Integrating Theories of International Regimes
Author(s): Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 3-33
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Review
of International
Studies
Abstract.
after
years
regimes,
there
students
of
international
to be a strong
that govern
continues
and
? British
International
PETER MAYER,
HASENCLEVER,
RITTBERGER1
Several
international
Copyright
of international
theories
Integrating
ANDREAS
VOLKER
26, 3-33
(2000),
relations
started
interest
scholarly
the behaviour
of
Studies
Association
regimes
AND
to ask questions
in the principles,
in particular
states
about
norms,
issue
procedures
decision-making
a
international
have
been
focus
of
and
theoretical
Indeed,
major
empirical
regimes
for many
in International
research
Relations
schools
of thought
have
years now. Three
shaped
on constellations
which
of interests;
the discussion
thus far: neoliberalism,
bases
its analyses
treats power
states as its key variable;
which
relations
and cognitivism,
which
realism,
among
rules,
areas.
emphasizes
articulated
international
explanatory
these schools
actors'
and
causal
defended
In
regimes.
in the
power
of thought.
Each
of
these
schools
of
has
knowledge.
thought
on
view
of
the origins,
and
consequences
stability,
we
the possibilities
of achieving
this article
additional
explore
a synthesis
international
of
of
toward
study
regimes
by working
and
social
a distinct
Introduction
than twenty years international
regimes or 'sets of [...] principles, norms,
which actors' expectations
and
around
decision
converge in
rules,
making procedures
a given area of international
relations'2 have been on the agenda of International
International
Relations.3
institution.4
type of international
regimes are a major
are
international
orders on either a
constructed,
deliberately
partial
Regimes
regional or a global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue-areas of inter
For more
national politics from the sphere of self-help behaviour. By creating shared expecta
tions about appropriate behaviour and by upgrading
in the
the level of transparency
a
to
states
to
other
with
view
issue-area, regimes help
cooperate
(and
actors)
reaping
joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security. If we classify international
1
a couple of ideas we put forward in the concluding
article further develops
chapter of our book,
Theories of International
Press, 1997). Earlier versions
Regimes
Cambridge
(Cambridge:
University
were presented
on 'International
at a conference
and discussed
Politics and Transnational
Relations',
Mexico
1997 and in seminars at the Department
of Political
Science of Stanford
City, 1December
and the Centre for International
of the University
of T?bingen.
The authors are
Relations
University
This
to Helmut
Petra Rotes and all the other
Breitmeier, Gary Goertz,
grateful
Stephen Krasner,
on the paper.
individuals who, on these and other occasions,
commented
2
as Intervening
and Regime Consequences:
'Structural Causes
Stephen D. Krasner,
Regimes
in Krasner
Variables',
Press, 1983), p. 2.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
(ed.), International
Regimes
3
to Technology:
The seminal article is John Gerard Ruggie,
'International
and
Responses
Concepts
4
Trends', International
Organization,
For this typology of international
in International
State Power: Essays
29 (1975), pp. 557-83.
see Robert O. Keohane,
Institutions
International
and
institutions
Relations
Press, 1989), pp. 3-4.
Theory
(Boulder, CO: Westview
3
4
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
value being at issue,5 we find that regimes exist in all
issue-areas by the dominant
of contemporary
world politics:
there are security regimes such as the
domains
economic
nuclear non-proliferation
trade
regimes such as the international
regime;6
as
the
for
environmental
such
the
of
international
regimes
regime
protection
regime;7
ozone layer;8 and, finally, human rights regimes such as the one
the stratospheric
on Human Rights.9
based on the European Convention
In the early 1980s, less than ten years after it had been launched, regime analysis
as
had turned into something of a cottage industry within International Relations10
than before the conditions under which
began to study more systematically
wax
in
and
the
theories of regime
international
wane,
process developing
regimes
about the political
formation
and change. At the same time, they asked questions
norms and
regimes: How effective are the agreed-upon
significance of international
scholars
rules by which we define regimes? Are they reliable predictors
for actors' behaviour
or does narrowly defined self-interest
induce actors to ignore regime injunctions
whenever
they turn out to be inconvenient? And how resilient or robust are regimes
to exogenous
is an
challenges or shocks in the issue-area or beyond? For example,
erosion of the power structure that prevailed when the regime was created bound to
lead to a collapse of the regime as well? Or do regimes assume a 'life of their own'
a measure
their forma
of independence
of the conditions
that facilitated
norms
were
in
the
the
and
that
'constitutional
adopted
shaped
principles
some regimes more
is it that makes
contract' of the regime? And, finally, what
effective (or more robust) than others?11
the rise of regime analysis has dimin
Some of the early noise that accompanied
mean
not
the
field
this
does
has ceased to exist. On the contrary, the
ished; however,
no
is
fact that the regime concept
longer the object of heated scholarly controversies
as
an
indication that the study of international
should be taken
regimes (or, more
acquiring
tion and
5
Internationale
Politik: Ein Konfliktmodell
See Ernst-Otto
(Paderborn:
1981),
Czempiel,
Sch?ningh,
p. 198.
6
for Contemporary
the Non-Proliferation
See Roger K. Smith,
Regime: Anomalies
'Explaining
41 (1987), pp. 253-82;
International
and Harald
Relations
International
Organization,
Theory',
Das Beispiel Nonproliferation',
in Beate Kohler-Koch
und Sicherheitspolitik:
M?ller,
'Regimeanalyse
in den internationalen
Nomos,
(Baden-Baden:
Beziehungen
1989), pp. 277-313.
(ed.), Regime
7
and Mark W. Zacher,
'The GATT
and the Regulation
of Trade Barriers:
See Jock A. Finlayson
in Krasner
and Michael
and Functions',
pp. 273-314;
Regimes,
(ed.), International
Regime Dynamics
J. Trebilcock
The Regulation
Trade: Political Economy
and Legal
and Robert Howse,
of International
Order (London: Routledge,
1995).
in Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane,
the Ozone Layer',
and
See Edward A. Parson,
'Protecting
Protection
Marc A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective Environmental
Wie entstehen globale
Breitmeier,
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 27-73; and Helmut
zum Schutz der Ozonschicht
Der Konfliktaustrag
und des globalen Klimas
Umweltregime?
(Opladen:
8
Leske
& Budrich,
1996).
in (West)Europa?Eine
'Rechtstaatlichkeit
See Martin
List,
Betrachtung',
regimeanalytische
33 (1992), pp. 622^2;
and Andrew Moravcsik,
Politische
'Explaining
Vierteljahresschrift,
Journal
Liberal Theory
and Western
International
Human Rights Regimes:
Europe', European
1 (1995), pp. 157-89.
International
Relations,
10
'Theories of International
International
See Stephan Haggard
and Beth A. Simmons,
Regimes',
9
of
41 (1987), pp. 491-517;
and Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young,
and Michael
'The
Z?rn,
Organization,
Journal of International
1 (1995), pp. 267-330.
Relations,
Regimes',
European
Study of International
11
as dimensions
of
effectiveness
and robustness
of the significance
For the distinction
between
and Rittberger,
international
Theories,
pp. 2-3. The term
Mayer,
regimes see Hasenclever,
is borrowed
contract'
of
On the Development
p. 282.
'constitutional
Formation:
45 (1991),
from Oran
Institutions
R. Young,
'Political Leadership
and Regime
in International
International
Organization,
Society',
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
5
and become a firmly
has matured
institutions)
broadly, the study of international
should we conclude
that
established
sub-field of International
Relations.12 Nor
a
work
has
is
deal
of
been
stagnating; indeed,
good
interesting
pub
regime analysis
lished over the last decade.13 Thus, issue-areas that earlier had attracted little atten
students of regimes have become major foci of empirical research. One
is
international environmental
example
politics before and after the Rio Conference
often brought against
of 1992.14 And in response to the charge of state-centrism
more
to
have
been
made
consider
the role
regime analysis,15 attempts
systematically
actors in bringing about, implementing,
and developing
of non-state
international
tion from
so-called epistemic communi
regimes.16 Thus, students of regimes have addressed
issue
who
i.e.
transnational
networks
of
share both a body of causal
ties,
experts
or
the
social
that require international
processes
physical
knowledge
regarding
action and a vision of a better public policy which they seek to help materialize.
Influential epistemic communities
have been identified in diverse international
issue
seas
arms
to
the
from
What
is
of
control.17
areas, ranging
more,
protection
regional
have begun to inquire into the theoretical possibility
and empirical reality
a
i.e.
of
of transnational
normative
institutions
scope
regimes,
transboundary
created and maintained
themselves. Examples
of such
by private actors among
international
of large trans
regimes include the rule-based
cooperation
private
in sectors such as insurance, banking, or shipping.18
national companies
scholars
three schools of thought have shaped the discussion
of regimes:19
Basically
of interests; realism, which
neoliberalism, which bases its analyses on constellations
treats power relations among
states as its key variable; and cognitivism, which
actors' causal and social knowledge.20
Each of these three schools of
emphasizes
12
a European-American
See Robert O. Keohane,
'The Analysis
of International
Towards
Regimes:
in Volker Rittberger
Research
Relations
(ed.), Regime Theory and International
(Oxford:
Programme',
Clarendon
and Volker Rittberger,
'Research on International
in
Press, 1993), pp. 23^5;
Regimes
The Adaptive
Internalization
of an American
Social Science Concept',
in Rittberger
Germany:
(ed.),
Regime Theory, pp. 3-22.
13
For a recent collection
of papers dealing with different aspects of international
regimes from diverse
theoretical
angles see Rittberger
(ed.), Regime Theory.
14
and Marc A. Levy, Institutions for the Earth: Sources of
See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane,
Protection
International
Environmental
Effective
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); Karen T. Litfin,
Ozone Discourse:
in Global Environmental
Science and Politics
Cooperation
(Irvington, NY: Columbia
at Sea: Environmental
B. Mitchell,
International
Oil Pollution
Press, 1994); Ronald
University
Policy
and Treaty Compliance
Global Governance:
(Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1994); and Oran R. Young,
the Environmental
Drawing
Experience
Insights from
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
15
A Critique
See Susan Strange,
'Cave! Hie Dragones:
of Regime Analysis',
in Krasner
(ed.),
International
Acta Pol?tica, Ti
pp. 349-51; and Gerd Junne, 'Beyond Regime Theory',
Regimes,
(1992), pp. 17-21.
16
zur Bildung
See Berhard Zangl,
'Politik auf zwei Ebenen: Hypothesen
internationaler
Regime',
1 (1994), pp. 279-312.
f?r Internationale
Beziehungen,
Zeitschrift
17
See Peter M. Haas
in Special Issue of
Power, and International
(ed.), Knowledge,
Policy Coordination,
International
46:1 1992).
Organization,
See Virginia Haufler, Dangerous
Commerce:
Insurance and theManagement
Risk
of International
'Bankers' Dilemmas:
Private
Press, 1997); Charles Lipson,
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
in Rescheduling
in Kenneth
A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation
under Anarchy
Sovereign Debts',
Cooperation
and Mark W. Zacher with Brent A.
Press, 1986), pp. 200-25;
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University
International
and Communication
Sutton, Governing Global Networks:
Regimes for Transportation
Press, 1996).
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
19
For an early observation
of this pattern see Krasner,
'Structural Causes',
pp. 1-2, 5-10.
20
See also Oran R. Young
of International
and Gail Osherenko,
'The Formation
Regimes: Hypotheses
in Young
and Cases',
and Osherenko
International
Environmental
Creating
(eds.), Polar Politics:
Press, 1993), pp. 1-21.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Regimes
18
6
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
a distinct view on the origins, stability,
and defended
thought has articulated
of international
consequences
regimes. At the same time, they have engaged
in extended,
and often fascinating,
intellectual discourses.21 Although
another
and
one
the
and
within
the
neoliberals,
realists,
study of
competition
cognitivists
no
a
a
case
can
has
international
doubt
been
be
made
that it is
one,
regimes
healthy
more
time students of international
the
regimes explored
systematically
possibilities
of a synthesis or division of labour among the three schools of thought. The prima
for such an endeavour
is that each of the three schools offers a
facie argument
coherent and plausible vision of international
regimes and is capable of bolstering
its preferred interpretation with considerable
empirical support, while none of this
or strong enough to establish one school as a clear winner.
evidence is compelling,
between
This
state of affairs
that the variables separately
suggests the possibility
and
schools?interests,
power,
by
knowledge?somehow
emphasized
interact in bringing
about and shaping
international
regimes. If so, theories of
international
regimes that play off one variable against the other two are ipso facto
inmany situations, both as
truncated. As a result, they are likely to prove misleading
as
same token, the promise
for
the
devices
and
guides
foreign policy. By
predictive
a
more
or more
holds
is
that
it
allows
for
that a theoretical
synthesis
complete
ambiguous
the
accurate
This
explanation
consideration
three
of international
regimes.
justifies an attempt to combine
elements of neoliberal,
realist,
to international
to
form a more complex theory.
and cognitivist approaches
regimes
its success, however. Thus, the loss of parsimony
that comes
It does not guarantee
with adding variables to a given theoretical framework, may not be overcompensated
by the gain in explanatory power, resulting in a theory that provides less rather than
more explanatory
variables
Furthermore,
leverage than the original formulation.22
must not merely be lumped together, they must be integrated, with their mutual
there is a significant danger of ending up
relationship
clearly specified. Otherwise
some
sort
of 'grab-bag' theorizing, where
the 'theory' consists of a set of
with
to trying out independent
unrelated explanatory
variables and 'explaining' amounts
the case at hand. Finally, those interested in
variables until one is found that matches
a synthesis of concepts and assumptions
in different schools of thought
originating
must take care that the resulting more complex theory still forms a coherent whole
and remains internally consistent.
