We often define a
martyr as an individual who sacrifices him or herself for an idea or
a belief. Yet,
there is always a
desire to find a
rational explanation behind such
an act. In my Writing 20 class, we
learned about martyrdom in both early
Christianity and modern Islam. Of our
focus on Islam, I found most interesting
various organizations’ interpretation of
martyrdom as a justification for suicide
bombing. When I researched suicide
attacks for my final project, I came
across a group called the Tamil Tigers or
the LTTE. This rebel group had operated
in Sri Lanka since the 1970s and it was
known for the high number of suicide
attacks it had committed since its emergence. The LTTE, however, had no association with Islamic fundamentalism. So
what exactly prompted suicide bombings in this nation? The obvious answer
was that Sri Lanka was in the middle of
a civil war, so any act of war was valid. I
found, however, that there was a culture
of martyrdom within this group, in
which every member was willing to die
for a separate Tamil nation. The centrality of the group’s leader, Velupillai
Prabhakaran, was for me the most
important factor behind the various suicide attacks it executed. How his cult of
personality promoted acts of martyrdom
within the LTTE became the focus of my
project. It is very difficult to analyze
what we see as a terrorist act as an act
of martyrdom, yet one thing I learned is
that the act itself is only a small part in
the entire process. There are complex
causes and effects that generate a cycle
of such acts. With Prabhakaran’s death
and the demise of the LTTE, this cycle,
in Sri Lanka’s case, has finally come to
an end. Due to the currency of these
events, I had to reframe my piece for
Deliberations, and I enjoyed revisiting
issues that before, with the group still
operating, were not possible to discuss.
Promotion of Martyrdom in
Sri Lanka through Velupillai
Prabhakaran’s Personality Cult and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Lizzeth Alarcón
Writing 20 (Spring 2009): Martyrdom in Christianity and Islam
Professor Pamela Reaves
O
n May 18, 2009, Sri Lankan military forces led a massive attack against
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), killing their leader
Velupillai Prabhakaran and ending the civil war that ravaged the nation
for twenty-six years. The LTTE was an important exponent of suicide
terrorism, a practice that is often associated with groups such as Hamas
and Al Qaida in the Middle East. Unlike these Islamic fundamentalist groups, the
LTTE was secular in nature. For the LTTE, suicide operations were acts of martyrdom
in which individuals sacrificed their lives for Eelam, the separate Tamil state that the
group worked to achieve. Prabhakaran, who directed the group since its emergence in
1972, promoted these acts of martyrdom and was influential in the group’s success
against government forces in the last decades.
Although the LTTE was not religiously affiliated, their martyrdom operations were
successful in their devastation. The leadership of Prabhakaran was one of the most significant factors
in such success.
For the LTTE, suicide operations
Over the years,
were acts of martyrdom in which
Prabhakaran
individuals sacrificed their lives
developed a cult
of personality, in
for Eelam, the separate Tamil
which he was
state that the group worked to
not only seen as
achieve.
the leader of the
LTTE, but of the
entire Tamil cause; he was the face of the Tamil struggle. This cult of personality
around Prabhakaran is what allowed for an effective promotion of martyrdom at both
the organizational and societal levels. Through the study of Prabhakaran’s propaganda and speeches, as well as accounts of Tamil society, I will show the magnitude of his
endorsement of martyrdom. This will help determine his role in generating support for
martyrdom within Tamil society, while at the same time guaranteeing recruitment of
suicide bombers.
The civil war in Sri Lanka was a product of the ethnic conflict existent between the
Sinhalese, who compromise the majority of the population with 71%, and the Tamils,
who make up 22% (O’Duffy 258). British colonialism in the area created social
inequality and mistrust between these two groups. After Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948, the Sinhalese government attempted to enforce its power over the
Tamil minority, which had been favored by the British during colonial rule. The gov35
Over the years,
Prabhakaran developed
a cult of personality, in
which he was not only
seen as the leader of the
LTTE, but of the entire
Tamil cause; he was
the face of the Tamil
struggle.
