Responsible Citizens, Exceptional Rulers or Terrorists: News
Media Coverage of Oligarchs around the Ukrainian Protests of 20132014
Draft - Please do not cite without Permission
Presented at the ICCEES IX World Congress, Makuhari, Japan, 201508-04
Hanna Söderbaum, Maxim Alyukov, Raphi Rechitsky 1
Abstract
Studying depictions of the wealthy in Ukrainian and Russian news media outlets
around the 2013-14 Ukrainian protests, this paper seeks to address how media
ownership and environment influences the representation of elites during times of
rapid socio-political change. Using a qualitative content analysis of a sample of 175
newspaper articles before, during and after the Maidan protests in six leading
newspapers across both countries, we found that coverage varies across media
ownership types—oligarch-owned, independent, and regime-controlled. The
oligarch-owned newspapers convey images of wealthy elites as responsible citizens
across all periods. However, what represented responsible behaviour changed over
time. Regime-controlled newspapers took diverging paths during the time of the
protests. State-owned regime newspapers used a variety of “deligimization
strategies,” while regime papers less dependent on the authorities combined the
“responsible citizens” frame of oligarchic newspapers with deligimization strategies
in line with those found in directly state-owned newspapers. Finally, among
independent newspapers in both countries, oligarchs moved from being framed as a
threat to the public good a more diffuse other, rendering exceptional the legitimacy
of wealthy figures swept into to power in the aftermath of Maidan.
These findings point to a dynamic relationship between representation and
media ownership during times of rapid socio-political change, when media of images
of elites depend on the ownership of outlets. As predicted by Chomsky propaganda
theories of the media, ownership remains the most important factor defining media
representation, across time as well as national media environments. Moreover, the
finding that independent news coverage in both Ukraine and Russia remained more
susceptible to change also shows how ownership influences coverage during times of
rapid change.
Hanna Söderbaum is a doctoral candidate at Department of Economic History and Uppsala Centre for
Russian and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University. Maxim Alyukov is a researcher with Public
Sociology Laboratory and a doctoral student at the European University at St. Petersburg. Raphi
Rechitsky is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the European University at St Petersburg. Our
gratitude to Olle Engkvist Byggmästare Foundation and Helge Ax:son Johnsons Foundation for project
support.
1
1
Introduction
This paper studies the images of Ukrainian oligarchs 2 in Ukrainian and Russian
news media outlets around the time of the 2013-14 protests on the Maidan, or
Independence Square, in Kyiv. One of the demands of the protestors was a stop to the
endemic corruption across social and political institutions. Oligarchs are often seen
as the symbol of corruption. Our paper raises questions about the idea of the oligarch
as well as legitimization strategies of oligarchs, and seeks to address how media
ownership and environment influences the representation of elites during times of
rapid socio-political change.
During the years leading up to the Orange Revolution in 2004/2005, a large-
scale privatization program allowed oligarchic clans that had developed during the
late 1990’s to gain valuable assets at low costs. This privatization led to the formation
of the class of super-rich whose property rights are among large segments of the
population seen as dubious and illegal. Nevertheless, the mass media continues to
play an instrumental role in post-Soviet politics and society under the direction of
emergent private and resilient state owners. As such, news media continues to be
highly susceptible to both economic and political pressures. The organization of the
press lacks rigid institutional boundaries and professional autonomy, rendering it an
effective instrument for elites to gain and maintain legitimacy amongst the public.
Throughout the post-soviet period, the media in Russia and Ukraine took diverging
paths. However, in the eyes of elites in both countries, the media continued to be
considered as a tool of power, not as an autonomous institution with its own rules
and routines. This dynamic was echoed by Russian president, Vladimir Putin when he
responded to a question by the director of independent radio station Echo of Moscow
at a University lecture: “contrary to a common perception, the mass media is an
instrument, rather than an institution” 3.
This article is organized as follows. We first present a literature review followed
by a methods section and a brief overview of the data. Reporting of the results are
organized according to our findings along outlets divided by media ownership type,
of key oligarch-owned, independent, and regime-controlled newspaper outlets.
We use the term “oligarch” as the conventional term for referring to Ukrainian industrial tycoons,
without implying any legal or moral judgement.
3 Reported by Alexei Venedictov, editor-in-chief of Echo Moscow, at a public lecture at HSE, February
26, 2009.
2
2
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implications for
studies of elites and the media.
Media & Ownership
Media scholar Sarah Oates outlines three different ways to study the media. The first
way to study the media looks at how audiences process media information. The
second way to study the media considers the content of the media. Finally, the third
way to study the media pays attention to the factors influencing news production, that
is a “political environment, media norms, media regulation, ownership of media
outlets, as well as how the journalistic and public relations professions carry out
their jobs”(Oates, 2008:4). That is, studies of news production investigate how
political, economic, and organizational context influences the media. In this study we
combine the latter two approaches: the analysis of media content and news
production.
The term “news production” implies a broad variety of factors influencing
media content, a study of each such factor can be seen as separate approach to media
content. For instance, Shoemaker and Reese identify four major areas of research
studying influences on media content (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013:63-253). First, it is
the study of characteristics intrinsic to journalists: professional backgrounds and
experiences, professional roles and ethics, personal attitudes, values and beliefs,
finally, power within organization (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013:61). Second, it is
professional routines patterning journalists’ behavior. Journalists internalize
bureaucratic procedures and professional rules of the newsroom and, as David
Altheide argues in his study of local news channel in Arizona, it promotes “a way of
looking at events which fundamentally distorts them" (Altheide, 1974:24). Third, it is
influences outside of media organizations: interests and pressure groups, advertisers,
audiences. For instance, sources are considered as a very important factor defining
what media messages look like – journalists often use sources which are cheaper and
easier to find. In a way, such sources monopolize journalists’ time preventing them
from looking for another, more costly and often more qualitative information (Gandy,
1982). Forth, it is ideological stance and concerns about status quo. For instance, in
his analysis of media coverage of shootings down of Korean flight by Soviet army in
1983 and Iran flight by U.S. military in 1988 Entman shows that through language,
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images and rhetoric a similar event can be depicted as accident or as deliberate act of
aggression depending on agent’s political stance (Entman, 1991). Finally, it is
organizational structure of media – hierarchies, goals, policy et cetera. One of the
most important factors in this category is media ownership. As media scholar Denis
McQuail argues, “there is no doubt that owners in market-based media have ultimate
power over content and can ask for what they want to be included or left out”
(McQuail, 2010:246). Moreover, many scholars consider this idea as not just finding
or hypothesis, but as fundamental principle of journalism: Herbert Altschull, a
veteran American journalist, calls the fact that “the contents of the media always
reflect the interests of those who finance them” the second “law of journalism”
(Altschull, 1994:298).
Perhaps the most famous approach considering the influence of ownership on
the media is neo-Marxist school of thought. As Baran and Davies argue, political
economic theory “studies elite control of economic institutions, such as banks and
stock markets, and then try to show how this control affects many other social
institutions, including the mass media (Baran & Davis, 2014: 223; see also Murdock,
1989). More specifically, political economy perspective conceptualizes both the tools
through which ownership organizes information and various types of ownership
leading to different impact on media content. Chomsky and Herman, the most
influential proponents of political economy model, argue that media power is
realized via the process of “filtering” 4 (Herman & Chomsky, 2002:2). The mass media
deploy filters in order to screen and censor information for the purpose of gaining
“support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity”
(Herman & Chomsky, 2002:Lvix)
Moreover, which information is censored or left out of coverage and how
depends on type of ownership media. Usually scholars consider media as belonging
to one of four types of ownership: corporate media, state media, independent media,
and publically owned media. McQuail identifies three types: large commercial
companies, small private non-profit organizations and the public sector independent
The filtering is a process defining what is covered and what is not. It is underlined by the
concentration of wealth and power, and the scholars of such process study “the routes by which
money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the
government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public” (Herman &
Chomsky, 2002:2).
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from state (McQuail, 2010:192). In addition, state owned media is another important
type of media ownership (Webster, 1992). Large commercial companies and state
are considered as the most powerful economic constraint organizing media content,
and such type of ownership is in the focus of Marxist political economy model. For
instance, Chomsky and Herman mention wealthy elites and corporations as the
driving factor influencing media content: "the dominant media forms are quite large
businesses; they are controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are
subject to sharp constraints by owners and other market-profit-oriented forces […]
this is the first powerful filter that effects news choices” (Herman & Chomsky,
2002:14). Owners and stakeholders are interested in profit, and this profit-driven
logic makes newsmakers pay attention to audience demand and advertising revenue,
but not to quality of news. As a result, owners’ economic interest works as constraint
imposed on news-making and indirect influence on editorial choices (Sigal, 1973).
Normally, state interests are considered quite distinct from corporate interests,
though in reality it proves to be an ideal rather than an argument. There is a body of
literature starting with Marx theory of state and arguing that to a varying degree
state is fused with or dominated by wealthy elites (Marx & Engels, 2008; Mills, 2000).