In this article we offer some ideas on what a synthesis avoiding
these pitfalls
or
in such a
rather:
how
students
of
international
interested
look
like,
regimes
might
we
to
More
undertake
defend
three
specifically,
might
proceed.
synthesis
propositions:
21
22
and Neoliberalism:
The Contemporary
Debate
See David A. Baldwin
(ed.), Neorealism
(New York:
and Edward D. Mansfield
Columbia
Press, 1993); Friedrich V. Kratochwil
(eds.),
University
A Reader
International
1994); James Der Derian
(ed.),
Organization:
(Glasgow: HarperCollins,
International
Macmillan,
(Basingstoke:
1995); and Charles W. Kegley,
Theory: Critical Investigations
in International
and the Neoliberal
Relations
Jr. (ed.), Controversies
Theory: Realism
Challenge
Macmillan,
1995).
(Basingstoke:
between parsimony
and explanatory
For the distinction
leverage see Gary King, Robert
in Qualitative
Social Inquiry: Scientific
Research
and Sidney Verba, Designing
Inference
104.
NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994), pp. 29-30,
O. Keohane,
(Princeton,
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
1
to rationalism23 as a
and realism not only share a commitment
it comes to
stance, but may fruitfully work together when
a
more
international
thus
the
of
unified
prospect
regimes,
offering
(1) Neoliberalism
metatheoretical
explaining
rationalist theory of international
institutions.
the cognitivist
school, which we refer to as
(2) There is a distinct strand within
'weak cognitivism',
which can serve as an analytically
necessary
supplement
to, and, as such, can be incorporated
into, the rationalist account of inter
national regimes.
one that includes the more radical, or 'strong', forms
A
(3)
'grand synthesis'?i.e.
as well?is
not on the cards. 'Strong cognitivists'
of cognitivism
have onto
commitments
that are strictly opposed to those of
logical and epistemological
neoliberals and realists. In this case, continued
intellectual competition
is both
more likely and more desirable than ill-fated attempts to merge two mutually
exclusive paradigms of inquiry.
To provide the necessary
to our argument we begin
background
essence of each of the three schools of thought in regime analysis.
Schools
of thought
in the study of international
by outlining
the
regimes24
Neoliberalism
Neoliberals
the role of international
emphasize
regimes in helping states to realize
common interests.25 In so doing, they portray states as rational egoists who care only
for their own (absolute) gains. International politics is not the realm of pure conflict.
Often cooperation would make all participants
better off, but it is hard to achieve
to
the
that
characterizes
international
life. In particular,
owing
pervasive uncertainty
as to whether
can
on
states are uncertain
their
they
rely
cooperation
partners'
transparency of behaviour and linking issues
promises. By way of increasing mutual
through time (thus making
reciprocal
strategies applicable),26
regimes reduce this
or
of
the
fear
uncertainty:
they mitigate
cheating
being exploited
by the other
parties, and thus make it easier for states to embark on collaborative ventures.
Neoliberals
have drawn heavily on economic
theories of institutions focusing on
are likened to investments
the role of information and transaction costs.27 Regimes
to states (and hence the more
that are the more profitable
likely to be made by
23
in international
states as self-interested,
Rationalism
relations
actors
theory portrays
goal-seeking
can be accounted
whose behaviour
for in terms of the maximization
of individual utility.
24
For a book-length
see
in contemporary
study of the three schools of thought
regime analysis
and Rittberger,
Theories.
Hasenclever,
Mayer,
25
See Robert O. Keohane,
'The Demand
for International
in Krasner
Regimes',
(ed.), International
and Collaboration:
in an Anarchic
Regimes,
pp. 141-71; Arthur A. Stein, 'Coordination
Regimes
in Krasner
and Robert Axelrod
and Robert O.
World',
pp. 115^0;
(ed.), International
Regimes,
under Anarchy:
and Institutions',
in Oye (ed.),
Cooperation
Achieving
Strategies
pp. 226-54.
Cooperation,
26
See Robert Axelrod,
The Evolution
(New York: Basic Books,
1984).
of Cooperation
27
costs are the costs associated with the conclusion,
Transaction
and enforcement
of
monitoring
Keohane,
agreements.
8
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
in the issue-area concerned.28 Game-theoretic
the higher is the 'issue-density'
or the Battle of the Sexes29 have been
such as the Prisoner's Dilemma
to
constellations
of
interests that underly different
characterize
types of
applied
on
contracts
'collaboration
based
formal
international
and
regimes (e.g.
regimes'
on
a
and
also
the
based
affect
likelihood
of
'coordination
conventions)
regimes'
them),
models
regime being created in the first place.30 Thus, the 'structure of the situation' (defined
in terms of the nature of the game that is being played)
is held in large part
ease
in
the
of
creation
situations of mixed
for
the
and
regime
responsible
probability
common
and
interests
motives
(where
divergent
coexist).31
to world
essential
elements of the realist approach
Deliberately
appropriating
the plausibility
of structural realism's scepticism
politics, neoliberals have challenged
institutions. They attempt to show that this scepticism cannot
vis-?-vis international
in fact be based on the assumptions
realists make about the nature of states and the
states to coordinate
their behav
international
system. Regimes
help self-interested
can be
states
and
iour such that they may avoid collectively
outcomes,
suboptimal
even
when
the
that
factors
shown to have an interest inmaintaining
existing regimes
no
are
them
into
being
longer operative.
brought
states lack a sense of obligation,
Neoliberals
point out that, although
they think
for oppor
rules. States with a reputation
agreed-upon
as partners
in the future to be accepted
in a
difficult
are
since
international
institutions
difficult
beneficial
potentially
regime. Moreover,
to construct,
states will hesitate to put an existing regime at risk (e.g. by making
the
on
in
of
their
conditional
fundamental
the
continuation
changes
cooperation
are
resilient because
international
they embody
regimes
regime). In other words:
twice before they violate
tunism will find it more
'sunk costs',
put
to other
i.e. they are political
investments
which
cannot
easily be recovered
and
uses.32
Realism
to
realists in the Waltzian
vein33 have paid little attention
structural
Although
on
see
as
which
international
international
institutions,
they
affecting
politics only
28
in the World Political Economy
and Discord
O. Keohane,
Cooperation
After Hegemony:
Press, 1984), pp. 79-80.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University
29
to study strategic
in economics
formal models
and employs
Game
interaction.
theory originated
are defined
of independent,
actors
in terms of the preference
Games
utility-maximizing
orderings
are subject to certain knowledge
The Prisoner's Dilemma
is a
conditions).
(who, moreover,
non
game with two players, where each prefers mutual
(CC) to mutual
cooperation
symmetrical
is unrequited
that his own cooperation
that
(CD), and desires most
(DD), fears most
cooperation
game with the
(DC). Battle of the Sexes is also a symmetrical
only the other player cooperates
characteristic
(where '>' stands for 'is preferred over').
ordering: DC>CD>DD>CC
preference
30
for
Versus Prisoners' Dilemma:
Duncan
'Coordination
See Stein,
'Coordination';
Snidal,
Implications
Political
79 (1985), pp. 923^2
and Regimes',
American
Science Review,
International
Cooperation
46 (1992), pp.
International
and Lisa Martin,
'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism',
Organization,
See Robert
765-92.
31
in der internationalen
Politik: Grundlegung
und Institutionen
und
See Michael
Z?rn, Interessen
Ansatzes
des situationsstrukturellen
(Opladen: Leske & Budrich,
1992), ch. 2.
Anwendung
32
See Keohane,
pp. 98-106.
After Hegemony,
33
Politics
See Kenneth N. Waltz,
House,
(New York: Random
1979). See also
Theory of International
International
19
of International
'The False Promise
John J.Mearsheimer,
Institutions',
Security,
(1995), pp. 5^9.
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
9
that
other, 'post-classical' or 'modified structural', realists34 acknowledge
a
in
is
is
need
of
Realist
interstate
that
reality
cooperation
explanation.
regime-based
students of international
regimes such as Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner or Joseph
than in discord among
Grieco
argue that power is no less central in cooperation
to these authors, the distribution
of capabilities among actors
nations.35 According
critically affects both the prospects for effective regimes to emerge and persist in an
issue-area and the nature of the regimes
that result, especially
insofar as the
the margin,
is concerned. An early formulation
of the benefits from cooperation
of
as
which
is the theory of hegemonic
inter
interprets regimes
stability
national public goods that are in short supply unless a dominant actor (or hegemon)
of hegemonic
takes the lead in their provision and enforcement.
Theorists
stability
doubt that regimes can be upheld in the absence of a strong leader who has a stake
allocation
this
idea
the possibility
of a 'hegemonic
i.e. a
admit, however,
afterglow',
the uncontested
of time in which
of
the
leader
has
superiority
as
or
but
fear
factors
such
of
from
inertia, habit,
vanished,
instability
resulting
state had established at the
change work in favour of the regimes the once dominant
height of its power.36
We have noted that neoliberals
hark back to some realist notions when making
in them. They
limited period
case for the significance
their comparatively
of international
optimistic
regimes,
for
the
of
international
acknowledging,
example,
anarchy and the
importance
primacy of states in world politics. Realists have taken up this challenge by pointing
out that their opponents'
is flawed because it fails fully to appreciate
the
argument
of those realist assumptions
that neoliberals
claim to have incorporated
meaning
into their theory. In particular, anarchy not only creates fears of being cheated by
one's cooperation
involves states in a
the lack of common
partners;
government
constant struggle for survival and independence
denying them the luxury of being
egoists who, by definition, are indifferent to how well others do. Rather, they need to
take into account both absolute and relative gains when contemplating
regime-based
with others. Since today's friend may be tomorrow's
foe, states are
cooperation
sensitive to relative gains in favour of their partners. Therefore,
they may sometimes
even when
abstain from cooperation
it would be beneficial
for them in absolute
terms. The overall result for realist students of international
is that inter
institutions
national regimes are more difficult to create and harder to maintain
than neoliberals
would have us believe. The likelihood for a regime to be put in place and to be stable
34
35
36
For
the distinction
between
'classical realists' (i.e. Morgenthau
and his fellow combatants),
are Waltz
'neorealists'
and Mearsheimer),
and 'post-classical
realists'
(whose leading representatives
see Stephen G. Brooks,
51 (1997), pp. 445-77.
International
The
Organization,
'Dueling Realisms',
latter group of authors has also been referred to as 'modified structural realists'. See Randall
L.
Schweller
and David Priess, A Tale of Two Realisms:
the Institutions
Debate', Mershon
Expanding
International
Studies Review, 41 (1997), p. 9.
See Robert
inWorld Politics
Press, 1981);
Gilpin, War and Change
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
and National
Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier',
'Global Communications
Stephen D. Krasner,
World Politics,
43 (1991), pp. 336-66; and Joseph M. Grieco,
among Nations:
Cooperation
Europe,
to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
and Non-Tariff
Barriers
America,
Press, 1990).
See Charles P. Kindleberger,
in the International
'Dominance
and Leadership
Economy:
and Free Rides',
International
Studies Quarterly,
25 (1981), pp. 242-54;
Public Goods,
Exploitation,
or
and David A. Lake,
and the International
Naked
'Leadership, Hegemony,
Economy:
Emperor
37 (1993), pp. 459-89.