As leader, Prabhakaran
determined which individuals were worthy
based on their commitment to the Tamil
cause. Therefore, being
a Black Tiger was one
of the greatest honors
within the LTTE.
36
ernment imposed Sinhalese language and
Buddhism over the Tamil speaking, Hindu population (Shafritz 171). As a result of oppression
and discrimination, various Tamil political entities emerged. The Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF), present in Parliament, was one
of them. The LTTE, which began as the Tamil
New Tigers (TNT), was formed by the youth
league of the TULF and had a more military
approach.
Prabhakaran’s central presence in the TNT
laid the foundation for the significant role he
would come to play in the group over the
years. Prabhakaran, who grew up exposed to
the rising militancy of the northern peninsula
of Jaffna, was associated with activist youth
gangs and participated in various political kidnappings (Hudson 80). At the age of twentyone, he helped form the TNT and became its
leader, imposing strict rules against smoking,
drinking, and sex. In 1975, the TNT carried
out the group’s first major operation. According to Chris Smith in “Sri Lanka: The Continued Armed Struggle of the LTTE,” they assassinated Alfred Duraiappah, the mayor of Jaffna,
which gave them nationwide reputation as one
of the most extreme Tamil insurgent groups
(213). Eventually, other militants joined the
group and it officially became the LTTE. As
Smith affirms, “what separated the LTTE from
the other armed resistance groups was the ability and willingness of Prabhakaran to match the
degree of violence of the government of Sri Lanka
against the Tamil groups” (214). Prabhakaran’s
strong leadership resulted in the LTTE’s initial
success and development. Not only did he help
establish the group as the most committed to
the Tamil cause, but he succeeded in resisting
the government’s repression. In disciplining
the LTTE and ensuring its effective workings,
Prabhakaran developed a cult of personality.
It is through this cult of personality that I
will begin examining martyrdom in Sri Lanka
and in the LTTE. The term “cult of personality,” as stated in the University of Michigan’s
study of personality cults, refers to the reverence of a leader through the extensive use of
media and propaganda. It consists of associating a leader with a “set of values or goals that
is perceived by the public to be beneficial to the
nation’s well-being” (“Fascist Personality Cults:
Deconstructing Personality Cult Theory”).
This leads to the creation of a hero or god-like
image of him or her. Other examples of personality cults are those of Joseph Stalin and Mao
Zedong, whose images were ubiquitous in their
respective societies. Similarly, Prabhakaran’s
leadership was centered on a cult of personality; he was seen as the supreme leader of the
Tamil cause. The Tamil people had faith in him
to relieve them of Sri Lankan government oppression and to lead them to the establishment
of Eelam. Prabhakaran’s personality cult, however, did not extend to an entire state; it was
not based around a dominating party, as in the
case of Stalin and Mao. Prabhakaran was the
leader of a rebel movement that only dominated specific regions of the state. Nonetheless, his
central status within the LTTE allowed him to
have a strong influence in the promotion of
martyrdom and the effectiveness of such operations in Sri Lanka.
One of the most important elements in
maintaining a cult of personality is taking advantage of mass media to portray the image of
a supreme leader. In posters and propaganda
throughout the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, Prabhakaran appeared as the main figure of the
movement. Figure 1 is a picture of various LTTE
billboards on a highway in northern Sri Lanka.
All the billboards show images of LTTE soldiers with the aim of recruiting new members.
The one on the left, however, includes Prabhakaran among the group of soldiers. Prabhakaran, who appears much larger in comparison to the rest of the Tigers, holds a weapon in
his hand that seems more powerful than the
rest in the picture. This portrayal shows the
significant status Prabhakaran had within the
LTTE and how committed he supposedly was
to the Tamil cause. Since Prabhakaran rarely
made public appearances, the citizens had to
trust these types of images for their judgment
of the leader. Consequently, there was even
a greater degree of expectation for the few
appearances he did make. Prabhakaran used
this element of mystery to maintain the public’s
attention and reaffirm his importance.
