Country report SLOVENIA
Summary
Reflecting its economic and political problems, Slovenia has been singled out as the potential next
candidate for an EU/IMF rescue package following this year’s Cypriot bailout. Its economy is going
through a protracted double-dip recession due to a serious banking crisis, fiscal consolidation at
home and weak external demand. The recent fall of the government has raised concerns that
important policy initiatives might not be completely implemented by the new cabinet. As nonperforming loans worth 20% of GDP burden the local banking sector, the swift transfer of a large
part of these loans to a bad-bank lies at the core of the current cabinet’s tasks, followed by fiscal
consolidation and structural reforms. It remains to be seen whether the new center-left cabinet will
be up to this challenge, as anti-austerity sentiment is rising. In spite of its current problems,
Slovenia managed to cover its financing needs for this year amid ample liquidity on international
capital markets, but larger-than-expected bank recapitalization costs might still force it to apply for
external assistance.
Author:
Fabian Briegel
Country Risk Research
Economic Research Department
Rabobank Nederland
Contact details:
P.O.Box 17100, 3500 HG Utrecht, The Netherlands
+31-(0)30-21-64053
F.Briegel@rn.rabobank.nl
May 2013
Rabobank
Economic Research Department
Page: 1/9
Country report SLOVENIA
Slovenia
National facts
Social and governance indicators
rank / total
Type of government
Parliamentary republic
Human Development Index (rank)
C apital
Ljubljana
Ease of doing business (rank)
35 / 185
Surface area (thousand sq km)
20
Economic freedom index (rank)
76 / 179
Population (millions)
2.1
C orruption perceptions index (rank)
37 / 176
Main languages
Slovenian (91%)
Press freedom index (rank)
35 / 179
Main religions
21 / 187
Serbo-C roatian (4.5%)
Gini index (income distribution)
31.15
C atholic (58%)
Population below $1.25 per day (PPP)
0.06%
Muslim (2%)
Head of State (president)
Orthodox (2%)
Foreign trade
Borut Pahor
Main export partners (%)
2011
Main import partners (%)
Head of Government (prime-minister) Alenka Bratušek
Germany
24
Germany
19
Monetary unit
Italy
14
Italy
18
euro (EUR)
Economy
2012
Austria
9
Austria
12
C roatia
8
C roatia
5
bn USD
% world total
Nominal GDP
46
0.07
Manufactures
83
Nominal GDP at PPP
58
0.07
Fuels and mining products
10
Export value of goods and services
35
0.16
Agricultural products
IMF quotum (in m SDR)
275
0.13
Economic structure
2012
5-year av.
Real GDP growth
-2.3
0.9
3
2
Industry (% of GDP)
28
30
Services (% of GDP)
70
67
Economic size
Agriculture (% of GDP)
Standards of living
Main export products (%)
7
Main import products (%)
Manufactures
68
Fuels and mining products
20
Agricultural products
11
USD
% world av.
Nominal GDP per head
22621
206
Openness of the economy
Export value of G&S (% of GDP)
Nominal GDP per head at PPP
28169
218
Import value of G&S (% of GDP)
72
Real GDP per head
18656
225
Inward FDI (% of GDP)
1.4
75
Source: EIU, CIA World Factbook, UN, Heritage Foundation, Transparency International, Reporters Without
Borders, World Bank, World Trade Organization.
Economy falls back into a deep and protracted double-dip recession
Slovenia’s economy still struggles to embark on a solid recovery following its very deep recession
in 2009, when GDP declined by almost 8%. While economic growth returned to a meagre 1% on
average in 2010 and 2011, as the global economic recovery helped Slovenia’s export-dependent
economy, it slipped back into recession last year. Pulled down by protracted balance-sheet repairs
by Slovenia’s heavily-indebted corporate sector, tight credit conditions, ongoing fiscal austerity
measures and their impact on consumer spending, rising unemployment and stagnating exports,
output fell by 2.3% in 2012. Compared to its euro area and regional peers, Slovenia experienced
the deepest recession last year, while its total GDP loss since the onset of the global economic
crisis (-8%) ranks second only to Greece (-20%) in the euro area.