Tattered Monarch
with Potential?',
International
Studies Quarterly,
10
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
when the expected gains are 'balanced'
such that relative losses do not accrue.37
is greatest
members)
Cognitivism?weak
(at least for the most
powerful
and strong
too, have been sharply
Cognitivists,
national institutions. Yet the thrust of
realist one: from the cognitivist point
some of the
that it has misconstrued
critical
to inter
the neoliberal
approach
to that of the
is directly opposed
the problem with neoliberalism
is not
of
this criticism
of view,
realist assumptions
about the nature of world
as
a
can be traced back
its
limits
of
institutions
international
theory
politics. Rather,
to
still
in
various
realist
neoliberal
theories. Thus,
directly
'heritages'
operative
of
all
shades
criticize
realists
and
for
neoliberals
alike
cognitivists
treating actors'
as
as
and
i.e.
facts
which are
exogenous
(perceived)
preferences
'givens',
options
to
but not theorized about. By this move,
either assumed or observed,
according
a significant
source of
realists and neoliberals
cognitivists,
ignore or trivialize
variation in international behaviour.
two strands within
It is useful to distinguish
the cognitivist
school of thought in
'weak'
and
Weak
(or minimalist)
cognitivists
regime analysis:
'strong' cognitivism.38
to
focus on the role of causal beliefs in regime formation and change.39 According
weak
neoliberals
and realists underrate both the degree of uncertainty
cognitivists,
in
face
decision-makers
many issue-areas today and their capacity for complex
to both means
extends
and ends.40 Uncertainty
about causal
learning, which
creates a demand on the part of decision-makers
for reliable issue
relationships
in turn, can become a source of political
influence for
which,
specific knowledge,
which
those who
can
therefore, have studied the role of
supply it.41Weak
cognitivists,
in international policy coordination
and, more generally, the
epistemic communities
and mechanisms
of governmental
conditions
learning.
stress the intellectual underpinnings
If weak cognitivists
of international
institu
names
also
the
'reflectivists'42
tions, strong (or maximalist)
go by
cognitivists?who
the social character of international
relations. No
and 'constructivists'43?emphasize
are
less than weak cognitivists,
concerned
with
actors'
strong cognitivists
knowledge,
37
A Realist Critique
See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy
and the Limits of Cooperation:
of the Newest
42 (1988), pp. 485-507.
International
Liberal
Institutionalism',
Organization,
38
and Rittberger,
See Hasenclever,
pp. 136-9, 154-7.
Theories,
Mayer,
39
See Judith Goldstein
and Robert O. Keohane,
'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical
Framework',
in Goldstein
and Political
and Keohane
Institutions,
(eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Change
40
41
Press, 1993), pp. 3-30.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
See Joseph S. Nye,
and US-Soviet
International
Jr., 'Nuclear Learning
Security Regimes',
41 (1987), pp. 371-402.
For a useful review of the literature on learning in foreign
Organization,
see Jack S. Levy,
a Conceptual
Minefield',
'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping
policy
48 (1994), pp. 279-312.
International
Organization,
See Peter M.
and International
in
'Introduction:
Communities
Haas,
Epistemic
Policy Coordination',
pp. 1-35.
(ed.), Knowledge,
42
Two Approaches',
32
'International
Institutions:
International
Studies Quarterly,
Robert O. Keohane,
(1988), pp. 379-96.
43
Nicholas
Greenwood
Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International
Onuf, World of Our Making:
of South Carolina
Relations
SC: University
Press, 1989); and Alexander
Wendt,
Anarchy
(Columbia,
is WTiat States Make
of It: The Social Construction
of Power Polities',
International
46
Organization,
Haas
(1992),
pp. 391-425.
Integrating
theories of international
11
regimes
of
but rather than causal beliefs they accentuate
social knowledge
(i.e. knowledge
norms and understandings
stance brings them
of self and other). This sociological
to realists and neoliberals
than their weak counter
into even sharper opposition
not
the
of states as rational
parts. Strong (but
weak) cognitivists
reject
conception
in the sense that their identities, power, and fundamental
actors, who are atomistic
States are as much
interests are prior to international
society and its institutions.
as
institutions
international
them.44
argue
shaped by
they shape
Strong cognitivists
that any durable pattern of interaction affects actors' self-understandings
and their
In
to
the
institutionalized
is
of
others.
initiate a
likely
cooperation
image
particular,
actors
in
and
which
actors'
is
process
egoism
dampened
increasingly respect, rather
the legitimate
interests of others.45 In the process,
take into account,
are
even
norms
when,
internalized,
initially, they were viewed by the
cooperative
to further their individual goals. As a consequence,
actors as mere
instruments
theories tend to attribute a greater measure
of effectiveness
and
strongly cognitivist
robustness to international
institutions than do either realist or neoliberal ones.
than merely
Table 1 :Schools of Thought in the Study of International Regimes
Neoliberalism
Realism
Central Variable
interests
power
Metatheoretical
Cognitivism
(especially 'strong
cognitivism')
rationalist
knowledge
rationalist
sociological
Orientation
Behavioural Model
relative
gains
seeker
absolute
role player
gains
maximizer
Institutionalism
Note:
A
school's
and robustness)
that,
although
weak
'institutionalism'
that it attributes
scholars
of
different
is measured
medium
by
to international
paradigmatic
the causal
strong
significance
(i.e.
regimes. This dimension
orientations
agree
that
the effectiveness
reflects the fact
institutions
make
a
difference inworld politics, they systematically disagree on how large that difference is.
If realists and neoliberals
the behavioural
portray states as utility maximizers,
at
model
that underlies
is that of a 'role player'.46 Role-playing
strong cognitivism
the international
vis-?-vis other
level occurs when governments
perceive obligations
states and the community
of states to be real and binding
they do not
(although
44
and International
in Ernst-Otto
See Alexander Wendt
and Raymond
'Institutions
Duvall,
Order',
to
and James N. Rosenau
Challenges:
(eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical
Czempiel
Approaches
World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books,
1989), pp. 51-73.
45
'Collective
and the International
See Alexander
Political
Wendt,
State', American
Identity Formation
88 (1994), pp. 384-96.
Science Review,
46
See Oran R. Young,
'International
Toward a New Theory
of Institutions',
World Politics,
Regimes:
are idealizations,
even according
to their
39 (1986), pp. 117-21. Note
that both models
which,
match
proponents,
reality only up to a point.
12
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
international norms operate as an
always honour them). In a world of role-players
in states' selecting of foreign policy goals and options.47 A role
essential yardstick
a decision asks what is appropriate for it to do in a given situation,
player making
its individually defined goals.48 The concept is not
rather than how it can maximize
to imply that international
roles are highly differentiated,
of
although
examples
specific roles which are defined by specific (informal) rights and duties do exist in the
international
role of the balancer or even
society as well. Think of the traditional
that of the 'world's policeman'.
Integrating
theories of international
Contextualizing
rationalist
approaches
regimes: open doors and dead ends
to international
regimes
In this section we try to lend substance to our first proposition,
to which
according
on international
neoliberal
and realist perspectives
in
regimes not only have much
common?which
is generally admitted?but
may well be combined to yield a more
possibility which tends to be ignored or downplayed
by the
satisfactory
theory?a
of the debate.49
protagonists
Realists
have recently been engaged in an intense dispute about
and neoliberals
to analyse and explain international
which of the two schools is better equipped
other
of
world
and
regimes
phenomena
politics. A remarkable feature of this dispute
is that both realists and neoliberals
have suggested
that the members
of the other
can be seen as
camp are not altogether wrong but that their theoretical propositions
a special case of one's own account of international
politics and regimes. Realists
to international
have argued that their approach
regimes subsumes neoliberalism,
a
have made
the inverse claim. For instance, Robert Keohane,
and neoliberals
'In comparing
has observed:
neoliberal
institutionalism
with
leading neoliberal,
we must understand
that neoliberal
institutionalism
is not simply an
neorealism
to neorealism,
alternative
but, in fact, claims to subsume it'.50 Conversely,
Joseph
a prominent
out that, by virtue of its
Grieco,
realist, has pointed
'post-classical'
of states' concerns with both absolute
and relative gains,
'realism
recognition
than does
theory of the problem of cooperation
provides a more comprehensive
neoliberal
institutionalism'.51
As claims about priority and subordination
these
among theoretical
positions
are in sharp opposition
a notable
to one another. There
statements
is, however,
common denominator
suggesting that students of international
regimes who adhere
to a rationalist mode of analysis (as do both neoliberals
and realists) are likely to
on their project by seeking
to enlarge and exploit
make more
these
progress
47
See Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy
among Nations
(New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990).
48
are spelt out in greater detail in the
The alternative
behavioural
models
implicit in this juxtaposition
final section of this article.
49
The word
needs stessing, for our argument
in this article ismainly
and cannot
theoretical,
'possibility'
and will not anticipate
the results of empirical
testing.
50
International
Institutions,
p. 15.
Keohane,
51
Grieco, Anarchy',
p. 503.
theories of international
Integrating
13
regimes
Theory of State Motivation
Linking Given Situations/
to Contexts
Relationships
(see below)
selects
1
'Realist'
Context:
Neoliberal
'Context':
Relative Gains
Are Not Important
Relative Gains
Are Important
implies validity of
Neoliberal Hypotheses
about Regime
Realist Hypotheses
about Regime
Formation
Formation
and Change
and Change
derive
Explanation/
Prediction
Explanation/
Prediction
Figure
1. Structure
of a contextualized
rationalist
theory
of
international
regimes.
commonalities
than by going for full victory, as it were. The crucial point is that
neoliberals
and realists concede to one another that the other side's arguments and
are valid provided that certain conditions
hold which their opponents
predictions
and to specify so far. If agreement on these conditions
have failed to acknowledge
could be reached, the door to a neoliberal-realist
synthesis would appear to be wide
open. Therefore, future theoretical and empirical work along rationalist lines should
or
build upon this limited mutual
the conditions
recognition and aim at establishing
contexts in which
'neoliberal' (i.e. optimistic)
rather than 'realist' (i.e. pessimistic)
about international
regimes are likely to apply and vice versa.52 Serious
expectations
towards this end might not only further our understanding
regimes but also reveal a broader zone of agreement between these
so far.
has been perceived and acknowledged
This consideration
offers the prospect of a contextualized
theory
is given by Figure
1. As
regimes the formal structure of which
Figure, advocating a synthesis of realist and neoliberal approaches
efforts
these
lines is not
right and sometimes
52
tantamount
to simply
the other. The
saying
specification
that sometimes
of the contexts
of international
two schools than
of international
indicated by the
to regimes along
one school will be
or conditions
under
in International
Relations
and Relative Gains
American
Powell, Absolute
Theory',
Science Review,
85 (1991), pp. 1303-20. For a sophisticated
book-length
study of the role of
see Gary Goertz,
in shaping state behaviour,
Contexts
Politcs
of International
(Cambridge:
Press, 1994).
Cambridge
University
See Robert
Political
contexts
14
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
be
(i.e. realist or neoliberals
ones)
apply must
at least in principle,
i.e. it must,
allow for
testable,
theoretically
the two literatures are rich with observations
before the fact. Fortunately,
predictions
can
an
in
and arguments which
be mined
attempt to construct such a contextualized
rationalist theory of regimes.
Much
of the recent debate between
realists and neoliberals
has centred on the
which
different
propositions
and
grounded
in international
of relative gains orientations
significance
politics. There are two
in a given situation, states
issues here. First: what difference does it make whether,
seek absolute or relative gains? And second: when are states actually preoccupied
relative gains? We look at the two issues
the rationalist synthesis we are proposing.
The first issue refers to the consequences
of
states at least sometimes take a strong interest
less well than their cooperation
partners, what
of international
tion make for the prospects
in turn because
with
both
are relevant
for
that
relative gains concerns. Assuming
in doing better or, at a minimum,
not
difference
(if any) does this motiva
and for the nature and
cooperation
regimes?
efficacy of international
Neoliberals
have argued that regimes are created and maintained
by states for the
serve
in
In particular,
mixed-motives
sake of certain functions
situations.53
they
states
to
for
mutual
benefit
and
cooperate
regimes help
by reducing uncertainty
that include verification
rules and
Thus,
regimes
asymmetries.
of
fears
cheated
their
them to
reduce
states'
partners, permitting
by
procedures
being
The case that comes to mind immediately
is
focus on the benefits from cooperation.
in
which
the
the nuclear non-proliferation
International
Atomic
Energy
regime,
informational
is entrusted
Agency
regime
with monitoring
members'
compliance
with
the substantive
provisions.54
have responded that the neoliberal argument is flawed because it is based
on the untenable assumption
that states care only for absolute gains.55 This assump
not concur with the fact that states, even as they are
to
does
tion, according
realists,
cease
not
to be competitors
for power and wealth. Hence,
do
cooperating peacefully,
assurance
that regime members
live up to their promises may not be enough: states
and that, over
fear that others reap the lion's share of the gains from cooperation
a
can
in
them
where
this
relative
time,
they
implement
advantage may place
position
Realists
a policy
to the
that hurts their less successful
cooperation
partners.56 Threats
a
a
are
an
extreme
state
of
such
but
of
form
other, less
policy,
military
security
a
state
to
turn
be
able
its relative
also
exist:
for
instance,
may
spectacular, dangers
a
even
to
it
force
better
deals
into
permanent bargaining advantage, permitting
gains
an
two
to
states
in
its
the
future.
between
liberalize
Thus,
upon
agreement
partners
an important
industrial sector (say, microelectronics)
may generate sizeable welfare
same
at
the
the
accord
for
both
time,
may help one state's firms to
parties; yet,
gains
increase
possibility
a decisive
53
54
55
56
57
the other state confronts
the
shares up to a point where
base and hence its ability to have
that its very industrial or technological
say in international economic deliberations may be at risk.57
their market
and Analysis'.
See Keohane,
'Demand';
See M?ller,
'Regimeanalyse'.
See Grieco, Anarchy'.
See Waltz,
Theory, p. 105.
and Michael
See Grieco,
Mastanduno,
Cooperation;
to Japanese
International
Industrial Policy',
Security,
'Do Relative Gains Matter?