The cult of personality of Prabhakaran was
not only rooted in these types of images; it was
also embedded in his structured organization
of the LTTE. As leader, Prabhakaran effectively
established a strong sense of loyalty by his followers. He had the title of commander of the
different forces within the LTTE, which included the military, the Sea Tigers, the Air Tigers,
and the Black Tigers (Smith 214). In reality,
however, Prabhakaran was not directly involved in these forces and there were other officials who directed them. Yet, he maintained his
role as the supreme leader by making all other
commanding officers report to him. Prabhakaran thus centralized effectively his authority within the group
AP IMAGES
Figure 1. LTTE billboards at Paranthan Junction.
Of the different factions in the LTTE, Prabhakaran
primarily oversaw the Black Tigers, the LTTE branch
that specifically entailed suicide bombing. According to Smith, only the Black Tigers, along with high
ranked officers, were allowed direct contact with
Prabhakaran (214). This shows the pedestal Prabhakaran had created for himself as only a few people
were worthy of seeing him in person. As leader, Prabhakaran determined which individuals were worthy
based on their commitment to the Tamil cause. Therefore, being a Black Tiger was one of the greatest honors within the LTTE. Lauren Guenther adds that admission was highly selective since so many people
wanted to die this way. According to Guenther, the
Black Tigers were secluded from the rest of the LTTE
(6). There was a formal training for those who desired martyrdom. In the “Red Garden,” individuals
were indoctrinated by specialists and through videos
of suicide bombings as they prepared themselves for
their “fatal mission” (6). This seclusion and process of
transformation appears ritualistic and similar to rites
of passage in many religions. In the case of Hamas,
once shahids (martyrs) are chosen, they begin a highly
regimented process of mental purification (Sprinzak
70). This preparation consists greatly in reading the
Qur’an and getting closer to Allah. Prabhakaran’s di-
rect involvement in training LTTE martyrs was a
more than sufficient guide to them. He fulfilled the
analogous role the Qur’an, or the group’s interpretation of it, has for Muslim martyrs.
The influence Prabhakaran had on the Black Tigers
is apparent in the documentary My Daughter the
Terrorist, which follows Darshika and Puhalchudar,
two female Black Tigers. Darshika, who was twentyfour and joined the LTTE when she was twelve,
explained that before becoming a Black Tiger she was
part of the Malathi regiment. The difference, she
added, was that they trained with fewer people and
used less weaponry as one person was capable of
killing masses. Both women admitted that no one
knew of their status as Black Tigers, not even their
families. However, they were aware that at any moment they were going to have a “mission” and they
were ready for it. Puhalchudar affirmed that they
would “do whatever the Leader decided” which
meant, “[they] would destroy [themselves] with the
Claymore mines that were attached to [their] bodies.”
These women were completely determined to fulfill
their role as Black Tigers and they were responsive to
their “Leader” in whatever mission he assigned them.
They were proof that suicide bombing does not necessarily revolve around religion, but that a strong sense
37
of self-determination for the Tamil cause, a value instilled everyday by Prabhakaran, can be just as strong
of a motivation. Because they trusted Prabhakaran to
provide them with an assignment of martyrdom, we
can see the extent of his cult of personality. He was
determining the fate of these individuals and they
accepted whatever his decision was unquestionably.
It is important to note that Prabhakaran effectively
instilled values of martyrdom that extended to the
entire LTTE, not only the Black Tigers. Tamil society
often made reference to the LTTE members’ willingness to die: every soldier carried a cyanide vial around
their neck. As Alastair Lawson, from the BBC, explains, Prabhakaran wore a cyanide vial capsule that
was supposed to be consumed in the event of his capture. As a result, LTTE soldiers wore it as well. In this
way, they could not “render valuable LTTE information” to the enemy in case of torture or punishment.
