National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical
Dimensions of International Relations
Author(s): Noel Kaplowitz
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 39-82
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1990
National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and
Conflict Strategies:PsychopoliticalDimensions of
InternationalRelations
Noel Kaplowitz'
This essay presents a psychopolitical theory of international conflict. National self-images and perceptions of enemies are explicated and analyzed
as determinants of various types of conflict behavior. Self-images include
how a people sees itself, that which it most likes about itself, that about which
it is most disturbed, the ways in which it may want to change, perceptions
of the nation's history, conceptions of national purpose and interest, and
views of the nation's power and limits. Regarding perceptions of enemies,
the theory emphasizes the differences with which parties perceive the same
issues, events, policies, and peoples, and suggests such gaps in perception
as keys to understanding conflict behavior and interactions. A typology of
conflict strategies is then elaborated, rangingfrom totalism to appeasement.
It takes into account both manifest aims and latent attitudes. Each strategy
is explicated in terms of the means emphasized, the characteristicbeliefs about
conflict entailed, and the self-images and perceptions of enemies which are
its sources. A series of hypotheses is presented concerning the relationships
between different types of self-images and perceptions of enemies, on the
one hand, and various conflict strategies, on the other. The ultimate purpose is to understand what makes for constructive and destructive conflict
outcomes.
KEYWORDS:psychopolitical;self-images;perceptionsof enemies;conflict strategies;constructiveand destructiveconflict.
'PoliticalScienceDepartment,Universityof California,Davis, Davis, California95616.
39
0162-895X/90/0300-0039$06.00/1
? 1990 International Society of Political Psychology
40
Kaplowitz
INTRODUCTION
This essay elaboratesthe foundationsof a psychopoliticaltheory of
internationalconflict. The term "psychopolitical"refersto psychological,
social-psychological,and culturalfactorsas they impingeupon politicalbehavior.The variablesexplicatedarenationalself-images;perceptionsof enemies;strategiesof conflict;and attitudes,manifestandlatent,towardissues.
A series of hypotheses is presented concerning the connections between differenttypes of self-imagesand perceptionsof enemies,and conflictstrategies.Thestrategiesrangefromtotalistandlong-runtotalist,through
and conciliatory.A related
competitiveanddeterrent,to firm-but-cooperative
work analyzesthe reciprocalinteractioneffects of partiesto conflict using
these different strategiesand is concernedwith how the attitudesand behaviorsof one actoraffect those of the other(Kaplowitz,1984).The dimensions of the theoryexplicatedin this essayare indispensableto the effective
and comprehensiveanalysisof such interactioneffects. The ultimateaim is
to understandwhatmakesfor constructiveand destructiveoutcomesin conflict situations.
Severalframeworksof analysishave dealt with a plethoraof foreign
policy determinantsincluding,for example, militarycapabilities,political
andinternational
structures,bureaucracies,
systems(Eastet al., 1979;Wilkenfeld et al., 1980).As a consequenceof relatedstudies, studentsof international relations(IR) now have a quite refined and elaboratedview of the
many variableswhich can influenceforeign policy.
Knowledgeaboutwhatmakesfor constructiveanddestructiveoutcomes
in conflictsituations,however,is sorelylacking.Constructiveoutcomesmay
be said to occurwhenall partiesemergeat least somewhatsatisfiedand feel
enhanced.Destructiveoutcomesoccurwhenthe partiesare dissatisfiedand
feel diminished(Deutsch,1973,p. 17). This conceptualdistinctionis particularlyuseful for studentsof internationalrelations.It assumesthat conflict
is ubiquitous-as does the still-dominantschoolof PoliticalRealismin IRbut thatit is approachedin differentwaysandthatthesearecrucialin determiningthat most importantof factors-the outcome. In a nuclearworld,
understandingthe determinantsof constructiveand destructiveoutcomes
should be a centralconcernof both scholarsand practitioners.
Deterrencetheory,the majorbody of workin the IR literatureon how
to deal with adversaries,as Jervis(1979,pp. 292-93)pointsout in his review
and critique,does not deal with what is assumedhereto be that most basic
and importantof issues-"transforminghostilerelationsinto peacefulones."
Deterrencetheory focuses on how adversariesmay be precludedfrom encroachingon one'sown vitalinterests.But it does not addressthe questions,
Psychopolitical Dimensions of InternationalRelations
41
"When can others goals be changed. . . ?" and "When can others be persuaded to adopt a 'problem solving' approach. .. ?" Indeed, Jervis adds,
astoundinglybut correctly,"Thereis littlein the internationalrelationsliterature to provideeven a start to answeringthese questions."
A varietyof conflictstrategieshavebeenexploredon the interpersonal
levelandthroughlaboratoryexperiments,the Prisoner'sDilemma,andcomputerizedgames(Axelrod, 1980;Deutschet al., 1967,pp. 345-60;Lengand
level,howWheeler,1979,pp. 658-65).Systematicstudieson the international
and
ever,arelacking.Thisessayanalyzespsychological,social-psychological,
culturalvariableswhichaffect the possibilitiesfor cooperationandconstructive outcomesin internationalconflicts.2
COGNITIVE, DEPTH-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
This enterprisewill ultimatelyrequirea synthesisof cognitive,depthpsychological,and behavioralapproachesin psychology,as they bearupon
the analysisof internationalrelations.Put schematically,cognitivepsychology focuses on perceptionsand beliefs, and the ways in whichthey are orof behavior.Behaviorismemphasizes
ganizedand processed,as determinants
the environmentas it operatesthroughreinforcementand resultsin learning. Depth-psychologyfocuses on needs, emotions, and resultantdefenses.
Until now, each of theseapproacheshas most often beenappliedseparately
in psychologicalstudies of IR.
Early psychoanalyticwork emphasizedthe interpretationof war as a
resultof the projectionand displacementof aggressiveimpulses(Durbinand
Bowlby, 1939;Glover, 1933).Thisapproachdid not directlyfurtherempirical research,however, or help in the formulationof effective policies for
constructiveconflictresolution.It did not accountfor the substantialvariation in the behaviorof nations, the many periodsof peace in international
relationsat the
of cooperative
anyof the determinants
2Verylittleworkhas beendoneconcerning
level.Jervis(1978),in one of the few pertinentarticles,has theorizedaboutseveral
international
structural
and situationalvariableswhichaffectthe possibilitiesfor cooperativebehavior.These
and technological
includethe advantageof defenseoveroffense,as influencedby geographical
factors;andthe natureof the payoffin conflictsituations,as determined
by factorswhichaffect
the tangiblecostsand gainsof aggressionand cooperation.In a laterwork(1982b)he suggests
additionalstructuralfactorswhichmakesecurityregimesdifficultto achieve.Theseincludethe
in manysecurityissues-whatonesidewinstheotherloses(asin disputes
inherentcompetitiveness
the highstakesinvolved;the difficultiesin measuringsecurity;and the costliness
overterritory);
of mistakes.
42
Kaplowitz
history, or the many pairs and groups of nations which enjoy cooperative
relations. It did not help to answer the crucial question-what accounts for
the difference?
At the same time, this earlierwork did generate several highly illuminating ideas. The most important of these for political psychology in general
and psychology and IR in particular is that political attitudes and behavior
can be generated and affected by needs, emotions, and images of which actors may be only dimly aware, if at all; and that such attitudes and behaviors
can serve the defensive function of protecting against underlying feelings and
dispositions which could be threatening, anxiety-producing, or damaging to
self-esteem if they became manifest.
More recent developments in psychoanalytic theory have elaborated the
idea of an "extended self' which comes to include the nation and its symbols. Related work illuminates connections between injury to the "group self'
or nation and damage to individual self-esteem, with consequent aggressive,
hate, and even rage reactions. This rich and suggestivebody of theory is potentially useful for further explicating the concept of national self-imagery developed in this essay and for extending our understanding of the ways in
which self-imagery is related to political attitudes and behavior.3
At the outset of the "behavioralrevolution" in political science, a group
of scholars basing themselves, in part, on a preceding generation of cultureand-personality research-itself heavily influenced by depth-psychological
theory-elaborated the concept of political culture as those aspects of the
more general culture, both manifest and underlying, which are specifically
related to political behavior (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pye, 1962, 1965; Verba, 1965). There has been little effort, however, to systematically relate political culture to international behavior. The subsequent focus upon attitudes,
perceptions, and beliefs is a necessary and useful step in the direction of specificity.
Interestingly enough, there have been few behaviorist studies of international relations - despite the enormous impact of behaviorism in psychology (Brewer, 1975). At the same time, a host of implicit assumptions and
sometimes explicit theories about the effects of threat and punishment(though
not promises and rewards) suffuses the strategic literature. A psychopoliti-
3A review of this substantialbody of literatureis beyond the scope of the presentessay. Heinz Kohut, the major theorist of self-psychology, reflects upon its applicationsto the humanitiesand social sciences in a useful volume edited by Strozier (1985). A capsule statement of the core of the
theory, as it may be applied to internationalconflict, is presentedby the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry(1978, pp. 408-422). Integrationof recent psychoanalyticself psychology with
the psychopolitical theory developed in this essay remains a separate and important task.
Psychopolitical Dimensions of InternationalRelations
43
cal theoryof internationalconflictmusttakeinto accountthe effectsof both
negativesanctionsandpositiveinducementson the tangiblecostsandbenefits
for an adversary.In this respect, it will integratethe assumptionsof behaviorismregardingthe environment,includingother actors, as conditioners of behavior.4
In recentyearstherehas been a trendin psychologyand IR studiesof
thinkingin purelycognitiveterms, so that "psychological"and "cognitive"
have been close to becoming synonymous. Jervis (1976) pioneered in
thoroughlyexaminingcognitivepsychologyand bringingit to bear, in illuminatingways,uponthe understandingof foreignpolicydecision-making.
His instructivestudy openeda whole domainof inquiryin the field of psychologyand IR. At the sametime, "cold"cognitivefactorswereemphasized
(1976,p. 3), to the neglectof affectivesourcesand componentsof attitudes.
Jervis'work touches briefly upon desiresand fears, as they influenceperceptions(1976, pp. 355-81).It does not deal with other kindsof affect, and
relatedneedsand motiveswhichcan influenceperceptionsand policiessuch
as humiliation,hate, envy, contempt,rage, revenge,powerlessness,shame,
admiration,and esteem.Nor does it treatrelatedculturalvariables.Larson
theimportanceof cognitiveprocessesin a workwhich
(1985)furtherunderlines
to
bear
the
brings
upon studyof AmericanCold Warpolicy, the most recent
developmentsin this field, in particularschematheory. Cognitivefactors
are cruciallyimportantdeterminantsof decision-makingand must be taken
into accountin a psychopolitical
conflict.At the same
theoryof international
a
more
is
if
the
time,
integratedapproach required
insights and riches of
the broaddomainof psychologyare to be most fully and fruitfullyused to
deepenthe understandingand make more effectivethe practiceof international relations.5
4Neo-Realisttheory in IR (Waltz, 1979) relatedlyemphasizesthe structureof the internationalsystem and prevailingpower configurationsas primarydeterminantsof national behavior. Since the
internationalsystem can be thought of as the environmentwithin which national behavior occurs,
neo-Realismis, in this sense, congruentwith behaviorism.I am indebetedto an anonymousreviewer
for calling attentionto this importantsimilarity.At the same time, there have been very few studies
of foreign policy which explicitlyfocus on reinforcementand learning-key processesin behavioral
psychology. The power relationsof nations are factored into that part of our theory which deals
with interaction effects and outcomes (Kaplowitz, 1984, pp. 368-400).
5In a later work which deals with the omissions of deterrence theory, Jervis (1979: 296-297,
305-306) recognizes the influence of culture upon foreign policy. One of the fundamental ommissions of such theory is that it has not taken into account how the political culture and psychology of an opponent may lead him to respond to deterrence attempts in ways which one
has not anticipated. Rather, this work has tended to project onto opponents assumptions about
conflict behavior that grow out of one's own political culture. In a retrospective look at his
study on misperceptions, Jervis (1982a; pp. 6-10) suggests that motivated errors and related
needs, values, and affect play a larger role than he had allowed for in his earlier cognitive work.