16 (1991), pp. 73-113.
America's
Response
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
15
realists may be quite right, but does it follow that regimes are absent or
in situations where
relative performance
matters?
the
Perhaps
inconsequential
can
and
advanced
the
neoliberals
is
be
functional
argument
only incomplete
by
to take into account both obstacles
in a straightforward manner
to inter
extended
national cooperation:
fear of cheating and relative gains concerns.
as well as neoliberal
realist
authors have suggested
that, in a
Interestingly,
The
to put up with gaps in gains from cooperation
in
situation where states are unwilling
not
be
in
favour of their partners, international
need
but
fact
irrelevant,
may
regimes
assume additional
functions
the purpose of which is to mitigate members'
relative
often
include
international
concerns.58
Thus,
gains
regimes
stipulations providing for
treatment of weaker partners who are less well able to exploit the oppor
differential
cooperation. A case in point is the Generalized
resulting from regime-based
of
Preferences
international
which
the
System
by
trading regime sought to accom
modate
the developing
countries who feared that full acceptance
of the GATT
in
to
than
them
rather
assist
their
efforts
catch
up with the
principles might hamper
serve
as
to
industrialized
also
institutional
frameworks
world.59 Regimes
may
to improve the relative performance
facilitate the arrangement
of side-payments
of
actors. Thus, the regular review conferences prescribed by the
otherwise dissatisfied
tunities
component
procedural
voice their concerns
of many
about the
regimes
skewed
allow relatively
distribution
of
states to
disadvantaged
to
and
gains
push for
corrections.
to the competitive
the scholarly discussion
that has dominated
Owing
approach
so far, insufficient attention has been paid to this somewhat surprising turn of the
debate. Surely, empirical research has yet to establish whether
(and when) regimes
relative gains concerns
may indeed serve the purpose of helping states to manage
and how this function is reflected in their normative and procedural content. Yet, for
the time being, this can be regarded as an excellent example for how realist and
to work together to produce
arguments may be made
interesting new
institutions.60
hypotheses about international
a contextualized
In light of these considerations,
rationalist
theory of inter
or contexts.
national
regimes would be concerned with three types of situations
or
to
not
be
whether
distinguished
Strategic situations would first
according
they are
neoliberal
58
See Joseph M. Grieco,
'Realist Theory
and the Problem
of International
with
Cooperation:
Analysis
an Amended
Prisoner's Dilemma',
Journal of Politics,
50 (1988), pp. 600-24; Grieco,
pp.
Cooperation,
in Frank R. Pfetsch
'The New
Institutionalism
and the Relative-Gains-Debate',
233^; Otto Keck,
and Pan-Europe:
Theoretical
and Empirical
Relations
(ed.), International
Approaches
Findings
and Lisa L. Martin,
'The Promise
of
(M?nster: Lit, 1993), pp. 35-62; and Robert O. Keohane
20 (1995), pp. 45-6.
Institutionalist
International
Security,
Theory',
59
See Finlayson
and Zacher,
and Michel Kostecki,
The
'GATT', pp. 293-6; and Bernard Hoekman
to WTO
Political Economy
(Oxford: Oxford University
of the Global Trading System: From GATT
60
Press, 1995), pp. 237-8.
Note
that our argument
to combine
realist and neoliberal
for using a strategy of contextualization
institutions
does not hinge upon the truth of this particular,
insights into international
'post-classical
of international
of significant
relative gains concerns. For
realist', account
regimes under conditions
if it turned out that relative gains concerns have much more devastating
effects on
example,
international
than the above considerations
inclined
suggest (as some more
cooperation
traditionally
realists might
argue), part of the content of the contextualized
theory, but not itsform or structure
in Figure
that the cooperation
1), would have to be altered. For an argument
indicating
see Duncan
effect of relative gains concerns
is easily overrated
'International
Snidal,
inhibiting
given
Cooperation
pp. 387-402.
Among
Relative
Gain
Maximizers',
International
Studies
Quarterly,
35 (1991),
(as
16
Peter Mayer,
Andreas Hasenclever,
2: Contexts
Table
in a Rationalist
and Hypotheses
Context
and Volker Rittberger
Synthesis
Relative-Gains
Non-problematic
Social Situations
or
(Zero-Sum
Absolute-Gains
Dominated
Dominated
Situations
Situations
Harmony)
('Realist Situations')
('Neoliberal
Situations')
low
high
Hypotheses
Overall Likelihood
of Regime Creation
very
Factors Affecting
Likelihood of
Regime
Creation
Regime
Features
power
low
availability of
structure
(in zero-sum
situations)
imposed regime
with skewed
distribution of gains
issue-density;
situation-structure
formula
regime
balanced
gains
securing
(PD, Battle etc.)
balanced gains;
mechanisms
gains
(in zero-sum
'contract'
making
more
(PD) or
mechanisms
'convention'
'equitable'
(Battle)
situations)
high
low
low
very
(in zero-sum
Regime Stability
with
compliance
situations)
In a
Note:
that
given
contingent
a rationale
of Harmony,
its most-preferred
receives
player
on what
does.
the other
(See Arthur
situation
stance and Choice
29-30.)
Therefore,
the contrary
for
each
to be
in International Relations
the
second,
the case,
do
A.
regime-building
outcome
and
Stein,
Why
is very
each
Nations
choice
Cooperate:
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
in this Table,
and fourth
dimensions
third,
not apply
to Harmony
situations.
to
hard
player's
imagine,
is not
Circum
Press, 1990), pp.
which
presuppose
is one in
A problematic
situation
social (or mixed-motives)
socially problematic.
in a
one's
individual
interest
result
of
which
the uncoordinated
may
pursuit
nor
zero-sum
true
This
is
of
neither
outcome.61
Harmony
collectively
suboptimal
situations the theory would expect international
situations. In such non-problematic
if they are.62 (Some power
regimes not to be created or to be inconsequential,
that common
interests are a conditio sine
the assumption
theorists have challenged
out that dominant
actors sometimes
qua non of regime-building,
pointing
impose
on
if the game is
with
limited
weaker
ones,
although
regimes
success.)63 Conversely,
one of mixed motives
such that cooperation
is desirable from the point of view of
the actors, but may fail to come to pass nevertheless
(as
owing to various obstacles
61
see Z?rn, Interessen,
of a problematic
social situation
pp. 153-61. The term 'mixed
See his The Strategy
of Conflict
Schelling.
(Cambridge, MA:
game' was coined by Thomas
Harvard University
Press, 1960), p. 89.
62
is a symmetrical
game defined by the preference
Harmony
Harmony
ordering: CC>DC>CD>DD.
of what the other
because
each player prefers to cooperate
poses no cooperation
irrespective
problem,
sense: there is no possibility
are zero-sum
in this technical
for
situations
does. Neither
problematic
to fall apart in a zero-sum
of rationality
and collective
individual
game, because
every
interpretations
For
the concept
motives
is Pareto-efficient.
See Stein, Why Nations
pp. 16-18, 25-6.
Cooperate,
in Rittberger
and Human
See Stephen D. Krasner,
Rights',
(ed.), Regime
'Sovereignty, Regimes,
The Rise and Fall of International
Theory, pp. 139-67. See also Oran R. Young,
'Regime Dynamics:
in Krasner
pp. 100-101.
Regimes,
(ed.), International
Regimes',
outcome
63
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
17
and realists),
international
regimes would be considered
specified by neoliberals
a
would
be
introduced: between prob
At
this
second
distinction
point
possible.
or mainly
in which actors are exclusively
lematic social situations
concerned with
in which relative gains concerns are dominant.
absolute gains and situations
The
that in the first type of situation neoliberal
go on to postulate
theory would
in the latter
hypotheses
(regarding regime formation,
stability etc.) apply, whereas
those hypotheses
that have been advanced
type of situation
by realists are
to outline some
appropriate. Table 2 uses familiar neoliberal and realist expectations
of the resulting theoretical relationships.64
Since the presence of relative gains concerns makes a difference for international
regimes, it is worthwhile
asking when states can be expected to care about how well
to themselves. This is where the second issue of the recent
others do as compared
are states concerned
debate comes in: under what circumstances
realist-neoliberal
with relative gains? Even realists such as Grieco readily admit that relative gains con
cerns are not a constant
over relationships
but vary considerably
and across issue
a
of
this
for
observation
contextualized
rationalist
implications
theory are
obvious: constructing
such a theory becomes a matter of specifying the conditions
under which relative gains concerns are severe and the conditions under which they
are slight or completely
dominated
of absolute gain. Grieco
has
by calculations
areas. The
a list of such conditions
in his discussion
of the determinants
of states'
to
relative
losses.65
sensitivity
to Grieco,
states' intolerance for relative losses is influenced by both
According
the present and the past of the relationship concerned.
It makes a difference whether
a
is
one's (potential) cooperation
partner
longtime ally or a longtime foe; whether
are at the brink of war or are members
the states in question
of a Deutschean
presented
it can be hypothesized
that cooperation
Thus,
pluralistic
security community.66
between France
and Germany
is
less
inhibited by
today
considerably
strongly
relative gains concerns than it was before 1914 or in the interwar period. Moreover,
tend to be suppressed when the states concerned
share a
relative gains concerns
common adversary67 or when the power difference between them is so large that no
conceivable gap in payoffs from cooperation
is likely to affect their relative positions
to a noticeable degree.68 Both conditions were met in the transatlantic
relationship
during the Cold War and, thus, may help to explain the unusually
high level of
in this region.69 States whose power base is or appears
institutionalized
cooperation
to be shrinking
to relative losses than, e.g., rising
tend to be more
sensitive
This
be
illustrated
of US-Japanese
hegemons.
hypothesis may
by the development
trade relations
since World War
where
the
United
who
had initially
II,
States,
on specific
in
tolerated considerable
has
insisted
openness,
asymmetries
increasingly
international
additional
realist and neoliberal
hypotheses
regarding
regimes which are directly
to the relative vs. absolute
in the proposed
gains issue and therefore might be included
see Grieco,
pp. 227-9.
synthesis
Cooperation,
65 See
'Realist Theory',
and Cooperation,
pp. 45-7.
Grieco,
pp. 610-13;
66
et al., Political
and the North Atlantic Area: International
Karl W. Deutsch
Community
Organization
in the Light of Historical
Press, 1957).
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Experience
67
and Free Trade', American Political
See Joanne Gowa,
Science Review,
83
'Bipolarity, Multipolarity,
(1989), pp. 1245-56.
68
See Duncan
'Relative Gains
and the Pattern of International
Political
American
Snidal,
Cooperation',
Science Review,
85 (1991), p. 725, n. 33.
69
See Schweller
and Priess,
'Tale', p. 20.
For
linked
18
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
i.e. reciprocity which
is defined as balanced outcomes.70 Moreover,
the
reciprocity,
nature of the issue is important.71 Cooperation
in economic
issue-areas is less likely
to be inhibited by relative gains concerns
states
than security cooperation.
Also,
(ceteris paribus) are the more strongly concerned with how well their partners do as
to themselves,
the more easily the gains at stake are transformed
into
compared
relative capabilities
(i.e. military
strength or bargaining power).
of variables affecting
Grieco's
concise discussion
the severity of relative gains
concerns
a contextualized
to those interested
in constructing
is most
relevant
rationalist theory of international
regimes. It provides an excellent starting point for
the development
of what might be called a theory of state motivation,
i.e. a theory
in which absolute gains seeking
which specifies the kinds of situation or relationship
relative gains concerns and vice versa. Such a theory would be a necessary
dominates
of the desired synthesis, because it would provide the a priori foundation
component
social situation, as to whether
needed to infer, with respect to a given problematic
realist or neoliberal hypotheses
about international
regimes apply.72
We refer to Grieco's
analysis as a starting point (if an excellent one) rather than
as an accomplishment
for two reasons: First, Grieco
fails to explicate in detail the
that account for the items on his list, although he is clear
rationale (or rationales)
as a result, the mutual
that perceptions
of threat are of critical
importance;
to
of
the
and
the
relative
variables
he
adduces are difficult
relationships
weights
a
assess. Second, his discussion
realist
bias.
he
Thus,
(not surprisingly)
displays
expects 'every state's [sensitivity to relative losses] to be greater than zero in virtually
It is true that whether or not Grieco
is correct
all of its cooperative
relationships'.73
on this count is an empirical question. But it is equally true that there is no a priori
reason for building the desired theory of state motivation
on such a narrow base. It
to system-level
to confine oneself
is not even necessary
and variables.74
arguments
Thus,
among
the literature on the democratic
democracies
cooperation
70
virtually
states with
between
eliminates
peace
suggests
relative
that the stable peace
gains
concerns
as
an
that exists
obstacle
to
this type of polity.75
in International
O. Keohane,
International
40
Relations',
Organization,
'Reciprocity
and John Zysman,
'1992: Recasting
Sandholtz
the European
(1986), pp. 1-27; and Wayne
Bargain',
42 (1989), p. 124.
World Politics,
71
'International
in Economic
and Security Affairs',
World Politics,
37
See Charles Lipson,
Cooperation
(1984), pp. 1-23.