Lawson affirms that Prabhakaran expected the same
“dedication” from his troops, even those who were
women or children. In the documentary, Darshika explained that they “were supposed to bite the vial which
cut their tongue and allowed for the cyanide to seep
into their blood” (My Daughter the Terrorist). For
the LTTE soldiers, dying in this manner was still a
form of martyrdom. The individual died within seconds, just as in the case of suicidal bombing, in order
to protect the Tamil cause. A total of 600 individuals
committed suicide this way (Lawson). The model that
Prabhakaran established for his followers shows the
impact he had on the LTTE. He was the one instructing the individuals in the path to martyrdom and
because he, the leader, was wearing the capsule, it
was expected that the rest of the LTTE soldiers do so
as well.
Tamil society often made reference to the LTTE
members’ willingness to die: every soldier carried
a cyanide vial around their neck.
38
The god-like image the LTTE had of Prabhakaran
is evident in the final actions of the suicide bomber
before his act of martyrdom when the Black Tigers
were allowed to share a “last meal” and take a picture with Prabhakaran (7). Once again, we see the
honor that it was being a Black Tiger and the status it
gave the individual, as he became closer to the leader
of it all, Prabhakaran. It would be an exaggeration to
equate LTTE martyrs’ interaction with Prabhakaran
to the Muslim promise of reaching Allah. However,
there are some roots of otherworldly benefits in this
last contact with him.
Prabhakaran was greatly involved in the memorialization of the martyrs, a crucial stage in the process of
martyrdom. Since 1991, the LTTE recognized the
Maveerar Naal, “our Great Heroes Day,” as Prabhakaran declared in his 2008 speech commemorating
the special day. In this speech, Prabhakaran alluded
to the heroes’ “wonderful dedication” which could
only be found in the heart of the Tamil people. He
acknowledged the fact that the heroes died for the
“redemption of our land so that our people may live in
freedom and with self-respect” (“Speech of V. Prabhakaran, leader, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on
annual Heroes’ Day.”). The primary motivation Prabhakaran provided for Tamil martyrdom was liberating
the Tamil people from the oppressive Sinhalese majority. This is reiterated throughout the speech, thus promoting the necessity of martyrdom in order to be free.
Prabhakaran also spoke of the heroes as if he knew
them well and knew exactly what their motives were.
Once more he was playing the role of the mentor and
guide who perfectly understood his pupils. Furthermore, he attempted to gain the support of the entire
Tamil society by asserting that the Sinhalese were
fighting not against the LTTE, but against the entire
Tamil population. He called it a “genocidal war,” thus
bringing Tamil society closer to his side and the LTTE,
while alienating the Sri Lankan government.
Memorialization of martyrs is evident as well in
the LTTE cemeteries. As Michael Roberts explains,
the Tamil people did not see cemeteries as burial
places, but instead they were viewed as “temples” or
“holy places” (86). The careful maintenance of the
graves is evidence that the martyrs were supposed to
be greatly remembered and even worshipped for their
actions. Prabhakaran went beyond providing a place
of memorial for martyrs, to making sure these places
were viewed as spiritually significant because they
denoted the fervor of the Tamil people’s struggle.
Prabhakaran’s active role in the entire martyrdom
process (in training, commanding, and eventually commemorating the martyrs) is reflected in the success of
such operations. Suicide bombing was an effective tactic of the LTTE since its first use in 1987. As Guenther
describes, the first operation of the Black Tigers was
driving a truck full of explosives into a Sri Lankan
military camp (2). This, she continues, was the beginning of the 75 suicide bombings that would follow.