However, no matter how close wealthy elites and state officials and bureaucracy,
state owned media is usually identified as separate category. As Chomsky and
Herman argue, “In countries where the levers of power are in the hands of a state
bureaucracy, the monopolistic control over the media, often supplemented by official
censorship, makes it clear that the media serve the ends of a dominant elite” (Herman
& Chomsky, 2002:1).
On the other hand, small non-profit media outlets are considered as the most
independent and economically unconstrained type of ownership. For instance,
Habermas, another famous proponent of neo-Marxist approach to media, describes
the formation of liberal public sphere, an institution providing framework for free
and critical communication about common good in the XVIII century. Free
communication and public sphere itself, according to Habermas, crucially depends on
ownership structure: one of the necessary conditions of its formation is independent
journals and newspapers emerging in the XVIII century (Habermas, 1991:89-141).
On the other hand, in the XX century the process of concentration of wealth together
with state intervention into previously non-state areas of social life lead to
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domination of two other types of media: big corporate media and state media. These
media undermine public sphere because of economic leverage big corporate and
state ownership gives to stakeholders or officials to manipulate editorial choices and
media content (Habermas, 1991:181-236). As Shoemaker and Reese argue, those
media which are involved in large corporate chains are less likely to be interested in
the local community they work in. On the other hand, the media which are not a part
of concentrated wealth and have strong ties with local communities have more
degree of autonomy and are more likely to commit themselves to community
interests (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013)
Finally, public sector media are quite large, but specific organizational
constraints and forms of budgeting they use work as a barrier against economic
influence. For instance, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is publicly funded
corporation; it is funded by an annual license paid by everyone who owns a TV set.
This system of funding makes it relatively free from both commercial and state
influence (Oates, 2006:83). Similarly, New York Times and Washington Post
decentralize their budgets providing each office with control over certain share of
resources. These resources make the offices relatively free from concerns about
profit making. Thus, “the organizational structure itself acts as a barrier or filter
between the larger organization's economic requirements and the routines of
newswork” (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013:139).
However, categorizing media into categories such as public or state are often
postulated rather than studied empirically. In part, this study fills an empirical gap in
the literature on media studies, and shows how media by ownership type, when
mediated by episodes of socio-political change, bias and influence media content in
different ways. In order to understand how ownership and socio-political change
interact in the case of Ukraine and Russia, we need to adjust the four-type model of
media ownership mentioned above to post-soviet societies. First, both Russia and
Ukraine have independent non-profit and state-owned media and these categories
are still in use. However, neither Russia nor Ukraine has public sector media and this
type of ownership is not relevant for the aims of the research. Finally, classic
corporate ownership in post-soviet context is often transformed into another type of
ownership. Comparing Russian and US media systems, media scholar Olesya Koltsova
identifies two types of media ownership: internal and external. Western corporate
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private ownership is usually internal, owners do not have interests outside media
industry and their goals are limited to getting income from their media business.
Thus, ““external owners” here will be those who, on the contrary, are interested first
of all in their political capital or in development of other kinds of business for which
they need the advertising-propaganda resource of mass media” (Koltsova, 2006:75).
Consequently, it is newspapers owned by wealthy elites, in other words, by oligarchs.
To address the issue of media control, Winter’s and Frye’s theories of oligarchy
provide a central point of departure in scholarship of elites (Frye, 2006; Winters,
2011). A universal definition of oligarchs can be fixed across historical periods and
geographical spaces, though oligarchies assume different forms. We use the following
definition by Winters: Oligarchs are actors who command and control massive
concentrations of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their
personal wealth and exclusive social position (Winters, 2011:5). Winters argue how
oligarchs may move in and out of official politics, depending on the nature of
institutions: “Oligarchs do not disappear just because they do not govern personally or
participate directly in the coercion that defends their fortunes. Instead, the political
involvement of oligarchs become more indirect as it becomes less focused on property
defense – this burden having been shifted to an impersonal bureaucratic state.
However, their political involvement becomes more direct again when external actors
or institutions fail to defend property reliably” (Winters, 2011:7).
Two relevant points are made by Winters and C. Wright Mills. Firstly, though
the power elites sometimes seem not to use their power, this choice not to act is also
of great consequence, and often even of greater consequence than the decisions they
do make. They have the power to, not necessarily always power over (Mills, 2000:4;
Winters, 2011:8,13). Secondly, the members of, the power elite are not solitary rulers.
“Advisers and consultants, spokesmen and opinion-makers are often the captains of
their higher thought and decision” (Mills, 2000:4). Winters illuminates the role of the
professional forces working for the interests of the oligarchs (Winters, 2011:18). The
representations of oligarchs in mass media and in private philanthropy foundations
make for prime examples of wealth-holders as “opinion-makers.”
As Winters argues, when institutions are enough strong to defend property
rights, oligarchs involve in politics indirectly, through media power in particular, in
order to defend income. Here we see the same tight bond between media content and
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ownership as in corporate or state media ownership, but this power has different
function. If in case of corporate media ownership property rights are enough stable
to allow corporations to earn money, in case of post-soviet countries, according to
Timothy Frye, drawing on the work of Winters, the illegal and dubious redistribution
constitutes “original sin” of propertied classes in post-soviet countries. Post-soviet
society sees their property as acquired illegally, and that puts their property rights in
permanent danger of new redistribution. However, post-soviet propertied class tries
to atone “original sin” and legitimate themselves in the eyes of society through “good
works” and providing of “public goods” (Frye, 2006). Thus, instead of viewing
rightholders as “passively responding to institutional constraints”, Frye emphasizes
their agency: “here rightsholders have the potential to take matters into their own
hands and shape the legitimacy and perhaps, ultimately, the security of their
property rights” (Frye, 2006:488). As Frye shows, this works in Russia, and the
importance of business’s social responsibility in public debate worldwide shows that
it works in other countries. We assume that the function of media owned by wealthy
elites in post-soviet context is similar to Frye’s “good works” strategy, its goal is not
only to earn money, but to legitimate and defend property rights and income which is
seen as illegitimate and dubious.
Thus, we identify three types of media ownership:
1) oligarchic, 2)
independent and 3) state-owned. But all these types were considered in more or less
stable political situations. As Frye points out referring to oligarchs’ property rights,
“far from being fixed in law, property rights are highly dependent on the political
climate” (Frye, 2006:488). We will consider all three media ownership types in the
context of political change.
Thus, the research question can be stated as follows: how did the Maidan
protest events and the revolution of dignity alter the ways in which major Russian
and Ukrainian news media outlets framed powerful wealthy Ukrainians and the idea
of an “oligarch”? Specifically, how/did both the country in which the newspaper is
published and the political-economic ownership of the news media outlets influence
the changes observed across this time?
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Methods
The turbulent time before, during, and after the 2013-2014 Maidan protests and
regime change in Ukraine provides an ideal opportunity to investigate changes in
media discourse across a short period of time. The rapid pace and bounded set of events
that preceded and followed the changes brought on by the Maidan protest allowed us to
compare coverage across three distinct periods:
1.
2.
3.
Period One, Before Maidan: August 1, 2013 – November 21, 2013
Period Two, During Maidan: November 21, 2013 – February 27, 2014
Period Three, After Maidan: February 28, 2014 – May 25.
Period One represents the months leading up to the Maidan protests. We
started data collection on August 1, since that date represents the start of the “trade
wars” 5. Two represents the start of the Maidan protests, the day after the botched
negotiations for the accession agreement with the European Union. Period Two ends
with the flight of President Yanukovych and the culmination of the protests with the
so-called Revolution of Dignity. Period Three was marked by the Russian annexation
of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and ends with the election of Petro
Poroshenko.
The criteria for our selection of sources were guided by media environment
considerations related to ownership of the outlet, the transnational scope of the
coverage, and popularity of the outlet. First, we tried to put our study in a
transnational perspective. It is often common to assume that the media exists in
national media environment, and the constraints of national media environment
define media content and strategies in the first place. To address the question of
whether and how national media environment or some other factors influence the
media we compared Russian and Ukrainian newspapers. Second, our goal was to
consider the relationships between coverage of elites and the structure of ownership.
In so doing, we chose newspapers having different patterns of ownership and
strategies of representations of elites. Finally, it was important to choose sources
Though the conflict between Russian and Ukraine grew earlier, only in August 2014 it became an
important topic for public discussion and was put in the framework of Russia-Ukraine-EU relations.
The trigger event for this discussion was the attempts of Russian government to restrict trade flows
between
Russia
and
Ukraine
starting
on
August
14
(URL:
http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2013/08/16/5574201.shtml ). We took August 1 – November 21 as
the first period to make sure that there was no aggravation of relations between Russian and Ukraine
before August 14.