72
not only are we unlikely
to move beyond
the 'grab-bag' stage of
Without
such a foundation,
but our synthesis
is likely to be non-falsifiable.
theorizing,
73
to Robert
Jervis's observation
that 'when a state
Grieco,
pp. 46-7. This is in contrast
Cooperation,
believes
that another not only is not likely to be an adversary,
but has sufficient
interests in common
See Robert
an increase in the
it to be an ally, then it will actually welcome
World Politics,
30 [1978], p. 175). See
under the Security Dilemma',
74 A
not
locates the causes of state behaviour
argument
systems-level
but in the way they are
themselves
(e.g. their domestic
institutions),
with
anarchical
structure
Theoretical
Analysis
other's power' ('Cooperation
also Gowa,
p. 1249.
'Bipolarity',
in attributes
of the states (units)
related to one another
(e.g. the
of
See Kenneth
N. Waltz, Man,
the State, and War: A
international
politics).
Press, 1959). Both realism and neoliberalism
(New York: Columbia
University
influences on state behaviour;
liberalism
is a unit-level
systemic
by contrast,
emphasize
theory. See
Andrew Moravcsik,
of International
Polities',
'Taking Preferences
Seriously: A Liberal Theory
51 (1997), pp. 513-53.
International
Organization,
75
The European
See Thomas Risse-Kappen,
Cooperation
Among Democracies:
Influence on US Foreign
sources for the democratic
Press, 1995), p. 30. Valuable
Policy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University
include Bruce Russett,
the Democratic
Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold
peace proposition
Grasping
War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
and
Press, 1993); James Lee Ray, Democracy
University
International
Peace Proposition
SC: University
of the Democratic
(Columbia,
Conflict: An Evaluation
of South Carolina
E. Brown,
Sean Lynn-Jones,
and Steven E. Miller
Press, 1995); and Michael
(eds.),
Peace
the Democratic
(London: MIT Press, 1996).
Debating
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
19
To sum up, both perspectives,
and realism, might offer valid insights
neoliberalism
into the nature and efficacy of international
regimes once we adopt the reading that
contexts of action. To
their predictions presuppose different, indeed complementary,
a systematic
in this complementarity,
unleash
the potential
for synthesis dormant
is needed of the variables
of
exploration
(at both the systems- and unit-levels
analysis) that influence the strength of relative gains concerns and, hence, the nature
of the context in which choices are made. Before we move on to an illustration of
how this approach may be used to explain particular
instances of regime-building,
one caveat is in order. On the preceding
pages we have spelt out the case for a
structured division of labour among specific (postclassical)
realist and neoliberal
an emcompassing
to international
approaches
regimes. We have not advocated
on world politics. Nor do we
synthesis of the realist and neoliberal
perspectives
intend to imply that each and any 'power-based'
(realist) or 'interest-based'
(neo
can or should become part of the
of international
institutions
liberal) account
Indeed, there is reason to suspect that attempts to come
synthesis we have outlined.
theories of international
up with an all-inclusive merger of realist and neoliberal
are
are loosely defined,
that
both
neoliberalism
and
realism
regimes
misguided,
given
and not perfectly homogeneous,
'schools of thought' rather than well-specified
and
in
to
consistent
'theories'.
has
rise
diverse
Realism,
internally
particular,
given
on international
the reconciliation
of which
in a single,
institutions,
perspectives
or not it includes a neoliberal
coherent theory?whether
be very
component?may
difficult at the least.76
Illustrating
the theory: the case of conventional
arms control
inEurope
structure and
regimes whose
on
to
shed
the
may
light
history of
since the early 1970s.77 As we shall argue, this
an earlier period
in which
intolerance
for
concerns
are
in
which
relative
period
gains
attenuated and the parties to the conflict can focus on absolute gains. Accordingly,
to realist expectations.
actors' behaviour
in the first period conforms
In particular,
come
not
in
does
about.
the
second
regime-based
cooperation
Conversely,
period
The contextualized
rationalist
theory
we have described
main components
arms control in Europe
conventional
down in two periods:
breaks
history
relative losses is high, and a later
76
of
international
be used
Even post-classical
realists sometimes
appear to differ in quite fundamental
ways. Thus, both Krasner
and Grieco
the role of power in processes
of regime formation,
but the former seems to
emphasize
to be more
focus on power as a means
the latter appears
interested
(or 'coordination
device'), whereas
a
in power as a goal of statecraft
As a result, Grieco
expects regimes to produce
('positionalism').
'balanced'
of gains for their members
distribution
of
(such that the pre-cooperation
to be reflected
whereas Krasner
in the distribution
of
expects power asymmetries
See Krasner,
'Global Communications'
and Grieco,
gains from regime-based
cooperation.
'Anarchy'.
77
to test the theory. A single case, even
should not be mistaken
The following
illustration
for an attempt
over time, can hardly sustain such far-reaching
if it permits
several independent
observations
as are involved in carrying out a theory test. Moreover,
as we have indicated,
conclusions
important
power
distribution
is preserved),
a test at this stage would be premature. WTiat we
details of the theory have yet to be specified. Hence,
to warrant
seek to provide
is a 'plausibility
that the theory is promising
the
probe' suggesting
enough
effort of working
it out more fully and subjecting
it to rigorous
tests. For the concept of a plausibility
in Political
in F. I. Greenstein
'Case Study and Theory
and N. W.
Science',
probe see Harry Eckstein,
vol. VII (Reading: Addison-Wesley,
Science,
Polsby
(eds.), Handbook
of Political
1975), pp. 79-138.
20
Peter Mayer,
Andreas Hasenclever,
and Volker Rittberger
state behaviour assumes a more
'neoliberal' character and the actors finally succeed
of conventional
in establishing a regime regulating the deployment
forces in Europe.
can be attributed
to a (partial) change in the context in
This change in behaviour
which the parties interact.
concentration
During most of the Cold War, Europe saw the highest peace-time
and the Warsaw Pact, were
of conventional
forces worldwide.78 Both sides, NATO
high costs in terms of
trapped in a security dilemma which not only produced
defied
the
unilateral
efforts to
defence
but
persistently
opponents'
expenditures,
secure higher levels of security for themselves by improving (or 'modernizing')
their
was
as
the
the
situation
rather
On
unstable,
contrary,
perceived
military
capabilities.
and fears of a surprise attack were widespread,
among Western
security
particularly
as a clear and
to what they perceived
experts and military
planners who pointed
threatening superiority of theWarsaw Pact with regard to both troops and tanks.
on ceilings for
Collective
efforts to stop the arms race and to reach agreement
armament
in Europe began in 1973, when the Soviet
and personnel
conventional
over conventional
forces with the US and its
Union agreed to enter into negotiations
in
in the
took
Vienna
and which,
These
which
allies.
place
European
negotiations,
as
came
to
MBFR
balanced
force
be
known
talks, came
West,
('mutual
reduction')
a
as
the
in
NATO
Warsaw
Pact's
deal
which
had
of
about
part
accepted
package
a
on
in
for
Conference
and
demand
Cooperation
Europe
Security
long-standing
the territorial status quo in Europe.
in which
the West was to recognize
(CSCE),
on broad principles
at Vienna
the negotiations
notwithstanding,
Early agreement
soon bogged down on the details. The parties agreed that the security of neither side
must be reduced by the regime to be created and that the goal should be parity of
so long as NATO
and
forces, but these areas of consensus proved inconsequential
on
were
of the status
the characteristics
unable to reach agreement
the Warsaw Pact
quo.
important, the Eastern bloc denied the very existence of the imbalance that
in the West. At the same time, it did not consent to on-site
decision-makers
a
as
means
in support of its
of verifying
the data that it produced
inspections
to consider extending
the
In addition,
the Eastern
side was unwilling
contention.
zone of application
of a treaty to the Western
part of the Soviet Union, which, as
to move
Pact quickly
of
NATO
feared, would allow the Warsaw
large quantities
to
to.
In
NATO
to the centre of Europe whenever
it wished
this,
response
weaponry
and wanted a treaty to obligate the
refused to talk about a reduction in armaments
these cuts would have to be asym
only. Moreover,
parties to troops reductions
Most
worried
demand
metrical,
analysis of the existing balance of forces. Neither
given NATO's
was acceptable
to the Warsaw
refusal to negotiate
Pact, however, as was NATO's
to
the West
upper levels for air and naval forces, where the Soviet Union
perceived
stances of both
sides tended to be
the negotiation
have an advantage.
Thus,
78
arms accord for Europe
include
the efforts to reach a conventional
inEuropa: Die Bundesrepublik
und MBFR
Deutschland
Abr?stung
L. George,
'The MBFR
in Alexander
Nomos,
1984); Coit D. Blacker,
Experience',
(Baden-Baden:
Dallin
Failures,
Achievements,
Security Cooperation:
(eds.), US-Soviet
Philip J. Farley and Alexander
Lessons
Press,
Zellner, Die Verhandlungen
1988), pp. 123^13; Wolfgang
(New York: Oxford University
in Europa: Konventionelle
die neue politische
?ber konventionelle
Lage in
R?stungskontrolle,
Streitkr?fte
and analyses
narratives
Useful
Reinhard Mutz, Konventionelle
of
Europa und die Rolle der Bundesrepublik
Falkenrath,
Shaping Europe's Military
1995).
(London: MIT Press,
Deutschland
Nomos,
(Baden-Baden:
Order: The Origins and Consequences
1994); and Richard
of the CFE Treaty
A.
Integrating
theories of international
21
regimes
in
concessions
inflexible, and neither side was willing or able to offer substantial
beneficial security regime.
order to permit the formation of a mutually
As a result, the talks continued
for more than ten years without
any
producing
success
were
of
there
when
results.
Whatever
d?tente,
prospects
tangible
evaporated
the MBFR
had been, gave way to the 'second Cold
whose offspring
negotiations
the talks were not formally abandoned until
War' at the end of the 1970s. Although
forces in
1987, for more than half a decade a substantial treaty limiting conventional
a
more
ever.
remote
Within
few
seemed
than
this
years,
however,
picture
Europe
to the Gorbachev-Shevardnadse
and dramatically.
changed unexpectedly
Owing
in Soviet foreign and security policy, the stalemate could be overcome,
turnaround
arms
in the formation of a conventional
and a process was launched that culminated
control
regime for Europe.
after Gorbachev's
indicated that it was
coming to power, the Soviet Union
a
new
to
to
the
of
take
whole
range
prepared
security issues that had
approach
soon began to
overshadowed
its relations with the West. What
ismore, Gorbachev
suit the action to the words. Largely due to the new conciliatory
attitude of the
Soon
Pact succeeded
in creating two important
and the Warsaw
a
the
short
of
time:
'confidence- and
within
security regimes
regime defining
period
set
which
the
of
and
vague,
measures',
security-building
loosely-knit,
replaced
ineffective rules that had been agreed upon as part of the Helsinki Accord,79 and the
to the once highly contentious
the 'double-zero
solution'
regime that sanctioned
In
Nuclear
Forces
both cases, the Soviet Union
issue.80
(INF)
Intermediate-Range
had departed
from its traditional
of
secrecy over the
policy
prioritizing military
Soviet Union,
NATO
sense of security that can emerge from increased
and enhanced
to
consented
intrusive
verification
transparency,
provisions.
Encouraged
by
these developments
and by a series of Soviet concessions
(including the announce
ment to reduce its troops by half a million
and to withdraw
50,000 men and 5,000
tanks from Eastern Europe), NATO
accepted the Warsaw Pact's offer to enter into
new talks on a conventional
arms control regime for Europe.
on 'conventional
These new Vienna
forces in Europe'
talks, labelled negotiations
mutual
confidence
and
(CFE), proved highly
complex,
far-reaching,
successful.
and
The most
intrusive
arms
tangible outcome
control
agreement,
was an unprecedentedly
which
has
become
a
central pillar of the new European
Moreover,
security architecture.
given the
intricate nature of the issues on the table, observers were amazed at the speed of the
which officially began in March
1989 and ended in November
the
negotiations,
was
not
the
agreement
following year. Finally,
only signed but survived the turbulent
ratification period during which one of the two military alliances (or 'groups' in the
the accord (the Warsaw Pact) as well as
language of the treaty) that had negotiated
one of the key parties to the agreement (the Soviet Union) broke up.81
The
CFE
specifies
Treaty, which
regional numerical
applies
ceilings
to the area from the Atlantic
to the Urals,
on both land and air forces, including tanks,
79
a Cooperative
See James E. Goodby,
'The Stockholm
Conference:
Negotiating
Security System for
in George,
pp. 144-72; and Volker
Farley and Dallin
(eds.), US-Soviet
Security Cooperation,
'Toward an East-West
The Case
Efinger, and Martin Mendier,
Security Regime:
Rittberger, Manfred
of ConfidenceJournal of Peace Research,
and Security-Building
11 (1990), pp. 55-74.
Measures',
80
Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control
See Thomas Risse-Kappen,
(Boulder, CO:
Europe',
Westview,
1988).