The LTTE’s use of suicide tactics can be considered
successful based on several factors. To begin with,
between 1987 and 2001 they carried out a greater
number of suicide attacks, 76 out of 315, than other
groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah did (Guenther
2). Also important to consider is the death of prominent political figures because of the group’s suicide
bombings. Guenther begins her article by depicting
the death of Rajiv Gandhi, India’s former prime minister, in 1991. She states, “Dhanu, a young woman
from Jaffna approached Gandhi with a garland of
flowers at a political rally... dropped the garland at
his feet, and as she reached down to pick it up, she
exploded” (1). The LTTE also succeeded in the assassination of the Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe
groups during the 1980s made the LTTE the only
remaining organization, so proving itself to the public was not really a necessity. Pedahzr adds that the
“aggressive actions of the army and the Sinhalese government were often enough to propel the Tamil population into the arms of the LTTE” (82). The LTTE’s
active resistance and violent retribution against the
government led the public to be on their side and consequently on the side of their leader, Prabhakaran.
This is not necessarily because they believed in his
methods, but because he represented relief from
repression. In fact, Tamils who fled to other countries
expressed their support of the LTTE and Prabhakaran.
HTTP://WWW.FLICKR.COM/PHOTOS/DAQUELLAMANERA/3618238742/
Premadasa in 1993. No other group has been able to
kill such high profile figures. It is evident that the leadership of Prabhakaran and his incorporation of suicide
tactics in the armed conflict against the Sri Lankan
government allowed for an effective guerrilla war.
The LTTE’s success in martyrdom operations despite its secular nature leads us to make a comparison
between the role of Prabhakaran’s personality cult
and the role of religion in other groups also deemed
successful. The use of religion in the recruitment of
bombers in organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas,
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad exemplifies its significance in the promotion of martyrdom. Sprinzak
affirms that “recruiters often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be bombers,
using their subjects’ faith in a
reward in paradise to strengthen
and solidify their willingness to
die” (69). We see here the function religion has in not only providing benefits for acts of martyrdom, but justifying them. The
Israeli conflict with Palestine and
Lebanon allowed for the concept
of jihad, or holy war, to be used
as an explanation of the necessity
for such suicide missions. The rewards of reaching Allah in paradise were the added compensation for engaging in this holy war.
In the above-mentioned groups,
using religion is effective because
it guarantees the individual’s
commitment to the cause, while
at the same time gaining widespread societal support. In the case of the LTTE,
Prabhakaran’s personality cult was not used directly
in recruiting soldiers for the LTTE. Individuals did
not simply join to be in the presence of Prabhakaran,
their leader, but rather they were driven by the ravaging effects of war. Nonetheless, once they were part
of the LTTE and they were assigned suicide missions,
Prabhakaran provided his support. This is the same
kind of reassurance religion provides for Muslim suicide bombers. Even though the LTTE’s suicide operations were secular in nature, they were greatly shaped
by Prabhakaran, whose leadership and methods built a
cult of personality similar to that of a religious leader.
While it is evident that Prabhakaran’s cult of personality drove the LTTE, it is important to consider
that the support and loyalty of Prabhakaran by the
LTTE was not the same as Tamil society. As Ami
Pedahzr explains in Suicide Terrorism, it is difficult to
assert that Prabhakaran used suicide terrorism to gain
public support (82). The LTTE’s aggressive actions
and eventual liquidation of the other Tamil insurgent
He called it a “genocidal war,” thus bringing Tamil
society closer to his side and the LTTE, while
alienating the Sri Lankan government.
The Tamil people who joined the LTTE and were
willing to become martyrs did not do it just to follow
Prabhakaran, at least not in the beginning. In the
documentary My Daughter the Terrorist, Darshika
admits that she joined the LTTE after her father was
killed by a Sri Lankan government’s aerial bombing.
Puhalchudar, similarly, was displaced and attacked by
Sri Lankan soldiers. Both of these women found in
the LTTE a way to fight back and liberate the Tamil
people from such violent repression. They followed
the orders of Prabhakaran because he championed
that resistance. Darshika affirms “our Leader started
the movement for our people and he leads our struggle.” This not only shows their trust in Prabhakaran
and the LTTE, but also an interesting reality within
Tamil society: the youth were at the base of LTTE
support. Young Tamils wanted to be part of the strug-
39
gle, even if it meant giving up their lives. Just
like Prabhakaran in his youth joined others like
him to form the LTTE decades ago, the Tamil
youth today had a desire to join the guerilla
movement.
attacks. Within every group, an act of suicide
terrorism has many underlying causes and driving forces. It is important for us to understand
these complexities because we often judge these
terrorist attacks without knowing that on the
other side they are being celebrated as acts of
martyrdom.
