 153/18, Daily minutes, 14.11.1961. HA 153/24, Daily
minutes, 5.5.1964.
48
49
10
Since 1970 P&G’s headquarter for its German division is located in Schwalbach near
Frankfurt/Main, where nowadays the strings of a diversified business are pulled.
From the mid-1970s onwards P&G expanded business in Germany according to its
home market pattern and diversified in different industries such as paper, food,
personal and health care. This was done on the one hand by ‘roll outs’ of
international brands such as Pampers, Head & Shoulders or Pringles and on the
other hand by the acquisition of German brand companies such as Dittmeyer
(1983/84), Blendax (1987/88), Ellen Betrix (1991/92), Röhm Pharma (1992/93),
Vereinigte Papierwerke Schickedanz (Tempo, 1994) and recently Wella (2003).
On a European level P&G’s development to a „global marketer“ was supported by
structural reorganisations. In the mid-1960s four “international divisions” were
installed and one of these was responsible for the European market. A centralized
European Technical centre was founded in Brussels to support the local subsidiaries
with r&d, chemical engineering, purchase, technology, and production. The
European sister companies were thought of as „clones“ of P&G’s American soap and
detergent business and worked together as a network59. Firms being acquired were
not treated as portfolio investments but „procterized“, which meant „being upgraded
and transformed to comply with P&G standards” and to become “miniature versions
of P&G”60.
4. The reception of P&G in Germany
P&G’s product strategy can be characterized as one of a high innovative potential and
readiness to take a risk. The company obviously benefitted from its “first mover’s
advantages“, even on the German market. Being first in the market with a pure
vegetable shortening, a synthetic detergent, a toothpaste against tooth decay and a
“really efficient antidandruff-shampoo” P&G had no problem to manage different
lines of business under one roof. German prejudices that a manufacturer of
detergents could not possibly produce food at the same time, because the consumer
would not accept this, were not considered at all. The same was true in the case of the
consistency of detergents. Although liquid products in the US since the first half of
the 1950s were very successful und increasingly displaced washing powders and
abrasives, German producers still were in doubt, “if the German housewifes are to
use a dish liquid at all”61.
Similarly, for innovations such as synthetic detergents or detergents basing on
enzymes, softeners and cold wash detergents, P&G also played the role of a
‘pathfinder’ in the German market for consumer chemicals. But instead of applying
the theory of the ‘procterization of foreign business’ the company learnt much about
the necessity to adapt to local conditions and consumer behaviour on foreign
markets. For P&G European business became the “story of the suds level” (Dyer at
al.), because the German washing machines in contrast to its American counterparts
were not suited for intensively foaming detergents such as Tide but rather to ‘suds
reduced’ products. With its ‘allround detergent’ Dash (1963) P&G again was first in
developing a German detergent formula for washing machines basing on a “sudsSchisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 383, 386. House that Ivory built, pp. 29f.
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 95, also Swasy, P&G Report. HA 455/19, Henkel & Cie GmbH, Volkswirt.
Büro, 1.6.1965: “P&G’s Offensive Defense”, Forbes, 15.4.1965.
61
HA 153/14, Daily minutes, 11.3.and 6.5.1958. Also HA 153/16, Daily minutes, 16.8.1960.
59
60
11
reduced formula”. The same is true for the brand Lenor (1963), which was the first
softener on the German market or Ariel (1967), which was the first the first detergent
on enzyme base62. All these at least set some benchmarks for modern laundry.
Innovative products such as these demand innovative marketing concepts. According
to Joseph Schumpeter “it was not enough to produce satisfactory soap. It was also
necessary to persuade people to wash”63. The US are seen as the country of origin of
modern marketing, which in the 1920s emerged as a new concept of sales
management in concentrating on demand creation and fulfilment of demand64. The
consumer’s wants thus became the starting point of any marketing activity, which
had to be uncovered in order to be profitably satisfied. The American marketing
expert E. Jerome McCarthy thus called „product, price, place und promotion“ as the
main instruments of marketing policy, which were adequately to be combined as
„marketing mix“ according to markets or time periods65. In view of the German
competitors the sale of detergents on the German market could not be increased any
further in the mid-1960s. They feared that, “shares of the market could only be
increased at the expense of the currently dominating companies” Henkel and Lever
Sunlicht, which held 50 or rather 45 percent of the market each 66.