Figure 1: GDP contraction since 2008
Figure 2: Economic growth
percentage
points
0
percentage
points
0
-5
-5
-10
-10
-15
-15
%-yoy
6
%-yoy
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-6
-8
-8
-10
-10
-12
-20
-20
Greece Slovenia
Italy
Source: Eurostat
May 2013
Portugal Spain
-12
08
09
10
11
Private consumption
Gross fixed capital formation
Net exports
Ireland Cyprus
12
13f
14f
Public consumption
Inventories
Real GDP
Source: European Commission
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Going forward, Slovenia’s economic outlook remains rather bleak, as the further escalation of its
serious banking crisis (also see next section) not only restricts access to credit, but also leads to
spiking risk premiums on Slovenian debt amid concerns that the country might have to apply for
EU/IMF financial assistance. While government and private consumption are expected to fall
further due to still rising unemployment levels and decisive efforts to rein in Slovenia’s bloated
fiscal deficit, further steep declines in gross fixed investments, particularly construction, are highly
probable. This trend is unlikely to change soon, unless Slovenia’s banking system, which is
currently drowning in bad loans, is cleaned up swiftly and thoroughly and thereby regains its
capacity to provide credit. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment is unlikely to compensate for the
domestic shortfall amid lingering concerns about Slovenia’s business climate and competitiveness
after years of reform backlogs. This leaves net exports as the sole source of growth in2013, but
owing to strongly declining domestic demand, Slovenia’s economy is expected to contract by 2%
this year before stabilizing next year. Even worse, the downside risks to the outlook, both domestic
and external, are considerable. As exports, primarily destined for the euro area, amount to about
70% of GDP, economic weakness abroad would hit Slovenia hard. At home, a protracted
deleveraging process of the corporate sector, delays in resolving the banking sector crisis, and
strongly rising taxes to finance recurrent recapitalizations of state-owned banks (SOBs) and
enterprises (SOEs) could further undermine Slovenia’s economic recovery.
A serious banking crisis asks for a swift policy response
Slovenia’s banking system currently undergoes a grave banking crisis, as predominantly local
state-owned banks are burdened with very high amounts of non-performing loans, while
capitalization levels at several banks remain weak in spite of recurrent recapitalizations by the
Slovenian state in recent years. In September 2012, Slovenia’s systemwide non-performing loan
(NPL) ratio increased to 14.2% of total loans, up from 11.2% in December 2011, while the
sectorwide Tier 1-capital ratio came in at 10.1%, also up from 9.6% from the end of 2011. Given
total bank assets worth about 140% of GDP, non-performing loans currently amount to about EUR
7bn, or roughly 20% of GDP. In contrast to other euro area members with a banking crisis, e.g.
Spain, non-performing loans are particularly prevalent in the corporate sector, while asset quality
of household loans has held up relatively well. As of September 2012, about 24% of corporate
loans were overdue, whereby the collapse of Slovenia’s construction sector brought with it a
sectorwide NPL-ratio of 62% in that segment.
Figure 3: Bank capitalization & Asset
quality
12
Figure 4: Non-performing loans per bank
%
%
24
% of respective
loan portfolio
80
% of respective
loan portfolio
80
10
20
70
70
8
16
60
60
6
12
50
50
4
8
40
40
2
4
30
30
20
20
0
0
08
09
10
11
12 (Sept)
Tier 1 capital ratio (l)
Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio (r)
NPL - Corporates (r)
NPL - Housholds (sole proprietors)(r)
NPL - Non-residents (r)
NPL - OFIs (r)
Source: Banka Slovenije
10
10
0
0
Large domestic
banks
Small domestic
banks
Total
Financial intermediation
Trade
Banks under
majority foreign
ownership
Construction
Manufacturing
Source: Banka Slovenije
The systemwide figures hide marked differences among banks, however. As mentioned before,
Slovenia’s three large state-owned banks (Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB), Nova Kreditna Banka
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Maribor, Abanka) are particularly affected. While foreign-owned banks’ NPL-ratio stood at about
11% in September 2012, a-third of all loans of the largest domestic banks was non-performing.
The sizeable build-up of bad loans comes in the wake of a lending boom that doubled Slovenia’s
loan-to-GDP ratio from about 40% of GDP in 2003 to 92% of GDP in 2011. It brought with it
extremely favorable credit conditions that oftentimes led to unprofitable corporate mergers and
acquisitions, as well as leveraged management bailouts at too high prices. According to the OECD,
the particularly poor performance of state-owned banks could be explained by a weak governance
framework that contributed to excessive risk-taking and sub-optimal credit standards, while
preliminary findings of the Slovenian Corruption Prevention Commission suggest that the apparent
misallocation of capital was likely also due to corrupt behaviour. Moreover, we note that widespread direct and indirect state-ownership, estimated at up to 50% of the local economy, likely
also contributed to the application of relatively lenient lending criteria by state-owned banks.