In still more recent essays (1985a, 1985b), he further stresses these ideas.
44
Kaplowitz
PREVIOUS FRAMEWORKS OF ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND IR
Virtually all frameworks which have attempted to bring psychology to
bear upon international relations have focused on perceptions of enemies
and beliefs about conflict on the individual level, as determinants of foreign
policy decision-making within single nations, on one side of a conflict situation. Brecher et al. (1969), in a framework which has informed considerable
research, elaborated an "attitudinal prism" and a set of "elite images" that
influence decision-making. They differed from more orthodox IR analysts
in their emphasis upon perceptions of the traditionally considered variables
of power capabilities, domestic politics, and the international system. In a
subsequent work, Brecher (1980, pp. 30, 102) briefly alludes to what we here
term "national self-images." The focus, however, is on perceptions of the
enemy and conflict beliefs, and their connections to foreign policy which are
analyzed in illuminating ways.
The "Operational Code" framework explicated by George (1969) also
suggests attention to particularenemy perceptions and conflict beliefs. Much
subsequent research has indicated a relationship between these variables and
decision-making(George, 1979; Holsti, 1976). Thus, the "OperationalCode,"
which derives from Leites' (1953) classic study of Bolshevik perceptions and
beliefs and which, as richly explicated by George, has become an important
construct in the evolving field of psychology and IR, can help to illuminate
the sources of foreign policy. But it cannot, by itself, explain the interaction
dynamics between say, the Soviet Union and the United States, or the outcomes in conflicts between them. While useful for understanding decisionmaking, this framework does not focus upon conflict relations and does not
address the questions: how can states effectively produce change in adversaries; how can they move them from hostile to more cooperative approaches;
and how can they increase the probability of constructive outcomes in conflict situations? At the same time, Leites, George, and Holsti-the formulators, explicators, and operationalizers of the code, and pioneers in the
psychopolitical study of international relations-have provided a rich and
indispensable basis for the present study.
Several scholars have examined the impact of cognitive structure (in
contrast to the content of perceptions) upon decision-making. They have
found that cognitive complexity is related to the range of behaviors suggested by actors regarding international problems (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973)
and that integrative complexity diminishes preceding the outbreak of war
(Suedfeld et al., 1977). But they have not suggested that complexity is related to policies likely to result in constructive outcomes, a key concern here.
However, complexity has also been related to favorable responses regarding
Relations
Dimensionsof International
Psychopolitical
45
other nations(Hermann,1980)and such responsesare, indeed, likelyto be
associatedwith constructiveoutcomes. Extrapolatingfrom this work, one
can hypothesizethat highcomplexityis likelyto be associatedwiththe more
intermediatestrategiesexplicatedlaterin this essayandwithconstructiveoutcomes, and low complexitywith the more extremestrategiesand with destructiveoutcomes.
The studyof personalityand foreignpolicyhas a substantialhistoryto
which severalscholarshave recentlyadded. Hermann(1980)found aggressivebehaviorassociatedwithhighsuspiciousness,
andwiththe needfor power
and control;and conciliatorybehaviorwithlow suspiciousness,and withthe
need for affiliationand friendlyrelations.Etheredge(1978)found support
of threatand force, and exclusiveas opposedto inclusivepoliciesregarding
the SovietUnionrelatedto hostility,competitiveness,ambition,distrust,low
self-esteem,and the need for dominance.Their dichotomousconceptions
of aggressiveand conciliatorybehavioroverlap,albeitin a veryroughway,
with the conflict strategiesexplicatedbelow. The personalitytraitsto which
they point may thereforebe associatedwith particularstrategiesand with
differentoutcomes, suggestinga potentiallink betweensuch work and the
theory developedhere.
Focusingon the personalitiesof individualscan generateimportantand
usefuldata for decision-makersas they confrontparticularadversaries.The
predictivepower of this level of analysisconcerningstate behaviorand its
potential for theory-buildingregardinginternationalrelations is limited,
however,by the particularandoften idiosyncraticpersonalityconfigurations
of leaderswho happento be in power. Psychologicallyinformedtheories
of internationalrelationsthus need to establishthe ways in which conflict
strategiesand outcomesaredeterminedby perceptions,beliefs,and attitudes
held by parties and groups within nations, and which characterizebroad
schoolsof thoughtregardingforeignpolicythattranscendindividualleaders.
THE PRESENTTHEORY
The theorywe explicate,thoughit buildsupon previousefforts, differs
from and adds to them in severalways. First, it introduces,explicates,and
emphasizesnationalself-imagesas a crucialvariabledeterminingconflictbehavior. Second, with regardto perceptionsof enemies,it focuses on differencesin perceptionsbetweenpartiesto conflict regardingthe samepeoples,
issues, and events, and on the implicationsof these differencesfor conflict
dynamics.Previouswork has been concernedwith correctversusincorrect
46
Kaplowitz
perceptions. Third, it explicates the relationship between various kinds of
self-images and perceptions of enemies on the one hand, and different conflict strategies on the other, and presents a series of related hypotheses.
Fourth, it suggests the exploration of modal images and attitudes which transcend individual leaders and are likely to change only gradually. In this way,
the theory and related policy implications are not dependent upon and circumscribed by turnovers in individual leadership and by the idiosyncracies
of particular personalities.
The theoretical dimensions explicated in this essay are requirementsfor
analysis of the reciprocal interaction effects of parties to conflict using different strategies, as these strategies produce constructive and destructive outcomes (Kaplowitz, 1984). Such work necessitates the researcher'sengagement
in the analytical tasks delineated here regarding the perceptual and motivational underpinningsof conflict strategies. If scholars and policy-makersthen
come to understand the images, perceptions, and beliefs which determine
such strategies, and the outcomes which result from interactions of parties
using different strategies, we will be in a better position to construct theory,
make predictions, and design policies for bringing about constructive outcomes.6
NATIONAL SELF-IMAGES
How a People Sees Itself
Robert Lane (1969, p. 1), in his work on the needs and motives which
energize political thought and behavior, remarks that if you ask a man why
he believes what he does, he is likely to tell you about the world and not
about himself: ". . . he sees things that way because they are that way."
In the same way, a foreign policy decision-maker, in explaining why his nation behaves the way it does, is likely to tell you about others -their inten6A detaileddiscussionof the differentlevelsof analysisin IR studiesis beyondthe scopeof the
andstatelevelsinfluence
presentessay.We notelaterthata varietyof factorsat the international
conflicts.At the sametime, it is clearthat not all stateseven
foreignpoliciesand international
withthesamepoliticalandeconomiccharacteristics
behavein the samewaysin similarsituations.
Not all democraticor authoritarian,
capitalistor socialist,largeor smallstatesbehavesimilarly.
Nor is the relativelyanarchicinternational
systema sufficientconditionfor waror evencompetitivebehaviorsin all placesat all times.Hence,analysisof the psychological
andculturalvariables
of foreignpolicyand the amelioration
of internaexplicatedhereis crucialto an understanding
tionalconflicts.
Dimensionsof International
Relations
Psychopolitical
47
tions, their power, their character."We behave the way we do," he may
understandablydeclare,"becausewe operatein an anarchicalworld where
securityand, ultimately,survivalareat stake,wherepoweris thereforewhat
counts, and because we are faced with dangerous, deceptive, and unscrupulousenemies."
Thedispositionto look outwardat othersas an explanationfor one'sown
behaviorhas been expressed,interestinglyenough, even in the psychology
and IR literature,whereone might have expectedother emphasesas well,
since psychologydealsto such an importantextentwith the internalcauses
of behavior.Yet, in the psychologyand IR literature,"perceptionsof the
enemy"has been the predominantfocus. To the extentthat this enterprise
has penetratedconventionalmodesof analysisin IR, it has beenvia this construct.
Self-imageshave been largely ignored. Thus, in Holsti's (1976, pp.
is not evenmen130-43)thoroughliteraturereview,the concept"self-image"
tioned. Nor has there been much considerationof self-imagerysince. Yet,
class workin politicaland social psychology(Adornoet al., 1950;Erikson,
1950;Lane, 1962;Lasswell,1930;Leites,1953)andthe manyresultingstudies
[reviewedby Sniderman(1975, pp. 12-15)]have indicatedthat self-images
andself-esteemcan havecrucialbearinguponpoliticalattitudesandbehavior.
It is a basic assumptionof the theorypresentedhere that the ways in
whichpeoplesand groupswithinnationssee themselvesinfluencetheirconflict behaviorin directand indirect,consciousand unconsciousways. Particularlyimportantare the most salientaspectsof nationalself-imagery,the
positiveand negativeboundariesof suchimagery-i.e., what a peoplelikes
and dislikesabout itself, how it views its history, the resultant"lessons"it
has learned,its aspirationsand desires,the ways in which it may want to
change,its conceptionsof nationalpurposeandinterest,and its perceptions
of its powers and limits.
Nationalself-imagesare thus an importantdimensionof politicalculture and are transmittedby agentsof that culture.At the same time, they
are also psychologicalvariablesin that they are ultimatelyheld by individuals. The explorationof nationalself-imagerywill thus integrateinto studies
of internationalrelations,an importantcomponentof politicalculture.The
level of analysis,however,will be imagesand perceptions-variableswhich
can be moreeasilyoperationalized,and whoseinfluenceupon policycan be
more readilydiscerned,than is the case regardingthe moregeneralconcept
of political culture.
Some of the earlierclassic worksin politicalpsychologypointedto a
relationshipbetweenself-imagesand conflict behavior.Erikson(1950, pp.
48
Kaplowitz
365-82) presented intriguing hypotheses about Soviet behavior under Stalin
as reactions to Bolshevik images of traditional Russia, which included fatalism, pessimism, soul-bearing, and self-pity. He suggested a connection between such images and the Soviet effort at building a new "imagery of steel
[which] suggests incorruptiblerealism and enduring, disciplined struggle"and
to "behavior which underscores without cessation the incorruptibility of
Bolshevik perception, the long range of its vision, its steel-like clarity of decision, and the machine-like firmness of action."
Leites (1953) also pointed to connections between self-images, perceptions of enemies, and strategies of conflict, although he did not explicitly
use these terms or centrally organize his work around these concepts. He
did, however, discuss a whole array of Russian self-images and Bolshevik
perceptions of traditional Russia and its intelligentsia. These included tendencies toward persistent doubt, emotionalism, depressed passivity, substitution of talk for action, procrastination,credulity, and fatalism. Leites linked
these images to such Bolshevik maxims, tactics, and "Operational Codes"
as emphasizing the correctness of the party line; excluding feelings from political calculations; guarding against perceiving facts in terms of wishes and
fears; being blunt, sharp, brief, and rude; actively struggling; and suspecting others. What counted in determining Bolshevik conflict behavior was
not the degree of validity in these images-but rather that these were the
Bolshevik images. Such images can change although, in most cases, quite
slowly. In such cases, conflict behavior will also change.
Ralph K. White (1970) later discussed virile and moral self-images
among parties to the Vietnam War and their relationships to militant positions. Virile images include military overconfidence, preoccupation with prestige, fear of humiliation, and concern with declining status. Moral images
comprise attributions of great virtue, truthfulness, blamelessness, and peaceableness to the self.
Despite these suggestive examples, there has been very little work which
relates national self-imagery to foreign policy and conflict processes. There
are several reasons, I believe, why this crucial factor has been ignored. First,
self-images are less obviously and directly related to foreign policy than are
perceptions of others who are the objects of that policy. There is a natural,
cognitively-rooted tendency, as attribution theory emphasizes, to point to
others and to situational variables as explanations for one's own behavior.