They were right, because P&G’s marketing ideas such as market leadership by
branding, turnover before profitability and adherence to consumer research were
successfully transferred to the German consumer markets67. Brand marketing as a
business technique “was one signal innovation in American marketing during the
twentieth century”. It epitomized the persistent theme of balancing centralized
oversight with decentralized decision making bases on who in the company who had
the best information about the decision at hand”68. Because of the emergence of
packaged consumer goods such as soups, condensed milk, beer or corn flakes, the US
economy became a starting point of a ‘brand revolution’, which was fostered by P&G
as one of its protagonists. Additionally the enlargement of distribution facilities such
as warehouses and supermarkets contributed to changing marketing techniques
which did without personal consultation and instruction but focussed on the
packaging of goods, advertisement and sales strategies. In this context P&G
distinguished itself by well-defined brand names, easily to remember, by emotional,
colourful package design as “the brand’s look”, and the use of dominant images in
advertisement to stress the product’s utility69.
Brand building therefore is seen as P&G’s „corporate pattern“ and its outstanding
Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 387f.
Quoted McCraw, American Business, p. 47.
64Robert Nieschlag (et alii), Marketing, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1988. Richard Tedlow, New and
Improved. The Story of Mass Marketing in America, Boston, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1997. Pamela
Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing,
Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1998. Susan Strasser, Satisfaction guaranteed. The
Making of the American Mass Market, Scanton/PA, Smithonian Books, 1989. Cf. also Friedrich
Schönemann, Die Kunst der Massenbeeinflussung in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Münster
1924.
65
Jerome E. McCarthy, Basic Marketing, various editions.
66
HA 455/19, Dieter Schneider, „Millionen für einen Waschmittelkrieg“, Welt der Arbeit,
21.2.64.
67
Decker, Das Beste, pp. 195–227.
68
McCraw, American Business, p. 49.
69
Decker, Das Beste, p. 208.
62
63
12
contribution „in business history“70. The company thus considered “the introduction
of new brands” as “garanty for the permanent growth of profits to-be”71 and
developed several elements of brand managment. One significant item was in-house
competition, which was understood as “pure competition“ although it also accepted
“brand cannibalism”72. “Never before an American firm had encouraged a kind of
such competition between brands of its own”, but was only engaged in different price
ranges73. To keep market shares within the firm, each brand was managed as a profit
centre and as a separate business from the conception of the product up to the
control of its success. According to the principle „one brand, one manager“ the
responsibility for one brand remained in the hands of one single product manager,
who headed the product group, developed the annual marketing plan, planned and
arranged advertising and sales promotion strategies, coordinated package design and
forecasted and analysed sales results. One consequence of this was, that in the
aftermath of World War II a single agency was being engaged for each brand and
P&G became one of the world’s largest advertisers74.
Market research was another important pillar of sales marketing which was
introduced by P&G already in the 1920s. The market research division, which was
introduced in 1925, was mainly to observe the price movements in the raw material
markets, but became an important marketing instrument under Paul Smelser, who
aimed at foreseeing shifts of the market and consumer wants, and with view to this,
the improvement of products and marketing concepts. The point was to know the
consumer much better than the competitor could do. This was to be achieved with
innovative research techniques such as to give samples to private households,
running tests of new products or to intensify field research by door-to-door
interviews about consumers habits in case of washing and cleaning, cooking etc. After
the war there were also telephone surveys and „check-up people“ who had to evaluate
sales promotion at the retailers75.
Consumer goods markets are mass markets which only can be captured by intensive
promotion measures. Procter proceeded in these markets with massive and
innovative advertising measures76. This also held for the German market, where
“advertising ... remained an affair of the Americans“, who, for German patterns, ran
an “extraordinary ad budget”77. Following an extensive survey on the German market,
P&G came to the conclusion, that per capita consumption of detergents in Germany
was “about 60 percent under the US consumption” and could “surely be increased”.