Owing to Slovenia’s poor economic outlook, asset quality will continue to deteriorate, which will
further undermine bank equity. Unsurprisingly, capitalization levels at the state owned banks are
far lower than at foreign-owned banks, which makes recurrent recapitalizations by the Slovenian
state necessary, especially so since Belgian banking group KBC sold its stake in NLB last year. In
its third loss-making year in a row, the banking system’s pre-tax losses in the first ten months of
last year increased by EUR 31m to EUR 155m compared to the same period in 2011, which will
likely deter any foreign investment into the ailing sector. We consequently caution that, given the
large and rising amount of NPLs (20% of GDP), considerable recapitalizations of the banking
system will be needed in the near future, unless these loans are carefully removed from the banks’
balance sheets. Slovenia’s government currently expects recapitalizations worth EUR 1bn this year,
but we caution that this amount will likely increase considerably given the country’s economic
outlook and its impact on asset quality.
We also note that the poor state of the banking sector has severely restricted its access to marketbased sources of external funding, on which the sector depends given its loan-to-deposit ratio of
136% in October 2012. While funding from foreign parent banks of local subsidiaries has declined
markedly, Slovenian banks’ access to (external) wholesale funding worsened considerably and led
to increased reliance on ECB funding (up from a pre-crisis 2.6% of total funding to 8.4% last
October). Since Slovenian banks are not yet forced to use the ECB’s Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA) facility, the risks to an abrupt stop of this type of funding are minimal, which
reduces the risk of imminent liquidity shortages of the local banking system. While Slovenia’s
central bank stresses that the commonly known problems of the banking sector have so far not led
to significant deposit flight in the wake of the Cypriot deposit bail-in, we do not completely exclude
this risk. Even though the availability of roughly EUR 4bn in bank equity and EUR 2bn of junior and
senior bank debt argue against a deposit bail-in, savers might still decide to take their money out
of Slovenia’s banks, particularly once the country receives increased attention from the EU
following the submission of its National Reform Program in May.
Given the apparent unsustainability of the situation, Slovenia’s previous government decided to
clean the banks’ balance sheets by means of transferring non-performing loans worth about EUR
4bn (11% of GDP) to a bad bank, the so-called Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC), which
was established in October 2012. It is envisaged that banks will receive government-backed BAMC
bonds in return for the transferred loans. Moreover, the creation of a Sovereign Holding (SH) was
decided that would bundle the state’s various stakes in enterprises for the purpose of privatization.
Both, the BAMC and the SH are not fully operational yet and have been subject to considerable
May 2013
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Economic Research Department
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political debate in Slovenia. While the Positive Slovenia party of incumbent prime minister Alenka
Bratušek opposed the SH, trade unions tried to block the BAMC by means of a referendum.
In our view, the swift implementation of both institutions likely represents the only way out of
Slovenia’s crisis. The removal of bad loans from banks’ balance sheets should re-enable them to
provide credit, while the privatization of state-owned enterprises should harden their budget
constraints and thereby reduce their need for ongoing funding by state-owned banks. While the
first transfer of bad loans to the BAMC is planned for June, less is known about the government’s
privatization agenda besides that it will likely comprise one of the state-owned banks. Still, we
caution that this necessary overhaul of the ‘Slovenian model’, which has taken place in other
regional peers decades ago, will likely face considerable public opposition.
Seriously deteriorated public finances raise concerns about medium-term debt
sustainability
Slovenia’s once very healthy fiscal situation has worsened markedly since the onset of the global
economic crisis and the start of the local banking misery. Unless high budget deficits are reined in
soon in the current low growth/recessionary environment, public debt sustainability could be
compromised over the medium-term.
While public debt amounted to a comfortable 22% of GDP in 2008, stubbornly high budget deficits
caused by declining tax revenues, recurrent recapitalizations of ailing state-owned banks and stateowned enterprises, as well as falling nominal GDP, increased public debt to 54% of GDP last year.