5
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having considerable impact on each country’s social and political life. Thus, each
chosen newspaper has wide circulation.
We selected six newspapers, three from Ukraine: Segodna, Fakty i Komentarii,
and Ukrayinska Pravda. In Russia, we selected Izvetiya, Vedomosti, and Novaya
Gazeta. First, all of them are leading in terms of audiences and thus have considerable
impact of social and political life (see Appendix 1 for more details about circulation).
Second, these newspapers differ by structure of ownership. First, powerful
businessmen directly own both Segodnya and Fakty i Kommentarii. Second,
Ukrayinska Pravda and Novaya Gazeta are owned mostly by collectives of journalists
and are less economically constrained. Vedomosti differs from both “oligarchic” and
“independent” patterns of ownership. The newspaper belongs to big business, but
this business specializes in highbrow journalism. Thus, it is balanced, professional
and characterized by high-quality coverage of finance and business. However, given
critical reporting, this pattern of ownership is less safe in the face of government’s
repressions. Finally, Izvestia is owned by regime-affiliated big business (see
Appendix 1 for more details about ownership).
From these papers, we identified a population of N=175 news articles using
each source’s official website archive. 6 We employed an inductive, qualitative media
analysis approach (Altheide 2005), with three waves of coding utilizing the Atlas TI
qualitative data analysis software package. In the first wave of coding, we reviewed
the general discourse regarding oligarchs, marking parts of the text of each article
into emergent codes, each of which we categorized into one of three families of
codes: oligarch as businessman, oligarch as political actor and oligarch as citizen.
The second wave consolidated the coding scheme by identifying the frames used in
each article as to understand the ways in which a particular oligarch or “oligarchs’”
actions were understood. Specifically, we looked to see how (a) each paper, (b) the
country in which each paper was published, (c) the paper ownership and type, and of
We used a number of keywords to search for the data. First, it was the names of Ukrainian wealthy
elites. Some of them, such as Levochkin and Kolesnikov, are powerful and rich but are not in the center
of media attention and their names, consequently, did not give any meaningful results in terms of data
collection. The people occupying important positions in Ukrainian politics and economy and whose
names are frequently mentioned in the press were Akhmetov, Kolomoyskiy, Firtash, Pinchuk and
Poroshenko. Second, we also combined the names with important keywords for media discussion
about oligarchs – “oligarch”, “Maidan”, “politics”, “power”, “money”, “business”. The articles which
were not related to the topic of the research but were collected by accident (i.e., there was a web link
containing some keywords inside the article) were coded as “extra”, kept but not included in the
selection.
6
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course, (d) the time period in which this frame occurred. The third wave of coding
refined the process begun in the second wave, and also focused on a more on an
analysis of the text and how particular and general “oligarchs” were characterized. In
the section that follows we provide an overview of the findings observed across the
three periods before, during, and after the Maidan protests.
Overall Patterns Across Three Time Periods and Various Papers
Table 1: Descriptive Findings
Ownership
type
Oligarchowned
Independent
from major
political and
economic
actors
Regime
controlled and
state owned
Paper name
Before
During
After
Fakty i
Kommentarii
(N= 38)
Philanthropists
Peacemakers
Segodnya
(N= 30)
Philanthropists
Peacemakers
Ukrainska
Pravda
(N= 27)
Yanukovych
“Family” and
others as threat
to public good.
Novaya
Gazeta
(N= 22)
Various
individual
oligarchs as
threats to public
good.
“Oligarchs” as
threat
General
“oligarchs” and
some specific
individuals as
threat to public
good
“The Family” of
Yanukovych as
threat to public
good.
Politician.
The “Family” of
Yanukovych as
threat to public
good;
Peacemakers
“Oligarchs” and
some specific
individuals a as
threat
(Specific)
Responsible
citizens
vs. “oligarchs”
(Specific)
Responsible
citizens
vs. “oligarchs”
Idea of
“oligarchs” as
threats in the
past. Individual
exceptions.
Vedomosti*
(N= 18)
Izvestia
(N= 20 )
Oligarchs and
International
Relations
Idea of
“oligarchs” as
threats in the
past, individuals
as exceptions.
“Oligarchs” and
some specific
individuals as
threat;
Peacemakers
Better thieves
than radicals;
Warlords,
terrorists,
extremists.
11
Different forms of Responsible Citizens
Oligarch-owned news before the Maidan Protests: Apolitical Philanthropists
and Effective Businessmen
Almost exclusively, the two oligarch-owned newspapers frame oligarchs as
philanthropists before the Maidan protests broke out (Period One). In Fakty i
Kommentarii, the reader is exposed to a large number of articles dedicated to the
various philanthropic initiatives by Victor Pinchuk, leaving any critical remarks aside.
One article depicts a girl who has suffered from a severe physical handicap but whose
condition has improved significantly after years of operations: “Meceanat and
philanthropist Victor Pinchuk is always happy to see [name of family beneficiary]. His
foundation helped this family to pay their house rent.”(Fakty i Kommentarii
02.08.13) The paper carefully covers all events by Victor Pinchuk Foundation, such as
its program “Public lectures” which “platform for dialogue between Ukrainian youth
and the most successful persons in the world allows the Foundation to breed a new
generation of responsible domestic leaders”(Fakty i Kommentarii 25.04.14), as well
as the Pinchuk Art Centre.
In Segodnya, we find the same intense frame of its owner, in this case Rinat
Akhmetov, as a philanthropist before the outbreak of the protests. It is both about his
support to football, and his help to people in need: “Recently, Development of
Ukraine foundation gave [name of beneficiary] housing.” A number of articles cover
the opening of a new school funded by Akhmetov: “Rinat Akhmetov opened the super
modern school number 63 in Donetsk.” (Segodnya 01.09.13) Akhmetov’s scholarship
program is yet another example:
The plan is to, by the fifth year, grant as many as 84 Akhmetovian
scholarships – amounting to 1 920 000 US dollar. The scholarship is open
for children 9-13 years old with good academic results. The first year’s
scholarships will be dedicated to children of deceased coalminers.
(Segodnya 11.10.13)
The philanthropist frame is the dominant by far, but we also identified frames of
Akhmetov as a political actor during this first period; a businessman with political
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responsibility. The political and economic arenas are framed inseparable, fighting
together for “independence”.
“The authorities and business have one goal - a strong and independent
Ukraine. Strength is when we are respected and independent; from
Russia, the US, and the EU. But it is impossible to be strong and
independent without a strong economy.” (Segodnya, 17.10.13)
The oligarchs need to cooperate in order to be strong enough against foreign threats
– wherever they may come from. Authorities and business are interdependent actors,
this synergy being the core of the oligarchic system.
Rinat Akhmetov and his System Capital Management are covered in Segodnya
as very important for the future of Ukraine, with effectiveness constituting the most
valuable feature. Akhmetov also talks about equal rights for everyone, that this is
extremely important for a conducive business climate. In yet another article in
Segodnya, oligarchs are framed as being for the rule of law. In a few articles in
Segodnya during this first period, Petro Poroshenko’s chocolate business
conglomerate, “Roshen”, is framed as being a very important part of Ukraine – an
assault on Roshen is an assault on Ukraine.
Oligarch-owned News during the protests: Calls for national unity
During and after the Maidan protests, the frame of oligarchs as philanthropists is
absent, or almost absents in Segodnya and Fakty i Kommentarii. 7 Akhmetov and
Pinchuk are in Segodnya now framed as brave and responsible citizens, calling for
unity and a peaceful solution to the situation. Victor Pinchuk remembers the Orange
Revolution and think of his responsibility as a businessman and citizen and does
everything that he can in order to contribute to a peaceful and constructive solution
to the problem:
On Maidan last Saturday I thought of my responsibility as a businessman
and citizen, how I in 2004 (during the Orange Revolution) did what I
could to help reach a peaceful and constructive solution to the problem»,
said Victor Pinchuk. He added that such a means of expression of
Ukrainian citizens gives him hope. (Segodnya 13:12:13)
The oligarch as a philanthropist is in the six papers only found in the three Ukrainian. And among
these, the absolute majority is found in the oligarch owned papers. In the independent paper
Ukrainska Pravda, it is appearing twice (once?), and both before the protests.
7
13
The headline says: “Ukrainian billionaires: Euromaidan bear witness to democracy
and infuses optimism” (101 Segodnya 13:12:13) It was Pinchuk who said it, but
Akhmetov seems to be trying to take some credit, this assumption based on the way
the article is outlined. In the same article, we read that Akhmetov and Pinchuk are
the only Ukrainian billionaires who openly took stance for Euromaidan, but that
others such as Kolomoyskii and Firtash may not be that “bad” either: (Segondya here
express pro Maidan values)
Rinat Akhmetov
and Victor Pinchuk are so far the only Ukrainian
billionaires who have openly declared their position concerning
Euromaidan. However, the unbiased coverage of the events by "1+1" and
"Inter", controlled by the billionaire Ihor Kolomoisky and Dmitri Firtash,
can be an indirect evidence of the fact that they occupy a similar
position. (Segodnya 13:12:13)
But Rinat Akhmetov is also quoted as supporting the regime and Yanukovych, in the
very same article, on the 13th of December 2013.