Works Cited
“Fascist Personality Cults: Deconstructing
Personality Cult Theory.” UM.SiteMaker Home.
19 Apr. 2009 <http://sitemaker.umich.edu/fascist
personalitycult/deconstructing_personality_cult_
theory>.
Guenther, Lauren. “The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka:
Unconventional Suicide Terrorism.” Duke
Journal of Politics Vol. XI (2006): 1-13. 29
Mar. 2009 <http://www.poli.duke.edu/undergrad/
ujournal.html>.
Hudson, Rex A. “The Sociology and Psychology of
Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?”
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
1999. 31 Mar. 2009 <http://www.fas.org/irp/
threat/frd.html>.
In the past year, when
the Sri Lankan army
began to debilitate the
LTTE, many believed
that the movement could
be saved if Prabhakaran
committed a final act of
martyrdom. However,
he never executed such
an act.
40
The cult of personality that surrounded
Prabhakaran was significant in the effectiveness
of the LTTE’s martyrdom operations, which
allowed for its growth and the progression of
martyrdom within Tamil society. Prabhakaran’s
military success generated Tamil support of
martyrdom operations as a way to combat
Sinhalese oppression. He was seen as the creator of such tactics in the eyes of the LTTE, and
the group was successful in attracting many
volunteers willing to die for Eelam. As Dayan
Jayatilleka affirms, his “superiority [was] not
military, it [was] mental, psychological; it [was]
almost spiritual” (69). Through their numerous
suicide bombings and other clandestine operations, the LTTE was able to wage war against
the Sri Lankan government for more than twenty years. At the head of this conflict, from beginning to end, was Prabhakaran. With his death,
the LTTE has come to an end as well. The
Tamil cause is no longer in his hands or in those
of the LTTE; it has lost its most powerful representative. In the past year, when the Sri Lankan
army began to debilitate the LTTE, many
believed that the movement could be saved if
Prabhakaran committed a final act of martyrdom. However, he never executed such an act.
Instead, he evaded the Sri Lankan army until
they overtook him and his forces. Although the
LTTE’s use of suicide terrorism was primarily
secular, we can still find parallels with other
groups that use religion as a medium in their
Jayatilleka, Dayan. Sri Lanka: The Travails of a
Democracy, Unfinished War, Protracted Crisis.
New Delhi: International Centre for Ethnic
Studies, 1995. 69.
Lawson, Alastair. “The Enigma of Prabhakaran.”
BBC World News: South Asia. 2 Feb. 2009.
29 Mar. 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/3236030.stm>.
My Daughter the Terrorist. Dir. Beate Arnested.
2007. DVD. New York, NY: Women Make
Movies, 2008.
O’Duffy, Brendan. “LTTE: Majoritarianism, SelfDetermination and Military-to-Political Transition
in Sri Lanka.” Terror, Insurgency, and the State
Ending Protracted Conflicts. New York:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
Roberts, Michael. “Pragmatic Action and Enchanted
Worlds: A Black Tiger Rite of Commemoration.”
Social Analysis 50.1 (Spring 2006): 73-103.
Shafritz, Jay M. Almanac of Modern Terrorism.
New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1991.
“Speech of V. Prabhakaran, leader, Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam on annual Heroes’ Day.”
The Hindu. 31 Mar. 2009 <http://www.hindu.
com/nic/prabhakaranspeech.htm>.
Sprinzak, Ehud. “Rational Fanatics.” Foreign
Policy (Sept 2000): 66-73.
“The corpse of the Tigers; The end of Sri Lanka’s
war. (Death of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s
Velupillai Prabhakaran).” The Economist (US)
391.8632 (May 23, 2009): 56EU.