This was “not to be achieved at the expense of competitors” but by sales and
promotion measures.78 Starting from this assumption P&G’s prominent sales strategy
Dyer, Rising Tide, p.2. House that Ivory built.
HA 455/19, P&G, Annual report 1965.
72
House that Ivory built, p. 111. Kevin Lane Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building,
Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1998. David A.
Aaker, Building Strong Brands, NY, Fee Press, 1996.
73
Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 220f.
74
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 101; House that Ivory built, pp. 158–165.
75
Dyer, Rising Tide, pp. 57f.–60. House that Ivory built, p.146. McCraw, American Business,
pp. 49f.. Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, p. 145.
76
HA 153/9, Daily minutes, 13.10.1953.
77
HA 455/98, Malitz, note, 11.4.1961.
78
HA 455/20, Note on Jost Henkel’s trip to New York, 15.3.1960. HA 455/20, Manchot,
19.10.1950: P&G was convinced that, „consumption in the Common Market could be increased by
rising affluence and would clear space for the ‘big four’ [soapers]”.
70
71
13
in Germany concentrated on all-embracing advertising campaigns. As German
competitors noted, P&G invested “enormous amounts” in promotion measures. With
the launch of Dash in February 1964, a budget of 60 million DM was spent for sales
measures and special supplements in magazines, expenses which were unusual in
Germany up to this time. The so called Operation Big Lift was meant as the “most
intensive advertisement campaign, which had been ever seen in Germany”. As it was
to mobilize millions of German housewives TV spots were broadcasted up to twice a
day in the first and second TV channel and also in radio up to three times a day.
Additionally there were full-page four-color-ads in popular magazines such as Hör
zu!, Für Sie, Stern, Bunte, Hören und Sehen, and in the daily newspapers as well79.
While entering the German market P&G benefitted from “the valuable experience
which came from well-prepared American advertising campaigns”. But competitors
such as Henkel and Lever assumed that “the German market first of all has to get
used to the aggressive American advertising”.80 More than this: Henkel worried about
“a market collapse” to come, which could be “mainly put down to massive
promotions measures of foreign big firms”81. In this context the German Anti-Trust
Law led to an increased sensibility towards „unfair“ or comparative advertising which
was common practice in the US but was not allowed in Germany. Henkel, for
example protested against slogans claiming absolute superiority such as „The most
spotless white of my life“ („Das strahlendsten Weiß meines Lebens”, Lever-Sunlicht,
SUWA), because this message was seen as not objective82.
As far as advertising is concerned, P&G is considered as the originator of „soap
operas“, which were put on radio from the late 1920s onwards. These entertaining
features arose during the Great Depression in order not to disrupt “the dialogue with
the consumers”83. Soap operas „offered lessons of domestic wisdom dispensed by
appealing characters wending their way through life’s perilous trials” and became a
longstanding pattern for entertaining and deliberating advertising on household
products. For the target group of housewives between 18 and 50 these broadcasts
became an important medium with its advertising for P&G products such as “Crisco
cooking conversations”, “radio housewives club”, “Mrs. Reillys Advice“ or „Sisters of
the Pan“84. Even Hollywood stars and entertainers acted in involving and emotional
family stories such as “The Puddle Family” or “Ma Perkins” and became darlings of
the public. First as complete episodes they were later made into series and
additionally there were feature-length programs and shows in prime time85.
In 1939 the first TV commercial for P&G’s Ivory soap was produced and in the
aftermath of World War II, the soap opera format was transferred to TV combining
commercial spots with sponsorships of regular TV shows. In 1948 P&G startet its first
TV episode for Ivory Snow and Crest in the context of the TV show “Fashions on
Parade” which was broadcasted live on the air. One year later the production
HA 153/23, Daily minutes, 4.2.1964.
HA 455/19, Dieter Schneider, „Millionen für einen Waschmittelkrieg“, Welt der Arbeit,
21.2.1964.
81
HA 289/1127, Note, 8.6.1955. Also HA 153/9, Daily minutes, 18.9.1953. Henkel’s own
commercial travellers estimated Henkel ads as ‚good’ but ‚not modern’.
82
HA 153/12, Daily minutes, 7.2.1956.