“My position is that Ukraine and the President, during the last three and
a half years walked (down) the European path. And during this time a lot
of things have been done.”
This is a clear try to stay neutral, if we assume that Segodnya goes Akhmetov’s
errands. Towards the end of December, Dmitry Firtash says he cannot stay silent in a
situation like this:
The head of the Federation of Employers Dmitri Firtash made an
announcement concerning the last events in the country. According to
him, what happened does not allow him as a citizen and businessman to
«stay silent on the side». (Fakty i Kommentarii 30.01.14)
Oligarchs are framed as united by Maidan. It seems more important for them,
perhaps even more in Segodnya than in Fakty i Kommentarii, to communicate a
collected force. Now more than ever they need to hold on to each other.
Oligarch-owned News after the protests: Responsible citizens
The most frequently used frame used after the protests is that of the responsible
citizen calling for unity (of forces). Akhmetov, along the same lines as before the
14
protests, is quoted “Our strength is the cohesion of business, power (authorities?)
and society” in Segodnya:
“I appeal to politicians and the Ukrainian authorities to do everything to
guarantee territorial sovereignty; restore democracy and the inviolable
rights and freedom of the citizens. I appeal to the business community in
Ukraine as well as their business partners to join effort and contribute to
a peaceful settlement, not sparing any material resources. I responsibly
announce that SCM group (System Capital Management), who today
counts to 300 000 people and represent Ukraine from West to East,
North to South, does everything possible to preserve the unity of our
nation.” (Segodnya 2.3.14)
On April 30, Akhmetov is in Segodnya quoted calling for unity of the nation:
The businessman urged for preserving unity in Ukraine. “My position is
unchanged: our country has to stay united. And I will do everything I can
so Donbas and Ukraine remain together. Believing in Donbas, believing
in Ukraine, I now invest and will continue investing in my country,”
Akhmetov stressed. (Segodnya 30.04.14)
The philanthropy frame is rarely occurring after the Maidan protests started.
However, it does exist, but it has become more politicized. Victor Pinchuk is quoted in
Fakty i Kommentarii:
“I think that contemporary art is combining both freedom and
transparency, - said the founder of the Future Generation Art Prize Victor
Pinchuk, addressing the young artists. (…) Repressive regimes hate
contemporary art… There is no more dissident than contemporary art
and contemporary artists. We invest in the Ukrainian artistic school and
in young international talents. I am proud over our investment and I
hope that it will be important for my nation during tough times.”
(09.12.14 Fakty i Kommentarii)
In Fakty and Kommentarii, Petro Poroshenko appears as funding of some parts of the
rebuilding in the city centre after the clashes in January and February. The stadium
Dynamo is being repaired and painted by paid Maidan activists, according to Fakty i
Kommentarii. This philanthropical activity is of a much more political character than
the philanthropy covered before the protests. (Fakty i Kommentarii 25.03.14) The
15
absence of the apolitical philanthropist image in these later periods suggest either
that the journalists or newspaper editors did not find this topic interesting enough.
Perhaps the “philanthropists” no longer were philanthropists, unless they engaged in
political philanthropy. In a crisis situation, all forces were gathered towards solving
the direct crisis. Fakty i Kommentarii is paying attention to Ihor Kolomoysky’s ”good
example” of supporting the army:
The head of Dnepropetrovsk oblast administration Ihor Kolomoisky did
not invoke business to help, but instead showed example of how it is
necessary to support the army. All fuel provided to the army units
stationed on the territory of Dnepropetrovsk and Kherson oblasts, is one
hundred percent paid from his personal account, and as for the rest of
the subdivisions of the Southern Operational Command, located in eleven
regions and the East and South-East Ukraine, the Dnepropetrovsk
governor has allocated half of the fuel requirements. These days the gas
stations in the area observed unusual customers - fighting vehicles and
tanks. (Fakty i Kommentarii 17.03.14)
Oligarchs, United
The studied newspapers cover their founders’ initiatives mostly, implying that their
newspapers can be an effective instrument and channel for their image. When
looking at specific oligarchs, and which papers frame which individuals in what light,
we found that they mention each other to some degree, but almost exclusively in a
positive manner. In the newspaper owned by Victor Pinchuk Fakty i Kommentarii,
philanthropic initiatives (during Period One) by Rinat Akhmetov’s foundation
Development of Ukraine is mentioned a few times, as well as is philanthropic
initiatives of Mykola Azarov, the Klichko brothers, Lyudmila Yanukovych (the wife of
the former President), and Dmytro Firtash. In Period Two and Three when the main
framing of the oligarch as a “responsible citizen”, Poroshenko and Kolomoysky are
also covered in a positive way. Poroshenko is framed as an oligarch and as such he is
dangerous. On the other hand he is framed as sincere and clever and has a chance to
challenge other oligarchs and corrupt system and to build democracy. Rinat Akhmetov’s
Segodnya is not mentioning the inititives of Pinchuk though, before the protests. The
only oligarch framed in a positive manner in Segodnya before the outbreak of the
16
protests is Dmitry Firtash. During the following periods, we see a change and
Pinchuk, Poroshenko and Kolomoisky are now framed in a positive light, next to
Firtash, and of course, Rinat Akhmetov. In Fakty i Kommentarii, Poroshenko is
funding the reconstruction of the Dynamo stadium, and in Segodnya, he is quoted
calling for the unity of the nation. According to Winters, oligarchs may disagree about
many things, but they always share a basic commitment to defense of wealth and
property. What we see in these oligarch-controlled newspapers is an increasing unity
among these actors, who, also according to Winters, during periods of severe crisis
are vulnerable to surges in other kinds of power, especially massive mobilization
they are not funding and controlling (Winters, 2011:19).
Oligarchs as a threat to public good
Before the protests, no article framed oligarchs as a threat to public good in these two
papers. During Period One, the farmers in Donetsk were rallying in support of the
Maidan protests. This was covered in Fakty i Kommentarii and “oligarchs” were now
framed in a negative tone, once:
We were robbed in 2013 – they accepted wheat and sunflower from us
below cost. This is to ensure that our economy became unprofitable, and
the oligarchs have bought up land, - says Vladimir Alchiev. (Fakty i
Kommentarii, 08.01.14)
After the protests, the number of articles of this frame increases with a few hundred
percent, but are still very rare. The only ones in which they appear are those which
quote Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Simonenko, the leader of the Communist Party,
(as part of their election campaigns). But “oligarchs” are here used as a diffuse term,
not mentioning anyone particular except for Yanukovych a few times, and once
Firtash and Levochkin.
Forced back into the political limelight
According to Winters, oligarchs can use their material resources to defend or
enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position. In systems where
institutions are strong, oligarchs have no need to be armed or participate directly in
politics, but can put their energy on income defence instead. Oligarchs may move in
and out of official politics, depending on the nature of institutions: “Their political
involvement becomes more direct again when external actors or institutions fail to
17
defend property reliably” (Winters 2011:7). The Ukrainian oligarchs did to a degree
try to refrain themselves from official politics, however, remaining their unofficial
political power. Victor Pinchuk left the parliament in 2006 and Rinat Akhmetov in
2012. They both established a private philanthropy foundation in the aftermath of
the Orange Revolution. But the unstable situation Ukraine was in, during and
following the protests, is a prime example of how these actors, the theory
accordingly, were more or less forced into the political arena. The two studied
newspapers were rather silent about the oligarchs at the beginning of the protests, a
reflection of the silence of the oligarchs themselves. Towards the escalation of the
protests in January and February, oligarchs “couldn’t stay silent”, and called for unity
and a peaceful solution, in a try to stay neutral towards both the regime and the
protestors, attempting to be sure to be on the winning side. Their power to, but not
necessarily over, was apparent in the newspapers. They had the power to make
public statements and get them published in their own newspapers. And they were
expected to. Their inactions during the first months of the protests on Maidan
resulted in silence in the media and their legitimacy base was starting to rock.
In the oligarch-controlled newspapers that we have studied in this section,
oligarchs are framed as moving from apolitical philanthropists to responsible citizens
making political statements. The Maidan protests were against oligarchy, however, as
Yanukovych and his Family was depicted the main source of evil, the other, if they
played their cards right, might walk out of this as with stronger legitimacy. In the two
papers here reviewed, no oligarchs are specified apart from Yanukovych, who is
mentioned within this frame in only a few articles, and Firtash and Levochkin (only
once), exclusively in quotes by Tymoshenko and Symonenko, the Communist Party
leader.