Haradstveit's work (1979, p. 55) suggests the refinement that actors tend to
explain their own "good" behavior in dispositional terms but "bad"behavior
in situational terms. Thus, there is still the tendency to ignore the self as an
explanatory factor regarding that "bad" behavior which is so crucial in international relations. Second, there is often a powerful disposition, as depthpsychological theory emphasizes, to ignore the role of one's own underlying
Relations
Dimensionsof International
Psychopolitical
49
needsand motivesin determiningattitudesand behavior,particularlywhen
suchacknowledgmentwouldresultin discomfort,embarrassment,or anxiety. Third, the very idea that self-imagesaffect behaviorimpliesthat one's
own nation may sometimesbe responsible,at least to some degree,for the
intensity, severity,and even "irrational"natureof conflicts with othersconsiderations
in the particularsensethat other-than-"objective"
"irrational"
or the behaviorof the opponentaccount for, or add a sharpedge to, the
conflict.Fourth,earlierstudiesof self-imageryandconflictbehaviorby Adorno, Erikson, and Leites were to a substantialdegree psychoanalytically
oriented-an approachsubsequentlyresistedin the social sciences.
George (1969), who explicatedand effectivelymade the case for the
continuingrelevanceof the "OperationalCode"construct,accordinglynoted that researcherscould explorethe relatedbeliefsand perceptionswithout
necessarilyacceptingthe psychoanalytic
premisesembeddedin the Leiteswork
from whichthe approachwas derived.The "OperationalCode,"as formalized by George,stressesbeliefsaboutconflictand perceptionsof the enemy.
It does not referto the nationalandgroupself-imagesor to the psychodynamic processesalludedto by Leites.At the sametimeGeorge(1969,pp. 195-96),
in his accompanyingcommentary,notes the effects of unconsciousmotives
and defenses againstthem upon manifest beliefs.
National self-imagesmay also be exploredwithoutnecessarilyengaging in depth-psychological
analysis.Thereare importantmanifestand cognitive aspectsof self-imagerywhich influenceinternationalbehavior, and
there are sometimesquite directand readilyobservableconnectionsin this
regard.The assumptionof a linkbetweenself-imagesand behavior,however,
also pointsimplicitlyto underlyingdimensionsand processes.If self-images
influencebehavior,they often do so indirectlyand in ways which are not
so readilyrecognized.Moreover,particularself-imagesmay be generatedby
underlyingneedsfor self-esteemandshapedby culturallyinfluencedrequirements for the achievementof such esteem. The expressionof such needs,
in turn, may be affected by a varietyof defense mechanisms(Rosenberg,
1979, pp. 55-56). Otherunconsciousmotivesentailingneeds for powerand
prestige-as ends in themselves-may also play a role in generatingselfimages.Widespreaddesiresto changewhat are perceivedto be undesirable
characteristicsof the nation may generaterelatedneeds. These underlying
aspectsof self-imagery,whichhave an importantaffectivecomponent,can
be crucialin determiningpoliticalbehavior.National self-images,because
they compriseimportantmanifestand underlying,cognitiveand affective
dimensions,and becausethey influencebehaviorin directand indirect,conscious and unconsciousways, providea key constructfor bridgingthe gap
betweencognitiveand depth-psychologicalanalysesof foreign policy attitudes and behavior.
50
Kaplowitz
Analysis of self-images is required for a thorough understanding of the
concerns which underlie policies. Such understanding, in turn, is essential
for interpretingthe meaning of a state's behavior- a point increasinglyrecognized in psychology and IR studies (e.g., Hermann, 1985, pp. xviv, 3-21;
Lebow and Stein, 1987, pp. 18, 45). Resultant knowledge may then be used
in the formulation of appropriate strategies for dealing with adversaries.
From work in political and social psychology, I have inferred two guiding propositions about the relationshipbetween self-images and conflict strategies: (1) the more grandiose the manifest, and negative the often underlying
self-images, the greater the disposition toward a totalist strategy, one which
requirestotal victory and implies total defeat for the other. Conversely, (2) the
more positive the self-images, the greater the tendency toward a firm-bycooperative strategy, one which aims at mutually satisfying outcomes in conflict situations.7 These propositions are elaborated and refined in the discussion of conflict strategies below.8
It is not only the degree of grandiose or negative self-imagery which
is important in determining conflict behavior. It is what is regarded as positive or what is disliked and why that is especially important in determining
such behavior. Do leaders and peoples feel they have been too passive and
weak, for example, too vulnerable to oppression, domination, humiliation,
or even physical annihilation? Do they feel they can recoup periods of past
greatness, that they deserve more in the present world, or that they can "do
7Forrelevantworkin politicaland socialpsychology,see Lane(1962,p. 156),citingRedland
Wineman(1957)on the connectionbetweenweakego strengthandlow self-estimates,andaggressivepersonalities;Adornoet al. (1950),concerningthe relationshipbetweenego weakness
and, by implication,low self-esteem,anda dispositiontowardoutgroupaggression;the related thesisin Levinson(1957);Erikson's(1956,p. 82) themeconcerningthe relationshipbetween
whathe termsoutwornor unfinishedidentitiesandthe wagingof holywarsthroughunlimited
worksuggeststhe
means;Deutsch's(1962,p. 107)conversepropositionthat "Psychoanalytic
capacityto understandratherthanto condemnis largelydeterminedby the individual'ssense
of self-esteem,by his abilityto cope withthe externalproblemsfacinghim, and by his sense
in overcominghis owndefects";Kohlberg's
of resoluteness
(1964,pp. 382-431)consonantfinding
that self-esteemis relatedto the abilityto empathizewithothersandto moralconduct,as cited by Lane(1969, p. 193);White's(1970)discussionof virile(or omnipotent)and moral(or
of militants;Etheredge's(1978)findings
self-righteous)imagerywhichhe findscharacteristic
regardingpersonalitycorrelatesof foreignpolicy attitudes;and the numerousreferencesin
Sniderman(1975,pp. 12-15)concerningthe relationshipbetweenself-esteemand politicalbehavior.
8Animplicitcorollaryto the firstpropositionassumesa relationshipbetweenmanifestgrandiose and underlyingnegativeself-images.The reasoningentailedis that grandioseself-images
areoftencompensations
or low self-esteem
for, or reactionformationsto, negativeself-imagery
which is usuallyrepressedbut may sometimesbecomemanifest.
Dimensionsof International
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Psychopolitical
51
anything"they want if only they have the "will"to do it? The exploration
of self-imagerythereforerequiresqualitativeanalysis. Quantitativeassessments may be useful for furthermeasuringintensitiesand for precisecomparisons(Holsti, 1976,pp. 136-37;George, 1979,p. 105).Knowledgeof the
contentof such imagesis also crucialto the formulationof effectivestrategies for dealingwith adversariesand for movingconflictpatternsin cooperative directions.
Negativeself-imageshavea specialimpactuponconflictbehavior.They
often generatecompensatingdefensiveattitudeswhichareespeciallyevoked
in conflictsituations.Conflictalso providesopportunitiesto proveself-worth
throughassertive,aggressive,and defiant behavior.
Alternatively,what a peoplelikes about itself may affect its demands
and expectationsregardingothers, and shape criteriafor evaluatingthem.
Lebow(1981,pp. 202-20)notesthe flatteringimageswhichnationsoften have
of themselvesand showshow suchimages,harboredby Americanand Indian decision-makers,gave riseto misleadingexpectationsconcerningChinese
behaviorin the Koreanand Sino-IndianWars.
Imagesof one'sown powersand limitsare also importantis determinconflict
behavior.Underestimationscan resultin unnecessaryacquiesing
cence to others. Exaggerations-more often the case in international
relations- can give riseto policiesof overextensionandto nationaldisasters.
Self-imagesbecomeoperativein the developmentof conflictorientations
and strategieswhennationalleaders,importantdecision-makers,andprominent opinion elites reflect them. Often importantself-imagesare common
to groups of leaders and elites, and characterizeparticular"schools of
thought"regardingforeign policy. We may then speak of modal images.
Perceptionsof History
Perceptionsof historyare a second importantdimensionof national
self-imagery.They can generatepowerfulneeds to avoid past experiences
whichare felt as humiliating,dangerous,or deadly(Jonesand Rosen, 1982,
pp. 130-50;Leites, 1953;May, 1973;Pye, 1968). Those aspectsof history
aboutwhicha peoplefeelsmostdisturbedcangiveriseto demandsfor change
whichare expressedparticularlyin conflict behavior.Theremay be a sense
of inadequacyor powerlessnessabout periodsof oppression,colonialism,
defeat, or even slippagefrom previousstatus. Theremay be shameabout
one's forebearsand the waysin which, it is perceived,they behavedtoward
oppressorsor conquerors. Such images can generate needs to prove to
52
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others -and most importantly to the self-that one's people is not inherently weak or inferior.
Nations which have experiencedrepeated defeats or long periods of subjugation and persecution may pursue conflict-and pursue it in particular
ways- in order to regain or maintain self-esteem. A similar process may occur if leaders and decision-makers are particularly concerned with honor,
prestige, or declining status, or if they believe their nations have become too
soft, passive, or undisciplined. Barber (1972, pp. 78-95, 129-42, 347-65,
424-42) provides some intriguing data in this regard. In such cases, personal
concerns will reverberate with sensitive modal chords in the larger political
culture which are reflected by significant groups within the nation.
Perceptions of history which are humiliating can lead to quests for a
veritable "New (or Renewed or Old-New) Man" who will restore honor, dignity, and strength to the nation - and who will also demand and gain respect
from the rest of the world (Erikson, 1950, pp. 359-402; Leites, 1953; Pye,
1968). The quest for a "New Man"is rooted in universalneeds for self-esteem.
There is widespreadagreementamong various schools in psychology regarding
the need for such esteem (Sniderman, 1975). These needs are also shaped
by particular cultures and histories. Needs for self-esteem may be aggravated by examples of technologically advanced, heavily industrialized, highly
modernized, and militarily successful societies, images of which are now
projected universally by a worldwide network of communications media.
These needs for self-esteem are a largely unrecognized and unexplored but
crucial source of international behavior.
Perceptions of history can also generate desires to recapture periods
of past glory. Such perceptions can ironically give rise to a questioning of
present self-worth since the nation may no longer be perceived as great. But
they can also be a source of encouragement for the future: "If once we were
great, surely we can be great again." Harking back to periods of past glory
can sometimes lead to grandiose blueprints for the future. Thus, the creation and recreation of peoples can have immense effects upon international
behavior.
Conceptions of National Interest
Conceptions of national interest comprise a third dimension of national self-imagery. Traditional IR theory has tended to assume that the meaning of the term "national interest" is self-evident-that "interests" are an
objective category and can be objectively determined (Morgenthau, 1960,
pp. 5-8). Despite much criticism, this particular view continues to substantially influence scholars and practitioners, so that many still use the term
Dimensionsof International
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"nationalinterest"as if it referredsolelyto mattersof fact and not to preferences or values.
It can be empiricallydemonstrated,however,that thereare often significantdifferencesconcerningwhatthe nationalinterestsare and how they
should be ordered.Different states and leaderswithin states, in relatively
similarsituations,often espousedifferentgoals. In addition,thereareusually competingsubgoalswhichcompriseoverarchingconceptionsof national
interest and there are often serious disagreementsconcerningtrade-offs
(Georgeand Keohane, 1980, p. 219).
Now, thereare somegeneralconceptionsof interestwhicharevirtually
universal,suchas maintainingthe existenceand securityof states.9If one asserts that "the state'sexistenceis a nationalinterest"and "a governmentis
actingin the nationalinterestif it preservesthe state'sexistence,"one is close
to statingmattersof fact sincealmostall peoplesand decision-makers
desire
that theirstatescontinueto exist. Oncewe get beyondthis not veryusefulor
informativelevelof generality,however,we findsignificantdifferencesregarding nationalinterests.If there is widespreadagreementon preservationof
the "nationalself,"thereis sometimesdisagreementconcerningthe "wayof
life"to be preserved.At times thereis even controversyregardingthe territory of the "nationalself" whose existenceis so widely desired.There are
also differencesconcerningthe amountsof securityactorsdesireandtheprices
they are willingto pay (Jervis, 1978,p. 174).This is to say nothingof ubiquitous differencesconcerningmeans for achievingaims.
Statementsaboutnationalinterestswhichseemto suggestthat suchinterestsarean objectivecategory,often stemimplicitlyfrompredictionsabout
whatwouldhappenif the stateconcernedengagedin or refrainedfrom particularactions, and from the valueswhich would be realizedor damaged.