Following three years of budget deficits in the range of 6% of GDP, expenditure-based fiscal
consolidation programs implemented by previous governments brought last year’s budget deficit
down to 4.0% of GDP. Partly owing to rising social transfers, this year’s budget deficit is expected
to increase again to 5.3% of GDP, while the European Commission expects the 2014 deficit to still
come in at 4.9% of GDP under the no-policy-change assumption. Given stagnant nominal economic
growth, public debt is expected to increase to 61% of GDP this year. These projections neither
include this year’s anticipated bank recapitalization costs of EUR 1bn (3% of GDP) nor state
guarantees for the BAMC. In case government-guaranteed bonds issued by the BAMC are
considered as public debt, the ratio may even increase to about 70% of GDP. Moreover, the
possible recategorization of the national highway company’s (DARS) debt could increase public
debt by another 8-9% of GDP.
Figure 5: Public finances (excluding
upcoming bank recapitalization costs)
% of GDP
Figure 6: CDS spreads
% of GDP
bps
bps
80
8
1600
60
6
1400
1400
40
4
1200
1200
20
2
1000
1000
0
0
-20
1600
800
800
600
600
400
400
200
200
-2
-40
-4
-60
-6
-80
-8
08
09
Public debt (l)
10
11
Budget balance (r)
12
13f
14f
0
Structural budget balance (r)
0
10
Public debt (l) (incl. BAMC bonds)
11
Slovenia
Source: European Commission, Rabobank
12
Portugal
Italy
13
Ireland
Spain
Source: Bloomberg
Since Slovenia’s debt refinancing costs have risen in line with its worrying debt dynamics, the
government’s dependence on short-term funding has increased accordingly in recent years. As 10-
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Country report SLOVENIA
year government bond yields have repeatedly reached levels close to or above 7% and foreign
investors are increasingly avoiding Slovenian exposures, reliance on the ailing local banking sector
also increased. While these trends strengthened the problematic interdependency between the
local sovereign and the banking sector, they also increased debt roll-over risks as the average
maturity of public debt shortened.
Given Slovenia’s still moderate public debt level, we note that the swift implementation of
necessary policies, particularly the implementation of the bad bank and the privatization of SOEs,
could restore international investor confidence and thereby improve access to international capital
markets at more favorable rates. Still, we note that additional spending cuts and reforms,
particularly pension reforms, will be needed to ensure medium-term debt sustainability, given last
year’s structural budget deficit of 2.7% of GDP. More clues about the future trajectory of Slovenia’s
public finances will be provided by the presentation of its privatization plans expected for early May
2013 and its National Reform Programme (NRP) for 2013-14, which has to be submitted to the
European Commission (EC) by May 9th, 2013. According to its preliminary version that has been
presented to parliament recently, the NRP aims at, among others, ongoing fiscal consolidation by
means of both spending cuts and tax increases, as well as reforms of the banking system and the
welfare state. In order to boost competitiveness and growth, a review of the minimum wage
system and the elimination of bureaucratic red tape is also considered. As Slovenia, together with
Spain, has been given a deadline under the EC’s new Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure to
implement necessary reforms by May 29th, close EU scrutiny can be expected, which could provide
an important external anchor for the implementation of policies.
Stability of Slovenia’s new center-left government will be crucial
While weak euro area demand for Slovenian exports and the ongoing local banking crisis goes a
long way in explaining the country’s current difficulties, we note that the impact of its rather
volatile political landscape and the local population’s apparent weak support for reforms should not
be underestimated. In particular, the instability of recent governments and the possibility of
binding referendums (with only 40,000 signatures needed to call for such a referendum)
considerably increased policy implementation risks in recent years. Given the country’s trade
unions’ opposition to needed changes in social security legislation, the previous government faced
considerable problems when implementing urgently needed labor and pension reforms. While last
year’s ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court eventually blocked referenda on the BAMC and
the SH, rising public discontent with economic policies could once more lead to proposals for new
referenda that cannot be rejected by the Constitutional Court indefinitely.