During all three periods, oligarchs (apart from to some degree Yanukovych and
“the Family”) were framed as “responsible citizens”. These papers’ framing indicates
that oligarchs took advantage over such large-scale political crisis as Maidan and
consequent war and used it as legitimation strategy, just as they used “good works”
and providing of “public goods” in Fryes terminology. And as Winters describes
oligarchs, opinion-makers are often the captains of their decisions.
18
From populism to exceptionalism
Independent News before the Maidan Protests
While sources owned by the wealthy/oligarchs changed depictions of their
newspapers’ owners from philanthropists to responsible citizens, independent
papers show a parallel but distinctly different process in the change of media
coverage. Before the Maidan, though sporadic and brief, independent news critically
depicted abstract frames of oligarchs as wealthy. Such coverage diagnosed grievances
about oligarchs as immoral, unpatriotic, and corrupt elites. For instance, oligarchs are
represented as wealthy outsiders wrecking the nation’s economy, by siphoning
public funds to their homes abroad:
People who essentially destroy the economy of their own countries and
ready the conditions for their eventual demise, live without worry in
some of the most luxurious places in the United States and Europe.
(Novaya Gazeta 119, 9:8)
The wellbeing of the Ukrainian nation is juxtaposed to the greed and unwillingness of
share a part of their wealth.
Nowadays everyone likes to count how many dollars people have under
their pillows. But, for some reason nobody wants to count how much
money Ukrainian oligarchs have in their safes. According to my count, if
every one of them pitched-in one or two billion, we would need no IMF
and Russia. Yet, personally, it’s difficult to belief in such a turn of events.
Our oligarchs are so greedy, that they pay pennies even to those closest
to them. And then to take such a sum from them. No, they would
probably leave for the US or start an upheaval, but they would not give
up the money. 8
Some frames characterized oligarchs as exception to “normal” i.e. western wealthy
people by way of their Ukrainian nationality. A particular Ukrainian oligarch becomes
identified as Ukrainian because of their personal character as greedy rather than due
to their socioeconomic status and political power.
Before the start of the Maidan protests, some populism against the wealthy in
general appeared quite sporadically in independent news. Instead, much
8
(Source)
19
independent news before the protests largely focused on oligarchs not as an abstract
category of powerful people, but a range of individuals and representing industries
owned by particular wealthy Ukrainians. Some op-ed stories named various wealthy
Ukrainians but discussed them in abstract terms. For example, one Ukrainianlanguage op-ed declared:
“Klitschko, Yatsenyuk, Poroshenko – the guys of the system. They can only
take power from the hands of Yanukovych as he once received from
Yushchenko's. All of them were cut from Kuchma's cloth. So, once again
profanity develops. "Big guys" keep the money, that of the people’s. And
their children will not become "civilized businessmen," as highbrow
political scientists try to convince us. Bandits are born from bandits. For
criminal oligarchs, but our oligarchs are all criminal, when they are
deprived of the money it will bring the courts - can only be born criminal
oligarchs!” (Ukrainska Pravda, August).
This legacy of individual wealthy Ukrainians in political positions became identified
as oligarchs since they had links to old regime politicians and thus inherently corrupt
by their association to politics.
Much of the pre-protest phase independent media likewise undertook
investigative reporting on a range of individual wealthy Ukrainians and their
disregard for everyday people, Ukrainians and Russians alike. For example, Novaya
Gazeta tended to detail the role of Dmitry Firtash in exacerbating tensions between
Ukraine and Russia in energy policy conflict particularly framing him as pursued his
own personal financial interests:
“The closer winter comes, the more contentious issues emerge between
Russia and its neighbours, in the field of hydrocarbon [natural gas]
deliveries. Some major players in post-Soviet space have already learned
how to use this to their advantage. Neither Ukraine, nor Russia or
«Gasprom» need another gas war, for example. And even if it will
eventually be resolved, then its winner may become Ukrainian
businessman Dmitriy Firtash” (Novaya Gazeta, August 11, my emphasis).
Ukrainian as well as Russian papers lead the way in investigative reporting the
uncovered the relationship between oligarch's wealth such as Fritash, business
dealings, and political power, and did so largely without nationalist tone.
20
Well ahead of the start of the protests, independent papers also focused critique
on President Yanukovych. Yet, the particular source of the framing before the
protests, represented him as both a politician and magnate, by way of his powerful
“oligarchs” ostensibly funded by his regime. Before the Maidan, such coverage often
linked President Yanukovych with a range of individual wealthy people. In many
instances, they framed issues by extensively quoting opposition parties and others.
For example, in the following article an anti-Yanukovych party funded the opening of
a Donetsk-based “Museum of Yanukovych Broken Promises”:
“Yanukovych promised Ukraine for the people, but we received a Ukraine
owned by Akhametov, Alexander Yanukovych, Kurchenko, Pshonka,
Firtash, Kolomoyskiy, and other oligarchs. In other words, Ukraine
contines to remain a part of someone’s private property, but in no way
owned of the people of Ukraine,” noted an UDAR [party spokesman]”
(Ukrainska Pravda, August 5, 2013).
Across all phases of coverage, the loyalties of President Yanukovych are framed in
one way or another as a politician holding wealth in the hands of “the Family” of his
associates. Yet, independent news specifically before the protests frames Yanukovych
as an “oligarch” politican, but one who sells out the public good to the private hands
of a wider group of particular named oligarchs in addition to his “clan.”
Independent News during the Maidan Protests
During the Maidan, independent papers continued to depict individual wealthy
Ukrainians and “oligarchs” as a threat to the public good. Much of this coverage
during Phase 1 took on a populist tone, criticizing the business practices and
exploitation of wealthy people. However, independent news after the start of the
protests increasingly turns critique from a range of wealthy Ukrainians to that of the
single most politically powerful “oligarch”: President Yanukovych.
The relatives and other associates of the then President became more and more
closely covered in exposes that stressed the expansive character of “the Family’s”
holdings. For instance the Russian independent Novaya Gazeta tended to expand on
investigate reporting taken from Ukrainian sources:
If you cannot earn millions on hydrocarbon tenders [«ugletrome»], why
not try those same tactics in other areas?"
21
The article goes on to state the exact figure totaling several billion dollars that the thenPresident's son accumulated in the previous two years. The article goes on:
"Here we have not only ugletrome but also railroads, construction,
energy….Yanukovych junior is building up his native Donetsk with sullen
business centers in the style of the age of Chicago's gangsters»(Novaya
Gazeta. March 3, 2014).
As previously, independent news cited expert sources such as Forbes to investigate
the nefarious means by which oligarchs acquired their wealth. However, once the
protests had begun following President Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the
European Union agreement, attention of the independent press began to ‘follow the
streets,’ focusing in on the wealth acquisition practices of “the family” and close
associates of President Yanukovych rather than all “clans” of wealthy industry
owners.
During the events on the Maidan, independent papers begin to discuss the way
in which Yanukovych privatized public goods and accumulated his wealth as an
exceptionally corrupt businessman. During these momentous events, the news begin
to revisit recent history.
In 2005, after the victory of the "orange" revolution, Yanukovych
remained out of work. Abandoned by his colleagues, he also lost all
financial support: Ukrainian oligarchs, wanting to keep the business,
tried to negotiate with the new president Yushchenko. Apparently,
Yanukovych remembers this betrayal, and when he came to power in
2010, he was determined not to depend on anybody in the future. He
achieved his goal in four years – to be in power is the easiest way to earn
billions on public procurement. (Novaya Gazeta March 3, 2014).
In this way, independent papers’ historical narrative of the defining period after 2005
starts to depict Yanukovych as isolated, defiant in his search for power rather than
collaborating with other wealthy figures in the ruling class.
Independent Papers after the Revolution: Oligarch as Empty Signifier
The end of the Maidan protests was marked by the ouster of President Yanukovych,
the rise of Petro Poroshenko during start of the Russia-backed conflict in Ukraine.
This Period 3, a handful of papers continued populist framing exclusively on
22
Yanukovych in Period 2, now reminding people the way the national good was
mismanaged under the previous regime:
"Unity and the struggle of opposites around him gave Yanukovych
comfort. He always understood Ukraine as a sort of field of balance,
which happened to be in this case a continuation of Kuchma's program.
The country needs to earn money—and the president, as the head
auctioneer of its enterprise needs to receive massive dividents." 9
In period 3, however, independent coverage took much less populist tones, railing
against the negative consequences of the excesses of oligarchic wealth, and took on
more of a neutral tone in framing of the ways in which wealthy Ukrainians used
politics for their personal ends. For instance, one Ukrainska Pravda article early in
the election season praised Yulia Timoshenko for her call to the Maidan mandate by
“separating money from politics” without naming individual oligarchs. It quoted
Timoshenko at length):
“I would say that Timoshenko chose a very appropriate strategy against
Proshenko and Tihypko—who are baiscally oligarchs. Though she never
mentioned their names in studio, she intentionally announced that there
should no longer remain any mixing of state responsibilities with
business after the recent victory on the Maidan, «There's no place for
Forbes billionaires to run for the presidency»… ” 10
Ironically, one silence such post-Maidan coverage overlooked is that Timoshenko
herself had just fallen of the Forbes list, likely due to her persecution by her chief
rival. Even when it moved beyond the memory of Yanukovych, by pointing to
individual political actors, the independent news discourse followed the political
mood after the Maidan, overlooking the broader continuity in the over-arching
political economy.