Suchvaluesand predictions,in turn, are heavilyinfluencedby nationalselfimages, perceptionsof others, culturallyinducedbeliefs about appropriate
behaviorin conflictsituations,andexpectationsaboutwhatis possible.These
psychologicaland culturalfactorsthushelpto determinethe valenceattached
to particulargoals- pieces of territoryfor example- and to the means for
achievingthem.
Failureto understandthe intensitiesof attachmentto goals often stems
frominsufficientattentionto suchpsychologicalandculturalinfluencesupon
policy. This inattention,in turn, can lead to crucialfailuresof deterrence
(George,1980,pp. 69-72;Jervis,1979,p. 306;Lebow,1985a)to self-defeating
policies, and even to strategicdisasters(Stein, 1985a, 1985b).Conversely,
knowledgeof the psychologicaland culturalinfluencesupon an adversary's
91am indebtedto the late NathanLeitesfor commentsconcerningthe discussionin this and the
followingparagraphon nationalinterests.
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54
policies can be immenselyuseful in the developmentof effective strategies
for dealing with him (Kaplowitz,1984).
Both the 1967and 1973warsin the MiddleEast occurred,in part, because Egypt, in the first case, did not initiallycomprehendthe intensityof
Israel'sconvictionabout the necessityfor overcominga perceivedthreatto
nationalexistence;and Israel,in the second case, did not sufficientlycomprehendthe degreeof Egypt'scommitmentto regainingterritoryandrecouping national honor. Accordingly,neitherparty adequatelyunderstoodthe
extentto whichthe other was impelledto take greatrisks. Whilesome theoristshavearguedthat suchbreakdownsof deterrenceare exceptions,these
exceptionshavegreatlyinfluencedthe shapeof internationalrelationstoday
and may well influencethe fate of the worldtomorrow.Understandingthe
other'sconceptionsof his nationalinterestsand the valenceshe attachesto
particulargoals is crucialif actorsareto deviseeffectivepoliciesfor dealing
with adversariesand if they are to enhancethe possibilitiesfor constructive
outcomes.
Criticsof psychologyand IR have often accusedthis enterpriseof ignoring "real"conflicts of interestand of assumingthat bitter disputesare
"merely"the products of "misunderstanding."
Psychopoliticalanalysis,
however,adds a crucialdimensionto traditionalthinkingon these matters.
It focuseson whatdeterminesconceptionsof nationalinterestsuchthat very
realconflictsdo occurthat often lead to destructiveinteractions.In particular, it indicatesthe waysin whichpsychologicalandculturalfactorsinfluence
conceptionsof interestand consequentinteractions.This mode of analysis
is then able to suggestwaysin whichresultantknowledgecan be usedto design policies more likely to make for constructiveoutcomes.
PERCEPTIONSOF ENEMIES
Muchof the workin psychologyand IR until now has focusedon perceptionsof enemies.The most salientperceptionsand particularlythose of
an enemy'saims, power,determination,andperseveranceareof obviousimportancein determiningbehaviortoward him.
Misperceptions
Therehas beenparticularemphasison misperceptionsor gapsbetween
"imageand reality."To the extentthat specifichypotheseshavebeengenerated, they pertainlargelyto misperceptions(Jervis, 1968; McGowanand
Shapiro, 1973, pp. 181-186).Much of this work has been concernedwith
the waysin whichperceptionscan be distortedby cognitiveprocesses(Axelrod, 1976; Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1985;Steinbrenner,1974). These include
Dimensionsof International
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strivings for consistency, the role of central beliefs and expectations in this
regard, the assimilation of incoming data to such pre-existing beliefs, and
the ways in which discrepant information is denied, explained away, or ignored; misplaced analogies from the past; premature cognitive closure; postdecisional rationalization to reduce dissonance; the failure to recognize
trade-offs; the avoidance of difficult choices; and incrementalchanges in images rather than fundamental rethinking (Lebow, 1981, pp. 102-107).
Depth-psychological theories add to cognitive explanations, the role of
underlying needs and related defense mechanisms. The needs most relevant
to international attitudes are those for aggression, power, esteem, rectitude,
and, to a lesser extent, affection. The most relevant defenses are the denial
of unpleasant realities; reaction formation, in attitude and behavior, in a
direction opposite from underlying feelings, images, or dispositions about
which one is anxious or embarrassed, or which would evoke personal or social disapproval; the projection onto others of one's own underlying motives
and attitudes, usually of an aggressivenature; and the rationalizationof egoistic or aggressive behavior in socially approved terms.
The concern with misperceptions in the psychology and IR literature
follows naturally from the focus upon decision-making as the primary dependent variable in most studies. It stems in particular from the premise that
correct perceptions are the key to rational and effective policies. Now, it is
indeed quite possible to correctly assess "reality"regardingsome tangible factors pertinent to policy formulation such as the level of armaments in a country or, more precisely, the numbers of tanks and planes it has. Even regarding
certain intangible factors such as the intentions of nations or the character
of leaders, it can sometimes be said, with varying degrees of assurance, that
particular perceptions are distorted or incorrect.
The intentions and attitudes of actors, however, are often manifold and
multilayered, and sometimes confused, inconsistent, or ambivalent, as well
as fluid and evolving. A certain perception may be correct regarding one
aspect of an enemy's position but incorrect regarding another. Consider, for
example, the perceptions "the Arab world or particularArab states are ready
to coexist with Israel" and "the Arab world or particular Arab states and
organizations are determined to ultimately destroy Israel"-two views which
form the core of highly contentious policy debates among involved parties.
The evidence in this regard, however, has been sufficiently complex and
ambiguous - when attainable and reliable - that resolution of the question,
as stated, has been difficult if not impossible. Most importantly, if one takes
into account latent as well as manifest attitudes and they turn out to differ,
both of the above perceptions can be true to a degree. This may even be the
case if one asks these questions with respect to particular actors - for example, Egypt and the PLO-entities to which many observers have been more
disposed to attach one of the above perceptions. Students of the Middle East
are familiar with disagreements among decision-makers and scholars regard-
Kaplowitz
56
ing the positions of the PLO and Egypt, even when they are exposed by and
large to the same data, even after the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and even following the declarations of the PLO in 1988. Similar observations could be made about Soviet attitudes regarding the West.
This is not to say that strong arguments cannot be made one way or
the other on such matters. Indeed, policy-makershave to make and weigh such
arguments. At the same time, interpretations of relevant data can be substantially affected by underlying assumptions, central beliefs, previously held
theories about conflict (Jervis, 1976), core perceptions of the enemy, prior
experiences, and related cognitive schema (Larson, 1985), as well as by anxiety, stress, and exposure to threat (George, 1980, pp. 47-49). Moreover, such
interpretationsmay be importantly influenced by an actor's own needs, goals,
and aspirations which stem, in part, from its self-images. Finally, the adversary's intentions may themselves be affected by, and change as a result of,
one's own attitudes and behavior.
Differences in Perception
Such analyticalproblems notwithstanding,studies of misperceptionhave
greatly enriched our understanding of foreign policy decision-making and
the difficulties involved. If one's primary concern, however, is to understand
the dynamics of confict and the strategies most likely to be effective in transforming destructive into constructive processes, then it is also crucial to focus upon the differences in perceptions of parties to conflict. Then one needs
to analyze the differences with which parties perceive the same issues, events,
policies, and peoples. To be exclusively concerned with which position on
such complex matters is more in accord with reality-or, as Stagner (1965,
p. 49) puts it, "Who is really right about this?"- will not adequatelyilluminate
conflict dynamics or suggest strategies that can yield constructive outcomes.
The actors involved in the Soviet-American and Arab-Israeli conflicts,
for example, have perceived and interpreted capitalism, socialism, Palestinian nationalism, and Zionism in different ways. The same is the case regarding
perceptionsof formative events such as World War II or the 1948 Arab-Israeli
War, important issues such as nuclear strategies or the territories taken by
Israel in the 1967 War, and various policies concerning these issues such as
the Strategic Defense Initiative or the Begin Autonomy Plan. These views
may well entail distorted perceptions and "selective inattention." Both cognitive processes and motivational dynamics play a part in generating such
misperceptions. Illuminating these sources of misperception can further our
understanding of policy-making processes among the respective actors. If
one wants to understandthe dynamics of these conflicts and the requirements
for more productive outcomes, however, one also needs to analyze the differ-
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ences in the actors'perceptionsof the above symbols, ideologies, political
movements,and socioeconomicsystems,and why the actorsperceivethem
as they do. Analysis of such differencesis crucialto a thoroughunderstandingof conflict patterns.
Attemptingto assess gaps between"imageand reality"can, in some
respects,be an irrelevantand evenmisleadingfocus regardingsuchmatters.
Often more useful and feasible, for purposesof analyzingconflict dynamics, is to portraythe gaps in perceptionbetweenthe parties- the interacting
subjectivities.How do they perceiveand evaluatetheirown and the other's
strength,character,intentions,trustworthiness,perseverance,and attitudes
towardissues?What is the meaningwhichthey attachto events?And why
aretheredifferencesin this regard?Understandingthesegapscan be of crucial importancein findingwaysout of interlockingbinds, devisingstrategies
for alteringconflictprocesses,and openingup newpossibilitiesfor constructive outcomes.
The Boundariesof Perceptions
What each party most dislikesabout the other can be a particularly
importantsourceof behavior.Negativeperceptionsarealso the most salient
ones for actorsin conflict.Moreover,suchperceptionsareespeciallyresilient
(Jervis,1976,pp. 310-15;White, 1970,pp. 310-19).Positiveperceptionscan
pointto potentialgroundsfor cooperation.In bitterdisputes,however,even
what is liked or admiredabout the other can heightenenvy and exacerbate
conflict.
Perceptionsof History
Perceptionsof the historyof relationswith others can influencecurrent attitudesand add a decisiveedge to them. Historymay teach "lessons"
about the need for caution, suspicion,and toughness.It may teach special
"lessons"about particularenemiesor categoriesof otherssuch as "aggresor "imperialists."
These"lessons"arethen
sors,""capitalists,"
"Communists,"
appliedto currentpolicies, sometimesappropriately,but at othertimes on
the basis of misleadinganalogies(Brewer,1975;Jervis, 1976, pp. 217-82).
Legitimacyand Authenticityof the Other
One of the most importantaspectsof enemy perceptions,largelyignoredin the literature,is the degreeof legitimacywhicheach partyaccords
the other (for exceptions see Bronfenbrenner,1961; Rapoport, 1960, p.
58
Kaplowitz
299-367; and Snyder and Diesing, 1977, pp. 299-310). This aspect of perceptions of the enemy feeds back into the formulation of one's own aims and
choice of means. In extreme cases, parties may completely derogate the
legitimacy of the other's claims and even the authenticity of his identity and
existence. Such positions give rise to total conflict in which each side attempts
to completely eliminate the other's political and sometimes physical existence.
In less extreme cases, accordance of legitimacy ranges from minimal to substantial, with important differential effects on conflict strategies and interaction dynamics.
Knowledge of how parties to conflict view themselves and each other,
and of differences in perceptions of the same issues and objects, the dimensions of which we have explicated here, is requiredfor an understandingboth
of the behavior of actors and of the interaction dynamics between them. Such
knowledge may then be used to inform strategies for coping more effectively and constructively with adversaries. It is to an analysis of such strategies
that we now turn.
STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT
The Policy Relevance of Psychology and IR
Scholars who advocate the study of psychological and cultural dimensions of international relations have had a difficult time answering the question, "what can be done with such information?" To be sure, this is not the
only approach to IR which has experienced such difficulties. At the same
time, most scholars in this subfield are decidedly interested in analyses which
will have a salutary effect upon international conflict and they expect that
this domain will be policy-relevant.
Early works which suggested the ways in which perceptions could be
distorted by defense mechanisms had difficulty in indicating what could be
feasibly done about such processes that would have beneficial effects on
the international level. There were suggestions for changes in child-rearing,
for emotional as well as intellectual understanding of the aggressive impulses
which presumably result in war, and for the complete suppression of these
impulses altogether through the establishment of collective security systems
(Durbin and Bowlby, 1939; Glover, 1933). These prescriptions,however, were
either ineffective, unfeasible, or at best, entailed very long-term projects
(Claude, 1962, pp. 94-204, is the classic analysis of the failure of collective
security).