83
Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 163f. McCraw, American Business, pp. 42–58. Dyer, Rising
Tide, p. 63.
84
Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, p. 168. House that Ivory built, pp. 17f.
85
Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, p. 170; House that Ivory built, p. 18.
79
80
14
company Procter & Gamble Productions Inc. was founded to buy and produce shows,
programs and other features for radio, TV and film such as the Jane Wyman Show or
the Warner Brothers production of „The Waltons“86.
The soap opera format aims at the transmittence of „memorable images“. This also
applies for the German market with the appearance of P&G’s images such as „Meister
Proper“ and „Klementine“, which came along with the launches of P&G products on
the German market and became very popular in Germany.87 Meister Proper, “Mr.
Clean” in the US, was an animated character and came to the German market in
1967. In an entertaining TV spot he gave a strong support to German housewives to
clean a very messy kitchen. The character was given the German name “Meister
Proper” instead of „Mr. Clean“ in order not to confuse the German consumer with an
English labelling. Klementine had no American equivalent although she was neither
typical for German TV ads at that time. She was a female mechanic for electric
washing machines and, not surprisingly, an outstanding expert for detergents as well.
Characters such as these appeared in TV spots in everyday life episodes, preferably
with a memorable punch line, in order to stress both credibility and entertainment.
In contrast to these two the TV spot for Lenor exerted a kind of “social pressure”,
“which comes from the protagonist’s messages and appeals to the consumer’s
conscience while propagating the idea that there would be no doing without these
things”88.
With strategies such as these but also with it’s pricing policy P&G again and again
moved beyond the usual pales of competitive conceptions in Germany, even though
the company had promised before “to stick to the rules of the game” und to adapt “to
the German price as well as to the sales and advertising methods”. Although P&G
wanted “to penetrate the German market slowly so as to not unsettle the German
industry”89, American firms were alleged as “not having any respect for European
business practices old traditions” such as agreements on prices, output and product
specifications which were to regulate the market.90 Indeed the German price system
which was traditionally quite inflexible because of regulative agreements was
threatened to be demolished by these promotion campaigns, because price cuttings,
give away and discounts in fact contributed to the increase of market shares.91 In view
of the German firm Henkel this price slashing had taken on indescribable forms92,
particularly because the price spiral led to a domino effect which no firm could avoid.
Henkel hoped to exert some influence on other market participants as the company
worried that the “whole price system will be disturbed if one breaks ranks” and the
prices would tumble.93 Apprehensions such as these led to „hard conflicts on the
markets for detergents“, because the old established competitors decided to do
„everything, to make P&G’s start as difficult as possible“.94 So it was thought to issue
Dyer, Rising Tide, pp. 87, 99f., Schisgall, Eyes on Tomorrow, pp. 256f.
HA 153/32, Daily minutes, 4.4.67. House that Ivory built, p. 73.
88
(See Pdf-File “Lenor”. Joachim Kellner (et alii, eds.), 50 Jahre Werbung in Deutschland,
Ingeheim, Westermann-Kommunikation, 1995, p. 188.
89
HA 455/19, Kobold/Kolvenbach, Meeting with P&G, 22.11.1961 in Düsseldorf. HA 455/19,
Law Dep., Meeting with P&G, 22.11.1961.
90
HA 314/130, Stanford Research Institute, Report, Vol. 1, July 1966, p. 66.
91
HA 153/9, Daily minutes, 1.12.1953.
92
HA 153/8, Daily minutes, 6.5.1952 and 14.10.1952. Before all Henkel was aiming at the fixing
of uniformed consumer price.
93
HA 153/17, Daily minutes, 20.6.1961. HA 153/19, Daily minutes, 6.2.1962.
94
HA 153/16, Daily minutes, 9.2.1960. 153/30, Daily minutes, 19.7.1966.
86
87
15
a publication on the German competitive law by Henkel or by the German brand
association in order to stress the differences to other European countries, for
example concerning the give away of original packages or presents. Henkel thought
“this could possibly retard or even avoid Procter’s market entry in Germany“, the
more as “a withdrawal from a market would be much more difficult because of
prestige reasons than deciding to enter into the market”95.