81
The treaty entered
into force on July
17, 1992.
22
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
armoured
combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters,
and combat aircraft. The
excess
to
their
within a specified
undertake
weaponry
parties
destroy (or convert)
an
to
time
and
the
results
of
allocation
of
period
subject
intra-group
process.82 The
an
which
establishes
intrusive
verification
enables
the
treaty
'regime',
parties to make
sure that the provisions
to be honoured.
of the treaty continue
The treaty meets
to the geo
demands
such as those pertaining
many of the long-standing Western
to
the
of
the
on-site
accept
obligation
inspections and, most
regime,
graphical scope
cuts
two
of
the
which
takes account of
the
distribution
among
important,
'groups',
in favour of the (former) Warsaw Pact countries. The
the pre-existing
asymmetries
Soviet Union was not the only party to make concessions,
too,
though. NATO,
than before, when it endorsed
the inclusion of air forces
showed greater flexibility
into the negotiations.83
rationalist (realist-neoliberal)
What can the contextualized
theory of international
sense
to
of
this
in
offer
make
the
regimes
important episode
history of East-West
First of all, it accounts well for a general feature of this case: achieving
arms control in Europe proved to be a
in the issue-area of conventional
cooperation
and
sometimes
difficult, protracted,
painful process, which was inhibited by mutual
for the
and an aversity to risk that, for a long time, made
it impossible
mistrust
no
comes
as
to
From
the
of
view
this
compromise.
theory's point
parties
surprise.
to Grieco,
The (case-specific)
values of most
of the variables which,
according
determine
the nature of the context of interaction
suggest that realism's more
on
international
should
go a long way towards
cooperation
pessimistic
perspective
relations?
explaining the case.
of the two alliances was one of
Thus, the history of the mutual
relationship
a
common
each was the
adversary,
enmity rather than amity. Far from sharing
in power between the two blocs were
other's most frightening opponent. Differences
to the weaker or to make
too small to permit the stronger to ignore what happened
so
that it could hardly do anything to increase its
the weaker
helpless and dependent
chances of survival. Gaps in gains from cooperation,
therefore, could matter for the
to the realm of
the issue-area belonged
fate of either bloc and its leader. Finally,
(or defection)
security, and obviously many of the potential gains from cooperation
in this field are readily converted into military
capabilities, which was bound to alert
collaboration.
the actors to the likely distributional
implications of regime-based
A second observation
is even more significant,
the history of
though. Reviewing
we
a
find
since
the
distribution
of typically
the issue-area
early 1970s,
temporal
more
that corresponds well with
'realist' and
nearly 'neoliberal' modes of behaviour
(as defined by our realist-neoliberal
change in the context of interaction
theory).84 The narrative has brought out two periods, which are clearly set off from
a partial
82
share of treaty-limited
is constrained
process
equipment
by a rule that defines the maximum
to possess
Order,
any one party is allowed
('sufficiency
rule'). See Falkenrath,
Europe's Military
pp. xv-xvi.
83
was NATO's
taken at the beginning
of the negotiations,
concession
Another
decision,
important
on a possible
successor
to the aging Lance
nuclear missile
its deliberations
short-range
postpone
84
This
1992. See Falkenrath,
Order, pp. 50-53.
Europe's Military
is a partial one, because many of the context-defining
change
change over time. This is not to say that the change was of minor
The
to
until
features of the situation did not
the
importance. As we have noted,
to the individual variables. Hence, we
is required to tip the balance. Both
in that it fails to attach weights
is as yet underspecified
or what kind of, change
in advance how much,
know
to up-grade
is needed
the theory's
and empirical work
theoretical
theory
cannot
that
specificity.
Integrating
theories of international
23
regimes
in terms of the actors' ability to focus on common interests and to resist
to engage
In the first period, which
in distributive
the temptation
bargaining.
were predominant
on
MBFR
coincides
with
the
tactics
talks,
bargaining
roughly
to accept arrangements
both sides which
indicate that the parties were unwilling
that, although beneficial to themselves, would have increased the other side's security
one another
to an
even
greater
extent.85
Thus, up until late in the
which would have preserved
would have benefited from a
terms of national
security,
cuts
insisted on symmetrical
1980s, the Soviet Union
in its favour. While both sides
the existing imbalance
lower level of deployed forces both economically
and in
a more
two
distribution
of
the
troops among
equal
alliances would have reduced the Soviet Union's
ability to launch a surprise attack
on Central Europe, when
to protect her vital interests.
she believed
it necessary
a
was
to
not
NATO
deal
that would not have done
accept
Conversely,
prepared
in
favour
of
about
the
the Warsaw
Pact. Even if
anything
security gap
perceived
on
this
central
of
contention
had
been
it
is
reached
agreement
object
unlikely that
success given the sharp disagreement
on
the negotiations
would have met with
the verification
issue. While NATO
argued that, without
adequate
compliance
a
arms
reduction
conventional
mechanisms,
treaty would be useless and undesirable,
the Soviet Union and its allies refused to receive on-site inspections, arguing that the
to engage in espionage. Under a stringent verifica
West would use this opportunity
not only the West would have been likely to reap 'surplus'
sanctioned
too, would have had the
by the regime; Eastern
inspectors,
over and above the information
obtain militarily
relevant information
decide whether or not NATO
honoured
its obligations
under the treaty.
tion scheme
gains not
chance to
needed to
Given
the
two
in
that existed between
the
and transparency
social systems
gap
openness
the military
the West would have stood to gain
however,
(including
sub-systems),
more from the proposed verfication
stance on this issue,
'regime'. The Soviet Union's
our
that relative gains con
therefore, provides additional
supports for
hypothesis
cerns were pronounced
during this period.
If the parties' conduct
in the first period is well accounted
for by the?realist?
to avoid relative losses even where this meant
that states were anxious
hypothesis
for improving
the negotiation
that
behaviour
foregoing
opportunities
stability,
in the second period, which set in soon after the new Soviet leadership
prevailed
came into office, could hardly have occurred had the parties, and above all the Soviet
not begun to up-grade
the weight of absolute gains in their utility calcula
Union,
85 It
might
seem that this could not be the case. One might
argue that in the security realm common
in this field the distinction
between
gains (if any) must be equally shared by the parties, because
absolute
and relative gains breaks down: itmakes no sense, so the argument
goes, to say that country
As security has been improved
in an absolute
at the same time it has lost security vis
sense, although
?-vis its adversary B. In that case country As security will simply have not been improved at all. This
a bipolar
it presupposes
however,
argument,
equates security with power. (Moreover,
situation.) A
more plausible
two partially
between
of
dimensions
conceptualization
distinguishes
independent
a state is the more
secure the less likely is an attack on its
to this definition,
security: according
secure the better are its prospects
for victory
in war. On this understanding
territory and it is the more
of the concept of security, a state may well increase its security in absolute
terms and at the same
time suffer a relative loss. This is when, due to some (bilateral)
itwins on the
security arrangement,
first dimension
but loses on the second. This conceptualization
also helps to distinguish
realist and
neoliberal
in the field of security: realists, believing
that states tend to base their
expectations
in this realm on worst-case
to trade superiority
decisions
scenarios, do not expect states to be willing
for a decreased
for war to break out, whereas
neoliberals
probability
predict just that.
24
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
was prepared
is reflected in the fact that Gorbachev
to
tions. The new motivation
consent
to NATO's
for
would
demand
which
cuts,
long-standing
asymmetrical
fears of a Soviet
increase stability (a joint security gain) and dissipate Western
as
we
not
have
he
did
eschew
from
attack.
noted,
Indeed,
surprise
enacting unilateral
a
in
order
of
This
reductions
troops
significant
magnitude.
spectacular move helped
to convince sceptical Western
of the seriousness of his intent and
decision-makers
of their own.
increased pressure on them to make concessions
the security dilemma,
the East-West
the
rapprochement
Although
mitigated
to be a socially problematic
forces continued
situation with regard to conventional
one. More
specifically, the basic features of the Prisoner's Dilemma were still intact.
to be dealt with, even when
problem
Consequently,
cheating remained a potential
so
no
much
about
relative
in keeping
worried
parties
longer
gains.86 Therefore?and
extensive
with neoliberal
parties established
compliance
expectations?the
on the
anisms to assure one another of sufficient levels of rule-compliance
both present and future governments.
the
the diminishing
But whence
importance of relative gains that marked
arms
in
control
and
of
the
of
conventional
appears
Europe
period
history
mech
part of
second
to have
that could be achieved? The combined
the immediate cause of the cooperation
we
in the preceding
have
of
outlined
Section
realist-neoliberal
regimes
theory
accounts
in terms of a change in the context of interaction. As
for this process
Grieco notes, the severity of relative gains concerns likely to shape a given relation
location on a
hypothetical
ship at a given time is a function of this relationship's
war
is to a
continuum between all-out
and stable peace. The closer the relationship
more
state of (actual) war, the
will be restrained by considerations
of
cooperation
been
their
relative gains. This is because states have to be careful not to help strengthen
them to have
partners, when, and to the extent that, they perceive
cooperation
incentives to pursue a policy that hurts their vital interests. In a cold war relation
are pervasive, whereas d?tente involves a slackening of the
ship such perceptions
to de
such that the parties are encouraged
fear and distrust
adversaries' mutual
in their deliberations
distribution
of gains
the
the expected
about
emphasize
a
desirability of
given cooperative project.
of Soviet foreign and security policy in the mid-1980s
had the
The reorientation
the East-West
from a (recently restored) cold war to a
effect of moving
relationship
new d?tente which came much closer to the stable peace end of the continuum
than
to the creation
had its 1970s precursor. In the language of the theory this amounted
in which rational actors could focus on absolute
of a new context of interaction,
famous
'new thinking' was that it
rather than relative gains.87 Part of Gorbachev's
states.
of capitalist
the Leninist doctrine of the inherent aggressiveness
to deny that liberal democracies
difficult
had
only had it been increasingly
historical
had
stable and economically
successful,
proven politically
experience
suggested to the new leadership that the threat they posed to the Socialist world had
broke with
Not
86
of being
because
gains concerns
intensify fears of cheating,
they increase the disutility
double-crossed
partners.
by one's cooperation
87
to the success and the speed of the CFE
to observers,
A factor that, according
contributed
was that civilian
leaders on both sides deliberately
reduced the influence of the military
negotiations
on the bargaining
to the MBFR
talks with their much greater involvement
process. This is in contrast
did no longer assume
their interests to be best
of the military
Obviously,
governments
bureaucracy.
Relative
served by the (realist) worst-case
See Mutz, Konventionelle
planners.
forms part of the professional
thinking which
p. 246 and Falkenrath,
Abr?stung,
Europe's
role of military
Order,
Military
p. 249.
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
25
relations
been grossly exaggerated by the traditional Soviet theory of international
and that capitalism was indeed compatible with peace.88
for launching a large-scale con
nuclear parity had made capabilities
Moreover,
as a deterrent.
redundant
ventional
offensive
Western
Indeed,
against
Europe
to
the attempt to increase
realize
that
civilian leaders in the Soviet Union
began
to an offensive
force posture was likely to be self
national
security by clinging
to respond by enhancing
and
because
it
caused
NATO
its
detrimental,
defeating
own military
a
on
and
burden
East-West
relations.89
placed
heavy
preparedness
Traditional
Soviet security policy had proven excessively
costly in both economic
and political
terms, and both types of costs were now seen as being intimately
In Gorbachev's
relations with
the West was a pre
strategy,
improving
for the success of the internal reforms through which he sought to
the economic crisis of the Soviet Union and to arrest its relative decline as
a superpower.90 In a nutshell, reviving d?tente was both possible and necessary from
linked.
condition
overcome
the point of view of the new Soviet government.
or not this (sketchy) explanation
of the formation of the CFE regime is
Whether
felt to be convincing
in its own terms, itmay be criticized for lacking 'causal depth'.
Context change may have caused actors to reconsider their utility functions, making
them place more weight on absolute gains than before, and this, in turn, may help to
in an issue-area where this
explain why they achieved
regime-based
cooperation
we
hitherto had proven
But
how
do
then,
explain the change of the
impossible.
the above analysis not leave the most
interesting part of the story
for? The factor that contributed most to the context change is that the
Soviet Union
and to re-define its interests as a
began to see the world differently
result. But what accounts for this spectacular and consequential
instance of govern
mental
of developing
learning? In the following Section we discuss two possibilities
the rationalist synthesis so as to accommodate
certain cognitive variables and, thus,
to allow for deeper explanations
of international
regimes.
context?
Does
unaccounted
Using weakly
cognitivist
variables
to supplement
rationalist
theories of regimes
we wish to defend in this essay is that rationalist explana
The second proposition
tions of international
and thus improved by a variant
regimes may be supplemented
we
as
to
of cognitivist
which
referred
above
'weak cognitivism'. The basic
theorizing
idea here is that weakly cognitivist
theories?i.e.
theories which are concerned with
or simple and complex learning?may
such as epistemic communities
be
phenomena
used
to fill frequently
admitted
gaps
in both
neoliberal
and realist
approaches
to
88
See Daniel Deudney
and G. John Ikenberry,
'International
Sources of Soviet Change',
International
16 (1991/92),
pp. 89-90.