One of the results was what might be termed an "if only" approach
to policy-if only peoples and leaders would be less defensive, more under-
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standing, and more realistic in their perceptions of enemies: "If the people
on each side could recognize the extent to which their own actions serve to
provoke and frighten the other side, instead of placing all the blame on the
'enemy'. . .. " (Gladstone, 1959, p. 136). Critics reflecting the Realist tradition in IR took particular aim at these "if only" implications (Waltz, 1954:
42-79).
More recent, largely cognitive analyses, interestingly and surprisingly
enough, have not proceeded very much beyond a contemporary version of
these earlier prescriptions, as they suggest that decision-makers become more
thoughtful, aware of perceptual errors, and sensitive to alternative explanations (Axelrod, 1976, pp. 224-25; Jervis, 1976, pp. 410-15, 423-24; Kinder
and Weiss, 1978, pp. 228-30). Such suggestionscan perhaps aid policy-makers,
if they are reflected upon, and help to render decision-making processes more
sophisticated. At the same time, virtually all schools of psychology would
agree that urging others to be more thoughtful and reflective is not a sufficient prescription for changing deeply rooted or substantially reinforced
processes. Brodie (1973, p. 307) asserted in this vein that even if one knew
what emotions were at work in making for war, this would not make any
difference since "repressedmaterial is not available for being swayed by arguments of reason. .. ."
To know such sources of international behavior, however, can make
a difference. Such knowledge, most importantly, affords an understanding
of the underlying determinants of behavior. This understanding can then be
used to shape strategies for dealing with others more effectively and in ways
more likely to lead to constructive outcomes. The underlying sources of an
adversary'sbehavior may not be amenable to verbal persuasion and reasoned
argument (Janis and Smith, 1965, pp. 188-235). But they can be influenced
by one's own behavior. The most fundamental way in which states can
mitigate or aggravate the psychological and cultural sources of hostility in
adversariesis through their own strategies of conflict. These are still the most
important levers in international relations. In this respect, psychopolitical
analysis necessarilydovetails with the more traditionalstudy of conflict
strategies.
The small-group problem-solving workshop can be an effective setting
for exploring, in depth, the concerns of parties to conflict and for generating new ideas about conflict resolution (Kelman, 1972, pp. 168-204). Coming to better comprehend the underlying psychological and cultural sources
of conflict behavior can be one of the benefits of such workshops, both for
the participants and the social scientists who conduct them. As Kelman himself has observed, however, such a setting cannot substitute for ultimate interaction at the governmental level. It is at this point that conflict strategies
come decisively into play.
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We proceed,therefore,to explicatesuch strategies.In this explication
we emphasizethe psychologicaldynamicsandthe consequencesfor strategy
whichstem fromparticularkindsof self-imagesand perceptionsof enemies,
and elaborateupon previouswork (Kaplowitz,1984, pp. 376-84).
Conflictorientationsaredispositionsto achieveparticularaimsand to
act towardsadversariesin particularways. Conflict strategiesare the plans
and actions designedto achievethese aims. They are defined here by such
aimswhichcan rangefrom total victory,throughmutualsatisfaction,to appeasementof the otherparty.Theyarefurtherdistinguishedby whetherfundamentalaimsareto be achievedin the shortor long run, andby differences
between manifest aims and latent attitudes. Strategiesare colored by the
meansemployed,whichrangefrom negativesanctionsthroughpositiveinducements.
Thetheorypropoundedhereassumesthatconflictorientationsinfluence
strategies,though there is not necessarilya one-to-onerelationshipin this
regard.A varietyof situationaland organizationalvariablesat the international and statelevelsof analysisand whicharewell-knownto international
relationistsalso come into play. These includedomesticpolitical and economicfactors;bureaucraticandorganizationalstruggles;powercapabilities;
the availabilityof particularmeans;the geographicalproximityof enemies;
the attitudesof importantthirdparties;and regionaland internationalconfigurationsand constraints.All of these variablesmay influencethe timing
of specific actions and may make difficult or precludebehavingin accord
with a particularconflict orientation.
This pluralityof determinantsnotwithstanding,theorycan best be advancedby focusingupon eachparticulardomainof variablesthat influences
behaviorandby probingas deeplyandextensivelyas possibleits effects.Most
of the advancesin social sciencetheoriesin general,and IR theoriesin particular,have been achievedin this way. It is then that the influenceof each
domain may be placed in a broadercontext.
Particularconflictorientationsaredeterminedby differentkindsof selfimagesand perceptionsof enemies.Theseorientations,as mediatedby situational variables,give rise to strategies.Core self-imagesand perceptions
of enemiesheld by individualsand groups,whichare then reflectedin broad
"schoolsof thought"and relatedapproachesto foreignpolicy, tend to be
relativelystable(Gamsonand Modigliani,1971,pp. 92-108;George, 1980,
p. 57; Rokeach,1968;Steinbrenner,1974,pp. 102-03).Yet suchimagesand
perceptionscan also change-usually over considerableperiodsof time but
occasionallyas the resultof traumaticor catastrophicevents(Deutschand
Merrit, 1965). They then give rise to changedorientationsand strategies.
Since differentpoliticalgroupswithin nations often hold differentimages
and perceptions,conflict orientationsand strategiesmay sometimeschange
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to a certainextent, and occasionallyeven to a considerabledegree, when
governmentschange.
Totalist Strategy
A totalist strategyis characterizedby the aim of, and often obsession
with, total wins regardingbasic issuesin conflict. Nothing less will suffice.
Totalism thus often entails complete eliminationor subordinationof the
other.
Proponentsof suchstrategiesemphasizethreatsandpunishmentsalmost
exclusivelyfor both logical and psychologicalreasons:logical, becauseit
would be difficultif not impossibleto promiseor rewardan adversarywith
anythingthat would make worthwhileacquiescencein his own demise;and
psychological,becausepositive inducementswould threatento undermine
the singlenessof purposeand completeindifferenceto the fate of the other
which are necessaryto the sustainingof totalist positions. Positive inducements would be threateningto the very psychologyof totalism.
Totalistpositionsderivefrom highlynegativeand monolithicpercepviewed as intrinsicallyevil, intions of the enemy. He is characteristically
no rightto the attainmentof
with
herentlyaggressive,or basicallyinferior,
the
other's
of
legitimacyand authenany of his aims. Absolutederogation
often becomeentotalist
actors
ticity arethe hallmarksof totalism. Indeed,
own
nations
who
their
accordeventhe
within
ragedby individualsor groups
slightestdegreeof legitimacyto the other'spositions.Suchaccordance,they
deeplyfear, will not only projectirresolutionto the enemy, but even more
importantly,will erode the validityof their own totalist demands.
Totalismis also generatedby exaggerated
positive,grandiose,andsometimes even megalomaniacself-images.Totalist actorsbelievenot only that
they are completelyrightand deservingof total victory, but also that they
are virtually omnipotent and always capable of achieving such victory.
Moreover,thereis often a finalityto totalistexpectations;the resultsof victorywillbe perpetuatedforever.Thesegrandioseaspectsof self-imagerymay
serveto compensatefor negativeself-imageswhichpertainto victimization,
passivity,fatalism,and weakness,and whichgive riseto damagedself-esteem
(Erikson, 1950, pp. 326-402; Leites, 1953). The negative aspects of selfimageryare often repressed,suppressed,or denied,thoughthey may sometimes become manifest.
Totalismcan thusdevelopas a reactionto underlyingfeelingsof powerlessnessor to recentperiodsof degradation,frustration,and humiliation.
withthe past,especiallyif coupledwithbitternessabout
Intensedissatisfaction
the presentand compoundedby uncertaintyaboutthe future,is particularly
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conduciveto the adoptionof totalist positionsin determinedbut also frantic questsfor compensation,certainty,and greatness(Erikson,1956,p. 82).
Long-RunTotalist Strategy
Occasionally,totalistactorscometo believethat it is necessaryto postpone completevictory.The enemy,it is thought,has too muchstayingpower and any attemptsto completelydefeat him in the short run would entail
an unacceptablepriceor resultin one's own defeat. This is especiallyso in
the nuclearera when much of internationalconflict occursbetweenthe superpowers,betweenstates at least one of whichpossessesnuclearweapons,
or betweenactors who are associatedwith the superpowersas allies, proteges, or clients.Thus, bilateral,regional,and internationalpowerconfigurationsmay be perceivedas preventingthe immediaterealizationof totalist
aims.Suchaimsmustthereforebe approachedgraduallyandvictoryachieved
in stages.
Long-runtotalistsstill emphasizethreatand force, however,sinceadversarieswill be reluctantto move even graduallytowardtheir own demise
merelybecause of an actor'swillingnessto negotiateover interimstages.
Moreover,negativesanctionsas well as stridentpropagandaare also affectively consonantwith, and help to sustain, the underlyingtotalist disposition. Thus, althoughan attenuatedform of coexistencemay be tolerated
for some time, full satisfactionrequiresthe other'scompleteeliminationor
defeat.
Perceptionsof the enemyarehighlynegative,but they differregarding
the enemy'sstaying power from those of totalists. Moreover,perceptions
are not so totally monolithicthat even interimagreementsare impossibleto
suffer. Still, little if any legitimacyis accordedthe enemy. Ultimately,it is
believed,he does not deserveto exist-at least not in his odious political,
sociocultural,or economic form.
Self-imagestend to be grandiose,though not so exaggeratedas to induce a belief that total victory can be achievedin the short run. As with
totalists,grandiositymayserveto compensatefor negativeself-images,usually
underlying.These self-imagesare also not so exaggeratedas to generatea
compulsionto act immediatelyin a totalist fashion, in orderto compensate
for innerfeelingsof weaknessor to gain someimmediatesenseof self-worth.
Thenegativeself-imagesmayevenhavebecomerecentlyattenuated,andsuch
actors may be better able to postpone the achievementof victorybecause
they have experiencedsome partialvictories,increasedpower,and recognition by others.
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and Deterrent-PunitiveStrategies
Competitive-Use-of-Force
A third set of strategiesaims at maximizingone's gains regardlessof
lossesto the other.At the sametime, proponentswill acceptsomethingless,
and usuallysubstantiallyless, than total victory. The literatureon conflict
strategieshastraditionallyemphasizedthosethat entailcompetitiveaimsand
negativemeans,both as objectsof studyandas prescriptionsfor policy.This
thruststemsfromthe orthodoxand still influentialRealistparadigmin IRone whichbecameparamountfollowingthe traumaof WorldWar II, embodied a reactionto the idealism,pacifism, and isolationismof the interwaryears,and was particularlysuitedto the Cold War.Thisparadigmhighsystemand
lightsthe conditionsof anarchyand insecurityin the international
the
if
it
does
not
exclude
the
de-emphasizes importance,
altogether, possibility of cooperativerelationsamongnations.At the veryleast,it downgradesthe
canbecomepredominant
possibilitythatthismodeof relationship
amongstates.
The minimalprescriptiveimplicationis the pursuitof a balanceof powerof power(Claude,1962,pp.
frequentlydefinedin practiceas preponderance
and
its
in
extension
the
nuclear
era-deterrence.
13-16)
Sometimes,the
logical
literaturehasgone furtherand emphasizedthe winningof conflicts(Schelling,
1960).
The maximizingof gains, especially in relativelyanarchic systems
characterizedby the "securitydilemma,"usuallyinvolvesattemptsto compel the otherto do somethingor, at the veryleast,to deterhim fromengaging
in particularactions.In a competitivestrategy,actorsstriveto win as much
as possible. In a deterrentstrategy,they aim at preventingthe enemyfrom
taking as much as he can. Winningas much as possible almost alwaysinvolves the use of force. Deterringothers from taking as much as they can
often involves the use of punishments.In both competitiveand deterrent
strategies,the thrustis upon demandingandforcing the otherto do or not
to do something.Both emphasizenegativesanctionssincethe fundamental
influenceprocessis one of threateningand/or coercingthe enemy.