Only in a few rare cases, exposes in independent papers were also critical of
Proshenko as a representative of the old regime and the role of his wealth wealth,
during his election campaign, as they were previously of Yanukovych. For example, a
month before the election, a syndicated article in Ukrainska Pravda criticized
9
(Source)
(Source)
10
23
Proshenko’s wealth. It pointed out that, contrary to popular images of Poroshenko as
a new face in politics:
In fact he is in Ukrainian politics since 16 years, having switched parties
and worked for different presidents, from year to year increased his
capital and owns a loyal TV-channel, which he refuses to sell even after
winning the presidential election. 11
However, by and large, coverage of Yanukovych and other oligarchs waned in general
and nearly disappeared altogether in Ukrainian papers, while remaining coverage of
the wealthy depicted Poroshenko as an exceptionally positive figure largely by
highlighting and then minimizing Poroshenko’s wealth and power with respect to
other wealthy Ukrainians. For instance, one typical Ukrainska Pravda article poses a
mandate for Poroshenko, not as an oligarch, but “breaking the oligarch consensus” as
the president elect, with the goal of “forcing to work honestly people who made
money on politics.” The article goes on:
Dmitri Firtash who was arrested in Vienna, at the request of the FBI and
is awaiting extradition to Illinois, directly expressed support to
Poroshenko. Son in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma, Viktor
Pinchuk supports him behind the scenes, as well as the owner of Ferrexpo
Konstantin Zhevago. In the last step, understanding the irreversibility of
victory of Poroshenko, Igor Kolomoisky and Rinat Akhmetov also found
common language with him. But now Poroshenko has to decide how to
curb Kolomoisky, who controls the Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa region,
appoints the prosecutors and equips private army. And how to reduce the
impact of Rinat Akhmetov's business empire, which under Yanukovych
has grown to the point that it began to control 20-30 percent of GDP. 12
As such, independent news specify Poroshenko as President, an agent rather than the
object of a dilemma of breaking down the “private armies” and “empires” of other
individual oligarchs.
In conclusion, we find critical independent papers Ukrainska Pravda and
Novaya Gazeta gradually moved from criticizing particular regime oligarchs before
11
12
(Source)
(Source)
24
the Maidan to universally criticizing the idea of oligarchs without criticizing regime
oligarchs after the Maidan.
From “the West” and “the East” Relations to Terrorists
State-controlled News before Maidan
One of the most striking features of regime–controlled and state-owned papers
newspapers in our selection is that before August 2013 they did not cover oligarchs
at all. The time when this topic becomes included in the coverage is the period of so-
called “trade wars” 13. During this period Kiev started to show signs of the movement
toward EU association, and Moscow replied with a series of trade restrictions
warning Ukraine about potential outcomes of escalation of Russia-Ukraine relations.
There are two features characterizing the coverage of both Vedomosti and Izvestia at
that time. First, the articles mentioning oligarchs were rare: we managed to find only
one article from Vedomosti and three from Izvestia during the period August 1 -
November 21. Second, the criticism of oligarchs was mainly abstract and did not refer
to any particular person. The main frame used by both newspapers to represent
oligarchs is opposition of abstract figure of oligarch to public good. However, what is
different is that for Vedomosti oligarchy is separate political and social problem.
Journalists consider oligarchs as an important factor determining post-soviet politics
and society in general:
“Privatization of the 1990s predetermined the development of societies
emerged out of Soviet Union’s ruins. Property rights were claimed to be
universal. In fact, property was concentrated in the hands of small group
of people (…) As a result, dubious property rights demanded to establish
the political regimes which would provide oligarchs with privilege”
(Vedomosti, 30/08/13).
To the contrary, Izvestia considered oligarchs not as separate problem, but mainly in
the context of international relations. Let us provide an example:
«Ukrainian oligarchs moving to the West rather than oppositionists
became European Integration supporters. They followed their money.
13
(…)
25
Ukrainian political scientist Anton Finko argues that a few of them have
financial interest in Russia” (Izvestia, 11/10/13).
As it can be seen, the journalist describes some abstract oligarchs going to the West.
Moreover, oligarchs here work as explanatory factor determining what journalists
are really interested in – the question of Ukraine’s movement toward either EU or
Customs Union - not as independent and separate topic of interest and critics of the
newspaper.
Forth, it is importance assigned to national differences or, speaking more
precisely, non-significance of any national differences for the coverage:
“For sure, the main obstacle on the way to creation of East-European
Union of Coil and Steel (…) was not even the plots of Americans or
Europeans unwilling to allow tight connection between Moscow and Kiev
to be established and strong Slavonic confederation to be revived. The
stumbling block is interests of oligarchic groups in both Ukraine and
Russia (…) That is why condition sine qua non for real closing is taming
of raw-materials oligarchs of both countries. Only strong bureaucratic
supranational apparatus, such as European Union, can handle this”
(Izvestia, 31/10/13).
Here we see several frames. First, the article reproduces almost Marxist logic: the
problem of Russia-Ukraine relations is not national interest of either Russia or
Ukraine and even not one of the governments, but oligarchs in both countries.
Second, European Union, one of the main enemies of Russian media throughout the
whole Ukrainian political crisis, is represented as progressive institution able to
overcome the problem of oligarchy.
State-controlled News during the Maidan Protests
What changes in the coverage happen during the very Maidan? First, the number of
articles dedicated to the coverage of oligarchs during in-between period is also rare
(two articles as compared to one during the period before in Vedomosti and one
article as compared to three during the period before in Izvestia). It can be explained
by shortness of this period and dramatic character of the events happened. But
Vedomosti and Izvestia follow different patterns. Vedomosti follows rather
independent newspapers’ strategy – the most frequent frame is opposition of
26
oligarchs belonging to Yanukovitch’s clan and public good: “But front-end reforms
were just the mask of concentration of power and wealth in hand of the president and
his close circle” (Vedomosti, 3/12/13). Thus, they focus on the oligarchs affiliated
with the old corrupted elite, while the oligarchs who supported Maidan are rather
represented as active citizens:
“”It should be acknowledged and remembered that people on both sides
of barricades are Ukrainians” – Firtash claimed on his official website on
January 30. -“Only peaceful way to resolve conflict situations is right”. “I
stand for bargaining table” – in turn claimed Akhmetov – “for politicians,
authorities, opposition, moral leaders of the country to make the decision
which we would be proud of at the bargaining table” (Vedomosti,
4/02/14).
In the case of Izvestia the coverage becomes more critical – Maidan is depicted as
controlled by powerful elites and having nothing to do with agency:
Ex-field commander of Maidan (in 2004) Yuriy Lutsenko is speaking
about why opposition gathers people on “veche” on the scene. According
to him, the president must be notified about firmness of the demands for
pre-term elections and oligarchs must be signaled that they should
support Maidan. Press controlled by wealthy people of the country –
Viktor Pinchuk, Igor Kolomoyskiy and Petro Poroshenko - is already
covering protests hyperactively” (Izvestia, 15/12/13).
Here Maidan is represented as a tool used by opposition to involve oligarchs into
struggle against the regime, and as a source of political legitimacy for superrich –
Pinchuk, Kolomoyskiy and Poroshenko – pursuing their own interests.
State-controlled News after the Revolution
The major changes happen after the overthrowing of the government and president
Yanukovitch’s flight. The moderate criticism of Izvestia turns to a variety of
delegitimization strategies. Let us consider some examples. The first type of frame
opposes particular oligarchs to public good:
«Here we need to remember about Akhmetov's claim. More specifically,
about its possible consequences. Harsh reaction of DPR's authorities to
de-facto strike of central factories of Donbass will inevitably provoke
27
new wave of riots and, conversely, will force Kiev to intervene with all
following consequences included. Otherwise, the absence of any response
by “strelkovci” (subordinates of field-commander of DPR Alexey Strelkov)
will inevitably demonstrate to donchane (Donetsk dwellers) who have
real power” In other words, Akhmetov will win in both cases. While his
Kiev and Donetsk/Slavonic enemies will show a loss” (Izvestia,
20/05/14).
There are several interesting features included in this frame. First, oligarchs are
represented as powerful actors able to take advantage of politics and both Russia’s
and Ukraine’s actions. In other words, they are able to exploit public good in favor of
their personal interests. Second, all criticism of oligarchs during this period is highly
personalized and focused on mainly Akhmetov and Kolomoyskiy. Finally, it is
interesting that, as compared to more independent newspapers, the main objects of
criticism are today’s oligarchs in power, not Yanukovitch’s “Family”. Let us provide
an example of the next delegitimization strategy:
“People really wanted ballots, not Kalashnikovs, to decide who will rule.