Security,
See Falkenrath,
Order, pp. 37-8.
Europe's Military
90
This case suggests that Grieco's
that relative decline
increases the sensitivity
for relative
hypothesis
losses may need to be qualified.
It was rational (or, at least, not plainly
irrational for the Soviet Union
as part of a strategy that aimed at
to accept short-term
relative losses in various
security issue-areas
decline with its negative
for long-term national
consequences
halting and reversing an economic
89
and the relatively benign
and
security. Both nuclear deterrence
(see Deudney
security environment
'International
Sources',
pp. 82-97) can help to explain why, in the case at hand, this course
Ikenberry,
of action was (or could appear to be) a rational choice for a leader committed
to the national
interest.
26
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
(a) Cognitive Variables Causally Preceding Rationalist Ones
State
Ideas
Interests
Outcomes
help shape
(b) Cognitive Variables Causally Succeeding Rationalist Ones
State
Ideas
Interests
Outcomes
intervene
Figure
2. Models
of a rationalist-cognitivist
synthesis.
core of these
the study of international
the rationalist
regimes without
violating
a
a
As
of
fruitful
division
labour
different
schools
consequence,
among
approaches.
of thought need not be confined to realism and neoliberalism,
but may extend to
some cognitivist approaches as well.
variables with rationalist
Integrating weakly
explanations
cognitivist
requires a
seen
different
form of synthesis,
We
have
that
realist
and
neoliberal
though.
to international
into a single
regimes can be reconciled and organized
approaches
whole by specifying the conditions
of validity of each, i.e. by theorizing the contexts
in, or conditions
under, which realist and neoliberal predictions
apply, respectively.
and weakly
rationalist
appear to be working
arguments
cognitivist
By contrast,
links in a single causal
together best when they are seen as addressing
subsequent
chain.
As Figure 2 indicates, weakly cognitivist variables may be either causally prior or
ones. This opens up two possibilities
to the rationalist
for a
causally posterior
division
of labour between
rationalist
and (weakly) cognitivist
theories of inter
national regimes.
The first way in which weakly
theories may supplement
rationalist
cognitivist
at least in principle: cogni
accounts of international
institutions
is straightforward,
tivists study features of a strategic (or choice) situation which are self-consciously
left unexplained
models
that rationalists employ. Recall that a
by the game-theoretic
answers
to
three
basic questions:
(1) who are the
game-theoretic
analysis requires
(2) what are the options
that the
the payoffs (or utilities)
these three pieces of information
be analysed, using the hypotheses
actors?
they perceive to have in the situation? (3) what are
actors attribute to each possible outcome?91 With
a game matrix can be constructed, which then can
to account for both the
rationalists have developed
environ
formation
and the institutional
attributes of regimes in varying decision
as
In
ments
Battle
of
the
such
Prisoner's
Dilemma,
Sexes, etc.).
(such
analyses
nor their preferences
are prob
alternatives
neither actors nor their behavioural
these essential components
of rationalist
lematized. Rather,
analyses are used as
are
or
ex post.
either assumed
established
unexplained
points of departure, which
an
on
at
influence
least the
Since actors' beliefs about cause-effect
relationships have
91
See Z?rn,
Interessen,
p. 324.
Integrating
theories of international
27
regimes
i.e. perceived options and payoffs, weakly cognitivist
latter two of these components,
of governmental
the conditions
theories that seek to illuminate
learning and to
account for the careers of ideas may be adduced to fashion deeper explanations
of
regimes
and
other
outcomes.
issue-area of trade provides a classical example of how new causal beliefs
actors
to redefine their interests:92 eighteenth
induce
may
century mercantilist
on
was
welfare
is
As a result, inter
the
idea
that
fixed.
global
premised
thought
in
which
incentives
for cooperation
national trade appeared as a constant-sum
game,
or the creation of international
not
did
exist.
contrast,
laissez-faire
By
regimes
is variable
and can be enhanced
liberalism
by an
taught that global welfare
The
trade
that international
unrestricted
exchange of goods and services, which meant
as
or
came to be seen as a variable-sum
Prisoner's
Dilemma
game (such
perhaps
even Harmony)
to cooperation
A
and regime-building.93
which was amenable
a
a
to
in
in
in
neutral
the
beliefs
sense) helps
(i.e. learning
explain
change
change
of interests, which, in turn, led to a change in policy.
constellation
can also be employed to supplement, or
Weakly
cognitivist variables and models
based on the contextualized
lend more causal depth to, explanations
rationalist
arms
the case of conventional
theory of regimes we have sketched above. Again,
control in Europe may help to illustrate our point. As we have seen, governmental
learning on the part of the Soviet Union was an important cause of the context
and the Warsaw Pact to focus on absolute rather than
change that enabled NATO
relative gains in the issue area of conventional
forces in Europe and, eventually, to
arms
a
settle upon
beneficial
control
Gorbachev's
'new
agreement.
mutually
to both the basic assumptions
and the strategic prescriptions
thinking' extended
of the former included a new
guiding Soviet foreign and security policy. Revisions
was
no
longer regarded as inherently aggressive and
image of the adversary, who
of the latter?made
and
possible by that new worldview
imperialistic. Revisions
of the security dilemma?were
by a better understanding
immediately
relevant to the case at hand: first, given that, within the East-West
setting, national
it should be sought primarily
security was, to a large extent, indivisible,
through
driven
efforts that included the opponent;
and second, military
cooperative
preparedness
should not exceed the level of 'reasonable sufficiency', because excessive armament
was certain to breed mistrust
counter-measures,
and, by provoking
likely to reduce
security in the longer run.94
have been used to explain the content and the
Weakly
cognitivist
approaches
that was at the root of the Soviet foreign policy
timing of the learning process
has argued that structural and functional
revolution. Thus, Thomas Risse-Kappen
in the Soviet Union's
models
alone cannot account for the turnaround
foreign and
92
93
See Stein, Why Nations
p. 120.
Cooperate,
the latter applies when the situation
Strictly speaking,
noted above, in a situation of Harmony
regime-building
but not when
it is Harmony.
As we have
is unlikely, because cooperation
emerges
to a situation where each state believes cutting
in the trade case corresponds
Harmony
spontaneously.
down tariffs is in its interest, even when the others do not follow suit. See Stein, Why Nations
pp. 29-30.
Cooperate,
94
See Jeff Checkel,
and the Gorbachev
World Politics,
'Ideas, Institutions,
Foreign Policy Revolution',
recent book
45 (1993), pp. 281. For a fuller account of these momentous
refer to Checkel's
changes
Ideas
Haven,
and International
Political
Change: SovietlRussian
CT: Yale University
Press, 1998).
is PD,
Behavior
and
the End
of the Cold War
(New
28
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
security policy (and for the West's response to it)95 and have to be supplemented
by
that not only take ideas seriously, but shed light on the conditions under
arguments
which particular
ideas begin to have an impact on the choices of policymakers.
In
his framework
he emphasizes
the role of transnational
networks
of experts and
ideas, and the importance
politicians, who develop and spread new policy-relevant
of the 'domestic structure' of the target countries, which determines how difficult it
is for a given set of ideas and their carriers to gain access to, and to influence, central
decision-makers.
More
argues that
specifically, Risse-Kappen
some
of
centered
the
ideas
around
that
informed
of
the
reconceptualization
'common
and
of
Soviet
security
interests
and
in the
security'
sufficiency'
originated
arms control
in the United
supporters
community
comprizing
as well
as peace
States
inWestern
researchers
and left-of-center
This
parties
political
Europe.
in the foreign
formed
with
'new thinkers'
and elsewhere
networks
institutes
community
policy
in the former
Soviet Union.96
Western
liberal
notions
'reasonable
internationalist
to Risse-Kappen,
contacts were
these transnational
in
instrumental
the new basic assumptions
about the international
system, the relation
transforming
of class values to human values, and the nature of capitalism
into a coherent set of
as we have noted, downplayed
which,
foreign and security beliefs and maxims,
and
oriented) stratagems in favour of a more cooperative
competitive
(relative-gains
According
inclusivist
approach.
in this first model of a rationalist-cognitivist
division of labour, interests
While,
and cognitive
such that the latter precede the former in the
factors are combined
causal chain, in the second type of synthesis of rationalist and cognitivist approaches
the sequence is reversed: here ideas, rather than helping to explain preferences
and
in turn, explain outcomes
(see Figure
perceived
options which,
2a), intervene
between
interests (which may or may not be accounted
for in cognitivist
terms) and
a
outcomes
In
to
this
such as regime formation
rationalist
(see Figure 2b).
approach
as 'focal points',
to
ideas operate
i.e. salient
solutions
cognitivist
synthesis,
a
to
the
which
coordinate
their
in
behaviour
parties
negotiation
problems
help
beneficial way.97 This approach
is exemplified
Garrett
and
mutually
by Geoffrey
of the European Community's
Barry Weingast's
intriguing study of the completion
in the late 1980s.98
internal market
The problem with conventional
functional explanations
of cooperation,
according
to Garrett and Weingast,
is that they fail to take into account that actors in a mixed
motives
situation
usually
face
several
possibilities
for cooperating
(i.e. multiple
95
to the Soviet Union.
At a minimum,
the members
had to learn
of NATO
Learning was not confined
how to interpret the new and, to many, bewildering
(as had, of
signals that came from the Kremlin
of the other Warsaw
Pact states).
course, the governments
96
Thomas Risse-Kappen,
'Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational
Domestic
Structures,
Coalitions,
and the End of the Cold War',
International
48 (1994), p. 186. For a cognitivist
Organization,
study
sources of Soviet
see Checkel,
'new thinking'
along similar lines which focuses on the domestic
actors on Soviet/Russian
'Ideas'. For additional
insights on the impact of transnational
security
'Transnational
Domestic
and Security Policy
Relations,
Structures,
policy see Matthew
Evangelista,
in Thomas Risse-Kappen
the USSR
and Russia',
Relations
Transnational
Back In:
(ed.), Bringing
Institutions
and International
Non-State
Actors, Domestic
Structures,
Cambridge
(Cambridge:
Press, 1995), pp. 146-88.
University
97
See Schelling,
pp. 57-8 and passim.
Strategy,
98
and Barry R. Weingast,
Garrett
the
'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions:
Geoffrey
Constructing
in Goldstein
Internal Market',
and Keohane
European
Community's
(eds.), Ideas, pp. 173-206.
in
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
29
cannot easily be distinguished
in terms of
Pareto-improving
equilibria99) which
are under
most
social
and
situations
self-interest.
Therefore,
efficiency
problematic
from a purely interest-oriented
the
variables
determined
perspective:
employed by
rationalists (i.e. efficiency and self-interest) do not suffice to explain the outcome. It is
of the post-hoc
character
of functional
that this
only because
explanations100
scene:
enter
This
where
factors
the
is
often
overlooked.
is
for, as
deficiency
cognitive
case
create
it
is
often
the
that
ideas
which
Garrett and Weingast
out,
convergent
point
in a mutually beneficial way
their behaviour
expectations permit actors to coordinate
and, at the same time, explain the specific content of the resulting regime.
In the mid
Consider
the case of the completion
of the EC's internal market.
a
to
states
the
EC
had
incentives
launch
of trade
member
1980s,
programme
strong
on trade grown significantly
in the
liberalization. Not only had their dependence
were
were
that
vis-?-vis
there
also
clear
preceding years,
signs
they
losing ground
the United States and Japan, whose economies had
their main overseas competitors,
recovered much more quickly and vigorously
from the recession
triggered by the
a removal of barriers to the free move
second oil crisis. Under
the circumstances
ment of goods, services, labour, and capital promised substantial economic gains for
the members
of the EC. But this fact at best explains why some institutional
was
arrangement
(or, more accurately, make progress on)
agreed upon to complete
the internal market.
Since a number of options
existed, which were not readily
in
terms
of
this
functional
argument cannot explain which
efficiency,
distinguishable
of the institutional possibilities was chosen. The explanatory
gap is filled by a 'focal
point' or salient solution that was provided by a decision of the European Court of
Justice of the late 1970s. In the Cassis de Dijon case the Court had asserted that the
states not to restrict the access of goods and
Treaty of Rome required member
state. Thus, the idea
services which are legally produced and sold in another member
at
of mutual
rather
the national
level
than, e.g., pervasive deregulation
recognition
or extensive standardization
at the supranational
became
the
level,
principle that the
of the internal market relied upon.101
completion
are
Ideas
also important when the available equilibria vary in their distributional
i.e. in situations akin to Battle of the Sexes. For example, in the issue-area
outcomes,
states had to coordinate
of international
communications
their use of the Geo
stationary Orbit, but had divergent preferences
regarding the coordination
principle
to be adopted. Whereas
the technologically
leading states would have maximized
their gains under a first-come-first-served
regime, the late-comers favoured at least a
modicum
of ex ante planning consistent with the principle of equal sovereignty
in
as
of frequencies
the distribution
and orbit slots.102 Under
such circumstances,
Krasner has convincingly
argued, relative power comes into play as an alternative
coordinating mechanism.
they come up with an
99
Garrett
and Weingast
concede this point. What
is more,
to
extend
their
interesting attempt
proposed
synthesis of
of choices
of a game is a constellation
such that each choice is optimal
(Nash) equilibrium
given
outcome
the choices of the others. A Pareto-inferior
is an inefficient outcome
in that at least one
actor could be made better off without making
any of the other actors worse off. In game-theoretic
as a collective
to overcome
ismodelled
relations, cooperation
attempt
analyses of international
A
Pareto-deficient
situations.