In practice,one strategysometimesleadsto the otherand occasionally
it is difficultto distinguishbetweenthem. If an actor is convincedhe faces
a ruthlessand aggressiveenemy, he will not only rely upon threatto deter,
but will also deem it necessaryto use force upon occasion. He may also go
beyonddeterrenceand defense, as in the case of the Americanintervention
in Vietnam,whichwas neverthelessexplainedand justified in termsof the
deterrencepolicy of the 1950s.
Implicitin competitiveand deterrentstrategiesare perceptionsof the
enemy as incorrigibleregardingone's own vital interests,at least for the
foreseeablefuture(Deutsch,1965;HoaglandandWalker,1979,p. 143;Snyder
64
Kaplowitz
and Diesing, 1977,pp. 188, 299), thoughtheremay be some hope that if he
is deterredor coercedlong enough,he may changeover the long run. Promises and rewardsare thereforeregardedas largelyirrelevant.They may even
be seenas dangerousandlikelyto encouragethe enemy(Jervis,1978,p. 196).
Theyarenot alwaysentirelyexcluded,however,as meansof influence.Negotiationsmaybe usedto tryto consolidategains,stabilizebalances,postponeconflict, or reassurenervousadversaries.Threatsand punishments,however,are
the meansemphasizedfor deterringand coercingothers.
The credibilityof a deterrentstrategynecessitatespunishmentfor enemy transgressionsregardingboth explicitand implicitlines. If he is allowed
to go unpunishedand permittedto derivegains from his behavior,he will
be reinforcedin his aggression.In this respect, deterrencetheory-albeit
unwittingly-incorporatesa fundamental
principleof behaviorist
psychology.
Deterrencestrategiesalso presumethatthe enemyis basicallyrationalat the veryleast it is hopedhe is so. Therefore,he will be inhibitedand will
yield when faced with sufficientthreatand force. If deterrenceor compellence does not work, it is usuallyassumedthat the threatswerenot credible
or the punishmentsnot massiveenough. Analysisof the impactof strategy
upon the adversaryis typicallystraightforward,basedon rationalactor assumptions,and couchedin termsof manifestcosts and benefits(Georgeand
Smoke, 1974, pp. 54, 73-74;Morgan, 1977, pp. 79-80;Rapoport, 1964, p.
166;Snyderand Diesing, 1977,pp. 304-05).Thoughdeterrencetheorydoes
not necessarilyassumerationalityon the part of the deterringactor (Morgan, 1977,pp. 115, 116, 119),it does presumethat the enemywill be rational enoughnot to acceptcoststhat (the actorthinks)areunacceptableto him.
Competitiveand deterrentactorstend to take little accountof the possibilitythat threatand force may fail becauseof the adversary'sunderlying
needsto savefaceandrecoupself-esteem.Accordingly,suchactorshaveoften
failedto adequatelyestimatethe degreeto whichan adversarywill be determinedto resistthreatsand to take risks to attain a position of equality,if
not dominance,in a conflict,preciselybecauseof internalpsychologicaland
culturalneeds whichgive rise to politicalimperatives.Takinginto account
such underlyingneeds and motives requires,in essence, subtly integrating
considerationsof a depth-psychologicalnatureinto more generaltheories
of influence.
Lebow(1981)hasshown,analogously,how internalpoliticalweaknesses
can impel statesto pursueaggressivepoliciesagainstpowerfuladversaries.
Whilehe stressesthe weaknessesof leaders,the politicalsystem,andthe state
itself, these are amongthe factorswhichcan give rise to the damagedselfimagesand the needsto recoupself-esteemwhichwe emphasizehere, as determinantsof strategy.Onlyveryrecentlyhaveseveralstudiesand commentariesbegunto suggestthis problematicaspectof deterrencetheory,as they
Relations
Dimensionsof International
Psychopolitical
65
point to the unexpected effects upon adversary behavior of intense frustration, wishful thinking, defensive denial, and desires for self-respect (Jervis,
1985a, pp. 21, 25, 28; Lebow, 1985a, p. 107; 1985b, pp. 182-83; Stein, 1985a,
pp. 45, 57; 1985b, pp. 82, 86, 88).
Since credibility is a crucial component of effective deterrenceand compulsion, there is typically great concern with demonstrating one's own resolve
(Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p. 188). Accordingly, there is a disposition toward
confrontation on issues even if they do not touch upon vital interests (Jervis, 1976, pp. 58-61; Morgan: 1985; Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p. 298). This,
in turn, involves the danger of creating asymmetriesof motivation-situations
in which an adversary becomes much more highly motivated regarding matters he perceives as vital than does one's own side (George et al., 1971, pp.
22-26; George and Smoke, 1974, p. 221). In this respect, too, deterrencetheory tends to ignore the strength of underlying motivations and has not been
sufficiently attuned to considerations of a depth-psychological nature.
A deterrent strategy presumes that the adversary will perceive the actor, interpret his behavior, and understand his intent in the same way the
actor does (or wants the adversary to see him). In some cases, with respect
to some adversaries, and regarding some issues the deterring actor is right.
Threat and force do, indeed, entail costs which can have an inhibitory effect
on undesirable behavior. Moreover, a deterrent stance intended as defensive
is sometimes seen that way. In other cases, however, the assumption that
the adversary will perceive and respond to deterrence attempts in the way
the actor might, or thinks the adversary will, is incorrect. A variety of psychological, cultural, historical, and political factors which impinge upon the
adversary can give rise to belief systems, perceptual predispositions, and
behavioral propensities which lead to actions the deterrer does not expect.
Thus, deterrence theory is not always adequate regarding its implicit cognitive assumptions. Understanding how and why states react to others as they
do, requires taking into account how they perceive the other's intent and interpret his behavior.?0
Competitive and deterrent strategies are generated by negative perceptions of enemies who are characteristically seen as aggressive and incorrigible. They also stem from particular kinds of positive and sometimes
ambivalent self-images. The self-images of actors using these strategies are
not so exaggerated as to lead to the belief that total and final wins are possible in most cases. Nor are these actors driven by either grandiose or negative
self-images to aim at such outcomes. Rather, they have positive enough images to make some demands upon others and to assert themselves to try to
'?Lebow and Stein (1987) have recently offered a thorough critique of deterrence theory from
both cognitive and motivational points of view.
66
Kaplowitz
realizetheirgoals. They may also harborambivalentself-images,however,
of havingbeentoo soft, naive,or insufficientlyvigilant.Relatedly,theymay
thinkthatothers-both externalenemiesand, as Morgan(1985,p. 149)points
out, domesticopponents-perceive them as passive, irresolute,or lacking
in courage.In such cases, in additionto calculationsderivedfrom negative
perceptionsof the enemy'sintentions,therewill be internallygeneratedneeds
to demonstrateto othersand to one's own people, that one is active, decisive, and courageous, and to avoid behaviorwhich may be perceivedas
projectingweaknessor lack of resolve.Thereis then a dispositionto make
and punishmentsmoremassive.Suchself-images
threatsmoredemonstrative
may play a role in generatingcompetitiveand deterrentstrategies,and will
in any case add a sharp edge to them.
Firm-But-Cooperative
Strategy
Oureveryday,intuitivesenseof conflictsuggeststhatthereareordinarily
winnersand losersin such situations,that the involvedpartiesaim at maximizingtheirgains, and are often, at best, indifferentto, if not activelyinterestedin negativeoutcomes for, their opponents. This sense of conflict
is consonantwith the frequentuse of orthodox competitiveand deterrent
strategies.
Actors may also aim, however,at achievingmutuallysatisfyingresolutions in conflict situations.Implicitin the very envisioningof such outcomesis the accordanceof at leastsomelegitimacyto someof the adversary's
positions and claims. Such a vision also presumesthat the adversarymay
eventuallybe broughtto at leastsomerecognitionof one'sown vitalinterests.
Otherwise,mutuallysatisfyingoutcomeswould not be possible.
The fundamentalthrustof such a strategyis producingand eliciting,
ratherthan demandingand forcing, changein an adversary.This strategy
emphasizespromisesand rewardswalicharemeantto demonstrateto the adversary that changes in a cooperative direction will entail net benefits
(Deutsch, 1965, pp. 151-57;Georgeand Smoke, 1974, pp. 604-13).At the
same time, capabilitiesfor negative sanctions are developedand held in
reserve,largelyfor defensivepurposes,but also to indicatethat whatever
gainsthe adversarymay derivefromhis hostileorientationwill not outweigh
the costs (Deutsch, 1965,p. 151). Suchcosts will resultfrom negativesanctions for oversteppingimplicitor explicitlines regardingunacceptablebehavior. A firm-but-cooperative
strategyis thus meantto indicatenot only
the possibilitiesfor cooperation,but also the costs of belligerence.
Such a strategyimplicitlyentails the belief that reliancesolely upon
threatsand punishmentswill not be sufficientfor movinghostileadversaries
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67
in cooperativedirections.Evenif, in particularcases, it is militarilypossible
to totallydefeat opponents- increasinglydifficultin contemporaryinternational conflict-negative sanctionswill have to be supplementedwith positive inducementsif thereis to be fundamentaland lastingchange.TheAllied
policiestowardthe defeatedpartiesin WorldWarsI and II reflectcontrasting examplesof negativesanctionsalone, and the supplementationof such
sanctionswith positive inducements.
Threatsandpunishmentsmaycertainlyinhibitor repressaggressivebehavior.They may also servethe veryimportantfunctionof graduallyeroding the totalismof particularadversariesby repeatedlydemonstratingthat
completevictoryis not possible.Butnegativesanctionscanalso increasefrustration,anger,rage, and a senseof injustice-all of whichcan heightenaggression.Meanwhile,the underlyingneeds,motivations,or aspirationsremain
unchanged,so that there will be a dispositionto revertto the originalaggressivebehavior(Berkowitz,1969;Dollardet al., 1939;DeutschandKrauss,
1965, p. 83; Holsti, 1977, p. 102; Milburn, 1961). Threatshave also been
found to reducethe rangeof alternativesconsideredin decision-making,to
decreaseplanning,and to simplifythoughtprocesses(Milburn,1973,citing
Holsti, 1971),all of whichare conduciveto reflexivelyaggressiveresponses.
Thus, negativesanctionsalone will haveonly limitedeffect in fundamentally changinghostile attitudes.This is all the more so if such attitudesserve
historicallyinducedand culturallyreinforcedneedsfor self-esteemandproof
of power-not infrequentneeds of actorsin highly chargedconflict situations (Jerviset al., 1985;Kaplowitz, 1976). Thus, negativesanctions,unby positiveinducements,willnot producecooperationin hostile
supplemented
adversaries.
A firm-but-cooperativestrategyimplicitlytakes into accountthe adversary'sunderlyingneeds and motives, as well as the tangible costs and
benefitswhichresultfrom his behavior.In this sense, it integratesconsiderations of a depth-psychologicalnature.The earlyStanfordStudieson Conflict and Integrationwhich focused on the perceptionsof partiesto World
War I, found along these lines, that nationsmay sometimesgo to war even
if they do not believethey can prevail,providingtheirperceptionsof adversarialhostilityaregreatenough(HolstiandNorth, 1965;Zinneset al., 1961).
motivationis powerfulenough,
Deterrencemayalso fail whenthe challenger's
whenhe is possessedwith a senseof desperation(Georgeand Smoke, 1974,
pp. 527ff; Stein, 1985a,b),or whenhe has an overpoweringneedfor revenge.
Thesefindingshighlightthe importanceof psychologicalneedsand motives,
influencedby history, culture,and politics, as determinantsof conflict behavior. Such needs may sometimesoutweighthe rationalcalculusof tangi-
68
Kaplowitz
ble costs and gains, and must be taken into account when analyzingthe
1
requirementsfor producingchange in adversaries.
strategiesalso integratean importantdimension
Firm-but-cooperative
of behavioralpsychologywhichviewsboth rewardsandpunishmentsas conditionersof behavior,but highlightsthe formerand deemphasizesthe latter
(Freedmanand Freedman,1975,pp. 33-86;George, 1980, p. 257; Rachlin,
1970;Rosecrance,1981,p. 32). The assumptionthatnegativesanctionsalone
are effective,not only for repressingundesirablebehavior,but for basically
changinghostile attitudes,amountsto an overly simplifiedapplicationof
behaviorism,though it is often made, wittinglyand unwittingly,by leaders
involved in bitter conflicts.