That is why they elected Petro Poroshenko. His main advantage,
according to sociological data, is that he was not Maidan’s leader.
Oligarchs are not welcomed in Ukraine as well as everywhere, but being
involved in civil war, people understood that, as Brodsky wrote, “people
like thieves more than bloodsuckers”. They hope that Poroshenko as an
oligarch will show cunning, resourcefulness, will negotiate, but not wage
war, and will compromise with Donbass and Russia” (Izvestia,
26/05/14).
What is striking here is that the trend outlined in the beginning (oligarchs are not the
topic of interest, but rather an explanation for what journalists really interested in –
Russia-Ukraine relations) is revealed fully. The argument here is that oligarchs in
power are harmful because they exploit public good, but it is better option than
Maidan and revolution. The next strategy is to accuse oligarchs in power of funding
terrorism and extremism:
“one of the owners of Moscomprivatbank, Ihor Kolomoyskiy, is very likely
to finance the “Right Sector”, radical organization operating in Ukraine,
it is confirmed by Russian and Ukrainian press. The “Right Sector” should
28
be recognized as terrorist organizations in Russia. It is intolerable to
allow Ukrainian “banderovtsi” and Nazi to be financed by money
Ukrainian bankers earn in Russia” (Izvestia, 4/03/14).
Kolomoyskiy is depicted here as not only threat, but as the person funding illegal
activities and people committing serious crimes. But what is interesting here is that
notwithstanding serious accusations we see the same tendency as in the periods
during and before in respect to oligarchy.
Right sector is the main bugaboo of Russian media toward Maidan. According to
the recent report published by Russian opposition, the number of references to Right
Sector during last year in TV reports outweighed the number of references to the
ruling party United Russia 14. And here Kolomoyskiys illegal activity works as
explanatory factor for Right Sector’s activity, but not assigned separate meaning and
importance.
Finally, the last widespread frame represents oligarchs in relation to the U.S. It
is twofold. Sometimes journalists represent Ukrainian oligarchs as puppets of the
U.S.:
“It is high time we, Ukrainians, should understand that the U.S. pursuing
only its own interests, interests of big business in Ukraine. The striking
example here is the appointment of son of vice-president Joe Biden as a
member of committee of directors of big gas production company in
Ukraine. As the saying goes, nothing personal – only business with
corresponding political priorities (Izvestia, 23/05/14).
In this case oligarchs are represented as the threat to public good, but this threat is
very specific – it originates in the U.S. interests in Ukraine. Another variation of this
frame also connects Ukrainian oligarchs and U.S. interests, but in opposite way:
“According to agreements, Timoshenko preserved her designation as
prime-minister, but in 2010 Yanukovitch would be elected as a president.
Everything was prepared, the agreement was about to be signed, but at
the 11th hour Yanukotich rejected the deal. Firtash, who made
Yanukovitch independent for Akhmetov by his money, helped him.
14 Boris Nemtsov, Ilya Yashinm Olga Shorina (2015). Putin, War: Independent Expert Report. Available
at: http://www.putin-itogi.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Putin.Voina_.pdf
29
Akhmetov was against this coalition, and Firtash shattered it” (Izvestia,
14/3/14).
Here the journalist stresses opposite interests of the U.S. and Ukrainian oligarchs and
Firtash’s actions against U.S. interests.
As compared to Izvestia coverage, Vedomosti has some quite interesting and
unexpected convergences and differences. According to the data, the newspaper tries
to maneuver between pro-regime agenda and pro-Maidan views. Its strategy of
depicting Ukrainian oligarchs is twofold. On the one hand, it follows the main
argument of pro-regime Izvestia and represents specific oligarchs as a threat to
public good. As Izvestia, they criticize today’s Ukrainian oligarchs in power without
mentioning “the Family” for stealing money, exploiting people and the country’s
resources:
«On Mondey vice-chairman of president administration Andrey
Senchenko accused oligarchs of intention to preserve their domination
which allows them to «rob further” Eastern Ukraine and continue to
“exploit millions of people” as cheap labor force. Such opinions are
generated because of almost royal status of such people in the Eastern
part of the country. For instance, Akhmetov’s SCM controls almost half of
extractive, metal and energy sector of Ukraine. Akhmetov and other
tycoons have enough influence to stop any separatist movements, as
Andy Hander, UK citizen with Ukrainian roots worked more than 10
years in Ukraine in public relations, says. “It seems that they are not
going to do this because they negotiate with Kremlin and new Ukrainian
authorities. They want to achieve status quo which would allow them to
preserve their business and assets and to flourish in Ukraine after
Yanukovitch” Hander says” (Vedomosti, 16/4/14).
At the same time, the second clear pattern is “active citizen”. In this sense they
follow rather Ukrainian oligarchic newspapers’ strategy of coverage:
“People from Akhmetov’s circles claim that the government is responsible
for repression of separatism. In fact, Akhmetov has less influence than
many people think, they add referring to Akhmetov participation in
negotiations with protesters in Donbass last week. Akhmetov represented
himself as a peacemaker there: he promised them more autonomy from
30
Kiev, to defend their rights to use Russian language, but emphasized the
necessity to preserve territorial unity” (Vedomosti, 16/4/14).
This position is quite schizophrenic; it criticizes and justifies oligarchs’ relation to
politics at the same time. Indeed, here one particular person – Rinat Akhmetov – is
represented as a threat and as responsible citizen. This schism can be explained by
newspaper’s paradoxical position. On the one hand, it is owned by big business and
sympathizes with Akhmetov and other big businessmen in Ukraine. On the other, it
occupies quite vulnerable position. Russian regime perceives big, especially foreign,
business with liberal and oppositional views as a threat. As we mentioned above, it
especially crucial for Vedomosti: 33% of its shares was supposed to be bought by
Gazprom. Now these shares are owned by more liberal-minded Demyan Kudryavcev,
but there is new threat on the horizon: in the beginning of 2016 Russian government
will introduce a law which does not allow foreign investors to own more than 20% of
shares of Russian companies. That is, in case of “wrong” behavior the government can
easily redistribute this property in the way it needs and by purely legal means. This
specific economic and political position prompts Vedomosti to maneuver between
two opposite frames of Ukrainian oligarchy: criticism of oligarchs as a threat to
public good and as responsible citizens.
Discussion
The Maidan protest events and the revolution of dignity evidently altered the
ways in which major Russian and Ukrainian news media outlets framed powerful
wealthy Ukrainians and the idea of an “oligarch.” After the Revolution of Dignity and
the ouster of Victor Yanukovych, another industrial tycoon was overwhelmingly
elected president, raising questions for both scholars and the public about the figure
of “the oligarch”. Can an oligarch change and contribute to the ending of oligarchy;
can there be a “good” oligarch able to implement necessary reforms; was the election
simply a reflection of the best choice in times of conflict with an external enemy; or
was the Maidan a re-enactment of a struggle between clans of oligarchs? Our study
shows that the dispersion of these ideas in media is highly dependent on ownership.
The
oligarch-controlled
newspapers
framed
oligarchs
(and
primarily
themselves) as responsible citizens all through the studied period of socio-political
31
change. Before the protests, this was expressed in their engagement in philanthropy;
during the protests the quantity of reporting declined, reflecting the unsecure
situation. In order to maintain legitimacy, or to improve it from the lost points during
the beginning of the protests, the end of the second and the third period is
characterized by again their framing as responsible citizens, however, now as
important agents for national stability or as political philanthropists. What we see
throughout the periods is that they use their media outlets as instruments for
legitimization. While before the protests started, the term oligarch is not employed,
after the protests it is, a sign of attempting to reflect public opinion.
Leading up to the protests, independent coverage reflected both abstract
populism, and agitation against Ukraine’s wealthy as a national ruling class, as well as
a proliferation of investigative stories detailing the way in which a range of individual
oligarchs’ groups ‘stole’ from the nation and competed with each other in a contest to
privatize public resources. By contrast, discussions of wealth and oligarchs nearly
disappear from independent media in both Ukraine and Russia during the Maidan
protests, with remaining attention geared towards the wealth of the departing
Yanukovych “family” clan took from state coffers. In the aftermath of the “Revolution
of Dignity,” independent news attention returned to the wealthy, but in a very
specific and isolated fashion. On one hand, independent news crystallized the
memory of the role of public theft in the bygone Yanukovych’s regime. At the same
time, news coverage shied away from attention to systemic current issues, and
focused only on the personal character of individual oligarchs such as Proshenko and
Kolomoyskiy. The quantitative lull in coverage and transformation in framing
processes from abstract ‘oligarchs’ to specific individuals as ‘oligarchs’ demonstrates
the heightened significance of the political moment for independent news in
particular.