Following the gradual disintegration of previous prime minister Janez Janša’s center-right coalition
government amid corruption allegations, Slovenia is currently governed by a center-left cabinet
under the leadership of Alenka Bratušek of the Positive Slovenia (PS) party. Amid rising external
pressure, Ms Bratušek struggled to form a coalition with the Social Democrats (SD), Gregor
Virant’s Citizen’s List (DL) and the Party of Slovenian Pensioners (DeSus). Her coalition currently
controls a narrow majority of 49 out of 90 seats in parliament, whereby the departure of any of the
coalition’s members could lead to the collapse of the government. While coalition cohesion has
been surprisingly strong so far in spite of lingering differences of opinion within the coalition,
government stability might be weak once painful decisions need to be taken. In particular, we note
that several parties, including the prime minister’s PS, were opposed to the previous government’s
economic policies, which they are now forced to implement amid rising speculations that the
country might be next in line for an EU/IMF bailout. Moreover, given the volatility of Slovenia’s
May 2013
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Economic Research Department
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Country report SLOVENIA
political landscape, several coalition members might opt to push for new elections if polls were to
indicate a victory.
Figure 7: Alenka Bratušek’s coalition
Hungarian and Italian
national communities
Nova Slovenija (NSi) 4
Independents
3
2
Figure 8: Employment situation
80
%
%
12
78
Pozitivna
Slovenija (PS)
Slovenska ljudska 6
stranka (SLS)
10
76
74
27
8
72
Slovenska
demokratska26
70
6
68
stranka (SDS)
4
66
64
10
Demokraticna stranka
upokojencev Slovenije (DeSUS)5
7
Socialni
demokrati (SD)
Državljanska lista
Gregorja Viranta (DL)
2
62
60
0
08
09
10
Employment rate (l)
Source: Slovenian parliament
11
12
13
Unemployment rate (r)
Source: Eurostat
Notwithstanding the risks of an early coalition break-up and consequent detrimental delays to
policy implementation, we note that Ms Bratušek, Slovenia’s first female prime minister, will face a
formidable task in convincing Slovenians that ongoing fiscal consolidation is needed. Moreover, it
remains to be seen whether vested interests will provide unconditional support for her privatization
agenda. Having assumed office with the promise of ‘more economic growth’ and milder austerity,
she now has to sell a planned VAT hike and large-scale privatizations to a disgruntled public; a
challenging task amid a continuously worsening labor market, increasing austerity fatigue and
rising public disenchantment with what it perceives as a ‘corrupt’ elite. It remains to be seen
whether she will be up to this challenge, given widespread perceptions among Slovenians that she
has been a protégée of former PS leader Zoran Janković1 so far and the fact that her party once
opposed most of the policies she now has to implement.
We caution that the failure to implement necessary policies in time, either caused by politicallymotivated delays, public opposition or the break-up of the current coalition government, could
have a detrimental effect on investor confidence and force the country to still apply for external
assistance.
Lingering concerns about an EU/IMF bailout
Following the Cypriot bailout, Slovenia was quickly singled out as the most likely next candidate for
an EU/IMF bailout. As foreign investors dropped their holdings of Slovenian sovereign bonds across
the board, yields of both short-term and long-term bonds spiked and temporarily reached levels of
almost seven per cent. Even though Slovenian government bond yields declined somewhat in
recent weeks as prime minister Bratušek reaffirmed her cabinet’s commitment to a swift clean-up
of the banking sector and ongoing austerity, they remain elevated and complicate the country’s
access to long-term external financing at acceptable rates.
Notwithstanding lingering concerns about insufficient access to funding, Slovenia’s government
managed to refinance its maturing debt and prefund this year’s financing needs by tapping both
local and external markets. Though denied by Slovenian officials, widespread state-ownership of
the local banking sector likely helped the government in selling treasury bills domestically amid at
times faltering external demand. In this regard, the importance of the local banking system’s
1
Mr Janković handed over the PS leadership to Ms Bratušek following the announcement by the country’s anticorruption commission that he could not explain the source of some of his income.
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access to ECB funding, whereby Slovenian government bonds can be used as collateral, should not
be underestimated, as it enables the local banking sector to finance the government in spite of its
poor state. While access to external bond markets at acceptable rates has been rather volatile in
recent weeks, Slovenia’s government successfully tapped international capital markets with USDdenominated 5-year and 10-year bonds in early May with a total volume of USD 3.5bn. The
amount raised should cover the Slovenian government’s financing needs this year. Given lingering
uncertainty about the actual implementation of the government’s rescue plan for the banking
sector, we note, however, that the successful issuance likely mainly reflected investors’ search for
yield amid ample liquidity on international capital markets.