A firm-but-cooperative
approachcautionsagainstsimplisticallyassumwill
that
the
ing
adversary
necessarilyperceiveand react to negativesanctions in a salutaryfashion. Rather,it entails taking into account how the
other perceivesand is likely to react to the behaviorof the actor. Thus, it
also incorporatesan importantdimensionof cognitivepsychology. One can
drawfrom the latterthe implicationthat strategieswhichuse negativesanctions exclusivelyareeasilyconsonantwith, and assimilatedto an adversary's
perceptionsof, a hostile environment.Conversely,actions dissonantwith
such perceptionsare morelikelyto induceadversarialchangein a cooperative direction.'2
At the sametime, the indiscriminateuse of a firm-but-cooperative
approachwould be discordantwith cognitivepsychology'sinjunctionto careof others.Totalistandlong-runtotalist
fullytakeinto accountthe perspectives
adversarieshavedeeplyrootedvestedinterestsin believingthat the actorwill
eventuallygive up or be defeated. Thus, the projectionof cooperationto
such enemies, even if accompaniedby firmness,is likely to be interpreted
as weakness.They will "selectout"the firmness,"homein" on the conciliation, and be reinforcedin their positions (Kaplowitz,1984, pp. 390-91).
A firm-but-cooperative
stanceis facilitatedby positiveself-images.In
suchcases, actorsrespecttheirown valuesenoughto be firm, to makesome
'Though usuallyso, it is not alwaysthe casethata rationalcalculusof costs andgainsdictates
that a partyrefrainfrom warif it thinksit may well lose the militarybattle. It still may be
the case, as Jervispointsout in a personalcommunication,thatthe costs of not goingto war
outweighthoseof doingso and losing- at leastlosingto a certainextent- shortof forfeiting
one'sindependenceand endangeringone'sphysicalexistence.An exampleof this wouldbe
Sadat'sdecisionto go to warwith Israelin 1973in orderto stun the latter,arosethe superpowers,and jar a stagnantpoliticalprocessinto motion, even thoughthereis no evidence
he thoughtEgyptcoulddecisivelywinsucha war.At thesametime,whenhumilitation,desperation, anger,an obsessionwithrevenge,or the needto provepowerareparamount,theycan
often outweighthe rationalcalculusof tangiblecosts and gains.
'Lebow's and Stein's(1987)recentexplicationof reassurancestrategies,whichhavesome features of the approachwe discusshere, is predicatedupon such assumptions.
Dimensionsof International
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69
demands upon the adversary, and to draw lines regarding unacceptable behavior. At the same time, they feel strong, secure, and confident enough to
project the possibility of being cooperative without fear of appearing weak,
eigher in the other's or in their own eyes. Such actors may also be motivated
by images of their nations as having been aggressive and uncompromising
with adversaries.
A firm-but-cooperativestrategywill be precluded, however, by the kinds
of negative self-images which give rise to and intensify compensatory needs
to prove power, bravery, and perseverance. Such needs are more easily expressed in totalist or highly competitive aims and are assuaged by an emphasis upon threat and force, rather than promise and reward or conciliation
and compromise. Furthermore, such negative self-images may stimulate fears
of appearing weak through gestures of cooperation.
A firm-but-cooperative strategy is also predicated on perceptions of the
enemy which are open and contain at least some positive elements. Because
the enemy is not completely amenable even to one's minimal demands,
however, such perceptions are likely to be mixed. Heradstveit (1979, p. 114)
finds, in line with this proposition, that pluralistic or mixed perceptions of
the enemy are associated with a propensity to support policies of compromise
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. George and Smoke (1974, pp. 597-599) provide
examples of changes in American perceptions of the Soviet Union and China from negative to mixed, which accompanied the evolution of policies in
what are termed here a firm-but-cooperative direction.
Conversely, if the enemy is perceived as fundamentally evil and aggresan
actor will have and should have no incentive to even think about
sive,
mutual satisfaction as an aim and positive inducements as means, leave alone
any disposition to test such an approach. At the same time, perceptions of
the enemy as totally unacceptable may, in some cases, be cognitively linked
to totalist conceptions of one's own national interests- regardless of the enemy's intentions and whether or not he changes. In such cases, the possibility
of according some legitimacy to the enemy's positions is precluded from the
outset.
A firm-but-cooperative strategy requires that, at some time, actors attempt to intervene in cycles of hostility with positive inducements to change.
They must also indicate to the adversary those aspects of his positions which
they regard as at least somewhat legitimate. Belief in the efficacy of such
actions does not necessarily entail the assumption that much of the incompatibility with the enemy is illusory (Jervis, 1976, pp. 75-76, 80). The actors'
conceptions of their interests are such that they are substantially incompatible. A firm-but-cooperative approach aims at altering the other's conceptions of interests and goals. This strategy presumes that the accordance of
some legitimacy to the adversary's positions, coupled with adequate firmness, may gradually have such an effect with certain kinds of adversaries.
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Kaplowitz
ConciliatoryStrategy
Occasionallyactorsin internationalrelationsand, more often, groups
withinnationsemphasizesatisfactionof the otherto the point of all but ignoringtheir own state'sneeds. Conflict, as they see it, resultsfrom factors
that can be changedthroughconciliationand offers of friendship.Better
education, more information,and increasedcommunicationare not only
necessary,but sufficientconditionsfor changinghostilerelationships.Since
conflictcan be eliminatedthroughthe redressof legitimategrievances,which
such actors tend to think is possible in almost all instances,promisesand
rewardsare used exclusivelywhile militarypower is de-emphasized,and
threatsand punishmentseschewed.
Sucha purelyconciliatoryapproachstemsfromperceptionsof the adversarywhichemphasizethe positiveand downplaythe negative.The other's
aggressionoccurssolely becausehis legitimateinterestshavenot been satisfied. Oncethis dissatisfactionis eliminatedthroughappropriateconcessions,
the enemywill be appeased,his hostilitywill dissolve, and he will become
more cooperative.
The conciliatorypositionis also facilitatedby particularkindsof negative and ambivalentimages. Proponentstend to regardtheir own state as
too aggressive,militaristic,or imperialistic.Thereforedemandsshouldnot
be madeuponthe adversary,but ratherconcessionsgranted.One'sown state
may also be seen as weak or potentiallyweak. Thus, self-imagesentailing
guiltand/or powerlessnesscan giveriseto sucha positionandprecludefirmness as a complementto conciliation.
Latent Acceptanceof Enemies
Theconflictpositionsdelineatedaboveareratherstraightforward.
There
is is anotherintriguingpossibility,however,withimportantimplicationsfor
emergingfrom the bindswhichcharacterizeseeminglyintractableconflicts.
Partiesmay sometimesvehementlyrejectthe idea of compromiseand anythingless than total victorybut neverthelessshowevidenceof expectingthat
the enemywill not be totally defeatedand, sometimes,not defeatedat all.
Thus, the actor latentlyacceptsthe enemy in the sense of not believinghe
can be eliminated.The actorbecomesresignedto some formof coexistence,
whetherhe likes it or not. There is no embracingin friendship,however,
and overt hostility continuesto be intense.
The rhetoricof such actorsis zero-sumand they may pay lip service
to totalistgoals. Theyhave substantiallygivenup, however,on the possibility of achievingsuch goals. Thus, thereis a lessercompulsiontowardideological purity and a somewhatgreaterpull toward pragmatism.
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Dimensionsof International
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71
This orientationraisesa numberof intriguingtheoreticaland policyrelevantquestions:(1) why is therelatentacceptancein the first placeif the
manifestaims are totalist or long-runtotalist?(2) why does the acceptance
remainlatent-why is it not acknowledged?and (3) what can othersdo to
help make manifestthis latencyso that mutuallysatisfyingconflict resolution becomes possible?
Latent acceptancedevelopsbecauseone party becomes convincedof
the other'sstayingpower. No matterwhat he does, the enemycontinuesto
exist, cannotbe defeated,and may even be thriving.Acceptanceof the enemy and some of his positions remainslatent, first of all, because of the
difficultyin acknowledgingdefeatregardinglong-standing,deeplycherished,
and ideologicallyingrainedgoals. Moreover,such acceptance,especiallyin
the contextof militaryinferiorityor defeatwhichthe latentlyacceptingparty
mayhaveexperienced,often has the meaningfor theseactorsof abjectyielding and unconditionalsurrender-of kneelingbeforethe enemyin a posture
of submission(Kaplowitz,1976). Thus, the very idea of acceptanceis experiencedas humiliatingand as an intolerableblow to self-esteem.These
blockagesto open acceptanceare of a depth-psychologicalnature.In addition, openacceptanceof the enemywouldproducetoo muchdissonancewith
the centralbeliefs of the prevailingideology. Hence, a cognitivebarrieris
also present.Suchpartiesarealso likelyto havebeenreinforcedwithintheir
nations and groups for maintaininga manifeststance of totalism or longruntotalism,and to havebeenpunishedfor any hints of a softeningin their
position.Hence,a behavioralreinforcementprocessis also at workin blocking open acceptanceof the enemy.
Partieswho only latentlyacceptenemiesemphasizethreatand punishment, sincetheymanifestlyrejectpermanentsolutionsbasedon compromise
regardingbasic issues. They may eventuallybecomeopen to some negotiations, however,and to whatthey assertare interimcompromises.Theymay
even come to favor such agreementsif these are designedso that the attendanthumiliationis minimized.Butsuchactorswillnot makepermanentpeace
unlessand until theirlatent acceptanceof the enemyhas becomemanifest.
Blockageof open acceptanceis generatedand reinforcedby ambivalent self-imageswhichmay involveconcernswith passivity,fatalism,weakfor bolsteringself-esteem
ness, or lackof courage.Theresultingrequirements
entaildemonstrationsof activism,persistence,andbravery-all of whichare
servedby continuedrejection,on a manifestlevel, of the other.
The negativeperceptionsof the enemy'sodious characterand evil intentionsmakeit all the moredifficultto openlyacknolwedgehis stayingpower. Such perceptionsare similarto those of long-runtotalistsexceptfor the
crucialexpectationthat the enemycannotbe eliminated.It is this particular
combinationof negativeself-imagesand perceptionsof the enemy which
makes for the recalcitrantbut intriguinglatent orientation.
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Kaplowitz
Kelman's remarks (1978, pp. 180-81) about distinguishing between
dreams - what we would here call long-run totalist dreams - and more pragmatic operational programs are germane to the discussion of latency. As explicated here, latency implies a potential though not actual operational
program which permits compromise with the enemy, and a potential recession of manifest totalism to the category merely of dreams. But the orientation of latent acceptance is not equivalent to such a pragmatic and open
program of compromise. Rather, it embodies substantial psychological and
hence political resistance to compromise. Moreover, the mere assertion on
the part of an actor, of a distinction between dreams and operational programs, is not by itself a sufficiently convincing indicator of latent acceptance
and could well be a manipulative deception compatible with long-run totalism. The development of latent acceptance in contrast to long-run totalism
turns on the strengthof expectationsthat complete victory cannot be achieved,
as opposed to beliefs about the necessity for some interim compromise now
in order to continue the march toward total victory later.
A'lII'UDES
TOWARD ISSUES
Attitudes toward specific issues are embodied in the aims that define
conflict orientations and strategies. These aims, as we have seen, can range
from total victory, through mutual satisfaction, to appeasement of the other.
The assessment of possibilities for constructive conflict resolution requires
mapping areas of overlap and convergence in attitudes regarding particular
issues. This task entails analysis of positions concerning optimal, satisfactory, and acceptable outcomes.
In cases where there appears to be no overlap whatsoever, it is crucial
to explore latent attitudes as well as manifest aims. An important indicator
of differences, in this regard, is evidence that the expectations of a party
about what can be achieved diverge from stated aims. Such evidence suggests that the actor himself has substantial, though perhaps repressed, doubts
about the efficacy of his policies.