In case of state-owned or regime-affiliated papers we see the following changes.
First, before Maidan they did not mention Ukrainian oligarchs at all, both as
individuals and as category. During “Trade Wars”, the period of heightened economic
conflict with Russian companies preceding the protests. Izvestia and Vedomosti
started to cover oligarchs, but oligarchs were not the point of interest as such,
journalists used them as explanatory factor for international relations processes
between Russia, Ukraine, Europe and the U.S. During Maidan the strategies diverge.
32
Vedomosti turns to patterns similar to independent papers: journalists criticize
oligarchs associated with old corrupted elites and represent current oligarchs in
power as responsible citizens. Izvestia turns to stronger criticism, but oligarchs are
still not the point of interest. The newspaper considers them as the factor explaining
Ukraine’s movement toward EU integration. Finally, during the third period Izvestia
turns to a variety of frames delegitimizing new Ukrainian government and oligarchs,
and Vedomosti follows two patterns: first, it covers oligarchs as responsible citizens
similar to oligarchic media; second, it employs “a threat to public good” frame similar
to state-owned Izvestia.
The two examples of oligarch-owned news-media outlets, Kommentary i Fakty
and Segodnya, reveal a change towards more inter-oligarch support. Elites tend to infight ahead of moments of turbulent, but in times of strife, they move to preserve
wealth and property. We see this political-economic dynamics displayed through
media coverage. Just as Winters’ theory of oligarchies predict, oligarchs stick
together when it comes to the commitment to defend wealth and property. According
to Winters, and the complementing theory of the original sin by Frye, they act just as
they are assumed to, beingprime examples of oligarchs. On the other hand, in the
independent media, the term “oligarch” is somewhat loosening. First, “oligarchs” are
not named as such anymore, except the plethora of reference to the past under
Yanukovych. Second, Poroshenko is framed as an exception to the rulers, as an
exceptional and necessary businessman turned politician, suitable for ruling the
country due to the political and economic crises.
Overall, we find that news coverage of the wealthy varies by media ownership
rather than politics or national media environment. Both Ukrainian and Russian
newspapers with three kinds of owners —privately by wealthy individuals,
independent news sources, and state-controlled newspapers owned by political
regime supporters—each exhibited distinct changes in their framing of wealthy
Ukrainian “oligarchs.” What follows is a discussion of the theoretical significance of
these findings.
What conclusions can be drawn from this change in representations of the
wealthy? First, we can notice something specific differing Russian and Ukrainian
media environments. There are completely different newspapers in terms of
ownership type in both countries: it is oligarchic newspapers in Ukraine and state33
owned and regime-influenced newspapers in Russia. This difference can be explained
by political economy of the Russian and Ukrainian regimes. Political scientist Henry
E. Hale argues that with the election of president Putin and centralization of power in
the early 2000s Russia experienced a transition from “competing pyramid” system of
power to “single-pyramid” system of power (Hale, 2010). As applied to our study of
the media, this can be seen in that the difference is not only between 1990s and
2000s Russia, but also between 2010s Russia and 2010s Ukraine. In Russia, stateowned and regime influenced papers are a result of a “single pyramid” system: the
regime keep the media on a short leash, and ownership is one of the main means
used to accomplish this task. Koltsova’s study of Russian media is demonstrative
here: trying to label media owners as state-owned or private, she comes to the
conclusion that it is impossible to draw the line and such terms are inapplicable here.
They are tied so firmly that instead of customary definitions she finally has to call
agents owning the media “cross-institutional groups” (Koltsova, 2006:18). Contrary
to the Russian case, in Ukraine the wealthy is the group controlling both the regime
and the media. In Hale’s terms, Ukraine remains a “competing pyramid” system
where various alternative centers of influence based on patron-client networks use
their media in the struggle for power.
Second, we can see similarities within one ownership group across both
countries. Both Russian and Ukrainian independent papers act in similar manner
across all the period of time covered. We find that coverage is less driven by
ownership patterns, than the coverage of oligarchic and state-owned/regime-
influenced newspapers. This fact can be explained by the specific ownerships pattern
in which outlets are embedded.
Thus, two important points follow. First, media strategies and content very
much depends on ownership patterns, not circumscribed to national differences,
such as political system or culture. Rather, media content depends on ownership in a
transnational setting. Second, different forms of ownership constrain media
differently. In times of rapid social and political change we can observe parallel but
qualitative dissimilar changes in media representations of powerful groups. These
differences are driven by ownership, such as ownership by a narrow group of
wealthy people, diffuse ownership and independent sources, and regime sources
controlled by the state. Governmental and oligarchic newspapers depend on
34
ownership more, while independent newspapers are more or less unconstrained in
terms of ownership and are influenced by social change more.
Appendix 1: Circulation and Ownership
Though television is the most widely-consumed news medium in the post-
Soviet region, major newspaper outlets are important since their coverage runs
parallel and develops discourse reported in other forms of media. Moreover, judging
by the scale of audiences, it can be assumed that they have considerable impact of
social and political life. The audiences of each issue of Segodnya and Fakti i
Kommentarii are 690.000 readers and 675.000 readers 15. Ukrainska Pravda is
internet-newspaper and does not have printed version, but judging by online visitors
it is similar in influence: as compared to Segodnya’s 486.000 visitors per week, it has
464.000 visitors per week 16. Regarding Russian newspapers, Novaya Gazeta has
1.500.000 monthly reach, Vedomosti – 2.900.000 17. Izvestia’s each issue audience is
460.000 readers 18.
We can also identify different structures of ownership in each case. Fakti i
Kommentarii belongs to Ukrainian metallurgical mill company Interpipe Group,
owned by businessman Viktor Pinchuk. In this case the influence of ownership on the
newspaper’s coverage is not concealed, but even publicly recognized by the
newspaper’s team. For instance, editor-in-chief of Fakti I Kommentarii Viktor Shvez
openly claims that initially the newspaper was a political project published a lot of
paid political advertisement and helped Viktor Pinchuk to get deputy mandate 19. The
same can be said about Segodnya, though not so straightforwardly. It is owned by
SCM Limited (30%) and System Capital Management. Both are companies owned by
businessman Rinat Akhmetov. Akhmetov denies his direct influence on the
newspaper’s coverage, but several cases of open censorship of the material
representing him in unfavorable light give a clue about his relationships with the
Oates, Introduction to Media and Politics.
http://www.liveinternet.ru/stat/ukrpravda/
17 http://calvertjournal.com/features/show/2234/russian-media-independent-compass
18 http://www.brand-pressa.ru/serv__idP_53_idP1_3043_idP2_2070_idP3_2071.html
19 http://infostok.org/company/301-fakty-i-kommentarii-polnoe-dose.
15
16
35
editorial board. For instance, in 2000s political observer Alexander Chalenko was
fired because of public statement arguing that Akhmetov owns the newspaper 20.
One third of shares of Vedomosti belong to Financial Times Groups, another
third of shares is owned by Dow Jones & Co (the owner of Wall St. Journal). The last
third was owned by Sanoma independent Media, but in the beginning of 2015 was
sold to the ex-editor of Kommersant newspaper, poet and writer Demyan
Kudryavzev. Thus, the newspaper belongs to big business, but this business is in
qualitative journalism. This specialization is reproduced in Vedomosti’s coverage;
like Wall St. Journal or Financial Times, it is more or less balanced, professional and
characterized by high-quality coverage of finance and business. However, this critical
qualitative reporting is dangerous in the context of government’s repressions. First of
all, given well-established practice of seizing of business of critically minded
oligarchs by the government formed in the end of 1990s and early 2000s (for
example, Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, Berezovskiy and so fourth), the newspaper is a
tasty morsel for neopatrimonial regime, especially in case of disobedience. Secondly,
this property status is even more vulnerable in times of severe international
confrontation and inner repressions. In 2013-2015 Russian government introduced
several laws restricting and banning organizations getting funding from abroad (the
laws on “Foreign Agents” and “Undesirable Organizations”), business is on a waiting
list: right now the newspaper is in danger of redistribution of property - in the
beginning of 2016 Russian government will introduce new legislation forbidding
owning of more than 20% of Russian companies’ shares by foreign investors 21.
Izvestia belonged to the Gazprom-Media for a long time. Currently it is
subsidiary company of Gazprom, the monopolist of Russian oil and gas production as
well as the structure perceived as “private business” of the president. Being elected,
Putin replaced Gazprom chairman of board of directors Viktor Chernomyrdin and the
company’s director Rem Vyachirev with his close allies Dmitry Medvedev (who was
future president as well) and Alexei Miller 22. In 2008 insurance company SOGAZ,
another subsidiary structure of Gazprom, bought the control stock of shares.
http://www.telekritika.ua/news/2010-07-22/54551
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/26/russia-limit-foreign-ownership-media
22 http://www.nemtsov.ru/old.phtml?id=705498.
20
21
36
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