100
See Keohane,
p. 80.
After Hegemony,
101
See Garrett
and Weingast,
'Ideas', pp. 187-91.
102
'Global Communications';
and Kai-Uwe
Krasner,
Zusammenarbeit
(K?ln: Carl Heymanns
Verlag,
Schrogl,
1993).
Zivile
Satellitennutzung
in internationaler
30
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
to include specifically power-based
neoliberal and cognitivist approaches
arguments.
In so doing, they make use of the contextual approach to synthesis we have referred
to earlier. In particular, they hypothesize
that
[t]he lesser the distributional
smaller
the disparities
asymmetries between contending cooperative equilibria and the
resources
in the power
of
actors,
the more
will
important
be
ideational
factors [relative to power factors]. Similarly, the effects of focal points will increase [and the
importance of the distribution of power decrease] with the actors' uncertainty about the
consequences
of
agreements
or about
relative
capabilities.
Thus,
both
expected significantly to influence the resolution of multiple-equilibria
relative
explanatory
power
of each
is likely
to vary
significantly
with
power
and
ideas
can
be
problems, but the
the context,
[our
emphasis]103
It seems
to us that this approach to specifying the interrelationship
between power,
in
and
the
and
continuation
of
rule-based
interests,
emergence
coopera
knowledge
tion holds considerable
promise and should certainly be followed up and further
developed.
Limits
to synthesis:
rationalism
and strong cognitivism
So far our presentation
has displayed a great deal of optimism with regard to the
the
schools of thought to achieve synergetic effects by pooling
for
three
possibilities
resources. This optimism,
and theoretical
items
their
(selected
of)
conceptual
our
comes
to
an
third
We
contend
end
with
that, in regime
however,
proposition.
a
the
of the more
that
also
incorporates
analysis,
'grand synthesis'?one
perspective
or
can
not
A
feasible.
fruitful
be, and is
radical,
dialogue
'strong', cognitivists?is
between
'economists'
and 'sociologists'
(i.e. rationalists)
already being, entertained
in
but
it is exceedingly
the
of
international
regimes;
(i.e. strong cognitivists)104
study
a
at
not
to
if
this
rationalist
difficult,
stage
imagine
fully-fledged
impossible,
most
the
identities
the
fundamental
which
would
preserve
(i.e.
sociologist
synthesis
and
and concerns) of both approaches. The reason is that rationalists
assumptions
are
to
committed
and,
ultimately
strong cognitivists
incompatible
epistemologies
most of all, ontologies.
John Gerard
such as Friedrich Kratochwil,
As to epistemology,
strong cognitivists
or
made
it
that
hold
the
Robert
have
clear
Cox
positivist
theory of
they
Ruggie
a flawed
to
and
for
which
neoliberal
realist
scholars
adhere
responsible
knowledge
on
with
its
facts
of
Positivism
observable
international
norms.105
emphasis
analysis
and objective measurement
of variables directs scholars to focus on overt behaviour
at the expense of intersubjective
to strong
thus missing,
according
understandings,
the very essence of international
strong cogniti
regimes. Consequently,
cognitivists,
vists have argued
the necessity
of an interpretivist
treatment
of
this subject, where
103
and Weingast,
Garrett
'Ideas', p. 186.
104
see Brian Barry, Sociologists,
Economists
and Democracy
For this terminology
(London: Collier
MacMillan,
1970).
105
A State of the Art
and John Gerard Ruggie,
'International
See Friedrich V. Kratochwil
Organization:
on an Art of the State', International
40 (1986), pp. 753-75;
and Robert W. Cox,
'Social
Organization,
in Robert O. Keohane
International
Relations
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
Theory',
and Its Critics
Press, 1986), pp. 204-55.
(New York: Columbia
University
(ed.), Neorealism
Integrating
theories of international
regimes
31
to understand motives
and actions from within replaces the quest for
in turn, have reaffirmed
from
behaviour
without.
their
Rationalists,
explaining
a
as
to
to
what
Keohane
refers
of
allegiance
positivistic'
'sophisticated
explanation
international
institutions
the
formulation
and
of
causal
including
empirical testing
to a 'grand synthesis'
Of the two obstacles
is pre
hypotheses.106
epistemology
reasons:
two
the
lesser
however.
This
is
for
one,
sumably
the attempt
(1) On the 'subjective' side (i.e. with respect to the epistemological
students of regimes hold), not all strong cognitivists
identify with
of empiricist
that
others
deem
methodologies
necessary;107
beliefs that
the rejection
conversely,
who have begun to study the role of ideas have admitted
that
an
cannot
in
be
such
endeavour.108
interpretation
ignored
beliefs that
(2) On the 'objective' side (i.e. with respect to the epistemological
students of regimes should hold),
it is not clear whether
of
the aspirations
are indeed irreconcilable.
'science' and 'hermeneutics'
have
Philosophers
the traditional
of explaining
seriously challenged
(the goal of
opposition
as
and
of
basic
methods
of
science)
(the goal
understanding
hermeneutics)
rationalists
social
research.109
for all the uncertainty
that surrounds this issue at the moment,
there
Nevertheless,
an
remains the claim made by some in the strongly cognitivist
that
camp
adequate
in international
interested
study of those topics that sociologists
theory are most
as the convincing
in?such
force of arguments110 or the intersubjective
knowledge
that constitutes
state identities111?requires
methodological
procedures and suggests
standards which fundamentally
differ from those that are accepted
epistemological
as valid inmainstream
rationalist analyses. And while the jury is out on the ultimate
truth value of this claim (and may remain there for a long time to come), its face
is large enough to suggest that positivists will find it hard indeed to study these
'new' objects of research with the aid of their traditional tool-box.112
more
a fruitful and
The second, presumably
obstacle
formidable,
inhibiting
in the
intellectually appealing
synthesis between rationalism and strong cognitivism
and strong cognitivists make
study of international
regimes is ontology. Rationalists
different assumptions
fundamentally
regarding the nature of actors and their inter
Rationalists
scrutinize a system which
is composed
of a group of
relationships.
a
interacting utility maximizers;
strong cognitivists
try to illuminate
society which is
value
106
Keohane,
p. 26.
Analysis',
107
See Wendt,
pp. 393^1.
Anarchy',
108
See Goldstein
and Keohane,
'Ideas', pp. 26-9.
109
of course, insist that there are indeed 'two stories' to tell?one
from the outside,
the other
Others,
can replace the other. See Martin Hollis
from the inside?neither
of which ultimately
and Steve
and Understanding
Relations
International
Smith, Explaining
Press, 1990). For an
(Oxford: Clarendon
see Thomas Haussmann,
excellent
Erkl?ren
und Verstehen: Zur Theorie und
survey of the discussion
der Geschichtswissenschaft
a.M: Suhrkamp,
Pragmatik
(Frankfurt
1991).
110
See Friedrich V. Kratochwil,
On the Conditions
and Decisions:
and Legal
Rules, Norms,
of Practical
in International
Relations
and Domestic
Reasoning
Press,
Affairs
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
111
112
1989).
See Wendt,
'Collective
Identity'.
to bring home
For an argument
strictly positivist means
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
the futility of studying
facts by
linguistic and other institutional
see John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay
in the Philosophy
of Language
Press, 1969), pp. 50-3.
University
32
Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer,
and Volker Rittberger
formed by, as much as it forms, a community
of role-players.113 To put it differently,
rationalists
and strong cognitivists
disagree with respect to the very 'logic' that
of the actors they study: in the terminology
introduced by
shapes the behaviour
James March and Johan Olsen, rationalists assume that states conform to a 'logic of
whereas
strong cognitivists
consequentially',
reject this premise arguing that states,
as other social actors, follow a 'logic of appropriateness'.
An actor who
'operates'
to a logic of consequentiality
first examines
its options and preferences
according
courses of action has the best con
of the possible
calculates which
in the light of these goals. By contrast,
the 'software programme'
that
sequences
determines
to a logic of appropriateness
the behaviour
of an actor who conforms
can be specified by the following reasoning:
and
then
(1)What kind of situation is this?
have I undertaken?
(2) Who am I?What obligations
is the most appropriate action for me in this situation?
(3) Which
Thus, other than actors who conform to the logic of consequentiality,
do not merely
take norms and rules into account,
their behaviour
these actors
is driven by
them.114
our point may seem to be overstated
and, indeed, many qualifications
Again,
be
added.
rationalists
have
maintained
that their approach does not
Thus,
might
a denial of international
and
admitted
the context-dependence
of
presuppose
society
rational choice models.115 At the same time, few strong cognitivists
contest that the
rationalist perspective
is capable of providing
insights into the behaviour of states in
the international arena. However, neither the mutual
that one's preferred
recognition
of analysis
is inherently
that the
limited, nor the mutual
acknowledgement
must
alternative
has
its
merits
be
confused
with
that
the
evidence
too,
respective
can
our
In
in
work
if
assessment
of
fact,
approaches
question
together productively.
the obstacles
that such a cooperation
would
confront
is correct, evidence of this
kind is not likely to be produced. This is not to say that such cautious judgments
and respectful attitudes as are expressed by these scholars are insignificant.
They
enhance the prospects for an open and fruitful scholarly dialogue from which both
sides as well as the study of international
regimes as a whole can only benefit.
mode
Conclusion
In this article we have drawn attention
to some possibilities
for theoretical synthesis
we perceive
are
to exist in the study of international
regimes. These possibilities
113
See Hedley
UK:
Bull, The Anarchical
Society: A Study of Order inWorld Politics
(Basingstoke,
and Duvall,
'Institutions'.
Macmillan,
1977); and Wendt
114
See James G March
and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering
Institutions:
The Organizational
Basis of
Politics
that the notion
that behaviour
is rule-driven
is
(New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 23. Note
actors have to make
consistent with the possibility
choices between different
that, in a given situation,
norms. Moreover,
must not be mistaken
with the logic of appropriateness
for
acting in accordance
norm is seldom a trivial,
The specification
and application
of the appropriate
simple-mindedness.
discretion.
process, but one that leaves actors with considerable
quasi-mechanical
115
'The Game
in Oye (ed.), Cooperation,
See Duncan
Snidal,
Polities',
p. 45.
Theory of International
In tegrating
theories of in terna tional regimes
33
is there a guarantee
that the
but not unlimited. Nor
considerable
and promising,
are
more complex theories that would result from integrating different perspectives
are
more satisfactory than the more simple approaches
of.
the
made
they
Ultimately,
value of a theory cannot be judged before it is empirically tested, and we have made
no attempt to conduct
such a test here. But this is a necessary
and trivial caveat
so
in
less
these
times), and certainly
increasingly
post-positivist
(although perhaps
one that should not discourage
students of international
regimes from exploring the
synergetic effects that could be achieved by integrating different theoretical
are not mutually
two such possibilities,
which
approaches. We have suggested
exclusive:
potential
and realism (or, at least, important
strands within
these two
(1) Neoliberalism
schools of thought) might be joined to form a unified rationalist
theory of
case
The
form
in
of
is what
international
this
synthesis appropriate
regimes.
a
we have called a 'contextualized'
an a
i.e.
which
includes
theory,
theory
of
the
conditions
under
which
the
theoretical
different
priori specification
that enter into it are valid.
perspectives
treat actors' interests as exogenously
Since
both
realism
and neoliberalism
(2)
be
supplemented
by a set of approaches, which focus on
given, they might
we have
For these approaches
this gap in rationalist
theorizing.
the
label
'weak
We
have
that
the
argued
cognitivism'.
incorporation
suggested
into the rationalist models
of the ideational factors that are studied by weak
cognitivists would require a different form of synthesis, though: more speci
precisely
to base this synthesis on the notion that rationalist
fically, we have proposed
links in a causal chain (with
and cognitive
variables
represent different
cognitive variables either preceding or following rationalist ones).
or 'grand',
for a comprehensive,
Finally, we have cast doubts on the prospect
includes even the more
radical variants of cognitivism
that
synthesis, one which
we have termed
with regard to both
'strong cognitivism'.
Sharp disagreements
and ontology
separate this group of scholars from their rationalist
epistemology
a meaningful
the dice heavily
of their
colleagues,
loading
against
synthesis
for bad news, however. As we have noted,
perspectives. This should not be mistaken
a great deal from the competition
has benefited
of different
regime analysis
in the past, and there is no reason why this should change in
theoretical perspectives
the future.