Meanwhile Procter’s market entry indeed was slowed down by the restrictive German
competitive law96. As Procter’s German partner Willy Maurer, head of the REI-Werke,
said, P&G found “the establishment of its German branch much more difficult than
one had imagined before”97. Particularly after the GWB competition regulative law
came into force, P&G was bothered by German competitors which fought with nonstop claims against “sales measures which had proved very successful in the US”98.
Matter of dispute were for example special offers such as price reductions and give
away which came along with the launch of new products and which were common
practice in the US. In Germany these were seen as unfair business practices, which
had to be prosecuted “in order to deter other firms from similiar sales methods”99.
These legal actions were focussing on the intention, that a “certain pattern of
competition had to be maintained ... to prevent the German market from being
destroyed or to stop new sales methods which would not be successful”100. But when
the launch of Dash and Lenor had been carried out successfully, Procter from 1967
onwards resorted “very much to price conflicts”, for example as far as the conditions
for the wholesalers were concerned.101 At least, some years later, after P&G had taken
the German consumer ‘by storm’ this led to the situation, “that formerly existing
market habits regarding the length and size of rebates did not exist any longer”102.
Conclusion
Particularly from 1945 onwards the German market for consumer goods proved to be
an outstanding growth market, because it was relatively underdeveloped compared to
other Western countries. This offered manifold chances to expanding American
companies such as P&G to capture these markets with innovative product and sales
strategies. Although P&G in contrast to the German firm Henkel could not count on
“the pulling force of the company’s name”, because most of the Germans did not even
know where the firm came from. But being much more “consequent, active and ... full
of ideas”, P&G succeeded in working it’s way up the German detergent market next to
Henkel103. Compared to its competitors Lever, Colgate and also Henkel, P&G stands
out for its “smooth and consequent management of all factors of marketing mix”
HA 455/20, K. Henkel to Manchot, 16.11.1959: Report on a meeting with Dr. Willy Lange.
Ibd., Kobold to Debus, 30.11.1959.
96
HA 153/16, Daily minutes, 9.2.1960. HA 153/30, Daily minutes, 19.7.1966.
97
HA O 22, Rheinische Post, 9.2.1962.
98
HA 455/20, Henkel Law Dep., New York-trip of Dr. Jost Henkel, 15.3.1960.
99
HA 153/16, Daily minutes, 31.5.1960. Henkel tested almost each ads campaign and bulk mails
of the competitors were tested for its „competitive legitimacy“.
100
HA 455/19, Dr. K. Henkel/Malitz, note, 18.9.1961.
101
HA 153/32, Daily minutes, 7.3.1967. HA 153/33, Daily minutes, 19.12.1967.
102
HA 153/42, Daily minutes, 12.11.1968.
103
HA 55/1, Daily minutes, 9.1.1968. Colgate Palmolive seemed to be restrained by the
„rentability on the American market“ and Unilever showed less interest for the detergent business”.
95
16
which focussed on market leadership and became obvious in product and price
policy and by sales and marketing measures as well104.
On this basis the German market for P&G became one of the main pillars of the
European business, where the company encountered new market cultures, far
reaching regulation acts and different national consumer wants105. „Constant change
and adaptation“ was P&G’s response to these manifold challenges. So at least these
experiences gained from the European business made the former soap maker a “true”
multinational106.
HA 55/1, Report, administrative board Persil GmbH, 4.4.1968.
HA 153/30, Daily minutes, 20.12.1966 and 7.6.1966.
106
Dyer, Rising Tide, p. 88. Also HA 314/130, Stanfort Research Institute, Report, Vol. 1, July
1966, pp. 66, 69: „Obwohl Unilever umsatzmäßig auf dem europäischen Markt die stärkste Position
einnimmt, wird die entscheidende Konkurrenz für Persil/Henkel zweifellos P&G sein – eines der
erfolgreichsten Unternehmen der Welt auf dem Markt für Marken-Konsumartikel. P&G ist sowohl in
den Vereinigten Staaten als auch in anderen Ländern für seine hervorragenden MarketingFähigkeiten und sein rücksichtsloses Vorwärtsdrängen bekannt.“
104
105