Latent attitudes may be further explored by analyzing positions on issues which do not directly tap raw emotions, elicit ego defensive attitudes,
or involve heavily reinforced group taboos, as is the case in highly intense
conflicts regarding ideological tenets, positions in principle, and the efficacy of force. Focusing only upon manifest attitudes in seemingly intractable
conflicts regarding ideological tenets, positions in principle, and the efficaoutcomes other than defeat for one side or continued conflict into the indefinite future, with the possibility of mutual catastrophe. Attitudes on other
issues, however, may indirectly suggest a willingness to accept something less
than a total win, even though the idea of compromise per se may evoke negative and defensive reactions.
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Dimensionsof International
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73
Table I. Conflict Strategies:Aims and Means
Means
Emphasisupon
Threatsand
Punishments
Positive Inducements and Negative Sanctions
Aims
Total win,
short run
Totalism
Total win,
long run
Long-Run
Totalism
Manifestaim:
total win in long
run; but latent
acceptanceof enemy
Latent
Acceptance
Maximizationof
interests;
offensive stance
Competitiveuse-of-force
(Usual)
Competitiveuse-of-force
(Occasional)
Maximizationof
interests;
defensivestance
Deterrentpunitive
(usual)
Deterrentpunitive
(occasional)
Mutual
satisfaction
Emphasisupon
satisfactionof
the other
Firm-butcooperative
(occasional)
Emphasisupon
Positive
Inducements
Firm-butcooperative
(usual)
Conciliatory,
appeasement
Particular strategies of conflict on the part of the adversary may either
aggravate or attenuate blockages to compromise which result from the underlying psychological needs and processes, as shaped by history and culture, which we have elaborated here. The mapping of potential overlap
through the exploration of latent as well as manifest attitudes may point to
possibilities for mutually acceptable outcomes. This procedure opens up the
possibility of and is required for analyzing the question-what strategies
would be most effective in making manifest the latent attitudes and thus the
areas of potential overlap, which would then create the possibility for constructive conflict resolution (Kaplowitz, 1984)?
HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SELF-IMAGES, PERCEPTIONS OF ENEMIES, AND CONFLICT
STRATEGIES
The foregoing analysis leads to the following hypotheses, which are also
schematized in Table II.
Kaplowitz
74
Table II. Conflict Strategies:Self-Imagesand Perceptionsof Enemies
Conflict Strategies Self-Images
Perceptionsof Enemy
Totalism
Highlynegative
Highlygrandiose
manifest;and negative
(may be underlying)
Highlynegative,with the beLong-runtotalism Grandiosemanifest;
lief enemycannot be defeated
and negative(may be
in short-run
underlying)
Manifestlong-run Ambivalentor Negative
totalism;latent
acceptanceof enemy
Negative,with expectations
cannot be totally defeated
Competitive-use-of Positiveor Ambivalent
force, deterrentpunitive
Positive or Ambivalent
Firm-but-cooperative
Negative
Conciliatoryappeasement
Negativeor Ambivalent
Mixed
Positiveor Mixed
1. Totaliststrategiesaregeneratedby highlygrandioseself-imagesand
negativeimages which may be underlying;and by highly negativeperceptions of the enemy.
2. Long-runtotalist strategiesare generatedby grandioseself-images
and negativeimageswhichmay be underlyingand somewhatattenuatedas
the resultof partialvictories,increasedpower, and recognitionby others;
and by negativeperceptionsof the enemy, which neverthelessattributeto
him sufficient power so that he cannot be defeatedin the short-run.
3. Latentacceptanceof the enemydespitemanifestlong-runtotalism
is generatedby ambivalentor negativeself-imageswhichpertainto passivity, weakness,and fatalism;and by negativeperceptionsof the enemy,which
neverthelessinclude underlyingexpectationsthat he cannot be defeated.
4. Competitiveanddeterrentstrategiesaregeneratedby positiveor ambivalentself-images,the latterof whichmay involveconcernswith softness,
naivete, insufficientvigilance, or lack of resolve;and by negativeperceptions of the enemywhichincludeincorrigibilityfor the foreseeablefuture.
5. Firm-but-cooperative
strategiesaregeneratedby positiveor ambivalent self-images,the latterinvolvingconcernswith havingbeen too aggressive or uncompromising;and by mixed perceptionsof the enemy, which
include hostility but also corrigibility.
6. Conciliatoryand appeasementstrategiesare generatedby negative
or ambivalentself-imageswhichpertainto aggressiveness,militarism,chauvinism, or imperialism;and by positive perceptionsof the enemy.
Relations
Dimensionsof International
Psychopolitical
75
SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
Thetheorypresentedherehas introducedand emphasizednationalselfimageryas a crucialvariabledeterminingconflictbehavior.Variousdimensionsof self-imageryareexplicatedandlinkedto conflictstrategies.Regarding
perceptionsof enemies,the theory stressesanalysisof the differenceswith
whichactorsperceivethe sameissues, events,policies, and nations. Studies
of such "gaps"in perceptionand interactingsubjectivitiesshould complement the hithertoprevalentconcernwith misperceptionsas a primarydependentvariable.Analyzingthese differenceswill illuminatethe dynamics
of conflict and may also indicateways out of interlockingbinds.
A typology of conflict strategiesis elaborated,rangingfrom totalism
to conciliation.The possibilityis stressedthat an actor may manifestlyreject the idea of acceptingthe enemyand of compromisewith him while, at
the same time, evidenceemergesthat he does not believethe enemycan be
defeatedexcept, perhaps,at an unacceptableprice.
The theory thus introducesthe idea of latent acceptanceof enemies.
The uncoveringof this latencyand the makingof it manifestare crucialin
conflicts from whichthereseemsno exit, short of defeat by one side of the
other or catastrophefor all.
The explicationof each strategyentailsan analysisof the kindsof selfimagesand perceptionsof enemieswhichare its sources.A relatedseriesof
hypothesesis presentedregardingthese connections.Such imagesand perceptionsmust be categorizedalong a positive-negativedimensionfor purposes of theoryconstructionand hypothesistesting. The understandingof
conflictdynamicsandthe derivationof policy-relevant
implications,however,
requiresknowledgeof the content of these imagesand the particularways
in which they influence conflict behavior, and thus, in-depth qualitative
analysis.
Assessment of the possibilities for constructiveoutcomes requires
analyzingattitudestowardissuesin conflict, both manifestand latent, and
mappingareasof overlap.Whilethe analysisof such attitudescan indicate
areasof convergenceor potentialoverlap,the strategiesof the partiesmay
neverthelesshavereciprocaleffects suchthat they becomeevermoretightly
locked into mutuallydestructiveinteractions.Analysisof these interaction
effects is thereforean essentialpart of the psychopoliticalstudy of international relations,one which is focused upon in a relatedwork (Kaplowitz,
1984).The influenceof an actor'sstrategyupon an adversaryis determined
not only by its impactupon the latter'smanifestand tangiblegains and losses, but also by its impactupon the imagesand perceptionswhichdetermine
his behavior.Analysisof reciprocalinteractioneffectsand of strategiesmost
appropriatefor producingadversarial
changein a cooperativedirection,there-
Kaplowitz
76
fore requires assessing and taking into account the self-images and perceptions of enemies elaborated here. It is in this way that knowledge of the
psychological and cultural sources of international behavior can ultimately
make a crucial difference in enhancing possibilities for constructive conflict
resolution.
APPENDIX: RESEARCH GUIDELINES
The theory presented here suggests the following guidelines for study
of the variables and processes explicated. These guidelines are meant to facilitate the construction of interview schedules, content analysis categories, and
schema for behavioral observations.
Self-Images
1. What are the most salient aspects of a people's, group's, or leadership's self-imagery?
2. Are the self-images grandiose, positive, ambivalent, or negative, and
in what particular ways?
3. About what are a people or group most disturbed concerning themselves? What do they most dislike?
4. In what ways do they want to change and what means are regarded
as most appropriate for producing these changes?
5. What do they most like about themselves and how do these images
influence the demands they make and the expectations they have regarding
others?
6. How do they perceive their nation's history and what are the most
salient images in this regard?
7. What aspects of this history are regarded as most disturbing and
what "lessons" have been learned?
8. What periods of the nation's history are most liked? In what ways
are these attitudes projected onto present aims and expectations for the
future?
9. What are the conceptions of national purpose and interest? How
are these influenced by other aspects of self-imagery?
10. What are the perceptions of the state's capabilities and power?
Perceptions of Enemies
1. What are the most salient perceptions of the enemy?
2. Are the perceptions highly negative, negative, mixed, or positive?
Psychopolitical Dimensions of InternationalRelations
77
3. What is most dislikedor distrusted?
4. What is most liked, preferred,or admired?
5. What are the perceptionsof the historyof one's relationswith the
other?What"lessons"havebeenlearnedaboutthe otherand how to behave
toward him?
6. Whatarethe perceptionsof the other'sinterests,positions,andgoals,
and what degree of legitimacyis accordedthese? To what extent is the
legitimacyand authenticityof the other'sidentityand existenceacceptedor
derogated?
7. What are the perceptionsof the other'sattitudestoward oneself?
8. What are the perceptionsof the other'spower, determination,and
perseverance?
9. What are the differencesbetweenPartyA's perceptionof Party B
and B's perceptionof itself; betweenB's perceptionof A and A's perception
of itself; betweenA's perceptionsof B's attitudestowardissues in conflict
and B'sattitudes;and betweenB'sperceptionsof A's attitudestowardissues
and B's attitudes?
Conflict Strategies
1. Are the aims of partiestotal victory, total victoryin the long run,
maximizationof gains regardlessof losses to the other, mutuallysatisfying
outcomes, or satisfactionof the other'sinterestswith little regardfor one's
own?
2. Are thereindicationsthat expectationsaboutwhatis possiblediffer
from manifest aims?
3. Is there latent acceptanceof the other and some of his positions?
4. Whatare regardedas the most appropriateand effectivemeansfor
achievingaims? Is there an emphasisupon negativesanctions,positiveinducements,or a mix of means?
5. Whatarethe beliefsaboutthe utilityof threatandforce?Whatkinds
of force are regardedas most effective?And what are the perceivedeffects
upon the adversary?
6. Whatarethe beliefsaboutthe utilityof positiveinducements?What
promisesand rewardsare regardedas most effective?And whatarethe perceived effects upon the adversary?
7. Are particularmeans supportedeven though there are indications
that proponentsdo not believe them to be achievingstated aims?
8. If so, what do the attitudesof the partiesindicateabout support
for such meansservingto fulfill psychologicalneeds, as affectedby history
and culture-such as needs for self-esteem, prestige, power, aggression,
revenge, and morale?
78
Kaplowitz
9. What are the attitudes toward the idea of compromise and negotiations with the enemy?
10. If compromise and negotiations are rejected in principle, are there
psychological needs and cultural patterns which give rise to connotations of
compromise and negotiations as meaning abject yielding, unconditional surrender, and kneeling before the enemy?
Attitudes Toward Issues
1. What are the attitudes of the parties toward the issues in conflict?
What are regarded as optimal, satisfactory, and acceptable outcomes?
2. What areas of overlap, if any, are indicated by the manifest attitudes of the parties?
3. Do attitudes on some issues indirectly suggest a willingness to compromise and accept something less than a total win, even though the idea
of compromise per se may evoke negative and defensive reactions?
4. If so, do blockages to compromise result from psychological needs
and cultural patterns?
5. What areas of potential overlap are indicated by latent attitudes
toward issues?
6. In what ways do the strategies of the other aggravate or attenuate
the blockages to compromise?
7. What strategies on the part of the other are most likely to make manifest the areas of potential overlap?'3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writing of this essay was facilitated by the support of the Institute
of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, and its Director, Carl Rosberg. I wish to thank Alexander George and the late Nathan
Leites for comments on an earlier draft; three anonymous reviewers for posing important questions of synthesis and additional lines of inquiry; and
Robert Jervis for his helpful synthesis of critical suggestions.
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