The recent successful domestic and external debt issuances should strongly reduce the need for an
EU/IMF-bailout in the near-term, but larger-than-expected bank refinancing costs could still force
the Slovenian government to once more issue debt this year. While we remain relatively optimistic
that the local banking sector should be able to buy at least part of a new debt issuance, provided
ECB funding remains in place, we note that access to international capital markets cannot be taken
for granted. In this regard, lacking progress on bank restructuring or the demise of the current
government could lead to a marked fall in external investor appetite for Slovenian debt. Therefore,
depending on the size of upcoming bank recapitalization costs, Slovenia could still be forced to
apply for external assistance, even as the likelihood of this event happening in the near-term has
decreased considerably. Moreover, given the small size of the Slovenian economy (0.04% of
Eurozone GDP), the likely small amount of needed support, and European leaders commitment to
halt contagion across the Eurozone, we do not expect any difficulties in obtaining ESM funds if
needed.
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Slovenia
Selection of economic indicators
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013e
2014f
GDP (% real change pa)
3.4
-7.8
1.2
0.6
-2.3
-2.0
-0.1
Harmonized consumer price index (%-yoy)
5.5
0.9
2.1
2.1
2.8
2.2
1.4
C urrent account balance (% of GDP)
-6.1
-0.4
-0.4
0.1
2.7
4.8
4.7
-0.1
Key country risk indicators
Economic growth
GDP (% real change pa)
3.4
-7.8
1.2
0.6
-2.3
-2.0
Gross fixed investment (% real change pa)
7.7
-23.5
-13.3
-9.2
-8.5
-5.6
0.0
Private consumption (real % change pa)
2.4
0.0
1.7
0.6
-2.8
-3.5
-1.8
-1.7
Government consumption (% real change pa)
5.3
3.3
1.6
-1.6
-1.6
-1.6
Exports of G&S (% real change pa)
3.9
-16.8
10.1
6.9
0.4
1.3
3.4
Imports of G&S (% real change pa)
3.8
-19.7
8.2
5.2
-4.5
-1.9
1.9
-4.9
Economic policy
Budget balance (% of GDP)1
-1.9
-6.2
-5.9
-6.4
-4.0
-5.3
Public debt (% of GDP)1
22
35
39
47
54
61
67
Harmonized consumer price index (%-yoy)
5.5
0.9
2.1
2.1
2.8
2.2
1.4
Exchange rate EUR to USD (average)
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
Recorded unemployment (%)
4.4
5.9
7.3
8.2
8.9
10.0
10.3
Balance of payments (m USD)
C urrent account balance
-3382
-279
-265
0
1157
2250
-3529
-697
-1327
-1531
-386
530
920
Services balance
2206
1672
1858
2088
2186
2390
2630
Income balance
-1471
-975
-796
-696
-514
-660
-920
-441
-279
133
139
0
-130
-390
Trade balance
Transfer balance
2230
Net direct investment flows
460
-885
439
1046
300
500
800
Net portfolio investment flows
561
6440
2633
1747
2000
1920
1950
External position (m USD)
Total foreign debt
57461
56100
53691
56259
52768
n.a.
n.a.
-18529
-20630
-20706
-19596
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Total assets
47661
49699
45461
43791
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Total liabilities
66190
70329
66167
63387
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
International investment position
Key ratios for balance of payments, external solvency and external liquidity
Trade balance (% of GDP)
-6.5
-1.4
-2.8
-3.0
-0.8
1.1
2.0
C urrent account balance (% of GDP)
-6.1
-0.4
-0.4
0.1
2.7
4.8
4.7
Inward FDI (% of GDP)
3.5
-1.3
0.8
2.2
1.4
2.2
3.2
Foreign debt (% of GDP)
105
113
114
112
114
n.a.
n.a.
Foreign debt (% of XGSIT)
International investment position (% of GDP)
1
144
180
161
142
140
n.a.
n.a.
-33.8
-41.6
-43.8
-38.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Excluding state guarantees for the Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) and upcoming bank recapitalization costs.
Source: European Commission Spring Forecast 2013, EIU (exchange rate, FDI & portfolio investment flows),
Central Bank of Slovenia/Banka Slovenije (External position)
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May 2013
Rabobank
Economic Research Department
Page: 9/9